Trust, Reciprocity and Favors in Cooperative Relationships

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu   Kyle Bagwell*

First draft: June 2004. This draft: October 2012

Abstract

We study trust, reciprocity and favors in a repeated trust game with private information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, either immediately or in the future. The size of a favor owed may decline over time, following neutral periods. Indeed, a favor-exchange relationship with this feature improves on a simple favor-exchange relationship. In some settings, an infrequent and symmetric punishment sustains greater cooperation. A honeymoon period followed by favor-exchange or symmetric punishment can also offer scope for improvement.

JEL Codes: D01, D82, D86, Z13
Short title: Trust, Reciprocity and Favors

*Atila Abdulkadiroğlu is Professor in Economics at Duke University, 213 Social Sciences Building, Durham, NC 27708-0097, email: atila.abdulkadiroglu@duke.edu; Kyle Bagwell is the Donald L. Lucas Professor in Economics at Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-6072, email: kbagwell@stanford.edu. We thank Alberto Martin for his excellent research assistance and Rajiv Sethi, Ennio Stacchetti, Eric Verhoogen, two anonymous referees, seminar participants at Berkeley, UCL, Colorado, Columbia, Duke, FIU, Nova de Lisboa, Maryland, NYU, UNC, Penn, and Pompeu Fabra, and conference participants at the 2004 Society for Economic Dynamics meeting for their valuable comments.
A substantial experimental literature confirms that subjects exhibit trust and practice reciprocity. For example, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) consider the trust game, in which one subject (the investor) has income and can invest by sending some or all of this income to another subject (the trustee), where the income sent grows en route and is received as a larger amount. The trustee may then choose to reciprocate, by returning some income to the investor. An investor that gives income to the trustee has shown trust, since the investor has incurred a cost and cannot be sure that the trustee will reciprocate. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe find that subjects often exhibit trust and practice reciprocity. In particular, evidence of positive reciprocity is reported: many subjects reward kind behavior with a kind response. de Quervain (2004) et al. study a modified trust game, in which the investor can incur a cost and punish the trustee if the latter does not reciprocate. They observe that such punishments often occur, indicating that subjects may also practice negative reciprocity, whereby they punish unkind behavior with an unkind response.

In this paper, we study how trusting and reciprocal behaviors may emerge from cooperation among self-interested players in a repeated interaction with private information. In making the assumption of self-interested players, our purpose is not to deny that individuals have social preferences that perhaps include an instinct for trust and reciprocity. Rather, our purpose is to better understand the underlying advantages that trusting and reciprocal behaviors afford when players have private information and gains from cooperation are present.

In the stage game of our repeated trust game with private information, either player \( a \) is given income, player \( b \) is given income, or neither player is given income. Each player is privately informed as to whether or not he is the investor. Thus, if a player does not receive income, then the player does not observe whether neither player received income or the other player received income. Next, if one player receives income, then that player may choose to exhibit trust and invest by sending some or all of his income to the other player. If a transfer is made, then the level of the investment is publicly observed; however, while the investment is value enhancing on average, the outcome is random. The investment either succeeds or fails, and the investment is completely lost when it fails. The trustee privately observes the investment.

---

1 de Quervain, et al (2004) also use PET scans and investigate the neural basis of punishment, finding evidence that humans derive satisfaction from the punishment of defectors. See also King-Casas, et al (2005) for related evidence of positive and negative reciprocity in a multi-round trust game. As Fehr and Gächter (2000a) observe, subjects in public-good games may also practice negative reciprocity. See Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Gachter (2000b) for excellent surveys of experimental work. In our working paper (Abdulkadiroğlu and Bagwell, 2005), we provide further discussion of psychological and anthropological studies of trust and reciprocity.
outcome. If the investment is successful, then the trustee can reciprocate within the period and send some or all of the returns back to the investor. Thus, if the investor exhibits trust and reciprocation does not occur within the current period, then the investor does not observe whether the trustee elected not to immediately reciprocate or the investment failed.

This game is highly stylized, but it serves to introduce two key incentive problems. First, when a player is selected as the investor, the gains from cooperation can be enjoyed only if this player has incentive to reveal that he is the investor and exhibits trust by investing in the other player. If a player reveals that he is the investor and exhibits trust, then the player has given a favor to the other player. As the investor always has the option of pretending that he has not received income, some gain must be anticipated when a favor is extended in this way. This gain may take the form of a favor that the current trustee now owes the current investor. This favor may be paid in the current period if the investment is successful, or it may be paid in the future if the players then adopt a path of play for the continuation that favors the current investor. We think of the former payment as immediate reciprocity and the latter payment as dynamic reciprocity. Second, in the event of a successful investment, if the cooperative equilibrium calls for immediate reciprocity, then the trustee must be given incentive to reciprocate and thereby reveal that the investment was successful.

More generally, the repeated trust game with private information serves as a simple framework within which to explore the provision of favors among individuals in on-going relationships. A self-interested individual that extends a favor naturally hopes for some gain in return. But the individual may not be able to determine when the recipient is in a position to return the favor. The recipient may not be in a position to reciprocate immediately, and we capture this possibility by assuming that the investment may be unsuccessful. As well, while at some point in the future the recipient will be in a position to pay the favor, the individual may not be able to observe the date at which this occurs. Further, the individual may find that he is in a position to extend another favor before having been paid for his last favor. We capture these possibilities with the assumption that each player is privately informed as to whether he is the investor, where there is a chance that neither player is the investor.\(^2\)

In our formal analysis, we follow Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) and characterize equilibria using the concept of self-generation. We thus look for a set of payoffs that can be enforced using only continuation payoffs that are drawn from that set. We may capture different

\(^2\)As discussed in the Conclusion, the model may also be interpreted in the context of the market for referrals.
forms of trust relations by considering different self-generating sets. For any given form of trust relation, our approach is then to construct and interpret the optimal cooperative strategies of players with bounded patience levels. Our approach thus differs from the usual folk-theorem analysis, which analyzes the payoffs of players with (approximately) unlimited patience.\footnote{Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) consider a general class of repeated games with private information and establish conditions under which sufficiently patient players can achieve approximately efficient payoffs. We may directly apply their findings to our setting and conclude that sufficiently patient players can achieve approximately the symmetric first-best payoffs even in the absence of immediate reciprocity.}

In our main analysis, we consider a trust relation in which the players implement a symmetric self-generating line (SSGL) of payoffs. For this trust relation, the self-generating set of payoffs is a line along which total payoffs sum to a constant value. The line is symmetric around the 45° line. We show that such a trust relation requires that the sum of the investment levels that the players are prepared to make in a given period is constant over time. Thus, an SSGL captures trust relations in which investment levels across players may change over time but the overall level of investment does not. We also find that dynamic reciprocity is required for the implementation of any payoff pair along a SSGL. In particular, the continuation value for the investor exceeds that of the trustee following a period without immediate reciprocity.

In this form of trust relation, optimal cooperation among players occurs when a highest symmetric self-generating line (HSSGL) is implemented. We construct an implementation of a HSSGL. If, for example, players seek to implement the symmetric utility pair on the HSSGL, and if, say, player $b$ is the first player to receive income, then player $b$ exhibits trust and sends a portion of this income to player $a$. In the following period, the players initiate a favor-exchange relationship, in which player $b$ begins as the favored player. Specifically, in the following period, the players implement the corner utility pair that represents the lowest (highest) payoff for player $a$ ($b$) along the HSSGL. The implementation of this utility pair initially requires that player $a$ transfers all income if he is the investor, while player $b$ transfers less than all income if he is the investor. If player $a$ is selected as the investor and transfers all income, we may understand that player $a$’s favor is paid, and the game moves to the opposite corner utility pair, at which player $a$ ($b$) receives his highest (lowest) payoff along this HSSGL. The opposite corner is implemented analogously. Here, it is player $b$ that owes the favor. In this way, when a player owes a favor, the player is induced to admit that he is the investor and pay the favor, since the player gains the future reward of becoming the favored player.

A novel prediction arises from this implementation: the size of the favor that is owed
diminishes with the realization of every successive “neutral” state (i.e., the state in which neither player has income). Thus, if player $a$ owes a favor to player $b$, then player $a$ transfers all income if player $a$ is immediately selected as the investor; however, if a neutral state is experienced first and player $a$ is selected as the investor in the next period, then player $a$ can fulfill his favor obligation by transferring less than all income. Similarly, if two neutral states are encountered and then player $a$ is selected as investor, then player $a$ can fulfill his obligation with an even smaller transfer. Intuitively, this process gives player $b$ incentive to transfer some income when he is the investor, since otherwise a neutral state would be observed and in the next period player $b$ would be favored to a smaller extent. Thus, following several neutral periods, the disfavored player acknowledges that a favor is owed but holds that less is now required to fulfill the obligation. One may imagine the disfavored player remarking: “Yeah, but what have you done for me lately?” The prediction that the size of the favor owed deteriorates over time when neutral states are experienced is novel to our framework. Another interesting feature is that implementation of HSSGL does not require the use of immediate reciprocity.

In independent work, Hauser and Hopenhayn (2008) study the continuous-time model without immediate reciprocity. In this setting, they show that the Pareto frontier is self-generating and thus renegotiation-proof. Hauser and Hopenhayn also provide arguments in support of their conjecture that efficient equilibria are characterized by a “forgiveness” property. As discussed above, our HSSGL exhibits a similar property following neutral states. Interestingly, and as we show (see Section VII.J), the Pareto frontier fails to be renegotiation-proof in our discrete-time model when immediate reciprocity is not available.4

Our characterization of HSSGL is also related to work by Athey and Bagwell (2001), who characterize the HSSGL of a repeated game in which colluding firms are privately informed about their respective costs. For a two-type model, they construct a HSSGL that utilizes “future market share favors” and achieves first-best payoffs for colluding firms.5 Intuitively, in both models, players’ actions in a given period serve two goals: they determine the extent to which efficiency is achieved in that period, and they are the means through which transfers are provided among players as a reward or penalty for past behavior. In the present paper, however,

---

4 Using a different argument, Hopenhayn and Hauser (2008) also briefly consider a discrete-time model and provide similar conditions under which the frontier is not self-generating.
5 For related contributions to collusion theory, see Aoyagi (2003), Athey and Bagwell (2008), Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) and Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004). Related themes are also explored in macroeconomics; early contributions include Green (1987) and Wang (1995).
the players do not have sufficient instruments with which to simultaneously accomplish both goals; therefore, a HSSGL does not achieve first-best payoffs.\textsuperscript{6} We thus develop arguments with which to identify the total payoff that is achieved on a HSSGL, and we characterize this payoff as a function of model parameters. As well, we construct a HSSGL without using a public-randomization device and thereby offer an equilibrium interpretation for favors that decline in size as successive neutral phases are experienced.

The second trust relation that we consider corresponds to the set of strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE).\textsuperscript{7} Here, the self-generating set of payoffs is a line that rests along the 45° line. In such equilibria, asymmetric continuation values are not allowed, and so players cannot use future favors as they do in a HSSGL. But the players can provide incentives for trust, if a period without an investor triggers a symmetric punishment. Likewise, the players can provide incentives for immediate reciprocity, if a symmetric punishment may be initiated once an investment is not reciprocated. We show that this trust relation has a feast-or-famine characteristic. In particular, players are completely unable to cooperate in SSE, if both informational asymmetries are significant (i.e., if a period without an investor often occurs and investments are often unsuccessful). But, when either informational asymmetry is less significant, the players can construct SSE with payoffs that exceed those under autarky. The optimal SSE may then even offer a total payoff exceeding that attained on a HSSGL. In fact, as either informational asymmetry gets sufficiently small, the optimal SSE yields approximately first-best payoffs.

Intuitively, if the probability that neither player is selected as the investor is small, then the players may impose a severe and symmetric punishment when neither player reports income. This punishment gives each player a great incentive to be honest when he is the investor; furthermore, the punishment is rarely experienced along the equilibrium path. It is then possible to use such a construction to generate equilibrium payoffs that lie above the HSSGL. One interesting feature of this construction is that it offers an equilibrium interpretation of negative reciprocity. If neither player is “nice” to the other, then the relationship runs the risk of deteriorating, with both players being “mean” to each other in the future.

We refer to our third trust relation as a hybrid equilibrium since it builds from the HSSGL and SSE constructions. In such an equilibrium, players begin with a “honeymoon” period that

\textsuperscript{6}In Athey and Bagwell’s (2001) collusion model, by contrast, when the firms have the same cost level, they may allocate market share asymmetrically and thereby achieve transfers without sacrificing efficiency.

\textsuperscript{7}In models of collusion, SSE are analyzed by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) and Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004).
is characterized by a high level of trust. If in the first period some player is chosen as the investor and makes the appropriate transfer, then the players proceed in the next period and thereafter to implement a HSSGL. The player that made the first-period investment begins as the favored player. Alternatively, if no income is reported in the first period, then the players suffer a symmetric punishment (“break up”). Thus, in a hybrid equilibrium, favor-exchange relationships and negative reciprocity are both predicted.

We first compare the optimal hybrid equilibrium with equilibria that implement a HSSGL. For a large set of parameters, we show that a honeymoon period is valuable: the optimal hybrid equilibrium offers a greater total payoff than is achieved on a HSSGL. The underlying insight here is that the first period is unique, since then players are not encumbered by obligations that are derived from past favors; hence, players may exhibit full trust in the first period.\(^8\) In a second comparison, we show that a large set of parameters also exists over which the optimal hybrid equilibrium offers a greater total payoff than is obtained in the optimal SSE. We show, however, that the optimal SSE can offer a greater total payoff if the probability that neither player is selected as the investor is sufficiently small.

Möbius (2001) also studies equilibrium favor provision when the ability to provide a favor is private information. Möbius studies a continuous-time game in which immediate reciprocity is not allowed and focuses on a class of equilibria that corresponds to a “chips mechanism.”\(^9\) For applications, a potential weakness of the continuous-time model is that a player’s capacity to provide a favor evaporates in the next instant. In a companion paper (Abdulkadiroğlu and Bagwell, 2012), we characterize the optimal equilibria of this class for our discrete-time framework. We identify an intermediate range of discount factors for which the optimal equilibrium of this class corresponds to a simple favor-exchange relationship, in which a player waits until his favor is reciprocated before extending another favor and favors owed do not diminish in size following neutral states. This relationship offers a strictly lower total payoff than is achieved on a HSSGL.

In a discrete-time model without immediate reciprocity, Nayyar (2009) reports parameter restrictions under which the implementation of payoffs on the Pareto frontier requires that

\(^8\)This prediction is of some special interest in light of Engle-Warnick and Slonim’s (2006) experimental finding that subjects in indefinitely repeated trust games exhibit greater trust in the first round.

\(^9\)In a chips mechanism, each player begins the game with an integer \(N \geq 1\) chips, an investor sends all income and receives a chip from the trustee if the trustee currently has a chip, and an investor sends no income if the trustee is currently out of chips. For a given discount factor, equilibrium incentive constraints limit the number of chips, \(N\), that may be used. See also Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004).
continuation values are drawn from the outer boundary of the equilibrium set, where the outer boundary includes the Pareto frontier but is potentially larger. She also provides a partial characterization of the strategies that support payoffs on the Pareto frontier. Kalla (2010) studies two important extensions in discrete time.\footnote{Lau (2011) also studies a model with favor exchange. In his model, the costs and benefits of favors are stochastic, and the cost of providing a favor may be private information.} First, he introduces incomplete information regarding players’ discount factors. He characterizes sufficient conditions under which patient players can separate from impatient players and then implement a favor-exchange relationship. He shows that separation under symmetric equilibria has to take place within a finite time period, after which beliefs diverge and separation becomes impossible. Second, in a complete-information setting, Kalla introduces scope for risk sharing via concave utility functions. He shows that some form of a favor-exchange relationship then becomes possible for all discount factors.

Finally, our paper is also related to Watson’s (1999, 2002) work on long-term partnerships with persistent and two-sided incomplete information. In this setting, a role for learning is present, and players may “start small;” by contrast, in our model, a role for learning does not arise, and indeed players may “start big” with an initial honeymoon period.

The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model. Section II provides our findings for HSSGL. Section III contains our analysis of SSE. Section IV characterizes optimal hybrid equilibria. Section V concludes. All proofs and the discussion of intermediate results are located in the Appendix.

I. The Model

We study a stylized model with two players, \( a \) and \( b \). In the stage game, either player \( a \) is given an income of $1, player \( b \) is given an income of $1, or neither player is given an income. The former two events each occur with probability \( p \in (0, 1/2) \) and the latter event thus occurs with probability \( 1 - 2p \). In any period, a player who receives income becomes an investor. Each player is privately informed as to whether or not he is the investor. Thus, if a player does not receive income, then the player does not observe whether neither player received income or the other player received income. If a player receives income, then that player may choose to exhibit trust and invest by sending any \( x \in [0, 1] \) to the other player. The transfers between players are publicly observed. The outcome of the investment is random. The investment either succeeds
or fails, where success occurs with probability \( q < 1 \). The investment produces \( kx \) when it is successful, and the investment is completely lost otherwise. We assume \( qk > 1 \); that is, the investment is value enhancing on average. The trustee is the player to whom an investment is sent. The trustee privately observes the investment outcome. If the investment is successful, then the trustee can reciprocate within the period and send some or all of the returns back to the investor. Thus, if the investor exhibits trust and reciprocation does not occur within the current period, then the investor does not observe whether the trustee elected not to reciprocate in the current period or the investment failed. We assume risk neutral players in order to abstract from insurance arrangements, and we let \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) denote the players’ common discount factor.

