

**ISSUES, IDENTITIES, AND PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES.
THE EMERGING RUSSIAN PARTY SYSTEM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

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The task of this paper is to report some tentative results from a survey among Russian politicians about the programmatic structuration of the Russian party system. Our research is motivated by our previous work. On the one hand, we have conducted in-depth studies of candidate strategies in Russian parliamentary elections (Smyth 1997). The basic theoretical argument here is that politicians quickly learn to take advantage of the institutional opportunities of the electoral system and the local resources in the political setting where they compete. On the other, we have completed a comparative study of programmatic crystallization and party competition in four East Central European polities (Kitschelt et al. 1997). The theory that explains variance among the patterns of party system formation encountered in these countries has implications for Russia. It argues that historical legacies, configured around the institutions and processes of the late communist polity, mediated by actors' rational strategies to advance their control of positions of power in the new democratic polities account for different pathways of democratic competition in post-communist countries. Placing Russia in a comparative setting, its system of party competition should look more like Bulgaria's than that of Central European countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. At the same time, there are institutional differences between Bulgaria and Russia in the new democratic order that lead us to expect less programmatic structuring in Russia.

Our account attacks two other common perspectives on post-communist politics. First, there is a *tabula rasa* view according to which in newly formed democracies politicians are unable to make programmatically coherent appeals because they know little about the setting of competitors in which they are placed or about their voters. Voters, in turn, know little about politicians, and are even unlikely to identify their own political interests, let alone organize around them. Both voters and politicians are expected to be slow in taking advantage of the new democratic institutions. In our paper, we attack this view as far as politicians' mapping of the competitive space is concerned. There is considerable level of programmatic structuration even in the Russian political space of party competition, although it has a different content and is not as clear-cut as in some East Central European countries.

Second, there is the *communist legacies* view postulating that the basic similarity of institutions and power relations in the former communist regimes produce similarities of party systems in the new democratic polities across the entire region. There are some undeniable legacies all post-communist countries share. But in this paper, we emphasize the differences among them in our comparison of our Russian findings with those of other East Central European countries.

Our results are preliminary for two reasons. First of all, this is the first tentative analysis of a Russian politician's survey conducted in the spring of 1997. Second, we are in the process of repeating the politicians' survey several times over the next twelve months (??? Regina, specifics) to get a better sense of the stability or volatility of the arrangements we have identified in the first survey. We first lay out the theoretical arguments that drive our paper (section 1). We then discuss the design of our study (section 2) and report initial results with regard to the level and the nature of programmatic structuring in the Russian party systems (sections 3 and 4).

1. The Theoretical Argument

We analyze two dependent variables in the comparative context. The first is the *programmatic structuration or "crystallization"* of the Russian parties and party system. The second is the *substantive competitive divisions and "dimensions"* on which parties locate their programmatic appeals. By programmatic structuration/crystallization we mean the extent to which parties take distinct and identifiable positions on political issues and project images to their voters that are more or less free of ambiguity about their stances. High programmatic structuration reduces uncertainty about a party's position. It makes it easier for voters to choose among parties in a deliberate, rational fashion. In rational voting, voters take the distance between their own ideal policy points and the announced positions of the parties, discounted by problems of uncertainty and credibility in the politicians' appeals, into account. An implication we do not explore in this paper is that in some, but not all democracies party systems that allow voters to construct a linkage between parties' policy positions and their own positions generate less cynicism and disaffection about the functioning of democracy than systems in which party positions are diffuse. Programmatic crystallization enhances the potential for *accountability and responsiveness* of political parties.

Under the rules of territorial representation, the winning candidates in legislative elections take on the task to represent their constituencies on an indefinite range of issues that may come up on the legislative agenda. Voters know party positions about very few of these issues and may grasp the candidates' positions only in a general way. Voters who wish to reduce the uncertainty about the behavior of the politicians whom they support will opt for (party) politicians who "bundle" issue stances such that their positions capture highly abstract generalized commitments. Thus, candidates and parties enable voters to choose more rationally among competitors in a low-information environment, if the former "map" their issue positions onto broad ideological "dimensions" (Hinich and Munger 1994). Examples are the polarity between market liberalism and social protectionism (also referred to as economic populism, or, in an older language, socialism), traditional and modern values, communitarian or individualist orientations and ultimately the most abstract and contentless schema of "left" and "right." It is these divisions and dimensions that are the second object of our analysis. We refrain from referring to them as "cleavages" because the language of cleavages suggests a fixity and durability of divisions that is an open question in post-communist societies. We wish to explore the content and the relationship between competitive dimension(s) in the Russian polity, as compared to its East Central European counterparts.

To avoid misunderstandings, we are not exploring whether more or less programmatic structuration or whether a particular kind of substantive division among parties contributes to democratic "consolidation" or not. We do not presume that high structuration delivers the most durable democracies. In fact, where democracies are structured around a *polarized* division, with parties taking extreme positions at opposite ends of a competitive dimension, chances are that democracy is quite fragile. Conversely, durable citizen-party linkages need not primarily rely on the convergence of policy positions between voters and their (party) representatives, let alone "responsible party government" in which the governing parties make good on their policy promises through executive action. Rather than compensating voters indirectly through public policies, announced in the arena of party competition, parties may directly compensate voters through selective incentives (jobs, housing, government contracts, favorable regulatory rulings, etc.). In such *clientelist*

voter-party linkages, programmatically structured competition between parties plays only a marginal role. Nevertheless, such systems may successfully "buy" the allegiance of constituencies and may last for many decades, as the Colombian example may illustrate. Thus, rather than taking programmatic structuration and the nature of divisions in post-communist polities as intervening variables to explain democratic performance and durability, for our study they are ultimate dependent variables. We are exclusively interested in the *procedural quality of Russian democracy* without addressing the systemic performance that might result from it.

We try to account for variations in programmatic structuration and substantive divisions in terms of two broad determinants. First, there are the specific *legacies of pre-communist and communist eras* that yield a particular resource distribution among defenders and challengers of the status quo in the critical phase of the communist breakdown as well as a variety of cognitive capacities, dispositions and expectations with regard to democracy. The latter are loosely related to Putnam's (1993) notion of "cultural capital." Second, the new democracies configure around *democratic institutions*, such as electoral systems and legislative-executive designs that shape politicians' strategies in the electoral and legislative arenas to articulate greater or lesser programmatic crystallization.

In other work, we have specified broad comparative frameworks that derive predictions about programmatic structuration and the nature of party competition for different post-communist polities (Kitschelt 1995; Kitschelt et al 1997; Smyth 1997). We will here only draw out implications for the Russian case and treat other configurations in a rather round-about fashion.

Legacies and Programmatic Structuration

Programmatic structuration is easier to engineer where countries have legacies of fully democratic or at least semi-authoritarian party competition before the advent of communism that generated a modicum of experience with party formation. Depending on the nature of such pre-communist political mobilization, the threat potential of non-communist contenders may have forced communist governments to relax repression in the aftermath of the thawing of Stalinism in the 1950s and find a mutual accommodation with the virtual and at times real opposition (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, possibly in certain time periods the Baltic states, Croatia). By contrast, where pre-communist mobilization included a very strong socialist and communist working class sector, the new ruling parties imposed a strict top-down Leninist regime (Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic).

The existence of a professionalized civil service before the advent of communism is also helpful for programmatic party competition. The ascending communist parties could make use of the administrative apparatus. It lowered corruption and a centrifugal sectorization of the state apparatus during communist times. In the transition from communism and its aftermath, a professionalized civic service makes the state apparatus less available to clientelist networks constructed by politicians from the old regime or their new challengers.¹

¹ We borrow this argument from Shefter (1994), chapter 1.

Countries with strong pre-communist working class mobilization, democratic experience, and a firm civil service organized *bureaucratic-authoritarian communism* with an intransigent ruling party that imploded in the face of a late, sudden and powerful surge of democratic opponents in 1989. In this environment, liberal-democratic forces quickly gained strength and moved to establish parties engaging in programmatic competition. Countries with pre-communist non-working class mobilization, semi-authoritarian regimes, and a weaker civil service typically built *national accommodative communist regimes* that generate reformist currents in the ruling party who first make concessions to the virtual opposition forces and then engineer a transition by sometimes lengthy negotiation from the old regime. Also here a variety of parties that develop programmatic orientation spring up relatively early.

Countries with little precommunist mobilization in parties, no experience of electoral competition, and a weak traditional clientelist state apparatus developed *patrimonial communism*. Patrimonial communism relies on personalist networks of political support, a decentered control of the state and party apparatus, and cooptation or heavy-handed repression of all forces of dissent that resist cooptation into the patronage networks. Here, liberal-democratic opposition is too feeble to mount a challenge to the system, even when it is weakened by economic crisis and a disintegration of the international communist alliance system. Elements of the late communist elite themselves engage in a *preemptive strike* to introduce a new political and economic system of rule that allows them to convert their old political assets in the party and state apparatus into new political and economic assets.

Polities emerging from patrimonial communism develop the most diffuse patterns of programmatic party competition. First, there is *no experienced and semi-organized liberal-democratic opposition* waiting in the wings with a capacity to mobilize around programmatic appeals. The emerging opposition many of whose members grow out of the offspring of the incumbent communist ruling elite is highly fragmented, divided into personal cliques, and hard to organize around parties. Such politicians either form precarious electoral "alliances" or "fronts" that paper over deep internal antagonisms or generate a proliferation of small proto-parties and sects. Second, preemptive reformers from the old system have every *incentive to thwart programmatic competition*. Their old ideology is discredited and does not provide them with a new roadmap to build a convincing general programmatic appeal. Hence they rely on strategies of muddling through with personalist networks and appeals to (re)build political power bases. Third, the *clientelist, decentered state apparatus* is available as a resource to which politicians avail themselves in the system in order to craft new alliances and followings. Personal linkages tend to be more important than a convergence of general policy positions between politicians and their constituencies. Fourth, also communist hardliners are faced with an *exhaustion of ideas* that would allow them to develop a new non-liberal theory of political economic development, yielding a sharper political action plan than vague social protectionist appeals. Fifth, outside the (post-)communist camp, if the liberal-democratic challenge that potentially feeds into programmatic party formation is weak, then *nationalist and ethno-cultural particularist parties* may challenge the inner core of the political elite. But we know that such appeals give rise to clientelist rather than programmatic parties (Horowitz 1985: chapters 7 and 8). It is very hard for nationalist/ethno-cultural organizations to take a clear position on

the critical questions of economic reform that are high on the agenda of post-communist polities, because their lead politicians must fear that such issues divide their own culturally defined constituencies into fragments defined by class, sector, and personal economic assets, such as education. Moreover, ethno-cultural networks facilitate the monitoring and enforcement of clientelist selective exchanges with electoral constituencies that make programmatic competition less relevant for office-seeking politicians.

Russia is a clear case of patrimonial communism. When it became communist, it was a peasant society without democratic experience, but with a corrupt Tsarist patrimonial state apparatus. Communist rule built on these foundations. Not by chance regional machines dominated politics and acted to insulate regional elites from the capricious nature of the central party apparatus (Urban xxxx; Taubman xxxx; Willerton 1992).² The party bureaucracy created conditions for this to happen, but was ultimately unable to control the established machines, as is evidenced by the failure of the early Gorbachev efforts to rid the party of the entrenched elite. The Soviet and Russian legacy of communism for democracy is thus not so much in the central hegemonic institution of the communist party, but in the structure of federal bureaucracies that gave regional leaders autonomy and created interests that were different from those of the capstone national elite. It also gave these leaders resources that could be used independent of the party and then funnelled into the process of party formation after 1991. The legacies of patrimonial communism thus created a wealth of incentives for politicians to build *personalist* relations between political representatives and constituencies. These personalist relations, in turn, undermine the capacity of parties to coordinate politicians around similar policies and thus promote programmatic crystallization.

Going beyond the core political-bureaucratic elites, Fish (1995a; 1995b; 1997) has exhaustively analyzed the difficulties of liberal-democratic forces in Russia to pool resources, coordinate politicians, and develop programmatic structuration around emerging party organizations. More so than in countries emerging from bureaucratic-authoritarian or national accommodative communism, for a long time liberal-democratic proto-parties have remained small cabales around crusading political personalities who jockeyed for positions and electoral market niches or even the Russian presidency. Thus, it is not primarily an inherent rejection of liberalism in Russian political culture, but the inability of liberal-democrats to agree on a political strategy and their lack of investment in a party organization that accounts for their poor electoral showing (Fish 1997: 201). All these attributes of political mobilization in the liberal-democratic party camp are likely to show up in its comparatively feeble programmatic structuration.

Thus, relative to other post-communist countries, we expect Russia to show less programmatic structuration in its party system. But this does not imply that there is no structuration at all. Moreover, over time, programmatic crystallization is driven less by historical legacies, congealed around actors' initial resource endowments and cognitive orientations at the moment of democratization, than by the institutional rules of democratic competition. Yet in the Russian case also these

² Consistent with our framework, Willerton (1992: 229-36) emphasizes the variation of patronage within the Soviet Union. Thus, Lithuania --with a semi-authoritarian pre-communist legacy and elements of national accommodative communism-- evidenced much less corruption and clientelism in the 1980s than did Azerbaidzhan, Willerton's contrast case and clearly an extreme example of patrimonial communism.

rules are relatively unfavorable to programmatic coherence of party competition.

