The UN at the Peacemaking-Peacebuilding Nexus

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Abstract

The UN Security Council (UNSC) confronts at least three challenges in translating its actions *during* armed conflict into more durable peace *after* conflict. First, heavy-handed interventions such as military deployments and sanctions can impede the ability for the disputants to identify and reach a self-sustaining settlement when there is insufficient follow through. Second, coordination problems can arise in handing off peacemaking activities from actors in the Secretariat to the Security Council when post-conflict security guarantees and continuous engagement are needed. Third, explicit attempts by the UNSC to produce peace and stability make it susceptible to the problem of cheap talk when it proclaims its concerns. After characterizing these problems in theory and generating observable implications, the paper uses original data on Security Council resolutions to test the hypotheses. The results indicate that the UN can succeed as a short-term peacemaker, particularly when it relies on diplomatic engagement and sanctions. However, when there is not adequate follow through in the form of peacekeeping, the UN struggles to improve the long-term prospects of peace in part because it tends to promote stop-gap ceasefire resolutions. With peacekeeping, active UN involvement during conflict can promote long-term stability. Half measures such as condemnations have little effect on the stability of peace.

Since 1946, the UN Security Council has issued over 2000 resolutions, the bulk of which directly address threats to international peace and security. While many of these resolutions relate to renewals of peacekeeping mandates in post-conflict environments, others pertain to the UN's role as a conflict manager in the midst of hostilities. In contrast to the rich and growing literature on third-party peacekeeping, less research has focused on how the UN's involvement *during* conflicts shapes the durability of peace *afterward*. In the language of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace," this paper addresses how the UN's role as peacemaker affects its roles as peacekeeper and peacebuilder.

From 2000 to 2005, the UN Security Council issued resolutions that pertained to ongoing hostilities in almost 40 percent of all the armed-conflict episodes that occurred¹ This figure contrasts with the 8 percent of armed-conflict episodes that were met with Security Council resolutions during the 1970s and the 17 percent of episodes during the 1960s. These observations, in tandem with the landmark Security Council Resolution 1973 in 2011 that used the "responsibility to protect" language to authorize NATO intervention in the Libyan civil war, are indicative of the growing eagerness of the Security Council to become involved in armed hostilities around the globe. While such interventions are almost always justified by a desire to attenuate violence in an immediate sense, it is worth asking what lasting effects the UN has when it becomes involved.

The UN is a complex aggregation of state and bureaucratic interests and faces at least three hurdles in trying to enhance enduring stability and peace. First, the free rider problem, which is most pronounced when the most powerful states do not much benefit from sustained involvement, contributes to myopia in the use of heavy-handed interventions such as military deployments and sanctions. These actions can impede the ability for the disputants to identify and reach a self-

¹As discussed below, the definition of an armed conflict comes from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data.

sustaining settlement when there is insufficient follow through. Second, coordination problems can arise in handing off peacemaking activities from actors in the Secretariat to the Security Council, organs that are dominated by different constellations of interests, when post-conflict security guarantees and continuous engagement are needed. Third, explicit attempt by the UNSC to produce peace and stability makes it susceptible to the problem of cheap talk when it proclaims its concerns.

This paper characterizes these problems in theory and, using original data on Security Council resolutions, the empirical evidence tests the observable implications and generally confirms the theoretical arguments. A few conclusions follow. The results indicate that the UN can succeed as a short-term peacemaker, particularly when it relies on diplomatic engagement and sanctions. However, when there is not adequate follow through in the form of peacekeeping, the UN struggles to improve the long-term prospects of peace in part because it tends to promote stop-gap ceasefire resolutions. With peacekeeping, active UN involvement during conflict can promote long-term stability. Half measures such as condemnations have little effect on the stability of peace.

The analysis here allows the literatures on conflict management and peacekeeping, which for the most part have been distinct, to speak to each other. A growing number of studies have assessed whether and how third-party peacekeeping is able to stabilize post-conflict relationships (Beardsley 2011*b*; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2004*a,b*, 2008; Walter 2002). While third parties might do well on average as peacekeepers, their involvement often does not start at the end of a conflict and their success is likely affected by what third parties are doing during conflict. The peacekeeping literature, however, is mostly separate from the conflict management literature that has focused on mediation, humanitarian interventions and legal dispute resolution.

It is prudent to consider how outside involvement during conflict can shape dynamics after

conflict. Extant studies that have assessed how third-party involvement during conflict affects the duration of peace have focused primarily on mediation (Beardsley 2008, 2011*a*; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996) is a notable study that has considered whether UN involvement of various types during crises can increase post-crisis stability, but their results are for the most part indeterminate and are specific to the interstate context. We still need greater insight into whether the UN, when it intervenes in both interstate and intrastate conflicts, can foster an environment conducive to durable peace. Toward this end, this paper attempts to reach a better understanding of when the UN can prevent conflict relapse from occurring and when it can actually enable a faster return to conflict.

The UN as Conflict Manager and Three Hurdles to Sustainable Peace

Before turning to the barriers that the UN must overcome to facilitate durable conflict resolution, we must consider how it is that the UN Security Council attempts to foster peace in a positive way. I distinguish between three mechanisms that the UN uses in the midst of violent conflict. The first mechanism involves the use of coercive leverage, including soft forms such as “naming and shaming” and harder forms such as sanctions, humanitarian military intervention and peace enforcement.² The use of leverage can be considered as a vehicle to alter the relative attractiveness of peaceful settlement when compared to the costs of ongoing hostilities. A second mechanism relates to security guarantees; it involves the tangible manipulation of the security environment

²Military interventions could involve an actual UN force but more typically involve a multinational force operating with a Security Council mandate.

but also requires the consent of the disputing parties. Peacekeeping, observer and police missions strive to protect vulnerable actors considering the implementation of their terms of peace. A third mechanism pertains to what might be considered pure diplomacy. It does not involve tangible leverage and instead involves the UN trying to facilitate the peace process through such activities as arranging talks, mediating and providing fact-finding committees and panels of experts. The goal here is often to develop clear lines of communication, clarify the information environment or provide political cover. With these mechanisms in mind, we can now consider the major barriers that the UN must overcome to foster durable peace.

Overcommitment of Leverage

Existing studies that have considered how third-party conflict management can affect the duration of peace after conflict indicate that heavy-handed involvement might do well in producing immediate results but can also weaken the ability for the disputants to reach a self-enforcing peace (Beardsley 2008, 2011*a*; Betts 2001; Kuperman 2001; Luttwak 2001; Rauchhaus 2009; Werner and Yuen 2005). Related, Greig and Diehl (2005) posit that peacekeepers decrease the incentives for disputants to fully settle their grievances. The principal issue across these studies is that third parties can disrupt the ability for the primary stakeholders in a dispute to fully buy into a peaceful arrangement. This particularly applies to the use of third-party leverage and security guarantees, which artificially make the environment at the time of settlement more conducive to peace and thereby increase the potential for the disputants to be dissatisfied again later when the third party's influence is no longer in the picture.

