.m:2
Mille
Plateaux: 4,5,6
D&G write in the preface to the book
that the various chapters or
plateaus
are relatively independent and can be read in any order, but I
think
that is really misleading. It is true
that this book does not
have the
relentless linearity of AO where the results of each part were
taken
up systematically and developed in the next.
In MP, however,
there
is nonetheless a progressive construction of the argument in
which
concepts (such as rhizome or double articulation) are elaborated
in one
plateau are then built on and taken for granted in the next.
Each
plateau is not really sufficient and self-contained but rather
refers
to more general arguments that are presented by the book as a
whole. There is something, though, that's different
about the book,
but
rather than saying that each plateau can be read on its own, I'm
tempted
to say that none of the plateaus can be understood before
having
read the whole book.
This is I think how I got myself into
trouble last week with
chapter
3, the Geology of Morals. I was
frustrated by the biological
discourse
because I saw no point for ethical intervention in it, no
space
for politics or pragmatics. I think now
I was asked too much of
that
chapter on its own. There are points of
political intervention in
biology,
but perhaps not in that chapter, perhaps not in year 10,000
bc. I have to find the political moment in other
plateaus and read
chapter
3 in their light. What is
experimentation in biology? How can
we
discover variation, passage, and deterritorialization in biology?
This
would not be experimentation to discover how things are, but
experiment
to make them how we want them to be -- perhaps not discovery
then
but invention. The only example I can
think of are contemporary
body
artists such as Stelarc who change their own bodies either
externally
with plastic surgery or internally, changing how the stomach
works. One then ought to ask how that is political,
but that is a
matter
for another time.
Politics
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are all conducted on
an explicitly political
terrain. I want to ask first of all in what way these
sections are
political
and what is meant by politics. One of
the preconditions and
really
one of the bases for the arguments about linguistics and
semiology
in the first two of these chapters is that language is not
the
model for all structures and organizations (as structuralism or
some
currents in structuralism would have it) but rather that the
question
of language is merely a subset of the larger question of
regimes
of signs, the question of semiotics. I
don't think it's best
to
understand what a regime of signs or what semiotics is by starting
from
language and then expanding or extrapolating.
It is better rather
to
start on a completely different track.
I would say as a first
approximation
that a regime of signs is a society.
Consider, for
example,
the ancient history of the Jews around the period of the
destruction
of the temple that D&G present.
"There is a Jewish
specificity,
immediately affirmed in a semiotic system.
This semiotic,
however
is no less mixed than any other. On the
one hand, it is
intimately
related to the countersignifying regime of the nomads" (p.
122),
the Jews the wandering people, but "on the other hand, it has an
essential
relation to the signifying semiotic" (pp. 122-23) by which
the
Jews dream or reestablishing an imperial society, and finally,
perhaps
most importantly it is characterized by a specific
postsignifying,
passional regime. Now this mixed regime
of signs, this
mixed
semiotic, is nothing other than ancient Jewish society. It is
not
that this regime is also social (just as sociolinguists like Labov
will
argue that language is also social or that it necessarily relates
to
society). No this regime is society
itself; society is nothing
other
than this regime of signs. (Or I guess
we would have to say that
society
is also a regime of bodies, a physical system that is distinct
from
the sign system, but let's leave that question aside for the
moment.) Once we cast the question of language in the
larger and
proper
framework of a regime of signs, then, and once we recognize a
regime
of signs as a society, it is clear a priori that this is a
political
terrain, simply in the sense that all questions are
immediately
questions of the polis, of the social field.
"For language
is a
political affair before it is an affair for linguistics; even the
evaluation
of degrees of grammaticality is a political matter" (139-
40).
Being a political matter, however, simply
in the sense of referring
to or
having social consequences, doesn't yet really grasp what I mean
by
political here. Last week I talked
rather vaguely about ethics in
order
to refer to the possibility of alternatives and action. Perhaps
rather
than ethics I should talk about pragmatics.
This is the opening
in
these chapters toward political action.
