The State as Facilitator of Collective Action:

A Review of Abram de Swaan's *In Care of the State*

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Introduction*

Pop Art, the brochure for a recent exhibition at the New York Museum of Modern Art suggested, may be understood as an attempt to make explicit the contemporary meaningfulness of art and to stimulate interest in art among a wide audience through incorporating everyday objects into the artwork. Similarly, Abram de Swaan's *In Care of the State: Health Care, Education, and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era* (de Swaan 1988) may be seen as an attempt to widen the appeal of social science by offering "conceptual models … by which we can make comprehensible in thought what we experience daily in reality …" (Elias 1991:7): De Swaan's "sociogenesis of the welfare state" (1988:62) traces and explains the increasing power of the state (or "government") into areas of our every-day lives such as education, sanitation, and social insurance. Ironically, just as pop art (and most other 20th century attempts to popularize art) never really became "popular" (cf. Beyme 1989:210f), de Swaan's book has gone out of print just as the popular debate about the proper limits of the reach of the state into social life has reached virtually all Western advanced industrial countries. This review essay argues that the book deserves another, closer look—both for its subject matter and for its methodology.

De Swaan sets out to explain the historical processes by which basic welfare (poor relief), elementary education, urban sanitation (sewerage and fresh water), and various types of social insurance (disability, old age, unemployment, and health), once seen as individual and local responsibilities, came to be provided through nationwide collective and compulsory arrangements, administered or at least regulated by the state. In order to do so, he develops a general model of interdependence, societal group conflict, and collective action, with causal feed-backs over time. In four issue-specific chapters he presents variations of that model—

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adopted to the societal and historic context of poor relief, education, etc.—followed in each case by five historical narratives of the issue-specific historical processes in the US, France, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, which provide strong empirical support for his theoretical arguments.¹

Following Imre Lakatos' injunction that "the first stage of any serious criticism of a scientific theory is to reconstruct, improve its logical deductive articulation" (Lakatos 1974:128), I will first summarize the core of de Swaan's decidedly non-parsimonious argument. Since this general theoretical argument, in the spirit of Norbert Elias' *The Civilizing Process*, takes shape and becomes fully comprehensible only in the study of specific historical processes (de Swaan 1988:8f; Elias 1997 (1937):77), I then outline in some detail the particular incarnations of the argument, that is, the models presented in the issue-specific chapters. For each issue-specific model, I will

- establish how it fits the logic of the larger argument,
- identify—using a graphic representation of the model—the collectivities, the "groups" whom de Swaan expects to interact in the societal group conflict,
- clarify each group's interests (which often have to be carefully distilled from the narrative),² and
- specify the feed-back loops (not included in the two-dimensional graphic representation of the model).³

While I raise, in my subsequent critique, some questions about the imputed motivations of the actors de Swaan identifies in his models, I find that de Swaan's broader argument and

1 This chapter structure is strictly maintained only in the chapters on elementary education and social insurance. In the chapters on poor relief and urban sanitation, the historical narratives are in fact intertwined with the presentation of the model. Similarly, the general model is not fully presented by de Swaan "up front" but in part only emerges from the issue-specific chapters. I will nonetheless, for analytical purposes, make a strict distinction between the general model and the specific ones as well as between each model and the empirical narratives.

2 De Swaan derives the interests of each group partly inductively, partly deductively from the material and socio-psychological position of its members, that is, he retains a methodological individualism that emphasizes the interest of the individual within each group.

3 The two-dimensional quasi-static models relate to the larger historical process argument as follows (Figure 1):
specific models indeed provide important insights, not just into the historical beginnings of what T. H. Marshall calls "social citizenship" (cf. Marshall 1963) but also into the ever-increasing "collectivization of care" that seems to define the modern welfare state. However, I argue that there is a crucial "missing link" (Zolberg 1981) in de Swaan's argument: The role of "societal group conflict," a key element in the argument, remains theoretically underdeveloped. This shortcoming weakens the argument because it is group conflict in its socio-political setting that provides de Swaan's argument with the mechanism for aggregating—or deciding between—the conflicting interests and demands of groups. Without a theory about group conflict, the argument lacks the link between group interests and demands on the one hand and outcomes on the other. I suggest that an explicit modeling of political institutions may provide the link, which would turn de Swaan's models into a full-fledged theory of the collectivization of care.4 Furthermore, to provide insights into more recent developments, I suggest that the argument could be further improved by incorporating the inter- or supra-national dimension, whose relative lack is surprising in light of the prominence afforded to it in Elias' work, in the tradition of which de Swaan explicitly places himself (cf. Rehberg 1991:64, 69ff). This leads me to a brief excursus, a digression on the social-scientific intellectual heritage of In Care of the State in the work of Elias, which is apparent in a number of ways. Particularly noteworthy is de Swaan's use of historical narratives as "data" to test or support social science theories that propose causal explanations of empirical regularities—which both stands in the tradition of Elias and is a significant improvement on it. This qualitative methodology, especially in the chapters on education and social insurance, allows de Swaan to overcome several of the problems of the compatibility of historical narrative and social science identified by the philosopher of history Louis Mink in his criticism of the "proto-scientific" ambitions of historical analyses (cf. Mink 1987 (1966)).5 De Swaan's work thus shows that the integration of "ideographic and nomothetic

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4 Throughout this paper, I will use the terms "theoretical argument" and "model" interchangeably to refer to any abstraction or simplification of 'reality' that depicts a relationship between specified aspects of reality, which holds with some regularity, whereas I reserve the term "theory" for an explanation of the regularity (cf. Waltz 1979).

5 Historical narratives, as I use the term, are in many respects similar to case studies, discussed in a number of books and articles on methodology in recent years (cf. Achen and Snidal 1989; Collier 1995; Fearon 1991; Geddes 1991; George 1979; George and McKeown 1985; Jervis 1985; Jervis 1990; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; King, Keohane, and Verba 1995; Przeworski 1995; Rogowski 1995; Tetlock and Belkin 1996). However, historical narratives, as used here, are not—as the term "narrative" may suggest—"interpretative" (Lijphart 1971:692) or
reasoning"—advocated by Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast in their forthcoming book on *Analytical Narratives* (1998a (forthcoming):15)—need not be limited to single narratives of one country but can be extended to a genuinely comparative analysis.

**De Swaan's Argument**

**General Model**

De Swaan starts from the observation that a number of social issues have over the past two hundred years developed, in the advanced industrial countries of "the West," from individual and local concerns into responsibilities of "the state," provided at least at a basic level throughout the territory within its reach and financed through compulsory measures. To understand this episode of (welfare) state formation, he argues, we need to conceptualize poor relief, elementary education, urban sanitation, and various types of social insurance (disability, unemployment, etc.) as public goods and their provision as four instances of historical processes in which an exogenously caused growth in the interdependence of individuals within a socio-political setting (itself at least partly defined by this interdependence) creates opportunities if the collective good is provided and threatens costs if it is not. Thus, interdependence among similarly situated individuals leads to a recognition of group interests, the pursuit of which requires collective action. A common objective alone, however, is insufficient to "transform the members of such a group into a coherent actor, capable of collective action" (de Swaan 1988:74). Rather, action emerges out of what de Swaan calls "societal group conflict" (1988:60)—competition between groups defined positively by their common and negatively by their conflicting interests—which itself creates or at least strengthens the coherence (the collective identity) of each group. Group conflict over the provision of the public good and the free riding problem associated with its provision lead to a situation where the state, thanks to its ability to demarcate responsibilities and
enforce collective arrangements if the web of interdependence has grown too large to rely upon interpersonal trust, becomes the most efficient provider (1988:8).

In thus directly or indirectly providing services beyond military security and law administration, the state increases what Michael Mann calls its "civilian scope" (Mann 1993:e.g. 499) or what I call its "reach" into the societal sphere—and it further increases the collective action inducing interdependence, both within and beyond the initial setting. This feed-back loop in the model restarts the process: the preferences of some initially opposed individuals and groups change as a low level of the good is provided (=interdependence ↑) and the preferences of others intensify, such that the reach of the state as well as the geographical size of the socio-political setting (which seems to be identical with the geographical dimension of "the state" for de Swaan) increase over time.

This feed-back loop from the dependent variable to at least some of the independent variables could easily render the argument circular: An increase in interdependence creates the potential for mutual (if not necessarily equal) gain—initially unachieved due to low collective identity and collective action problems—which leads via collectivity-strengthening societal group conflict to the provision of a public good, which leads to an increase in interdependence, which creates a further potential for mutual gain, etc. De Swaan escapes this danger of circularity inherent in such a model (cf. Moon 1975:172-174) through the incorporation of a temporal dimension into his argument: increases in the primary causal variable, interdependence, are themselves caused by changes in the dependent variable (and thus in turn by an increase in interdependence) only insofar as those effects have taken place during a prior point in time (similar to the causal effects that lag variables are intended to capture in time series regression models).

**Poor Relief**

In chapter 2, "Local Charity, Regional Vagrancy, and National Assistance," de Swaan seeks to explain a series of "charitable equilibria" from the 9th to the 19th century and the accompanying "gradual transformation of local poor relief into a national system of correction and assistance" (de Swaan 1988:18). In each "charitable equilibrium," a high level of social
peacefulness is achieved by appeasing the vast majority of "the poor" (according to the contemporary definition) through collective provision of assistance—poor relief "legitimates" exclusion from possession—and banishing or imprisoning the rest (1988:14f, 18). De Swaan explains this evolution of "group altruism" (1988:25) by reference to the changing scope of interdependence and the resulting collective action problems both among (the members of) the propertied classes and between the propertied classes, the poor, and the state (as groups). Consequently, he rejects explanations of the increasing scope of, and state involvement in, poor relief that invoke humanitarian idea(l)s, reformist campaigns, or state capacity as such (1988:50). He even rejects ethical ("Christian") values or beliefs as an independent explanatory variable for the pre-modern period, although he recognizes them as an important signaling device, creating (with the assistance of the local clergy) the impression that all or most others are contributing, too (cf. de Swaan 1988:23, 26f).  