Institutions and Programmatic Structuration

Democratic institutions to a considerable extent are endogenous to the bargaining situation faced by ambitious politicians in the transition process. How these politicians frame their preferred options to pursue political power, however, depends on their cognitive maps and ideological dispositions as much as on their expected electoral support level and position in the institutional status quo. The bargaining power of the electoral favorite clearly matters and one would expect politicians who personally or whose parties as teams of politicians are likely to win a plurality of the vote to call for highly disproportional plurality or majority-run-off electoral systems and a strong executive presidency (Lijphart 1992; Frye 1997). But such institutions tend to undermine the programmatic coherence of parties by featuring the personal appeal of individual politicians on political center stage, such as presidential candidates or legislative candidates in single-member electoral districts. Hence, strong liberal-democratic or socialist parties whose politicians are able to develop coherent programmatic appeals may well opt for closed-list proportional representation and a weak presidency, particularly if their process of party formation is already well advanced, *even though* they might do well in a presidential contest or highly personalist legislative elections.³ Reformers emerging from inside communist successor parties often opt for more personalist systems of representation and governance at the moment of communist collapse when they reckon that their ideology is less popular than the personality of their individual political leaders and that their control of office might allow them to build clientelist networks that cement their political rule through clientelist bonds to constituencies.

This is not the place to specify models of choosing electoral laws and executive power structures in post-communist democracies. But for Russia, two important facts stand out. First, the liberal democratic forces were weak, divided, and held at arms-length by the sitting Russian president. They had precious little bargaining power over the choice of the electoral law or the constitutional provisions of the presidency. Second, the communists still controlled much popular support, but had lost the presidency to Yeltsin in 1990 and had no viable candidate of their own. Neither power nor ideological considerations would have led them to embrace a strong presidency, but they had essentially no say in the drafting of the constitution.

A group of reformers growing out of the old system, with Yeltsin as Russian president as its hub, controlled the process of institutional choice. Because of the threat of an ideologically more coherent anti-reform opposition camp and the programmatic and organizational weakness of the liberal democratic camp, as well as the precarious political organization of those in control of the levers of power, Yeltsin did everything to weaken and restrain the influence of

³ Examples are the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic.

political parties in the emerging Russian democratic polity.⁴ On the one hand, Yeltsin chose a commission of personal loyalists who drafted a constitution that maximizes the executive and legislative powers of the presidency vis-a-vis parliament.⁵ On the other, his advisors prepared an electoral law designed to minimize the risks of an outright victory of a coherent opposition camp by devising a mixed electoral system in which half of the seats are filled by national closed party lists, nominated by politicians at the national level, and the other half is recruited from individual member districts with plurality voting. Once legislators were elected in part based on personal and local electoral appeals, complex interest alignments among legislators in 1995 virtually made sure that bargaining in the Duma and between parliament and presidency would not change this system (Remington and Smith 1996).

In the Russian presidentialist constitution with far-reaching legislative and executive prerogatives associated with the chief executive office, at least four mechanisms undercut programmatic party formation. The first two operate in the run-up to presidential elections. Because the competition for the main electoral prize is personalist and politicians have limited incentives to pool resources because of the two-round run-off majoritarian format of the election, the system (1) produces a proliferation of parties around potential presidential candidates or (2) very severe intra-party conflicts about the nomination of the party's candidate. After elections, strong presidentialism undercuts programmatic party competition because presidents are not dependent on a firm legislative majority. Hence, they may be inclined (3) to engage in legislative coalition building among groups of legislators on an issue-by-issue basis, thus undercutting party formation. Conversely, (4) legislators tend to be more constituency-serving and to pay less attention to overall party positions, if the stability of the executive does not stand and fall with party discipline (Ordeshook, 1995).

The interaction between Russia's presidential system and its mixed electoral system creates disincentives for programmatic party formation. The closed-list proportional representation tier of the electoral law should foster party formation. Moreover, mixed systems within a framework of parliamentary democracy in fact often do promote programmatically coherent parties.⁶ But in a presidential system like Russia's, the legislative-executive design does not reinforce cohesive party formation. As a consequence, the balance of the mixed electoral system tilts toward personal representation. Furthermore, presidential and legislative elections in Russia are non-concurrent, thus reducing the incentive for presidential and legislative candidates to work together. Moreover, in Russia the local and regional parties have very little control over the central party nomination process for the closed list candidates, while the center virtually has no influence on the single member district candidates. The divorce between central and local level undercuts party

⁴ Thus, Yavlinky (1997:7) complains about Yeltsin's persistent efforts to "denigrate parties and civil structures."

⁵ White, Rose and McAllister (1996: 87-106 and 184-96) provide an instructive account of Russian constitution making.

⁶ The Hungarian party and electoral system would be a case in point. Although the electorate chooses almost half of the legislators in single-member districts with majority run-off elections, the imperatives of party discipline in a parliamentary democracy override the centrifugal incentives of the electoral system. Germany is a bad example, because the relative strength of the parties in the legislature is ultimately determined by the closed-list tier of seats.

formation (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1997: 38-40). At the local level, entrenched networks use party labels in an opportunistic fashion or even may go so far as to use party money and organization without using party labels at all (Smyth 1997).

Overall, then, the Russian institutional arrangements amplify and reinforce the obstacles to programmatic party formation that derive from a legacy of patrimonial communism. In Russia, *both* patrimonial communist legacies and new democratic institutions work against programmatic party formation. By comparison, in Bulgaria, legacies are un conducive to party formation, but a parliamentary democracy with closed-list proportional representation in multi-member districts is a countervailing force. In Hungary and Poland, legacies of national accommodative communism are more favorable to programmatic competition, as are the institutions of a parliamentary system with mixed electoral systems.⁷ In the Czech Republic, finally, bureaucratic-authoritarian communist legacies, as well as a parliamentary system with closed-list proportional representation promote programmatic party formation and discourage personal representation. At least compared to these reference cases, Russian democracy should exhibit *less* crystallized programmatic competition.

Legacies and Dimensions of Party Competition

Political institutions constrain or facilitate the *articulation* of societal divides in the political arena, but they do not determine the content and alignment of such divisions (Cox 1997: chapter 11). In this spirit, explaining the *content* of the party structuration we observe in Russia requires drawing on the country's political-economic legacies. In democracies emerging from bureaucratic-authoritarian communism, communist parties remain intransigent, but the transition is associated with a strong liberal democratic mobilization that essentially sidelines them and confines their electoral support to a small minority. Subsequent to national-accommodative communism, post-communist parties may well resurge, but only because they embrace the new political and economic order and develop a reputation as social democratic players within a capitalist democracy. In the aftermath of patrimonial communism, however, the communist successor parties remain popular *and* intransigent at the same time. It is easy to see why. In material terms, the parties developed extensive clientelist networks many of whose participants stand to lose from market liberalization. Given the deeply corruption-ridden economies and bureaucracies of patrimonial communism, its enterprises probably are more rent-seeking and much less ready to compete in a market setting than those existing under other communist regimes.⁸

⁷ Hungary has parliamentary rule, but a mixed electoral system. Poland combines a semi-presidential system in which the president wields considerable executive and legislative powers with an open-system multi-member district electoral law that gives some leeway to personal political campaigns.

⁸ Following the judgment of a panel of investment experts polled by the *Wallstreet Journal's Central European Economic Review* (December 1995-January 1996: p. 9) on a scale of 1 (= most corrupt) to 10 (= least corrupt), Russia scores a miserable 2.3, compared to much higher values in formerly bureaucratic-authoritarian and national accommodative communist countries (Czech Republic: 8.6; Slovenia: 9.3; Poland: 8.6; Hungary: 8.8; Estonia: 7.1; Latvia: 6.6; Lithuania: 6.8). Bulgaria as our other patrimonial comparison case has a score of 5.6 and is the highest

At the same time, in cultural-ideological terms, the opposition has limited resources and capabilities to offer a credible alternative. The ruling communist party led the country from an agrarian to an industrial society and the population has never been exposed to contending model of modernity and an alternative development strategy. In this situation, it is very hard for many citizens to attribute credibility to the fledgling liberal-democratic party alternatives. The internal divisions of the liberal-democratic camp are not designed to instill more confidence in voters that a viable alternative to the status quo is at hand.

The existence of a comparatively intransigent communist party, facing a divided field of democratic reformers, has several implications for the formation of party alignments after patrimonial communism. First, the *regime divide* (democracy versus communist rule) remains vibrant for a longer period of time and polarizes the population more deeply than in countries emerging from bureaucratic-authoritarian or national accommodative communism where communist parties are sidelined or embrace social democracy. Eventually, also in formerly patrimonial communist countries, communists might accept the rules of democratic competition, but this happens with much less ease than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Second, the regime divide directly reinforces an *economic divide over liberalization strategies*. The intransigent (post-)communist parties constitute a tough social protectionist, anti-liberal camp that is pitted against an often feeble and internally divided camp of market reformers. Although the parties on both sides of the polar divide may be *internally diffuse, with limited programmatic crystallization only*, they are sharply separated into competing camps of pro- and anti-reform.

The depth and centrality of the regime and economic divides permit politicians to draw in other political and cultural issues to reinforce the conflict between the central party camps. Whereas after national-accommodative communism politicians in competing parties may share so much common ground on economics that they seek out socio-cultural divides as cross-cutting dimensions of competition to differentiate their own party from its competitors, after patrimonial communism such socio-cultural issues feed into and reinforce the central political and economic divide. With regard to questions of national autonomy and socio-cultural distinctiveness, culturally *particularist* positions that insist on drawing sharp boundaries between "insiders" and "outsiders" end up on the economically social-protectionist, politically anti-reform side. After all, the insistence on the uniqueness of a culture and nation provides an argument to restrict open competition and thus conveniently matches the political objectives of those who oppose market liberal reform.⁹ The common theme is *national protection*, both from domestic and from international market forces. Politicians who present themselves as the advocates of the "losers" of market liberalization thus also oppose an international economic, political and socio-cultural opening, but insist on the national uniqueness of their country.

Whether or not this logic also spills over into questions of domestic cultural pluralism and ethnic divides, is a

ranked country within that group of communist regimes. The correlation between types of communist rule and levels of corruption in the transition economies is extremely high.

⁹ This is not to imply that socio-cultural conflicts are a pure epiphenomenon resulting from underlying economic divisions.

complicated question. Within each ethnic group, those who stand to lose from economic liberalization may certainly be more inclined to insist on non-market criteria of economic distribution that take socio-cultural group membership into account. How ethnic pluralism interacts with other divides, however, may depend on the relative resource endowments of each group and their majority or minority status (cf. Kitschelt 1995). Particularly if ethnic groups are internally stratified in economic terms, their political spokespeople may refrain from strong positions on the economic divide. For this reason, domestic ethno-cultural divides always have a potential to cross-cut regime and economic policy divides.

In a simple formula, democratic competition after patrimonial communism tends to yield a polarization between party camps on a single axis of competition on which political, economic, socio-cultural, and sometimes also ethnic divides mutually reinforce each other. By contrast, after national-accommodative communism, economic divides are less polarized and cross-cut by moderately salient socio-cultural divides. After bureaucratic-authoritarian communism, an economic divide between winners and losers of market liberalization tends to dominate the party competition, but it is not reinforced or cross-cut by major political or socio-cultural divides.

With regard to Russia, many observers have claimed a fusion and mutual reinforcement of economic and socio-cultural divisions such that political and economic opposition to reform go together with nationalism (cf. Vujacic 1996; McFaul 1996). Given the very hazy visions of a non-market liberalizing populist and social-protectionist economic policy, nostalgic patriotism and nationalism may represent a unifying formula for the post-communist party permitting its leaders to paper over their lack of conceptual ideas to tackle the structural crisis of formerly planned economies (cf. Ishiyama 1996; 1997). At the same time, the assimilation of nationalist rhetoric into the (post-)communist party agenda may cause internal party strains and extraordinary internal diffuseness of politicians' views of the precise link between economic and socio-cultural issues.