Let \( t \) denote the time index. For \( i \in \{a, b\} \), let \( w_i^t = 1 \) if player \( i \) receives income and \( w_i^t = 0 \) otherwise. Player \( i \) privately observes \( W_i^t = \{w_i^t\}_{t=1}^T \). Let \( \tau_t = (j, x) \) if player \( j \) invests in the amount of \( x > 0 \) in period \( t \) and \( \tau_t = 0 \) otherwise. Both players observe \( T_t = \{\tau_z\}_{z=1}^t \). Let \( \kappa_i^t = 1 \) if player \( j \) invests in player \( i \) and the investment succeeds, \( \kappa_i^t = 0 \) if player \( j \) invests in player \( i \) and the investment fails, and \( \kappa_i^t = 0 \) if player \( j \) does not invest in player \( i \). The trustee privately observes \( K_i^t = \{\kappa_z^i : \kappa_z^i \neq 0\}_{z=1}^t \). Since \( \kappa_z^i \) is relevant only when player \( j \) invests, we do not consider \( \kappa_z^i = 0 \) as part of player \( i \)’s private history. Let \( \theta_t = (i, r) \) if player \( j \) invests and player \( i \) reciprocates in the amount of \( r > 0 \), and \( \theta_t = 0 \) otherwise. Both players observe \( R_t = \{\theta_z\}_{z=1}^t \). Note that \( \theta_t = 0 \) when \( \tau_t = 0 \); that is, if there is no investment, then there is no reciprocity by the other player either. Thus, the private history of player \( i \) at time \( t \) is denoted \( h_i^t = (W_i^t, K_i^t) \), and the public history is denoted \( H_t = (T_t, R_t) \). Let \( H_t \) denote the set of possible private histories, and \( H_t \) denote the set of public histories at \( t \).

A strategy \( \sigma_i \) for player \( i \) consists of an investment decision \( I_i^t : H_i^t \times H_{t-1} \rightarrow [0, 1] \), such that \( I_i^t(h_i^t, H_{t-1}) = 0 \) when \( w_i^t = 0 \), and \( I_i^t(h_i^t, H_{t-1}) \in [0, 1] \) if \( w_i^t = 1 \); and a reciprocity decision \( R_i^t : H_i^t \times (H_{t-1}, \tau_t) \times [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, k] \) such that \( R_i^t(h_i^t, H_{t-1}, \tau_t) = 0 \) if \( \tau_t \neq (j, I_j^t) \) or \( \kappa_i^t = 0 \) and \( R_i^t(h_i^t, H_{t-1}, \tau_t = (j, I_j^t)) \in [0, kI_j^t] \). Note that \( \tau_t = (j, I_j^t) \) if and only if \( I_i^t > 0 \), and \( \theta_t = (i, R_i^t) \) if and only if \( R_i^t > 0 \).

Following Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), we use the solution concept of perfect public equilibrium (PPE). A strategy for player \( i \) is public if at every period \( t \), it depends only on player \( i \)’s current-period private information, \( (w_i^t, \kappa_i^t) \), and the public history, \( H_{t-1} \). A PPE is a profile of public strategies that forms a Nash equilibrium at any date, given any public history. Following Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990), we can define an operator \( B \) which
yields the set of PPE values, $\Psi^*$, as the largest self-generating set.\footnote{To this end, let us note that players’ strategy spaces are effectively finite. Using terminology provided by Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004), we say that a deviation is an off-schedule deviation (i.e., observable, as a deviation, to other players) if it contains a positive investment or positive reciprocity that differs from the equilibrium value. Such deviations can be avoided by the threat of reverting to autarky. Thus, a deviation is relevant to our analysis only if it is an on-schedule deviation (i.e., unobservable, as a deviation, to other players). In such a deviation, a player selects zero investment or zero reciprocity, even though the equilibrium strategy calls for a positive value. A player effectively chooses between the action that is suggested by his equilibrium strategy and an on-schedule deviation with zero investment or zero reciprocity. Therefore, a player reveals his income or the investment outcome truthfully when the PPE calls for positive values of investment and reciprocity. Equivalently, if an income level or investment outcome represents the player’s type, then a player’s action space consists of this finite type space. We can thus directly apply the dynamic programming techniques of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990).}

For any set $\Psi \subset \mathbb{R}^2$, consider the following mapping: $B(\Psi) = \{(u, v) : \exists (u_\theta, v_\theta) \in \Psi, \text{ for } i \in \{a, b\} \text{ and } \theta \in \{0, 1\}; (u_\alpha, v_\alpha) \in \Psi; x, y \in [0, 1], r \in [0, kx] \text{ and } s \in [0, ky] \text{ such that:} \}

\begin{align}
IR: u, v, u_\theta, v_\theta, u_\alpha, v_\alpha & \geq \frac{p}{1 - \beta}, \\
IC^a_x: 1 - x + q(r + \beta u_{a1}) + (1 - q)\beta u_{ao} & \geq 1 + \beta u_o, \\
IC^b_y: 1 - y + q(s + \beta v_{b1}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{bo} & \geq 1 + \beta v_o, \\
IC^a_\theta: ky - s + \beta u_{b1} & \geq ky + \beta u_{bo}, \\
IC^b_\theta: kx - r + \beta v_{a1} & \geq kx + \beta v_{ao}, \\
PK^a: u = p[1 - x + q(r + \beta u_{a1}) + (1 - q)\beta u_{ao}] \\
& + p[q(ky - s + \beta u_{b1}) + (1 - q)\beta u_{bo}] + (1 - 2p)\beta u_o, \\
PK^b: v = p[1 - y + q(s + \beta v_{b1}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{bo}] \\
& + p[q(kx - r + \beta v_{a1}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{ao}] + (1 - 2p)\beta v_o. 
\end{align}

Observe that we use $u$ to denote player $a$’s payoff, $x$ to denote investment level by player $a$, and $r$ to denote the amount that player $b$ reciprocates when the investment is successful. Similarly, we use $v$ to denote player $b$’s payoff, $y$ to denote the investment level by player $b$, and $s$ to denote the amount that player $a$ reciprocates when the investment is successful. The utility pairs that are induced may depend on the public path of play: we use $(u_\alpha, v_\alpha)$ to denote the continuation values that are induced when neither player reports income, and we
use \((u_i, v_i)\) to denote the continuation values that are induced when player \(i \in \{a, b\}\) invests and the other player reciprocates \((\theta = 1)\) or not \((\theta = 0)\). For a given \(\Psi\), we will say that \(\{x, y, r, s, u_i, v_i, u_o, v_o\}\), for \(i = a, b\) and \(\theta = 0, 1\), implements a utility pair \((u, v)\) if all of the constraints above are satisfied.

We now mention two important benchmarks. First, the Nash equilibrium of the static game is autarky: no player invests, and so each player expects a payoff of \(p\). In the Nash benchmark, in every period, the players use the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The payoffs for the repeated game are then \(u = v = \frac{p}{1-\beta}\), and so \(u + v = \frac{2p}{1-\beta}\). The Nash benchmark payoff is used in the IR constraint above, since autarky is the worst punishment. Second, given our assumption that \(qk > 1\), the first-best benchmark occurs when each player invests all of his income. The players’ joint per-period payoff is then \(2pqk\). Thus, in the first-best benchmark, \(u + v = \frac{2pqk}{1-\beta}\).

We observe that the first-best benchmark could be achieved by patient players, if either informational asymmetry were absent. If some player always receives income (i.e., \(p = 1/2\)), then in any period it is common knowledge among the two players as to which player received income. When the players are sufficiently patient, they can then support an equilibrium with first-best payoffs, by threatening an infinite reversion to the autarky equilibrium of the static game in the event that a player with income does not invest all income. Likewise, if an investment is always successful (i.e., \(q = 1\)), then in any period it is common knowledge among the two players that the trustee has received \(k > 1\) and is thus able to reciprocate immediately this entire quantity. If the players are sufficiently patient, they can again support an equilibrium with first-best payoffs, by threatening an infinite reversion to the autarky equilibrium of the static game in the event that the trustee does not immediately reciprocate the quantity \(k > 1\).

II. Highest Symmetric Self-Generating Lines

In this section, we consider PPE that can be characterized in terms of symmetric self-generating lines. We begin with the benchmark of a simple favor-exchange relationship. We then argue that PPE characterized by symmetric self-generating lines involve trust and dynamic reciprocity. Finally, we provide an implementation of the utility pairs that rest upon a highest symmetric self-generating line, and we also characterize the unique features of such an implementation.
A. Preliminaries

Formally, a line (segment) is defined by a closed and convex set of utility pairs, \((u, v)\), that sum to the same total; thus, a line is defined by \((\underline{u}, \overline{v}) \rightarrow (\overline{u}, \underline{v})\) where \(u + v \equiv T \in \mathbb{R}\) along the line. A self-generating line is a line such that, for any utility pair \((u, v)\) on the line, the pair can be implemented using some \((x, y, r, s)\) and continuation values, \((u_i, v_i, u_o, v_o)\), where the continuation values are all drawn from the given line. Thus, if a pair \((u, v)\) is on a self-generating line, with \(u + v = T\), then it is necessary that \(u_o + v_o = T\) and \(u_i + v_i = T\), for all \(i\) and \(\theta\). A symmetric self-generating line is then a self-generating line for which \(u = v\) and \(\overline{u} = \overline{v}\). A highest symmetric self-generating line (HSSGL) is a symmetric self-generating line that achieves the highest value for \(T = u + v\).

Our game allows for a rich set of instruments, and a given utility pair on a HSSGL may have multiple implementations. In addition, it is possible that multiple HSSGL’s exist. All such lines must, by definition, achieve the same value for \(T = u + v\); however, the corner utility pairs, \((u, \overline{u})\) and \((\overline{u}, u)\), may differ across HSSGL’s, in which case one HSSGL may be wider than another. Accordingly, we say that a HSSGL is widest if the associated \(\overline{u} - u\) is largest.\(^{12}\)

Fix an implementation of a utility pair, \((u, v)\), that rests on a self-generating line. We define the level of trust in the implementation as \(x + y\), and we say that player \(a\) (\(b\)) exhibits more trust if \(x > y\) (\(x < y\)). Likewise, we say that player \(a\) (\(b\)) exhibits immediate reciprocity if \(s > 0\) (\(r > 0\)). Further, we say that the implementation embodies dynamic reciprocity if \(u_{ao} > u_{bo}\) and \(v_{bo} > v_{ao}\). In other words, dynamic reciprocity is present if the continuation value for the investor exceeds that of the trustee following a period without immediate reciprocity. Finally, we say that player \(a\) (\(b\)) is the favored player if \(u > v\) (\(v > u\)).

Henceforth, we maintain the assumption that \(\beta\) is sufficiently large, so that

\[
\beta \geq \beta^* \equiv \frac{1}{1 + p(qk - 1)}.
\]

For any \(\beta > 0\), this constraint is sure to hold for \(qk\) sufficiently large. At the other extreme, this constraint can only hold for \(\beta\) near unity when \(qk\) is close to unity.\(^{12}\) Given a symmetric self-generating line, it is straightforward to use the techniques of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) and establish the existence of a widest self-generating line that contains the given line.

\(^{12}\)
B. Simple Favor-Exchange Relationship

To fix ideas and illustrate the role of (8), we consider a simple favor-exchange relationship. In such a relationship, one player begins as the favored player while the other player is initially the disfavored player. If the favored player receives income, then no transfer is made and the identity of the favored player is unchanged; however, if the disfavored player receives income, then that player transfers all income and thereby becomes the favored player in the following period. Finally, if neither player receives income, then the identity of the favored player again remains unchanged. A key feature of the simple favor-exchange relationship is that a player that provides a favor (i.e., transfers income) does not do so again - at any level - until after the other player provides a favor. Notice also that immediate reciprocity is not utilized.

We may characterize this relationship in terms of a self-generating line, in which the players move deterministically between two corner utility pairs, \((u, \overline{u})\) and \((\overline{u}, u)\). The utility pair \((u, \overline{u})\) is implemented when player \(b\) is the favored player. In this case, we may understand that player \(a\) owes the favor. Formally, the players implement this utility pair as follows: (i) if player \(a\) receives income, then player \(a\) transfers all income \((x = 1)\); (ii) if player \(b\) receives income, then no transfer \((y = 0)\) is required; and (iii) if neither player receives income, then no transfer is feasible. In case (i), player \(a\)’s favor is paid, and it is then player \(b\)’s turn to provide a favor. The players thus implement the other corner utility pair, \((\overline{u}, u)\), in the next period. In cases (ii) and (iii), player \(a\)’s favor is not yet paid, and the players implement \((u, \overline{u})\) again in the next period. The utility pair \((\overline{u}, u)\) is implemented in similar fashion, except here player \(a\) is favored.

We now provide a formal characterization of a simple favor-exchange relationship.

**Proposition 1.** There exists a symmetric self-generating line that specifies a simple favor-exchange relationship, in which \(x + y = 1\) and \(T = p[1 + qk]/(1 - \beta)\). In particular, let

\[
\begin{align*}
\underline{u} &= \frac{p^2 \beta(1 + qk)}{(1 - \beta)(1 - \beta + 2\beta p)}, \\
\overline{u} &= \frac{p(1 + qk)(1 - \beta + \beta p)}{(1 - \beta)(1 - \beta + 2\beta p)}.
\end{align*}
\]

The corner utility pair \((\overline{u}, u)\) can be implemented using the following specification: \(r = s = 0\), \(u_0 = u_{a1} = \overline{u}, u_{b0} = u_{b1} = u_o = \overline{u}, v_{a0} = v_{b1} = v_a = u, v_{b0} = v_{b1} = v_o = \overline{u}\), and \(x = 1 > 0 = y\). The corner utility pair \((\overline{u}, u)\) can be implemented symmetrically, by interchanging \(x\) with \(y\) and \(u\) with \(v\) in the above specification.
A key step in the proof of Proposition 1 is to show that the disfavored player is willing to transfer all income. In particular, to implement \((u, \bar{u})\), we require that (2) is satisfied so that player \(a\) is willing to transfer all income \((x = 1)\). For the proposed specification, we find that (2) holds if \(\bar{u} - u \geq 1/\beta\), where \(u\) and \(\bar{u}\) are defined in Proposition 1. Simple calculations confirm that this inequality holds if and only if \(\beta \geq \beta^*\). Thus, we may understand our maintained assumption (8) as ensuring that players have sufficient patience to implement a simple favor-exchange relationship.

The simple favor-exchange relationship generates payoffs that exceed the autarkic payoffs that arise under repeated play of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Thus, this intuitive relationship can be interpreted as efficiency enhancing. An important limitation of this relationship, however, is that the benefit of investment is not exploited when the same player receives income in successive periods. We thus next characterize the more sophisticated favor-exchange relationship that implements a HSSGL.

C. Implementation of HSSGL

To characterize behavior along a HSSGL, we must first analyze the general features of symmetric self-generating lines. In the Appendix, we provide all of the proofs and an extensive discussion of these features. We show there that the same level of trust is used when implementing any utility pair along a given self-generating line, where higher self-generating lines are associated with higher levels of trust. We also show that dynamic reciprocity is necessary for the implementation of any utility pair along a symmetric self-generating line, where a greater level of trust is associated with a larger degree of dynamic reciprocity (i.e., a larger value for \(u_{ao} - u_{bo}\)). We show as well that the implementation of the corner utility pair, \((u, \bar{u})\), on a given HSSGL requires full trust (i.e., \(x = 1\)) by player \(a\) and an upper bound on the investment level by player \(b\) (specifically, \(y \leq \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*}\)). Intuitively, the disfavored player is willing to exhibit full trust only if the future reward of becoming the favored player is sufficiently large, which in turn implies an upper bound for the investment level required of the favored player. These results imply an upper bound for the level of trust that can be supported in a symmetric self-generating line; thus, if we can implement a self-generating line that achieves this bound (i.e., for which \(x + y = \frac{2\beta}{\beta + \beta^*}\)), then we can be assured that we have constructed a HSSGL.

\[\text{As discussed in the Appendix, an implication is that first-best total payoffs cannot be achieved using a symmetric self-generating line.}\]
As we show in the Appendix, we may implement a HSSGL using a public-randomization device. Under this approach, the key task is to implement the corner utility pair, \((u, \overline{u})\). The other corner utility pair, \((\overline{u}, u)\), can then be implemented in an analogous way, and all intermediate utility pairs can be realized, in expectation, by using a public-randomization device that induces a lottery over the two corner utility pairs.\(^{14}\) To implement \((u, \overline{u})\), we specify that player \(a\) transfers all income if he is the investor and that player \(b\) transfers less than all income (specifically, \(y = \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*}\)) if he is the investor. If player \(a\) is selected as the investor and exhibits full trust, then the opposite corner utility pair, \((\overline{u}, u)\), is implemented in the following period. If instead player \(b\) is selected as the investor and makes the required (partial) transfer of income, then the corner utility pair, \((u, \overline{u})\), is implemented again in the following period. Finally, if neither player reports income, then an intermediate utility pair is induced in expectation in the following period, where the intermediate utility pair favors player \(b\) but to a smaller extent than did the initial corner utility pair.

The implementation has two interesting features. First, the extent to which a player is favored diminishes in expectation when a “neutral” state (i.e., a state in which no player has income) is encountered. Intuitively, this feature ensures that a player is willing to transfer some income even when that player provided the most recent favor. For example, by transferring some income (namely, \(y = \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*}\)) in this situation, player \(b\) ensures that the corner utility pair \((u, \overline{u})\) is implemented again in the following period rather than an intermediate utility pair in which player \(b\) is favored to a smaller extent. Second, the implementation does not require the use of immediate reciprocity.

Building on these findings, we now consider the implementation of a HSSGL when a public-randomization device is unavailable. The intermediate utility pair that follows a neutral state must then be directly implemented, which leads to new predictions about the evolution of cooperative relationships when successive neutral states are encountered.