Poor relief constitutes a collective action problem and thus fits the broader argument above because the "charitable equilibrium" created by voluntary poor relief is unstable: "in the short run it reward[s] the defector who [is] able to enjoy the social order at no expense" (de Swaan 1988:29). Poor relief thus is a public good for the propertied classes among themselves. It also constitutes a collective action problem for the propertied classes, "the poor" and the working non-propertied classes (as groups), because the viability of any poor relief requires that the vast majority of the non-propertied individuals forego the chance to free-ride on poor relief. Poor relief arises out of societal group conflict and thus fits the broader argument above because the propertied classes, the poor, and the state (as groups) have consistent but conflicting interests regarding the redistributive regime of poor relief, yet present both threats and opportunities to each other.  

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6 One here gets the impression that de Swaan might be rationalizing away the Weberian thesis of a spirituality we can no longer grasp—nothing in de Swaan's narrative suggests that deep-rooted religious values might not provide an equally valid explanation of local poor relief in medieval and early modern times.  

7 This aspect is not really included in the model. De Swaan also alludes to a number of other collective action problems, such as the "sufficient" organization of "gangs of bandits" in the countryside, to the level where they could confront state power well into the 19th century (1988:19), but it is the collective action problem arising from voluntary poor relief that he models.
Hence de Swaan derives a general model of the societal conflict over poor relief, which he then traces historically in France, Britain, and the US, with occasional references to other, mostly European countries (see outline below). Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the conflict configuration in the poor relief model to clarify the group actors and their interests.

[ FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ]

The historical process this model seeks to explain begins with the re-institution of private property and a money economy starting in medieval Europe, which simultaneously created an individually attributable surplus and made exclusion from it more visible, thus creating the interdependence among the propertied classes. Systematic but voluntary arrangements for "caring for the poor" consequently came into being at the local level starting in the 9th century, often under the "entrepreneurial" leadership of the parish priest who fulfilled state-like functions if without physical means of enforcement (de Swaan 1988:27, 23f, 6). By the 13th century, lay charities at the parish and town level came to supplement the funds administered by the church, based on a much more explicit notion of interdependence and collective action:

One person's refusal to give was no longer considered as just individual callousness toward a particular poor person, but came to be experienced as an affront to the sense of community upon which the collective charitable system was built (de Swaan 1988:27).

On this still largely voluntary basis, the late medieval, early modern "charitable equilibrium" develops (de Swaan 1988:28f). The move toward more compulsory systems of assistance that "encompass the full area of interdependence" (1988:32) is then sparked by exogenous disturbances of the charitable equilibrium, such as major price changes in external markets, epidemics, crop failures, or wars (1988:31), which often led to a failure of the voluntary poor relief system, first at the local level, then—as a consequence of the mobility of the poor—at the regional level. By the 18th century, the large cities that due to their openness had become forced to maintain the regional equilibrium through municipal poorhouses and "workhouses" starting in the 16th century, began to press an increasingly capable central state (the ruler and his or her administration) to solve the regional collective action problem through state action (de Swaan 1988:33ff, 42ff). The initial response of the state in the 17th century was to assign responsibility
for poor relief to communities based on the individual poor's place of birth. But enforcement was weak, and the mandate to provide could be easily circumvented by the local community's refusal to recognize the individual's need and entitlement (cf. de Swaan's discussion of the categorization of the poor: 1988:15-21). Moreover, once the industrial revolution got underway, rulers and officials began to see labor mobility as desirable—and arrangements that immobilized potential workers for manufacture and industry were seen as counterproductive. The central state consequently was drawn into the setting of binding eligibility standards for poor relief and eventually into its nation-wide, increasingly uniform administration (de Swaan 1988:35ff). These historical developments progressively increased the area of interdependence and thus recreated the Prisoner's Dilemma at the regional and national level, such that [the propertied, politically dominant classes of] villages, towns, and regions became, as collectivities, participants in the conflict over collective action.

Three other feedback loops are apparent: (1) The collective action (of those who provide poor-relief) in itself defines the individual contributors as members of the collectivity, thus increasing the recognition of a collective action problem—though without as such yet enabling collective action (cf. de Swaan 1988:27). (2) The growing size of the area should be expected to lead to a decrease of social control as an instrument to ensure compliance with the collective action regime. This raises the need for alternative means of enforcement: compulsion by the state. The historical narrative sections of de Swaan's chapter indeed confirm this development—and that it resulted in increased demands for state action. (3) The social stability that arises from the establishment of a "charitable equilibrium" should contribute, *ceteris paribus*, to greater accumulation in the future. Greater wealth in turn leads to further needs to justify exclusions from it, which leads to a renewed need for collective action. Some of the historical developments sketched above were already of this nature, but the logic of this feedback loop should continue well beyond the 19th century that concludes de Swaan's historical account.

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8 Compare Jacob Burckhardt's notion that the keeping of individual records and statistics on the masses and the poor was a defining innovation of the "modern" state (Burckhardt 1989 (1860):76ff, 83ff).
9 Cf. de Swaan's discussion of poverty as a social status invention (1988:13f).
Elementary Education

The division of even early politically unified states such as France into a multitude of "lingual regions," each with its own local speech, limiting "communication opportunities," may have been historically contingent (i.e. not be universal to state/nation-building processes—de Swan remains agnostic on this point), but it was a universal phenomenon throughout Europe in the late 18th, early 19th century (with immigrant communities, particularly in urban areas, serving as functional equivalents in the US to the rather rural linguistic groups in Europe). Whatever little schooling existed for children of peasants, workers, and the poor at that time was "custodial" rather than educational in its objectives: It sought to keep children out of trouble and to instill piety, virtue, patience, and industriousness (de Swaan 1988:55ff). But in the course of the 19th century, this local affair of (non-) education was transformed—in virtually all European countries and the US—into a system of general and compulsory education with a basic curricular unity, centering on reading and writing in a single, universal national language and some basic arithmetic. It is this transformation—the changing legitimacy of compulsory and publicly provided elementary (primary) education for the "masses" from the late 18th until the early 20th century and the changing scope of the curriculum of that elementary education—that de Swan seeks to explain with the complex argument presented in chapter 3, "The Elementary Curriculum as a National Communication Code" (de Swaan 1988:52-117).10 The presentation of the theoretical model in this chapter is followed by five historical accounts of the evolution of public elementary education in four European countries and the US, which de Swaan treats as qualitative empirical data in support of his broader, abstract argument.

Elementary education constitutes a collective action problem in two respects: (1) While a child's education is an "individual good, a long-term investment by parents in their offspring" (de Swaan 1988:75), its provision is both financially and practically more feasible collectively, when teachers and facilities are shared among several pupils. (2) Individuals may have a genuine interest in the education of (the children of) others (a) because they have a "collective interest in the transmission to the next generation of uniform and shared codes for communication, a

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10 The issue of legitimacy of mass education as such and the issue of the expansion of the curriculum were closely intertwined in the process of this transformation and can hence be treated as one issue.
coherent body of knowledge which each one may assume the others to be familiar with" (1988:75); and (b) because they may derive immediate or medium-term benefits from the spread of a supra-regional common language, basic arithmetic skills, and behavioral norms, but will not be able to derive benefits commensurate with the efforts that would be individually required to improve or increase the scope of basic education.

Basic education arises out of societal group conflict because its provision, and particularly the spread of literacy and a common national language presents not only an opportunity to some individuals and groups but also is a threat to the (imputed and empirically confirmed) interests of some others. Most prominent among such groups are local elites whose position of power over their usually illiterate "clientele" (who speak and understand only the local dialect) is reinforced by their ability to mediate or "translate" between the language of the central court and the local speech (in both directions) (de Swaan 1988:59, 68f).11

De Swan's argument starts, chronologically, with the 18th century growth of the bureaucratic apparatus of states and the increase in supra-regional commercial activities, which occurred for exogenous reasons. These developments created one or several collectivities of individuals above the level of local and regional politics and economic structure—he calls them "metropolitan elites"—whose interests diverged from the only supra-regional collectivity that had previously existed in each state, namely the loose collectivity constituted by local elites due to their ties with, and interaction at, the court (cf. Bendix 1978). Bureaucrats of the central state, de Swan argues, inherently endeavor to reduce their dependence on local elites for communication of laws and regulations to the local populations, as well as for tax collection. As a means to this end, de Swaan expects them to seek a unified basic education for all segments of the population, which would allow them direct personal and impersonal communication (using verbal contacts, printed public announcements, etc.). It would also allow bureaucrats the recruitment into their ranks of individuals from a variety of lower-middle class backgrounds with

11 Local dialects, de Swan argues rather convincingly, were often so strong, with major differences not only in pronunciation but altogether different grammatical structures, etc. that any one dialect was virtually unintelligible for a speaker of another. Communication beyond the regional sphere thus required true bilingualism (though there was of course some overlap between most directly adjacent regional speeches).
a primary loyalty to the central state (de Swaan 1988:58f, 73). Supra-regionally trading entrepreneurs, the second major group among the "metropolitan elites," similarly are expected to seek improved elementary education because the unification of the lingual regions increases market size, because it facilitates the standardization of measures and currency, and because a general basic familiarity with arithmetic and geography facilitates exchange (de Swaan 1988:59, 73f).

The main counterpart of the metropolitan elites in de Swaan's model are the traditional local elites, including the clergy, which for the reasons noted above are expected to oppose educational unification of the country. This expectation is qualified, however, in two ways. Insofar as local elites are conceived as bilingual "translators," who profit from their ability to translate between the local and some other (usually the central) "code," they may be expected to favor central code education in all other regions because it increases their "active translation opportunities" (de Swaan 1988:70f, 73). Clergy in fact could be expected to act "as entrepreneurs in collective education" (1988:75) under certain circumstances: In countries where an established majority church existed we might expect its clergy to support centralization of educational authority, as long as the church's prerogative was not questioned. The goal in this case would be "a state-supported monopoly for church-controlled elementary education" (de Swaan 1988:84). The result need not be a vastly improved education (it may remain primarily custodial), but definitely a universal reach of schools. Minority religions, though generally more likely to favor local monopolies (cf. also Mann 1993:84f), might—if one minority started to receive state funds for education—also favor state support for church-run schools, as long as it is done on a pluralistic basis, allowing "church-controlled education by a multiplicity of denominations" (de Swaan 1988:84). Moreover, the particular religious competition of the 19th century within Christianity could be expected to improve the curriculum as Protestant

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12 Curiously, de Swan does not discuss the external security component of "creating" a coherent national population, but this omission is not crucial to his argument.