Strong action by the UN Security Council is especially prone to encourage post-conflict arrangements that depend too much on constant third-party pressure. For, when the Security Council

is unified in pushing for peace, it has the potential to marshal considerable incentives for the disputants to at least temporarily stop fighting. That is, when the Security Council devotes major resources to a conflict, primarily in the form of peacekeeping and peace enforcement deployments or sanctions, sufficient consensus must exist among the P-5. Moreover, such action is only possible when an expectation exists that enough states, whether in the P-5 or not, will be able to fund a mission, staff a mission or implement sanctions. In short, general consensus among the international community is the key motivator for major UN mission deployments and sanctions. Under the weight of such outside influence, the belligerents in conflict are more likely to adopt short-term solutions that would not be mutually acceptable in the absence of such pressure. This might occur because the mission deployments and sanctions temporarily inflate the costs of belligerence or because mission deployments can bring aid and assistance on which the actors become dependent. In the long run, such peace is likely to be fragile because the key stakeholders in the dispute are only responding to the outside pressure and not actually reaching a self-enforcing accord.

The ability for UNSC actions of sanctions and military force to leverage the combatants toward peaceful arrangements is only part of the story, however. Leverage itself does not create a problem for long-term peace. The difficulty in realizing long-term peace from heavy-handed UNSC action is really a problem of the post-conflict environment, when such leverage is used and then abandoned prematurely once hostilities have abated. Since peace and stability produce benefits that are enjoyed by states other than those that are producing them, the logic of collective action suggests that there will be a free rider problem in the provision of sustained leverage. Once some semblance of peace has been achieved in a conflict, it becomes difficult for the actors in the international community that are responsible for contributing the leverage—the UNSC in this case—to sustain it and tailor it to the fostering of self-enforcing peace. Third parties with many interests around the

globe often have strong incentives to push for a reduction in violence in various conflicts, but they have much less incentive to patiently cultivate a stable long-term relationship between adversaries that is more than just the superficial attenuation of hostilities. The great powers responsible for authorizing and financing strong UNSC action are especially susceptible to a myopic use of leverage.

The free-rider problem inherent in the production of peace and stability, especially in areas that are not crucial to the well being of the most powerful states, can lead to UNSC engagement that proves fleeting because sufficient interest to continue costly action is unsustainable. The substantial heterogeneity of preferences among the most powerful states who must also constantly address new pressing matters that require attention and resources can lead to fickle UNSC conflict management. The expectation, therefore, is that UN action during conflict that involves military force or sanctions will tend to foster only short-term peace that then attenuates and becomes more fragile in the long run.

Leverage Hypothesis: Compared to conflicts without any UN involvement, UN involvement with mission deployments or sanctions will produce post-conflict peace stability only in the short term.

Coordination

A second difficulty that third parties face when managing conflicts is coordinating responsibilities for constant engagement after the disputants reach a settlement. In the face of concerns related to the implementation of post-conflict peace settlements, peacemakers doing the UN's diplomatic engagement may need to resort to promises of monitoring or tangible security guarantees in order to move the negotiations forward. Whether such post-settlement implementation assistance is actually authorized and executed depends on the coordination between the UN actors that are trying to de-escalate the conflict—often actors within the Secretariat that have strong preferences

for peace and that are shielded from strong state interests—and those that are needed for decisive action during the implementation phase—typically state powers.

Moreover, even when the UN is involved without promising security guarantees, some level of follow-up can be important to maintaining peace. For instance, when a UN body is helpful in improving information flows between combatants, abbreviated involvement in the future can make the benefits of that involvement only temporary because the clarity that was gained has decreasing relevance to future states of affairs. Over time, preferences and relative strengths change, which means that information gained during conflict will lose its value as time passes. To ensure that UN peacemaking activities have a more lasting effect, coordination between involvement during conflict and involvement after conflict must be smooth.

Such coordination when different principals are involved can be quite difficult. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999) stress that multiparty mediators face substantial difficulties during the transition from peacemaking to peacebuilding. UN diplomatic engagement during armed conflict episodes is particularly prone to the coordination problem and thus can struggle to produce long-term peace. Since actors such as the Secretary-General, special envoys or ad-hoc committees, which consist of international civil servants, neither well represent the interests in the UNSC nor dictate UNSC action, it is easy for the transition from the UN's diplomatic involvement during conflict to its involvement after conflict to be awkward and inconsistent. When follow-up is needed, the UNSC may simply decide that such action is not worth the expense and effort, or certain members of the P-5 may block action that conflicts with their foreign policy objectives. In this regard, Beardsley (2011*a*) finds that mediation under the auspices of the UN, and League of Nations before it, has produced post-conflict peace durations that became more fragile than when other mediators were involved. The expectation here is that UNSC involvement related to diplomatic initiatives without

the use of leverage will, to the extent that it facilitates the reduction of hostilities in the short run, also struggle to improve the prospects for a more durable peace.

Diplomatic Engagement Hypothesis: Compared to conflicts without any UN involvement, UN involvement with diplomatic engagement will produce post-conflict peace stability only in the short term.

Cheap Talk

Separately, a number of studies have considered how intermediaries must wrestle with the problem of cheap talk, where mere external recommendations for peace are not sufficient to change the incentives for the disputing parties to reach an agreement. In light of the cheap talk problem, some studies in the literature have considered the need for bias (Kydd 2003; Savun 2008), impartiality (Favretto 2009; Kydd 2006; Rauchhaus 2006), leverage (Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas and Wilkenfeld 2006; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Favretto 2009; Smith and Stam 2003; Wilkenfeld, Young, Quinn and Asal 2005) or legally binding resolution (Gent and Shannon 2010; Mitchell and Hensel 2007).³ One general theme in this literature is that a strong third-party preference for peace without the use of inducements lacks a means of changing the disputants' preferences in choosing whether to concede or challenge, in whether to escalate or de-escalate. Disputants simply will not heed any advice, warnings or admonishments from third parties that have an incentive to say whatever it takes to get the actors to back down and that are unable to contribute anything more than words.

UN Security Council resolutions that call for peace or that condemn noncompliant parties are prone to convey bias toward peace and thus will frequently be unable to overcome credibility problems associated with cheap talk. This preference for peace stems partly from the notion that

³See also Fey and Ramsay (2010).

the UNSC is involved in the production of the imperfect public goods of peace and stability. That is, the UN was founded by the P-5 states as a vehicle to help promote stability in the international system, and that organizational mission still motivates much of the UNSC activity. Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) find that the UN is more likely to intervene in those international crises that are most threatening to human security and international stability. The mere call for peace and issuance of condemnations should in most cases reveal very little to the combatants about whether seeking a peaceful resolution is prudent because the combatants would have expected such calls from a third party that simply wants peace.

