The Domestic Politics of European Integration:
Public Opinion, Referenda, and EU Membership*

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Abstract
Integrating insights from realist intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, comparative and international political economy, this paper develops a general deductive model of public perceptions of EU membership that grounds the study of this issue more firmly in the general theoretical literatures on European integration and public opinion. We specify this general model inductively for the Austrian referendum on EU membership in 1994, based on a qualitative analysis of the public debate preceding the referendum. We then test the model quantitatively using several statistical techniques to analyze the referendum results: OLS regression of data from Austria's 121 political administrative districts to estimate effects for low-level aggregates of EU citizens-to-be and Gary King's maximum likelihood-based ecological inference technique to estimate individual-level effects. Consistent with the general model, we find that highly political considerations—especially the potential for transnational coalition building through EU institutions—were important determinants of the variation in support for EU membership within the country, along with aggregate and individual-level economic considerations.
Introduction

Public opinion has come to impose a real constraint on the process of European integration.\(^1\) This trend manifests itself most prominently in the increasing use of referenda in current and prospective member states (see figure 1). Through these referenda, national electorates have repeatedly shown that we can no longer take for granted a "permissive consensus" (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) regarding the transfer or pooling of decisionmaking powers entailed in European Union (EU) membership—which had long been assumed by theories of European integration.\(^2\) Public opinion will also have a direct influence on the course of European integration in the near future: Of the thirteen countries that currently are applicants for accession to the EU, ten have already committed themselves to holding referenda as part of the domestic ratification of the treaties through which they would become EU members, although most of them are not constitutionally obliged to do so.\(^3\) It therefore has both theoretical and practical relevance to ask: What explains variations in support for EU membership?

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The increased practical importance of public opinion for the process of European integration has led to a fruitful growth in scholarship since the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 Danish referendum, and we have gained a number of important insights from that new literature.\(^4\) However, existing scholarship on public opinion and European integration

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\(^1\) We emphasize public opinion as a constraint rather than a driving force because, while there surely are instances where public opinion drives policy and politics (cf. Page and Shapiro 1983), politics above the national level usually "is not constituency driven, but … constituency constrained" (Putnam 1993:71; cf. also Cohen 1995; Wittkopf 1990).

\(^2\) The European Communities (EC) became the European Union through the Maastricht Treaty, though the EC still exist as distinct institutions within the EU. We will use the acronym EU throughout the paper to refer to the EC or EU respectively.

\(^3\) The thirteen states are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey. Negotiations are underway with all but Turkey; see [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.htm) for details. Only Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Turkey have not—yet—made a commitment to holding a referendum, and the EU considers referenda "likely" to be held "in all applicant countries" [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/faq/index.htm#Public%20support](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/faq/index.htm#Public%20support) 15 Feb 2002, our emphasis).

\(^4\) Earlier studies of public opinion and European integration were few and far between (cf. Dalton and Duval 1986; Deutsch et al. 1967; Feld and Wildgen 1976; Handley 1981; Hewstone 1986; Inglehart 1967; 1970a; 1970b; 1978;
remains largely divorced from the larger theoretical literature on European integration, as well as
the general literature on public opinion. We try to advance our theoretical understanding of
public opinion regarding European integration—and make the study of public opinion more
relevant to the larger theory debate—by deductively deriving a model of public perceptions of
EU membership from the grand theories of European integration and some general theories of
international and comparative political economy. At the same time, we take seriously the
limitations of deductively modeling public opinion pointed out in the literature on public opinion
and therefore illustrate the usefulness of our approach by specifying the model for the Austrian
referendum on EU membership of June 1994, which allows us to subject it to rigorous empirical
tests.

Most newer studies of public perceptions of European integration emphasize general
economic conditions at the macro level of the nation state (e.g. Anderson 1995; Anderson and
Kaltenhaler 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993) or the economic costs and benefits of EU
membership at the micro level of the individual voter (e.g. Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel
and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a; Moses and Jenssen 1998) as the key determinants of variations
in public support for European integration. We agree that economic costs and
benefits—including the highly political distributional effects of economic policies (cf. Tsoukalis
1993)—are important. Yet, national-level economic effects cannot explain the considerable
variation in public perceptions of EU membership within countries, and domestic economic
interests, both at the aggregate and at the individual level, only provide a very partial explanation
of support for EU membership—even when controlling for subjective factors (cf. Gabel and
Whitten 1997). We argue that for the people within the EU (and those contemplating becoming
EU citizens), the EU is far from being merely an economic entity. It is a distinctly political
In addition to economic factors, political factors such as perceived threats to national identity and opportunities for coalition building at the trans- and supra-national level play a major role in shaping perceptions of EU membership.

Based on this general argument, we develop a political-economic model of public perceptions of EU membership, which integrates key insights from the literatures on public opinion, European integration, and comparative and international political economy. While recognizing the importance of economic and political benefits for a country as a whole, we concentrate on those factors that may explain varying support within a country. Specifically, we stipulate that support for EU membership based on economic interests should vary by sector, skill level, and eligibility for EU structural fund aid—and depend upon context, especially on the national economic policies (such as agricultural subsidies) expected in the absence of EU membership. Equally important as these economic factors are several political factors. Here, we stipulate that variation in support for EU membership is based on one of two logics. First, EU membership provides some—vague but noteworthy—security benefits. Their importance should vary by the proximity of potential security threats. For other political interests, EU membership involves a tradeoff between a loss of autonomous decisionmaking power and the gain of participation in EU-level decisionmaking. The net effect should vary by issue issue and depend upon the availability of like-minded actors in the trans- and supra-national institutions of the EU, though it seems bound to be negative for those who view integration as a threat to one's distinct national culture and identity.

This general deductive model identifies the kinds of issues that are likely to shape public perceptions of EU membership. To identify the specific issues that have salience in the public debate and thus are likely to shape public opinion in a particular country at a particular time (cf.

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5 A sophisticated economic model could incorporate many of the political issues, such as the transit issue in the Austrian case, by presenting them as externalities. Doing so would merely entail a semantic change in our argument. Moreover, we are concerned with more than the political reverberations of EU economic policies.

6 Drawing this distinction allows us, for instance, to disaggregate the notion of postmaterialist interests (cf. Inglehart 1967 and later works) and advance our theoretical understanding of their role in the process of European integration.
Habermas 1990), we must proceed inductively. We therefore specify the model for Austria—the largest and first candidate country to hold a referendum on EU membership in the last wave of EU enlargement—using qualitative information from the Austrian public debate over EU membership in the weeks and months prior to the referendum. This approach allows us to contextualize the hypotheses in ways that previous studies have failed to do. Consequently, we notice, for instance, that the conventional wisdom of higher support for EU membership among farmers (cf. Gabel 1998b:48f, 63f) is unlikely to apply to the previously well protected and nationally income-supported Austrian farmers.

To test the resulting inductively specified model on a separate set of data, we conduct two sets of statistical analyses using the referendum results as our dependent variable and quantitative measures of the operationalized explanatory variables. First, we conduct OLS regressions on aggregate data at the level of Austria's 121 Politische Bezirke (political-administrative districts). These analyses yield a number of important insights. Economic interests are indeed important, but only explain about 35% of the variation in EU support at the district level. Adding political variables to our model greatly increases its explanatory leverage, allowing us to explain more than 65% of the observed variance. Specifically, the greater the economic importance of the two sectors that expected detrimental economic effects, the lower was a district's support for EU membership in the referendum; similarly, the more low-skilled inhabitants live in a district, the lower the level of support. At the same time, the level of support is greatly higher in districts designated as recipients of EU Structural Fund aid. Among the operationalized political hypotheses, expected security benefits of EU membership in the districts bordering non-EU countries appears to increase support for the EU, whereas other political concerns decrease support: The higher the level of environmental concern in a district, or the higher the level of concern over a loss of national identity, the lower the Yes-vote in the referendum.

These aggregate-level results support our general political-economic model and advance our theoretical understanding of public perceptions of EU membership at the level of district-
level electorates. Moreover, such macro-level analyses can yield valid and important insights into political dynamics, even if they do not capture the micro-level calculus, i.e. the considerations of each individual citizen when s/he chooses how to vote in the referendum (cf. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989:esp. 1129f). However, using these aggregate results to explain individual-level motivations for EU support (which are implicit in the theoretical rationale behind our model) is marred by the ecological inference problem: We cannot infer from aggregate data that a higher level of EU support in districts with more individuals who exhibit a certain attribute is indeed due to higher levels of support from among these individuals without making some assumptions that are problematic and impossible to test directly (cf. King 1997:esp. 37ff). Unfortunately, no data are available that would allow us to correlate individual referendum votes with other characteristics of the individual citizen. Yet, the ecological inference problem is particularly important here, because other scholars have found their aggregate-level explanations of variation in EU support only weakly confirmed when tested at the individual level (cf. Moses and Jenssen 1998:228ff).

We therefore address the issue of ecological inference head-on in a second set of statistical analyses, using Gary King's "solution to the ecological inference problem" (EI) (King 1997). This EI solution, which we introduce briefly in a separate section, combines a modified method of bounds with a procedure that uses existing information on each aggregate unit to point-estimate the percentage of Yes- and No-votes in the referendum that is attributable to individuals who exhibit a certain characteristic (such as being farmers) and model the remaining uncertainty. The careful EI estimates show that our model of public perceptions of EU

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7 To illustrate, imagine a scenario where EU membership were known among the mass public (nonfarmers) to lead to income-losses for farmers. Assume further that farmers themselves—more aware of the complexities of the issue than the general public—know that the proper second-best scenario for calculating the opportunity costs of EU membership is not the current pre-membership period, but non-membership while being subjected to GATT rules on agricultural trade (expected to result in even larger income losses). Under these conditions, we might observe lower levels of EU support in districts with high levels of agricultural employment even if farmers in fact exhibit higher levels of EU support than nonfarmers. The lower level of support at the aggregate level might be entirely explained by the ill-informed sympathy of nonfarmers.
membership indeed holds up well, even when tested at the individual level: Support for EU membership was indeed lower among farmers and low-skilled laborers, for instance.\(^8\)

Referenda on whether or not to join the EU, with the preceding public scrutiny of the costs and benefits of membership in extensive public debates, provide exceptional opportunities to study the public perception or "social legitimacy" (Weiler 1991:2469ff) of the EU. By using the results of a referendum on EU membership for our empirical analysis, we avoid the problem that different survey questions, when used as measures of public support for EU membership, lead to quite different results (cf. Handley 1981; Janssen 1991:449-454; Niedermayer 1995; Eichenberg 1998). Even more importantly, the decision over membership must bring to a head all the issues that shape the perception of the institution.\(^9\) While question wording may still matter (cf. Krosnick 1989; Sudman and Bradburn 1982) and the government's popularity may contaminate the results (Franklin, Eijk, and Marsh 1995; Schneider and Weitsman 1996), the publicity and extensive public discussion preceding these referenda should leave little question in the voter's mind that s/he is deciding on the country's membership in the EU. Positive votes in a referendum would therefore be indicative of the EU's legitimacy insofar as they signal a commitment to accept the costs to gain the benefits—with the understanding that a changed cost-benefit analysis tomorrow will not allow the easy reversal of today's decision.\(^10\)

We have chosen Austria for our empirical analysis because Austria was the first of the four most recent prospective member states to hold a referendum on EU membership, which

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\(^8\) Not all variables lend themselves equally to using the EI method. In addition, the structure of the data sometimes makes it difficult to use the method because there is no unique maximum or the limited variation on a given variable renders the 95% confidence interval too restrictive. See discussion below.