13 De Swaan omits this qualification, presumably under the assumption that state financial support will inevitably result in some interference in curricular matters by state official (for instance through the setting of standards).
denominations seek to teach reading the bible in the core or "standard" language and as churches compete for school-children based on the educational opportunities they offer.\textsuperscript{14}

The final group de Swaan considers are parents. As the centralization of public authority and in turn the reach of the state increases, conducting official business with the state is necessary for almost everyone and requires ever more a basic familiarity with the standard language as well as basic reading and writing skills. De Swaan hence hypothesizes that all parents should be expected to have an interest in seeing at least their own children acquire such skills (1988:80). There are, however, sub-groups among the collectivity of "parents." Lower class individuals historically had, de Swaan argues, lesser collective action capabilities than middle and upper class individuals (in part precisely because lower class parents lacked the basic education now at stake). They might hence be expected not to communicate their demands for increasing the scope of education (1988:75, 80).\textsuperscript{15} Conversely, upper and middle class parents, even among the metropolitan population, may be expected to have the conflicting interests of maintaining their educational privilege, which might lead them to oppose universal elementary education. But, de Swaan argues in a section that appears to be more empirical summary than deductive reasoning, this demand for continued socio-educational differentiation was channeled toward improvements in the secondary education rather than resulting in any upper or middle class obstruction of the mass elementary education project (1988:86). Moreover, French and Latin came to serve as the middle and upper class lingua franca or "elite code," supplemented and later replaced by specialized discipline-specific vocabularies or jargons (de Swaan 1988:81, 86f)—one of the phenomena of self-perpetuating elites long recognized by Marxist scholars (cf. e.g. Miliband 1983). Figure 3 summarizes the conflict configuration.

\textsuperscript{14} This very competition, however, is likely over time to accelerate the development of a "general Christian paideia" (de Swaan 1988:85) (so as to attract the children of parents of different denominations) instead of strictly denominational religious teachings, which in turn would undermine the denominations' claim to exclusive control. The argument about the competitive appeal of the churches in multi-denominational regions and states appears problematic in that it must have been an appeal to the parents—the poorer ones of which, that is, the ones whose children would be most affected by an increase in the scope of education, did not care much, as he later notes (see discussion below).

\textsuperscript{15} Such an argument is of course difficult if not impossible to verify, though de Swaan indeed finds only ambiguous evidence of lower class demands for better or more widely available education, although such demands increased over time, arguably because even basic literacy increased the ability of lower class parents to demand education for their children (1988:82).
There are at least two feed-back loops in this model. (1) Even a partial success in increasing the scope and raising the quality of education (increasing the uniformity of language and knowledge) can be expected to increase the opportunities for cross-regional commercial activities and the effectiveness of the state bureaucracies, thus swelling the ranks of these metropolitan elites and increasing their importance, which in turn would increase further the impetus for widened and improved elementary education. (2) Industrialists entirely reverse their preference over time, as their markets for both inputs and outputs turn from local to regional and national: De Swaan rejects traditional Marxist stipulations that industrialists, seeking docile labor, drove the spread of elementary education. Instead, he notes early industrialists' interest in retaining child-labor and, even more important, their interest in protecting their markets for labor, raw materials, and finished products alike—which in the beginning were predominantly local. Industrialists should therefore be expected initially to oppose education reforms just as the traditional local political elites. Over time, however, industrialists should come to see the material benefits of enlarged uniform markets and improved basic skills, which should lead them to join the supporters of the improved and expanded elementary education that would provide them with a larger pool of more skilled or more easily "trainable" labor.\footnote{Empirically, employers also lost their fear of "excessively intellectually mobilized" labor, but it is unclear whether that is an inherent element of this process.}

\textbf{Urban Sanitary Services}

Chapter 4, "Medical Police, Public Works, and Urban Health," presents a model to explain the provision of what I call "sanitary services"—sewerage and the supply of uncontaminated fresh water—in an urban context, a model which with some modifications may be applied to any services that have more or less a public good character.\footnote{Pollution control and "cleanup" is a current example of such a service with a strong public good character; the provision of gas, power, telephones, and more recently cable TV are examples of merely "semi-public good" services (cf. de Swaan 1988:137, 139, 142). Most of these examples meet the non-depletability characteristic of a public good; non-excludability is established only through externalities.} The provision of such services constitutes a \textit{collective action problem} because they are, except for the very wealthy, unattainable without pooling resources to build the necessary infrastructure. Moreover, in the
particular case of sanitary services, provided like most other services at first on a subscription basis (de Swaan 1988:126f), the remainder of impoverished, often centrally located districts or even just individual houses that lacked sewerage and a fresh water supply created externalities for the subscribers—smells, "visibility of misery" (1988:123), and especially threat of disease—which strengthened the public good character of sanitary services and increased the incentives for compulsory city-wide provision, financed through fees or general taxation (1988:130).\footnote{Formally, at the outset, sewerage and fresh water supply have only the non-depletability characteristic of a public good. Non-excludability is only established indirectly through the positive externalities (such as a cleaner environment) enjoyed by non-subscribers, too, and the negative externalities of non-subscribers living among subscribers.} The provision of sanitary services arises out of societal conflict because the enjoyment of the full benefits for the urban middle and upper classes depended upon forcing others to participate (mostly newcomers and the poor, which either could not afford it or did not value improved hygiene enough to volunteer participation).

De Swaan's analysis takes as its point of departure the rapid urbanization of the 19th century, when the continuous arrival of mostly poor and (in Elias' sense) "uncivilized" newcomers increased the density of life and threatened the established city dwellers in their secure social status. To be sure, the newcomers also presented the established city folk with a number of opportunities, such as an increased labor supply in times of rapid urban industrial expansion; a growing number of consumers and producers; and the potential for economies of scale, for instance in the provision of sanitary services (1988: 137, 142). But these benefits were seen as depending largely upon the successful integration of the newcomers, that is, turning them into established city dwellers.\footnote{De Swaan's account here is strikingly reminiscent of many past and present immigration debates.} The group conflict hence was at least in part a conflict between urbanites (in general) and unintegrated newcomers.

At a lower level of aggregation, the upper and middle classes had distinctive and collective interests in the social conflict (notwithstanding individual free-riding incentives), distinct from the interest of the "established" urban working and lower class(es). Given the inevitable "functional interdependence" of individuals in urban life—autarky, as de Swaan notes, is never really an option in an urban setting—the increasing proximity of people from different classes, including the newcomers from less "civilized" rural areas, created "status anxiety" among the
upper and middle classes (de Swaan 1988:119, 123). The rapid urbanization of the 19th century thus increased among the privileged the sense of interdependence (with the lower classes and each other), while at the same time rendering them unable to isolate themselves from the "lower class threats" of rebellion, mob violence, crime—and disease. The spread of disease, particularly in long-remembered devastating epidemics such as the cholera epidemics of 1832 and 1849, was a particularly powerful reminder to the middle and upper classes of their loss of control because the threat of epidemics was not based on intentional behavior (1988:125f, 122).

As the connection between sanitary conditions and disease was beginning to be understood, spatial segregation along social lines was the first reaction (with individual families moving to "new" neighborhoods as they could afford it). Segregation had two consequences: (1) It made the construction of a sewerage system and later a fresh water supply easier by spatially pooling "subscribers" (though a free riding incentive remained); and (2) it strengthened group identities, particularly among the growing urban middle class (de Swaan 1988:128f, 137). But segregation was an insufficient safeguard, particularly against the threat of epidemics, as it did not reduce the functional interdependence among city dwellers across class divisions but merely increased the human traffic between distinct neighborhoods. Given the dominance, among administrators and medical professionals, of the so-called "miasma" theory—that "cholera and other infective diseases were … caused by emanations exuding from filth, stagnant water and foul air …" (1988:134)—compulsory, city-wide provision of sanitary services became the demand, particularly of the middle class.20

In addition to social classes, "enlightened civil servants" (140) seeking improved sanitation for all, political leaders in pursuit of the middle class vote in an increasingly democratic political system, and professionals such as doctors and engineers, whose "relevant" skills gave them both a particular understanding of the problem and made them eligible for social advancement and economic gain if sanitary services were to be provided on a mass basis, were recognizable collective actors (de Swaan 1988:139-142). Figure 4 present a graphic representation of this largely inductively derived model.

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20 Cf. Mann (1993:481), who extends the logic of this argument to explain middle class concern for the economic and social "well-being" of lower classes in general.
There are three feed-back loops in the model. (1) Improved sanitary conditions made even more dense urban habitation possible, thus in turn further increasing the interdependence that had started the process. (2) The working class, which initially rejected sanitation schemes as patronizing came to favor the compulsory provision of sewerage and fresh water supply in their quarters (particularly when paid for from the general tax fund) as they saw traditional working class neighborhoods (including sanitary conditions) deteriorate under the influence of the poor "who were being driven out of the renovated zones" (de Swaan 1988:137). (3) As cities grew over time and past newcomers became established working class dwellers or at least "established poor," the number of the established city dwellers (who had become accustomed to the provision of sewerage and a clean fresh water supply) increased relative to the number of newcomers (who increasingly were not given the choice of non-subscription as all areas of the city became connected to the mandatory municipal system). Thus, over a few generations, "the new sanitary arrangement … bec[a]me uncontroversial and slipped out of the public consciousness" (1988:142).