Moreover, since token gestures of concern are rather easy to pass in UNSC resolutions, mere calls for action are not likely to convey much information about the willingness of the international community to intervene in more substantive ways that could actually entice the disputants to change their course. Again, the disputants would have expected the UNSC to issue some call for peace even if it is not resolute in authorizing more meaningful action later. UNSC resolutions that simply call for peace or condemn violence thus face two credible problems: they are often unable to credibly convey the prudence of concessions and they are often unable to credibly convey the willingness of the international community to become more substantively involved.

Peacemaking activities that involve diplomatic engagement by the Secretary General, special envoys or committees also face the cheap-talk problem from having bias toward peace. The Secretariat is a large bureaucracy that self-selects personnel who are interested in pursuing peace and it needs to justify its existence by upholding the goals in the founding charter. Despite such bias toward peace, such diplomatic engagement still has some potential to improve conflict bargaining. The Secretary General and special representatives of the UN will have less of a problem being impartial than Security Council statements, and impartiality has been shown in some studies to

improve the ability for third parties to facilitate truth telling and trust building (Favretto 2009; Kydd 2006; Rauchhaus 2006). As the bureaucracy of a nearly universal organization, this precludes an “us versus them” partial approach to conflict management. Moreover, diplomatic engagement itself often involves much more than third-party discussions with the disputants; it can also help provide political cover and credible promises of future security guarantees (Beardsley 2011*a*).

So, even though UN representatives that are substantively involved diplomatically must grapple with the inherent cheap-talk problem in their involvement, they do have means to occasionally overcome it and contribute to at least short-term peace. The stronger expectation discussed above is for mere Security Council statements to be especially uninformative. This produces a hypothesis that will be examined—with the understanding that hypothesis testing is limited in being able to confirm a null relationship.

Half-Measures Hypothesis: Compared to conflicts without any UN involvement, UN involvement that lacks substantive engagement will have no effect on the stability of post-conflict peace.

Mitigating Factor: Peacekeeping

The above are expectations of when the UN is likely to fail to heighten the long-term durability of peace, but are there situations in which the UN might actually improve the prospects for lasting peace? Peacekeeping missions, particularly multidimensional ones with peacebuilding components, should provide a key means by which to clear each of the above hurdles. When peacekeepers follow up on strong Security Council leverage, the international community can maintain the incentives for peace that were in place at the time the conflict episode ended. In other words, peacekeeping can provide enforcement to prevent the adversaries from backsliding while trying to implement a fragile agreement (Walter 2002). Separately, peacebuilding activities during a peacekeeping mission can

provide a bridge from the environment in which the conflict was settled to a self-enforcing peace. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) have shown that such multidimensional peacekeeping is an essential part of fostering an environment in which peace becomes robust and secure. By especially building up the dispute-resolution mechanisms associated with a stronger domestic rule of law, peacebuilders can attempt to foster an environment in which armed conflict is not needed as an outside option to settle grievances.

Related, peacekeeping can provide needed monitoring and security guarantees during implementation when earlier diplomatic involvement would have lacked much ability to provide lasting influence in the post-conflict environment. As mentioned above, coordination issues can prevent UN diplomatic engagement from having a long-term impact on the viability of peace. The authorization of peacekeeping entails that many concerns for coordination have been resolved with the tangible commitment of monitoring and security guarantees. Moreover, the deployment of a peacekeeping operation establishes a focal entity—the mission and its SRSG—that is responsible for the post-conflict peace and thereby facilitates the necessary coordination. So, we should expect that diplomatic engagement that is actually followed by peacekeeping should have a greater potential to contribute to lasting peace.

Also, mission deployments during the post-conflict period provide clearer, costly signals about the Security Council’s commitment to upholding a given peace when only half measures were used during the conflict. If a peacekeeping mission is authorized, the tangible commitment of resources helps reduce the uncertainty about the extent to which the UNSC is committed to fostering peace. Note, however, that such a commitment of resources is unlikely to eliminate completely the uncertainty, as lingering questions regarding the sustainability of the effort in the face of adversity can persist. The argument here is simply that peacekeeping helps signal some

information about the international community’s willingness to engage beyond rather noisy token declarations of concern.

Peacekeeping Hypothesis: UN involvement of each type will perform better at securing lasting peace when peacekeepers deploy to the post-conflict environment.

Research Design

To test the hypotheses, I use version 4-2009 of the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002), in the time period of 1946 to 2005, in conjunction with original data coded on all the UN Security Council resolutions during the same time period. An armed conflict episode occurs when there is a dispute that involves at least one government actor and results in 25 battle-related fatalities in a year. The data used for this study include interstate conflicts, intrastate conflicts and internationalized civil conflicts.¹ Post-conflict periods enter into being at risk for conflict relapse in the first month after a conflict episode has ended and then exit the risk set the month after a subsequent conflict episode. The data are observed in discrete monthly intervals because this allows for information on the specific timing of conflict onsets and terminations, as well as on Security Council resolutions.⁴ With binary time-series cross-sectional data, I use bivariate probit estimation, as specified below.

After a conflict relapse and then subsequent termination of the new armed conflict, states become at risk for another conflict relapse with the event time reset. Since the existence of prior failures potentially influences the fragility of peace in later post-conflict periods, the models include the number previous episodes as a covariate. This allows the risk of relapse to be conditional upon

⁴When the coders of the Armed Conflict Data are uncertain about the precise day a conflict episode began, they typically code it as the first day of the relevant month.

prior failures. States can also be in multiple conflicts at the same time, as, for example, India at one time was fighting eight different armed conflicts. In such cases, each different conflict enters into the risk set separately. In this way, the potential for, say, India's return to violence against Pakistan over Kashmir is considered separately from India's return to armed conflict in Nagaland. To account for the correlation across observations that involve the same state, robust standard errors that adjust for clustering on the country are generated.⁵

The primary explanatory variables consist of indicators of the content of Security Council resolutions during a conflict. Original data have been collected on the content of all UNSC resolutions from 1946 to 2008. Among other things, the data identify when the resolutions were passed, which states were the subjects of the resolutions, and what types of action were contained in the resolutions.⁶ It is important to note that almost all the Security Council resolutions have multiple actions of different types, and the data capture each separate type of activity in a resolution.

Using these data, I first aggregated for the purposes of this study the different types of UNSC action into five categories. The first category is whether the UN authorized the deployment, expansion or extension of a mission with a military component. This includes UN peacekeeping missions and non-UN multinational forces, but it does not include civilian monitoring missions. The second category also relates to the use of tangible leverage and captures authorizations and expansions of sanctions. The sanctions could either be broad or targeted. UN activities of active diplomatic

⁵For interstate conflict, the clustering is based on the first location state listed.