**Proposition 2.** There exists a HSSGL that can be implemented without a public-randomization device and in which \(x + y = 2\beta/(\beta + \beta^*)\) and \(T = p[2 + \frac{2\beta}{\beta + \beta^*}(qk - 1)]/(1 - \beta)\). In particular, let

\[
\begin{align*}
    u &= \frac{p + \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*}}{1 - \beta}, \\
    \overline{u} &= u + \frac{2}{\beta + \beta^*},
\end{align*}
\]

and consider any utility pair \((u, v)\) along the line connecting \((u, \overline{u})\) and \((\overline{u}, u)\). This pair can be implemented using the following specifications: \(r = s = 0, u_{a0} = u_{a1} = u + (x + y)/\beta = \overline{u}, u_{bo} = \overline{u}_{bo} = \overline{u}\).\(^{14}\)Athey and Bagwell (2001) assume a public-randomization device and use a related approach.
\[ u_{b1} = u, v_{ao} = v_{a1} = u, v_{bo} = v_{b1} = \bar{u}, \text{ and} \]
\[ x = \beta \beta^* \frac{v - p}{\beta} - u, \quad (10) \]
\[ y = \beta \beta^* \frac{u - p}{\beta} - u, \quad (11) \]
\[ u_a = \beta^* \left[ \frac{u - p}{\beta} + \frac{u(1 - \beta^*)}{\beta^*} \right], \quad (12) \]
\[ v_a = \beta^* \left[ \frac{v - p}{\beta} + \frac{u(1 - \beta^*)}{\beta^*} \right]. \quad (13) \]

In the implementation featured in Proposition 2, any utility pair \((u, v)\) on the line that connects \((u, \bar{u})\) and \((\bar{u}, u)\) as defined in (9) can be implemented using only continuation values drawn from that line. For example, at the start of the game, the players might seek to implement a symmetric utility pair corresponding to the midpoint of this line. Let \((\bar{u}, \bar{u})\) denote the midpoint:
\[ \bar{u} \equiv \frac{u + \bar{u}}{2} = \frac{p + \alpha (1 - \beta^*)}{1 - \beta^*}. \quad (14) \]

Notice from (10) and (11) that \(x = y\) when \(u = v\); thus, since \(x + y = 2\beta/(\beta + \beta^*)\), we have that \(x = y = \beta/(\beta + \beta^*)\) in the first period. Suppose, for example, that player \(b\) receives income in the first period. The implementation then calls for player \(b\) to exhibit trust and send \(y = \beta/(\beta + \beta^*)\) to player \(a\). Play then moves to the second period, at which point the players seek to implement the corner utility pair \((u, \bar{u})\). This asymmetric pair rewards player \(b\) for reporting income and showing trust toward player \(a\) in the first period. Player \(b\) thus becomes the favored player, since \(v = \bar{u} > u = u\).

To implement \((u, \bar{u})\) in the second period, the players use the corresponding values for \(x\) and \(y\) that are given by (10) and (11). When \((u, v) = (u, \bar{u})\), it is direct to confirm that these values are given by \(x = 1\) and \(y = (\beta - \beta^*)/(\beta + \beta^*)\), indicating that player \(a\) now exhibits more trust than player \(b\).\(^{15}\) Thus, if player \(a\) receives income in the second period, then player \(a\) sends \(x = 1\) to player \(b\) and thereby becomes the favored player in the third period, at which point the opposite corner utility pair \((\bar{u}, u)\) is implemented. If instead player \(b\) again receives income in the second period, then player \(b\) sends \(y = (\beta - \beta^*)/(\beta + \beta^*)\) to player \(a\). By transferring some income in this way, player \(b\) ensures that the utility pair \((u, \bar{u})\) is implemented again in the third period.

\(^{15}\)As suggested above, this implementation is also used for the corner utility pair of the same HSSGL when players have access to a public randomization device. See also Proposition 9 in the Appendix.
The remaining possibility is that no income is reported in the second period. Going into the third period, the players then seek to implement the utility pair \((u_o, v_o)\), as given by (12) and (13) when \((u, v) = (u, \bar{v})\). As Proposition 2 shows, this pair may be implemented deterministically (i.e., without a public-randomization device). To determine the implementation for the pair \((u, v) = (u_o, v_o)\), we again refer to (10)-(13). At this point, it is important to use the notation with care. Given \((u, v) = (u_o, v_o)\), we may think of the two left-hand-side variables determined by (12) and (13) as a pair \((\tilde{u}_o, \tilde{v}_o)\) that represents the utilities that the players seek to implement at the start of the fourth period, in the event that no income is reported in the third period. In this general manner, for any given path of income realizations for the infinite game, we may refer to (10)-(13) and determine the path of trust (i.e., the amounts of income that are given from one player to another) for the infinite game.

As the discussion above suggests, one interesting possibility is that the players report no income over successive periods. Continuing with the example above, suppose player \(b\) sends income to player \(a\) in the first period, so that player \(b\) is the favored player in the second period, and suppose neither player reports income in the second, third, etc., periods. Does player \(b\) remain the favored player, until a period finally arrives in which player \(a\) has income? Is the size of the favor that player \(a\) owes reduced in each successive period that no income is reported?

These questions are readily answered using (10)-(13). To this end, we may use (10) and (11) to find that
\[
x - y = \beta^* [v - u].
\] (15)
Equation (15) captures a basic relationship between the utility pair that the players seek to implement and the extent to which each player exhibits trust. In particular, if the players seek to implement a utility pair in which player \(b\) is favored (i.e., in which \(v > u\)), then player \(a\) must exhibit more trust (i.e., \(x > y\)). Next, given the expressions for \(u\) and \(\tilde{u}\) presented in (9) and (14), respectively, we may use (12) to derive that
\[
u_o - \tilde{u} = \frac{\beta^*}{\beta} [u - \tilde{u}].
\] (16)
Of course, given that \(2\tilde{u} = u_o + v_o = u + v = u + \bar{u}\), we may equivalently restate (16) as
\[
\tilde{u} - v_o = \frac{\beta^*}{\beta} [\tilde{u} - v].
\] (17)
Equations (16) and (17) indicate key relationships between the utility pair \((u, v)\) that the players seek to implement in a given period and the utility pair \((u_o, v_o)\) that they seek to implement in the next period in the event that no income is reported in the given period.
Consider first the possibility that $\beta = \beta^*$. Using (16) and (17), we see then that $(u, v) = (u_o, v_o)$. In this case, when the players seek to implement $(u, v)$ and neither player reports income, then the players again seek to implement $(u, v) = (u_o, v_o)$ at the beginning of the next period. As (15) confirms, the trust levels that players are expected to exhibit are then unchanged. Put differently, the favor that is owed does not diminish as successive no-income states are encountered. Consider next the case in which $\beta > \beta^*$. If $u = v = \tilde{u}$, then once again the favor owed does not diminish as successive no-income states are experienced. In this case, if no income is reported in the given period, then the players again seek to implement the same utility pair, $(u, v) = (u_o, v_o) = (\tilde{u}, \tilde{u})$, in the next period. In particular, $x$ and $y$ both remain at the symmetric level, $\beta / (\beta + \beta^*)$.

The final possibility is that $\beta > \beta^*$ and $(u, v) \neq (\tilde{u}, \tilde{u})$. In this case, patient players seek to implement an asymmetric utility pair. For simplicity, let us focus on the situation in which player $b$ is favored: $v > \tilde{u} > u$. We thus have from (15) that $x > y$. Now suppose that neither player reports income in the current period. Referring to (16) and (17), we see then that the players proceed to the next period and seek to implement $(u_o, v_o)$, where $u_o < \tilde{u} < v_o$. Given $\beta^*/\beta < 1$, we may further observe that $u < u_o$ and $v_o < v$. Thus, when $\beta > \beta^*$ and the players seek to implement $(u, v)$ such that $v > \tilde{u} > u$, if no income is reported, then in the next period the players seek to implement $(u_o, v_o)$ such that $u < u_o < \tilde{u} < v_o < v$. Applying (15), we see that in the next period player $a$ continues to exhibit more trust than does player $b$; however, the extent of the trust differential is reduced (i.e., $x$ remains larger than $y$, but $x - y$ is lower).

Recalling the two questions posed above, we thus conclude that player $b$ remains the favored player until a period occurs in which player $a$ has income. But the size of the favor that player $a$ owes is reduced in each successive period that no income is reported.

Thus, when player $b$ is the favored player and a period is experienced in which neither player reports income, player $a$ acknowledges that a favor is still owed but insists that the favor is now smaller in size. We may imagine player $a$ exclaiming, “Yeah, but what have you done for me lately?” The key intuition is associated with the $IC^b_y$ constraint. As (3) indicates, when the players are attempting to implement a utility pair that favors player $b$, they must be sure to give player $b$ the incentive to report income (and thus send $y$ to player $a$). To accomplish this, they use a utility pair $(u_o, v_o)$ that penalizes player $b$ somewhat when no income is reported.

We may summarize the discussion above as follows:

**Corollary 1.** Consider the implementation of a HSSGL that is specified in Proposition 2.
If \( \beta = \beta^* \) or \( (u, v) = (\tilde{u}, \tilde{u}) \), then \( (u_o, v_o) = (\tilde{u}, \tilde{u}) \) and so the values for \( x \) and \( y \) are not altered following a period in which no income is reported. If \( \beta > \beta^* \) and \( v > \tilde{u} > u \), then \( u < u_o < \tilde{u} < v_o < v \) and so \( x - y \) remains positive but is reduced following a period in which no income is reported. Likewise, if \( \beta > \beta^* \) and \( u > \tilde{u} > v \), then \( v < v_o < \tilde{u} < u_o < u \) and so \( y - x \) remains positive but is reduced following a period in which no income is reported.

Finally, it is interesting to compare the total payoff achieved in the HSSGL of Proposition 2 with that achieved in the simple favor-exchange relationship of Proposition 1. If \( \beta > \beta^* \), then the level of trust, and thus the total payoff, is strictly higher in a HSSGL than in the simple favor-exchange relationship. Intuitively, when \( \beta > \beta^* \), the featured HSSGL offers a strictly higher payoff, because a player transfers some income even when that player provided the most recent favor. As explained above, an incentive for such behavior is provided, since the size of a favor owed deteriorates in size following the experience of a neutral state.\(^{16}\)

### D. Uniqueness

The implementation of a HSSGL is not unique. As Proposition 1 establishes, the implementation of a HSSGL can be achieved without the use of immediate reciprocity (i.e., \( r = s = 0 \) in this implementation). As we show in the Appendix, however, alternative implementations of a HSSGL exist in which immediate reciprocity is used. In addition, and as we discuss above and confirm in the Appendix, alternative implementations of a HSSGL may be constructed that utilize a public-randomization device. Despite these findings, we next establish that, for any utility pair on the widest HSSGL, every implementation is characterized by the same values for \( x, y, u_o \) and \( v_o \).

To present this result, we define a notion of uniqueness. Fix any \( (u, v) \) on the widest HSSGL. Let \( \{x, y, r, s, u_o, v_o, u_o, v_o\} \) and \( \{x', y', r', s', u_{o}', v_{o}', u_{o}', v_{o}'\} \) be two implementations of \( (u, v) \), where each implementation uses only continuation values that are drawn from a HSSGL. We then say that \( (u, v) \) is implemented uniquely (up to \( \{r, s, u_o, v_o\} \)) if, for any such two implementations, we have \( x = x', y = y', u_o = u_o' \) and \( v_o = v_o' \). Otherwise, we say that there exists multiple implementations for \( (u, v) \). Thus, we define uniqueness in terms of the trust

---

\(^{16}\)In our companion paper (Abdulkadiroğlu and Bagwell, 2012), we consider equilibria that correspond to a “chips mechanism” and identify a range of intermediate discount factors for which the optimal equilibrium in this class corresponds to a simple favor-exchange relationship (i.e., a chips mechanism with a single chip). For such discount factors, it then follows that a HSSGL offers a strictly higher total payoff than the optimal chips mechanism.
relationship (i.e., the values of $x$ and $y$) and the manner in which utility pairs evolve following neutral states (i.e., the values of $u_o$ and $v_o$). Then:

**Proposition 3.** Every $(u, v)$ on the widest HSSGL is implemented uniquely.

With this proposition, we have a uniqueness result for our prediction that the size of the favor that is owed diminishes in expectation when a neutral state is encountered.

This concludes our characterization of HSSGL’s. In the following sections, we compare the total payoff achieved along the HSSGL with alternative benchmarks.

**III. Strongly Symmetric Equilibria**

In the analysis above, we allow that players can promise future favors through asymmetric continuation values, but we do not allow that players may threaten a symmetric punishment whereby $u = v$ is lowered following certain public outcomes. We now consider strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) and thus adopt the opposite emphasis: players’ utilities are no longer allowed to move asymmetrically along a negatively sloped line, but players’ utilities are now allowed to move symmetrically along the 45-degree line. We characterize optimal SSE and, in particular, identify specific circumstances under which SSE generate a symmetric payoff for the game that exceeds that obtained on a HSSGL.

**A. Characterization of Optimal SSE**

We proceed now to characterize optimal SSE. To begin, we follow Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) and define an operator $B^{ss}$ which yields the set of strongly symmetric PPE values, $\psi^*_s$, as the largest self-generating set. Denoting the autarky payoff for a player as $u_{aut} = \frac{p}{1-\beta}$, we may define this operator as follows:

For any $\psi_s = [u_{aut}, u]$ consider the following mapping: $B^{ss}(\psi_s) = \{v : \exists x \in [0,1], r \in [0, kx], v_o, v_{10}, v_{11} \in \psi_s$ such that:

$$IC_x : 1 - x + q(r + \beta v_{11}) + (1 - q) \beta v_{10} \geq 1 + \beta v_o$$  \hfill (18)

$$IC_\theta : kx - r + \beta v_{11} \geq kx + \beta v_{10}$$  \hfill (19)
\[ PK : v = p[1 - x + q(r + \beta v_{11}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{10}] \]
\[ + p[q(kx - r + \beta v_{11}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{10}] + (1 - 2p)\beta v_o \].

Let \( \psi^*_s = [u_{aut}, u_{max}] \) be the maximal fixed point of \( B^{ss} \). That is, if \([u_l, u_h]\) is a fixed point of \( B^{ss} \), then \([u_l, u_h] \subset [u_{aut}, u_{max}] \).

Observe that this operator requires symmetry across players, with \( u \) denoting the payoff enjoyed by each player, \( x \) denoting the investment that a player makes in the current period if that player receives income, \( r \) denoting the reciprocity that the trustee then offers in the current period if the investment is successful, and \( v_o, v_{11} \) and \( v_{10} \) denoting the continuation values that each player receives in the future if the current period has no investor, a successful investment and an unsuccessful investment, respectively. For a given \( \psi_s = [u_{aut}, u] \), we thus say that \( \{x, r, v_{10}, v_{11}, v_o\} \) implements \( v \) if all of the constraints above are satisfied.

We refer to a pair \((q, p)\) as an information structure. Consider the set \( I = \{(q, p) : q \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1], p \in [0, \frac{1}{2})\} \), which is the set of all feasible information structures. The characterization of optimal SSE reveals that behavior differs depending upon which of three different information-structure regions is in place. The respective regions are illustrated in Figure 1. We now describe the behavior that emerges in each region. The proofs are contained in the Appendix.

### A.1. Region \( I_1 \): Low \( q \) and not so high \( p \)

Let \( q^* = \frac{k + \sqrt{k^2 + 8k}}{4k} \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \). Consider \( I_1 = \{(q, p) \in I : q \leq q^* \text{ and } p \leq \frac{1}{q(k+1)}\} \). In this region, we find that \( u_{max} = u_{aut} \). Thus, under this information structure, the players are unable to cooperate using SSE. Intuitively, given that \( p \) is small, no-investor states are common. Hence, if players attempt to provide incentives for trust by using the threat of a symmetric punishment, then this punishment often would be experienced on the equilibrium path. Further, with \( q \) being small as well, the value of future cooperation is not huge. The players are thus unable to enforce a strongly symmetric equilibrium in which trust is exhibited. Clearly, if \( \beta \) is sufficiently high that a HSSGL exists, then the players earn a higher total payoff in a HSSGL than in the optimal (autarkic) SSE.

### A.2. Region \( I_2 \): Not so high \( q \) but high \( p \)

Consider now \( I_2 = \{(q, p) \in I : p \geq \frac{2q - 1}{2q} \text{ and } p > \frac{1}{q(k+1)}\} \). For \( \beta > \frac{1}{p(qk+1)} \), we find that \( u_{max} = u_{aut} + \frac{p(qk+1)-1}{1-\beta} \). The following implements the optimal SSE in the latter case: \( x = 1, v_{10} = v_{11} = u_{max}, r = 0 \) and \( v_o = u_{max} - \frac{1}{\beta} > u_{aut} \).
We observe that implementation of $u_{\text{max}}$ is achieved without use of immediate reciprocity (i.e., $r = 0$), and that players incur a moderate punishment when the neutral (no-investor) state is experienced (i.e., $u_{\text{max}} > v_o > u_{\text{aut}}$). We also find that $\lim_{p \to 1/2} u_{\text{max}} = \lim_{p \to 1/2} u_{\text{eff}}$, where $u_{\text{eff}} = \frac{pqk}{q-1}$ is the payoff that a player enjoys in the first-best benchmark. This implies that, when $p$ is sufficiently close to $\frac{1}{2}$, patient players achieve a higher total payoff in the optimal SSE than they do on a HSSGL. Intuitively, when $p$ is close to $\frac{1}{2}$, the neutral state is rare; thus, the players can use the threat of a symmetric punishment in this state to provide incentives for trust while only rarely experiencing the punishment on the equilibrium path.

A.3. Region $I_3$: High $q$ but not so high $p$

Finally, consider $I_3 = \{(q, p) \in I : q > q^*\text{ and } p < \frac{2q-1}{2q}\}$. Define $\tilde{\beta} = \frac{1}{1+p(2kq^2-qk-1)}$. Then $\tilde{\beta} < 1$ if and only if $q > q^*$. For $\beta \geq \tilde{\beta}$, we find that $u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} + \frac{\lambda}{1-\beta}$, where $\lambda = \frac{\nu(2kq^2-qk-1)}{2q-1} \geq 0$ since $q \geq q^*$. The following implements the optimal SSE in the latter case: $x = 1, v_o = v_{11} = u_{\text{max}}, v_{10} = u_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{\beta(2q-1)} \geq u_{\text{aut}}$ and $r = \frac{1}{2q-1} > 0$.