"Pragmatics is a politics
of
language," (82) or perhaps more generally, pragmatics is a politics
of
semiotics. What do they means by
political here? How does one do
politics
in D&G's universe? It is of course
a practical matter, but I
would
argue that the first thing one needs is criteria for political
action,
and that is what D&G provide. You
can recognize when D&G are
proposing
criteria for political action when they start talking about
usage
or particular two different usages for something. The difference
between
major and minor is perhaps the clearest criterion we get in
these
chapters. "'Major' and 'minor' do
not qualify two different
languages
but rather two usages or functions of language" (104). The
major
usage of language insists on language's unity and uniformity, on
the
fixity of its constants. The minor
usage operates a reduction of
constants
and proliferates variations of the language.
"The major and
minor
modes are two different treatments of language one of which
consists
in extracting constants from it, the other in placing it in
continuous
variation" (106). Maybe we should
even distinguish here
between
the majority usage of language that is the dominant
standard,
the minority usage that also poses a standard but a
subordinated
one, a stable ghetto language, and finally a minoritarian
usage
that poses no standard but only variation, that deterritorializes
the
major language. According to this
understanding all great authors
invent
a minor language, or more properly, they make minoritarian usage
of the
language. In the beautiful expression
of Proust that D&G cite,
every
great book is written in a kind of foreign language. This minor
language
or minor literature is more or less the center of D&G's little
book
about Kafka.
We should also cast this difference on a
larger plane, not just as
two
usages of language, two ways of speaking or writing, but as usages
of
society, two ways of living. The major
or majority way of living
refers
to the standard of the society, to the "adult-white-
heterosexual-European-male"
(105) as D&G say. The minor or
minority
refers
then to nonstandard ways of living. The
difference between
majority
and minority has nothing to do with numbers, because in fact
the
minorities are most often larger in number.
It is probably not
wrong
to say that the difference is not one of number but of power,
that
the difference between the majority and the minority is a power
difference,
but D&G rather refer directly to the social standard or
constant
as the mark of the majority. The
minority way of living,
then,
would refer to a subordinate system, or a subsystem -- one,
however,
that still maintains a standard. I
think it would be accurate
to link
this to our notion of subculture (and it would be interesting
to
situate the question of subculture developed in British cultural
studies
in this context -- I'm thinking specifically of Dick Hebdige's
book). Finally, minoritarian is something different:
"we must
distinguish
between: the majoritarian as a constant and homogeneous
system;
minorities as subsystems; and the minoritarian as a potential,
creative
and created, becoming" (105-06).
It might be true (I wonder
about
this) that the minorities as subsystems or subcultures would have
more
access to a minoritarian becoming than those closer to the
dominant
standard: Kafka as a Czech Jew writing in German was perhaps
in a
better position than Goethe to deterritorialize the German
language,
to invent it as a foreign language.
This might be an
interesting
point at which to link this to Hebdige's notion of
subcultures
and their creativity.
The minoritarian usage, then, is not
simply the usage that is
proper
to subordinated populations. It is
defined rather by its
creativity. In fact, the minoritarian is the only source
of creativity
or
production among these three. The
majority usage just repeats the
dominant
standards, and the minority usage repeats the subordinated
standards. There is no majority or even minority
becoming, because
they
are both stuck in homogeneous repetitions.
Only the minoritarian
usage
is a becoming; and it is only a becoming.
Back in the context of D&G's
order-words, we should recognize that
there
are two usages of order-words. The
major usage of them is as
commandments
or orders -- "You will do this, you will not do that" --
each of
which, according to D&G, is a little death sentence. The major
usage
of order words is always a verdict. But
of course that is not
the
only usage possible: "the order-word is also something else,
inseparably
connected: it is like a warning cry or a message to flee"
(107). The minoritarian usage of order-words is
part of a line of
flight.
We have seen these lines of flight posed
as the political
alternative
before, but what interests me here is that flight or escape
is not
enough. "In the order-word life
must answer the answer of
death,
not by fleeing, but by making flight act and create," by
transforming
"the compositions of order into components of passage"
(110). Flight must be creative. It must not only be the refusal of
the
major usage, the refusal of the standard, the norm, the law, but a
creation
of an alternative. In other words,
flight cannot be just
flight
-- that would be negative and empty.
Flight must be positive and
creative:
constituent flight. Now, when I say
constituent we can't
just
mean the constitution of an new order, new norms, a new majority.