Social Insurance

Lest the reader prematurely conclude that collective action requires a state or a hegemonic enforcer, though, de Swaan incorporates an "interlude" on autonomous collective action that was "neither compelled nor protected" by state or law (de Swaan 1988: 143): Workers' Mutual-Aid or "Friendly Societies" (chapter 5). Mutual Aid Societies were voluntary organizations of rarely more than a hundred members each. They provided funds for medical care, sick pay, "a decent burial" (1988:143), and sometimes even unemployment dole and disablement or old age pensions to their members or their widows. Mutual Aid Societies became widespread in the second half of the 19th century, covering by the century's end somewhere between 20 and 50%.

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21 In analyzing an alternative causal path (and how it failed) de Swaan also avoids the pitfalls of an exclusive use of Mill's method of agreement—non-variance on the dependent variable leading to an inability to distinguish empirically between the many other variables that also show no variance and hence could be causal; a problem recently noted in much of the state formation literature by Hendrik Spruyt in his critique of teleological "unilinear" theories (cf. Spruyt 1994:4, 11, 18ff).
of the working men in Western Europe and North America. The direct material benefits of this mutual insurance system were, to be sure, not public goods since they were both excludable and depletable, but their administration raised a number of collective action problems, particularly since the membership of most societies was little educated and not experienced in the handling of substantial funds. Moreover, the indirect benefits of greater social and economic stability extended well beyond the societies' membership—for which reason they were often supported, even with "privileges and exemptions" by commercial and political elites (who also initially hoped for a reduction of tax-funded municipal relief and "moral improvement" of the workers (de Swaan 1988:147)\textsuperscript{22}). In this sense, mutual societies may be considered public goods.

Having described the societies' ascent, however, de Swaan turns his attention primarily to their demise or, more precisely, their replacement by "nationwide, compulsory and collective" "insurance under state control" against "the adversities of working life" (1988:157, 150, 177): disability, old age or death, unemployment, and disease (health insurance)—adversities against which non-monetarized forms of "insurance" had existed in the family or village community prior to industrialization and urbanization (1988:250). In chapter 6, de Swaan therefore again develops a general model—of the genesis and evolution of these four types of social insurance—then presents five historical narratives covering Prussia/Germany, Britain, France, the US, and the Netherlands from the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century (1988:187-217). In particular, he conceptualizes the conflicts over social insurance as conflicts over the accumulation of "transfer capital"—defined as a "claim to future transfers upon specified conditions of adversity or deficiency," the (considerable) monetary value of which can be calculated (using risk estimates) even though its market value is zero since the claim is non-transferable (de Swaan 1988:152f).

Social insurance so conceived constitutes a collective action problem not only because its positive externalities are characterized by non-depletability and non-excludability, but also because transfer capital itself has these characteristics to some extent. Any individual's actual

\textsuperscript{22} These hopes were, however, undermined by the mutual societies' exclusions of "bad risk" individuals on often highly subjective and personal grounds and by the tendency of clergy and middle class citizens to "combine under the cover of mutualism to secure for themselves the privileges granted to the working men's societies" (1988:145f, 148).
claim does not significantly deplete the "capital stock," and an individual's potential claim depends only in part (if at all) upon the size of his or her previous "private" contributions. Moreover, the total capital constitutes a commons in the sense that an individual's approximate "property right" (his or her claim to transfers upon specified conditions) cannot be sold—which differentiates it from the "social security" derived from private property (de Swaan 1988:153, 166f).

Mandatory state insurance, providing "permanence, national scope and legal compulsion" (de Swaan 1988:149) was technically superior in that it offered effective and efficient solutions for many of the problems by which the mutual aid societies had been plagued: sophisticated risk assessment to enable the inclusion of persons of low social standing; fund planning to ensure adequacy of funds without stockpiling; objective and impersonal procedures for claims assessment to reduce fraud and favoritism; and the spreading of risk across age groups and professions. The state also was the only actor able to give credible guarantees decades in advance (for old age pensions) and to ensure back-up funding for health insurance in the case of epidemics (1988:180f). And having previously gained experience and administrative "state capacity" (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; esp. Skocpol 1985:8, 17ff) or "infrastructural power" (Mann 1993:59) in the provision of nation-wide public poor relief, mass education, and service networks, the state in the early 20th century seemed "capable of … tasks on the scale the new insurance schemes would require" (de Swaan 1988:156). But this extension of the reach of "the state," this beginning of the social welfare state properly speaking, did not come about automatically. It, too, arose out of societal conflict, between groups and individuals that benefited from the status quo (especially the self-employed property-owning bourgeoisie) and those who sought the greater (expected) benefits of change (especially the members of an "activist regime").

The starting point for the process modeled in this chapter is again an exogenously caused increased sense of interdependence—particularly among workers and industrialists and within each group on a regional and increasingly national scale—in the wake of 19th century industrialization, combined with (a) a changing understanding of disability, "unproductive" old age, and unemployment as vices beyond the individual worker's control or fault and (b) the
apparent insufficiency of the older mutualist arrangements (cf. de Swaan 1988:161f). Most important among the proponents of the establishment of social insurance (as a response to the increased interdependence) is what de Swaan calls an "activist regime" (1988:156), that is, a coalition of political leaders and bureaucrats, which we may consider representatives of "the state." De Swaan also expects workers and "progressive industrialists" to favor comprehensive and compulsory social insurance, the former primarily because it improves their social security by allowing them to accumulate "savings" that are beyond their personal control and therefore can not be claimed by needy friends or relatives, the latter primarily because it reduces labor conflicts (de Swaan 1988:162, 170f). But these two groups also have conflicting interests, each ideally seeking an arrangement where the other side pays the contribution in full but one's own side retains full institutional control of the scheme. Support for any particular proposal can consequently be expected to be conditional on the particular mix of required contributions and control over benefits contained in the proposal, and how it compares with previous arrangements (mutualist schemes; existing company-based funds) (cf. de Swaan 1988:158). Most significant among the opponents of the adoption of comprehensive and compulsory social insurance is the self-employed, property-owning petty bourgeoisie (including farmers), the members of which de Swaan hypothesizes to seek (1) the maintenance of their property-based privilege over the proletariat and (2) the preservation of their sovereignty vis-a-vis the state and workers (1988:168). Since the petit bourgeoisie is the only group that consistently opposes social insurance, their "strength" largely determines the timing of the first-time establishment of the various social insurance arrangements (1988:156).

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23 In addition, the members of the petit bourgeoisie are expected to fear having to pay for the "imprudence" of lower class individuals. But this resentment should be shared by all other better-off individuals and could be offset (as de Swaan later shows) by arrangements that excluded individuals and families above a certain income level from the compulsory scheme (making the right to draw benefits conditional upon contributions in their cases).

24 Individual industrialists might be expected to oppose social insurance to maintain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis older, established companies or "progressive industrialists" that have previously established some such provisions on a firm-by-firm basis, but such opposition would be transitory (as successful new firms would presumably soon experience the same labor conflicts and demands that had previously led older, larger firms to provide some company-based insurance) (de Swaan 1988). Similarly, opponents existed within the working class, such as anarcho-syndicalists; but de Swaan shows that their ideological interests often soon gave way to their material ones (1988: 172, 167, passim).
As before, figure 5 summarizes the model of the societal conflict, including the position and interests of the groups involved.

[ FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ]

Here again several feed-back loops exist, which should strengthen the support for the adoption of nationwide, compulsory and collective social insurance over time. The establishment of any one of the four types of insurance increases the interdependence between citizens and the state and makes the interdependence among the citizens more explicit (de Swaan 1988:159f), which should be expected to strengthen the willingness of political, social and economic leaders to accept comprehensive social insurance as "inactivity might lead to deterioration, and finally to chaos and rebellion" (1988:167). The "successful" establishment of one type of social insurance, which shows the feasibility of such a scheme, should also be expected to ease doubts and opposition to other types.

In addition, empirically, positions changed over time in favor of social insurance for largely exogenous reasons. (1) While the self-employed petty bourgeoisie, as a distinct social group, maintained its opposition, individual members of this group became increasingly dependently employed, forming the "new middle class" (Mills 1951; cf. Möller, Raulet, and Wirsching 1993; Glassman 1997). With their livelihood and social security now based on employment income rather than independence, they faced many of the same risks as workers, which caused them to favor compulsory insurance because "allowing some to enjoy benefit without paying dues (within their means) might tempt many to try a free ride, and thus undermine the system yet" (de Swaan 1988:167). Moreover, and this is another feed-back loop, social insurance schemes that maintained a class distinction, strengthened the employed (new) middle class' collective identity and hence the likelihood of their support for a collective scheme. (2) Workers, who at first had dreaded the prospect of state interference, over time came to support compulsory and collective insurance because new commercial private insurers lured individual low risk workers, particularly young ones, away from the mutual societies, thus rendering this alternative, worker-controlled social insurance unsustainable and effectively turning many workers into high risk insurance rejects (de Swaan 1988:150).
The Missing Link: Societal Conflict

The most important shortcoming of de Swaan's argument, to my mind, is that he seriously undertheorizes the conflict between social or "societal" groups. This shortcoming deprives de Swaan's theory of a crucial link because he hypothesizes conflict to contribute to the very formation of the groups and, even more importantly, because his general model has to rely upon social conflict to provide the mechanism for aggregating—or deciding between—the conflicting interests and demands of these groups.\footnote{Giving prominence to group conflict while leaving it theoretically underdeveloped has of course something of an illustrious heritage in the literature on the state—in Karl Polanyi's account of the rise of fascism, for instance, the conflict between capitalists and "society" (both on a theoretical plane and on the level of actual social unrest) is a direct cause of fascist take-overs in the 1930s and of the latent threat of fascist takeovers in the future. But apart from a reference to the impunity afforded to potential fascist revolutionaries by sympathizers in high places (Polanyi 1957 (1944):238), he provides no theory or even a model of the conflict or its institutional context, which would afford us a better understanding of why similar incarnations of the conflict led to fascism in some countries, but democratic welfare states (if not his preferred form of Christian socialism) in others (1957 (1944):235-248). Elias, too, has been criticized for describing rather than theorizing the institutions within which conflicts occur (cf. Rehberg 1991:75f).} Simply put, in order to link outcomes in a causal explanation to conflicting interests, we need to make explicit what resources allow certain groups, certain interests to prevail over others in a given context. In other words, we need to make explicit the domestic political institutions within which these conflicts of interest occur, the "particular mechanisms that shape the interplay between strategic actors and thereby generate outcomes" (Bates et al. 1998a (forthcoming):16; cf. also Milner 1997:18ff).