We observe that implementation of $u_{\text{max}}$ is achieved without punishment in the neutral (no-investor) states (i.e., $v_o = u_{\text{max}}$). Instead, players punish one another when there is no immediate reciprocity (i.e., $v_{10} < u_{\text{max}}$). Thus, in this implementation, immediate reciprocity plays an important role (i.e., $r > 0$). We also find that $\lim_{q \to 1} u_{\text{max}} = \lim_{q \to 1} u_{\text{eff}}$. This implies that, when $q$ is close to 1, patient players achieve a higher total payoff in the optimal SSE than they do on a HSSGL. Intuitively, when $q$ is close to 1, investment is almost always successful; thus, the players can use the threat of a symmetric punishment when immediate reciprocity is not offered to provide incentives for trust while only rarely experiencing the punishment on the equilibrium path.

B. Comparisons

It is interesting to compare regions $I_2$ and $I_3$. Start with $(q, p) \in I_2$, where immediate reciprocity plays no role. As we increase $q$, we reach $I_3$, where immediate reciprocity begins playing a role. Also, as we move from $I_2$ to $I_3$, the punishment phase shifts from following a neutral (no-investor) state to following the state in which trust is exhibited but immediate reciprocity is not offered. As suggested above, the intuition is that players provide incentives most efficiently by emphasizing the information asymmetry for which the “bad” outcome (no investor, unsuccessful investment) is unlikely. Further, it is precisely in those circumstances where a bad outcome is
very unlikely that the optimal SSE offers a total payoff that exceeds that in a HSSGL.

We have not specified whether a punishment-phase utility is itself implemented or if it is achieved in expectation via a public-randomization device that induces a lottery over \( u_{\text{max}} \) and \( u_{\text{aut}} \). The latter interpretation is immediate and requires no further analysis. Under this interpretation, any punishment phase entails the risk of permanent autarky. Similarly, it is possible to implement a punishment-phase utility with a lottery in which the players risk temporary autarky, whereby in each period the players leave autarky (return to \( u_{\text{max}} \)) with a constant hazard rate. To implement in expectation a given punishment-phase utility, the lottery must place a higher probability on going to autarky when the autarky relationship is temporary.

For future reference, we now collect our findings for payoffs:

**Proposition 4.** Let \( u_{\text{max}} \) represent the utility achieved in the optimal SSE. (i) For \((q,p) \in I_1\), \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \). (ii) For \((q,p) \in I_2\), if \( \beta \geq \frac{1}{p(qk+1)} \), then \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} + \frac{p(qk+1)-1}{1-\beta} \). (iii) For \((q,p) \in I_3\), if \( \beta \geq \hat{\beta} \), then \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} + \frac{\lambda}{1-\beta} \), where \( \lambda = \frac{p(2kq^2-qk-1)}{2q-1} \geq 0 \).

Thus, throughout region \( I_1 \), the optimal SSE offers a strictly lower payoff than does a HSSGL. For \( \beta \) sufficiently high, however, the optimal SSE offers a strictly higher payoff than does a HSSGL in subsets of region \( I_2 \) and \( I_3 \) within which \( p \) is sufficiently close to 1/2 and \( q \) is sufficiently close to 1, respectively.

As Proposition 4 confirms, our analysis of the optimal SSE in regions \( I_2 \) and \( I_3 \) imposes additional restrictions on \( \beta \) beyond our maintained assumption that \( \beta \geq \beta^* \). The restrictions are important. For example, consider the subset of region \( I_2 \) in which \( q \leq \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \beta < \frac{1}{p(1+qk)} \). Letting \( p_s \equiv \frac{1}{\beta(1+qk)} \), we may state the latter inequality as \( p_s > p \). We observe that \( p_s < \frac{1}{2} \) when \( q = 1 \) if and only if \( \beta > \frac{2}{1+k} \). But simple calculations confirm that \( \beta^* > \frac{2}{1+k} \). Given \( \beta \geq \beta^* \), we thus conclude that \( p_s < \frac{1}{2} \) when \( q = 1 \). As Figure 2 illustrates, Proposition 4 part (ii) refers to that portion of region \( I_2 \) that lies above the \( p_s = p \) curve. In contrast, our present interest is in the subset of region \( I_2 \) that rests below the \( p_s = p \) curve and in which \( q \leq \frac{1}{2} \).

We now provide our main finding for this subset.

**Proposition 5.** Let \( u_{\text{max}} \) represent the utility achieved in the optimal SSE. For \((q,p) \in I_2\), if \( q \leq \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \beta < \frac{1}{p(1+qk)} \), then \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \).

Thus, in this subset of region \( I_2 \), the optimal SSE corresponds to autarky and therefore offers a strictly lower payoff than does a HSSGL.
IV. Hybrid Equilibria

Our discussion above characterizes HSSGL’s and optimal SSE. With these constructions established, we are now able to consider the possibility of hybrid equilibria. In such equilibria, players begin the game by exhibiting a high level of trust in period one. If some player receives and transfers income in the first period, then the players thereafter exchange favors by implementing a HSSGL, with that player being the favored player in the second period. Alternatively, if no player receives income in the first period, then the players may revert to a symmetric punishment in the second period. In broad terms, such equilibria are thus characterized by an initial “honeymoon” period, after which the players either continue with a favor-exchange relationship or experience a breakdown. In this section, we characterize the optimal hybrid equilibria and compare the associated payoffs with those achieved in HSSGL’s and optimal SSE.

A. Characterization of Optimal Hybrid Equilibria

Recall the definition of implementation in Section I. For a given \( \psi = [u_{aut}, u] \), we now say that a pair \( \{x, u_o\} \) implements \( u \) in a hybrid equilibrium if \( \{x, y, r, s, u_i\theta, v_i\theta, u_o, v_o\} \), for \( i = a, b \) and \( \theta = 0, 1 \), implements the utility pair \( \{u, u\} \) when \( x = y, r = s = 0, u_{a1} = u_{ao} = v_{b1} = v_{bo} = \overline{u}, u_{b1} = u_{bo} = v_{a1} = v_{ao} = u \) and \( u_o = v_o \in [u_{aut}, u] \), where \( u \) and \( \overline{u} \) are defined by (9). In an optimal hybrid equilibrium, \( x \) and \( u_o \) are chosen to deliver the maximal value for \( u \). Thus, in an hybrid equilibrium, the players exhibit equal trust in the first period (i.e., \( x = y \)). If some player receives income and transfers the amount \( x \), then in period two the players implement a HSSGL. At this point, the player that made the period-one transfer is favored and thus enjoys a continuation value of \( \overline{u} \) while the other player’s continuation value is \( u \). If instead neither player received income in period one, then in period two the players implement a symmetric utility pair, \( (u_o, u_o) \).

Our next result states that an optimal hybrid equilibrium exists.

**Proposition 6.** There exists an optimal hybrid equilibrium. If \( 1 < p(1 + qk) \), then \( x = 1 \) and \( u_o = \overline{u} - 1/\beta \) implement the optimal hybrid equilibrium, and the corresponding equilibrium utility is given by

\[
    u = [p(qk + 1) - 1] + p + \beta(1 - p)\overline{u} + \beta p u
\]

If \( 1 > p(1 + qk) \), then \( x = \frac{\beta}{\beta + q} \) and \( u_o = \overline{u} \) implement the optimal hybrid equilibrium, and the corresponding equilibrium utility is given by \( \overline{u} \). If \( 1 = p(1 + qk) \), in all implementations of
optimal hybrid equilibria, the corresponding equilibrium utility is given by \( \tilde{u} \).

To see the intuition, suppose that \( 1 < p(1 + qk) \). If we increase the punishment that follows an event in which no income is reported (i.e., if \( u_o = v_o \) is lowered), then the players can be motivated to transfer a greater income (i.e., \( x = y \) can be raised). The benefit of an increase in the size of the transfer is measured by \( qk - 1 \) and happens with probability \( p \). On the other hand, the players then suffer a greater punishment when, in fact, neither player has income. This cost is experienced with probability \( 1 - 2p \). Thus, the net gain is positive if \( 1 - 2p < p(qk - 1) \), or equivalently, if \( 1 < p(qk + 1) \).

**B. Comparisons**

We next compare the payoffs in optimal hybrid equilibria with those in HSSGL’s and optimal SSE. As above, we use \( u_{\text{max}} \) to represent the payoff that a player expects at the beginning of the game, when players use an optimal SSE. Similarly, if players begin the game by implementing the symmetric utility pair on a HSSGL, then \( \tilde{u} \equiv (\pi + u)/2 \) represents a player’s payoff. Finally, if players implement an optimal hybrid equilibrium, we let \( u_H \) represent the corresponding payoff that a player expects at the beginning of the game.

We first compare optimal hybrid equilibria and HSSGL’s. Using Proposition 6, we have the following corollary:

**Corollary 2.** If \( 1 < p(1 + qk) \), then the optimal hybrid equilibrium offers a strictly higher total payoff than does any HSSGL, and thus \( u_H > \tilde{u} \). If \( 1 \geq p(1 + qk) \), then all optimal hybrid equilibria offer the same total payoff as does any HSSGL, and thus \( u_H = \tilde{u} \).

This finding follows directly from Proposition 6. When \( 1 < p(1 + qk) \), we may use (21), (14) and (9) to compute the explicit expression for the payoff difference:

\[
    u_H - \tilde{u} = \left\{ \left[ p(qk + 1) - 1 \right] + p + \beta(1 - p)\bar{u} + \beta pu \right\} - \left\{ u + \frac{1}{\beta + \beta^*} \right\} \\
    = \frac{[p(1 + qk) - 1]\beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*} > 0.
\]

As discussed above, the key point is that, when \( 1 < p(1 + qk) \), players can benefit by using the threat of a symmetric punishment to enforce an initial “honeymoon” period in which the level of trust is very high. Provided that some player receives and transfers income in the first
period, the players then use a favor-exchange relationship (i.e., move along a HSSGL) in all future periods.

If \( 1 < p(qk + 1) \), we may easily verify that \( \bar{u} > u_H > \tilde{u} > u \). Thus, as Corollary 2 indicates, when a honeymoon period is included, the players earn a higher symmetric payoff at the start of the game \( (u_H > \bar{u}) \). One perspective on this result is that the first period is a special period, since players are not encumbered by obligations that are derived from past favors; hence, they may set \( x = y = 1 \) and exhibit full trust in the first period. We observe as well that the player that made a period-one transfer emerges as the favored player in period two and in fact then enjoys a higher continuation value than at the start of the game \( (\bar{u} > u_H) \). Correspondingly, the player that enters period two as the disfavored player experiences a reduced continuation value \( (\bar{u} < u_H) \).

We next compare optimal hybrid equilibria and optimal SSE. We focus on region \( I_2 \), where \( 1 < p(1 + qk) \). We provide two results. First, recall from Proposition 5 that the optimal SSE generates the autarky payoff, \( u_{\text{aut}} \), in the subset of region \( I_2 \) in which \( q \leq \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \beta < \frac{1}{p(1+qk)} \). In Figure 2, members of this subset satisfy \( q \leq \frac{1}{2} \) and rest below the \( p_s = p \) curve, where \( p_s = \frac{1}{\beta(1+qk)} \). Using Proposition 5 and Corollary 2, we may thus conclude that:

**Corollary 3.** If \( q \leq \frac{1}{2} \) and \( 1 < p(1 + qk) < 1/\beta \), then the optimal hybrid equilibrium offers a strictly higher total payoff than does the optimal SSE and any HSSGL. In fact, under these conditions, \( u_H > \bar{u} > u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \).

We have thus identified a subset of region \( I_2 \) in which the optimal hybrid equilibrium offers a strict improvement over HSSGL’s and optimal SSE.

To develop our second result, we recall Proposition 4. As indicated there, when \( p \) is sufficiently close to \( \frac{1}{2} \), players achieve a higher total payoff in the optimal SSE than in any HSSGL: \( u_{\text{max}} > \bar{u} \). We now confirm that, under similar circumstances, the optimal SSE also improves upon the optimal hybrid equilibrium: \( u_{\text{max}} > u_H \). Interestingly, this ranking obtains even though the optimal hybrid equilibrium also employs symmetric punishments after neutral states.

Following Proposition 4, we focus on the subset of region \( I_2 \) for which \( \frac{1}{\beta} < p(1 + qk) \), or equivalently \( p_s < p \). As established previously and depicted in Figure 2, \( p_s < \frac{1}{2} \) when \( q = 1 \). The subset thus exists. Over this subset, we have from Proposition 4 that \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} + \frac{p(qk+1)-1}{1-\beta} \). Next, since \( 1 < \frac{1}{\beta} < p(1 + qk) \), we may use (21) and write

\[
u_H - u_{\text{max}} = [p(qk + 1) - 1] + p + \beta(1-p)\bar{u} + \beta p\bar{u} - u_{\text{aut}} - \frac{p(qk + 1) - 1}{1-\beta}.
\]
After further manipulations, we find that \( \text{sign}\{u_{\text{max}} - u_H\} = \text{sign}\{p - p^*\} \), where

\[
p^* = \frac{1}{\sqrt{qk + 1}}.
\]

Simple calculations reveal that \( 1 < p^*(qk + 1), \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial q} < 0 \) and \( \lim_{q \to 1/k} p^* = 1/2 \). Using these facts, and that \( p_s = 1/2 \) when \( q = \frac{2-\beta}{k\beta} \), we may draw the following conclusion: For all \( q \in (\frac{2-\beta}{k\beta}, 1) \), there exists \( p_L(q) \) satisfying \( \max\{p_s, p^*\} \leq p_L(q) < \frac{1}{2} \) and such that, for all \( p \in (p_L(q), \frac{1}{2}) \), \( u_{\text{max}} > u_H \).\(^{17}\)

We may now summarize as follows:

**Corollary 4.** There exists a subset of region \( I_2 \) for which the optimal SSE offers a strictly higher total payoff than does the optimal hybrid equilibrium, and thus \( u_H < u_{\text{max}} \).

Finally, we note that the payoffs may also be easily compared in region \( I_1 \). In this region, the optimal SSE yields autarkic payoffs: \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \). Throughout this region, the optimal hybrid equilibrium corresponds to a HSSGL and thus yields the higher payoff \( u_H = \tilde{u} > u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \).

V. Conclusion

We study a repeated trust game with private information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, either immediately or in the future. Private information is a fundamental ingredient in our theory. A player with the ability to provide a favor must have the incentive to reveal this capability, and this incentive is provided by an equilibrium construction in which favors are reciprocated.

Our study offers new predictions with respect to the social interactions of self-interested individuals. In particular, we offer the novel prediction that the size of a favor owed may decline over time, as neutral phases of the relationship are experienced in a favor-exchange relationship. We also describe circumstances in which a relationship founded on favor exchange may be inferior to a relationship in which an infrequent and symmetric punishment (e.g., a risk of temporary or permanent autarky) keeps players honest. Finally, we show that a hybrid

\(^{17}\)For higher values of \( q \), it is possible that the relevant constraint is that \( p > 1 - \frac{1}{2q} \). In Figure 1, this inequality corresponds to the positively sloped line that separates regions \( I_2 \) and \( I_3 \). It is thus possible that \( \max\{p_s, p^*\} < p_L(q) \).
relationship, in which players begin with a honeymoon period and then either proceed to a favor-exchange relationship or suffer a symmetric punishment, can also offer scope for improvement.

While we motivate our analysis in general terms as an equilibrium theory of trust, reciprocity and favors, it may also be useful for specific economic applications. Following Garicano and Santos (2004), consider for example the market for referrals. Suppose there are two players and two tasks, where player \( a \) (\( b \)) has an advantage in performing task 1 (2).\(^ {18} \) In a given period, an individual may contact player \( a \) (\( b \)) and request that this player perform task 2 (1) for a fee. It is also possible that no such contact occurs. Each player can profitably perform both tasks; however, under efficient cooperation, player \( a \) (\( b \)) would refer any individual requesting task 2 (1) to player \( b \) (\( a \)). Assume one player does not observe when the other is contacted: the capacity to provide a referral is private information. The contacted player may thus privately perform the entire task or refer some or all of the task to the other player. If a referral is made, then it is public; e.g., the contacted player may send a referral letter. When a referral is made, the individual may not actually contact the other player: the referral may not be received. If the referral is received, then the other player may elect to send a referral fee. Assume the other player privately observes whether the referral is received. If we now think of a referral as a favor and a referral fee as immediate reciprocity, then the repeated trust game with private information can be reinterpreted as a repeated referral game with private information.

Much work remains. First, we hope that some of our predictions can be tested in the laboratory. In part for this reason, we use the popular trust model. Second, future work might consider whether other behavioral regularities might be interpreted using the theory of repeated games with private information. Finally, the analysis developed here might be reinterpreted or extended in such a way as to offer useful insight for other specific economic applications.

VI. References


\(^ {18} \)For instance, player \( a \) (\( b \)) may be a plumber (electrician) who is also able to perform certain electrical (plumbing) tasks.


VII. Appendix

A. Proof of Proposition 1

We show that the proposed specification implements the corner utility pair \((u, v) = (u, \overline{u})\) for a symmetric self-generating line. First, we observe that 
\[
\overline{u} + u = T = p\left[\frac{1 + qk}{1 - \beta}\right] = u_{i\theta} + v_{i\theta} = u_o + v_o, \text{ for all } i \in \{a, b\} \text{ and } \theta \in \{0, 1\}.
\]
Second, we observe that 
\[
\overline{u} - u = p\left(\frac{1 + qk}{1 - \beta + 2\beta p}\right) \geq 1/\beta, \text{ where the inequality is strict if } \beta > \beta^*.
\]
Third, it is now direct to confirm that the specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints, (1)-(5), and also the promise keeping constraints, (6) and (7). Finally, as explained in the statement of the proposition, we may now implement the opposite corner utility pair, \((\overline{u}, u)\).

B. Self-Generating Lines: Necessary Features

We begin by considering the level of trust along a self-generating line. Our first finding is that the level of trust is fixed along a self-generating line.

Lemma 1. Along a self-generating line, total payoff is given as
\[
T = \frac{p[2 + (x + y)(qk - 1)]}{1 - \beta},
\]
and so the same level of trust, \(x + y\), is used when implementing any pair on the self-generating line.