As
D&G say in the passage I just cited, it involves a transformation of
"the
compositions of order into components of passage." The passage is
what
I'm calling constituent flight. Another
way of approaching this
is to
say that D&G are proposing not a new order nor a new standard,
but
rather a new usage, or maybe a new way of life, a new mode of life.
So this
is my answer to the question about what does politics means
here in
its most summary form: alternative usage, passage, constituent
flight.
Parenthetically, I want to address in the
context of this
discussion
of minoritarian politics D&G's easily irritating use of the
term
"becoming-woman." (You might
recall the term becoming-woman used
earlier
in AO in the context of President Schreber, who was becoming a
woman.) The term is used here principally to
illustrate the fact that
minoritarian
usages are creative and majoritarian are not, or in other
words,
that minoritarian usages are becomings.
"There is no becoming-
majoritarian;
majority is never becoming. All
becoming is
minoritarian. Women, regardless of their numbers, are a
minority,
definable
as a state or subset; but they create only by making possible
a
becoming over which they do not have ownership, into which they
themselves
must enter; this is a becoming-woman affecting all of
humankind,
men and women both" (106). Men are
the majority and women
the
minority even if there are more women than men because the standard
is
defined in terms of Man. Women/minority
is thus a state or a
subset,
which is itself not creative nor subversive.
What is creative
is not
the fact of being a minority but rather a minoritarian usage, a
becoming. Becoming-woman a process, a becoming that
has woman as the
endpoint,
it is not a process of becoming more feminine so as to reach
the
final ideal identity. (And in this
sense President Schreber's
becoming-woman
insofar as he was simply changing sex is misleading).
Becoming-woman
doesn't have an identity as its endpoint nor really any
endpoint
whatsoever, but rather it is a deviation or flight from the
standard
of Man that creates an alternative, a passage.
In this sense,
it is
D&G's way of naming a feminist practice, a feminist usage. [I
should
note that there have been several interesting debates about this
term
"becoming-woman" in D&G.
Alice Jardine and Rosi Braidotti have
written
against D&G's usage of it and Camilla Griggers has tried to
develop
it into a useful feminist concept.]
I want to open one other parenthetical
note about minoritarian
politics
that arises from the passage I cited about becoming woman.
They
said that this becoming-woman affects all of humankind, men and
women
alike. D&G said from the beginning
that major and minor do not
have to
do with number, in the sense that the majority might refer to a
smaller
number of people and the minority a larger number. Once we
consider
them as two political usages, though, majoritarian and
minoritarian,
they do have to do with number in a reversed and absolute
way. "But at this point, everything is
reversed. For the majority,
insofar
as it is analytically included in the abstract standard, is
never
anybody, it is always Nobody ... whereas the minority is the
becoming
of everybody, one's potential becoming to the extent that one
deviates
from the model. There is a majoritarian
"fact," but it is the
analytic
fact of Nobody, as opposed to the becoming-minoritarian of
everybody"
(105). "Continuous variation
constitutes the becoming-
minoritarian
of everybody, as opposed ot the majoritarian Fact of
Nobody. Becoming-majoritarian as the universal
figure of consciousness
is
called autonomy" (106). I'm
interested in the collective dimension
of this
explanation, which qualifies what might have sometimes seemed
like
very individualistic notions of flight.
Minoritarian politics is
not
only collective, however, it is universal or at least potentially
universal. It is potentially the politics of
everyone.
Abstraction
I'm still trying to work out D&G's
usage of abstraction, largely
around
their analyses of abstract machines.
Frequently in common
situations
one might be criticized for being too abstract, particularly
in
political discussions. I often get this
response. The reasoning is
that
the abstract is assumed to pertain to the ideal realm and in
contrast
the practical always involves a minimum of abstraction, it is
concrete. D&G, however, maintain the role of the
abstract in practical
politics. The first level of explanation for this is
that they
consider
the abstract not ideal but virtual. The
importance of this
shift
for us now is that is the position of the two conceptions with
respect
to reality. The ideal is opposed to the
real but the virtual
is
not. The virtual is opposed to the
actual, but it is completely
real. (For those of you familiar with Marx, I
think his discussion of
the
"real abstraction" is very close to this.) But staying within the
D&G
framework, the best way to approach understanding this concept of
virtuality
is to begin by thinking about what is not actual -- or
better,
what is not actuel in the sense of the French word as either
spatially
present or temporally present. The
virtual is what is
inactual
but real. Deleuze's favorite example
for this is memory in
Proust:
a memory is real but not actual. So,
then, an abstract machine
or
diagram is virtual and completely real even if it is not actual.