⁶All resolutions were coded independently by two research assistants who then compared their resolutions to reach a consensus. The principal investigator had final say on any disagreements between the coders. In addition, separate steps have been taken to ensure consistency across coding pairs, such as by later going through all the peacekeeping missions and verifying that all the resolutions relevant to each mission's mandate are consistent over time.

engagement – including calls for good offices and mediation, the formation of fact-finding or civilian monitoring missions and the formation of special tribunals – constitute the third category. The fourth category includes instances of condemnation, where the Security Council deplores hostilities, non-compliance or human-rights violations.⁷ Since condemnations are particularly prone to the cheap talk problem, I also use a measure that only considers the condemnations in which none of the P-5 states abstained during the vote. Finally, all resolutions about a particular state that did not contain any of the first four types of action are coded as an “other” type of involvement.

With the categories so defined, I form independent variables that indicate if Security Council resolutions with these types of actions were passed in the last twelve months of an armed conflict episode. I include information about only the last twelve months of an episode because earlier resolutions are not indicative of the UN’s influence and involvement during the time at which a conflict ended. Among the 372 armed conflict episodes experienced by states, there were 41 UN force-deployment resolutions in the last 12 months of the conflict, 23 cases of sanctions, 46 diplomatic engagements, 47 condemnations (45 with no P-5 abstentions), 38 other types of involvement and 285 cases without any UN Security Council resolutions.⁸ Since some of the hypotheses expect an attenuation effect as time moves on, I interact each of these indicators with the natural log of how many months have elapsed since the previous conflict. In doing so, UN involvement during conflict can have a variable effect on the stability of peace after conflict.

Peacekeeping forces are defined using the International Military Intervention (IMI) data (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). These data include information on all forceful interventions across

⁷Threats of future sanctions are also included in this condemnation category.

⁸Note that these are just the counts of the armed conflict episodes—the actual number of observations in the study is much greater, as the data track all the post-conflict months.

state lines from 1946 to 2005. For the purposes of this analysis, peacekeeping is defined as the deployment of military personnel to a foreign state by the UN, a regional security organization or a coalition of states.⁹ The purpose of the force also must be for observing, patrolling, monitoring, disarming, intimidating or combating. Since such a definition could also include collective security actions that clearly are not peacekeeping, I have excluded such interventions as the US-led UN force in the Korean War and humanitarian interventions that did not involve the consent of the host countries. I have also separated the UNMOGIP peacekeeping activities along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan from the unrelated conflicts in the east and northeast of India. I include a variable that indicates if either peacekeeping is ongoing at the time of observation or if peacekeeping had been deployed since the termination of the previous conflict episode but is not currently deployed. To assess how post-conflict peacekeeping can condition the effects of the UN's involvement during armed conflict, I interact this peacekeeping variable with the respective involvement variables. No interaction with the use of force variable is included, however, because almost all uses of force were followed by peacekeeping in the post-conflict environment.

In terms of control variables, the models include post-conflict UNSC involvement, so that the involvement during conflict can be separated from the involvement after conflict has abated. I thus include measures of whether a UNSC resolution involving each type of action has been issued since the close of the previous conflict episode and within the past year. The models also account for non-UN involvement, since the absence of strong UN involvement could indicate no substantive third-party activity or it could indicate the involvement of a non-UN entity. I use the IMI data to

⁹Only missions that fall under the purview of the UN, regional security organizations or coalitions are considered as peacekeeping missions since forces from single states, such as the Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, often lack consent from the state to which they deploy or are otherwise motivated by dubious intentions.

code for any militarized interventions by a regional organization or multinational force during the last twelve months of the previous armed-conflict episode. It is also important to control for whether the conflict is interstate or intrastate in nature, since there is quite a bit of heterogeneity between the conflict dynamics of each type.¹⁰ I additionally control for how precarious the conflict situation is through three variables. The first is the measure of conflict intensity of the previous conflict episode from the Armed Conflict Data, essentially distinguishing those episodes that reached the level of 1000 battle-related fatalities and those that did not. The second is a measure of conflict history, which should provide a sense for how fragile peace is in a particular state. The measure of conflict history is defined to include built-in decay so that it declines in value as long as no new conflicts occur. I set the exponential decay rate such that the half life of the conflict history variable is ten years.¹¹ Third, I include a measure of the duration of the previous armed conflict episode, which can account for variation in how difficult the previous episode was to bring to a close in the first place. As an additional control variable, the number of previous recurrences is included because the risk of relapse is likely contingent on the number of previous relapses. Finally, I include a cubic polynomial of the natural log of the time at risk is included in order to account for time dependence and to allow the baseline propensity for recurrence to vary with some flexibility (Carter and Signorino 2010).

Like other studies of third-party involvement (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Gilligan and Ser-

¹⁰The results are generally consistent if the models are run on split samples of interstate and intrastate conflicts, although the estimation for some of the models fails to converge because of the decrease in sample size and lack of sufficient information in the data.

¹¹That is, when a conflict erupts, the conflict history variable increases by one unit in the following period and, in each subsequent period, a fraction of the previous conflict history is lost such that the conflict history variable becomes half of what it was after ten years of peace, a quarter of what it was after twenty years, etc.

genti 2008), there is a potential for endogeneity to bias the results, as interventions are likely to be chosen conditional on expectations of the outcomes. If certain types of interventions are more likely in disputes that are more easily resolvable, we would potentially observe stronger pacifying effects of such interventions than are actually present. Similarly, if certain types of interventions are more likely in disputes that are quite difficult to resolve, we would be prone to underestimate the actual efficacy of those types of interventions. For these reasons, I run bivariate probit models, which estimate an equation of conflict relapse simultaneously with an equation of UNSC involvement while controlling for the correlation in the errors and thus potential unobservable factors driving variation in both involvement and relapse risk. Since the choice to take a particular type of action is distinct from a choice to take another type of action, separate models are run for each type of action. In each model, one equation estimates the determinants of that type of action, and the ultimate outcome equation includes an indicator of that type of action while controlling for whether or not there was UNSC involvement of another type such that the reference category still includes the cases without any UNSC involvement.