Proof: Using (6) and (7), if we can implement a pair \((u, v)\) on a self-generating line, then
\[
T \equiv u + v = p\left[2 - x - y + q(r + s + \beta(u_{a1} + v_{b1})) + (1 - q)\beta(u_{ao} + v_{bo}) + q[k(x + y) - (r + s) + \beta(u_{b1} + v_{a1})] + (1 - q)\beta(u_{bo} + v_{ao})\right] + (1 - 2p)\beta(u_o + v_o).
\]
Rearranging and using \(u_o + v_o = T = u_{i\theta} + v_{i\theta}\), we may solve for \(T\) and confirm (22).

We now consider whether a self-generating line can take the form of a self-generating point. In other words, can we implement a single utility pair, \((u, v)\), using continuation values that satisfy \((u_{i\theta}, v_{i\theta}) = (u, v)\) and \((u_o, v_o) = (u, v)\)? Our next finding confirms that the opportunities for such an outcome are quite limited.

Lemma 2. A point \((u, v)\) constitutes a self-generating line if and only if \(u = v = \frac{p}{1 - \beta}\).
Proof: Suppose \( u_i = u_o = u \) and \( v_i = v_o = v \). Using (2), it follows that \( qr \geq x \). Likewise, (3) implies that \( qs \geq y \). Next, (4) and (5) respectively imply that \( 0 \geq s \) and \( 0 \geq r \), from which it follows (from feasibility) that \( s = 0 = r \). It thus follows that \( 0 \geq y \) and \( 0 \geq x \), from which it follows (from feasibility) that \( x = 0 = y \). Using \( u_i = u_o = u \) and \( s = r = x = y = 0 \), we may solve (6) for \( u \), finding that \( u = \frac{p}{1-\beta} \).

This finding indicates that a point is self-generating only if it entails no trust (i.e., \( x = y = 0 \)) and thus results in the Nash (autarky) payoff.

We consider now the implementation of the corner of a self-generating line, \((u, \overline{u})\). We focus here on symmetric self-generating lines, where \( u = \overline{u} \), and \( \overline{u} = \overline{v} \). Our finding places some structure on \( x \) and \( y \).

Lemma 3. Consider any symmetric self-generating line with \( T > \frac{2p}{1-\beta} \). Let \((u, \overline{u})\) denote the point on the line at which player a’s utility is minimized. The implementation of \((u, \overline{u})\) requires \( x > y \), and so player a exhibits more trust.

Proof: Given \( T > \frac{2p}{1-\beta} \), the line must not be a point (by Lemma 2). Thus, \( u < T/2 \). Using Lemma 1, it follows that

\[
 u < \frac{p[2 + (x+y)(qk - 1)]}{2(1-\beta)}.
\]

Next, using (2) and (4), we have from (6) that

\[
 u \geq p(1 + \beta u_o) + p\{q(ky + \beta u_{bo}) + (1-q)\beta u_{bo}\} + (1 - 2p)\beta u_o
 = p + pqk y + (1 - p)\beta u_o + p \beta u_{bo}
 \geq p + pqk y + (1 - p)\beta u + p \beta u
 = p + pqk y + \beta u,
\]

where in the second inequality we use \( u_o \geq u \) and \( u_{bo} \geq u \). It follows that

\[
 u \geq \frac{p + pqk y}{1 - \beta}.
\]

Using (23) and (24), it is clearly necessary that

\[
 f(x, y) \equiv \frac{p[2 + (x+y)(qk - 1)]}{2(1-\beta)} - \frac{p + pqk y}{1 - \beta} > 0.
\]

Calculations confirm the following inequalities: \( f_x > 0 > f_y \) and \( f(x, x) \leq 0 \). By the latter inequality and (25), \( x = y \) is not possible. Likewise, if \( x < y \), then a contradiction is reached with (25), since the inequalities just stated then imply that \( f(x, y) < 0 \).

Thus, a player’s utility can be driven to its minimum level along a self-generating line only if that player exhibits more trust. In essence, the trust that the player shows is the means through which that player’s utility is reduced.

In our model, players can achieve a first-best outcome only if they exhibit total trust \( x = y = 1 \). Building on Lemma 3, we now establish that players are not able to use a symmetric self-generating line to achieve a first-best outcome.
Corollary 5. There does not exist a symmetric self-generating line that yields first-best total payoffs.

The argument is simple. By Lemma 1, if a self-enforcing line generates first-best total payoffs, then \( x + y = 2 \) is required, so that total payoff is \( T = 2pqk/(1 - \beta) \). Given \( x \in [0, 1] \) and \( y \in [0, 1] \), this means that each utility pair on the self-generating line is implemented using \( x = y = 1 \). By Lemma 2, this total payoff cannot be achieved with a self-generating point. Further, as shown in Lemma 3, when a symmetric line is used, we can implement the corner only if \( x < y \). An implication of Corollary 5 is that no PPE can yield first-best total payoffs.

We consider next a necessary condition that is associated with the implementation of \((u, v)\) along a symmetric self-generating line. This condition establishes a key relationship between the level of trust and dynamic reciprocity.

Proposition 7. Consider any symmetric self-generating line and associated value \( x + y \). For any \((u, v)\) on this line to be implemented, it is necessary that

\[
u_{ao} - u_{bo} \geq \frac{x + y}{\beta}.
\]

Proof: Consider the implementation of any utility pair \((u, v)\) along a symmetric self-generating line. Using \( u_o + v_o = T \) and \( u_{i\theta} + v_{i\theta} = T \), we may rewrite (3) as

\[
1 - y + q[s - \beta u_{b1}] - (1 - q)\beta u_{bo} \geq 1 - \beta u_o.
\]

We may now add (2) and (27) to obtain

\[
u_{ao} - u_{bo} + q[u_{a1} - u_{b1} - u_{ao} + u_{bo}] \geq \frac{x + y - q(r + s)}{\beta}.
\]

In similar fashion, using \( u_{i\theta} + v_{i\theta} = T \), we may rewrite (5) as

\[
kx - r - \beta u_{a1} \geq kx - \beta u_{ao}.
\]

We may now add (4) and (29) to obtain

\[
\frac{-(r + s)}{\beta} \geq u_{a1} - u_{b1} - u_{ao} + u_{bo}.
\]

Using (28) and (30), we see that implementation of \((u, v)\) is possible only if (26) holds. ■

This proposition reveals two important lessons. First, if players achieve a positive level of trust, then dynamic reciprocity is necessary for the implementation of any utility pair along a symmetric self-generating line. In words, when the two players are cooperating along a line, player \(a\) must do better tomorrow when player \(a\) made an investment today and player \(b\) did not reciprocate than when player \(b\) made an investment today and player \(a\) did not reciprocate. It is perhaps surprising that dynamic reciprocity is required. After all, immediate reciprocity is also possible. The important point is that players can use immediate reciprocity only when they
have incentive to do so; thus, if player \( a \) makes an investment today and player \( b \) is expected to immediately reciprocate (if possible), then player \( b \) must foresee a reduced continuation value (i.e., a low \( v_{bo} \)) if immediate reciprocity is withheld. Along a self-generating line, this implies in turn that player \( a \) must enjoy an increased continuation value (i.e., a high \( u_{ao} \)) when player \( a \) makes an investment and immediate reciprocity fails to materialize. Second, as the players increase the level of trust (i.e., as they implement larger values for \( x + y \)), incentive compatibility implies that the degree of dynamic reciprocity (i.e., \( u_{ao} - u_{bo} \)) must also grow. Greater trust is associated with greater dynamic reciprocity.

C. Highest Symmetric Self-Generating Lines: Necessary Features

We focus on the implementation of a corner utility pair, \((u, v) = (\bar{u}, \bar{v})\), of a HSSGL. By the symmetry of the environment, if we can implement the corner pair \((u, \bar{v})\), then we can also implement the other corner pair, \((\bar{u}, v)\). Following Athey and Bagwell (2001), if players have access to a public-randomization device, then we can then implement any utility pair along the HSSGL as a convex combination of the two corners. Let \( \{x, y, r, s, u_{i0}, v_{i0}, u_{0}, v_{0}\} \) implement \((u, \bar{v})\) on a HSSGL. The pair \((u, \bar{v})\) on a HSSGL may admit distinct implementations; as well, multiple HSSGL’s may exist in that \((u, \bar{v})\) and \((\bar{u}, v)\) may differ across HSSGL’s. Our characterizations of necessary features thus take different forms. Our strongest characterizations hold for any HSSGL and for any implementation of the associated \((u, \bar{v})\). But it is also useful to offer characterizations of necessary features that apply only to certain HSSGL’s. By characterizing the necessary features of an implementation of the widest HSSGL, we acquire insights that enable us to construct a HSSGL.\(^{19}\)

We begin by confirming that a HSSGL must achieve some trust (i.e., \(x + y > 0\)) and thus generate a total payoff that exceeds the Nash autarky payoff (i.e., \(T > 2p/(1 - \beta)\)). To establish these points, we construct a symmetric self-generating line in which \(x + y = 1\).

**Lemma 4.** There exists a symmetric self-generating line, in which \(x + y = 1\) and thus \(T = p[1 + qk] / (1 - \beta) > 2p / (1 - \beta)\).

**Proof:** We implement the corner utility pair \((u, \bar{v})\) for a symmetric self-generating line with \(x = 1 > y = 0\). The opposite corner utility pair, \((\bar{v}, v)\), then can be implemented in symmetric fashion (with \(y = 1 > x = 0\)), and all utility pairs on the line between the corners can be implemented using a public-randomization device. Consider then the following specifications: \(x = 1, y = 0, r = s = 0, u_{a0} = u_{a1} = u + 1/\beta, u_{b0} = u_{b1} = u_{o} = u, v_{a0} = v_{a1} = \bar{v} - 1/\beta\) and \(v_{b0} = v_{b1} = v_{o} = \bar{v}\), where \(u = p / (1 - \beta)\) and \(\bar{v} = pqk / (1 - \beta)\). Observe that \(u + \bar{v} = T = p[1 + qk] / (1 - \beta) = u_{a0} + v_{a0} = u_{o} + v_{o}\) for all \(\theta \in \{0, 1\}\). It is direct to confirm that the specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints, (1)-(5), and also the promise keeping constraints, (6) and (7). Finally, given that \(\beta \geq \beta^*\), calculations confirm that \(u + 1/\beta \leq \bar{v}\), and so every specified utility pair indeed falls on the line that connects \((u, \bar{v})\) and \((\bar{v}, v)\).

Using Lemmas 2 and 4, we conclude that a HSSGL cannot be a point (i.e., \(\bar{u} > u\) on a HSSGL).

\(^{19}\)As noted in footnote 12, given a symmetric self-generating line, it is straightforward to establish the existence of a widest self-generating line that contains the given line. The existence of a widest HSGGL is used below in the proof of Lemma 7, for example.
Our next result holds for any HSSGL and implementation of the associated \((u, \overline{u})\).

**Lemma 5.** Fix any HSSGL. For any implementation of the associated \((u, \overline{u})\), \(x = 1\) and thus \(y < 1\).

**Proof:** Assume to the contrary that \((u, \overline{u})\) is implemented on a HSSGL with \(x < 1\). Recall from Lemma 1 that \(T = \frac{p(2+(x+y)(q^k-1))}{1-\beta}\). We obtain a contradiction by constructing an alternative self-generating line with \(u + v = T' > T\). To construct this alternative line, it is sufficient to implement a new corner pair, \((u', \overline{u}')\), on a line with \(T' > T\). The rest of the alternative line can be implemented using convex combinations of \((u', \overline{u}')\) and \((\overline{u}', u')\).

Starting from the implementation of \((u, \overline{u})\), we implement the new corner pair \((u', \overline{u}')\) by making several changes. First, we increase \(x\) by a small amount, \(\varepsilon > 0\). This change leads to a higher value for \(T\), which increases in amount \(\frac{p(qk-1)}{1-\beta} \varepsilon \equiv \gamma\). To place our new continuation pairs on this higher line, we must ensure that \(u' + \overline{u}'\) is higher than \(u + \overline{u}\) by \(\gamma\); likewise, we must ensure that the values for \(u_a + v_a\) and \(u_{a0} + v_{a0}\) increase by \(\gamma\), for all \(i\) and \(\theta\). To this end, we leave \(u_a\) and \(u_{a0}\) at their original levels, increase \(u_{a0}\) and \(u_{a1}\) by \(\varepsilon/\beta\), increase \(v_{a0}\) and \(v_{a1}\) by \(\gamma - \varepsilon/\beta\), and increase \(v_{b1}\), \(v_{b0}\) and \(v_a\) by \(\gamma\). Note that \(\gamma - \varepsilon/\beta \geq 0\) if and only if \(\beta \geq \beta^*\). We leave \(s\), \(r\) and \(y\) unaltered. Given that \((u, \overline{u})\) was originally implemented, it is straightforward to confirm that the new specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints, (1)-(5). Referring to (6), we calculate that \(u\) is unchanged (i.e., \(u = u'\)). We may use (7) to confirm that \(\overline{u}\) has increased by \(\gamma\) (i.e., \(\overline{u}' - \overline{u} = \gamma\)). Thus, all new continuation values are at or above \(u'\) and at or below \(\overline{u}'\), given \(\beta \geq \beta^*\), and thus rest on the new - and strictly higher - self-generating line. This is a contradiction, and so \(x = 1\) is necessary. Finally, given Corollary 5, it follows immediately that \(y < 1\). \(\blacksquare\)

Thus, when implementing the worst value on any HSSGL for player \(a\), player \(a\) must exhibit full trust (i.e., \(x = 1\)) even though player \(b\) does not (i.e., \(y < 1\)).

We next report two simple conditions that characterize any implementation of \((u, \overline{u})\) along the widest HSSGL.

**Lemma 6.** Consider the widest HSSGL. For any implementation of the associated \((u, \overline{u})\), \(u_{bo} = u\) and (4) binds.

**Proof:** Consider any implementation of \((u, \overline{u})\) along the widest HSSGL and suppose to the contrary that \(u_{bo} > u\). Then \(v_{bo} < \overline{u} = T - u\). Starting with this implementation, let us now decrease \(u_{bo}\) by \(\varepsilon > 0\) and increase \(v_{bo}\) by \(\varepsilon\). Making no other changes, we observe that the new specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints (1)-(5). Referring to (6) and (7), we see that the new corner utility pair, \((u', \overline{u}')\), satisfies \(u' < u\) and \(\overline{u}' > \overline{u}\), contradicting the assumption that the original implementation corresponded to the widest HSSGL.

Next, consider any implementation of \((u, \overline{u})\) along the widest HSSGL and suppose to the contrary that (4) is slack. Then \(\beta(u_{b1} - u_{bo}) > s \geq 0\), and it follows that \(u_{b1} > u\) and \(u_{bo} < \overline{u}\). Starting with this implementation, let us now decrease \(u_{b1}\) by \(\varepsilon > 0\) and increase \(v_{b1}\) by \(\varepsilon\). We note that (2) and (5) are unaffected by this change and thus continue to hold. Further, (3) is now sure to hold with slack, and (4) holds provided that \(\varepsilon\) is sufficiently small. Once again, we refer to (6) and (7) and observe that the new corner utility pair, \((u', \overline{u}')\), satisfies \(u' < u\)
and \( \pi' > \pi \), contradicting the assumption that the original implementation corresponded to the widest HSSGL.

As this result confirms, when implementing the worst value for player \( a \) along the widest HSSGL, player \( a \)'s continuation value remains at this worst value in the event that player \( a \) fails to reciprocate in the current period.

We now consider specific implementations of the corner utility pair for the widest HSSGL. In particular, we posit an implementation of the widest HSSGL and then show that an implementation must exist that satisfies useful properties.

**Lemma 7.** Consider the widest HSSGL. There exists an implementation of the associated \((u, \pi)\) in which (i) \((5)\) binds, (ii) \( r = s = 0, u_{a1} = u_{ao} \text{ and } u_{b1} = u_{bo} \), (iii) \((3)\) and \((2)\) bind, (iv) \( u_{ao} = u_{bo} + (x + y)/\beta \), and (v) \( x = 1, u_{bo} = u \) and \((4)\) binds.

**Proof:** To prove part (i), we fix any symmetric self-generating line and implementation of the associated \((u, \pi)\). Suppose that \((5)\) is slack. Then \( \beta (v_{a1} - v_{ao}) = \beta (u_{ao} - u_{a1}) > r \geq 0 \), and it follows that \( u_{a1} < \pi \) and \( u_{ao} > u \). Starting with this implementation, let us now decrease \( u_{ao} \) by \( \varepsilon > 0 \) and increase \( u_{a1} \) by \((1 - q)\varepsilon / q \). Correspondingly, we increase \( v_{ao} \) by \( \varepsilon > 0 \) and decrease \( v_{a1} \) by \((1 - q)\varepsilon / q \). For \( \varepsilon \) sufficiently small, \((5)\) continues to hold; furthermore, all other constraints are unaffected by this change. Thus, the new specification also implements \((u, \pi)\) along the same self-generating line. We can proceed in this way until \((5)\) binds.

For part (ii), we consider the widest HSSGL. By Lemma 6, we know that \((4)\) binds in the implementation of \((u, \pi)\). Further, as just established, there exists an implementation of \((u, \pi)\) under which \((5)\) binds. Thus, \((u, \pi)\) can be implemented with a specification under which \((4)\) and \((5)\) bind. For this implementation, we thus have that \( r + \beta u_{a1} = \beta u_{ao} \text{ and } s + \beta v_{b1} = \beta v_{bo} \). Given \( u_{ao} \) and \( v_{bo} \), any values for \( r, s, u_{a1} \) and \( v_{b1} \) that satisfy these latter two equations and feasibility constraints can also be used to implement \((u, \pi)\). Thus, there exists an implementation in which \( u_{a1} = u_{ao}, v_{b1} = v_{bo}, r = 0 \text{ and } s = 0 \).