\(^9\) Public debates over the EU in current member states are rarely about whether to be a member or not and may therefore require a different model (cf. Schlozman 2002: (8)). Consequently, a single policy issue might be more dominant in the less consequential debates in current member states than in a debate over membership as such. Furthermore, we would expect in a current member state a different dynamic insofar as there are likely to be groups whose interests are served best by the EC/EU 'as is:' They would be strongly in favor of the EU, but opposed to changes.

\(^10\) There actually is no provision in the Treaty of Rome that explicitly prohibits a member from leaving the Community, but neither is there a procedure for doing so. Furthermore, the treaty is not limited in duration. While no member state has to this date put the treaty to the test by asking to leave the EU, that event would seem to involve at least difficult and politically costly negotiations.
afforded its electorate the highest possible degree of independence from the referenda elsewhere (in the Scandinavian countries in this case).\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, Austria is divided into 121 political-administrative units for which economic, demographic, and voting information is regularly recorded. Unlike the Scandinavian countries (cf. Moses and Jenssen 1998), Austria therefore allows for aggregate-level statistical analyses within one country.

\begin{quote}
A great many of us make two mistakes in our judgment of the common man. We overestimate the amount of information he has; we underestimate his intelligence.
Elmo Roper in Fortune, Feb. 1942, as quoted in (Nincic 1992:48)
\end{quote}

**Public Opinion and European Integration**

Scholars of European integration have tended to avoid theorizing public opinion—its sources just as much as its effect on the process and content of integration. Two sets of concerns have motivated this omission, the first related to the nature of public opinion, the second specific to the nature of European integration. Yet although there is some validity to both of these sets of concerns (resulting in increased uncertainty about out-of-sample predictions), neither provides a good reason to shy away from systematic theoretical as well as empirical analysis of public opinion when its influence on "the workings of [Europe's] governmental system" (Key 1961:535) is increasingly apparent.

The first impediment to theorizing public opinion about the EU is the nature of public opinion in general. As Walter Lippmann noted long ago, political events and decisions play a very minor role in most people's daily lives, most of the time (Lippmann 1922:e.g. 58ff). It would therefore be irrational for the average citizen to pay much attention to, gather good information on, and form carefully thought-through opinions about, all but a few aspects of public affairs (cf. Downs 1957). And indeed, public opinion research in the US (e.g. Erskine 1962; 1963a; 1963b; 1963c) and in other Western democracies (e.g. Klingemann 1979: 227ff) has found that "popular levels of information about public affairs are, from the point of view of

\textsuperscript{11} Referenda in Finland, Sweden, and Norway followed in the summer and fall of 1994 (consciously in that order—cf. Jahn and Storsved 1995).

Consistent with this view, those who study public opinion in the particular context of European integration have often found that average citizens felt little affected by the EU and consequently had little interest in, and information about, EU institutions or other aspects of European integration (cf. Inglehart 1970a; Brunner 1981:160f; Slater 1983:esp. 75f; Janssen 1991:451; Percheron 1991; Rattinger 1996:64ff; Anderson 1998:572ff).

The second impediment is the nature of European integration. We can distinguish three characteristics that make it difficult to theorize public opinion about the EU and conduct empirical research on it. First, EU membership today affects several interlinked issue areas. Determining one's best interest therefore involves complex tradeoffs of costs and benefits across these issue areas, which may require greater cognitive efforts than the average voter is able or willing to expend (cf. Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994:459f). Moreover, the institutional manifestation of European integration is something of a moving target as competencies and decisionmaking structures of the EU change, seemingly ever more rapidly (cf. Janssen 1991:448; Caporaso 1998:340ff). Such fluid complexities should be expected to impede informed public discourse and opinion formation—and make theorizing about it quite difficult, particularly since social science theories rarely allow us deductively to assign precise relative weights to multiple competing considerations. Second, interested parties have highly skewed access to information. Public opinion about the EU may therefore be even more volatile and/or inconsistent than public opinion in general (cf. Janssen 1991:453f; Percheron 1991), which would make it particularly difficult to establish any existing structure of opinion empirically. Third, several scholars have found (and others assumed) that there is a "permissive consensus" (Lindberg and Scheingold
1970) among the public regarding European integration (cf. also Bulmer 1983:361f; Slater 1983:74; Janssen 1991:449f; Rattinger 1996:70)—and it seemed "as impracticable as it is unnecessary" (Haas 1958:17) to study a phenomenon that exhibits no consequential variation.

Yet, while some of these concerns are valid, most do not apply to public opinion in the context of referenda over EU membership and none should keep us of from seeking a better theoretical understanding of public opinion in the context of European integration. Public opinion scholars have in recent years questioned several of the general problems identified above. Even if the level of factual knowledge is low and computational abilities are limited, citizens may well be able to hold opinions that are quite stable, structured, and coherent in the sense of being consistent with "objective" interests—as long as citizens are able to draw correct inferences from the limited information thanks to information shortcuts, vertical constraints in opinion structure, and other cognitive processes that we are only beginning to understand (e.g. Cosmides and Tooby 1994; 1996; Holsti 1992:446ff; Neuman 1986; Nincic 1992:45ff; Page and Shapiro 1992). In addition, European integration itself provides reasons to be optimistic about the feasibility of a general theory of public perception of EU membership. Most importantly, "EU policy is no longer a policy domain that is distant from the everyday life of Europeans" (Dalton and Eichenberg 1998:251). As salience increases, public opinion about the EU should become better informed and more stable over time. Second, in the post-Maastricht referenda world, where governments know that "European mass publics have the ability and willingness to constrain and possibly forestall further progress toward a unified Europe" (Anderson 1998:570), EU treaties that are put to a referendum may well be among governments' best-explained policy decisions. Public scrutiny of the trade-offs should facilitate reasoned public opinion formation and reduce the availability of private information, as attentiveness and cognitive effort among the public increase in response to political stimuli (cf. Bennett 1988; also Pelinka 1995). In sum, there is no reason to omit public opinion any longer from a theoretical treatment of European integration.
Toward a General Model of Public Perceptions of EU Membership

Although the "grand theories" of European integration—realist intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and neofunctionalism—have all tended to omit public opinion from their explanations of European integration, we may deduce from each of these approaches several hypotheses about the sources of public perceptions of the EU. In this section, we specify for each approach what it implies, in combination with theories of international and comparative political economy, for a model of public perceptions of EU membership.

Realist Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalists conceive of the process of European integration (and the EU as the outcome of that process at a given time) as a series of bargains between states that resolve specific cooperation problems through the creation or modification of international organizations, in which agents interact on behalf of their principals, the EU member states (e.g. Garrett 1992; Garrett 1993; Hoffmann 1966; Lange 1993; Milward 1984; 1992; Scharpf 1988; Taylor 1982; Wallace, Wallace, and Webb 1977).

Traditional intergovernmentalism is based on "Realist" assumptions, emphasizing the deeply political character of integration but restricting the political analysis to the interaction of states as unitary actors (cf. Cornett and Caporaso 1992:229ff). Despite its neglect of public opinion, this realist intergovernmentalism allows us to derive from it a set of important hypotheses about the sources of public perceptions of the EU. Explicitly or implicitly, scholars in this tradition view national governments as either sufficiently insulated from, or sufficiently capable of controlling, domestic public opinion to warrant treating governments (and their pursuit of security and wealth for the state) as autonomous from civil society and its divisions. Consequently, public opinion should be either irrelevant to the process of European integration or a function of state interests (cf. Carr 1964:132ff). The former position is questionable, given the increasing use of binding referenda, and theoretically indeterminate regarding the sources of public opinion (cf. Keohane 1984:34f). The latter, however, yields observable implications: If
European integration is merely an instance of inter-state conflict and cooperation, then domestic public support for EU membership should, from a realist intergovernmentalist perspective, be a function primarily of geopolitics and secondarily of economic consideration as a means to enhancing the security of the state (cf. Gowa 1989). Security and economic effects for the country as a whole (and relative to other countries) should figure prominently in the public debate. Net benefits should result in public approval, net costs in public rejection, with no meaningful variation within a country.

**Security Effects**

The security benefits of EU membership are limited, but worth discussing briefly. Despite attempts to raise the profile of European Political Cooperation to the level of a "Common Foreign and Security Policy," turn the Franco-German brigade into a multinational formation that could be the nucleus of an EU army, and formalize the ties to the WEU, the EU is no military alliance, and EU membership involves no security obligations or guarantees. Yet, EU membership tends to increase interdependence and thus gives member states an increased stake in each other's security. This increased stake can provide a deterrent security benefit if it raises the risk for third parties that using military force against an EU member state might lead to countermeasures by several or all EU member states. This security benefit of EU membership is vague, but might be a consideration, particularly for states who do not want to become members of WEU or NATO.

**Aggregate Economic Effects**

In the economic realm, we can distinguish between two types of aggregate economic effects in the EU context: (1) direct financial transfers (from the member state's national budget to the EU budget and from the EU to the member state or some part thereof) and (2) endogenous trade- and investment-related economic effects resulting from the economic liberalization entailed in joining the EU's common market. Trade theory suggests that, in the absence of major

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12 Rejection should then never occur (except for fluke accidents) because the government would, under these conditions, not seek EU membership.
trade diversion, trade liberalization leads to both static (initial) and dynamic welfare gains, due to comparative advantage, economies of scale, etc. (e.g. Bhagwati 1988; Krugman and Obstfeld 1991:11ff, 68ff, 121ff). Moreover, EU membership removes or reduces many of the political risks associated with foreign direct investment, and ensured market access makes investments more attractive to foreign and domestic investors alike (cf. Mattli 1999:47f). Trade- and investment-related effects thus promise increased economic growth as a consequence of EU membership. To assess the overall economic effects of EU membership for a state, we have to add to these growth benefits the net financial transfers. The EU’s net financial transfers to a member state consist of EU payments to the state or its nationals (e.g. farming aid to individual farmers or structural funds to regions, paid via the national budget and/or allowing a reduction in the national budget) minus the state's contribution to the EU budget (calculated by a complex formula based on the country's GDP and paid out of the national budget). For countries with high per-capita GDP (in comparison with the EU average), the net financial transfers tend to be negative, though they are presumably always balanced by other benefits of membership.14

**Liberal Intergovernmentalism**

Liberal intergovernmentalism shares realist intergovernmentalism's notion of European integration as a series of international bargains, but rejects its assumption of states as unitary actors. Starting in the 1980s, some intergovernmentalists noted that their focus on national governments as the main actors in fact requires the analysis of democratic domestic politics as the sources of the preferences that governments pursue in international bargains (cf. Bulmer 1983; Wallace 1981). The resulting "liberal intergovernmentalism" (cf. Moravcsik 1993; 1998)

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13 As an almost perfect manifestation of the economist’s ideal-typical "small country," which relies for the achievement of economies of scale on openness toward the world market, where it is a price taker and thus has to be competitive, Austria seems highly suited to reap such economic benefits through EU membership (cf. Katzenstein 1985:esp. 39ff, 186f).

14 This may explain why Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton (1993:522ff) find no evidence of a correlation between financial transfers and opinion poll support for the EU in their time series of data from the EC-9 from 1973 through 1988. They conclude "The calculus of relative budgetary returns may have been relevant for Prime Minister Thatcher, but it does not appear to affect the thinking of most European citizens" (1993:524).
recognizes, consistent with a "liberal" theory of foreign policy and international politics (cf. Moravcsik 1997), that national preferences are a function of "constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituencies" (Moravcsik 1998:18) whose analysis must precede the analysis of the strategic interaction of national preferences at the international level (cf. also e.g. Milward 1993).