In specifying the models, a number of variables are included in the equations for the UN actions but not the ultimate outcome equations. These are exogenous sources of variation for the UN activity and are important for proper identification of the simultaneous equations models. The first two variables identified as candidates to be in the involvement-type equations are dummy variables for the Cold War period (pre-1990) and P-5 participation in the conflict. These variables primarily shape the variation in UNSC actions and are not likely to have direct effects on the propensity for conflict to recur. Another set of variables consists of the counts of the number of UNSC resolutions worldwide with each type of involvement in the previous year. These variables measure general proclivity for the UNSC to take certain actions, which has fluctuated greatly over

time. While it is likely that UNSC action will co-vary with the amount of previous involvements worldwide, a link between previous involvements and the duration of peace is not obvious. A final set of variables included only in the first equation consists of regional dummy variables, since the UNSC tends to be more active in certain regions than others (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012), but it is not clear how regional classification would predispose the conflicts to different peace durations. In addition to these variables that are included in the involvement equations but not the outcome equation, I also include the intensity, duration and interstate variables in both equations because they are likely to directly affect both the ability for the UNSC to act and the propensity for recurrence.¹²

Bivariate probit models that are very similar to the ones above are also run to examine how UN involvement affects the way in which the conflicts end. The dependent variable in these models is an indicator of whether the armed conflicts ended in a ceasefire according to the UCDP termination data (Kreutz 2010). One of the principal struggles that the UNSC faces is to encourage myopic agreements that are not self-enforcing. A mere ceasefire arrangement that is neither a formal peace treaty nor a victory for one of the belligerents represents a common form of a stop-gap solution that should be more common when there is short-term third-party pressure to halt the violence. The intent then is to see if the UNSC is more likely to encourage such termination outcomes, which would more fully explain any struggles to promote durable peace. The independent variables in these models are specified like those that look at the risk of relapse, except that the post-conflict

¹²The conflict history and count of the number of previous episodes are not included in the equation for UN involvement types because they help account for heterogeneity in conflict proneness and also interdependence among the observations but are not likely to much shape the propensity for the UN to become involved independently from the intensity of the conflict, which is included in both equations. When these two variables are included in the first equations, the results confirm that they are statistically insignificant.

variables are omitted because the post-conflict environment is causally subsequent to the outcome process (ceasefire) in this case.

Results

Table 1 presents the bivariate probit models of how each type of involvement affects the risk of conflict relapse.¹³ The "action" variable and its interactions change from model to model, and they correspond to the activities listed at the top of the respective columns.¹⁴ With the three-way interaction between the action variable, the length of peace and peacekeeping, the coefficients themselves are not easily amenable to testing the hypotheses. We can get a sense for both the statistical and substantive effects by calculating the relative risk ratios of recurrence with different profiles of Security Council involvement during the previous conflict. Using the respective models, and differentiating between the effects with and without post-conflict peacekeeping, Figure 1 presents the ratios between the propensity for recurrence with each type of involvement in place and the propensity without any UN involvement over time.¹⁵ In essence, these are the hazard ratios associated with each profile of UN involvement, calculated for different lengths of time after a conflict episode has ended. Values greater than one indicate that recurrence is more likely and values less than one indicate that recurrence is less likely.

To start, we see in Figure 1 that the use of force has a statistically significant and positive

¹³The results for the full models that include the equations for the types of action chosen can be found in the online appendix.

¹⁴The "other action" variable and its interactions thus also change from model to model.

¹⁵This figure highlights the key findings, and the relevant figures for the other types of involvement can be found in the online appendix.

effect on the stability of peace in the long run, but not in the short run.¹⁶ Substantively, we see that the risk of relapse ten years after an episode has ended falls by about 33% when the UNSC authorized some form of force during the armed conflict. Keeping in mind that almost all cases in which the UNSC authorized force also involved post-episode peacekeeping, this comports well with the peacekeeping hypothesis.

In support of the diplomatic engagement hypothesis, we observe, without peacekeeping, that Security Council resolutions that include authorizations or calls for diplomatic activity are less likely to experience recurrence in the period immediately after conflict termination, but the peaceful dividend fades over time. In fact, after ten years, the armed conflicts that experienced diplomatic engagement without peacekeeping are actually more likely to recur. This corroborates well the effects of mediation found in other research (Beardsley 2008, 2011*a*). While a third party like the UN can help the disputants identify settlements that are mutually preferable to conflict in the immediate sense, such settlements are less likely to prove durable given the problems with coordinated follow-through that the UN faces when becoming diplomatically involved as a peacemaker. Without the ability to provide credible and indefinite security guarantees or continual engagement, the Secretariat and special commissions will have only limited success in helping the disputants find an arrangement that can endure without third-party involvement.

While diplomatic engagement without peacekeeping has an attenuating effect on peace durability, the involvement of peacekeeping in the post-conflict setting appears to mitigate the attenuating effect but also appears to mitigate the short-term positive effectiveness of diplomatic engagement that we observed in the absence of peacekeeping. When diplomatic engagement occurs during a

¹⁶To calculate the long-term effect, we must consider both the coefficient on the action variable, as well as the coefficient on its interaction with post-conflict peace time.

conflict episode and is followed by peacekeeping, the risk of relapse does not much change. It is likely that a selection effect (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006) could explain the null finding. Peacekeeping is more likely to occur in the most difficult conflicts (Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005), which means that the cases with diplomatic engagement and peacekeeping have a baseline likelihood of relapse that is greater than those without peacekeeping. In this way, diplomatic engagement could still be reducing the relapse of conflict in the short-run, but we are not observing it because of the selection effect. The current model is able to account for the non-random assignment of diplomatic engagement but not also the non-random assignment of peacekeeping. Future research might better assess the role of diplomatic engagement when it is followed by peacekeeping.

The results from the model that examines the effect of sanctions supports both the leverage hypothesis and the peacekeeping hypothesis. That is, we see that sanctions in the absence of peacekeeping lead to long-term instability by five years after an episode has ended, which supports the leverage hypothesis. Again, we see an attenuation effect in which UNSC involvement does well in the short run but not in the long run. With peacekeeping, the attenuating effect of sanctions vanishes, and the long-term propensity for relapse actually continues to decline. This suggests that peacekeeping can continue to provide incentives for peace after a conflict that ended with heavy-handed third-party involvement.

The results pertaining to the use of condemnations are also consistent with the expectations, as no statistically significant effect is present when such half measures are issued, with or without peacekeeping. Less anticipated are the findings pertaining to other involvement. Such involvement is associated with long-term peace with or without peacekeeping. A full understanding of why this would be the case must be left to future research. One possible explanation is that when the

UNSC issues resolutions that fall into this other category, it is often doing something of substance and not necessarily issuing token gestures of concern. These resolutions that do not involve the other four types of activity considered here do not occur very often, even though most resolutions include some form of empty statement of the value of peace. Some of these resolutions in the other category involve the formation of sanctions committees while others include special instructions to a UN body or clarifications on a matter. That is, these resolutions in some cases are indicative of the UN being involved in the peace processes in multifaceted ways, and perhaps in ways that are more sustainable than pure applications of leverage.

In general, the results confirm many of the expectations described above. In particular, the UNSC appears to not much be able to secure long-term peace with its actions during conflict unless those actions are followed by peacekeeping in the post-conflict environment. The arguments focused on how third parties such as the UN are prone to promote arrangements to end hostilities that are not self enforcing. The third party might do this through being heavy handed and pushing for a reduction of hostilities that crucially depends on the outside pressure, or through providing assistance that requires coordination from the negotiation to the implementation stage. To get a clearer picture of these mechanisms, Table 2 presents the results from bivariate probit models with each conflict as the unit of analysis and the termination of an episode via ceasefire as the ultimate outcome measure. The results confirm that UN actions such as sanctions and diplomatic engagement have positive relationships with mere ceasefires, which is notable because these types of involvement also had the strongest attenuating effects. Note, however that UN involvement that was placed in the “other” category is also strongly associated with ceasefires, yet we did not see an attenuating effect. Again, future research should uncover what the UN is specifically doing in these “other” cases.