To be sure, domestic political institutions are not altogether absent from de Swaan's account. But they remain implicit, and their workings remain unclear. At times, for instance, de Swaan seems to assume a rather ideal pluralistic, liberal democratic system of government—there is a notion in many narratives that a group's numerical strength is directly correlated with its strength in the political conflict. At other times, de Swaan appears rather cognizant of the less ideal democratic institutional setting that characterized most of the processes he analyzes—he differentiates, for instance, in the chapter on social insurance between the declining "number" and the declining "political position" of the petty bourgeoisie. But it remains unclear what factors other than sheer number determined political strength and thus the declining effectiveness of traditional middle class opposition to nation-wide compulsory arrangements (cf. 1988:217). Political institutions thus play an implicit role in de Swaan's historical narratives, but
he does not make explicit his assumptions about how they aggregate or give preference to certain interests over others; and institutions are largely absent from his larger theoretical argument.

That said, theorizing about how conflicting interests get aggregated in the process of societal group conflict and which resources allow groups to succeed in any particular conflict is especially difficult given de Swaan's subject matter. Most of these conflicts, being about "new" issues, occur outside of the well-established institutional structures that political scientists usually rely upon for their analysis (or ex-post predictions) of outcomes that arise from conflicts between individuals or group actors. Existing institutions that link the same group actors on different issues may well establish conflict patterns, constrain actors and their strategies, and thus determine outcomes, as suggested by the seemingly ever increasing reach of the European Court of Justice (Weiler 1982; Burley and Mattli 1993; Alter 1995; Alter 1996; Weiler 1993; Mattli and Slaughter 1998). But at the same time, political institutions may themselves change in the course of these conflicts, as political actors inherently seek to escape constraints (cf. Almond and Genco 1990:57f). To complicate matters further, different contexts may, as Norbert Elias notes, require actors to rely upon different skills and resources to advance their position in a conflict of interest (Elias 1997 (1939):162f). All of these difficulties increase the complexity of the task but need not impede theorizing about conflict. Incorporating an explicit, deductive theory of societal group conflict into de Swaan's argument would greatly enhance its predictive and explanatory power, while one could still maintain a healthy appreciation for the "contingency of history" (Allan 1992:237). Doing so would also, presumably, provide an explicit explanation for why some interested groups figure more prominently in a given model than others.

Finally, theorizing more explicitly the political institutions that shape the outcome of societal group conflicts would clarify the limits of the generalizability of the argument and hence make it more useful for understanding the contemporary politics of the welfare state and for improving future social policy making. One might expect, for instance, that developing countries—many of which have only in recent years begun to experience the interdependence-enhancing urbanization and increasing differentiation of social and economic functions, which start de Swaan's processes—will undergo a similar welfare state formation process. However, this might not happen for instance if full democratization precedes certain changes (even if the
group interests de Swaan identifies hold): Would urban sanitary services have come if political entrepreneurs (his "politicians") had courted the working class vote rather than the middle class vote?

**Actors and Interests**

For the most part, the material and socio-psychological interests and the resulting strategies of de Swaan's group actors are very plausible and appear empirically well supported, even if those interests at times have to be carefully distilled by the reader from a complex historical narrative. Yet here, too, the usefulness of the argument for understanding and policy making could be improved, namely by making assumptions more explicit, that is, by deriving the hypothesized interests and strategies more consistently and explicitly deductively. Doing so would make more clearly apparent which interests in the particular cases are historically contingent and which are inherent in the group as defined.

Deriving interests and strategies more deductively yields at least two further advantages. First, it leads to more nuanced hypotheses; and second, it leads us to consider alternative explanations that might not be apparent when working inductively because particular outcomes may be overdetermined. I will consider these two points in the context of specific examples from the book.

In the chapter on urban sanitation, a political economy analysis of group interests and strategies, based explicitly on the same rational material assumptions that de Swaan appears to make implicitly, should lead us to expect that support for—and opposition against—compulsory

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26 This is not to say that the interests of a socio-economic group must be unchanging and thus can be deductively derived completely independently of the historical context. But only by making our assumptions explicit do we become aware of the relevant contextual variables. Thus, as de Swaan recognizes, the hypothesized interest of employers and political elites in the early 20th century conflicts over social insurance (their hypothesized support) presumes a notion that "workers may lose their income through no fault of their own and cannot anticipate such adversity by individual providence" (de Swaan 1988:154) such that "society" must provide (funds, not just police enforcement) for the maintenance of social peace—a belief that throughout most of the 19th century had still been rejected by elites in favor of a belief that social safety nets for workers encourages idleness (cf. de Swaan 1988:160, 3ff; Polanyi 1957 (1944):77ff, 224). Explicit deductive derivation does not imply, however, the need to follow up, as de Swaan does in the chapter on elementary education, with a mathematical reformulation which at times makes one wonder whether it serves, as Stephen Krasner bluntly put it, any purpose "beyond demonstrating the author's algebraic abilities" (1985:142).
sanitary services varies greatly depending on who pays for them in the particular provision scheme under consideration. Having merged the presentation of the theoretical argument and the empirical findings almost completely in this chapter, de Swaan overlooks this aspect—presumably because the differences I hypothesize here do not figure prominently in the empirical record. In the chapter on the national language and elementary education, by contrast, actors' hypothesized interests and strategies are largely derived from explicit assumptions, which makes for a much clearer argument—though it, too, could be improved, particularly by incorporating the economic calculus emphasized by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for trade between previously autark groups or regions: Locally scarce factors lose from trade (or economic openness in general, including labor mobility); locally abundant factors gain (cf. Rogowski 1989). Because he overlooks this aspects, de Swaan for instance expects industrialists in markets with an abundant supply of labor to oppose elementary education in the early stages just as much as industrialists in local markets with a scarce labor supply—which seems unlikely based on the very material interests to which he gives such prominence.

Spelling out actors' interests more clearly might also have led de Swaan to probe more thoroughly the sufficiency of simpler alternative explanations. Might we not, for instance, have observed the same transformation of poor relief or social insurance from a private concern into a compulsory state-administered system if rulers and their administrators had acted on their interests (which called for the collectivization of poor relief and social insurance, respectively) by extending their role to the extent that the state's capacity allowed at a given time—irrespective of the interests of societal groups (cf. Elias 1997 (1939):151)? De Swaan convincingly rejects explanations based on state capacity alone, but he does not provide enough information to rule out the above explanation, which combines the state's (but no other actor's) interests and state capacity to explain state action. Such an explanation may still reserve a prominent place for societal group conflict—a stalemate in social (class) conflict may be necessary to enable autonomous state action, as Karl Marx argued (cf. Marx 1987:110f, 122, 131ff; Elias 1997 (1939): 21f, 302ff, 316f)—but it need not. In either case, this alternative

27 Scarcity and abundance are measured with respect to the average availability of the given factor of production in all the localities/regions/countries engaging in the economic opening in question.
explanation would hypothesize a much more exclusive prominent role for the one actor which de Swaan himself identifies as the "required" one in some of his models: the state (e.g. 1988:157).²⁸

What exactly we mean by this term may of course differ, depending upon the institutional context. The "activist regime" in the chapter on social insurance, for instance, appears to be in fact comprised of two groups with distinct interests: bureaucrats and politicians. The former are hypothesized to pursue the interests of 'the state' (and maybe their personal interest), but not the interest of any particular societal group. The latter might also pursue the interest of the state but are expected to pursue primarily electoral gain, that is, serve the interests of particular constituency groups.²⁹ Indeed, de Swaan's empirical account offers some evidence of Weberian rational bureaucracies exhibiting, despite their commitment to unquestioning obedience that arguably gave it a 'fascist potential,' considerable potential for disinterested, problem-solving policy innovation of the kind that Max Weber repeatedly celebrated in his discussions of modern bureaucracy (cf. Elias 1997 (1937):108; Weber 1972 (1921/22)).³⁰ Yet for identifying issues as "problems" to be solved, bureaucracies may still depend upon political leaders—should it really be a coincidence that social insurance was adopted in each of the five countries de Swaan studies only after (though not necessarily very soon after) the enfranchisement of the working class (cf. de Swaan 1988:157)? Sorting out the relative importance of these disaggregated components of "the state" may be a promising avenue for further research on welfare state formation, with important policy implications in the era of privatization of public services.

Finally, the conceptualization of group actors in the theoretical argument might be improved by incorporating some hypotheses regarding cross-cutting loyalties or multiple identities, since the groups identified in de Swaan's models are not all mutually exclusive from the perspective of

²⁸ This is not to suggest that the state can impose its will at random, even if it holds the monopoly of physical coercion, because an exclusive reliance on coercion to force compliance is too costly (cf. Elias 1997 (1937):144). (Compare also Michael Mann's observation that state bureaucracies' attempts to achieve centralization through "head-on collision" with social actors have always failed (Mann 1993:483).) But, as Elias suggests, state preferences and actions may consciously or unconsciously meet a societal need and thus acquire legitimacy (1997 (1937):159); and grudging compliance induced by a rational calculations of the costs and benefits of compliance versus resistance often precedes an internalization of the norms thus introduced (1997 (1937):396n5)—EU-wide gender equality legislation or US civil rights laws may be recent examples of such a formal-legal imposition of norms preceding their wide-spread adoption.

²⁹ The conflict over social insurance takes place in a largely democratic political setting.

³⁰ It is often overlooked, though, that Weber was much more pessimistic about the innovative potential of modern bureaucracies in his political writings (cf. Weber 1988 (1921)).
the individual. Not addressing this issue leads de Swaan, for instance, to conflate state and nation in his second issue-specific chapter. The spread of elementary education appears in his account to create automatically a coherent sense of nationality throughout the territory of the state. And indeed, a shared basic education was critically important in the nation-building process in many countries (cf. Russov 1995; Weber 1976), but it also failed in many others—for instance famously in Austria-Hungary and arguably in the Soviet Union—and it produced ambiguous results even in some states such as France where 'the state' succeeded in imposing linguistic unity for public life (Corse, Basque, Breton quasi-nationalisms persist).