Public opinion as a constraint on governments is consistent with the liberal variant of intergovernmentalism. What, however, does this approach imply about the sources of public opinion? Most fundamentally, it suggests that we should observe variation in public support for EU membership not just across but also within countries, and that such differences in public support within countries should be based on the distribution of the economic costs and benefits of EU membership across groups and individuals. In line with a wide literature that emphasizes the role of distributional factors and adjustment costs in economic liberalization (e.g. Rogowski 1987; Simmons 1994) and identifies economic sectors as the source of domestic political coalitions and divisions in international bargains over liberalization (e.g. Milner 1988; Frieden 1991; Shafer 1994), liberal intergovernmentalism sees well-organized economic interest groups (especially industries and farmers) as the main domestic political actors (e.g. Moravcsik 1998:50). Well-organized economic interests should be prominent in the public debate and might influence public opinion at large. Moreover, individual perceptions of EU membership should be a function of the material interests of the group(s) with which the individual closely associates. These insights lead to three sets of hypotheses about sub-state variation in support for EU membership based on economic interests.

**Distribution of Financial Transfers from the EU**

Beyond subsidies to agriculture, the various programs of the Structural Fund are the main channels through which the EU returns money to the member states. Yet, structural fund money is not returned to the national governments for their discretionary use. Rather, it is earmarked for specific projects in specific administrative units. EU membership thus involves geographically
based—direct and indirect—redistribution. We doubt that EU regional aid should be understood as side payments with the purpose of boosting public opinion (Carubba 1994), but we expected such aid to have the effect of boosting support among those living in regions that receive it.

Structural Fund aid is granted under six categories, called objectives and numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5a, and 5b (criteria for each objective vary, cf. Pollack 1995). Of these, objective 1, 2, and 5b aid require prior designation of a region as an area of the respective type. "Objective 1" status, based on having a per capita GDP below 75% of the EU average, stands out among these because it is negotiated intergovernmentally (requiring unanimity in the Council) and can therefore be specified unambiguously prior to becoming a member state. This suggests higher levels of public support in any region that is guaranteed EU aid receipts due to being designated an objective 1 area.

**Sectoral Effects**

Sectoral arguments seem particularly suited as the basis for understanding political cleavages on economic issues in advanced industrialized countries, where both capital and labor have invested highly into industry-specific assets and skills (cf. Frieden and Rogowski 1996). A sector's competitiveness in the EU-market should be expected to be particularly important in the EU context because EU regulation severely limits the ability of national governments to intervene in the market by legal means to help specific firms or sectors—an important change from previous practice for almost all states. In general, internationally competitive sectors should be expected to favor EU membership; uncompetitive and protected sectors that would become import-competing, should be expected to oppose it (cf. Moravcsik 1998:35-41).

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15 All projects require co-payment by the national or regional governments, which varies from 30 to 70%, depending on the objective and project.
16 We concentrate on the increase in support among recipients rather than the decrease among those who indirectly pay for it because beneficiaries' interests are likely to be more concentrated.
17 Indeed, certain industrial sectors appear to have been the ones that first put EU membership on the political agenda in 1985/86, when the two main political parties still considered it a non-issue (Luif 1988:167-184; Schneider 1990; Kunnert 1993).
Sectoral arguments, however, make strong and potentially problematic assumptions about actors' understanding of their own interests in very complex contexts (cf. Lindblom 1977; Krasner 1978:19; McNamara 1998:32ff). These arguments might therefore apply primarily to fairly unambiguously affected sectors with particularly high stakes. Moreover, the prominence of a sector in the public mind may depend upon factors other than the economic importance of the sector, for instance because sectors differ in their ability to overcome collective action problems and because sectoral interests may be hidden from public view by corporatist political-economic institutions that aggregate interests at a higher level. Since we lack uncontested theoretical models of such collective action and aggregation issues (agriculture in particular seems to defy the logic of such arguments frequently), it would be difficult to identify the position and importance of specific sectors deductively. We therefore postpone the discussion of specific sectors to the empirical section, although we identify agriculture as a strong candidate, due to its prominence in the EU.

**Skilled vs. Unskilled Labor**

Even if economic interests align primarily along sectoral lines, a sophisticated analysis of class-based interests may still be warranted. Though economic integration may privilege business, because firms arguably are more suited to having and seeing their stake in supranational governance (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998:15), support for the EU does not seem to line up with social classes in any straightforward manner (Hix 1999:esp. 145ff, 154ff). More important seems to be the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor. Conventional wisdom has it that free trade benefits labor in low-wage countries at the expense of labor in high-wage countries (cf. Cohen 1998), but within the high-wage countries benefits skilled workers at the expense of unskilled workers who have no sector-specific labor assets. Because the employment of unskilled labor is primarily based on cost per hour, firms or "capital" will tend to shift economic activities that employ unskilled labor to low-wage countries and/or put downward pressure on unskilled workers' wages in high-wage countries (e.g. Wood 1994; 1995; also Gabel
1998a:940f; Rogowski 1989:177). Given the free movement of labor in the EU—envisaged in articles 48 through 51 of the Treaty of Rome and accelerated by the SEA and Maastricht revisions—these arguments should hold a fortiori in the EU, even if most labor movement in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s was by low-skilled workers from outside of the then-current EU member states (cf. Tsoukalas 1993:32f, 148ff). Although the recent development of an EU social policy and some ECJ decisions that are favorable to labor complicate the picture (e.g. Lange 1993), we should expect that workers' support for EU integration will co-vary with skill levels, with unskilled workers in high-wage countries particularly likely to be opposed.

A materialist rational choice model might stop here. We argue, however, that the EU's institutional structure has made the question of membership a political as well as economic one. Neofunctionalism provides a fruitful starting point for this argument.

Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalists conceive of European integration as a process in which domestic actors from participating countries and supranational actors of the newly created European institutions interact with each other directly, transnationally, and with the member state governments in ways that change the actors' interests in a systematic way. Specifically, due to functional and political spillover processes (cf. Burley and Mattli 1993:55f), "loyalties, expectations, and political activities" shift "toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas 1958:16).

Despite this emphasis on individuals and groups below the nation state, Ernst Haas considered the mass public uninteresting as a political actor (1958:17f; 1970:628). Consequently, neofunctionalists, too, have tended to ignore public opinion (cf. Haas 1958; 1961; 1964; Nye 1970; Schmitter 1970), though there were some exceptions (e.g. Deutsch 1957; Deutsch et al.

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18 The argument is quite contested; for the latest on this debate cf. Feenstra 2000.
Maintaining functionalism's emphasis on technical and economic aspects of integration, and cognizant of the limited importance of the incipient European Communities to the daily lives of the member states' citizens at the time, neofunctionalists concentrated primarily on supranational actors—especially the European Commission, later also the Court and the European Parliament (cf. Alter 1996; Burley and Mattli 1993; Mattli and Slaughter 1998; Pollack 1997; Ross 1994)—and secondarily on well organized, concentrated interest groups with transnational ties, such as industrial sectors (cf. Kohler-Koch 1996; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998:7ff). Only more recent neofunctionalist work has put the focus back on domestic politics and indirectly on public opinion. Paul Pierson and Walter Mattli, for instance, emphasize improving one's chances for re-election as the primary motivation of political leaders' policy choices. Pierson uses governmental leaders' high discount rates (short time horizons) to explain why they may be willing to incur the long-term costs of decreased autonomy for their state in order to achieve short-term socio-economic benefits from integration (Pierson 1996:135ff). Mattli's notion of regional integration's "demand condition" is similarly driven and constrained by an electoral calculus: Some non-governmental domestic groups seek integration because it would benefit them; governments comply if integration promises a "marginal" electoral benefit (Mattli 1999:42, 51, 80-99, esp.93ff). Since the marginal electoral benefit depends upon public approval or dislike, explaining public perceptions of EU membership should be a crucial component of a neofunctionalist explanation of European integration.

Although neofunctionalist accounts of European integration so far have not attempted to explain public perceptions of EU membership, neofunctionalism suggests two sources of variation in public support. First, neofunctionalism emphasizes that the costs and benefits of integration are distributed unevenly across groups and individuals within a state. This view

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19 Inglehart is not usually classified as a neofunctionalist, but his notion of a post-materialist socialization into a European identity may be seen as a particular form of (neo)functionalist spillover.

20 The neofunctionalist conception of the process of integration implicitly calls for an analysis of public opinion if the salience of the EU to the average citizen were to rise, as it has done in the meantime with the extension of EU-level policymaking to issues of employment law, gender equality, environmental regulation, etc.
suggests variations in support of, and opposition to, integration within each country, based on the
distribution of economic benefits across geographic regions, economic sectors, and skill levels
(as in the liberal intergovernmentalist model) and on the differential importance of the security
benefits identified by the realist intergovernmentalist approach. But neofunctionalism suggests
additional sources of variation in public support: Political institutions above the nation state
provide a new "political opportunity structure" (Kitschelt 1986) for actors below the nation state
to forge transnational coalitions to achieve objectives that are unobtainable at the domestic level.
EU membership thus presents deeply political opportunities or threats, depending on the actor's
ability to find powerful political allies in other member states or in the EU's supranational
institutions. This suggests that political considerations also affect public opinion, and that
variation in support for EU membership within each country will be partly a function of expected
opportunities for purposive political action at the EU level.

**EU as Politics: Domestic Divisions and Transnational Coalitions**

The obverse of the neofunctionalist view of the EU as a partially autonomous
supranational institution is that membership inevitably involves "gaps" in state control (Pierson
1996:esp. 132f). In public debate, this problematique is often discussed as a "threat to national
sovereignty." Unfortunately, sovereignty is an extremely vague term, and its overuse in the
context of European integration has not rendered it any more precise. References to a loss of
sovereignty in public discourse often conflate several issues, which should be kept analytically
distinct. We therefore disaggregate "threat to national sovereignty" into concerns about a loss of
national control over policy/decisionmaking and "anxiety about national identity" (cf. Berger
1995:202)

**National vs. Supranational Control over Policy**

As the debate over the "three faces of power" reminds us (cf. Bachrach and Baratz 1962;
Dahl 1957; Lukes 1974), control over policy or more generally decisionmaking can be real or
imagined. Externalities from economic activity, such as environmental pollution, as well as
many other problems that escape national boundaries, such as disease control, the drug trade, and terrorism, can be solved effectively only through international cooperation (cf. Keohane and Nye 2001).\textsuperscript{21} The institutional mechanisms of the EU provide an exceptionally effective tool to achieve such cooperation—but participation in the decisionmaking is limited to member states, even if the consequences of EU decisions affect others, too. As the international law advisors of the Austrian foreign ministry put it in their evaluation of membership:

The experience of the past 25 years ... has shown that for a small country ... the reduction of sovereignty that results from the present situation where de facto a large portion of the community's laws [and regulations] will have to be applied domestically so as to participate in the dynamic economic sphere of the integrated Europe ... is greater than the loss of sovereignty experienced in the event of membership that would provide opportunities to participate in the formation and taking of decisions. (Kunnert 1992:34, document D10)

The ability to influence European-wide norms and policy decisions at the EU level should therefore increase support for EU membership.

However, EU membership not only makes a loss of autonomous decisionmaking power apparent, it also redistributes political power domestically in two ways. First, when decisionmaking power moves to the European level, those who previously had a majority (or at least a blocking minority) domestically may well no longer be in the majority (or have veto powers). Second, as Moravcsik has recently argued, Karl Kaiser's argument about transnational relations as a potential threat to the democratic process (Kaiser 1969; 1972) applies specifically to the EU, in that both institutional bargains and day-to-day operations have redistributed "key domestic political resources—initiative, institutions, information and ideas"—in favor of the executive (Moravcsik 1994; also Copelovitch 2001; but see Phelan 2001 for a more skeptical view).