Conclusion

This paper has argued and demonstrated that UN Security Council action during conflict shapes the durability of post-conflict peace. In the absence of peacekeeping, diplomatic engagement and sanctions tend to reduce the potential for conflict relapse in the first few years after conflict but do not appear to have much effect on long-term stability. In the long run, UN peacemakers can find it difficult to coordinate responsibilities with actors responsible for peacekeeping, peacebuilding and other sustained engagement, and pressure during conflict is typically not sustainable after conflict because of the free rider problem in the production of impure public goods. This is also seen in how UNSC actions such as sanctions and diplomatic engagement tend to promote mere ceasefires as the means to terminate conflict, which are really stop-gap measures that are less likely to fully resolve the issues in contention than, say, formal peace agreements or victory by either side.

Peacekeeping, however, appears to mitigate some of these causes of an attenuating effect, as sanctions help reduce the long-term fragility of peace when peacekeeping operations deploy after conflict has abated. Moreover, the use of force, which is almost always followed by peacekeeping, appears to reduce the propensity for conflict relapse in the long run. These findings suggest that the presence of a peacekeeping operation serves as a bridge from the involvement during conflict to the involvement after conflict and can help maintain the incentives of the actors to abide by their agreements reached under the influence of UN leverage. That is, when peacekeeping missions deploy, they ensure that the combatants are not quickly left with a different set of incentives than what they experienced when negotiating the settlement.

Peacekeeping is thus one way for the UN and the greater international community to protect their investments and keep up much needed pressure after earlier leverage was brought to bear. This of course is both good news and bad news, as the dependence on peacekeeping is itself only a

temporary fix to the self-enforcing-peace problem. The UN and greater international community are thus right to focus on more multidimensional aspects of peacebuilding during peacekeeping deployments. The hope is that such activities can get all the necessary stakeholders to buy into a durable arrangement before the peacekeepers exit and leave the original former combatants to their own devices.

The findings also confirm that condemnations have little effect on the propensity for recurrence. These types of action struggle to have much of an effect because of the cheap-talk problem. The use of naming and shaming during conflict does not have a noticeable effect on the willingness for actors to return to conflict. Such condemnations, however, are not necessarily meaningless; presumably these condemnations are part of a broader agenda for the Security Council members to shape the conversation of what is and is not unacceptable international behavior.

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Table 1: Bivariate Probit Models of Conflict Relapse

IV	1: Force	2: Sanctions	3: Diplomacy	4: Condemnations	5: Other
Recurrence Equation					
Action	0.0199 (0.520)	-2.323* (1.280)	-1.338* (0.804)	-0.169 (0.672)	-0.504 (0.389)
Action*ln(Peace-months)	-0.0869 (0.119)	0.506 (0.311)	0.261 (0.201)	-0.0157 (0.185)	-0.00748 (0.0900)
Action*PKO		2.075* (1.203)	1.449 (0.960)	0.771 (0.793)	0.815 (0.758)
Action*PKO*ln(Peace-months)		-0.581* (0.308)	-0.343 (0.225)	-0.164 (0.211)	-0.252 (0.186)
Other Action	-0.0328 (0.299)	0.0370 (0.300)	0.195 (0.237)	-0.328 (0.398)	-0.407 (0.494)
Other Action*ln(Peace-months)	0.0199 (0.0718)	-0.00141 (0.0742)	-0.0365 (0.0575)	0.0793 (0.0891)	0.140 (0.125)
Post-Conflict Force	-0.173 (0.129)	-0.160 (0.119)	-0.202* (0.123)	-0.188 (0.116)	-0.202* (0.114)
Post-Conflict Sanctions	0.0223 (0.192)	0.0165 (0.189)	-0.00133 (0.199)	0.0179 (0.189)	0.0471 (0.194)
Post-Conflict Diplomatic Engagement	-0.0140 (0.138)	0.00647 (0.129)	0.00843 (0.124)	0.00743 (0.122)	0.0128 (0.133)
Post-Conflict Condemnation	0.262** (0.0858)	0.266** (0.0855)	0.254** (0.0966)	0.237** (0.0859)	0.266** (0.0830)
Post-Conflict Other Involvement	-0.242* (0.136)	-0.268* (0.131)	-0.262* (0.142)	-0.264* (0.139)	-0.228 (0.143)
Any Peacekeeping	-0.0114 (0.115)	0.118 (0.272)	0.0917 (0.320)	0.0165 (0.311)	0.277 (0.329)
Any Peacekeeping*ln(Peace-months)		-0.0332 (0.0632)	-0.0255 (0.0724)	-0.0140 (0.0689)	-0.0713 (0.0768)
Regional/MNF Force	-0.125 (0.112)	-0.115 (0.112)	-0.141 (0.115)	-0.150 (0.114)	-0.158 (0.122)
Conflict Intensity	-0.0226 (0.0723)	-0.0255 (0.0757)	-0.0132 (0.0750)	-0.0214 (0.0727)	-0.0182 (0.0797)
Conflict History	0.0204 (0.0155)	0.0215 (0.0167)	0.0204 (0.0159)	0.0205 (0.0163)	0.00715 (0.0166)
Duration	0.000499 (0.000417)	0.000454 (0.000445)	0.000499 (0.000413)	0.000474 (0.000406)	0.000732* (0.000395)
Interstate Conflict	-0.201* (0.0893)	-0.227** (0.0886)	-0.194** (0.0807)	-0.206* (0.0897)	-0.198* (0.0864)
Previous Recurrences	0.0393 (0.0309)	0.0388 (0.0316)	0.0405 (0.0286)	0.0395 (0.0312)	0.0340 (0.0327)
ln(Peace Months)	3.832** (0.525)	3.915** (0.538)	3.992** (0.526)	3.908** (0.533)	4.042** (0.561)
ln(Peace Months) ²	-0.908** (0.138)	-0.932** (0.142)	-0.950** (0.140)	-0.921** (0.139)	-0.966** (0.147)
ln(Peace Months) ³	0.0647** (0.0115)	0.0669** (0.0118)	0.0683** (0.0118)	0.0654** (0.0116)	0.0700** (0.0123)
Constant	-7.487** (0.603)	-7.576** (0.640)	-7.693** (0.612)	-7.618** (0.632)	-7.659** (0.685)
Observations	62619	62619	62619	62619	62619

The estimated parameters in the action occurrence equation can be found in the online appendix.