Our analysis of political alignments after patrimonial communism arrives at similar results as Fish's (1995) and McFaul's (1996) characterizations of the Russian situation. We would differ from McFaul primarily with regard to the interpretation of Russia as in the midst of a "social revolution" with warring camps locked into a polarized struggle. A revolutionary situation requires continuous and often violent contestation of political power unconstrained by institutional rules. McFaul himself admits that the mostly peaceful methods of political competition speak against the diagnosis of Russia caught up in social revolution. Russia *does* have a polarized, uni-dimensional axis of party competition, but this is not the same as saying that Russia travels through a period of revolutionary turmoil.¹⁰

¹⁰ McFaul's assertion that a revolutionary situation prevails because the "centrist" forces in the party system have been vanishing, as proved by the changing relative strength of parties from the 1993 to the 1995 legislative elections, relies on a classification of new parties the author himself (McFaul 1996: 94) finds questionable. Had he classified Lebed's *Congress of Russian Communities* as well as a greater share of the vote for independents as "centrist" votes, then the "centrist" camp would have lost only a marginal share of voters compared to 1993. Whereas McFaul's table 1 (1994: 92) distributes 94.3 percent of the 1993 party-list vote over the three camps, he does the same for only 88.2 percent of the 1995 vote. Possibly, the residual 11.8 percent accruing to parties each garnering less than 1 percent of the vote may express some voter dissatisfaction with the extremes.

2. Design of the Study

Our study is based on a March 1997 survey among some 360 Russian politicians in 17 oblasts geographically dispersed across Russia, though mostly in its European part.¹¹ We made an effort to include oblasts from the seven large geographic regions that divide the country. We also attempted to mix industrial, mining, and agricultural regions and to include some ethnic Republics, in addition to the large national centers Moscow and St. Petersburg that have tended to be the focus of party development. The idea was to maximize the difference in conditions within the sample.

We asked politicians to place their own party as well as its competitors on policy issue scales and on more general ideological dimensions. Our research builds on a study by Laver and Hunt (1992) which asked political science experts to rate parties in their own countries on such scales, but use of this rating technique is not necessarily confined to employing political scientists as the parties' judges. In fact, by soliciting scores on parties' positions from politicians themselves, political scientists can gain insight into how parties mutually perceive each other and how they construct the conceptual map of political competition in a country. Moreover, whereas political science experts often have only a vague secondary image of the internal coherence or diffuseness of political parties, politicians' responses permit us to measure the internal cohesiveness of parties directly.

A critical design choice is the selection of parties whose politicians we targeted by our survey. We included parties that successfully won seats in the 1993 Duma and had credible showings in the 1995 legislative election. This applies to the communists (KPRF), the Liberal Democrats (LDPR), Yabloko, and Our Home is Russia (NDR), as one successor organization of the 1993 reformers. We also included Women of Russia, the Agrarian Party, and Democratic Russia's Choice (DVR). Although these parties did not have strong showings in the 1995 elections, they still have substantial organizations and a public profile that gives them some claim to be reckoned with as serious contenders. We also included the nascent organization of Alexander Lebed in order to track its development. This party was just holding its founding congress at the time of our first survey, but it had made considerable efforts to establish regional organizations previously. In some cases, it built on the old party organization KRO that Lebed used as a platform in the 1995 legislative elections. That party failed to capture seats in the party list race.

The parties represented in our study received 68.2 percent of the vote in the 1995 Duma election. Compared to that, our politicians' questionnaires in an earlier study of four East Central European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) covered parties receiving between 82 and 91 percent of the vote in national parliamentary elections close to the time of our survey (Kitschelt et al. 1997: chapter 2 and 3). Among the Russian parties we left out are only two groups receiving between four and five percent of the vote, the centrist *Workers Self-Management* and the hardline

¹¹ The oblasts included: Vologda, Voronezh, Sverdlovsk, Republic of Tartarstan, Kemerovo, Kostroma, Krasnodarsk, Krasnoiarisk, Kursk, Moscow,, Novosibersk, Republic of Karelia, Saint Petersburg, Saratov, Republic of Bashkiria, Chelyabinsk, and Yaroslavl.

communist organization *Working Russia*. The residual of the vote accrued to a myriad of lists receiving less than three percent of the vote each. By ignoring these groups, as well as the many unaffiliated candidates in local single-member district races, *we bias our sample against our hypothesis that the development of the Russian party system shows less programmatic structuring than that of other post-communist countries with different legacies than patrimonial communism and democratic institutions that are more conducive to party formation*. Including these groups many of which lack a presence in some of the regions we polled would have caused many practical problems of implementing the survey. Moreover, many politicians would have been unable to place these parties on the various policy issues. Our estimates of the programmatic coherence of the Russian party system based on the eight most prominent parties thus represent the *upper bound* of reasonable estimates of programmatic party formation. This must be taken into account in the interpretation of our data.

With more than 370 respondents in 17 regions and 8 parties, our sample translates into roughly 45-50 respondents per party country-wide, or 2 - 3 respondents per party in each of seventeen Russian region. By standards of population surveys, this sample is small. By standards of elite studies, we have assembled a rather substantial number of respondents.

On each policy item, we formulated two polar opposite options and then led politicians place their own party and their competitors on a 10-point Likert-type scale running from one extreme position to the other. We also asked them how important the issue is for their own party (10-point scale). In our previous East Central European surveys, we employed the original Laver/Hunt 20-point scales. But we accept the criticism that a 20-point scale is probably too detailed for a survey among non-political scientists and generates a great deal of measurement error. In the comparison of our Russian with our East Central European data, *this change in the scoring format probably biases results against our hypotheses*. A 20-point scale provides more opportunity for "noise" or "measurement error" than a 10-point scale. When measuring the diffuseness of parties on an issue, the standard deviations that result from respondents' scores of the same party on the 20-point scale may thus be *more than* twice as large as that on the 10-point scale.

Our survey included most of the same policy items as those we employed in the Central European surveys, but we slightly adapted them to local Russian conditions. Moreover, we added some policy questions of unique relevance for Russia, as the heir of a former hegemonic power. A first basket of policy questions concerns socio-economic issues of protection versus market liberalization. As in the other countries, we asked how much parties might be inclined (1) to privatize health care and health insurance, (2) to let state companies go bankrupt, if not viable in a market setting, (3) to prioritize speedy privatization over social and political principles of justice in the creation of private ownership rights, (4) to favor fighting inflation over fighting unemployment, and (5) to preserve or dismantle the system of collective farms and agricultural subsidies. Later in the survey, we asked respondents (6) to place parties on a general economic policy scale ranging from state intervention to liberal market economics.

Four issues broadly concern national autonomy. As in the Central European surveys, politicians scored (1) how favorably disposed Russian parties are to foreign capital inflows and at a more abstract ideological level (2) how much parties emphasize a national consciousness and sense of destiny as opposed to a consciousness of European regional ties

and global problems of humankind. Moreover, in Russia, we asked specific questions about (3) parties' positions on the treatment of Russians in the near-abroad (how much should Russia intervene?) and (4) on Russia's cooperation with the West, particularly with its military alliance system.

Linked to the "national" questions, but not identical with them, we included two items exploring issues of multi-cultural tolerance. First, politicians scored how much adaptation to Russian ways of life parties expect from non-Russian citizens for the latter to expect equal treatment to Russians. Furthermore, politicians indicated the extent to which parties are tolerant to the idea that non-Russians should be permitted to use their own language in schools and governments in their regions.

The remaining questions concern social values and the quality of life. Two of them have clear economic implications and we set them apart from the others. One is the extent to which parties wish to prioritize environmental protection, even if this entailed a sacrifice of jobs. The other asks politicians to determine the extent to which parties wish to support public child care in order to enable women to work. This question, however, may not be at the cutting edge of gender-related social policy questions. Many Russian women apparently wish to escape the double burden of work and home so that actual policy questions revolve around the parties' willingness to pay women to stay home and raise their own children.

The other value/life style questions have a socio-political, but not really an economic-distributive content. They concern the extent to which parties (1) see a role for church influence in government, schools, and social organizations, (2) endorse the death penalty on certain violent crimes, (3) wish to impose moral restraints on the mass media and (4) see Russian values undermined or sustained by social change. Finally, we presented respondents a broader scale on which they could place parties' appeals between an emphasis on cultural individualism and values of community and solidarity.

Politicians also placed parties on a 10-point left-right scale, and we will explore below whether and how the issue positions politicians ascribe to parties help us predict the politicians' placement of these parties on the left-right scale.

3. Programmatic Structuration

Programmatic structuration or "crystallization" has to do with the coherence of parties around policy appeals. At the most general level, we can measure programmatic coherence by the magnitude of the average standard deviation in our respondents' judgments of parties' j on issue k . For each party and issue, we calculate that standard deviation as a gauge of programmatic coherence. To get a very rough systemic level measure, we then compute the average diffuseness for all eight Russian parties. This measure is very rough and needs further refinement because it does not distinguish whether the judge belongs to the same party as that being judged and whether some parties are more heterogeneous than others. It also ignores the differential salience or the actual position that individual parties take on the issue relative to their competitors. It is one thing, if parties are vague on issues of high salience and quite another if they are vague on low salience issues. These complications will be examined later.

Before we turn to our actual data, let us give a fictitious example that illustrates what the real numbers mean. Consider a very small sample of evaluators E_1 through E_6 who assess parties A through D on the same issue k on a 10-point scale ranging from "left" (= 1) to "right" (= 10). All four parties actually receive the same mean score from the judges, a center-left 3.5 points. But in the first case (party A), none of the judges' scores is very far off the party's overall mean value, except judge E_1 who assigns it an extreme score of 1, although that is still on the same "side" of the issue as the party's mean value. The resulting standard deviation is a fairly modest 1.52. The picture is not all that different with regard to party B, although judge E_6 now ventures to place the party on the center-right of the issue. Perceived programmatic heterogeneity is much greater with regard to parties C and D. In both cases, two judges or one third of the sample place the party on rather extreme left positions (scores 1 or 2). Simultaneously, one or two judges (33% of the evaluators) place the party on the opposite side of the center positions of the issue scale with scores of 6 or 7. The standard deviation, or programmatic diffuseness, of the party's perceived position now jumps to a hefty 2.17 or even 2.51. In both instances, there is substantially less agreement about the position of the parties than in the cases of A or B. As we move from A through B to C and D, the standard deviation of judge's scores begin to approach, but still stays considerably below, the value for the standard deviation that might result if we randomly assigned positions to a party (column E) or the maximum heterogeneity that is possible on a 10-point scale (column F).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

With a 10-point scale, as a rule of thumb, standard deviations in the neighborhood of or below 1.75 signal relatively robust programmatic structuration. Once we substantially exceed this level, however, and get into the neighborhood of 2.0, 2.2. or even 2.5, parties' policy positions appear to be ever more diffuse. Even at the upper bound of our examples, we stay considerably below standard deviations resulting from the random assignment of values to a party. With this in mind, let us now examine table 2. Here we list the average standard deviations for all the evaluated parties in Russia, Bulgaria, and the three Central European (CEU) countries Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland combined.¹² For the non-Russian cases, where judges employed 20-point scales, here as well as in future comparative evidence, we have divided the resulting parameters by two to obtain results equivalent to the Russian 10-point scale.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Our data show that on each and every issue, the parties' average standard deviations are smaller in the CEU countries than in Bulgaria and almost always smaller in Bulgaria than in Russia. The result is in agreement with one of our lead hypotheses that in the legacy of patrimonial communism (Bulgaria, Russia) and the presence of a constitutional design that undermines the formation of programmatic parties (Russia) the diffuseness of parties should be greater than in the

¹² Data for East Central Europe are from Kitschelt et al. (1997), chapter 5. Examination of the data for individual Central European countries shows that our regional averages do not mask high intra-regional diversity. The data are not computed from the raw scoring, but from respondents' relative scoring. We transformed each respondent i 's scoring of all parties j on a particular issue k by subtracting the mean value respondent i assigns to all parties j from the particular value each party receives. This way, we remove "personal anchor points" of respondents' judgments from our data. For the rationale behind this, compare Kitschelt et al. (1997: ch. 3).

aftermath of bureaucratic-authoritarian communism (Czech Republic) or national-accommodative communism (Hungary and Poland) and the presence of institutions more or less conducive to programmatic party formation.

The rank order of programmatic crystallization applies not only across all the substantive issue areas, but also to the formal left-right scale. Russian politicians have a harder time to place their parties on that scale than Bulgarians, let alone Central Europeans. Comparing the results issue by issue, an "information intensive" question, such as that which asks politicians to compare modes of privatization (variable 32) generates more diffuseness than simpler questions, such as the generalized question about state-led or market liberalized economies (VAR 46). In these instances, however, the cross-national differentials remain almost invariant. Russia always has the most diffuse parties. Our subsequent discussion will show the robustness of this interpretation of our very rough indicator of programmatic diffuseness/crystallization by probing into several alternative explanations for the Russian results and desaggregating our data analysis.

For Russia, we also provide the standard deviation of the various parties' level of programmatic diffuseness on the issues. A high standard deviation, say above .30, indicates that some parties are a great deal more diffuse than others (e.g., VAR 40, on privatization of collective farms or VAR 45 on non-Russian language in school). We examine these data on a party-by-party basis later.