These changes have important consequences for domestic political actors (as suggested by the neofunctionalist perspective): Those groups or individuals who anticipate being able to

\textsuperscript{21} Cooperation here as defined by Keohane (1984) as negotiated agreement that involves adjustment costs, not merely harmony of interests.
forge explicit or implicit political coalitions with other actors at the international level (e.g. governments of other member states) or at the supranational level (e.g. the European Commission) will see EU membership as enhancing their chances of achieving their goals. Such opportunities should be particularly important for those who also have a stake in issues on which nation states are interdependent and those who are in a minority domestically. Conversely, those groups and individuals who see no chance of finding like-minded coalition partners among the members and institutions of the EU, should see little benefit in pooling sovereignty and will likely be more concerned about the loss of autonomous national decisionmaking. This concern should be prevalent among those who are ex ante politically influential domestically, and urgent for those whose interests are not likely to be vigorously defended by their national government.

As with some of the economic interests, specifying the political interests that will have salience for public opinion is better done inductively in the next section. However, it will be useful to identify potentially important issues. Whether policy is set at the national or supranational level might be particularly important for individuals or groups with a strong interest in environmental issues and more generally in the externalities of economic activity (Dalton and Eichenberg 1993:88; 1998:264ff; Sbragia 1993; Vogel 1993). Whether these (and other) groups and individuals see EU membership as beneficial or not will depend highly on context, especially the perceived availability of political allies in other member states' governments and in the supranational institutions. The shift of policymaking authority to the European level will, however, be unambiguously negative for followers of the nationalist-traditionalist Right, which, unlike other ideologically and issue-oriented groups, can rarely imagine to find more than temporary opportunistic allies in a larger European political arena. Their problem is closely related to the other dimension of "sovereignty:" the anxiety about a loss of national identity.

22 Indeed, such considerations apparently caused the British Labour Party to become, in the early 1990s, one of the most ardent supporters of the EU—it offered the hope to ensure social legislation for British workers of the kind they were unlikely to get through the Tory-controlled Parliament (cf. Grahl 1988 versus Tindale 1992; Tim Büthe also thanks the late Vincent Wright for fruitful discussion of this issue).
National Identity

Weak and elusive as the "European identity" may be, the European Union is often accused of undermining national identity. Whether EU membership is seen as a substantial threat to national identity by any particular constituency should vary depending on the way in which its identity is defined (cf. Hedetoft 1994). In general, though, those who have particular anxieties about, or attachments to, maintaining their country's distinctive national culture are likely to be less supportive of (or more opposed to) EU membership than those who are at ease with their national identity and those who are more cosmopolitan by inclination. Moreover, due to its visibility as a highly institutionalized non-national entity, the EU provides a convenient target onto which to project general fears of change—fears that are often expressed in terms of a loss of culture and identity.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Specifying the Model for Austria 1994: The Public Debate Preceding the Referendum

As noted above, public opinion lacks institutionalization, which is particularly consequential when we are interested in public opinion about a complex phenomenon that requires prioritizing among issues and interests. Deduction can help us identify the types of economic and political issues that are likely to be important, but which ones will have salience for public opinion at a particular place and time? Economic sectors are surely important, but as farmers in Europe, the US, and Japan have shown time and again, the ability to organize collective action and attract attention is at least as decisive as a sector's contribution to GDP. Which sectors are most important for public opinion? And of the multiple dimensions of sovereignty, which will be salient? To answer these questions, we now turn to a brief analysis of the public debate that preceded the Austrian referendum, which will enable us to specify inductively the hypotheses developed in the previous section.23

23 A more extensive and fully documented version of this analysis can be found in (Büthe 1995).
Sources

The following discussion is based on an analysis of the news coverage, editorials, letters to the editor, and advertisements in the eight major Austrian daily newspapers during the 2-3 weeks preceding the referendum and in two major weekly news magazines during the 2-3 months before the referendum. The analysis covers more than 80% of the Austrian daily press by circulation (cf. Nick and Pelinka 1993:38). All of the newspapers and magazines used for the analysis are independent of each other and sold throughout Austria (with the exception of the predominantly regional daily Tiroler Tageszeitung), and all of them maintained a pluralism of opinions in the op-ed sections and among the published letters to the editors, despite some clear leanings of the editors.

In addition, we take into account the publications with which the three all-embracing peak level associations informed their respective members—the industrialist's association (Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft), the farmers' chamber(s) (Präsidentenkonferenz der Landwirtschaftskammern Österreichs), and the workers' and employees' chamber (Bundeskammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte)—as well as materials by two voluntary associations, the federal union (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB) and its sub-groups, and the farmers' organization Bauernbund of the conservative party, ÖVP. These newsletters, brochures, and leaflets outlined the anticipated consequences of EU membership from the

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24 Although polls have found that television is in general the primary news source for more than 60% of Austrians (Nick and Pelinka 1993:81), print media were identified as the most important source of decision-relevant information about EU membership by 56% of respondent (38% TV) in a late May/early June 1994 poll (WW no.24/94:21) (cf. Plasser and Ulram 1994:100ff for a fine-grained analysis of information sources) and any major broadcast in the monopoly Austrian (state) television network, ORF, earned immediate coverage in all the daily papers.

25 These newspapers are the conservative Presse (Pr) and the left-liberal Standard (Std, Austria's "prestige" or "elite" newspapers, cf. Deutsch 1967:240), the high-circulation Kurier (Ku) and Kleine Zeitung (KIZ), the sensationalist popular daily Neue Kronen Zeitung (NKZ) and its new petit-bourgeois rival Täglich Alles (TA). In addition, we analyzed the Tiroler Tageszeitung (TT) for coverage of the local debate on transit issues. In addition, our analysis draws on the coverage of EU issues in two weekly news magazines: the Wirtschaftswoche (WW)—the closest Austria has to a high-circulation advocate of economic liberalism and considered "the leading Austrian news magazine" by the Financial Times (FT, Survey of Austria, 30May94)—and the left-liberal weekly Profil.

26 None of the dailies outright endorsed one side in the referendum, though all displayed a noticeable tendency in favor of EU membership, with the exception of TA whose call for a No-vote was equally blatant as the NKZ's support for the Yes-side. The WW was clearly in favor of EU membership while Profil remained uncommitted.
association's members' perspective, focusing on economic gains and costs for the respective sector, and contrasted them with the costs and benefits of staying out of the EU.\(^{27}\)

**Costs and Benefits for Austria (Aggregate Economic Effects)**

Three sets of aggregate economic issues dominated the public debate about the costs and benefits for Austria as a whole: The net financial contributions of Austria to the EU budget, the impact of EU membership on investment and economic growth, and the impact on the currency and currency stability.\(^{28}\) With a per capita income well above the EU average and Eurostat social statistics ratings that were surpassed among the EU countries only by Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, Austria was expected to be a net contributor to the EU budget (Bundeskanzleramt 1994a:13, 70). There was, however, considerable disagreement about the precise amount of Austria's net financial contribution, particularly in years to come, since the level of EU agricultural price guarantees (set yearly) and structural aid receipts (project-dependent) are not fixed by the accession treaty. Consequently, different estimates of Austria's net financial contribution—ranging from 11 to 17 billion Austrian Schillings (ÖS) per year were reported at different times (Pr 7Jun94:8; Ku 1Jun94:3, 7Jun94:7), which led to many questions and debates about the "real" cost of EU membership in letters to the editor, question and answer section, and via EU-information hotlines (Pr 3Jun94:7; NKZ 6Jun94:20; TA 22May94; Ku 9Jun94:2). But the portrayal of these additional costs as handouts to lazy Southern Europeans tanning under olive trees\(^{29}\) appears not to have found much resonance in a country that has long been highly engaged in Third World development programs—both idealistically and financially. And these direct financial costs were largely understood as being outweighed by indirect gains, particularly by increased economic growth.

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\(^{27}\) References to particular sources in the following sections will omit the initial "for instance" but should always be understood as illustrative examples rather than exhaustive lists; unless otherwise noted, all translations from Austrian materials are from Büthe 1995.

\(^{28}\) We omit the detailed discussion of the currency issue since it is beyond the scope of our model.

\(^{29}\) By TA and FPÖ-chairman Jörg Haider; [for instance in] "EU Entscheidungs-Test: So erfahren Sie, ob Sie den EU-Anschluß wollen oder ablehnen." TA 1May94:4f; Std 9Jun94:5.
Austrian firms and sectors, and eventually the government on their behalf, had initially sought EC membership to ensure the competitiveness of Austrian exports through tariff-free access to the European market (cf. Gehler and Steininger 1993; Schneider 1990). The European Economic Area (EEA) treaty, which, effective 1 January 1994, extended the EC-EFTA free trade agreement of 1972/73, actually guaranteed Austrian goods free access to the European market (where 65% of Austrian exports were sold in the early 1990s). But the successful implementation of the EU's Single Market Program ("Europe 1992") and concomitant institutional reforms widened the gap between "mere" market access and EU membership. Publications and advertisements by Austrian firms, industry associations, and their peak level Wirtschaftskammer, as well as respected economics experts, pointed out a number of economic benefits ranging from investment incentives to various regulatory issues. Investments would be stimulated by EU accession thanks to the secure knowledge of equal treatment with investments made elsewhere in the EU (Std 7Jun94:15, 9Jun94:23; Ku 9Jun94:18). Financing for such investments on international financial markets would be cheaper. And access to EU subsidies for transnational joint research projects and infrastructure investments would ensure continued interest in Austria by high-tech industries (Std 7Jun94, for a critique cf. Kneucker 1993). Economic benefits in the regulatory realm ranged from time and administrative costs saved by the abolition of border controls (estimated to amount to additional costs of up to 4% for "tariff-free" Austrian exports to EU countries, cf. Std 8Jun94:29; NKZ 11Jun94:30) to the ability to participate in the making of the rules (product standards, health and environmental standards, regulation of competition etc.), to which Austria was already subject as a consequence of EEA. Finally, there were reasons of economic psychology, which led some economists to favor EU membership as providing a "boost of confidence" whereas a "No" in the referendum might lead to uncertainty and possibly pessimism (e.g. Günter Tichy in Std 8Jun94:29). For all these reasons, Austrian economists expected EU membership to result in additional economic growth.

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30 At the time, Austrian firms still paid a premium when raising capital for investments in Austria, i.e. not in the EU itself—despite EEA.
of 2.8% and the creation of about 42,000 new jobs (net) over the first five years (Pr 28May94:8; Std 4/5Jun94:6). Similar and quite consistent estimates—suggesting an unambiguous net economic benefit—were advertised by the government, industry associations, and most unions. An advertisement by Austria's Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) put it most pointedly: "EU means Jobs!"31

These aggregate economic effects of EU membership do not suggest any differentiation within Austria that would be testable with the quantitative data used below. Yet, the public debate, as reflected in the media, suggests that most Austrians, despite some doubts on particular issues, saw the economic consequences for Austria as a whole as beneficial, such that the baseline of public perceptions of EU membership should be positive.