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$ in a two-tailed test

Table 2: Bivariate Probit Models of Ceasefire Terminations

IV	1: Force	2: Sanctions	3: Diplomacy	4: Condemnations	5: Other
Recurrence Equation					
Action	-0.0552 (0.699)	1.202** (0.280)	0.703* (0.410)	0.530 (0.715)	1.104** (0.274)
Other Action	-0.477* (0.259)	-0.694** (0.263)	-0.912** (0.374)	-0.392 (0.265)	-0.462* (0.265)
Peacekeeping	0.655** (0.224)	0.564** (0.196)	0.524** (0.209)	0.534** (0.200)	0.421* (0.188)
Regional/MNF Force	-0.402 (0.280)	-0.331 (0.303)	-0.328 (0.275)	-0.340 (0.274)	-0.317 (0.324)
Conflict Intensity	0.141 (0.198)	0.103 (0.190)	-0.0132 (0.202)	0.0710 (0.200)	0.189 (0.184)
Conflict History	0.0243 (0.0778)	0.00637 (0.0848)	0.0154 (0.0732)	0.0299 (0.0759)	0.0253 (0.0704)
Duration	0.00184* (0.000799)	0.00208** (0.000659)	0.00204** (0.000683)	0.00184** (0.000702)	0.00128 (0.000857)
Interstate Conflict	0.589** (0.227)	0.606** (0.231)	0.525** (0.222)	0.604** (0.209)	0.462* (0.231)
Previous Recurrences	-0.0960 (0.0809)	-0.0631 (0.0812)	-0.0798 (0.0801)	-0.0915 (0.0814)	-0.0687 (0.0811)
Constant	-1.507** (0.323)	-1.434** (0.320)	-1.326** (0.306)	-1.454** (0.321)	-1.516** (0.310)
Observations	372	372	372	372	372

The estimated parameters in the action occurrence equation can be found in the online appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$ in a two-tailed test

Figure 1: Relative Risk Ratios of Armed-Conflict Recurrence, with 90% Confidence Intervals

Online Appendix

Table 3: Bivariate Probit Models of Conflict Relapse

IV	1: Force	2: Sanctions	3: Diplomacy	4: Condemnations	5: Other
Recurrence Equation					
Action	0.0199 (0.520)	-2.323* (1.280)	-1.338* (0.804)	-0.169 (0.672)	-0.504 (0.389)
Action*ln(Peace-months)	-0.0869 (0.119)	0.506 (0.311)	0.261 (0.201)	-0.0157 (0.185)	-0.00748 (0.0900)
Action*PKO		2.075* (1.203)	1.449 (0.960)	0.771 (0.793)	0.815 (0.758)
Action*PKO*ln(Peace-months)		-0.581* (0.308)	-0.343 (0.225)	-0.164 (0.211)	-0.252 (0.186)
Other Action	-0.0328 (0.299)	0.0370 (0.300)	0.195 (0.237)	-0.328 (0.398)	-0.407 (0.494)
Other Action*ln(Peace-months)	0.0199 (0.0718)	-0.00141 (0.0742)	-0.0365 (0.0575)	0.0793 (0.0891)	0.140 (0.125)
Post-Conflict Force	-0.173 (0.129)	-0.160 (0.119)	-0.202* (0.123)	-0.188 (0.116)	-0.202* (0.114)
Post-Conflict Sanctions	0.0223 (0.192)	0.0165 (0.189)	-0.00133 (0.199)	0.0179 (0.189)	0.0471 (0.194)
Post-Conflict Diplomatic Engagement	-0.0140 (0.138)	0.00647 (0.129)	0.00843 (0.124)	0.00743 (0.122)	0.0128 (0.133)
Post-Conflict Condemnation	0.262** (0.0858)	0.266** (0.0855)	0.254** (0.0966)	0.237** (0.0859)	0.266** (0.0830)
Post-Conflict Other Involvement	-0.242* (0.136)	-0.268* (0.131)	-0.262* (0.142)	-0.264* (0.139)	-0.228 (0.143)
Any Peacekeeping	-0.0114 (0.115)	0.118 (0.272)	0.0917 (0.320)	0.0165 (0.311)	0.277 (0.329)
Any Peacekeeping*ln(Peace-months)		-0.0332 (0.0632)	-0.0255 (0.0724)	-0.0140 (0.0689)	-0.0713 (0.0768)
Regional/MNF Force	-0.125 (0.112)	-0.115 (0.112)	-0.141 (0.115)	-0.150 (0.114)	-0.158 (0.122)
Conflict Intensity	-0.0226 (0.0723)	-0.0255 (0.0757)	-0.0132 (0.0750)	-0.0214 (0.0727)	-0.0182 (0.0797)
Conflict History	0.0204 (0.0155)	0.0215 (0.0167)	0.0204 (0.0159)	0.0205 (0.0163)	0.00715 (0.0166)
Duration	0.000499 (0.000417)	0.000454 (0.000445)	0.000499 (0.000413)	0.000474 (0.000406)	0.000732* (0.000395)
Interstate Conflict	-0.201* (0.0893)	-0.227** (0.0886)	-0.194** (0.0807)	-0.206* (0.0897)	-0.198* (0.0864)
Previous Recurrences	0.0393 (0.0309)	0.0388 (0.0316)	0.0405 (0.0286)	0.0395 (0.0312)	0.0340 (0.0327)
ln(Peace Months)	3.832** (0.525)	3.915** (0.538)	3.992** (0.526)	3.908** (0.533)	4.042** (0.561)
ln(Peace Months) ²	-0.908** (0.138)	-0.932** (0.142)	-0.950** (0.140)	-0.921** (0.139)	-0.966** (0.147)
ln(Peace Months) ³	0.0647** (0.0115)	0.0669** (0.0118)	0.0683** (0.0118)	0.0654** (0.0116)	0.0700** (0.0123)
Constant	-7.487** (0.603)	-7.576** (0.640)	-7.693** (0.612)	-7.618** (0.632)	-7.659** (0.685)
Action Occurrence Equation					
Cold War	-0.144 (0.117)	-1.095** (0.250)	-0.333** (0.131)	-0.229 (0.166)	-0.0633 (0.0897)
P-5 State	-5.949** (0.583)	-5.937** (0.438)	-1.714** (0.545)	-6.465** (0.510)	0.664 (0.446)
Previous Year Force	0.0236** (0.00584)	0.0284** (0.00709)	0.0158** (0.00520)	0.0155** (0.00631)	0.00440 (0.00470)
Previous Year Sanctions	-0.0106 (0.0168)	-0.0455** (0.0156)	-0.0224** (0.00848)	-0.0224 (0.0144)	-0.0163* (0.00803)
Previous Year Diplomatic Engagements	-0.00358 (0.0101)	0.0120* (0.00665)	0.00426 (0.0126)	-0.00478 (0.0123)	-0.0125* (0.00619)
Previous Year Condemnations	-0.0101* (0.00580)	-0.00943 (0.00633)	-0.0105** (0.00446)	0.000923 (0.00363)	-0.00487 (0.00310)
Previous Year Other Action	-2.52e-05 (0.00469)	-0.00803 (0.00714)	-0.00122 (0.00433)	-0.00187 (0.00559)	0.00880* (0.00412)
weurope	-4.485** (0.307)	-4.194** (0.322)	0.608 (0.602)	-4.736** (0.358)	0.0383 (0.704)
ceeurope	0.651 (0.568)	0.889* (0.486)	0.141 (0.453)	1.050* (0.585)	0.183 (0.400)
ssafrica	-0.279 (0.313)	0.350 (0.363)	-0.513 (0.362)	0.480 (0.370)	-0.0587 (0.304)
meast	0.709* (0.338)	0.287 (0.321)	0.362 (0.301)	0.801* (0.358)	0.338 (0.386)
asia	-0.680* (0.396)	-0.639 (0.504)	-0.829* (0.461)	-0.661 (0.486)	-1.869** (0.356)
pocean	-5.451** (0.322)	-5.346** (0.417)	-6.563** (0.675)	-5.665** (0.371)	-1.522** (0.473)
Conflict Intensity	0.326 (0.280)	0.823** (0.315)	0.565* (0.280)	0.313 (0.389)	0.455 (0.351)
Duration	0.00277* (0.00138)	0.000515 (0.00217)	0.00275* (0.00138)	0.00272* (0.00159)	0.00451** (0.00151)
Interstate Conflict	0.598 (0.468)	0.0218 (0.418)	0.470 (0.349)	0.470 (0.373)	0.160 (0.382)
Constant	-2.421** (0.419)	-3.389** (0.490)	-2.096** (0.392)	-2.411** (0.556)	-1.986** (0.535)
Arctan(ρ)	0.217* (0.116)	0.416** (0.145)	0.170 (0.127)	0.138 (0.102)	0.380** (0.123)
Observations	62619	62619	62619	62619	62619