**International Dimension**

The impetus for the processes modeled by de Swaan arises in each case from "lengthening chains of interdependence," evidenced by the expansion of the web of commercial ties, the growth of a supra-local bureaucracy, etc. It is hence surprising that the evolution of all the social issues de Swaan analyses in *In Care of the State* seems to come to a final conclusion at the level of the nation state (and at the city level in the sanitary services chapter), even though the developments that brought about the extension of the socio-political sphere from the local to the regional to the nation state level would appear to continue beyond that level.\(^{31}\) Indeed, given the increasing (recognition of) functional differentiation and interdependence among and across state boundaries, especially in post-WWII Europe, one might see the growth of international organizations and particularly the increasingly supranational character of the European Union as evidence that a further extension is underway (cf. Ruggie 1986:146ff; Spruyt 1994:12ff).\(^{32}\) De Swaan's general argument thus has potentially great contemporary relevance. But when interdependencies and the resulting conflicts of interest transcend national boundaries, the set of actors may well change, as does the institutional context (cf. Elias 1997 (1939):167). Making de Swaan's analytical framework applicable to contemporary international issues therefore requires

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\(^{31}\) The problem of the limited "generality of conclusion," due to the temporally closed nature of the narrative (discussed below), may justify refraining from venturing predictions beyond the nation state level, but de Swaan does not really provide an explanation for his choice of the temporal space of his narratives.

\(^{32}\) Particularly striking in this context are the similarities between de Swaan's general argument and neofunctionalist theories of European integration.
more than just extrapolation from his general argument; it requires the explicit incorporation of the inter- or supranational dimension.

Such an explicit incorporation of the international dimension might not only increase the applicability of the argument, but it would also improve the existing specific models for de Swaan's chosen *explananda*. De Swaan explicitly acknowledges the importance of a Hintzean "rivalry between states" (de Swaan 1988:12; Hintze 1975 (1906)), in the "second image reverse" (Gourevitch 1978) tradition of the state formation literature. He notes how considerations of international competitiveness influenced bureaucrats' and employers' preferences on social insurance, recounts how the threat and experience of war shaped interests and expectations, and warns against prematurely applying the interdependence notion to purely information-based "relations" of Western media audiences with the poor and sick in "faraway countries [where they] represent neither danger nor opportunity" (de Swaan 1988:159, 167, 181, 190, 176, 255f). But these international factors are largely absent in his models, except for a passing reference to interstate competition as one of the assumed sources of the states' interests in domestic conflicts (cf. de Swaan 1988:2). This relative lack of the international dimension in the theoretical argument is particularly puzzling given how prominently interstate competition figures in Elias' state formation theory in the *Civilizing Process* (cf. Elias 1997 (1939): esp.17-22, 132-138)—itself largely a paraphrase of Otto Hintze's earlier argument (1975 (1906)).

**Intellectual Heritage: *In Care of the State* in the tradition of Norbert Elias**

It hence seems warranted to look more closely at the tradition of Norbert Elias, which de Swaan implicitly and explicitly evokes in this and other works (de Swaan 1988: 2f, 51, 136, 140, 164; de Swaan 1991: passim). The intellectual indebtedness of *In Care of the State* to the work of Elias is apparent in multiple ways. De Swaan seems clearly inspired by Elias' search for conceptual models and an overall vision … by which we could understand how a large number of individuals form with each other something that is more and other than a collection of separate individuals — how they form a 'society' [the original text further defines society, just as de Swaan, as "a collage/structure of interdependent individuals" (Elias 1987:26f)], and how it comes about that this society can change in specific ways, that it has a history
which takes a course which has not been intended or planned by any of the individuals making it up (Elias 1991:7). 33

In particular, de Swaan provides the analysis of some of the very issues that Elias identified as crucial to an understanding of Western "modernity," but which Elias relegated to future research: social collectivization ("Vergesellschaftung") of service provisions and the historical processes through which ever larger political entities came to assume social responsibilities (cf. Elias 1997 (1939):159, 291). And in explaining how different configurations of interdependence and social conflict have caused essentially similar processes of (welfare) state formation to proceed at different times in different countries (one of them being the US), de Swaan offers a more nuanced and more broadly comparative answer than Elias himself to the question why the establishment of "publicly controlled central [state] institutions" has been so "delayed" in the US compared to Europe (Elias 1991:51). 34

Moreover, crucial elements of de Swaan's argument—the concept of lengthening "chains of interdependence," the notion that increased social mobility or at least intensified interaction across social class divisions leads to demands for behavioral adaptation, and the expectation that economic efficiency-enhancing monopolization leads to demands for political control—build upon Elias' work (cf. Elias 1997 (1937):195; Elias 1997 (1939):153, 156ff). Elias' observations also appear to be the inductive source of some of de Swaan's hypothesized group interests, most notably the socio-psychological interest of the middle class in maintaining its status or "social distance" (cf. de Swaan 1991:168f; Elias 1997 (1937):110f). Furthermore, de Swaan's account of middle class "internalization" of external constraints as "norms" draws directly on Elias' theory of civilizational change (de Swaan 1988: e.g. 164; cf. Elias 1997 (1937):198ff, 296, 320f; Elias 1997 (1939):327f); his occasional digressions on the civilizing dimension of urban health provisions—"urban sanitation went with a 'sanitation of speech', and the technical perfection of the water closet led to the exclusive association of the "odors and sights of defecation … with poverty and disease" (de Swaan 1988:136, 140)—are strongly reminiscent of Elias' narratives of

33 Throughout this section of the paper, all translations are mine except where an English translation is listed in the reference list.

34 An *explanandum* that still appears valid despite Theda Skocpol's observation that Marshallian "social citizenship" benefits were provided selectively by the American state well before European states undertook for instance veteran's benefits on a massive scale (cf. Skocpol 1992). Cf. also: Mann (1993:501f).
the changing notions of propriety and shame in late medieval and early modern Europe (Elias 1997 (1937):157ff); and de Swaan's description of modern urbanity (and its reliance on the Weberian state's monopoly of legitimate physical violence as a 'guarantee' for increased individual security) (1988: passim), while based on many and more recent sources, mirrors Elias' depiction (Elias 1997 (1937):81f; Elias 1997 (1939):329, 331ff)—to mention just a few indications of In Care of the State's intellectual debt to The Civilizing Process.

At the same time, there are several and important differences between de Swaan's and Elias' work—beyond the obviously differences in their explananda. First, insofar as In Care of the State is an extension of The Civilizing Process, it is indeed an at least temporal "extension" rather than a "mere" refinement of Elias' account of state formation and its "centralizing tendencies" (cf. Elias 1997 (1939):306): With the partial exemption of poor relief, the processes analyzed by de Swaan all begin sometime in the 19th century—when royal courts were no longer "the models and style-setting centers of Western civilization" (Elias 1997 (1939):11, cf. also 14)—whereas Elias' inquiry covers "only" the period from the 12th to the middle of the 18th century.35

Second, for Elias, the ever increasing differentiation of social functions, which for him uniquely characterizes the early modern and modern history of the West, means that the "chains of interdependence" that bind each individual to others become ever longer—which, through social pressures, leads to an increasing uniformity of behavior and the norms that constrain it.36 For de Swaan, ever longer chains of interdependence also lead to geographically ever more encompassing and substantively uniform collective arrangements (to provide poor relief, sanitary services, etc.), but his explanation emphasizes the compulsory character of these arrangements, backed up by the coercive power of the state. In so doing, de Swaan escapes one of the key criticisms of Elias' theory, namely that the effectiveness of social control as a constraint on individual behavior is (logically and empirically) inversely proportional to the length of these chains of interdependence (cf. Duerr 1988:10f; 1990:8, 20ff; 1993:18, 23-29; 1997:12-17).

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35 With the exception of occasional references to later developments—similar to de Swaan's occasional references to late 20th century developments in his concluding chapter.
36 This is of course a vast simplification of Elias' argument, but I think it fairly summarizes the core of his theory (cf. his "draft/outline" of a theory of the civilizing process: Elias 1997 (1939):321ff).
Third, de Swaan's group actors are more self-conscious of their collective identity (the formation of which is an important part of his argument) than Elias' group actors who may be only the analyst's mental constructs, superimposed on the historical process for analytical purposes (cf. Elias 1997 (1937):127).

Fourth, Elias explicitly rejects the notion that instrumental rationality (individual action optimally chosen in pursuit of a given end) can sufficiently explain outcomes in a social and historical process (e.g. Elias 1997 (1939):295, 323ff). For de Swaan, by contrast, outcomes may well be fully explained by the ends rationally pursued by individuals—if the number or political power of similarly situated individuals that share in the pursuit of a given end as a group is large enough.37 De Swaan would merely emphasize that both the incentives of individuals and the strength of the groups they form is likely to change over time.

And fifth, this change can occur much more quickly in de Swaan's models than in Elias' theory of civilization, which relies primarily on generational change for the solid internalization ("Verfestigung") of changed values (Elias 1997 (1939):331f, 343). Generational changes also have an important role to play in de Swaan's models—directly for instance when a uniform national language takes hold as new generations go through a uniform national education system and indirectly for instance when demographic changes (later generations having longer life expectancies) undermine the sustainability calculations upon which social insurance schemes are based—but other developments such as new technologies can also permanently change incentives, interdependencies, group identities, and behavior; and they can do so much more quickly.