**Costs and Benefits at the Länder Level and Below**

*Financial Transfers from the EU to Sub-National Regions*

Relatively poor or otherwise "disadvantaged" regions within Austria could expect EU membership to result in indirect transfers via the EU Structural Fund. In particular, the entire Burgenland had been classified as an "objective 1" area in the Austrian accession treaty (AA-AFNS3 FINAL 420 D). Up to 2.5 billion ÖS in EU funding through 1999 were thereby guaranteed to be available for projects in the Burgenland. In addition, numerous other areas were expected to become eligible for objective 2 and 5b funds based on their classification as regions facing particular difficulties (from industrial change to alpine farming) under the EEA treaty (Bundeskanzleramt 1994c:18ff) (; Std 30May94:6). However, since objective 2 and 5b designation falls under the authority of the Commission (cf. Pollack 1995), it could be awarded only after actual accession in January 1995. Moreover, due to its rather technical nature, the designation of structural funds objectives other than objective 1 was rarely reported or discussed

31 Some articles, op-eds, and letters to the editor also voiced the concern that the ability to benefit from the new economic opportunities of the larger, integrated market might vary depending on skill level, and in particular that unskilled workers would be likely to lose (Ku 4Jun94:2f; TA passim). This issue, however, was framed more as a question of economic and social policy than as a question of purely economic costs and benefits. We will therefore discuss it below.
in the public debate. Inhabitants of the Burgenland, however, were made aware of the forthcoming windfall by a government and peak level association advertisement and "information" campaign that appealed to the voters not to forego the chance of grant funding for the development and welfare of their state (e.g. NKZ 6Jun94:30; Std 30May94:6, 9Jun94:5, EU-Sonderbeilage 4/5Jun94:11). This regionally focused public debate leads us to expect support for EU membership to be higher in the Burgenland than elsewhere in Austria.

**Security Issues**

While balancing between East and West had ceased to be a concern in mid-1994 (cf. Luif 1988:182ff), security had not. With war in the Balkans as close to Vienna as Tyrol (NKZ 6Jun94:2), and expansionist nationalists on the rise in Russia, security in Europe had still more of a traditional military ring to it in Austria than in many other Western European countries. Neutrality enjoyed too much public esteem to suggest giving it up. Yet, many questioned whether neutrality was still sufficient to serve its traditional function of providing for Austrian independence and territorial integrity. EU membership seemed to square the circle: Austria could remain militarily neutral while becoming part of an international confederation that would contribute to Austrian security all the same, and where (causally linked or not) war between the member states had become unthinkable (NKZ 8Jun94:8). States like a re-invigorated Russia would be less likely to threaten or pressure Austria if it was an EU member. Furthermore, the other states in the Union would surely not simply watch if conflict in the Balkans were to spill across Austria's borders—regardless of whether Austria would also eventually join the military 'wing' of the EU or not. Such at least was the hope expressed by many Austrian politicians and commentators (NKZ 12Jun94:2f; TT 10Jun94). While issues of national security are surely first and foremost national issues, the nature of the security threat and the media coverage of the potential security benefits of EU membership suggest that this issue was particularly important to

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32 Newly accessible Soviet plans showed that the Warsaw pact, regardless of Austrian neutrality, had planned for conventional forces, in the event, to go through Austria. These revelations made the usefulness of neutrality look questionable in retrospect (NKZ 6Jun94:2). Luif traces the main international events that contributed to the "reinterpretation of neutrality" after 1989 (Luif 1993:24).
those living near the border with non-EU states in Austria's East or South-East. In those regions, we should therefore find, *ceteris paribus*, higher support for EU membership.

**Sector-Specific Costs and Benefits**

As noted above, specific economic sectors such as the textiles industry had been instrumental in putting EC/EU membership on the Austrian political agenda in the late 1980s (cf. Luif 1993:29). Thereafter, however, most sectors and their organized interests appear not to have entered the public debate directly but to have conformed with the customs of Austrian neo-corporatism by limiting debates and bargaining to the non-public fora of the *Sozialpartnerschaft* (cf. Dachs 1997; Nick and Pelinka 1993). This behavior makes it difficult to ascertain the position of each sector, but the statements of—ostensibly representative—employers (and employees!) from many industries in interviews, letters to the editors, and inserted quotes suggest that the overwhelming majority of sectors (*qua* economic interests) favored membership. The strong support for a "Yes"-vote from almost all peak-level associations provides further evidence that most sectors expected to benefit. Two sectors, however, stood out as objects and subjects of the popular debate: agriculture and food processing. While they may not have been the only ones to bear economic costs, their likely losses as a consequence of EU accession (due to the high level of protection they had previously enjoyed) had salience.

**Agriculture**

The consequences of EU membership for Austrian farmers were by far the most prominent sectoral effects in the public debate preceding the referendum. Although Austrian agriculture in the early 1990s provided full-time employment only to 5.8% of the working population and contributed less than 3% to GDP (Bundeskanzleramt 1994a:245), it had public sympathies not unlike agriculture in France, backed up by solid environmental and economic interests (Std 4/5Jun94:2, 14Jun94:1; WW 24/1994:21): "Inefficient" agriculture and forestry provide crucial safeguards against soil erosion in alpine regions and preserve a precarious
environmental balance that directly contributes to Austria's attraction as a tourist destination—and Austria derives per capita earnings five times the EU average from tourism.

Heretofore heavily protected and subsidized domestically, Austrian farmers would have to accept reduced price guarantees and other disadvantages as a consequence of being subject to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); agricultural employment was expected to decline. Farmers had therefore voiced strong opposition to EC/EU membership when an application for membership was first seriously considered by the Austrian government in 1987/88 (Luif 1993:29f; Pr 30Jun89:1,4). In several respects, the agricultural sector was expected to lose from EU membership.

Two developments qualified this expectation in 1994. First, through the Austrian neocorporatist institutions and their prominent role in one of the government parties, farmers solicited several exemptions from EU rules (for instance for alpine and environmentally friendly farming) and side payments from the Austrian government (tax reductions, reduced fees for state insurance, etc.) to compensate for anticipated income losses. Second, without EU membership, Austrian farmers would within a few years become subject to WTO rules, which after the recent conclusion of Uruguay GATT round included provisions for most agricultural goods. The application of GATT/WTO rules without EU membership were expected to lead to much deeper cuts in agricultural price guarantees because the Uruguay agreement provided for an exemption for agricultural exports to other countries within one's regional trade association.

Yet, these considerations were only occasionally noted in the public debate (NKZ 11Jun94:28f; Ku 12Jun94:3), though they figured prominently in some of the publications geared at farmers (Bauernbund 1994:19; Präsidentenkonferenz 1994: 9-18, 201f, 235ff). While some farmers' associations endorsed EU membership under these conditions, some of their own leaders publicly disagreed (K/Z 1Jun94:4, 2Jun94:8, 13Jun94:9; TT 11Jun94). Milk and grain producers seemed certain to lose, though determining the consequences for individual farmers required complex calculations (cf. Bundeskanzleramt 1994b; Bundesministerium für Land- und
Forstwirtschaft mit ORF2 1994). Despite the WTO tradeoff and substantial side-payments, agriculture often appeared in the public debate as the worst loser from EU accession.

**Food Processing Industry**

The food processing industry was generally considered Austria's least competitive industrial sector. The industry was expected to lose large parts of its domestic market share and to send parts of its workforce into unemployment to stay competitive in the EU—despite lower input prices (Wirtschaftskammer 1993). Some of these anticipated losses were in fact the result of EEA rather than EU membership, which had already opened much of the sector to competition from EU imports, but the EEA-EU distinction was not always made in the public debate.

While the sector was not entirely unified in its position and could count on special government support programs to ease the competitive transition (Std 30May94:2,5), it largely opposed EU membership. It was clearly and publicly considered a sector that would pay heavy costs for EU membership (WIFO study in Pr 28May94:8, Std 30May94:2; Ku 2 Jun94:17).

**National vs. Supranational Control over Policy**

Political aspects of EU membership—and especially the question of loss or gain over policymaking—were frequently discussed in the Austrian public debate. A tabular comparison of the arguments for and against EU membership in the Presse (5May94) summed it up well: "Austria loses its sovereignty, because important decisions will now be made in Brussels," versus "Austria gains in sovereignty, because it can then participate in the decision-making in Europe." Similar arguments were found in almost all papers (KlZ 1Jun94:7; 6Jun94:2; 11Jun94:2f; NKZ 1Jun94:8; 2Jun94:3; 7Jun94:2,3; 9Jun94:28; Ku 5Jun94:4; 11Jun94; Std 4/5Jun94:3; 6Jun94:4f). Most of the discussion (and public interest), however, was not about the abstract questions of sovereignty, but about control over policy in specific issue areas. Three issue areas were particularly salient.
**Economic and Social Policy**

EU-opponents accused the government on many occasions of a sell-out of the Austrian social system. Insofar as such accusations were specified, they were mostly about the social distribution of the costs and benefits of economic integration with countries with significantly lower wage levels and higher inequality of income and wealth. Consistent with many theoretical arguments in the literature on the international political economy of trade and integration, opponents argued that EU membership would lead to downward-spiraling Austrian wages, the loss of jobs to cheap foreign labor, and increased inequality. Especially unskilled labor would lose, and EU-Austria would then be unable to help them (Ku 1Jun94:1f, 4Jun94:2,3; TA passim; NKZ 12Jun94:3). The issue attracted few letters to the editor and many of the specific arguments were questionable, but the general argument that unskilled labor would pay a disproportionate share of the costs went largely undisputed. The mandatory-membership peak organization of labor, the *Arbeiterkammer*, emphasized that it had carefully calculated costs, benefits, and risks before endorsing the Yes-vote as early as January 1989 (cf. Leitner 1993:105). Overall, Austrian employees stood to gain, but the *Arbeiterkammer* also had to admit that some would lose (Std 30May94:5, 4/5Jun94:9). Independent economic experts also emphasized that low-qualification labor *in general* was at a higher risk of becoming superfluous (Std 30May94:3,5).

The counterarguments seemed more suited to ease the general social consciousness than to ease the concerns of low-skill labor: *Arbeiterkammer*, political party representatives, and labor economists argued that social policy would remain a national policy prerogative (Std 30May94:7) and that the government *should* respond to the economic risks experienced by unskilled labor by investing more in skills training and re-training (Std 30May94:3,5). That EU membership would guarantee employees representation on managerial boards in EU-based multinationals (MNCs, Std 1/2May94:22) held little promise for unskilled workers since the same economic logic that would make them redundant in high-wage Austria would make it

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33 Surprisingly, the communist party, KPÖ, did not make such specific claims to motivate their opposition to EU membership—at least not in their few ads published in the general press (Std Europa-Sonderbeilage 4/5Jun:14; Ku 10Jun94:3, 11Jun94).
unlikely that they would find like-minded allies among MNCs’ workers abroad (note, however, Imig and Tarrow 2000). Assurances that extra "support" would be available for those who would "temporarily" lose their jobs as a consequence of EU membership remained rather vague (Europa-Sonderausgabe 4/5Jun94:7).

**Environmentalist Concerns**

Even though its environmentalist party has never participated in government, Austria is among the most politically "Green" countries in Europe. Its environmental standards, such as for air and water quality, as well as Austrian health and safety standards in 1994 were on average far more stringent than the corresponding standards across the EU; and as a consequence of the only previous Volksabstimmung (binding referendum) in the Austrian Second Republic, nuclear energy had been outlawed for both military and civilian use since 1978. Many members of the Greens and numerous environmental non-governmental organizations were apparently concerned that businesses at home and abroad were seeking Austrian EU membership as a way of loosening these restrictions (Std10Jun94:34f; TT 10Jun94). Environmentalists were primarily concerned about two potential consequences of EU membership. First, Austria might be forced to adjust its standards downwards to bring them in line with lower EU standards, and it might not be allowed to raise them unilaterally if it so desired. Second, Austria might have to allow its high standards to be undermined by having to accept foreign products manufactured to the lower standards of other member states in line with the Cassis-de-Dijon principle that was well known to the Austrian newspaper reader by June 1994. In addition, there were numerous concerns about atomic energy, including that Austrians would end up financing atomic energy research through Austrian EURATOM membership dues (Pr 3Jun94:6; Std 3Jun94:6).