In a within-country or cross-national comparison, one explanation of higher programmatic diffuseness may be that some issues simply happen to be less politically salient. Because politicians do not care about their own party's and its competitors' position on the issue and may not know them, the response pattern looks more random. Table 3 provides the average mean salience scores for all Russian parties, the standard deviations of the parties' means (indicating how similar politicians see the importance of the issue for each party), and standardized salience scores relative to the national average of all issues. For Bulgaria and the CEU countries, we here offer only the standardized scores that lend themselves to a more straight-forward cross-national comparison.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

In Russia, just as in the other post-communist countries, the economic issues clearly have the greatest salience. In Russia, but not elsewhere, they are followed by national questions, particularly the protection of ethnic Russians in the near-abroad (VAR 54). Beyond that, only environmental protection (VAR 42) and moral restraint of the mass media (VAR 43) excites Russian politicians. It is worth noting, and we return to that in the next section, that the multi-cultural issues are uniformly judged as comparatively unimportant¹³. This applies even to Bulgaria where the last communist government politicized the Turkish minority question in the late 1980s.

There is virtually no linkage between the parties' average programmatic diffuseness, reported in table 2, and the mean salience scores in table 3. Such a linkage does not show up, even if we desaggregate our data to the level of individual parties and calculate whether a party's attribution of salience to an issue enables us to predict its programmatic coherence on the issue. Also in a cross-national perspective, Russian parties are not more programmatically diffuse, because they

¹³ The standard deviation of the eight parties' salience ratings of the issues are very small (VAR 36: .64; VAR 45: .59).

attribute less salience to the issues.

The standard deviations for the Russian salience scores signal on which items there is great dispersion among the individual parties in their salience judgments, such as the question of letting companies go bankrupt (VAR 31), child care and women (VAR 37), Russians in the near-abroad (VAR 54), or Russian values and societal modernization (VAR 53). Table 4 lists the four most important and the four least important issues for each Russian party. Almost everywhere, the questions of social security/health care (VAR 30) and agricultural reform (VAR 40) make it into the top four. Pensions and social protection of the elderly, a problem for which health care is key, has been a constant issue of debate in Russian politics. Questions of land privatization have also received much attention. At the time of the survey, parliament debated and passed a bill banning the sale of land. President Yeltsin refused to sign it.

In about half the parties, environmental protection (VAR 42) and the inflation/unemployment trade-off (VAR 33) appear among the most salient issues. Also this fact is hardly surprising in light of Russia's ecological crisis. Because the ecological crisis is closely identified with the old communist regime, it is telling that this policy problem does *not* appear among the most salient issues for communists and extreme nationalists (LDPR), but that of radical reformers (DVR and Yabloko) and "softer" opposition parties with obvious special group predispositions (agrarians and women).

Beyond these four issues that account for almost 70% of the eight parties' top-4 salience rankings, parties have their more idiosyncratic favorite issues. Thus in the case of the LDPR and Lebed, Russians in the near abroad (VAR 54) make it into the top group. In the LDPR's case, this also applies to the question about collaboration with the Western military alliance (VAR 52) and traditional Russian values (VAR 53). We should keep this in mind, because later we explore whether the LDPR indeed competes on these issues by constituting a cross-cutting policy dimension. Only one other party has a salience profile that is not dominated by economic issues, Women of Russia. Here, of course, the women's question (VAR 37) is at the top of the list, and traditional values (VAR 53) as well as the environment (VAR 42) also make it into the top four. Viewed with the eyes of a Westerner, politicians in *Women of Russia* thus give the party an almost "post-industrial" configuration of policy priorities. Of course, these issues have a different meaning and urgency in the Russian setting than in the feminist or ecological politics of advanced capitalist democracies. It is a question worth exploring, however, whether the party's unique priorities contributed to its decline in electoral support.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

There are also four of our sixteen issues that account for almost 70% of the least salient rankings by politicians of the eight parties. Everyone mentions the issue of church and politics as a low salience issue, although politicians across the political spectrum like to be seen at Orthodox rites or in the company of clergymen. Because the Orthodox church has always been firmly subjected to whatever political regime ruled Russia, politicians are more likely to express their adherence to national culture and traditions with this gesture than any meaningful commitment to spiritual and organizational concerns of the church. Also the two "multi-cultural" questions show up on most politicians' lists of least salient issues, i.e. the use of languages other than Russian in school (VAR 45) and the equal treatment of minorities who do not follow predominant Russian customs (VAR 36). Furthermore, five of eight parties attribute little importance to the

question of child care and women's role in labor markets (VAR 37). Two reasons may account for this result. On the one hand, women are the main losers of the economic liberalization process and they have too little organization and consciousness to fight for their interests. This is a phenomenon that can be observed across post-communist countries. On the other, as we have suggested earlier, women try to escape the double burden of work life and home so that policy issues now revolve more around support for homemakers.

For the quality of democratic competition, it is an interesting question, whether the most *salient* issues are also those that *polarize* the parties most. If parties are in deep disagreement on conflicts they find most important to resolve, legislatures may encounter difficulties to pass policies on them. Or if two camps alternate in majority status and impose their policy preferences on the country, we may encounter wild policy swings across governments and electoral terms. In Russia, of course, parliamentary decision making capacity is heavily constrained by presidential decree power so that the chief executive can enact or block policies, almost no matter what the nature of parliamentary party support around an issue. Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare the Russian situation with that of the East Central European countries.

Our empirical measure of *polarization* is the standard deviation of the mean positions our judges assign to all Russian parties. Let eight parties A through H receive the mean scores 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 on issue k, then the index of *polarization* or "*spread*" is a hefty 2.45. If, by contrast, the distance between parties is compressed to .5 units each, such that they take positions 4, 4.5, 5,...and 7.5 in the centrist region of the policy space, then the standard deviation or spread is a more modest 1.22.

Before we engage in a substantive interpretation of empirical findings, let us step back and consider what a high polarization value means for our comparative analysis. First of all, polarization may mean what the term says, namely that the parties in a system are deeply at odds over how a policy issue should be resolved. But there are two other interrelated reasons why a party system may *appear* to be highly polarized according to our operationalization. First, respondents may assign extreme positions to some parties not because those parties are particularly *extreme* on these issues, but because respondents are *certain* which "side" of the issue these parties support. *High polarization scores thus imply high certainty about a party's position on the issue.* This leads to a second, technical consideration. If a party's position on an issue is highly uncertain, our judges assign random scores to the party on that issue, as our measure of programmatic diffuseness indicates. In the presence of high programmatic diffuseness, the means of a party j's position on issue k will regress to the mean of the issue scale (i.e., the neighborhood of 5.5 on the 10-point scale). If most parties are diffuse on issue k and thus have mean scores in the center of the scale, this induces the appearance of low polarization. Because our measure of polarization taps between-party issue disagreement *as well as* levels of certainty about the parties' positions in the system, we also refer to it with a less suggestive term as the *spread* of the parties in the policy space. Table 5 depicts the levels of spread/polarization in Russia, Bulgaria, and the three Central European countries.

Because of the dual mathematical meaning of our measure of polarization or spread, there should be a *mathematical bias that issues on which parties are highly diffuse (table 2) show little polarization.* As a counter-factual, a positive linkage between salience and polarization may be suppressed, if parties are also internally highly diffuse on the most

salient issues.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

The spread of Russian parties is highest on agriculture (VAR 40) and economic liberalization strategies (VAR 31, 46). It is also very substantial on two of the other economic issues (VAR 30, 33), but less so on the micro-economics of privatization (VAR 32). Thus, the most salient issues do show very high polarization, *although* we also know that the high level of diffuseness on these issues (table 2) must depress their values of polarization below what we might expect, were the parties able to project a more clear-cut image. Other issues that display moderately high levels of spread among the parties revolve around national autonomy (VAR 34, VAR 48) and questions of crime and values (VAR 41, 47, and 53).

Despite the fact that Russian parties are highly diffuse on the most salient economic issues, our data show a moderate positive correlation between polarization/spread and issue salience ($r = +.43$). This association contrasts with what we find in Bulgaria ($r = -.17$) where the diffuseness of the parties on the most salient economic issues depresses an equivalent positive correlation,¹⁴ and particularly within the CEU countries, where party systems are indeed somewhat less polarized on the most salient economic issues ($r = -.29$), *although* their programmatic diffuseness on highly salient economic issues (such as VAR 30, 31, and 33) is comparatively low (see table 2). Compared to the other countries, the Russian data are even more impressive, if we remove two outliers, environmental policy (VAR 42) and the protection of the Russians in the near abroad (VAR 54). These are valence issue on which all parties claim to be in the same spatial region on the issue (rather reluctant to endorse environmental concerns, but moderately to strongly in favor of protecting Russians in the near abroad). Without these items, the relationship between spread/polarization and issue salience is $+.64$.

Our data thus provide modest evidence that in Russia parties tend to be more polarized on the most important issues, whereas in the Central European countries, there is a reverse tendency of more consensus among the parties on the most important political issues.¹⁵ In our theoretical sketch, we have suggested that in democratic polities following patrimonial communism there is more issue polarization between different party camps, no matter how diffuse the relevant parties may be internally.

So far, we have assumed that programmatic diffuseness of parties' placement on the issues reflects the uncertainty of their true positions on these issues. At the aggregate level of analysis of measuring diffuseness of all parties in a system, there is an alternative interpretation that we must address in order to check the validity of our measure, the presence of *systematic asymmetry* in the assessment of a party's position. Imagine politicians of party A placing their own party at 2.0 on the 10-point scale, whereas their competitors place them in the neighborhood of 7.0. Our gross measure of diffuseness

¹⁴ In table 2, the average programmatic diffuseness for the Bulgarian economic issues is not much higher than for the non-economic issues, but this includes agriculture, an issue that is not as salient as that of other economic issues in that country and also shows less salience.

¹⁵ Desaggregating the three countries, the negative tendency exists everywhere, but it is most pronounced in Hungary ($r = -.47$). After the Hungarian negotiated transition, parties find economics most important, but there is comparatively little disagreement between them on what needs to be done. See Kitschelt et al. (1997: table 5-5).

then would show low programmatic crystallization, just as it would if politicians belonging to party A as well as those belonging to its competitors had assigned party A values of 2 or 7 randomly. But these two situations are very different. Where "insiders" give their own party a profoundly different, but coherent policy score than "outsiders," we have a configuration of *valence competition*. In that case, many politicians sense the electorate is on one side of the issue, yet they dispute how close each party gets to that valued position. They always try to project an image of their own party that gets it relatively closer to the preferred position of the voters than the competing parties would admit.

For example, in East Central Europe there is a tendency of *all* parties to see themselves as more sympathetic to market liberalization than their competitors admit. Conversely, in Russia, as we will see below, all parties have a tendency to see themselves as more reluctant to let inefficient state companies go bankrupt as their competitors attribute to them.

The distinction between "spatial" and "valence" issues, as measured by systematic asymmetries, is not a categorical one, but a continuum, depending on how much the gap between insider and outsider assessments contributes to the appearance of each party's programmatic diffuseness. At the systemic level, we can test for the existence of systematic asymmetries by regressing the position assigned to each party *j* on issue *k* on (1) the party label of the evaluated party, (2) the party membership of the judge and (3) the *interaction term* between the evaluated party label and the judge's party. Since our independent variables are nominally scaled, we employ an ANOVA routine designed for this measurement level. *The percentage of variance explained by the interaction term, compared to an equation that does not contain the interaction term, indicates the level of systematic asymmetry and valence competition.*

Of course, valence competition not necessarily expresses itself in systematic asymmetry. It is also possible that politicians from both insiders and outsiders place the parties on the "right" side of the issue, but then dispute how competently they pursue the favored policies. This sort of valence competition, however, does not cause problems for our gross measure of programmatic diffuseness. Systematic asymmetries are a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the presence of some measure of valence competition.

Table 6 reports the percentage of variance in parties' position on the issues accounted for by systematic asymmetries. In Russia, the interaction term that signals systematic asymmetries is statistically significant if the explained variance is about five percent or more. Table 6 also provides comparison scores for East Central Europe. In this case, we have to disaggregate the Central European countries and report Hungary separately. In Hungary, the negotiated transition led to a greater convergence of parties around support for liberal market democracy than elsewhere which makes valence competition through systematic asymmetries more likely. The results show that, overall, in Russia systematic asymmetry is not much of a problem. The variance the interaction term explains is generally low. As a consequence, systematic asymmetries cannot explain cross-nationally why Russian parties are programmatic so much more diffuse than their CEU counterparts. Nor can systematic asymmetries explain the variance of programmatic diffuseness *within* Russia. Hence our rough systemic index of programmatic diffuseness (table 2) indeed measures uncertainty about the parties' programs much more than insider/outsider differentials. Precisely because the parties are so far apart on the critical issues, they cannot sincerely dispute their respective positions, even if these positions are diffuse.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Nevertheless, there are some interesting parallels to the other countries revealed by the measure of systematic asymmetries. Everywhere, the issue of environmental protection has aspects of valence competition. Because politicians feel that voters endorse the concept, they place their own parties in a position slightly more favorable to environmental protection than politicians from other parties would grant them. Nevertheless, in Russia this is only a slight tendency (9 percent explained variance), and from a low baseline of sympathy with environmental concerns. On the 10-point scale, with 10 indicating the most pro-environmental position, no party receives an overall average score of more than 5.7, the average party scores 5.01, and the average boost members of each party give to their own party, compared to how politicians from other parties see that focal party, is only 1.61. In Central Europe, valence competition on environmental issues is much fiercer (16 and 24 percent explained variance through systematic asymmetries).