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37 De Swaan would surely agree with Elias that the evolution of human norms and institutions (in the broad sense, including such "institutions" as poor relief) in the course of a historical process that stretches decades or even centuries does not follow any individual's master plan, rationally pursued, but he does, unlike Elias, present many of the interim outcomes (which jointly constitute the process) as consciously adopted ends, pursued by individually rational action—while allowing for unintended consequences and other 'systemic' effects. In this sense, de Swaan's notion of the state appears closer to Jacob Burckhardt's of the state as a "conscious, calculated human creation"—albeit for Burckhardt still a "work of art" rather than a piece of engineering (Burckhardt 1989 (1860): esp. 12f).
Use of Historical Narratives as Qualitative Data

But de Swaan's greatest intellectual debt to Elias as well as his most important contribution in going beyond Elias is probably methodological. Specifically, de Swaan's use of historical narratives as empirical data to support a social science theory or model is much clearer and appears more self-conscious than Elias'. As a result, de Swaan succeeds in applying a methodology that is based on a positivist notion of social science—manifest in the search for causal explanations of observed regularities—to the study of broad historical processes, overcoming many of the problems the philosopher of history Louis Mink identified in his critique of the use of "proto-scientific methods" in historical research.

Elias explicitly and implicitly criticized sociological theorizing that attempts to isolate events from the historical process within which they occur in order to derive static explanatory models (1997 (1937):80ff; 1997 (1939):390). The resulting loss of comprehension has been most thoroughly articulated by Mink, who thought "scientific" causal explanation to be incompatible with an understanding of historical processes (1987 (1966):64ff): Scientific causality—the "explanation of any phenomenon [through] its subsumption under general principles which are not ad hoc and for which disconfirming instances are not known"—Mink argues, necessarily involves the proposition of deductive hypotheses that link independent variables (i/v's) to a dependent one (d/v), which then must be tested on empirical data in the form of i/v's and d/v's (Mink 1987 (1966):67). But disaggregating a historical process into "dependent" and "independent" variables, he warns, deprives it of its process character. And doing so deprives us of understanding, he argues, because any one event in a historical sequence becomes meaningful only if seen as part of the larger process (Mink 1987 (1966):64f, 80, 82f).

Elias consequently saw as the greatest general (not subject-matter specific) contribution of his Civilizing Process to have introduced a way of studying long-term historical processes, which enables us to evaluate cause and effect of individual human mental or physical actions (of which the historical record necessarily consists and which inevitably are temporally closely bounded) within the larger and changing context (cf. the opening passages of the 1968

38 Elias considers momentary social "equilibria" and isolated events "wholly legitimate and [for merely practical reasons?] indispensable" objects of empirical sociological research (Elias 1997 (1937):395f), but warns against the inadequacies of theoretical models that are based on such a static, "snapshot" conception of individuals and society.
introduction: Elias 1997 (1937):10f). Elias' method consists of supporting his theoretical arguments with narratives that span the historical space of the processes he sought to analyze (thus, sections 4 through 6 of chapter 3 part II, for example, may be seen as qualitative "data" in support of the theoretical model of the monopoly mechanism deductively presented in section 3). But Elias—the "ex-post" ("nachträgliche") methodologist (Rehberg 1991:74)—is never explicit about this use of historical narratives as data, nor does he follow this idealized depiction with great consistency.39

De Swaan, by contrast, is quite conscious of, and explicit in, his use of historical narratives. Particularly in chapters 3 and 6 (which analyze the evolution of elementary education and social insurance, respectively), he clearly distinguishes the deductively presented theoretical argument from the empirical information that is presented in the form of five case studies, one each for Prussia/Germany, France, the Netherlands, Britain, and the US. These case studies do not consist of an explicit, systematic assessment of the covariance of the independent and dependent variables identified by the theoretical argument, but instead provide for each country a historical narrative. In each narrative, the groups about which de Swaan hypothesized in the abstract, as well as temporal progression, have a role—which is what allows an assessment of the theoretical argument.40 Due to the narrative-as-data, this assessment is never entirely explicit, requiring the reader to keep the various parts of the argument in mind while reading the country-specific sections, but de Swaan clearly does provide the assessment in each narrative. Five historical case studies of course cannot provide a statistical test of the argument—de Swaan has to reject, implicitly, any attempt to make "many observations from few" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:217ff) because he treats the historical narrative of each country as a self-contained unit so as to incorporate temporal progression into each "observation"—but they can at least provide what Harry Eckstein calls "plausibility probes" (Eckstein 1975:108ff).

39 His narratives are often interspersed with "raw data" in the form of extensive original quotes, many of which he lets 'speak for themselves' (particularly in chapter 2 of the Civilizing Process, the "History of Manners"), and they are sometimes only loosely connected to his theoretical arguments.

40 This format allows him to show that the groups identified by his model were indeed the ones affecting changes and outcomes—which he has to do, given that he criticizes and rejects several alternative explanations because of their failure to show, empirically, that those who benefited from given changes were in fact the ones pushing for them (cf. de Swaan 1988:60f).
De Swaan's methodology thus has many of the advantages of the "analytical narratives" that Robert Bates *et al.* currently advocate to integrate interpretative, historically contextual narratives and formal social science theory (Bates *et al.* 1998a (forthcoming):12ff). De Swaan, too, renders his interpretations of the historical record "vulnerable" to empirical disconfirmation and to critical examination of the logical consistency of the underlying model(s)—albeit arguably less formally so than Bates *et al* (cf. Bates *et al.* 1998a (forthcoming):22). But *In Care of the State* differs from and goes beyond *Analytical Narratives* not just in its greater "macro"-historical ambition but in its reliance upon process tracing as only a preliminary means of testing the theoretical argument: To support the validity of his theoretical causal claims, de Swaan offers several narratives (each of which process traces his argument) of different instances of the *explanandum* in the comparative tradition.

I want to illustrate this point with a brief methodological analysis of de Swaan's chapter 3. After he has presented his theoretical model, de Swaan here provides for each of the five countries a narrative of the evolution of "the elementary education of peasants and workers in national codes of communication" from the late 18th through the early 20th century (de Swaan 1988:88). In each narrative, de Swaan assesses, based on some primary research and a wealth of secondary sources, the position taken by most if not all of the groups identified in his model, any changes in their position, and changes in the actual system of elementary education, such as the oft-observed "development of a nondenominational Christian curriculum" (1988:107) and the increasing separation of secondary education from the primary one. The particular history of each of these five countries differed, of course, and so do the five historical narratives, emphasizing for instance in the French case how religious and linguistic central-vs-local conflicts coincided (and impeded linguistic unification), while emphasizing in the Dutch case the importance of the Napoleonic invasion in bringing to power a metropolitan elite that was exceptionally independent of the local elites and clergy (and hence able to undertake sweeping reform quickly), etc. At the same time, however, these are not five separate narratives suggesting five *ad hoc* explanations of the evolution of elementary education, but they are consciously selected and written as test cases for the validity of the abstract model.
De Swaan thus overcomes the problem of deciding what matters for the narrative (Mink 1987 (1978):187f)—the problem that leads to the ad-hoc-ness of many inductive historical explanations: His larger, abstract model provides the criteria for what matters; historical information that is particular to each country is provided only insofar as it is necessary to understand the relationship between the "independent variables" or to appreciate the contingencies of the historical process. Having thus assured that each narrative contains the same (or at least functionally equivalent) elements, he can employ each narrative as a unit or "observation" to test or probe his causal argument. To be sure, this procedure does not resolve Mink's "second dilemma of the historical narrative," namely that:

as historical it claims to represent, through its form, part of the real complexity of the past, but as narrative it is a product of imaginative construction, which cannot defend its claim to truth by any accepted procedure of argument or authentication (Mink 1987 (1978):199).  

But it does allow de Swaan to provide a "scientific" causal explanation of several instances of historical processes, without depriving them of their process character.

Remaining Methodological Problems

Beyond Mink's "second dilemma," I see three problems in de Swaan's use of historical narratives as empirical evidence. First, in chapters 2 and 4 (on poor relief and on sanitary services) the historical process is broken up into parts whose inherent link is often unclear, and de Swaan's theoretical argument is interwoven with empirical information in a way that makes it difficult to tell whether a given statement is a deductively derived hypothesis or the summary of his empirical findings. This is not a necessary problem when using historical narratives as data, but it indicates how difficult it is, even for de Swaan, to integrate scientific methods and historical narratives well.

Second, and more problematic because probably inherent in the use of historical narratives to support an argument with a temporal dimension, is that the need to "conclude" the narrative—

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41 Indeed, de Swaan makes no claim that his is the "only true" historical narrative (cf. de Swaan 1988:60).
42 Though he leaves unresolved the issue of defining or delineating historical sequences as distinct "events" (Mink 1987 (1966):88), that is, provides no generalizable justification for choosing the starting and ending points of his narrative.
while the process may be on-going—restricts the "generality of our conclusions" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:137). Through the feed-back loops (a change in the dependent variable is hypothesized to change the magnitude of the explanatory variables), time has a role akin to an independent variable (in interaction with the original i/n's). As long as the passage of time is only an independent, but not a dependent variable in the model—which I believe is the case here, but may not always hold in models with a temporal dimension—truncating its range (setting an end-point for the narrative) does not introduce selection bias. But more than with other independent variables of which we restrict the range, we should have doubts about the linearity of the relationship between time and outcome beyond the investigated period. If we find, for instance, that the state of the economy has over many electoral cycles been positively correlated with incumbent re-election and explains with great consistency some given percentage of the variance in the outcome of US Congressional elections, we may be quite confident that this variable will again have an effect of similar magnitude and certainly of similar direction in future elections. But when time itself becomes an independent variable, which moreover affects the outcome in a variety of ways, how can we assume that the effect of time (through the other independent variables) on the dependent variable will linearly continue as observed during the time period covered by the narrative?

Third and finally, de Swaan's use of historical narratives as empirical evidence can be easily faulted for failing to assess alternative explanations. This also appears to be one of the inherent weaknesses of using historical narratives as data: The literary freedom of the author makes it unlikely that a less convincing 'second' narrative, based on an alternative explanation of the same phenomenon (which could conceivably be supplied by the same author just as quantitative works often operationalize and test alternative explanations) would be accepted as sound evidence of the failure of that alternative explanation. But at the same time, de Swaan's historical narratives...
narratives provide strong support for the plausibility of his argument, maintaining a basic commitment to a scientific approach while overcoming some of the problems of a pure positivist method. And it may be that at the level of broad historical phenomena where the temporal dimension is crucially important to any explanation, providing such support for the plausibility of the argument is the best we can hope for from any one scholar—science is, after all, a collective enterprise (Weber 1991 (1919)).