For part (iii), we consider the widest HSSGL. We know there exists an implementation of \((u, \pi)\) in which \((4)\) and \((5)\) bind, and \( u_{a1} = u_{ao}, v_{b1} = v_{bo}, r = 0 \text{ and } s = 0 \). By Lemma 6, we also know that \( u_{bo} = u \). Since \( x = 1 \) by Lemma 5, we may use Proposition 7 and further conclude that \( u_{a1} = u_{ao} = u_{bo} + (x + y)/\beta > u \). Finally, we know from Corollary 5 that \( y < 1 \).

Let us now suppose that \((3)\) is slack in this implementation. Using the properties just reported, we then find that \( \beta [u_{ao} - u_{bo}] > y \geq 0 \), and so it follows that \( u_{ao} > u \). We now derive a contradiction, by implementing an alternative utility pair, \((u', \pi')\), such that \( T' = u' + \pi' > u + \pi = T \). Starting with the original implementation, we first increase \( \varepsilon \) by \( \varepsilon > 0 \), where \( \varepsilon \) is small. This change generates an increase in \( T \) in amount \( \gamma = \frac{p(\delta k - 1)}{1 - \beta} \varepsilon \). It also increases the right-hand side of \((6)\) by \( pq \varepsilon \). Second, we decrease \( u_{ao}, u_{a1} \text{ and } u \) in amount \( \delta \), where \( \delta \) satisfies \( p\beta \delta + (1 - 2p)\beta \delta = pq \varepsilon \) and is thus given by \( \delta = \frac{pq \varepsilon}{\beta(1 - p)} \). Third, we increase \( v_{ao}, v_{a1} \text{ and } v \) in amount \( \delta + \gamma \). Finally, we increase \( v_{b1} \) and \( v_{bo} \) in amount \( \gamma \), while leaving \( u_{a1} \) and \( u_{bo} \) unaltered. It is straightforward to confirm that our new specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints \((1)-(5)\), where \((3)\) continues to hold if \( \varepsilon \) is sufficiently small. Referring to \((6)\), we see that \( u' = u \). Since \( u_{a1}, u_{ao} \text{ and } u \) all exceed \( u \), all continuation values under our new specification continue to exceed \( u' = u \), provided that \( \varepsilon \) is small. Referring to \((7)\), we see that

34
\( \pi' = \pi + \gamma > \pi \). Since \( v_{ao}, v_{a1} \) and \( v_o \) are all less than \( \pi \), all continuation values rest below \( \pi' \). The contradiction is now established.

Last, we suppose that (2) is slack in this implementation. Recalling the properties reported above, we know that \( u_{a1} = u_{ao} > \mu \) and hence \( v_{a1} = v_{ao} < \pi \). We now derive a contradiction by constructing a wider HSSGL. To this end, we start with the original implementation, and then decrease \( u_{a1} \) by \( \varepsilon \) and increase \( v_{a1} \) by \( \varepsilon \). Making no other changes, we observe that the new specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints (1)-(5). Referring to (6) and (7), we see that the new specification implements \( (\mu', \pi') \), with \( \mu' < \mu \) and \( \pi' > \pi \). Thus, we can implement a wider line without changing \( T \), which is a contradiction.

For part (iv), we observe from above that there exists an implementation of \( (\mu, \pi) \) on the widest HSSGL, in which all four incentive constraints (i.e., (2)-(5)) bind, and \( u_{a1} = u_{ao}, v_{b1} = v_{bo}, r = 0 = s, u_{bo} = \mu \) and \( x = 1 > y \). Given that all four incentive constraints bind, we may follow the steps in the proof of Proposition 7 and confirm that the necessary condition (26) then must hold with equality: \( u_{ao} - u_{bo} = (x + y)/\beta \). Thus, \( u_{ao} = \mu + (x + y)/\beta \).

Finally, part (v) simply lists properties (identified and used above) which we establish in Lemmas 5 and 6 as being true in any implementation of the widest HSSGL. ■

According to this result, if we can implement a corner utility pair and thereby construct the widest HSSGL, then we can do so with an implementation for which (5) binds and in which neither player exhibits immediate reciprocity. Referring to Proposition 7 and Lemma 7, we are now able to summarize some key findings on dynamic and immediate reciprocity.

**Corollary 6.** For any symmetric self-generating line, any utility pair on the line can be implemented only if the implementation embodies dynamic reciprocity. In particular, for any HSSGL, the associated \( (\mu, \pi) \) can be implemented only if the implementation embodies dynamic reciprocity. In the widest HSSGL, there exists an implementation of the associated \( (\mu, \pi) \) such that neither player exhibits immediate reciprocity.

In short, dynamic reciprocity is necessary for constructing a HSSGL, but immediate reciprocity is not.

We are now in position to derive an upper bound for \( y \).

**Proposition 8.** Fix any HSSGL. For any implementation of the associated \( (\mu, \pi) \), \( x = 1 \) and \( y \leq \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*} \).

**Proof:** Consider any HSSGL and the implementation of the associated \( (\mu, \pi) \). By Lemma 5, \( x = 1 \). Suppose to the contrary that \( y > \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*} \). Let us now consider the widest HSSGL. (Recall that \( x + y \) is invariant across all HSSGL’s.) By Lemma 7, we can implement the associated \( (\mu, \pi) \) with all four incentive constraints (i.e., (2)-(5)) binding, \( u_{a1} = u_{ao} = \mu + (1 + y)/\beta \), \( u_{b1} = u_{bo} = \mu \) and \( r = 0 = s \). Referring to the binding (3), we find that \( u_o \) may be expressed as \( u_o = \mu + y/\beta \). Using this expression, we may derive from (6) that

\[
\mu = \frac{p + y[p(qk - 1) + 1]}{1 - \beta}. \tag{31}
\]
Using as well that \( u_o + v_o = u_{o\theta} + v_{\theta} = u + \pi \), we may derive from (7) that
\[
\bar{u} = \frac{pqk - y}{1 - \beta}. \tag{32}
\]
Recalling that \( u_{a1} = u_{ao} = u + (1 + y)/\beta \) and using (31), we may derive that
\[
u_{ao} = \frac{1 + y - \beta[1 - p - yp(qk - 1)]}{\beta(1 - \beta)}. \tag{33}
\]
Finally, we may use (32) and (33) to find that \( \bar{u} \geq u_{ao} \) if and only if \( y \leq \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*} \). Thus, under our assumption that \( y > \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*} \), it follows that \( \bar{u} < u_{ao} \), and so a contradiction is obtained. ■

Intuitively, the disfavored player is willing to exhibit full trust only if the future reward of becoming the favored player is sufficiently large. This implies in turn an upper bound on the investment that is provided by the favored player.

We note that Proposition 8 implies an upper bound for the total level of trust; in particular, this proposition establishes that, in the HSSGL,
\[
x + y \leq \frac{2\beta}{\beta + \beta^*}. \tag{34}
\]
Thus, Proposition 8 provides important guidance as we go forward and attempt to construct a HSSGL: if we can implement a symmetric self-generating line with \( x + y = 2\beta/(\beta + \beta^*) \), then we can be assured that we have constructed a HSSGL.

D. Highest Self-Generating Line: Implementation with a public randomization device

We now construct a HSSGL. We do this in two ways. First, in this subsection, we assume the existence of a public-randomization device and achieve the construction by implementing the corner utility pair \((u, \bar{u})\) along a HSSGL. Using Proposition 8, we can be assured that we have a HSSGL if \( x = 1 \) and \( y = \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*} \). Under this approach, when the implementation calls for an intermediate utility pair, the players may use the device to randomize over \((u, \bar{u})\) and \((\bar{u}, u)\) and generate the intermediate pair in expectation. Second, in the next subsection in which we prove Proposition 2, we construct a HSSGL when players do not have a public-randomization device. Any intermediate utility pair then must be directly implemented.

We begin with the situation in which players have access to a public-randomization device.

**Proposition 9.** There exists a HSSGL, in which \( x + y = 2\beta/(\beta + \beta^*) \) and \( T = p[2 + \frac{2\beta}{\beta + \beta^*}(qk - 1)]/(1 - \beta) \). In particular, the corner utility pair \((u, \bar{u})\) can be implemented using the following specifications: \( x = 1, y = (\beta - \beta^*)/(\beta + \beta^*), r = s = 0, u_{ao} = u_{a1} = u + (1 + y)/\beta = \bar{u}, u_{bo} = u_{b1} = u, u_o = u + y/\beta, v_{ao} = v_{a1} = u, v_{bo} = v_{b1} = \bar{u}, \) and \( v_o = \bar{u} - y/\beta, \) where
\[
u = \frac{p + \frac{\beta - \beta^*}{\beta + \beta^*} \cdot 1}{1 - \beta}, \quad \text{and} \tag{35}
\]
The corner utility pair $(\bar{u}, \bar{v})$ can be implemented symmetrically, by interchanging $x$ with $y$ and $u$ with $v$ in the above specification. Finally, any utility pair on the line between the corners - and specifically the utility pair $(u_o, v_o)$ - can be implemented using a public-randomization device so that each corner utility pair is selected for implementation with appropriate probability.

**Proof:** By Proposition 8, if a symmetric self-generating line exists for which $x+y = 2\beta/(\beta+\beta^*)$, then this line is a HSSGL. Thus, the proof is complete if we show that the specifications above implement the corner utility pair $(u, v) = (u, \bar{v})$ for a symmetric self-generating line. First, we observe that $u + \bar{u} = T = p[2 + \frac{2\beta}{\beta+\beta^*}(qk-1)]/(1-\beta) = u_{i\theta} + v_{i\theta} = u_o + v_o$, for all $i \in \{a, b\}$ and $\theta \in \{0, 1\}$. Second, we observe that $\bar{u} = u_{ao} = v_{a1} > u_o \geq u$, where the final inequality is strict when $\beta > \beta^*$. Third, it is direct to confirm that the specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints, (1)-(5), and also the promise keeping constraints, (6) and (7). In particular, the IC constraints all bind. Finally, as explained in the statement of the proposition, it is now direct to implement the opposite corner utility pair, $(\bar{u}, \bar{v})$, and we may then implement $(u_o, v_o)$ by using a public-randomization device. ■

The players may achieve a symmetric ex ante payoff of $(1/2)(u + \bar{u})$ if they begin the game with a coin toss that determines whether they implement $(u, \bar{v})$ or $(\bar{u}, v)$. If, say, player $b$ wins the toss, they start by implementing $(u, \bar{v})$ with player $b$ as the favored player. In this implementation, if player $a$ receives the income, then player $a$ exhibits full trust ($x=1$) and becomes the favored player in the next period when the players implement $(\bar{u}, v)$; if instead player $b$ receives the income, then player $b$ exhibits partial trust ($y<1$) and remains the favored player in the next period when the players again implement $(u, \bar{v})$; and finally if neither player reports income, then in the next period the players utilize the public-randomization device to implement in expectation the utility pair $(u_o, v_o)$. Notice that $v = v_o > u_o = u$, and so player $b$ remains the favored player in the final case; however, if $\beta > \beta^*$ so that $y > 0$, then player $a$’s expected utility following the event in which no income is reported is strictly greater than player $a$’s expected utility at the beginning of the period. As explained in the text, the implementation of $(u, \bar{v})$ requires player $b$ to report income (and thus send $y$ to player $a$), and this is accomplished by penalizing player $b$ somewhat when no income is reported.

While the implementation of a HSSGL in Proposition 9 does not utilize immediate reciprocity, alternative implementations of a HSSGL exist in which immediate reciprocity is used. Consider the following specifications: $x = 1, y = (\beta - \beta^*)/\beta, u_{b1} - s/\beta = u_{bo} = u, u_{ao} = u_{a1} + r/\beta = u + (1 + y)/\beta = \bar{u}, u_o = u + y/\beta, v_{bo} = v_{b1} - r/\beta = u, v_{ao} = v_{a1} + s/\beta = \bar{v}$, and $v_o = \bar{u} - y/\beta$. These specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints, (1)-(5), and also the promise keeping constraints, (6) and (7). Further, it is direct to confirm that $\bar{u} \geq u_{b1} = u + s/\beta$ if $s \leq \beta[\bar{u} - u] = 1 + y$; likewise, we see that $u \leq u_{a1}$ if $r \leq 1 + y$. Recalling that $s$ and $r$ are feasible if and only if $s \in [0, ky]$ and $r \in [0, kx]$, we may conclude that these specifications also implement a HSSGL provided that $s \in [0, \min(ky, 1+y)]$ and $r \in [0, \min(k, 1+y)]$, where $y = (\beta - \beta^*)/\beta$. We note that this family of implementations includes the implementation featured in Proposition 9 as a special case. Based on this discussion, we see that the practice of immediate reciprocity implies that a player that extends trust enjoys a less valuable future when some of that trust is reciprocated in the immediate period; for example, if the players seek to
implement \((u, \pi)\) and player \(a\) receives income, we see that \(u_{a1} < u_{ao}\) when \(r > 0\). By contrast, as Proposition 7 suggests, our analysis indicates that the extent of dynamic reciprocity, which we define as \(u_{ao} - u_{bo}\), remains at the value \(\pi - u\) whether or not players exhibit immediate reciprocity.

E. Proof of Proposition 2

Pick any utility pair \((u, v)\) such that \(u \in [u, \bar{u}], v \in [u, \bar{\pi}]\) and \(u + v = u + \bar{\pi}\). From Proposition 9, we know that \(u + \bar{u} = T = p[2 + \frac{2\beta}{\beta + \beta^*} (q_k - 1)] / (1 - \beta)\). Simplifying, we have that \(u + \bar{\pi} = \frac{2p}{1 - \beta} + \frac{2\beta (1 - \beta^*)}{(\beta + \beta^*) (1 - \beta) \beta^*}\). We also know that \(\bar{\pi} - u = 2 / (\beta + \beta^*)\), where \(u\) is given by (35). Using these facts, we may use (10) and (11) to confirm that \(x + y = 2 \beta / (\beta + \beta^*)\). Thus, by setting \(u_{ao} = u_{a1} = \bar{u}\), we also set \(u_{ao} = u_{a1} = u + (x + y) / \beta\). We now proceed as follows. First, using (12) and (13), we may confirm that \(u + \bar{u} = u + v = u + v\), for all \(i \in \{a, b\}\) and \(\theta \in \{0, 1\}\). Second, we may use (10)-(13) to confirm that the values for \(x, y, u_o\) and \(v_o\) are feasible. In particular, using (10), we find that \(x \geq 0\) since \(v \geq u\) and \(\beta \geq \beta^*\), where \(x > 0\) if \(v = u\) or \(\beta > \beta^*\); and we find that \(x \leq 1\) since \(v \leq \bar{u}\), where \(x < 1\) if \(v < \bar{u}\). Next, we may use (12) to confirm that \(u_o \leq \bar{u}\) since \(u \geq \bar{u}\) and \(\beta \geq \beta^*\), where \(u_o < \bar{u}\) if \(u < \bar{u}\) or \(\beta > \beta^*\); and we find that \(u_o \geq u\) since \(u \geq u\) and \(\beta \geq \beta^*\), where \(u_o > u\) if \(u > \bar{u}\) or \(\beta > \beta^*\). Finally, given that \(u + \bar{u} = u + v = u + v\), it now follows that \(v_o \geq u\) since \(v \geq u\) and \(\beta \geq \beta^*\), where \(v_o \leq u\) if \(v > \bar{u}\) or \(\beta > \beta^*\); and it follows as well that \(v_o \leq \bar{u}\) since \(v \leq \bar{u}\) and \(\beta \geq \beta^*\), where \(v_o < \bar{u}\) if \(v < \bar{u}\) or \(\beta > \beta^*\). Third, it is direct to confirm that the specifications satisfy the IR and IC constraints, (1)-(5), and also the promise keeping constraints, (6) and (7). In particular, the IC constraints all bind. Thus, any \((u, v)\) along the line connecting \((u, \bar{\pi})\) and \((\pi, u)\) can be implemented using only continuation values drawn from that line. ■

F. Proof of Proposition 3

Consider the widest HSSGL. Let \(\lambda\) be the set of points on this HSSGL for which there exist multiple implementations. Suppose to the contrary that \(\lambda \neq \emptyset\). Then it is straightforward to show that \(\lambda\) is convex and symmetric around the 45-degree line; therefore, \(\lambda\) contains \((\bar{u}, \bar{u})\), the middle point of this HSSGL. We will show that \((\bar{u}, \bar{u})\) is uniquely implemented, which then establishes that \(\lambda = \emptyset\).

Consider a point \((u, v)\) on the widest HSSGL and an implementation of it, \(i = \{x, y, r, s, u_{i0}, v_{i0}, u_o, v_o\}\). Following the proof of Lemma 7, given any implementation, we can find an alternative implementation such that (4) and (5) bind, \(r = s = 0\) and \(u_{i0} = u_{i1} \equiv u_i\), with all other variables remaining the same. For such an implementation, suppose that (2) is slack; that is, suppose \(\beta (u_a - u_o) > x \geq 0\). Then, for small \(\varepsilon > 0\), if we decrease \(u_a\) by \(\varepsilon\), increase \(u_o\) by \(\frac{p}{1 - 2p} \varepsilon\), and change nothing else, the resulting implementation is feasible and implements \((u, v)\). The same argument applies to a slack (3) as well. Therefore, given any implementation, we can find another implementation with the same values for \(x\) and \(y\) and with (2) and (3) binding.

38
We know that \( \tilde{\delta} = \{ \tilde{x} = \tilde{y} = \frac{\beta}{\beta + \beta_x}, \tilde{r} = \tilde{s} = \tilde{u}_{\theta} = \tilde{v}_{\theta} = \tilde{u}, \tilde{u}_{o} = \tilde{v}_{o} = \tilde{u} \} \) implements \((\tilde{u}, \tilde{u})\).

We now argue that \((\tilde{u}, \tilde{u})\) is uniquely implemented. Suppose to the contrary that there exists another implementation \(i = \{ x, y, r, s, u_{\theta}, v_{\theta}, u_{o}, v_{o} \} \) of \((\tilde{u}, \tilde{u})\). As established above, we can focus on an implementation \(\hat{i}\) such that (4), (5), (2) and (3) bind, \(r = s = 0\), and \(u_{i0} = u_{i1} \equiv u_i\). Define the following: \(\Delta x \equiv x - \tilde{x}, \Delta y \equiv y - \tilde{y}, \Delta u_{\pi} \equiv u_{\pi} - \tilde{u}_{\pi}, \Delta v_{\pi} \equiv v_{\pi} - \tilde{v}_{\pi} \) for \(\pi \in \{a, b, o\}\). Then \(\Delta x = -\Delta y\), since \(x + y = \tilde{x} + \tilde{y}\).