At the same time, Austrian environmentalists were well aware that many of their concerns (about nuclear power and air quality in particular) could only be addressed effectively

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34 Indeed, the accession treaty contained a provision that committed Austria to the adoption or acceptance of lower European-wide or other-country product standards after four years, unless a prior review at the EU level led to the adoption of higher European standards instead (Pr 9Jun94:3).
at the inter- or supranational level. Pro-EU environmental activists and private groups therefore made two main counter-arguments. First, EU supporters argued that the Commission's and ECJ's record of always putting business interests first was due to a lack of authority—until very recently—to take environmental considerations into account. Since the EU had recently acquired "competence" on environmental matters, a more balanced approach should be expected (Std 10Jun94:35). Second, and even more importantly, as an EU member, Austria could tip the balance in favor of more environmentalist policies all around, and Austrian experience with environmentally friendly technology would enable its EU representatives to make a convincing case that cleaner air, cleaner water, and generally improved environmental protection are fully compatible with economic growth (NKZ Journal Umwelt & EU 4Jun94:2,4f,7f). Particularly if the Scandinavian countries were to join, too, there would be a solid pro-environmental majority in the EU.

These prospects of EU-level transnational coalitions in favor of the environment were extensively discussed and caused a number of prominent Greens to go public with personal endorsements of a "Yes"-vote (NKZ 6Jun94:5; Std 9Jun94:1; KlZ 11Jun94:1)—and some senior party figures who opposed EU membership emphasized that their position was solely due to their expectation that the current Austrian government would fail to push an environmentalist agenda in Brussels (Std 6Jun94:5). But many environmentalists and the Greens' official platform remained opposed to EU membership, warning that it would deprive Austria of its ability to regulate the economy in environmentally friendly ways (cf. Kunnert 1993: 79, 154f, 205; Leitner 1993:104; TT 11/12Jun94). Similarly, attempts by the government and independent legal experts to discredit claims that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) would force Austrians on grounds of free trade to accept nuclear power and waste from abroad (or to re-open its closed nuclear plant at Zwentendorf) did little to reduce the prominence of nuclear energy related concerns about EU membership in the public debate (TA 1Jun94:3; Ku 2Jun94:2; KlZ 7Jun94:3; Pr 3Jun94:6, 9Jun94:3).
Transit

One specific environmental concern merits separate analysis due its prominence in the public debate: the transit of EU goods through the Alps on heavy trucks (*NKZ* 12Jun94:3; *TT* *passim*). Especially the people living in or near the Inn valley, i.e. the main highway route (Brenner-Kufstein) between Italy and Germany, have since the early 1980s become increasingly vocal in their opposition to the noise and pollution that the trucks are imposing on them. Transit rights for these trucks had therefore become a hot issue, closely tied to the EU membership question since dominating the Tyrol state parliamentary elections in 1989 (cf. Nick 1989; esp. Brunner and Hussl 1989). A December 1991 agreement between Austria and the EC banned trucks over 38 [metric] tons and created an system of tradable pollution 'rights' to reduce aggregate exhaust by 40% through 2004 (cf. Kunnert 1993:249; Pallaver 1993:250ff). This agreement was explicitly validated (with minor changes) in the accession treaty, and EU membership was to result in significant EU subsidies for the construction of a high-tech train connection between Verona (Italy) and Munich (Germany), which could serve as a substitute to car and light truck travel through the Inn valley (*NKZ* 3Jun94:5; *Std* 3Jun94:26; *Pr* 4Jun94: 1,8).

On this issue, too, hopes for pro-environmental transnational coalitions seemed to sway some, but most of those directly affected by the transit issue appeared to retain their doubts whether such hopes were worth taking the risk of loosing their ability to regulate traffic and pollution locally and nationally. The fear lingered on that once Austria were an EU member, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) might rule that the freedom of movement for goods overrides the transit agreement. This argument was made by numerous opponents using more or less detailed scenarios, and seemed to survive all government and EU claims to the contrary (*TT*; *Std* 10Jun94:34).

National Identity

Almost 50 years after the end of World War II, most Austrians' sense of national identity was based more on a sense of alpine distinctiveness, Viennese savoir-vivre, and a 40-year tradition of neutrality than—positively or negatively—on any joint history with Germany.
Friedensreich Hundertwasser's portrayal of EU accession as a "second Anschluß" therefore seemed silly to most observers (NKZ 31May94:8, 2Jun94:20; Profil 18/1994:20ff). Yet, the prospect of 7.3 million Austrians joining an organization already populated by 79 million Germans created noticeable unease, particularly in light of the dominance of German multinationals in several industries in Austria, the prominence of the Bundesbank in monetary affairs, and the experience of German tourists often outnumbering the natives in Austrian villages during the summer and winter tourist season. A sense or fear of being swamped was apparent in many letters to editors or comments in discussions.35

The government and other proponents of EU membership attempted to assuage such fears by pointing to institutional safeguards and largely symbolic measures to ensure Austrians that they could retain their distinct political voice and national culture and identity in the EU. Most prominent among the institutional safeguards discussed in public debate was the system of "weighted votes." If decisions were to be taken by majority vote in the EU Council, 7.3 million Austrians would command four votes, 79 million Germans only ten—and Germany would be only one of the (anticipated) 16 member states (NKZ 6Jun94). Among the more symbolic measures was a section in the accession treaty to which officials pointed as evidence that Austria's separate cultural identity was not endangered by German domination. With Austria's accession, a number of distinctly Austrian words (cf. Wintersberger and Artmann 1995) would have to be used on par with the 'high German' terms in all official texts. These ranged from Jänner for January (Januar in German) to Paradeiser for tomato (Tomate) and Obers for cream (Sahne). Such a measure may appear to be of little practical importance but seems to have been quite important and successful in signaling that the government was not selling out Austrian culture and identity.

35 Similar concerns appeared to drive the particularly strong opposition among the German-speaking Swiss in the December 1992 Swiss referendum on EEA membership (cf. Arndt 1998:263ff; Enzelsberger 1996:38ff).
More difficult to illustrate but latently ever-present was a general fear of change when people spoke of a loss of identity. The "can't things stay the way they are?" mentality, which a *Standard* editorial pointed out (1/2Jun94:29), was exactly the mentality to which the chairman of the Austrian nationalist party, Jörg Haider, sought to appeal when he called the EU a gamble on an uncertain future and promised: "Without the EU, everything will just stay the way it is." (*KlZ* 2Jun94:3).

Figure 3 summarizes the model as specified through the inductive analysis of the public debate.

**Aggregate Analysis: Referendum Results at the Politischer Bezirk Level**

We can now proceed to test—subject to data limitations—whether the dominant issues of the public debate were indeed relevant to the outcome of the referendum. In the absence of exit poll data that includes detailed information about individuals' profession, skill-level, place of residence, concern with environmental matters, fear about a loss of national identity, etc., we use aggregate data one level below Austria's federal states. Our unit of analysis consequently is the "political administrative district," *Politischer Bezirk*, which yields 121 observations.36

As discussed in the beginning, in the realm of public opinion—as exhibited in a referendum—there is no institutionalized structure for aggregating interests to arrive at a national preference or decision. Readers who are interested in the implication for other countries should therefore concentrate primarily on the signs rather than the third decimal of the point estimates of the coefficients since the signs of the coefficients are the primary test of the general model.

36 Formally, there are only 99 politische Bezirke. Vienna's 23 districts are only Gemeinden—administrative units below the Bezirk level. However, we will treat Vienna as 23 observations, as is customary in Austrian statistics as well, for otherwise a single district would cover more than 800,000 valid votes, i.e. more than 17% of the approximately 4,665,000 valid votes cast throughout Austria. Dividing Vienna into its 23 Gemeinden distributes these 17% of votes among 19% of observations. For a map of Austria identifying all political districts, cf. http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_karten/kartogramm/kartogramm102.shtml (6 March 2002).
We operationalize the model as follows. Our dependent variable, \textit{yes.vote}, is the percentage of voters voting Yes in the referendum. We employ eight independent variables. \textbf{objective1} is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for each district designated an objective 1 area and thus guaranteed Structural Fund aid receipts, 0 otherwise.\textsuperscript{37} Testing the importance (for public perceptions of EU membership) of the most salient form of financial transfer from the EU to sub-national entities, we expect this variable to have a positive coefficient. \textbf{agriculture} is a measure of the number of persons in the \textit{Bezirk} having their primary employment in agriculture (or forestry) as a percentage of the population. \textbf{food.industry} is a measure of the number of people working in—or depending on someone working in—the food processing industry, as a percentage of the population. These variables test for sectoral effects; they measure the economic importance for each district of the two sectors that were most prominent in the public debate. Our specified model suggests that both of these variables should have negative coefficients since both sectors were expected to be negatively affected by EU membership. \textbf{low.skill} is a measure of the level/importance of unskilled labor in the district. Specifically, it is the percentage of the population having no more than the "required minimum education."\textsuperscript{38}

Economic theory and the Austrian public debate expect unskilled workers to bear a disproportionate share of the economic costs of EU membership, leading to the hypotheses that (1) unskilled individuals and/or (2) regions for which unskilled labor is more important, will be less supportive of EU membership. In the OLS estimate, this variable tests the second of these hypotheses and should have a negative coefficient. \textbf{security.concern} is a dichotomous variable

\textsuperscript{37} All districts of the Burgenland are coded 1.

\textsuperscript{38} A potential objection to this measure should be addressed: Previous research on public opinion has often used a continuous or ordinal measure of education as a predictor of support for EU integration, finding consistently that support for integration is positively correlated with the level of education, \textit{ceteris paribus}, which is usually explained by the generally tight correlation between education and "cognitive mobilization," i.e. the level of knowledge and understanding of European integration (Inglehart 1970a). Such an interpretation, however, is not warranted here. Most importantly, polls on the day of the referendum found that, by then, the vast majority of voters (85\% among ostensible Yes-voters, 69\% among No-voters) felt very well or fairly well informed about the effects of EU membership (cf. Plasser and Ulram 1994:104). Moreover, by using a measure that is dichotomous at the individual level and looking only at the percentage of voters with minimal education, we separate the unskilled fraction from the remainder of the population. If we were hereby erroneously capturing part of larger education–EU-support relationship, we should find a very weak effect.
coded 1 for all 29 districts that share a border with a non-EU member state; 0 otherwise. It tests the hypothesis that concerns about threats to Austrian national security, found to have had particular salience in non-EU-border regions, increases support for EU membership and should therefore have a positive coefficient. **environmental concern** is a measure of the strength of environmental concerns in the district. Specifically, it is the percentage of votes cast in the district for the environmentalist party *Die Grünen* in the October 1994 national parliamentary election.\(^{39}\) Since many Austrians remained skeptical about the EU's environmental and health standard credentials, we expect a negative coefficient. **transit** is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for the four Inn valley districts Innsbruck-Land (88), Innsbruck-Stadt (86), Schwaz (94), and Kufstein (90), i.e. the districts along the main transit route between Italy and Germany; 0 otherwise. Testing the hypothesis that the concern over a loss of decision-making autonomy on the specific issue of transit rights for heavy trucks through the Inn valley reduces support for EU membership, it should have a negative coefficient. **national identity** is a measure of the level of nationalist sentiment and concern with Austrian culture and identity in the district.\(^{40}\) Specifically, it is the percentage of the votes cast in the district for the FPÖ in the October 1994 election, based on the assumption that the level of electoral support for the Austrian nationalist FPÖ co-varies across district with nationalist sentiments and concerns with Austrian culture and identity.\(^{41}\) Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics, along with a summary of operationalized hypotheses (expected sign of the coefficients).