(Remember
that the Foucault's understanding of the Panopticon is as a
diagram. The panopticon is virtual, real but not
actual.) The
question,
then, if we are going to insist that this level of
abstraction
is how does this virtual, abstract machine relate to what
is
actual, to what is here and now.
"Defined diagrammatically in this
way, an
abstract machine is neither an infrastructure that is
determining
in the last instance nor a transcendental Idea that is
determining
in the supreme instance. Rather, it
plays a piloting role.
The
diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent,
even
something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come,
a new
type of reality. Thus when it
constitutes points of creation or
potentiality
it does not stand outside history but is instead always
"prior
to" history. Everything escapes,
everything creates -- never
along
but through an abstract machine that produces continuums of
intensity,
effects conjunctions of deterritorialization, and extracts
expressions
and contents" (142). The response,
then, to the person who
tells
you you are being too abstract in a political discussion, is that
on the
contrary we are never abstract enough.
Political action flows
from or
through the abstract machine which is entirely inactual. The
abstract
machine is prior, or, in other words, as I argued a few weeks
ago, it
is productive. I'm still a bit unclear
about this "piloting"
role or
about the kind of determination exercised by the abstract
machine,
but I hope that will become clear in some other week.
The
Masochist
I think this question of abstraction and
politics is also central
in the
project to make for yourself a body without organs. (There is,
of course,
a rather close relation between abstract machine, plane of
consistency,
and body without organs.) Now, we have
to ask two
questions
about this "abstract" or "virtual" project to make a body
without
organs: how to do it, but first of all why do it? D&G answer
the why
question in terms of desire. The body
without organs is the
field
of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency proper to desire
(where
desire is defined as a process of production, without reference
to any
external instance, such as lack that would crush it or pleasure
that
could bring it to an end). (NB that
Deleuze's criticisms of
Foucault
and his use of pleasure in the letter from a few weeks ago are
taken
up again verbatim here and in a footnote.)
So the BwO is the
field
where desire can produce freely without end.
We might say also
that
the BwO is the field where intensities can best appear and grow.
The BwO
is itself of zero intensity but it is the proper medium for
intensities. I would say, then, translating it into
another language,
that we
should make a body without organs in order to increase our
power
to act and think and to increase our power to be affected. D&G
really
only focus on the second half, on the power to be affected, the
heightened
intensities.
The masochist construction of a BwO is a
good example of the
increase
of our power to be affected. The
masochist is not really
interested
in pain. Pain is merely a means:
"the masochist uses
suffering
as a way of constitution a body without organs and bringing
forth a
plane of consistency of desire" (155).
"The masochist
constructs
an entire assemblage that simultaneously draws and fills the
filed
of immanence of desire; he constitutes a body without organs or
plane
of consistency using himself, the horse, and the mistress" (156).
D&G
then cite a case in which a masochist plans how he wants his
partner
to ride and kick him with her boots in order to have an intense
on him
to leave an imprint on his body.
"Legs are still organs, but
the
boots now only determine a zone of intensity as an imprint or zone
on a
BwO" (156). The masochist makes a
BwO in order to increase his or
her
power to be affected, in order to nurture zones of intensity. But
in
these terms this can seem a completely unpolitical and individual
practice. I would say that in order to conceive the
program to
construct
a body without organs as a political practice the other
aspect
must be emphasized -- that corresponding to the increase in our
power
to be affected is an increase in our power to act and think.
Here
the example of the masochist might not be sufficient, and I would
like to
come up with something more adequate.
We need to think of a
way to
link this conception of making a BwO with the universality and
creativity
of the notion of a minoritarian becoming that they proposed
in the
linguistics chapter.