First, suppose that \(x \neq \tilde{x}\). As (2) and (3) bind under both \(\tilde{i}\) and \(i\), we have that \(\Delta x = \beta(\Delta u_a - \Delta u_o)\) and \(\Delta y = \beta(\Delta v_b - \Delta v_o) = -\beta(\Delta u_b - \Delta u_o)\). Further, the promise-keeping constraint, (6), must hold under both \(\tilde{i}\) and \(i\). Thus,

\[
0 = -p\Delta x + pqk\Delta y + \beta[p\Delta u_a + p\Delta u_b + (1 - 2p)\Delta u_o] \\
= -p\Delta x + pqk\Delta y + \beta[p(\Delta u_a - \Delta u_o) + p(\Delta u_b - \Delta u_o) + \Delta u_o],
\]

which implies

\[
\Delta u_o = \frac{p(qk - 1)}{\beta}\Delta x.
\]

Since \(\Delta x \neq 0\) and \(\frac{p(qk - 1)}{\beta} > 0\), \(\Delta u_o\) and \(\Delta x\) have the same sign. Recall that \(\tilde{u}_{\theta} \equiv \tilde{u}_a = \tilde{u}\). Thus, \(\Delta u_a \leq 0\). Now, if \(\Delta x = \beta(\Delta u_a - \Delta u_o) > 0\), then \(\Delta u_o < 0\), which is a contradiction. So, \(\Delta x \leq 0\) must hold. Using a similar argument, we can show that \(\Delta y \leq 0\) must hold as well.

First, suppose that \(\Delta u_o \neq 0\) and \(\Delta x = \Delta y = 0\). As (2) and (3) bind under both \(\tilde{i}\) and \(i\), we have that \(\Delta u_a = \Delta u_o\) and \(\Delta u_b = \Delta u_o\). As just argued, \(\Delta u_a \leq 0\). Similarly, with \(\tilde{u}_{b\theta} \equiv \tilde{u}_b = \tilde{u}\), \(\Delta u_b \geq 0\). Thus, it must be that \(\Delta u_o = 0\).

We conclude that \((\tilde{u}, \tilde{u})\) is uniquely implemented. Thus, \(\lambda = \emptyset\). That is, every point \((u, v)\) on the widest HSSGL is implemented uniquely. \(\blacksquare\)

G. Strongly Symmetric Equilibria (SSE)

We provide here proofs concerning strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE). Given any \(\psi_s = [u_{aut}, u]\), following APS (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1990), define

\[
B^{ss}(\psi_s) = \{ v : \exists x \in [0, 1], r \in [0, kx], v_o, v_{10}, v_{11} \in \psi_s \text{ such that} \}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
IC_x & : 1 - x + q(r + \beta v_{11}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{10} \geq 1 + \beta v_o, \\
IC_o & : kx - r + \beta v_{11} \geq kx + \beta v_{10}, \\
PK & : v = p[1 - x + q(r + \beta v_{11}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{10}] \\
& \quad + p[kx - r + \beta v_{11}] + (1 - q)\beta v_{10}] \\
& \quad + (1 - 2p)\beta v_o \}.
\end{align*}
\]

Let \(\psi_s^* = [u_{aut}, u_{max}]\) be the maximal fixed point of \(B^{ss}\). That is, if \([u_l, u_h]\) is a fixed point of \(B^{ss}\), then \([u_l, u_h] \subset [u_{aut}, u_{max}]\).

Refer to a pair \((q, p)\) as an information structure. Consider the set \(I = \{(q, p) : q \in \left(\frac{1}{k}, 1\right], p \in (0, \frac{1}{2})\}\), which is the set of all feasible information structures.
H. Solving for $\psi^*_s$

Start with a very large $u^1$. Given $u^n$, by slightly abusing the notation, define $u^{n+1}$ as follows:

$$u^{n+1} = B^{ss}(u^n) = \max u = p[1 - x + q(r + \beta v_{11}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{10}] + p[q(kx - r + \beta v_{11}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{10}] + (1 - 2p)\beta v_o$$

$$= p[1 + (qk - 1)x + 2\beta(qv_{11} + (1 - q)v_{10})] + (1 - 2p)\beta v_o$$

subject to

$$x \in [0, 1], \ r \in [0, kx], \ v_o, v_{10}, v_{11} \in [u_{aut}, u^n],$$

$$IC_x : 1 - x + q(r + \beta v_{11}) + (1 - q)\beta v_{10} \geq 1 + \beta v_o,$$

$$IC_\theta : kx - r + \beta v_{11} \geq kx + \beta v_{10}.$$ 

We will employ APS to solve for $u_{max}$. Accordingly, if $u^1 > u_{max}$, then $B^{ss}(u^n) < u^n$ and

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} u^n = u_{max} = B^{ss}(u_{max}).$$

Let $u_{eff} = \frac{\max qk}{1 - \beta}$ be the average utility of the first-best solution, i.e. investing $x = 1$ every period when some agent receives positive income. Then $u_{max} \leq u_{eff}$; therefore, it would suffice to start with $u^1 = u_{eff}$.

**Proposition:** For any $u \geq u_{aut}$, $IC_x$ and $IC_\theta$ bind at the solution of $B^{ss}(u)$.

**Proof:** The proof proceeds via three claims.

**Claim 1:** $v_{11} = u$.

**Proof:** If $v_{11} < u$, then increasing $v_{11}$ increases the objective without violating $IC_x$ and $IC_\theta$. Contradiction.

**Claim 2:** $IC_\theta$ is binding.

**Proof:** Suppose in contrary that $IC_\theta$ is slack. Then $u - v_{10} > \frac{r}{\beta} \geq 0$, i.e. $u > v_{10}$. Now increase $v_{10}$ by $\varepsilon > 0$. $IC_x$ becomes slack, $IC_\theta$ continues to hold if $\varepsilon$ is small enough. The objective increases. Contradiction.

**Claim 3:** $IC_x$ is binding.

**Proof:** To the contrary, suppose that $IC_x$ is slack. Then $v_o = u$ and $x = 1$. To see this, check the following: If $v_o < u$, then increase $v_o$ by $\varepsilon > 0$. $IC_x$ is not violated if $\varepsilon$ is small enough; $IC_\theta$ is not affected; and the objective increases. Contradiction. If $x < 1$, then increase $x$ by $\varepsilon > 0$. $IC_x$ is not violated if $\varepsilon$ is small enough; $IC_\theta$ is not affected; and the objective increases since $qk > 1$. Contradiction.

Substituting $v_o = u$ and $x = 1$, $IC_x$ becomes $q(r + \beta u) + (1 - q)\beta v_{10} > 1 + \beta u$, equivalently $qr > 1 + (1 - q)\beta(u - v_{10})$. Binding $IC_\theta$ yields $r = \beta(u - v_{10})$. These together imply $(2q - 1)r > 1$. Thus, a contradiction is immediate unless $2q - 1 > 0$. In that event, $r > \frac{1}{2q - 1} > 0$, and so $u > v_{10}$. We can thus increase $v_{10}$ by $\varepsilon > 0$, and decrease $r$ by $\beta \varepsilon$, and $IC_\theta$ continues to hold. Then the total change on the left hand side of $IC_x$ can be computed as $(1 - 2q)\beta \varepsilon$. Since $IC_x$ is slack by supposition, $IC_x$ continues to hold if $\varepsilon$ is small. The total change in the objective can be computed as $2p(1 - q)\beta \varepsilon > 0$, so the objective increases. Contradiction.

This completes the proof of the proposition.
Now, binding $IC_x$ and binding $IC_\theta$ imply $v_o = 2qu + (1 - 2q)v_{10} - \frac{x}{\beta}$. Substituting $v_{11} = u$, $v_o = 2qu + (1 - 2q)v_{10} - \frac{x}{\beta}$, and $r = \beta(u - v_{10})$ yields

$$B^{ss}(u) = \max \ p + 2q(1-p)\beta u + (p(qk + 1) - 1)x + (1 - 2q(1-p))\beta v_{10}$$

subject to

$$v_{10}, v_o = 2qu + (1 - 2q)v_{10} - \frac{x}{\beta} \in [u_{aut}, u],$$

$$0 \leq x \leq 1,$$  \hspace{1cm} (37)

$$\beta(u - v_{10}) \leq kx.$$  \hspace{1cm} (38)

The following three curves will be crucial in characterizing the optimal strongly symmetric equilibrium:

$$Curve 1 : p = \frac{1}{qk + 1},$$

$$Curve 2 : p = \frac{2q - 1}{2q},$$

$$Curve 3 : p = \frac{k(2q - 1) - 1}{qk - 1}.$$

Curve 1 is convex and decreasing in $q$. Curves 2 and 3 are both concave and increasing in $q$. Furthermore, all three curves intersect at $q^* = \frac{k + \sqrt{k^2 + 8k}}{4k} \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$. For $q < q^*$, curve 1 lies above curve 2, which lies above curve 3. For $q > q^*$, curve 3 lies above curve 2, which lies above curve 1. The three curves partition the set of information structures into six subsets. See Figure 3.

We drop the superscript of $u^n$ to simplify the notation.

**Case 1:** $p \geq \frac{2q-1}{2q}$, i.e. above curve 2.

Consider two subcases:

**Case 1.1:** $p \leq \frac{1}{qk + 1}$, i.e. below curve 1.

The coefficient of $x$ and $v_{10}$ are nonpositive and nonnegative, respectively, in the objective of $B^{ss}(u)$. Therefore, the objective function is nonincreasing in $x$ and nondecreasing in $v_{10}$. Setting $x = 0$, $v_{10} = u$, check that $v_o = u$ and $r = 0$ so that all the constraints are satisfied. This implies $B^{ss}(u) = p + \beta u$ for all $u$. Then $B^{ss}(u) < u$ as long as $u > u_{aut}$. Therefore, $u^\infty = \lim_{n \to \infty} u^n = u_{aut}$. Hence, $u_{max} = u_{aut}$ in this case.

**Case 1.2:** $p > \frac{1}{qk + 1}$, i.e. above curve 1.

The coefficient of $x$ is positive and the coefficient of $v_{10}$ is nonnegative in the objective of $B^{ss}(u)$. Check whether $x = 1$ and $v_{10} = u$ is a solution for $B^{ss}(u)$. Substituting $x = 1$ and $v_{10} = u$, we obtain $B^{ss}(u|x = 1, v_{10} = u) = p + \beta u + p(qk + 1) - 1$. Also, $B^{ss}(u|x = 1, v_{10} = u) < u$.
if and only if \( u > u_{\text{aut}} + \frac{p(qk+1)-1}{1-\beta} = \gamma \). Therefore, starting with \( u^1 = u_{\text{eff}} > \gamma \), we obtain a decreasing sequence of \( \{u^n\} \) with \( u^\infty = \lim_{n \to \infty} u^n = \gamma \).

Now check feasibility of the solution \( x = 1 \) in the limit: \( v_o = u^\infty - \frac{1}{\beta} \geq u_{\text{aut}} \) if and only if \( \beta \geq \frac{1}{p(qk+1)} \). Since \( p(qk+1) - 1 \geq 0 \), i.e. \( \frac{1}{p(qk+1)} < 1 \), in these regions, there exists \( \beta \geq \frac{1}{p(qk+1)} \). Then, for all \( u \geq u_{\text{max}} \), all the constraints are satisfied when \( x = 1 \), \( v_{10} = u \). Therefore, \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} + \frac{p(qk+1)-1}{1-\beta} \). Furthermore, check that \( \lim_{p \to 1/2} u_{\text{max}} = \lim_{p \to 1/2} u_{\text{eff}} \).

To address the possibility raised in Proposition 5, we now further suppose that \( q \leq 1/2 \) and \( \beta < \frac{1}{p(qk+1)} \). Suppose that both \( x < 1 \) and \( v_{10} < u_{\text{max}} \) is satisfied in the solution of \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) \). Then, we may increase \( v_{10} \) by \( \varepsilon \) and increase \( x \) by \( (1-2q)/\beta \varepsilon \). If \( \varepsilon > 0 \) is small enough, \( x < 1 \) and \( v_{10} < u_{\text{max}} \) continue to hold. Furthermore, \( v_o \) remains the same as defined by (37). Thus, all constraints hold and the objective of \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) \) increases, which is a contradiction. As a result, either \( x = 1 \) or \( v_{10} = u_{\text{max}} \) in the solution of \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) \). Suppose \( x = 1 \). Given \( q \leq 1/2 \), we may use (37) to find that
\[
v_o = 2qu_{\text{max}} + (1-2q)v_{10} - \frac{1}{\beta} \leq 2qu_{\text{max}} + (1-2q)u_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{\beta} = u_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{\beta}.
\]
Arguing as in the previous paragraph, we may now use \( \beta < \frac{1}{p(qk+1)} \) and conclude that it is not possible that \( x = 1 \) in the solution of \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) \). Thus, it can only be that \( x < 1 \) and \( v_{10} = u_{\text{max}} \) hold in the solution of \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) \). Note that (37) is the only constraint that causes \( x < 1 \). Therefore, (37) is binding from below in the solution of \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) \). This yields \( v_o = 2qu_{\text{max}} + (1-2q)u_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{\beta} = u_{\text{aut}} \), so that \( x = \beta(u_{\text{max}} - u_{\text{aut}}) \). Substituting \( v_{10} = u_{\text{max}} \) and \( x = \beta(u_{\text{max}} - u_{\text{aut}}) \) into the objective of \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) \), we obtain
\[
u_{\text{max}} = B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) = p + \beta u_{\text{max}} + (p(qk+1) - 1)\beta(u_{\text{max}} - u_{\text{aut}}).
\]
Simplifying and using \( \beta < \frac{1}{p(qk+1)} \), we obtain \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \).

Case 2: \( p < \frac{2q-1}{2q} \), i.e. below curve 2.

The coefficient of \( v_{10} \) is negative in the objective function. Also \( p < \frac{2q-1}{2q} \) implies \( q > \frac{1}{2(1-p)} > \frac{1}{2} \), so the coefficient of \( v_{10} \) in (37) is negative as well. Consider following subcases:

Case 2.1: \( p < \frac{1}{qk+1} \), i.e. below curve 1.

The coefficient of \( x \) is negative in the objective function. \( q \) varies between \( \frac{1}{2} \) and 1. Curve 3 intersects the \( q \)-axis at \( q = \frac{1+k}{2k} \). We will consider the following three subsubcases:

Case 2.1.1: \( q < \frac{1+k}{2k} \), i.e. to the left of where curve 3 intersects the \( q \)-axis.

Note that \( 2q - \frac{1}{k} \in (0,1) \). So, \( (2q - \frac{1}{k})u + (1 - 2q + \frac{1}{k})v_{10} \in [u_{\text{aut}},u] \) if \( v_{10} \in [u_{\text{aut}},u] \). Also, if (39) binds, \( v_o = (2q - \frac{1}{k})u + (1 - 2q + \frac{1}{k})v_{10} \). Now, suppose that (39) is slack at the optimal solution. Then decrease \( x \) so that (39) binds. This \( v_o \in [u_{\text{aut}},u] \) holds because of the previous argument, and the objective increases. A contradiction. Therefore, (39) is binding at the optimal solution.
Now consider \( x > 0, v_{10} < u \), and a decrease in \( x \) by \( \varepsilon > 0 \). In order to satisfy \( \beta(u-v_{10}) = kx \), increase \( \beta v_{10} \) by \( k\varepsilon \). This changes the objective by \( \Delta = -(p(qk+1) - 1)\varepsilon + (1-2q(1-p))k\varepsilon \).

Check that \( \Delta > 0 \iff p > \frac{k(2q-1)^{-1}}{qk-1} \), which holds in this case. Therefore, check \( x = 0 \) and \( v_{10} = u \). All the constraints are satisfied when \( x = 0 \) and \( v_{10} = u \). So, \( x = 0 \) and \( v_{10} = u \) hold at the optimal solution for all \( u > u_{\text{max}} \). Then \( B^{ss}(u) = p + \beta u \), and \( B^{ss}(u) < u \iff u > u_{\text{aut}} \), so that we have \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \).

**Case 2.1.2:** \( \frac{1+k}{2k} \leq q < q^* \).

Suppose that (39) binds at the optimal solution. Then \( v_o = (2q - \frac{1}{k})u + (1 - 2q + \frac{1}{k})v_{10} \) is (weakly) decreasing in \( v_{10} \), and \( v_o = u \) when \( v_{10} = u \). Suppose \( \frac{k+1}{2k} < q \). Then \( v_o \leq u \) implies that \( v_{10} = v_o = u \), which implies \( x = 0 \). Alternatively, suppose \( \frac{k+1}{2k} = q \). Then \( v_o = u \) for all \( v_{10} \). If \( x > 0 \) and \( v_{10} < u \), we can follow the argument above (for Case 2.1.1), and decrease \( x \) by \( \varepsilon > 0 \) and increase \( \beta v_{10} \) by \( k\varepsilon \). We then satisfy (39) and induce \( \Delta > 0 \), since \( p > \frac{k(2q-1)^{-1}}{qk-1} = 0 \). Thus, \( v_{10} = v_o = u \) and \( x = 0 \) again follows. So, in either case, \( B^{ss}(u) = p + \beta u \).

Now suppose that (39) is slack. If \( v_o = 2qu + (1 - 2q)v_{10} = \frac{x}{\beta} < u \), we can increase the objective by decreasing \( x \). So, \( v_o = u \) must hold. Then \( x = \beta(2q-1)(u - v_{10}) \). Substituting \( x \) in \( B^{ss}(u) \), and taking its partial derivative with respect to \( v_{10} \), we obtain \( \frac{\partial B^{ss}(u)}{\partial v_{10}} = p\beta[-2kq^2 + qk + 1] > 0 \) since \( q < q^* \). Also check that \( v_{10} = u \) implies \( x = 0 \) and \( v_o = u \). That is, all the constraints are satisfied. Therefore, \( v_{10} = v_o = u \) and \( x = 0 \) hold in the solution of \( B^{ss}(u) \). Again, \( B^{ss}(u) = p + \beta u \).