\(^{39}\) There is a potential endogeneity problem here, as for the FPÖ variable (below). However, with the Green party leadership divided over the EU at the time of the referendum, there is little reason to expect that voters who had previously voted for other parties would have voted for the Greens in October to express their anger over the outcome of the June referendum.

\(^{40}\) Many measures could be used. Ideally, I would measure the strength of organizations that aim at maintaining or reviving the folk traditions and customs or the like—*Traditionspflegervereine, Vereine zur Bewahrung des Volkstums/Brauchtums, Schützenvereine*—and weigh them by the degree to which they are reactionary. Such a variable, however, would require extensive local research—particularly since many such local organizations may not be registered—and even the most careful coding is bound to have arbitrary and subjective elements in it (cf. "Ein kleines Dorf in den Bergen hat große Angst." *TT* 14Jun94). The FPÖ following seems a close though incomplete measure of such tendencies, given the party's current orientation.

\(^{41}\) There is a potential endogeneity problem here in that voters who opposed the EU might have voted FPÖ in October because of the FPÖ's position on the referendum. However, judging from the elections at the state level where they took place earlier in the year, there were no large changes in either direction and the national
Since many observers still portray the EU as being "just" an institution of economic cooperation, we first run an OLS regression to estimate the restricted model that includes only the variables that capture the (expected) economic costs and benefits of EU membership (model 1). Table 2 summarizes the results. We find that economic interests alone indeed can explain about 35% of the observed variance. All coefficients have the predicted sign, except for agriculture, for which the coefficient fails to be significantly different from zero.

Parliamentary vote provides me with one measure that was close to the referendum in time and taken at the same time in all districts.
We now perform a second OLS regression estimate for the full model, including the four political variables (model 2, see table 2 above). The results suggest that the full political-economic model is greatly superior: It explains more than 65% of the observed variance; the standard error of the regression is down from 4.0 to 2.9. All coefficients are statistically significant at or below the .05 level, and all have the predicted sign. To provide a better sense of the substantive significance of the variables, table 3 shows the effect on yes.vote of a one standard deviation increase in each explanatory variable (holding all others constant).
The model thus predicts that public support for EU membership in the referendum is higher by 7.47 percentage points in districts designated as objective1 structural fund recipients than in non-objective1 districts, ceteris paribus—a very large effect, given that the yes.vote ranged only from 52.75% to 77.76%. A one standard deviation increase in the level of agricultural employment leads to a decrease in public support by 1.67 percentage points. While this is not a large effect, it suggests that EU membership was indeed seen as "bad" for farmers, despite the threat of even greater losses from GATT/WTO rules without EU membership. A one standard deviation increase in the level of employment in the food processing industry leads to a decrease in support by 1.25 percentage points. Both sectors that featured prominently in the public debate as likely losers from EU membership thus had the predicted negative effect on the outcome of the referendum, though the substantive effect in both cases was quite small. A one standard deviation increase in portion of unskilled workers (people with minimal education) among the population of a district leads to a decrease of 1.95 percentage points.

Turning to the political variables, we find that support for EU membership is increased by 2.53 percentage points, ceteris paribus, in the 29 districts bordering a non-EU state, which we interpret as an indication of heightened desire for the security benefits, no matter how vague, of EU membership. A one standard deviation increase in the level of concern with environmental issues, as measured by the vote for the Green party, leads to a decrease in support for EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 std deviation change in ...</th>
<th>predicted change in yes.vote</th>
<th>95% confidence interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>objective1</td>
<td>+7.47</td>
<td>(5.10, 9.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td>-1.67</td>
<td>(-2.66, -0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>food.industry</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
<td>(-1.85, -0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low.education</td>
<td>-1.96</td>
<td>(-2.93, -1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security.concern</td>
<td>+2.53</td>
<td>(0.92, 4.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environmental.concern</td>
<td>-2.57</td>
<td>(-3.40, -1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transit</td>
<td>-8.58</td>
<td>(-11.81, -5.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national.identity</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>(-1.36, -0.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3: Illustration of the predicted effects of a one-standard-deviation change in each of the independent variables (change from 0 to 1 for the dichotomous variables) while holding the other variables constant.
membership of 2.57%. We find an additional and much larger effect for the 4 districts in the Inn valley, where the question of political control over traffic and environmental regulation dominated the public debate. As predicted by our model, voters in these districts were much less supportive of EU membership; the effect is estimated at a 8.58 percentage point decrease. Finally, a one standard deviation increase in the level of concern over national culture and identity, as measured by the vote for the FPÖ, leads to a decrease in support by 0.79 percentage points. This is a surprisingly small effect, given the prominence of such concerns in the public debate, though it may suggest that the government was more successful in alleviating these concerns than some others. We will return to this issue in the conclusion.

**Solving the Ecological Inference Problem: Individual Level Analysis**

The results in the previous section suggest that the independent variables identified by our model indeed affected the outcome of the Austrian EU referendum in the hypothesized way. This conclusion, however, is based on observations at the aggregate level of Austria's 121 political districts, which limits the inferences that we can draw from the analysis. We illustrate this problem for the low.skill variable. We find, as hypothesized, a negative coefficient for this variable, which enables us to conclude that districts with a higher percentage of unskilled workers have a lower level of support for EU membership. But what about individual motivations, which often provide the microfoundations for our hypotheses? Can we infer from our findings anything about individual referendum decisions given certain individual-level attributes? For example, can we infer from the lower levels of support in districts with a high percentage of low-skill voters that individuals with low skill levels are probabilistically less supportive of EU membership than individuals with high skill levels? (At the individual level, the variable is dichotomous: the individual can only have a given attribute (A) or not have that attribute (~A)). Unfortunately, we can not draw this inference, because it would require an assumption that we cannot test—namely that the additional No-votes in districts that score high on the low.skill variable came from among those low-skilled individuals. For this and all other
continuous variables in our operationalized model, drawing inferences about individual behavior from aggregate-level data runs the risk of committing the "ecological inference fallacy" (cf. Robinson 1950).

The ideal test for arguments about individual motivations would use individual-level data, but such data does not exist for most referenda. In the Austrian case, we only have information about referendum votes and attributes of the voters at the aggregate level of each political district. Table 4 illustrates this situation for the low.skill variable, where $X_i$ and $T_i$ are known for each district $i$ (as a fraction or percentage of $N_i$, the number of voters/valid votes in the district), but $\beta_i^A$ and $\beta_i^{~A}$ are unobserved.

What percentage of "low skill" voters voted "Yes" in the 1994 EU referendum?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>low.skill</th>
<th>Voted “Yes” in the EU Referendum</th>
<th>Voted “No” in the EU Referendum</th>
<th>voters in district $i$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_i^A$</td>
<td>$1-\beta_i^A$</td>
<td>$X_i$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high (non-low) skill</td>
<td>$\beta_i^{~A}$</td>
<td>$1-\beta_i^{~A}$</td>
<td>$1-X_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU referendum outcome</td>
<td>$T_i$</td>
<td>$1-T_i$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The basic ecological inference "problem." Unobserved quantities of interest: $\beta_i^A$, the fraction of voters with the attribute (A) "low skills," who voted "Yes" in the referendum and $\beta_i^{~A}$, the fraction of voters who are not categorized as low-skilled (~A) and who voted "Yes" in the referendum. Observed variables: $X_i$, the fraction (percentage) of voters in district $i$ categorized as low-skill; $T_i$, the fraction of Yes-votes among the valid votes ($N_i$) in district $i$.

**Method**

In order to resolve this "ecological inference problem," we utilize an "ecological inference" technique developed by King (1997: esp.26f, 91ff). This technique allows us a rigorous test of the validity of the hypothesized relationships at the individual level (for those

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43 Multiple polls on EU membership were conducted in Austria between 1987 and 1994, but their sample sizes were quite small, and they did not gather information on all of the factors identified in our theoretical model. Moreover, the high percentage of voters who decided only in last few weeks whether to participate in the referendum and how to vote (cf. Plasser, Sommer, and Ulram 1995:328-334) (Ogris 1994) makes poll data less suitable.

44 The computer software, “EzI: A Program for Ecological Inference,” is available online at [http://gking.harvard.edu](http://gking.harvard.edu)
variables for which there is variation within the districts). In essence, it uses the known information \((X_i \text{ and } T_i)\) from each low-level aggregate (each district in our case) to estimate the unknown quantities \(\beta_i^A\) and \(\beta_i^{\sim A}\) for each district and \(\beta^A\) and \(\beta^{\sim A}\) for the population as a whole.

Since King’s EI method has rarely been used yet in published work and therefore may not be familiar to all readers, a brief non-technical introduction is warranted. The EI method proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we extract as much deterministic information as possible from the aggregate-level data to narrow the range of possible values for the individual-level quantities of interest. The second step involves building a maximum likelihood statistical model to estimate where within the deterministic bounds the quantities of interest probably fall.

**Step I: Deterministic Analysis of Bounds**

Two simple graphs help explain our task. The first is a scatterplot of the information we know for certain: the aggregates \(X_i\) (here: low.skill) and \(T_i\) (yes.vote) for each district \(i\). Since both variables are measured as a fraction of the voters, all observations must fall within the interval \([0,1]\), such that the plot is bounded by the "unit square." This scatterplot is shown in figure 4, where each dot represents an actually observed combination of \(X_i\) and \(T_i\). The second graph is reserved for the unobserved quantities of interest and is therefore blank for now. Here, each dot represents a combination of \(\beta_i^A\) and \(\beta_i^{\sim A}\). Our task is to draw inferences from the first graph about the second.

![FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE](image)

The first inference we can draw is that \(\beta_i^A\) and \(\beta_i^{\sim A}\) must also fall within the unit square since they, too, are fractions. Second, we can use the "marginal values" \(X_i\) and \(T_i\) to narrow the range of each \((\beta_i^A, \beta_i^{\sim A})\) further because \(X_i\) and \(T_i\) in each district impose restrictions on the

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45 The ecological inference problem is not a factor where the hypothesis is captured by a district-level dichotomous variable (objective1, security.concern, transit).
46 The following discussion draws heavily on (Ferree 1998).
possible range of joint distribution values, $\beta^A$ and $\beta^{-A}$. Specifically, we know from the aggregate-level data that the following "accounting identity" holds true:

$$T_i = \beta_i^A X_i + \beta_i^{-A}(1- X_i) = \beta_i^{-A} + (\beta_i^A - \beta_i^{-A})X_i$$

In theory, $\beta^A$ and $\beta^{-A}$ each have a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. They can therefore be plotted in a "unit square" with $\beta^A$ ("betaA") on the x-axis and $\beta^{-A}$ ("beta~A") on the y-axis (see figure 4). In practice, the unobserved parameters are much more tightly restricted by the above accounting identity: Our knowledge of $T_i$ and $X_i$ for each district narrows the possible values of $\beta_i^A$ and $\beta_i^{-A}$ for each district to one line per district. Connecting all possible combinations of $\beta_i^A$ and $\beta_i^{-A}$ for a given district, the line for that district cuts across the unit square, intercepting the axes at the respective maxima for $\beta_i^A$ and $\beta_i^{-A}$ in the district. Drawing these lines for all 121 districts into a single unit square creates (for each independent variable) a graph like the one shown in figure 5. It maps all that we know for certain about our quantities of interest. To proceed further, we need to implement a statistical model.