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .05$ in a two-tailed test

Table 4: Bivariate Probit Models of Ceasefire Terminations

IV	1: Force	2: Sanctions	3: Diplomacy	4: Condemnations	5: Other
Recurrence Equation					
Action	-0.0552 (0.699) -0.477*	1.202** (0.280) -0.694**	0.703* (0.410) -0.912**	0.530 (0.715) -0.392	1.104** (0.274) -0.462*
Other Action	(0.259) 0.655**	(0.263) 0.564**	(0.374) 0.524**	(0.265) 0.534**	(0.265) 0.421*
Peacekeeping	(0.224) -0.402	(0.196) -0.331	(0.209) -0.328	(0.200) -0.340	(0.188) -0.317
Regional/MNF Force	(0.280) 0.141	(0.303) 0.103	(0.275) -0.0132	(0.274) 0.0710	(0.324) 0.189
Conflict Intensity	(0.198) 0.0243	(0.190) 0.00637	(0.202) 0.0154	(0.200) 0.0299	(0.184) 0.0253
Conflict History	(0.0778) 0.00184*	(0.0848) 0.00208**	(0.0732) 0.00204**	(0.0759) 0.00184**	(0.0704) 0.00128
Duration	(0.000799) 0.589**	(0.000659) 0.606**	(0.000683) 0.525**	(0.000702) 0.604**	(0.000857) 0.462*
Interstate Conflict	(0.227) -0.0960	(0.231) -0.0631	(0.222) -0.0798	(0.209) -0.0915	(0.231) -0.0687
Previous Recurrences	(0.0809) -1.507**	(0.0812) -1.434**	(0.0801) -1.326**	(0.0814) -1.454**	(0.0811) -1.516**
Constant	(0.323)	(0.320)	(0.306)	(0.321)	(0.310)
Action Occurrence Equation					
Cold War	-0.661* (0.355) -5.354**	0.0219 (0.537) -6.341**	0.603 (0.547) -1.024**	1.144* (0.542) -5.851**	0.575 (0.537) 0.277
P-5 State	(0.362) 0.0368	(0.425) 0.0351	(0.420) 0.0337*	(0.381) 0.0557**	(0.407) 0.0179
Previous Year Force	(0.0231) 0.0283	(0.0259) -0.100	(0.0204) 0.0192	(0.0196) -0.0509	(0.0223) 0.00166
Previous Year Sanctions	(0.0385) 0.000517	(0.0633) 0.0944**	(0.0570) 0.0674**	(0.0432) 0.0189	(0.0552) -0.0183
Previous Year Diplomatic Engagements	(0.0377) -0.0183	(0.0226) -0.00436	(0.0241) -0.0183	(0.0236) 0.0254	(0.0301) 0.00142
Previous Year Condemnations	(0.0248) 0.00987	(0.0360) -0.0181	(0.0221) 0.0110	(0.0200) 0.00606	(0.0239) 0.0576**
Previous Year Other Action	(0.0278) -4.792**	(0.0226) -4.780**	(0.0193) 0.374	(0.0240) -4.259**	(0.0202) 0.502
weurope	(0.410) 0.483	(0.691) 1.872**	(0.605) 0.0971	(0.429) 1.495**	(0.468) 0.598
ceurope	(0.501) 0.0149	(0.433) 1.322**	(0.376) -0.392	(0.466) 0.787*	(0.365) 0.179
ssafrica	(0.379) 0.697*	(0.486) 1.254**	(0.301) 0.303	(0.381) 0.998**	(0.299) 0.443
meast	(0.403) -0.514	(0.400) 0.341	(0.246) -0.811**	(0.339) -0.126	(0.380) -0.934**
asia	(0.517) -5.138**	(0.669) -4.463**	(0.344) -6.179**	(0.508) -4.459**	(0.342) -1.578**
pocean	(0.509) 0.877**	(0.666) 0.660**	(0.821) 0.983**	(0.376) 0.665*	(0.623) 0.689**
Conflict Intensity	(0.251) 0.00169	(0.272) 0.000663	(0.240) 0.000952	(0.331) 0.00101	(0.249) 0.00255*
Duration	(0.00108) 0.680*	(0.00169) 0.189	(0.00135) 0.796**	(0.00141) 0.572*	(0.00131) 0.309
Interstate Conflict	(0.331) -2.982**	(0.297) -4.460**	(0.214) -3.618**	(0.315) -4.608**	(0.265) -3.546**
Constant	(0.737) -0.552	(0.636) -13.44**	(0.699) -0.856**	(0.786) -1.164	(0.716) -14.68**
Arctan(ρ)	(0.432)	(3.285)	(0.316)	(0.737)	(3.501)
Observations	372	372	372	372	372

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .05$ in a two-tailed test

Without Peacekeeping

With Peacekeeping

Figure 2: Relative Risk Ratios of Armed-Conflict Recurrence, with 90% Confidence Intervals