We obtain \( B^{ss}(u) = p + \beta u \) in both cases. Hence, by taking the limit, we obtain \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \) in this case.

**Case 2.1.3:** \( q \geq q^* \).

Suppose that (39) binds at the optimal solution of \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) \). The same argument in Case 2.1.2 applies: \( v_o = (2q - \frac{1}{k})u + (1 - 2q + \frac{1}{k})v_{10} \) is decreasing in \( v_{10} \), and \( v_o = u \) when \( v_{10} = u \). Then \( v_o \leq u \) implies that \( v_{10} = v_o = u \), which implies \( x = 0 \). So, \( B^{ss}(u_{\text{max}}) = p + \beta u_{\text{max}} \), which yields \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} \). We will rule out this possibility next.

Now suppose that (39) is slack. Then, by the same reasoning in Case 2.1.2, \( v_o = u \) and \( x = \beta(2q-1)(u - v_{10}) \). Substituting these in \( B^{ss}(u) \), we obtain \( \frac{\partial B^{ss}(u)}{\partial v_{10}} = p\beta[-2kq^2 + qk + 1] < 0 \) since \( q \geq q^* \). Therefore choose, \( v_o = u, x = \beta(2q-1)(u - v_{10}) \), and \( v_{10} \) as small as possible subject to \( x \leq 1 \) and \( v_{10} \geq u_{\text{aut}} \). Check that \( \beta(u - v_{10}) \leq kx \) is equivalent to \( q \geq \frac{1+k}{2k} \), which is satisfied in this case. So, either (i) \( v_{10} = u_{\text{aut}} \) and \( x = \beta(2q-1)(u - u_{\text{aut}}) \leq 1 \), or (ii) \( x = 1 \) and \( v_{10} = u - \frac{1}{\beta(2q-1)} \geq u_{\text{aut}} \) holds in the solution. As we start with a large \( u \), \( x = \beta(2q-1)(u - u_{\text{aut}}) \) will exceed 1, therefore case (ii) will hold for large \( u \).

Now check if case (ii) holds in the limit. In case (ii), we have

\[
B^{ss}(u) = p + 2q(1-p)\beta u + (p(qk+1) - 1) + (1-2q(1-p))\beta(u - \frac{1}{\beta(2q-1)})
= p + \beta u + \lambda
\]

where \( \lambda = (p(qk+1) - 1) - \frac{1-2q(1-p)}{2q-1} = \frac{p}{2q-1}(2kq^2 - qk - 1) \geq 0 \) since \( q \geq q^* \).

In the limit, we obtain \( u^\infty = u_{\text{aut}} + \frac{\lambda}{1-\beta} \). So, \( v_{10} = u^\infty - \frac{1}{\beta(2q-1)} \geq u_{\text{aut}} \) is equivalent to \( \beta \geq \tilde{\beta} = \frac{1}{1+p(2kq^2 - qk - 1)} \). So, for \( \beta \geq \tilde{\beta} \), we obtain \( u_{\text{max}} = u_{\text{aut}} + \frac{\lambda}{1-\beta} \) and \( \lim_{q \to 1} u_{\text{max}} = \lim_{q \to 1} u_{\text{eff}} \).

43
This also rules out binding (39). Note that \( \hat{\beta} < 1 \iff q > q^* \).

**Case 2.2:** \( p \geq \frac{1}{qk+1} \), i.e. above curve 1

In this case, the coefficients of \( x \) and \( v_{10} \) in the objective of \( B^{ss}(u) \) are nonnegative and negative, respectively. So, the objective function is nonincreasing in \( x \) and decreasing in \( v_{10} \).

Obviously, all the constraints cannot be slack at the optimal solution. Consider \( x < 1 \) and \( v_{10} > u_{aut} \). Decrease \( v_{10} \) by \( \varepsilon \) and increase \( x \) by \( \beta (2q - 1) \varepsilon \). Then \( v_o \) remains unchanged. The left hand side of (39) increases by \( \beta \varepsilon \). The right hand side of (39) increases by \( k (2q - 1) \beta \varepsilon \). Note that \( q > \frac{1+k}{2k} \), i.e. \( k (2q - 1) > 1 \) in this case. Therefore, (39) becomes slack and the objective increases. So (39) is slack in the optimal solution.

The same argument also implies that (i) if \( x < 1 \) then \( v_{10} = u_{aut} \), and (ii) if \( v_{10} > u_{aut} \) then \( x = 1 \). Otherwise it would be possible to increase the objective as above.

In case (i), \( x < 1 \) would also imply \( v_o = u_{aut} \). Otherwise, a small increase in \( x \) would increase the objective without violating any constraint. Similarly, in case (ii), \( v_{10} > u_{aut} \) would also imply \( v_o = u \). Otherwise, a small decrease in \( v_{10} \) would increase the objective without violating any constraint, since (39) is slack.

In case (i), solving \( x \) from \( v_o = 2qu + (1-2q)v_{10} - \frac{\beta}{2} \), we get \( x = 2q \beta (u - u_{aut}) \). Then \( x < 1 \) is equivalent to \( u - u_{aut} < \frac{1}{2q} \). In case (ii), solving \( v_{10} \) from \( v_o = 2qu + (1-2q)v_{10} - \frac{\beta}{2} \in [u_{aut}, u] \), we obtain \( v_{10} = u - \frac{\beta}{2(2q-1)} u_{aut} \). Then \( v_{10} > u_{aut} \) is equivalent to \( u - u_{aut} > \frac{1}{\beta (2q-1)} \). Since \( \frac{1}{2q} < \frac{1}{\beta (2q-1)} \), \( u - u_{aut} < \frac{1}{2q} \) and \( u - u_{aut} > \frac{1}{\beta (2q-1)} \) cannot hold simultaneously. For large \( u \), \( u - u_{aut} < \frac{1}{\beta (2q-1)} \) holds. Thus, for large \( u \), by setting \( x = 1 \), \( v_o = u \) and \( v_{10} = u - \frac{1}{\beta (2q-1)} u_{aut} \), we get \( B^{ss}(u) = p + \beta u + \lambda \) and \( u^\infty = u_{aut} + \frac{\lambda}{1-\beta} \) as above. Also, \( v_{10} = u^\infty - \frac{1}{\beta (2q-1)} u_{aut} \) is equivalent to \( \beta \geq \hat{\beta} \) as above. So, for \( \beta \geq \hat{\beta} \), we obtain \( u_{max} = u_{aut} + \frac{\lambda}{1-\beta} \) and \( \lim_{q \to 1} u_{max} = \lim_{q \to 1} u_{eff} \).

**I. Characterization of Optimal Hybrid Equilibria**

We begin with the following lemma:

**Lemma 8.** In any implementation of an optimal hybrid equilibrium, (2) and (3) bind and

\[
    u = p + \beta u_o [1 - p (1 + qk)] + p \beta [q k \bar{u} + u].
\]

**Proof:** Suppose (2) is slack. If \( x = y < 1 \), then we can raise \( x \) and \( y \) by a small amount while keeping \( u_o = v_o \) fixed. This new implementation satisfies all constraints and generates a higher utility, contradicting the hypothesis that the original specification implemented an optimal hybrid equilibrium. Likewise, if \( x = y = 1 \) and \( u_o = v_o < u \), then we can obtain a contradiction by increasing \( u_o = v_o \) a small amount while keeping \( x = y = 1 \). Finally, if \( u_o = v_o = u \) and \( x = y = 1 \), then \( u < \bar{u} - 1/\beta < \bar{u} - 1/(\beta + \beta^*) = (\bar{u} + u)/2 \equiv \bar{u} \), where the first inequality follows from the supposition that (2) is slack. A contradiction is obtained, since players may implement a hybrid equilibrium that generates the higher utility \( \bar{u} \), by using the implementation of a HSSGL that is specified in Proposition 2 when \( (u, v) = (\bar{u}, \bar{u}) = (u_o, v_o) \). (See also Corollary 1.) Thus, (2) is binding, and by symmetry so is (3). Next, given that (2) and (3) bind, we may substitute for \( x \) and \( y \) in (6) and thereby derive (40). \( \blacksquare \)
Our next finding indicates that the characterization of optimal hybrid equilibria is sensitive to the sign of $1 - p(1 + qk)$.

**Lemma 9.** Suppose $\{x, u_o\}$ implements $u$ in an optimal hybrid equilibrium. If $1 < p(1 + qk)$, then $x = 1$, $u_o = \bar{u} - 1/\beta$ and

$$u = \left[p(qk + 1) - 1\right] + p + \beta(1 - p)\bar{u} + \beta pu.$$  

(41)

If $1 > p(1 + qk)$, then $x = \frac{\beta}{\beta + \beta^*}$ and $u_o = u = \tilde{u}$. If $1 = p(1 + qk)$, then $u = \tilde{u}$.

**Proof:** First, suppose $\{x, u_o\}$ implements $u$ in an optimal hybrid equilibrium and that $1 < p(1 + qk)$. Using (40), we see that $u$ is greater when $u_o$ is lower. Lemma 8 indicates that (2) must bind; thus, it is necessary that $u_o = \bar{u} - x/\beta$. Suppose $x < 1$. We then have that $u_o = \bar{u} - x/\beta > \bar{u} - 1/\beta \geq u \geq u_{out}$, where the weak inequalities are strict if $\beta > \beta^*$. With $x < 1$ and $u_o = u_{out}$, we may thus increase $x = y$ by $\epsilon$ and decrease $u_o = v_o$ by $\epsilon/\beta$. All constraints remain satisfied. Using (6), we see that utility is increased by $-\epsilon v + pqk\epsilon(1 - 2p)\beta(-\epsilon/\beta) = \epsilon[p(qk + 1) - 1] > 0$, a contradiction. Thus, if $\{x, u_o\}$ implements $u$ in an optimal hybrid equilibrium, then $x = 1$ and $u_o = \bar{u} - 1/\beta$. Using (40), we may then confirm that $u$ is given as in (41).

Second, suppose $\{x, u_o\}$ implements $u$ in an optimal hybrid equilibrium and that $1 > p(1 + qk)$. As noted in the proof of Lemma 8, we may implement a hybrid equilibrium that generates the payoff $\bar{u}$. Thus, it is necessary that $u \geq \bar{u}$. Suppose $u > \bar{u}$. Since (2) and (3) bind in the implementation of $\bar{u}$, we may reason as in the proof of Lemma 8 and conclude that $\tilde{u}$ satisfies

$$\tilde{u} = p + \beta\bar{u}[1 - p(1 + qk)] + p\beta[qk\bar{u} + u].$$

(42)

Likewise, $u$ and $u_o$ must satisfy (40). Subtracting (42) from (40) and using $\beta[1 - p(1 + qk)] \in (0, 1)$, we obtain $u - \tilde{u} = \beta[1 - p(1 + qk)](u_o - \bar{u}) < u_o - \tilde{u}$, and so it follows that $u_o > u$. This contradicts the requirement that $u_o = v_o = [u_{out}, u]$. It follows that the optimal hybrid equilibrium utility is $\bar{u}$, when $1 > p(1 + qk)$. Correspondingly, we then have $x = \beta(\bar{u} - \bar{u}) = \frac{\beta}{\beta + \beta^*}$.

Finally, suppose $\{x, u_o\}$ implements $u$ in an optimal hybrid equilibrium and that $1 = p(1 + qk)$. Using (40), we see that $u$ is then independent of $u_o$, when (2) binds. Using (40), the corresponding payoff is $u = p + p\beta[qk\bar{u} + u]$. By (42), when $1 = p(1 + qk)$, $u = \bar{u}$.

As discussed in the text, the key intuition is that a greater symmetric punishment is costly when experienced but also generates an increase in the size of the investment. The net effect is positive if $1 < p(qk + 1)$.

We now give the proof of Proposition 6.

**Proof of Proposition 6:** Suppose $1 < p(1 + qk)$. The proposed implementation satisfies all constraints, provided that $u_o = \bar{u} - 1/\beta \in [u_{out}, u]$, where $u$ is given in (41). To this end, we observe that $u_o = \bar{u} - 1/\beta \geq u \geq u_{out}$, where the weak inequalities are strict if $\beta > \beta^*$. Next, $u_o = \bar{u} - 1/\beta < \bar{u} - 1/(\beta + \beta^*) = \tilde{u} < u$. When $1 \geq p(1 + qk)$, we may implement $\bar{u}$ by using $x = \frac{\beta}{\beta + \beta^*}$ and $u_o = \tilde{u}$, as explained in the proof of Lemma 8. □
J. The Pareto Frontier fails to be renegotiation-proof when immediate reciprocity is not available

We now show that, in our discrete-time model when immediate reciprocity is not available, the Pareto frontier is not self-generating and thus fails to be renegotiation-proof.

**Proposition 10.** Suppose that immediate reciprocity is not available, \( p(qk + 2) > 2 \) and \( q \leq \frac{1}{2(1-p)} \). Then the Pareto frontier is not renegotiation-proof for \( \beta \in [\beta^*, \tilde{\beta}] \neq \emptyset \), where

\[
\tilde{\beta} = \frac{qk}{2qk - p(qk + 1)}.
\]

**Proof:** Suppose that the Pareto frontier (PF) is renegotiation-proof (RP). Consider the symmetric point, \((u_{PF}^a, u_{PF}^b)\) at the intersection of the PF and the 45° line. We first show that \( x = y = 1 \) at the symmetric point of the PF. Suppose to the contrary that \( x < 1 \) at the symmetric point. Consider \( IC_a^x \) with \( r = 0 \):

\[
IC_a^x = x + u_a + (1 - y) - (1 - x) - u_o - v_o.
\]

By RP, we have \( u_o = u_{PF}^b \). If \( IC_a^x \) is slack, \( x \) and \( y \) can be increased, which in turn increases \( u_{PF}^b \), a contradiction. So \( IC_a^x \) must be binding. Increase \( x \) and \( y \) by \( \epsilon \) and decrease \( u_o \) and \( v_o \) by \( \frac{\epsilon}{\beta} \). Then the total change in \( u_{PF}^b \) is given by

\[
\Delta = -p\epsilon + pqk\epsilon - (1 - 2p)\epsilon.
\]

Now \( \Delta > 0 \) if and only if \( pqk + p > 1 \) or equivalently \( \tilde{\beta} = \frac{1}{p(qk + 1)} < 1 \), which is implied by \( p(qk + 2) > 2 \). So \( x = 1 \) at the symmetric point of the PF. In the absence of immediate reciprocity, the maximum feasible payoff for a player is given by \( \frac{pqk + p(1 - \frac{1}{qk})}{1 - \beta} \), taking into account the other player’s individual rationality constraint (IR). This payoff is generated for a player, say \( a \), when \( b \) invests all of $1, and \( a \) invests only \( \frac{1}{qk} \) in order to meet \( b \)'s IR. So we obtain an upper bound of \( \frac{pqk + p(1 - \frac{1}{qk})}{1 - \beta} \) for \( u_a \). Replacing that upper bound, \( x = 1 \) and \( u_o = u_{PF}^b \) in \( IC_a^x \) above, we obtain

\[
\beta u_{PF}^b \leq \frac{pqk + p(1 - \frac{1}{qk})}{1 - \beta} - 1. \tag{43}
\]

Note that the parameters fall into region \( I_2 \). When \( \beta > \tilde{\beta} = \frac{1}{p(qk + 1)} \), the maximum payoff that can be generated by SSE in region \( I_2 \) is

\[
u_{SSE} = \frac{p + p(qk + 1) - 1}{1 - \beta}. \tag{44}\]

If the right hand side of (43) is less than \( \beta \) times the maximum value in (44), we obtain a contradiction, as \( u_{PF}^b \geq u_{SSE} \) must hold. Check that

\[
\beta \frac{pqk + p(1 - \frac{1}{qk})}{1 - \beta} - 1 < \beta \frac{p + p(qk + 1) - 1}{1 - \beta}
\]
is equivalent to $\beta < \hat{\beta}$. Note that

$$\beta^* = \frac{1}{1 + p(qk - 1)} < \hat{\beta} = \frac{1}{p(qk + 1)}.$$ 

Also

$$\tilde{\beta} = \frac{1}{p(qk + 1)} < \beta = \frac{qk}{2qk - p(qk + 1)}$$

if and only if

$$0 < p + qk(pqk - 2(1 - p))$$

which is satisfied if $p(qk + 2) > 2$. For large values of $k$, there exists $p$ and $q$ such that $p(qk + 2) > 2$ and the constraints of $I_2$, $q \leq \frac{1}{2(1-p)}$ and $p(qk + 1) > 1$, are all satisfied. In that case, there exists $\beta \in [\beta^*, \hat{\beta}] \neq \emptyset$ and we obtain a contradiction of $u^{PF} < u^{SSE}$ for such $\beta$, so the PF cannot be RP for small values of $\beta$ when immediate reciprocity is not available. □
Figure 1: The Partition for the Information Structure

\[ p = \frac{1}{(qk+1)} \]

\[ p = \frac{(2q-1)}{2q} \]
Figure 2

\[ p = 1/(qk+1) \]

\[ p = (2q-1)/2q \]

\[ p = 1/\beta(qk+1) \]
Figure 3

The diagram shows three curves labeled Curve 1, Curve 2, and Curve 3. The axes are labeled as $p$ on the vertical axis and $q$ on the horizontal axis. The curves intersect at various points, indicating the relationship between $p$ and $q$.

The coordinates for the curves are specified as follows:

- Curve 1 intersects at $p = 1/2$.
- Curve 2 intersects at $q = 1/k$ and $q = 1/2$.
- Curve 3 intersects at $q = 1/2$, $q = q^*$, and $q = 1 + k/2k$.

The graph also highlights the point $q^*$ where the curves meet, indicating a critical point in the relationship between $p$ and $q$.