[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

**Step2: Statistical Model**

In spite of the drastic narrowing of possible values for $\beta_i^A$ and $\beta_i^{-A}$ which we have achieved with the help of the information in the margins of the table, the location of the true betas on each line remains uncertain. In isolation, estimating each beta for a single district is impossible; all points on the line are equally likely to be the "true" point. Therefore, we now invoke the unit homogeneity assumption—that individual voters who exhibit a certain attribute like low skills behave essentially alike, regardless of the district in which they live—which suggests that the "true" points $\beta_i^A$ and $\beta_i^{-A}$ for the 121 districts should all cluster around the true points $\beta^A$ and $\beta^{-A}$ for the country as a whole. As visual inspection suggests, the most likely area of the plot for such a cluster of points is where the lines most densely overlap (cf. King 1997:123ff).
King's ecological inference method (EI) formalizes the process of identifying the most likely location of this cluster of points. In technical terms, the model assumes that the true points $\beta_i^A$ and $\beta_i^{-A}$ are distributed according to a truncated bivariate normal distribution, which can be thought of as a "pile" of $(\beta_i^A, \beta_i^{-A})$ points. (It is "truncated" because it cannot extend outside the unit square; those parts of the distribution that extend outside the square are disregarded.) Visually, this results in a three-dimensional tomography plot with a small mountain over the unit square. The technique then uses maximum likelihood estimation to find the most likely location and dimensions for the cluster of points and from this information calculates point estimates for the population parameters $\beta^A$ and $\beta^{-A}$, and confidence intervals for these point estimates (cf. King 1997:141ff).

**Results**

The results of our ecological inference estimations for the variables on which there is variation within the district are summarized in table 5, with point estimates in bold type and 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. We find strong evidence to support the conclusion that our findings at the aggregate district level also hold at the individual level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>attribute</th>
<th>fraction who voted &quot;Yes,&quot; given the attribute in column 1</th>
<th>fraction who voted &quot;No,&quot; given the attribute in column 1</th>
<th>fraction of voters who exhibit the attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agricultural</td>
<td>43.6% (20.8-66.4)</td>
<td>56.4% (33.6-79.1)</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-agricultural</td>
<td>67.5% (66.5-68.5)</td>
<td>32.5% (31.5-33.5)</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 In addition, EI adopts two other assumptions. First, it assumes a lack of "aggregation bias" (the betas are uncorrelated with X's. Second, it assumes a lack of "contagion" among $T_i$ (King 1997:92-94). In terms of the model’s estimates, violating the second assumption is the most problematic; however, tests for aggregation bias suggest that this is not a problem in our data.

48 The Ecological Inference technique actually first calculates district-level estimates, then calculates estimates for the country as a whole by weighing each districts by its population size and averaging across the weighted districts. We focus here on the national-level estimates of $\beta^A$ and $\beta^{-A}$ since our ultimate quantities of interest are the effects of the aforementioned set of variables on national public opinion concerning European integration.

49 The results for the food industry variable are excluded because the data are clustered too close to the bounds of the unit square to perform a maximum likelihood estimation. Given the extremely small percentage of food industry workers across all of the districts (on average, 1.9% of the population), not enough variation in the data was present for the EI computer program to calculate point estimates of $\beta^L$ and $\beta^H$. 
Individuals in the agricultural sector and those with low skill levels voted "Yes" in the Austrian EU referendum at a significantly lower rate than those in other sectors or with higher skill levels. These results are significant at the 95% level, which is actually rarely used for EI estimates since it unduly increases the risk of a type II error (falsely accepting the null hypothesis of no effect); the customary level for EI estimates is the 80% level (cf. King 1997).50 The results for environmental concern and national identity also corroborate at the individual level our aggregate-level findings that greater concerns about environmental and national identity issues led to decreased support for Austrian accession to the EU (full separation is achieved at the 90 and 80% level, respectively). In contrast to previous studies on European integration and public opinion, our study thus finds similar results from both the aggregate- and individual-level

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50 The information in table 5 should be read primarily within columns: First, the point estimates of $\beta^A$ and $\beta^{\sim A}$ (for a given voter attribute $A$) should differ, consistent with the sign in the "operationalized hypotheses" column of table 1. Second, the confidence intervals around $\beta^A$ should overlap as little as possible with the interval around the corresponding $\beta^{\sim A}$ (the extent of the overlap of the confidence intervals around $\beta^A$ and $1-\beta^A$ is irrelevant). Full separation of the confidence intervals indicates statistical significance at the corresponding level of confidence.
quantitative analyses. By combining several distinct methodological approaches, we are able to
draw confident conclusions about the key factors influencing public opinion on the European
Union in the 1994 Austrian EU referendum.

**Conclusion**

We have developed a general model of public perceptions of EU membership, specified
and operationalized it for the Austrian case, and subjected it to statistical tests at the aggregate as
well as individual level (using Gary King's solution to the ecological inference problem). The
results of our empirical analysis of the Austrian referendum on EU membership strongly support
the model. As expected, the level of support for EU membership co-varied with economic
interests below the nation-state: It was especially high among the voters in districts that had
been designated as recipients of EU Structural Fund aid. The two economic sectors that were
considered particularly likely to incur heavy costs as a consequence of EU
membership—agriculture and food processing—were visible as opponents of EU membership in
the public debate and helped predict domestic variation in support: The more important each
sector is for the local economy, the lower the level of support in the district—and the ecological
inference analysis confirmed that it was indeed the farmers who were less supportive of EU
membership. Similarly, those with low skill levels voted "Yes" at a significantly lower rate than
those with higher skill levels.

Yet, support for EU membership also co-varied with political factors. We found that the
Yes-vote was especially high in districts bordering non-EU-members states, where awareness of
(and hope for) the security benefits of EU integration are high. We also found, both at the
aggregate and individual level, that voters who were especially concerned about loss of national
policymaking autonomy on environmental issues or about a loss of national culture and identity,
voted in support of EU integration at a lower rate than voters without such particular concerns.
The fear of commercial interests using the political opportunity structure of the EU to override
more stringent environmental regulations was particularly prevalent along the main trucking
route between Italy and Germany in the districts of the Inn valley, whose inhabitants were much less supportive of EU membership.

These findings have several important implications for the literature on public opinion and European integration. First, most generally, we have shown that for EU citizens (to be), the EU is far more than an intergovernmental organization to facilitate market exchange. The common market and the consequences of EU membership for national economic policies are important and lead to systematic variations in support, but the economic consequences of EU membership alone explain only about a third of the variation that we observe. Taking into account genuinely political considerations of the national electorate almost doubles the explanatory leverage of our model. EU citizens seem to be quite aware that moving decisionmaking powers from the national to the transnational and/or supranational level carries both risks and opportunities for particular political interests across a broad range of issues. Whether this recognition translates into increased or decreased support for EU membership depends on the perceived availability of like-minded interests at the EU level.

Second, more specifically, we have shown that support for, or opposition to, EU membership based on material interests or what Gabel calls "utilitarian appraisal" (Gabel 1998c), is not simply a function of direct material gains or losses, but follows an (imperfect) opportunity cost logic, where expected gains or losses from EU membership are discounted for the gains or losses that one expects to incur without EU membership. Since there is much uncertainty about these expectations, perceptions may play as much of a role as the results of "objective" economic analysis (cf. Gabel and Whitten 1997). Consequently we find, contrary to the conventional wisdom that "all else being equal, farmers should express greater utilitarian support than nonfarmers" (Gabel 1998b:49), that farmers in Austria, who enjoyed the benefits of domestic
trade protection and income support measures prior to EU membership, were less supportive than nonfarmers.51 This finding holds not only at the aggregate, but also at the individual level.

Third, we have argued for disaggregating Inglehart's notion of "postmaterialist" values or identities into a (post-)nationalist and a non-materialist component. We showed that separating the issue of nationalism from the pursuit of non-material interests is not only theoretically warranted because there is no necessary theoretical link between them, but also empirically useful. That these two dimensions of Inglehart's "postmaterialism" have so far been collapsed in the literature may explain why the empirical findings have been inconclusive, with some studies finding evidence of "postmaterialism" increasing EU support (e.g. Inglehart 1970b; Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1987), others finding the opposite or no effect (e.g. Gabel 1998b:95f, 101; Janssen 1991). We find that concerns about maintaining one's distinct/traditional national identity indeed reduce support for EU membership, which supports Inglehart's argument insofar it implies that those with a post-nationalist identity are more supportive of EU membership. At the same time, contrary to Inglehart's thesis, those with post-materialist interests—environmentalist in particular—are by no means automatic supporters of EU membership. To the extent that they see EU membership as a means by which free market/trade imperatives will trump domestic environmental protections (due to institutional biases and/or the lack of like-minded environmentalists at the EU level), which was the dominant perception in Austria, non-materialists may in fact be less supportive of the EU.

Fourth, our findings shed further light on the scope of the grand theories of European integration by testing their relative strengths in explaining public support for EU membership. Realist intergovernmentalism implies that aggregate security and economic effects should be the only determinants of public perceptions of EU membership, and its strong version suggests that public opinion should exhibit no meaningful variation within a country. This approach captures

51 In his quantitative analysis of Eurobarometer data disaggregated by time periods, Gabel (1998b) also finds that support among farmers declined over time. Contextual factors such as the ones we identified in Austria may explain this trend.
important aspects of the public debate, but its usefulness for understanding public opinion of European integration is called into question by our finding of significant and systematic variation of support for EU membership within a country. Liberal intergovernmentalism subsumes the traditional realist variant by recognizing the importance of geopolitical and aggregate economic effects, but goes beyond it by emphasizing the importance of divergent economic interests within countries as determinants of the preferences and strategies that national governments pursue in international bargains over integration. At the same time, liberal intergovernmentalism considers only domestic, but not transnational or supranational political actors. This approach leads to a parsimonious model of the variation in public perceptions of EU membership within a country based on the domestic distribution of economic interests of individuals and groups, which can explain much of the observed variance. Neofunctionalism, which similarly focuses on domestic economic actors, but also emphasizes domestic divisions on non-economic issues and the importance of political coalitions at the trans- and supranational level, implies a more political conception of public perceptions of EU membership. The resulting model is less parsimonious, but captures more of the public debate and affords us additional explanatory leverage in the analysis of the referendum results.

Beyond these theoretical and substantive contributions, the paper also seeks to make a methodological contribution by explicitly and fruitfully integrating deduction and induction, qualitative and quantitative analysis. We started from general theories of European and regional integration, as well as comparative and international political economy. We deductively derived from these theories a general political-economic model of public perceptions of EU membership. But due to the nature of public opinion, we then proceeded inductively from an empirical analysis of the Austrian public debate prior to the referendum, using qualitative information drawn from Austrian news coverage prior to the referendum. This analysis allowed us to identify those specific sectors, issues, etc. that had salience for the public and should therefore be expected to have shaped its perception of EU membership. To test the resulting operationalized hypotheses, we then turned to a separate set of data, the referendum outcomes at the district
level and *quantitative* information on district-level variation on the explanatory variables. King's *Ecological Inference* procedure then allowed us to derive estimates of the likelihood that individuals who exhibited particular attribute (such as being a farmer) indeed behaved, as hypothesized, differently from those without this attribute.

In this paper we have explored the dynamics of public opinion in a single European Union candidate country, and shown how a combination of political economy and purely political factors explains much of the variation in domestic support for European integration at both the aggregate and individual levels. One of our most striking individual findings was the very modest effect of anxieties over national culture and identity, measured by the level of support for the nationalist-Right party FPÖ. This finding is particularly surprising since the rise of the nationalist Right in post-EU accession Austrian politics has often been attributed to disgruntled EU-opponents—with important implications for current candidates, where ethno-nationalist conflicts appear to have been silenced rather than resolved (cf. Papagianni 2002). Future research should address the consequences of EU membership for domestic party and electoral competition. In particular, future research should investigate to what extent the "new" FPÖ-vote in fact has come from those who opposed EU membership. The ecological inference estimation technique used here holds particular promise for that kind of analysis.
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