Valence competition with systematic asymmetries play a role in Russia also on enforcing moral standards in the media (VAR 43) and social protection/health care (VAR 30). Parties see themselves as slightly less willing to call for private health insurance than their competitors attribute to them and all parties are more eager to enforce moral standards. In a similar vein, *all* parties claim to care more about unemployment (VAR 33) than their competitors would grant them.

It is interesting on which issues there is no substantial valence competition, although the parties do not compete spatially, as is indicated by a convergence of their position, measured as low spread/polarization (table 5). These issues include the protection of Russians in the near abroad (VAR 54). On the 10-point scale, with 1 being most concerned with Russians in the near abroad, all parties score in a narrow range between 2.9 and 5.0. There is also little disagreement between the parties about each others' positions on child care/women (VAR 37) and Russian as official language of school instruction (VAR 45). Both issues do not only lack salience, but all parties place themselves and their competitors close to the center of the scale, with the LDPR receiving the comparatively most pro-Russian value of 6.7.

Our analysis has focused on the Russian party system, as a whole, compared to that of the four East Central European countries. Our results show that, at the systemic level, Russian parties are substantially more diffuse in their programmatic crystallization than their counterparts in Central Europe. Bulgaria is situated between Russia and the CEU countries. As our next analytical step, let us disaggregate our analysis to that of individual parties. Is it possible that Russia has a higher level of programmatic diffuseness than other post-communist countries only because one or two smaller parties are extremely unsettled, while everyone else has equally high programmatic coherence as their East Central European counterparts?

For the individual party analysis, we reconceptualize two of our four variables, diffuseness and systematic asymmetries. Our measure of issue salience is already geared to respondents of individual parties and table 4 reported relevant evidence. The concept of polarization is of inherently systemic interest only.

We measure programmatic diffuseness by the standard deviation of party j 's position on issue k as measured by the *scores of only those judges i who belong to party j* . We thus get an idea of the "insider coherence" of a party's position. Where politicians attribute little salience to issues, insider incoherence simply means that the party does not formulate a

position on the issue. Where politicians belonging to a party j recognize the issue as salient, however, but nevertheless cannot agree on the position they ascribe to j , high incoherence implies *intra-party conflict*.

Table 7 reports the internal diffuseness of parties, as measured by their own politicians for our set of economic issues, national issues, multi-culturalism and two socio-cultural high salience issues, the environment and moral restraint on the mass media. The table speaks volumes, but we have to confine ourselves to some highlights. As a general remark, the internal heterogeneity of own members' party issue ratings is substantially *greater* than the diffuseness that emerges from the judgment of politicians belonging to competing parties. Those close-up to a party appear to agree less what the party is all about than distant observers who are not involved in the party's internal debates.

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

First, examining the average internal diffuseness scores for the eight parties reveals that the parties of reform tend to be the programmatically most coherent parties, even though their level of coherence still stays far behind that of liberal parties reached in East Central Europe (Kitschelt et al. 1997: chapter 5). The average diffuseness for all fourteen issues over all eight parties is 2.34. Relative to this average, Our Home is Russia (average 1.96) and Russia's choice (average 1.98) are the most coherent parties. Yabloko follows at some distance (average 2.27). Surprisingly, Lebed's nascent party shows extraordinary coherence on the economic issues (average 1.62) and gives it a comparatively high average programmatic coherence (2.02), although the party has not been around long. The reason may be that Lebed's politicians assume the mantle of centrism and have taken "centrist" positions on the economic issue scales as their focal point. Whether this coherence survives once the party is tested in difficult policy decisions remains to be seen.

The parties of "anti-reform" are generally much less programmatically coherent than the parties of reform. On a general level, this may be a consequence of the objective absence of a coherent vision of political-economic development other than the liberal-democratic program. The core opposition party, the KPRF, is still relatively united on economic issues where it takes defensive positions to protect the status quo. But the party leadership's efforts to take on the patriotic and culturally parochial Russian mantle appears to yield a great deal of internal party strain, as is evidenced by the high division on the issues of Russia's foreign defense orientation (VAR 52) as well as the protection of Russians in the near abroad. Even more so, the KPRF respondents agonize over what position the party should take on issues of multiculturalism.

The other anti-reform parties are particularly divided on economic issues. Above all, this applies to the Agrarians who appear to descend into utter programmatic chaos when faced with questions such as the privatization strategy (VAR 32), reform of agriculture (VAR 40) and defining the general philosophy of the party vis-a-vis the market/planned economy alternatives (VAR 46). To a lesser extent, a similar confusion characterizes the Women of Russia. Moreover, in both "soft" opposition parties, there is a great deal of dissensus over the NATO question (VAR 52). The parties' parliamentary oscillation between hardline opposition to the Yeltsin government and sporadic compromises with the reform camp shows up in considerable internal conflict.

The party with the greatest internal heterogeneity, however, is clearly Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party. On some

economic questions, the party appears all but incapable of defining a central tendency (especially privatization strategies/VAR 32 and the market/planned economy balance/VAR 46). What is worse, particularly on the questions of "national" identity, the party has next to no internal programmatic profile. The diffuseness value of 3.97 on the question of protection of Russians in the near-abroad is the lowest value of programmatic crystallization we have found in any Russian party on any issue. Also on multi-culturalism and the socio-cultural questions, the party is internally divided. These results suggest that the binding "cement" of the motley coalition that rallies behind the flag of the LPDR is really its flamboyant leader Zhirinovsky. Whatever the positions are he projects in public, they are not widely shared among his following. The LPDR is a typical "charismatic" party where bonds among contributors are based on the personality of the leader, not on the identity of the party program or on clientelist selective benefits that accrue to the followers. The results on the LPDR show the poverty of nationalist appeals in post-communist politics. They are incapable of providing answers to the pressing problems of political-economic reform. Resorting to nationalist-patriotic slogans, whether by Zhirinovsky or Zhuganov, appear as simple cop-outs in the light of our data that are likely to backfire by fuelling intra-party dissension.

Our second reconceptualized party-level variable is that of systematic asymmetries. We measure systematic asymmetries as the difference between the value members of party *j* assign to their own party on the issue *k* ("insider judgment") and members of all other parties attribute to it on the same issue ("outsider judgment"). Average insider/outsider differences of equal or greater than 1.2 units on our 10-point scale typically correspond to significant systematic asymmetries in our party system analysis. According to table 6, Russian parties show most asymmetry on the question of environmental protection (VAR 42), moral standards in the mass media (VAR 43), public health insurance (VAR 30), state enterprise (VAR 31), and fighting unemployment (VAR 33). This is also confirmed by our individual party analysis.

Table 8 provides the differentials between insider and outsider judgments on these five policy issues. Almost everyone wants to appear as more social protectionist on health care as competitors admit. This tendency is particularly pronounced for the "party of government" opponents identify more with a market-liberal stance than its own politicians, but also for the nationalist parties led by Zhirinovsky and Lebed. Even Yabloko's politicians try to back-pedal from a highly liberal image and embrace more social protection. A similar tendency is visible on the other two economics related issues. Yabloko, NDR, LPDR, and Lebed affiliated politicians distance themselves from the judgment of their competitors who perceive these four parties as more market liberal than their own politicians would admit. On state enterprise and fighting unemployment, also *Women of Russia* politicians wish to project a highly social-protectionist image. Only DVR politicians confirm the judgment that they are hardline market liberal.

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

On environmental protection and enforcement of morality we obtain the familiar result we already reported earlier. With regard to the latter, a contrast to East Central Europe stands out. In East Central Europe, tolerance is the valence position and politicians scramble to appear more libertarian than their competitors would grant them, whereas moral

rigidity is the valence position in Russia. Thus, starkly put, whereas in East Central Europe valence competition revolves around politicians being anxious not to be seen as intervening in the freedom of the mass media, while their competitors suspect them of anti-liberal intentions, in Russia politicians have a tendency to outbid each other in eagerness to put moral restraints on the mass media, while their competitors accuse them of moral laxity.

We can now put our analysis of internal party diffuseness/conflict together with the data on systematic asymmetries. Where parties are internally coherent and not subject to asymmetric judgments of their position, they engage in *spatial competition*. Each party knows where it stands on the issues and it does not dispute the positions of its competitors. Where parties are internally coherent, but subject to asymmetric judgments, they are involved in a situation of *valence competition*. Internally they agree on certain positions, but competitors challenge this self-image. Where internal diffuseness is high, but asymmetries low, *internal conflict* is the signal the party sends to the electorate. Where both internal diffuseness is great and asymmetries prevail, it is very difficult for voters to decode any signal from a political party. The party projects a *chaotic appearance* so that voters who engage in some rational deliberation of their choice might find it extremely unattractive to support that party. Whatever support such parties rally is likely to be based on non-programmatic bases, such as clientelist linkages or charismatic leader-follower relationships.

Figure 1 reports the mean internal cohesiveness and external asymmetries parties experience on three of the issue packages we have distinguished in tables 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. Economic issues and national issues have the greatest average salience (positions marked by subscripts E and N for each party's position). We have thrown in multi-cultural issues (subscript MC) because we will show in the next section that they provide the only issue bundle that cross-cuts the most important competitive divide in Russian politics. By contrast, the socio-cultural value issues do not constitute independent dimensions of competition and we therefore ignore them here. In the figure, for each party the subscript indicates the issue areas economics (E), nation (N) and multi-culturalism (MC). The vertical line going through the figure indicates the mean value of internal diffuseness in the Russian parties (2.30). This is a great deal higher than in the East Central European countries where it is only 1.79, even once Bulgaria is included. The horizontal line through the figure represents the mean asymmetry of 1.03, only slightly greater than in the four East Central European countries (.89).

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The three parties that show the greatest internal coherence and the least external asymmetries and thus are relatively best equipped to engage in spatial programmatic competition are the three reform oriented parties, the DVR, Yabloko and the NDR as party of power (hatched triangles). This, of course, applies only in comparison to other Russian parties. By East Central European standards, also the most coherent Russian parties are highly diffuse. Comparing the different policy issues, Yabloko has rather substantial internal diffuseness on economics, suggesting that different currents fight over how market-liberal this parties really wants to be in its strategic stance.

The "anti-reform" parties in Russia, the communists, agrarians, and women, are comparatively less coherent and more subject to systematic asymmetries than the liberal parties. In the case of the KPRF, there is a trade-off. On economics, there is more challenge of its economic policy positions from the outside, while on national and multi-cultural issues the

party is mostly divided internally. the reverse applies to Women of Russia and a mixed picture is displayed by the Agrarians. The figure shows clearly that, overall, the "national" parties have the greatest difficulties to define their niche in programmatic terms. Maybe for this reason, they are highly dependent on the personality of a particular leader. In Lebed's case, there is considerable internal coherence on the most salient issues, but the party's position is challenged by its competitors (high asymmetries). Conversely, in Zhirinovskiy's case, outside observers tend to agree with the party's central tendency, except on economics where outsiders see the party as more market-liberal than its followers see themselves, but the party is terribly confused internally. Similar configurations characterize national-charismatic parties in other post-communist countries, such as the Hungarian Smallholders' Party under Jozsef Torgyan or the short-lived parliamentary instrument created by Lech Walesa, the Non-partisan Bloc for Reform in Poland.

Although our investigation identifies considerable divergence in the level of programmatic structuration among Russian parties, even the most structured parties are much less crystallized than their East Central European counterparts. Our analysis shows that, as of 1997, the process of Russian party formation has not yielded a level of programmatic crystallization equivalent to East Central Europe. This divergence cannot be due to the fact that Russian parties had insufficient time to learn the techniques of party competition, accountability, and responsiveness. We collected our data in East Central Europe in 1994, about four years after the democratic founding elections in those countries. If we count the 1993 Duma elections as the first more or less free founding elections in Russia, our politicians' survey of March 1997 took place only slightly less than four years later.

Our data suggest that the interaction between political-economic legacy and the design of the new democratic institutions in Russia make it difficult to form programmatically coherent parties that link national and local politicians. This reinforces the dominance of an independently elected presidential executive with semi-dictatorial powers.¹⁶

4. Political Alignments: A Dominant Reinforcing Divide

In spite of the high diffuseness of Russian parties, can we extract "central tendencies" identifying programmatic political divides between the contenders from the cacophony of voices that fill the political space in the arena of party competition? We proposed above that in contrast to democratic polities that emerge from bureaucratic-authoritarian or national accommodative communism, after patrimonial communism a single dimension of competition is likely to emerge on which economic and non-economic issues reinforce each other. Polities succeeding patrimonial communism have a larger

¹⁶ Our results are consistent with Michael McFaul's (1997) recent *New York Times* Op-ed piece where he observes that coherent opposition to Yeltsin's legislative agenda has almost vanished. Because parties do not compete on programs in the Russian institutional setting, the power of the opposition to Yeltsin has imploded because parties cannot coordinate around an alternative program in the legislature.

and more powerful status-quo oriented camp of communist stalwarts and a weaker, more diffuse reform movement. We now test this hypothesis by means of a varimax-rotated factor analysis of the parties' issue positions on the 16 policy issues in our survey. For the time being, we bracket our three more abstract ideological scales (VAR 46, 48, 49) and the left-right placement of the parties (VAR 50).¹⁷ Table 9 reports the factor loadings on each of the three factors that emerge from our factor analysis with eigenvalues exceeding 1.0.

TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

The analysis produces a very strong first factor that explains almost 40 percent of the variance (eigenvalue: 6.29). It pits those parties that call for more social protection (VAR 30: public health care), more support of ailing state companies (VAR 31), more policy priority for unemployment (VAR 33), more restrictive treatment of foreign investors (VAR 34), and more protection of agriculture (VAR 40) against market liberalizers who are more inclined to privatize industry and agriculture, even if bankruptcies result from it, to make individuals more responsible for their own social safety, to fight inflation, and to welcome foreign investors. Also micro-economic questions concerning the mode of privatization relate to this dimension, but with more feeble factor loading (VAR 32). Yet it is not just economics that loads strongly on factor I, but also several cultural and national questions. Social protectionists call for the death penalty on certain crimes (VAR 41) and more restraints on the media (VAR 43). Moreover, they are less inclined to collaborate with the Western alliance system (VAR 52). Social protectionists are also slightly more vigorous in intervening in defense of Russians in the near-abroad (VAR 54), but this variable does not load strongly on *any* factor because it is a valence issue that generates little variance across the parties.

The second factor is much less powerful (14 percent explained variance, eigenvalue 2.31) and loads most distinctly on the environment (VAR 42), child care/women's role in the economy (VAR 37), cooperation with the West (VAR 52), speed of privatization (VAR 32), and the compatibility of Russian values with economic reform. It shows those with "Western" values who endorse environmental protection also to favor *less* child care, *more* cooperation with the West, *speedier* privatization (rather than one that emphasizes concerns of distributive justice) and *more* compatibility between reforms and Russian values.

The third factor has a rather marginal explanatory value (9.4 percent, eigenvalue 1.51) and loads strongly only on the low-salience multi-cultural issues equal treatment of non-Russian minorities in the Russian federation (VAR 36) and the use of other languages than Russian in schools and public life (VAR 45). Virtually none of the other issues loads on factor III.

The factor analysis thus obtains a strong factor with mutually reinforcing economic and socio-cultural issues and a second "cross-cutting" factor with Western life style versus Russian cultural and national concerns. Disregarding the very weak single-issue multi-cultural tolerance factor, does this imply that Russian politics is characterized by cross-cutting political divisions and dimensions of competition? We can answer this question by examining the mean factor scores our

¹⁷ Inclusion of the three general scales does not add any new information. We scrutinize politicians left-right placement of the parties in a separate analysis below.

politicians assign to the competing parties (table 10). Comparing party mean scores on factor I and II, we find a very high correlation ($r = -.85$). The more social protectionist and morally restrictive and traditional a party is (factor I), the less it wishes to cooperate with the West and the less it attributes priority to environmental protection or wishes to speed up privatization (factor II). Figure 2 reveals that Lebed's nascent party is the only slight outlier to an almost deterministic relation between the positions respondents ascribe to the parties on factors I and II. Were it not for Lebed's followers being rated as slightly more market liberal than its national appeal on factor II would lead us to predict, the correlation between the remaining seven parties' positions on the two factors would be almost perfect ($r = -.96$).

FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

In other words, *our analysis reveals that Russian party competition approximates uni-dimensionality*. In contrast to countries emerging from bureaucratic-authoritarian and national-accommodative communism, Russia does not have a socio-cultural and national dimension that cross-cuts economics. *Salient economic, national, and socio-cultural issues all reinforce each other on a single dimension of party competition*. A similar tendency can be observed in the other patrimonial communist country on which we have data, Bulgaria (Kitschelt et al., 1997). Where high economic policy polarization divides post-communist society into two camps, like magnets the dominant axis of competition attracts salient socio-cultural and national issues that reinforce the divide.

More specifically, our data provide no evidence that the LDPR situates itself on a cross-cutting "national" economic dimension and combines an extreme nationalist with a centrist economic position. By the account of its own politicians, the party is in fact more social-protectionist than politicians belonging to competing parties are willing to admit (table 8). The LDPR does have weak outlier positions on the non-salient multi-cultural issues that constitute the third factor, but even in the reckoning of LDPR politicians, these issues are irrelevant (see table 4).

Before we move on, let us return to table 10 one more time and examine some general parameters that emerge from our calculations. First, consider the standard deviations of the each party's mean positions. These standard deviations are *much* lower on the dominant first dimension than the subsidiary factors. Since the standard deviation is also a measure of diffuseness (like that reported in table 2), it is not surprising that Russia's diffuseness on factor I is still very substantially greater than that emerging in equivalent factor analyses for the Central European countries.¹⁸ Moreover, the polarization of parties' mean scores is much greater on factor I, as measured by the distance of the extreme opposite parties' factor scores (2.17 on factor I, but 1.44 or less on the other factors). Finally, *all* the most salient issues, save environmental protection and the valence issue of protection of Russians in the near-abroad, load on factor I. The average salience rating of the five highest loading issues greater than +/- .50 on factor I is 8.40, 7.75 on factor II, but only 6.70 on the two residual issues defining factor III.

¹⁸ Of course, it is somewhat hazardous to compare such standard deviations directly, given that some of the issue items, though not the scale metrics, vary cross-nationally. But the differences are stark: Whereas average standard deviations of parties' mean positions on the first factor are .67 in Russia, they are .41 in Hungary, .46 in the Czech Republic, and .53 in Poland.

We have conduct one final test for asymmetries by running the factor analysis for respondents from each party separately. Do different parties' politicians identify dramatically distinct spaces of party competition? We could find no such evidence. In general, running the factor analyses for individual parties' politicians (and thus reducing the N of respondents from 376 to 45-50!), generated similar results as the general factor analysis with very few exceptions confined to the content to minor ancillary second or third factors. Also when desaggregating our data set by politicians from each of the seventeen regions, we could not identify dramatically varying perceptions of the space of party competition. *In as much as Russia has a programmatically structured system of party competition at all, this competition reveals a national party system, not one differentiated by regions.*

By constructing "unobserved" variables, factor analyses may appear like magic with little grounding in the actors' real political experience. To show the empirical relevance of our analysis, let us return to the original variables and select those that load highly on the different factors. In table 11, we have combined the parties' mean scores on the issues of public health care (VAR 30) and extent of privatization (VAR 31) to represent the economic issues, the death penalty (VAR 41) and mass media restraint (VAR 43) scores to represent socio-cultural issues, general orientation toward international cooperation (VAR 48) and collaboration with the Western alliance system (VAR 52) to represent national issues, as well as tolerance of Russian minority expression (VAR 36) and non-Russian language in public institutions (VAR 45) to represent multi-cultural issues. Furthermore, we report the parties' mean left-right placement. The table also provides a correlation matrix between the parties' scores on each index, showing that parties' mean economic, national, and socio-cultural positions are interrelated at extremely high levels (.91 to .98, never mind the sign because the meaning of the endpoints varies). Only multi-culturalism tends to cut across this dominant divide, although those parties in favor tend to be more economically liberal ($r = +.36$) and socio-culturally libertarian ($r = +.55$) and less nationalist ($r = -.60$). Our data show once more the uni-dimensional nature of Russian party competition.

TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE

Table 11 shows that at the aggregate level of comparing parties' mean positions, the meaning of "left" and "right" is closely linked to the syndrome of economic, national, and socio-cultural orientations we have identified in Russian politics. These mean values, of course, gloss over the considerable diffuseness inside political parties we can capture by reverting to the individual level analysis of our respondents. In a regression reported in table 12, we therefore employ the left-right placements of the parties by our 376 respondents as the dependent variable (i.e., 8 x 376 party placements) and representative variables from each of the four factors identified in table 9 as the independent variables to predict such placements. We then repeat the exercise with the three factors we identified in our analysis.

TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE

The economic variable "public health care" in the first equation and the economic-socio-cultural factor I in the second equation are by far the most powerful predictors of parties' left-right placements. But also environmental protection, as marker for the second "Western" factor, as well as that factor itself, leave a substantial mark on left-right placements. Tolerance toward non-Russian minorities among the multi-cultural variables has a modest additional impact on left-right

placements. Market-liberal, cosmopolitan, pro-environmental and multi-culturally tolerant parties are "on the right," whereas social-protectionist, nationalist, less environmental and culturally intolerant parties are "on the left."

By contrast, in the Central European countries Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, politicians identify nationalism and cultural intolerance with the "right" (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1997: table 7-5). Moreover, the explained variance of the equations in those countries is much greater than in Russia, indicating much less programmatic diffuseness and much more ideological constraint between parties' substantive policy positions and their left-right placements.¹⁹ For one final time, our data confirm the difference between party competition in Russia and in the Central European post-communist countries.

5. Conclusion

First, we developed a theoretical argument in this paper hypothesizing that programmatic party formation in Russia is likely to be more diffuse than in other East Central European countries. Both legacies of communist political-economic institutions as well as the new democratic institutions themselves contribute to this development. Our empirical evidence bears out this expectation. Democratic polities following patrimonial communism, like Bulgaria and Russia, have more diffuse party formation than their Central European counterparts emerging from bureaucratic-authoritarian or national accommodative communism. Russia, in turn, has more diffuse party formation than Bulgaria, because on top of institutional legacies, Russia has also new democratic institutions that discourage programmatically coherent party formation. Strong executive and legislative presidential power and an electoral system that disconnects national decision making and local candidate competition undercut programmatic party formation (cf. Ordeshook 1995; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1997). We should remind readers that our methodology has biased our findings *against* our hypothesis, because we have no empirical technique to capture the policy position of the myriad of small parties and individual candidates in legislative elections. The parties included in our survey commanded 326 out of 450 seats in the December 1995 Duma, going up to 345 out of 450 seats by February 1996. The remaining 105 Duma members are unaffiliated with any of the parties our survey was able to capture.

Second, we argued that after patrimonial communism chances are great for the emergence of a mutually reinforcing economic, national, and socio-cultural political divide among the parties in the competitive arena. Whatever programmatic crystallization can be observed thus leads to the formation of mutually reinforcing political conflict alignments, contributing to a single over-riding competitive dimension. This argument is consistent with McFaul's (1996) interpretation of Russian party politics, although we do not subscribe to his qualification of the current Russian era as a

¹⁹ The explained variance in the three Central European countries ranges from .57 to .75. Even in Bulgaria, it is .55 and thus higher than in Russia. But in Bulgaria, four factors are needed to obtain this comparatively strong result.

revolutionary situation. Contrary to McFaul, our data provide little evidence of a vanishing center in Russian politics. Russian politics is still divided into an anti-reformist "left," a pro-reformist "right," and a "center" that is made up of a changing cast of parties. As figure 2 shows, Lebed's party is the latest entry into the center, but also *Women of Russia* come close to that position. Not by accident, ecological evidence suggests that in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections, Lebed could draw on former supporters of Zhirinovskiy, but also supporters of other nationalists, reformers, and small parties (Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Sobyenin 1997).

Our research has been preoccupied with aspects of the *procedural quality of Russian democracy*. By focusing on political elites, we have ignored questions concerning the accountability and responsiveness of politicians to their voters. This would presuppose a comparison of elite and electoral constituency positions.²⁰ Moreover, we have refrained from theorizing about or empirically testing the implications of the procedural quality of democracy for the policy outputs and outcomes of the Russian democratic polity. In-depth studies of the process of party competition and of democratic choice more generally in post-communist countries, however, are an indispensable precondition to address that much larger agenda.

²⁰ Miller et al.'s (1997) work suggests a rather robust linkage between the electorates' and the parties' mean positions. Voters have a general sense of where parties stand, even though the parties' positions are internally divisive and uncertain.