**Conclusion**

There are many ways of reading this book. *In Care of the State* may be read, in the tradition of Norbert Elias' *The Civilizing Process* (Elias 1997 (1937); 1997 (1939)), as a study of the "unfinished project of modernity," an attempt to gain a partial understanding of the "evolution of the contemporary condition" somewhere between its roots in a "distant past" and its only "vaguely defined future" (Kuzmics and Mörth 1991:9), Alternatively, it may be read as an extension—or a qualification—of Mancur Olson's work on the importance and problems of collective action in the process of state formation (Olson 1982). (De Swaan explicitly puts his work in both of these traditions.) One may read and evaluate it more broadly as an attempt to marry historical sociology and rational choice; or one may read its theorizing about individuals in their social context(s) as an early example of what recently has come to be known as "network theory." I have addressed some of these aspects of the book, but my review has concentrated on de Swaan's explicit and implicit model(s) of the "later stage[s] of state formation" (de Swaan 1988:165)—the evolution of the welfare state in Western Europe and North America from the early 19th to the mid-20th century—and the methodology he uses to establish the plausibility of his theoretical argument.

In calling attention to how the "reach" of the modern state into the societal sphere has come to be so extensive, Abram de Swaan's *In Care of the State* not only improves our understanding actually able to subsume and reconcile alternative explanations (cf. Bates et al. 1998a (forthcoming):24; Weingast 1998 (forthcoming)).

47 Quote is from Habermas (1981), but compare the Holbach quote (from 1774) that opens and concludes Elias' *Prozeß der Zivilisation*: "La civilisation … n'est pas encore terminée"!

48 In Karl-Siegbert Rehberg's terms, de Swaan seeks to contribute to our understanding of the "process" rather than the "condition" of modernity (cf. Rehberg 1991:61ff).
of the roots of our contemporary modernity, but also makes an important contribution to contemporary debates about future public policy. As he puts it:

At present, the most pressing political problem is not the financing of collective institutions, but the ever-increasing control of the central state and its conglomerate bureaucracies over more and more intimate aspects of life (de Swaan 1988:11).

Moving from even a thorough causal analysis of the past to contemporary policy is of course always a difficult undertaking, aggravated by the shortcomings of the theoretical argument discussed above and the inherent problem of generalizing from models that are empirically supported only by temporally bounded narratives. This latter problem is particularly apparent when the temporal context supplies notions of causality, such as when the 'intellectual hegemony' of the "miasma" approach—invisible substances indicated by "smells" were highly scientifically believed to be the cause of epidemics—enabled the formation of a broad alliance in favor of the city-wide compulsory provision of sanitary services (cf. de Swaan 1988:133ff).

Given our current causal understanding of epidemics, more targeted, 'surgical' actions may be possible to ensure the safety and/or health of privileged individuals and groups with no need to improve the lot of the poor urban masses in general; "gated communities" in contemporary America may be seen as such a targeted safeguard against some of the threats on which de Swaan's models rely. The former, theoretical, problem is less intractable: Future research may improve on de Swaan's model in the ways I have suggested and thus lead to clearer policy recommendations. But even without a complete theory of welfare state formation and some remaining doubts about its generalizability, de Swaan makes a genuine contribution to current policy debates—keeping in mind both Dankwart Rustow's warning that what brings an institution into existence may not be what sustains it (cf. Rustow 1970:346) and Paul Pierson's finding that the dismantling of the welfare state is an altogether different political process from its formation (Pierson 1994).

De Swaan's narratives illustrate the difficulties of providing public goods or "social services" without enlisting the assistance of the state in the administration or oversight of a collective and compulsory system for their provision. Yet he also shows (unfortunately without making it a theoretical issue in itself) the loss of social capital that results when the state takes
over previously privately organized tasks—for instance when the public compulsory social insurance replaced workers' mutual aid societies, which had had the positive externalities of "instill[ing] a sense of togetherness … among the new proletarian city-dwellers" and providing, though the societies' meetings, exercises in grass roots democratic practice (de Swaan 1988:144f, cf. also 254f). The book thus has the very timely policy implication that, while individuals need the state as a facilitator of collective action in modern societies with their ever longer but also looser chains of interdependence, policy makers and other representatives of the state should, in the interest of the viability of the society that underpins each state, take an interest in (1) limiting state intervention in society to issues where highly desirable collective action is truly unachievable without state involvement and (2) in seeking ways of intervening that are most compatible with the maintenance of social capital.

49 De Swaan's account illustrates the futility of liberitarian calls for a state-less society.
References


Figure 2

**STATE**
- strengthen the overall collectivity, incl. in competition with other states [2]
- maintain order for easy governance and assurance of tax base [33]
- increase authority at the expense of local autonomy (mix of hesitancy and desire) [50f]

**POOR RELIEF**

**PROPERTIED CLASSES**
- minimal insurance against violence and curses [16f]
- safety in the countryside—against "roaming bands of [the] indigent" threatening robbery and arson [15, 17, 19, 34]
- reprieve from the moral challenge of "visible suffering" [15]
- deference, gratitude, and prayers from the poor; honor and prestige [16, 27]
- maintain a cheap labor pool [passim]
- minimize the human reservoir for petty crime and rebellion [20, 27]

**DOCILE PAUPERS**
- attract alms through conformity while implicitly threatening exposure to suffering and disease and damage [18]

**THE POOR**
(individuals' status often difficult to discern)

**ABLE-BODIED, NOT WORKING-FOR-A-WAGE POOR**
- improvement of their condition, however temporary, through stealing, robbing, raping, burning, or plundering [18]
Figure 3

EARLY INDUSTRIALISTS
- protect market for labor, raw materials, and finished products [73]
- retain child labor [116]
First: (-)
Later: (+)

LOCAL ELITES
- avert loss of power-enhancing mediating monopoly as translators from supra-local and written language to local speech and vice versa [59,68f]

CENTRAL STATE BUREAUCRATS
- increase reach/power
- become independent of local elites for
  - tax collection [58f]
  - recruitment [73]

SUPRA-REGIONALLY TRADING ENTREPRENEURS
- increase size of unified market [59,73] with
  - standard language
  - standardized measurements and currency
- facilitate exchange through general knowledge of arithmetic and geography [73]

SCOPE & QUALITY OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION

PARENTS
- maintain rights at court [80]
- conduct official business vis-a-vis the state [80]
(NOTE: class subdivisions exist within this group—see text)

CLERGYMEN IN COMPETITIVE RELIGIOUS SETTING
- maintain educational monopoly for children from one's religious group [84]
- attract and indoctrinate children of other-denominational parents [75, 84]
(NOTE: In the absence of religious competition, clergymen are part of the local elites!)
Figure 4

ESTABLISHED CITY DWELLERS

UPPER CLASS
- shares most of the middle class' concerns (incl. health externalities) [passim]
- seeks to maintain its privilege and opposes having to pay for others' benefits [140]
- yet welcomes low cost of common provision if service has not been previously been established on a private good basis [126f]

MIDDLE CLASS
- establish safeguard against "social contamination" [121f]
- re-establish "social distance"
- integrate newcomers; improve the poor in order to decrease threat of rebellion, mob violence, crime, and epidemics [125f]

PROFESSIONALS
- improvement of scientifically understood conditions
- individual career advancement and raised status of the collective [140]

POLITICIANS
- raise awareness of the health threats and propose state-provided solutions in pursuit of the middle class vote [140]

PROVIDING OF URBAN SANITARY SERVICES

ENLIGHTENED CIVIL SERVANTS
- general improvement of sanitary conditions [139f]
- initiative depends upon contemporary scientific knowledge/beliefs [133f]

WORKING CLASS/POOR
- display opposition to resented patronizing behavior of the middle and upper classes [122]
- counteract deterioration of working class neighborhoods as the poor driven out elsewhere settle there, too [137]

NEWCOMERS
- minimize patronizing impositions by the established and better-off and safeguard oneself against their hostility [122, 125]
Figure 5

INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYERS ("PROGRESSIVE INDUSTRIALISTS")
- reduce labor conflicts [158]
- improve industrial relations [217]
- share risk for disability claims once employer liability became the standard presumption [179]
- relief from moral responsibility to care for disabled and aged employees [217]
- raise lower class morale ... (see regime)
FOR ESTABLISHED "PROGRESSIVE" ONES:
- reduce competitive disadvantage of the firms that had previously established company-based funds (funded by company contribution beyond regular wage) [170f]
- overcome demographic change problems faced by such funds [171]

INDEPENDENT (SELF-EMPLOYED) PROPERTY-OWNING PETTY BOURGEOISIE (INCL. FARMERS)
- maintain social distinction (property-based privilege over the proletariat) [156]
- maintain sovereignty vis-a-vis the state and workers [168]

ACTIVIST REGIME
- raise lower-class morale and turn workers into good, law-abiding citizens [147]
- short-run electoral gain [156, 194]
- long-run expansion of state control [156, 194]
- increase worker loyalty to the state/country [181]
- maintain healthy reservoir for armed services in case of war [176, 190]
- try out new "practices of public administration" [175]

OTHERWISE NON-COVERED OR "BAD RISK" LOW-SKILLED AND NON-PERMANENT WORKERS
- overcome exclusion from mutualist and private insurance arrangements [145f]

WORKERS
- remedy against their "inability to provide for almost inevitable periods of income loss" [165]
- get benefits of insurance without giving employers at the company-level control over funds [172f]
"MODERATE" UNION LEADERS:
- gain/maintain institutional control of the administration of the scheme so as to minimize decreased attractiveness of union membership as benefits equally accrue to non-members (unlike benefits of previous, union-based insurance schemes) [158, 172f]

ADOPITION OF NATION-WIDE, COMPULSORY, AND COLLECTIVE SOCIAL INSURANCE

NEW, EMPLOYED MIDDLE CLASS
- raise lower class morale ... (see regime)
- acquiescent, even supportive, as long as class distinction (workers-employees) is maintained [156]