TABLE 1: PARTY SCORES AND PROGRAMMATIC DIFFUSENESS.
A FICTITIOUS EXAMPLE

| MAXIMUM EVALUATORS | EVALUATED PARTIES | | | | | | E RANDOM SCORES | VARIANCE | F |
|------------------------|-------------------|------|------|------|---|------|-----------------------|----------|---|
| | A | B | C | D | | | | | |
| E-1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | | |
| E-2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | |
| E-3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 10 | | |
| E-4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | 6 | 1 | | |
| E-5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | | 8 | 10 | | |
| E-6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 | | 10 | 1 | | |
| MEAN SCORES | 3.5 | | 3.5 | 3.5 | | 5.17 | 5.5 | | |
| STANDARD DEVIATIONS | 1.52 | 1.76 | 2.17 | 2.51 | | 3.49 | 4.93 | | |

TABLE 2: PROGRAMMATIC DIFFUSENESS OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES (AVERAGES FOR ALL PARTIES/COUNTRY)

| | RUSSIA | | BULGARIA | CENTRAL EUROPE |
|--|--------|------|--|----------------|
| | MEAN | S.D. | | |
| A. ECONOMIC ISSUES | | | | |
| VAR 30 Health/social security | 2.06 | .17 | 1.85 | 1.52 |
| VAR 31 Privatization, scope | 1.98 | .20 | 2.06 | 1.68 |
| VAR 32 Speed/Justice of privatization | 2.27 | .29 | 2.34 | 1.82 |
| VAR 33 Fighting inflation or unemployment | 2.02 | .13 | 1.92 | 1.64 |
| VAR 40 Privatization of collective farms | 2.00 | .31 | 1.69 | 1.51 |
| VAR 46 Markets or planned economy | 1.95 | .14 | 1.83 | 1.55 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| MEAN, ECONOMIC ISSUES | 2.05 | | 1.95 | 1.62 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| B. NATIONAL AUTONOMY | | | | |
| VAR 34 Foreign direct investment | 2.06 | .20 | 1.98 | 1.69 |
| VAR 48 National or cosmopolitan orientation | 1.94 | .14 | 1.87 | 1.57 |
| VAR 52 Participation in the Western alliance system | 2.06 | .11 | 1.83 | n.a. |
| | | | BUL: TURKEY AS FOREIGN ALLY | |
| VAR 54 Protection of Russians in the near-abroad | 2.05 | .24 | n.a. | 1.74 |
| | | | HUNGARIANS ABROAD | |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| MEAN, NATIONAL ISSUES | 2.03 | | 1.89 | 1.63 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| C. MULTI-CULTURAL ISSUES | | | | |
| VAR 36 Minority Treatment in the Russian federation | 2.05 | .34 | n.a. | 1.65 |
| | | | CEU: TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS | |
| VAR 45 Non-Russian language in schools and public life | 1.90 | .36 | 1.81 | n.a. |
| | | | BUL: TURKISH IN SCHOOL | |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| D. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES | | | | |
| VAR 37 Public child care and women's employment | 2.24 | .20 | 2.08 | 1.74 |
| VAR 42 Environmental protection versus economic growth | 1.99 | .19 | 1.57 | 1.54 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| E. SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES | | | | |
| VAR 39 Church influence on schools [Bulgaria: Orthodox church] | 1.97 | .23 | 1.71 | 1.38 |
| VAR 41 Appropriateness of the death penalty | 2.12 | .22 | n.a. | n.a. |
| VAR 43 Moral censorship in the mass media | 2.19 | .20 | 2.03 | 1.75 |
| VAR 47 Individualism versus traditionalism | 1.96 | .28 | 2.12 | 1.65 |
| VAR 53 Compatibility of Russian values and political reform | 2.03 | .23 | 1.92 | 1.68 |
| | | | BUL + CEU: AUTHORITY OR INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AS VALUES IN SCHOOL (VAR 41) | |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| MEAN, CULTURAL ISSUES | 2.05 | | 1.95 | 1.62 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| VAR 50 Left-Right Placement | 2.07 | .29 | 1.80 | 1.58 |

TABLE 3: SALIENCE OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES (AVERAGES FOR ALL PARTIES/COUNTRY)

| | RUSSIA | | BULGARIA | | CENTRAL EUROPE | |
|--|---|------|----------|---------|----------------|---------|
| | MEAN | S.D. | Z-SCORE | Z-SCORE | Z-SCORE | Z-SCORE |
| A. ECONOMIC ISSUES | | | | | | |
| VAR 30 Health/social security | 8.86 | .69 | +1.55 | | +1.13 | +1.13 |
| VAR 31 Privatization, scope | 7.49 | .91 | -.23 | | +1.13 | +1.13 |
| VAR 32 Speed/Justice of privatization | 7.49 | .73 | +.22 | | +1.13 | +1.13 |
| VAR 33 Fighting inflation or unemployment | 8.35 | .53 | +.88 | | +1.13 | +1.13 |
| VAR 40 Privatization of collective farms | 8.61 | .78 | +1.22 | | +1.16 | +1.16 |
| VAR 46 Markets or planned economy | NO SALIENCE VALUES ON GENERAL IDEOLOGY SCALES | | | | | |
| MEAN, ECONOMICS | 8.23 | | +1.73 | | +1.94 | +1.87 |
| B. NATIONAL AUTONOMY | | | | | | |
| VAR 34 Foreign direct investment | 7.57 | .46 | -.13 | | -.48 | -.18 |
| VAR 48 National or cosmopolitan orientation | NO SALIENCE VALUES ON GENERAL IDEOLOGY SCALES | | | | | |
| VAR 52 Participation in the Western alliance system | 7.63 | .69 | -.05 | | -2.10 | n.a. |
| VAR 54 Protection of Russians in the near-abroad | 8.03 | .96 | +.47 | | n.a. | n.a. |
| C. MULTI-CULTURAL ISSUES | | | | | | |
| VAR 36 Minority Treatment in the Russian federation | 6.99 | .64 | -.88 | | n.a. | -2.23 |
| VAR 45 Non-Russian language in schools and public life | 6.41 | .59 | -1.64 | | -.81 | n.a. |
| D. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES | | | | | | |
| VAR 37 Public child care and women's employment | 7.39 | 1.02 | -.36 | | -1.77 | -.72 |
| VAR 42 Environmental protection versus economic growth | 8.22 | .44 | +.71 | | +1.16 | +1.16 |
| E. SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES | | | | | | |
| VAR 39 Church influence on schools [Bulgaria: Orthodox church] | 5.95 | .80 | -2.23 | | -.48 | -1.47 |
| VAR 41 Appropriateness of the death penalty | 7.39 | .87 | -.36 | | n.a. | n.a. |
| VAR 43 Moral censorship in the mass media | 8.33 | .65 | +.86 | | -.16 | -.16 |
| VAR 47 Individualism versus traditionalism | NO SALIENCE VALUES ON GENERAL IDEOLOGY SCALES | | | | | |
| VAR 53 Compatibility of Russian values and political reform | 7.68 | .95 | +.01 | | +1.16 | -.40 |
| BUL + CEU: AUTHORITY OR INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AS VALUES IN SCHOOL (VAR 41) | | | | | | |
| MEAN, CULTURAL ISSUES | 7.34 | | -.43 | | -.16 | -.94 |
| VAR 50 Left-Right Placement | NO SALIENCE VALUES ON GENERAL IDEOLOGY SCALES | | | | | |

TABLE 4: THE PARTIES' MOST AND LEAST IMPORTANT POLICY ISSUES

| | COMMUNIST PARTY (KPRF) (AGRO) | AGRARIANS (WOMEN) | WOMEN OF RUSSIA (DVR) | RUSSIA'S CHOICE | YABLOKO (LDPR) (NDR) | LIBERAL DEMOCRATS (NDR) | OUR HOME IS RUSSIA | LEBED |
|---------------------------|--|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|----------------|
| TOP FOUR ISSUES | | | | | | | | |
| # 1 | VAR 30: 9.91 | VAR 40: 9.75 | VAR 37: 9.21 | VAR 40: 8.85 | VAR 30: 8.89 | VAR 54: 9.57 | VAR 30: 8.15 | VAR 30: 9.00 |
| # 2 | VAR 43: 9.40 | VAR 30: 9.30 | VAR 30: 9.17 | VAR 31: 8.36 | VAR 33: 8.51 | VAR 40: 9.04 | VAR 33: 8.08 | VAR 32: 8.40 |
| # 3 | VAR 40: 9.36 | VAR 33: 9.00 | VAR 53: 8.81 | VAR 33: 8.34 | VAR 40: 8.34 | VAR 53: 8.87 | VAR 40: 8.08 | VAR 42: 8.00 |
| # 4 | VAR 32: 9.23 | VAR 42: 8.87 | VAR 42: 8.77 | VAR 42: 8.32 | VAR 42: 8.04 | VAR 52/30:8.83 | VAR 43: 8.00 | VAR 54: 8.00 |
| BOTTOM FOUR ISSUES | | | | | | | | |
| # 14 | VAR 34: 7.74 | VAR 32: 7.81 | VAR 52: 6.94 | VAR 54: 6.92 | VAR 53: 6.62 | VAR 42: 7.72 | VAR 36: 6.62 | VAR 36/37:6.80 |
| # 15 | VAR 45: 7.43 | VAR 37: 7.81 | VAR 31: 6.89 | VAR 45: 6.79 | VAR 36: 6.34 | VAR 39: 7.04 | VAR 37: 6.11 | VAR 53: 6.40 |
| # 16 | VAR 41: 7.13 | VAR 36: 6.77 | VAR 45: 6.85 | VAR 37: 6.51 | VAR 45: 6.02 | VAR 36: 6.49 | VAR 45: 5.94 | VAR 45: 5.60 |
| # 17 | VAR 39: 7.06 | VAR 39: 5.62 | VAR 39: 6.26 | VAR 39: 5.83 | VAR 39: 4.77 | VAR 45: 6.23 | VAR 39: 5.60 | VAR 39: 5.40 |

TABLE 5: POLARIZATION OVER THE POLITICAL ISSUES

| | RUSSIA | BULGARIA | CENTRAL EUROPE |
|--|--------|--|----------------|
| A. ECONOMIC ISSUES | | | |
| VAR 30 Health/social security | 2.06 | 1.15 | 1.62 |
| VAR 31 Privatization, scope | 2.26 | 2.0 | 1.88 |
| VAR 32 Speed/Justice of privatization | 1.55 | 1.25 | 1.94 |
| VAR 33 Fighting inflation or unemployment | 1.83 | 1.50 | 1.85 |
| VAR 40 Privatization of collective farms | 2.47 | 1.80 | 1.95 |
| VAR 46 Markets or planned economy | 2.17 | 1.80 | 1.97 |
| MEAN, ECONOMIC ISSUES | 2.06 | 1.58 | 1.89 |
| B. NATIONAL AUTONOMY | | | |
| VAR 34 Foreign direct investment | 2.11 | 1.75 | 2.25 |
| VAR 48 National or cosmopolitan orientation | 2.05 | .95 | 2.18 |
| VAR 52 Participation in the Western alliance system | 1.56 | 2.20 | n.a. |
| | | BUL: TURKEY AS FOREIGN ALLY | |
| VAR 54 Protection of Russians in the near abroad | .83 | n.a. | n.a. |
| MEAN, NATIONAL ISSUES | 1.64 | 1.35 | 2.21 |
| C. MULTI-CULTURAL ISSUES | | | |
| VAR 36 Minority Treatment in the Russian federation | .77 | n.a. | 1.37 |
| | | CEU: TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS | |
| VAR 45 Non-Russian language in schools and public life | 1.08 | 2.3 | n.a. |
| | | BUL: TURKISH IN SCHOOL | |
| D. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES | | | |
| VAR 37 Public child care and women's employment | .53 | .55 | 1.70 |
| VAR 42 Environmental protection versus economic growth | .70 | 1.0 | .57 |
| E. SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES | | | |
| VAR 39 Church influence on schools [Bulgaria: Orthodox church] | .99 | 1.15 | 2.83 |
| VAR 41 Appropriateness of the death penalty | 1.98 | n.a. | n.a. |
| VAR 43 Moral censorship in the mass media | 1.68 | 1.30 | 1.85 |
| VAR 47 Individualism versus traditionalism | 1.89 | 1.30 | 2.13 |
| VAR 53 Compatibility of Russian values and political reform | 2.03 | 1.25 | 1.88 |
| | | BUL + CEU: AUTHORITY OR INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AS VALUES IN SCHOOL (VAR 41) | |
| MEAN, CULTURAL ISSUES | 1.74 | 1.25 | 2.18 |
| VAR 50 Left-Right Placement | 2.07 | 2.25 | 2.40 |

TABLE 6: ASYMMETRIC JUDGMENTS OF THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

| | RUSSIA | BULGARIA | CENTRAL EUROPE CZ/POL HUN | | |
|--|---|----------|------------------------------|------|------|
| A. ECONOMIC ISSUES | | | | | |
| VAR 30 | Health/social security | 7 | 11 | 4.5 | 15 |
| VAR 31 | Privatization, scope | 4 | 6 | 5.5 | 7 |
| VAR 32 | Speed/Justice of privatization | 3 | 4 | 4 | 7 |
| VAR 33 | Fighting inflation or unemployment | 6 | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| VAR 40 | Privatization of collective farms | 3 | 5 | 4.5 | 9 |
| VAR 46 | Markets or planned economy | 3 | 3 | 5.5 | 22 |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| | MEAN, ECONOMIC ISSUES | 4.3 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 11.3 |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| B. NATIONAL AUTONOMY | | | | | |
| VAR 34 | Foreign direct investment | 3 | 6 | 4.5 | 13 |
| VAR 48 | National or cosmopolitan orientation | 2 | 10 | 5.5 | 7 |
| VAR 52 | Participation in the Western alliance system | 3 | 2 | n.a. | n.a. |
| VAR 54 | Protection of Russians in the near-abroad | 4 | n.a. | n.a. | 4 |
| BUL: TURKEY AS FOREIGN ALLY HUNGARIANS ABROAD | | | | | |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| | MEAN, NATIONAL ISSUES | 3 | 6 | 5 | 10 |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| C. MULTI-CULTURAL ISSUES | | | | | |
| VAR 36 | Minority Treatment in the Russian federation | 8 | n.a. | 9.5 | 5 |
| VAR 45 | Non-Russian language in school and public life | 3 | 2 | n.a. | n.a. |
| CEU: TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS BUL: TURKISH IN SCHOOL | | | | | |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| D. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES | | | | | |
| VAR 37 | Public child care and women's employment | 5 | 12 | 7 | 5 |
| VAR 42 | Environmental protection versus economic growth | 9 | 9 | 16 | 24 |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| D.SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES | | | | | |
| VAR 39 | Church influence on schools [Bulgaria: Orthodox church] | 6 | 19 | 3 | 3 |
| VAR 41 | Appropriateness of the death penalty | 3 | 6 | n.a. | n.a. |
| VAR 43 | Moral censorship in the mass media | 8 | 13 | 8 | 4 |
| VAR 47 | Individualism versus traditionalism | 5 | 11 | 8 | 2 |
| VAR 53 | Compatibility of Russian values and political reform | 3 | n.a. | 9.5 | 4 |
| BUL + CEU: AUTHORITY OR INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AS VALUES IN SCHOOL (VAR 41) | | | | | |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| | MEAN, CULTURAL ISSUES | 5 | 12 | 7.1 | 3 |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| VAR 50 | Left-Right Placement | 3 | 3 | 4.5 | 2 |
| <hr/> | | | | | |

TABLE 7: THE INTERNAL PROGRAMMATIC DIFFUSENESS OF THE PARTIES

| | ECONOMICS | NATIONALITY | MULTI-CULTURALISM | ENVIRONMENT MORALITY | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| KPRF | 30:1.80 31:1.33 32:3.21 | 33:1.96 40:1.66 46:2.18 | 34:2.10 48:2.29 | 52:3.18 54:3.03 | 36:3.42 45:3.37 | 42:2.48 43:1.76 |
| AVERAGE | 2.02 | | 2.65 | | 3.40 | ALL ISSUES: 2.41 |
| AGRARIANS | 30:2.25 31:2.00 32:3.59 | 33:2.14 40:2.86 46:2.87 | 34:2.60 48:3.09 | 52:3.39 54:2.54 | 36:2.03 45:2.09 | 42:2.90 43:2.52 |
| AVERAGE | 2.62 | | 2.91 | | 2.06 | ALL ISSUES: 2.64 |
| WOMEN OF RUSSIA | 30:2.77 31:2.77 32:2.60 | 33:2.25 40:2.44 46:2.07 | 34:2.27 48:2.14 | 52:2.85 54:2.08 | 36:1.94 45:2.45 | 42:2.08 43:2.81 |
| AVERAGE | 2.48 | | 2.39 | | 2.15 | ALL ISSUES: 2.43 |
| RUSSIA'S CHOICE | 30:2.25 31:2.48 32:1.67 | 33:2.10 40:2.44 46:1.80 | 34:2.08 48:2.15 | 52:1.72 54:2.08 | 36:1.80 45:2.45 | 42:2.17 43:2.64 |
| AVERAGE | 1.91 | | 2.01 | | 1.72 | ALL ISSUES: 1.98 |
| YABLOKO | 30:2.68 31:2.47 32:1.83 | 33:2.30 40:2.58 46:1.80 | 34:2.44 48:1.76 | 52:2.99 54:1.91 | 36:2.21 45:2.39 | 42:1.88 43:2.96 |
| AVERAGE | 2.35 | | 2.06 | | 2.30 | ALL ISSUES: 2.27 |
| LIBERAL DEMOCRATS | 30:2.23 31:2.40 32:3.24 | 33:2.30 40:2.06 46:3.06 | 34:2.44 48:3.32 | 52:2.99 54:3.97 | 36:2.87 45:2.97 | 42:2.58 43:2.72 |
| AVERAGE: | 2.55 | | 3.18 | | 2.92 | ALL ISSUES: 2.80 |
| OUR HOME IS RUSSIA | 30:1.94 31:2.01 32:2.56 | 33:2.23 40:1.92 46:1.28 | 34:2.03 48:1.51 | 52:1.97 54:1.75 | 36:1.86 45:2.49 | 42:1.82 43:1.97 |
| AVERAGE: | 2.01 | | 1.82 | | 2.18 | ALL ISSUES: 1.96 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------|-------------|---------|-------------|---------|-------------|-------------------------|
| LEBED | 30:1.54 | 33:1.60 | 34:2.19 | 52:2.55 | 36:2.07 | 42:2.63 |
| | 31:1.56 | 40:1.51 | 48:2.08 | 54:2.18 | 45:2.58 | 43:2.23 |
| | 32:2.42 | 46:1.09 | | | | |
| AVERAGE: | 1.62 | | 2.25 | | 2.33 | ALL ISSUES: 2.02 |

TABLE 8: SYSTEMATIC ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN INSIDER AND OUTSIDER POLICY EVALUATIONS

| | COMMUNIST PARTY (KPRF) (AGRO) | AGRARIANS (WOMEN) | WOMEN OF RUSSIA (DVR) | RUSSIA'S CHOICE | YABLOKO (LDPR) | LIBERAL DEMOCRATS (NDR) | OUR HOME IS RUSSIA | LEBED ASYMMETRY | AVERAGE | |
|---|---|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------|-------|
| INSIDERS SEE THEIR OWN PARTIES AS RELATIVELY MORE THAN OUTSIDERS FOR... | | | | | | | | | | |
| VAR 30 | social protection | +1.77 | +1.58 | +1.66 | +0.21 | +2.08 | +2.51 | +1.65 | +2.49 | +1.74 |
| VAR 31 | protection for state enterprise | +1.63 | +1.12 | +1.42 | +0.17 | +0.70 | +2.26 | +0.58 | +0.88 | +1.10 |
| VAR 33 | fighting unemployment | +1.50 | +0.85 | +2.06 | -0.14 | +1.62 | +1.88 | +1.38 | +0.88 | +1.25 |
| VAR 42 | environmental protection | +1.11 | +1.54 | +1.27 | +1.54 | +1.55 | +2.52 | +0.98 | +2.36 | +1.61 |
| VAR 43 | enforcing moral standards in the mass media | +1.76 | +1.28 | 1.84 | +1.23 | +1.13 | +2.54 | +0.84 | +2.45 | +1.64 |

TABLE 9: POLITICAL DIVIDES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(VARIMAX ROTATED FACTOR ANALYSIS)

| | FACTOR I | | FACTOR II | | FACTOR III |
|--|---|--|---|--|---|
| | Social protection versus market liberalization | | Western orientation versus national autonomy | | intolerance versus tolerance toward cultural diversity |
| A. ECONOMIC ISSUES | | | | | |
| VAR 30 for protection of public health care | +.89 | | -.06 | | -.05 |
| VAR 31 opposing broad scope of privatization | +.85 | | -.14 | | -.01 |
| VAR 32 for more speedy than equitable privatization | -.41 | | +.58 | | +.16 |
| VAR 33 fighting unemployment rather than inflation | +.83 | | -.11 | | -.04 |
| VAR 40 against privatization of collective farms | +.85 | | -.21 | | +.01 |
| B. NATIONAL AUTONOMY | | | | | |
| VAR 34 for restriction of foreign investment | +.84 | | -.20 | | +.10 |
| VAR 52 participation in the Western alliance system | -.51 | | +.62 | | +.07 |
| VAR 54 less protection of Russians in the near-abroad | -.30 | | +.48 | | +.32 |
| C. MULTI-CULTURAL ISSUES | | | | | |
| VAR 36 minorities need to adjust to Russian norms to expect equal treatment | -.03 | | +.15 | | +.85 |
| VAR 45 only Russian language in schools/public life | +.48 | | -.08 | | +.61 |
| D. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES | | | | | |
| VAR 37 less public child care to support women's employment | +.14 | | +.58 | | +.06 |
| VAR 42 prioritizing environmental protection | +.11 | | +.70 | | -.26 |
| E. SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES | | | | | |
| VAR 39 less church influence on schools | +.63 | | +.19 | | +.02 |
| VAR 41 for the death penalty | +.76 | | -.19 | | +.28 |
| VAR 43 more moral censorship in the mass media | +.82 | | -.07 | | -.04 |
| VAR 53 Compatibility of Russian values and political reform | -.48 | | +.56 | | +.33 |
| EIGENVALUES | 6.29 | | 2.31 | | 1.51 |
| EXPLAINED VARIANCE | 39.3% | | 14.4% | | 9.4% |

**TABLE 10: POLITICAL DIVIDES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
PARTIES' MEAN FACTOR SCORES**

| | FACTOR I | | FACTOR II | | FACTOR III | |
|---|----------|------|-----------|------|------------|------|
| | mean | s.d. | mean | s.d. | mean | s.d. |
| KPRF | +1.19 | .69 | -.61 | 1.00 | -.13 | 1.05 |
| AGRARIANS | +.89 | .73 | -.18 | .93 | -.29 | .86 |
| WOMEN | +.09 | .67 | +.03 | .90 | -.48 | .87 |
| DVR | -.98 | .60 | +.54 | .96 | -.06 | .87 |
| YABLOKO | -.62 | .62 | +.47 | .93 | -.16 | .82 |
| NDR | -.76 | .60 | +.30 | .77 | +.00 | .86 |
| LDPR | +.40 | .78 | -.19 | .94 | +.96 | .86 |
| LEBED | -.21 | .75 | -.37 | .95 | +.15 | .87 |
| Differential between extreme parties | 2.17 | | 1.15 | | 1.44 | |
| average standard deviation | | .68 | | .92 | | .88 |
| average salience of the five strongest issues with factor loadings >.50/N of issues | 8.40/5 | | 7.75/5 | | 6.70/2 | |

TABLE 11: PARTIES' MEAN POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES

| | COMMUNIST PARTY (KPRF) (AGRO) | AGRARIANS (WOMEN) | WOMEN OF RUSSIA (DVR) | RUSSIA'S CHOICE | YABLOKO (LDPR) | LIBERAL DEMOCRATS (NDR) | OUR HOME IS RUSSIA | LEBED |
|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| For protection from the market (VAR 30 and VAR 31) | 17.52 | 16.56 | 11.53 | 5.43 | 7.21 | 12.10 | 6.73 | 9.70 |
| Law and Order: Death Penalty and Mass Media Morality (VAR 41 and VAR 43) | 16.40 | 14.54 | 11.15 | 5.56 | 7.89 | 13.96 | 8.04 | 11.40 |
| Opposition to Multi-Culturalism (VAR 36 and VAR 45) | 8.74 | 8.75 | 7.65 | 7.52 | 7.68 | 12.38 | 7.92 | 8.69 |
| International Openness (VAR 48 and VAR 52) | 4.62 | 5.58 | 8.84 | 14.18 | 12.69 | 5.77 | 12.60 | 8.16 |
| Left-Right Placement | 2.58 | 3.38 | 5.14 | 7.25 | 6.36 | 5.30 | 6.71 | 5.23 |

| | ECONOMIC PROTECTION | LAW AND ORDER | MULTI-CUL-TURALISM | INTERNATIONAL OPENNESS |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| LAW AND ORDER | | +0.96 | | |
| MULTI-CULTURALISM | +0.36 | +0.55 | | |
| INTERNATIONAL OPENNESS | -0.94 | -0.99 | -0.60 | |
| LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT | -0.98 | -0.94 | -0.25 | +0.91 |

TABLE 12: DETERMINANTS OF PARTIES' LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT

A. REGRESSION WITH POLICY VARIABLES

| | unstandardized coefficient | t-value | standardized coefficient |
|--|-------------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| INTERCEPT | .001 | .00 | |
| VAR 30: PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE | -.38 | -26.4 | -.42 |
| VAR 42: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION | +.26 | +13.4 | +.21 |
| VAR 36: TOLERANCE FOR MULTI-CULTURALISM | +.17 | +8.9 | +.14 |

ADJUSTED R-SQUARE .243 (p < .001)

B. REGRESSION WITH FACTOR VARIABLES

| | unstandardized coefficient | t-value |
|--|-------------------------------|---------|
| INTERCEPT | .001 | .00 |
| FACTOR I: SOCIAL PRO- TECTION | -1.18 | -32.3 |
| FACTOR II: WESTERN ORIENTATION | +1.07 | +29.4 |
| FACTOR III: TOLERANCE FOR MULTI-CULTURALISM | +.32 | +8.7 |

ADJUSTED R-SQUARE .397 (p < .001)

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


FIGURE 1: TYPES OF PARTY COMPETITION. COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN PARTIES




FIGURE 2: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE COMPETITIVE SPACE