Magnesian Inviolability*

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SUMMARY: In 221/20 the citizens of Magnesia on the Maeander sought to create crowned games in honor of Artemis Leukophryene. The goddess had appeared to them and Delphi instructed that “it is more agreeable and better for those who revere Apollo Pythios and Artemis Leukophryene and treat the city and territory of the Magnesians on the Maeander as sacred and inviolable.” But why it took Magnesia more than a decade to secure asylia and inaugurate the enhanced games has remained a puzzle. It has been thought since Kern (1901) that the Magnesians first attempted to win acceptance of inviolability and the games in 221/20, that their invitations were almost universally snubbed, and that the city did not succeed in securing international recognition until 208/7. This paper argues that there was no failed campaign of invitations in 221, that Magnesia did not canvass the Greek world until 208/7.

IN 221/20 THE CITIZENS OF MAGNESIA ON THE MAEANDER Sought TO CREATE crowned games in honor of Artemis Leukophryene. The goddess had appeared to them, and consulting Delphi they learned that “it is more agreeable and better for those who revere Apollo Pythios and Artemis Leukophryene and treat the city and territory of the Magnesians on the Maeander as sacred and inviolable” (Asylia 66.4–10).1 These were but first steps on a long journey,

1 And if one set of ingenious tentative restorations be accepted these two communications were not the first (Asylia 66.1–4, at p. 187): “although the word order is clumsy: καὶ τοιαύτης [οὔσης τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἐ|κέλευσε (or ἐ|χρησεν) α]ὐτοῖς τε[λε]ῖν πάντας τοὺς προε[ῃμένους Μάγνησιν | χρησμού|]ς ὁ θεός,” Such recommendations could reach considerable numbers: SEG 45 911–13 (I.Kallatis 48–50).
which would involve the dispatch of embassies to Greek cities from Sicily to Iran, the systematic collection and publication of an archive of nearly 100 inscriptions in the agora at Magnesia.

There is much to call extraordinary here. The dossier of inscriptions (I. Magnesia 16–89; Asylia 66–131) is the largest extant group of documents concerning a city’s pursuit of inviolability. Moreover, the archive is thought to shed light on that rarest of inscribed events, a diplomatic failure (Slater and Summa 2006: 276–77). But this was an age of increased religious mobility, of great festal innovation and renovation, in which “panhellenic festivals were the agora of the Greek world.” Cities went to great lengths, literally, to insert themselves in the religious and political landscape of Hellenism, as did the curricula vitae of competitors near and far. And in that context Magnesia’s initiative was perhaps ambitious in scope and scale, but not in some essential property of politics or piety.3

One feature of the city’s painstaking efforts to activate the divine utterance has remained puzzling: namely, why it took so many years to secure asylia and inaugurate the enhanced games. It has been thought since Kern (1901) that the Magnesians first attempted to win acceptance of inviolability and the games in 221/20, that their invitations were almost universally snubbed, and that the city did not succeed in securing international recognition until more than a decade later, in 208/7 (Rigsby 1996: 180–85). This paper argues that there was no failed campaign of invitations in 221, that Magnesia did not canvass the Greek world until 208/7.

I. THE NARRATIVE

The theory that the Magnesians had failed at a first attempt in 221 is the product of inference from careful reading and restoration of a difficult text (Asylia 66.16–35):4

16 >—< πρῶτ[οι στεφανί]—

 τὴν ἀγῶνα θείαν τῶν κατοικούντων τὴν Ἀσίαν [ἐψηφίσας]—

to, τὴν ἐκδοχὴν τοῦ χρησμοῦ ταύτην λαβόντες, [διότι ?]

τιμήσουσιν οὕτως Ἀρτεμίν Λευκοφρυηνὴν μάλ[ιστα οἱ πρός]

20 τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβῶς ἔχοντες, ἐάμ Μάγνησιν ἐπὶ τὸν ᾽ ῥαῖον ἐπό—

 μενοι βωμὸν Ἀρχηγέτιδι γέρα κεχαρισμέν[α ἀποδιδῶσιν,]


3 For a heavily political interpretation of the episode: Dušanić 1983.

4 Text given here with new readings and restorations by Slater and Summa 2006: 289–91, on the basis of a new squeeze, and crucial and ingenious new restorations at 16 (πρῶτ[οι]), 18 ([διότι?]), and 19 (μάλ[ιστα οἱ πρός]) advanced by Thonemann 2007.
First of those dwelling in Asia, they voted to establish a crowned competition, taking this to be the sense of the oracle: that those who are pious toward the divine will honor Artemis Leukophryene best if, in following the Magnesians to the old altar, they should render pleasing gifts to the Foundress, inasmuch as also other competitions were at first established for money, but subsequently became crowned owing to oracles.

But when, after trying, they had been dragged around, in the stephanephorate of Moiragoras, who is the fourteenth from Zenodotos, under whom the oracle came to them, recalling their ancestral friendships, they revealed also to others all that had been proclaimed in the oracle.

And in the stephanephorate of Moiragoras they proclaimed the crowned (sc. competition) equal to the Pythian, giving a crown of 50 gold staters to the goddess, with the kings and the other Greeks to whom they sent embassies accepting, having voted by nations and cities to honor Artemis Leukophryene and that the city and territory of the Magnesians be inviolable . . .

The dates 221/20 and 208/7 are secure enough. As for the rest of the accepted narrative, let us first distinguish what is explicit from what is inferred. Magnesia resolved (or wished, or discussed) to hold games in honor of Artemis (16–17). And so it immediately sent ambassadors seeking recognition of both inviolability and the competition; both the speed and the action itself are

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6 Before Thonemann’s ingenious restoration in line 16, the prevailing view was that Magnesia first sought acknowledgement of asylia all over the Greek world but of the games only in Asia, an unparalleled and improbable gesture.
inferred. But their attempts were stymied by the invited cities; derailment (παρηλκύσθησ[αν]) is in the text, but by whom and how are modern inference. Fourteen years after obtaining the oracle the Magnesians succeeded (24–26, 28–33). It is clear, then, that the decisive elements in the picture of a failed initial mission in 221 are an artifact of interpretation and do not appear in the text: namely (a) that there was an initial mission, (b) that it immediately followed the vote to enhance the games (itself a restoration: [ἐψηφίσαν]το), and (c) that this mission failed. Nothing in the surviving text tells of a quest in 221.

2. EARLY ACCEPTANCES?

Two bodies of evidence external to the Magnesians’ own account of events have been taken to support the existence of a mission in 221: (1) a decree of the Aetolian League that proclaims inviolability for Magnesia and has been assigned to 221, and (2) a clause in Gonnoi’s acceptance decree of 208 that is thought to imply prior recognition of inviolability in 221 and so to provide an explanation for the small cluster of acceptance decrees from 208 (and later) that are silent on the matter of inviolability and so have been taken to indicate the same.

a. Aetolian League

A decree of the Aetolian League, dated to the second stratêgia of Agelaos, proclaims for Magnesia both inviolability and a hieromnemonic vote on the Amphictyonic council (Asylia 67). Rigsby assigns the decree to 221, since, unlike the other acceptances of 208, it fails to mention “Artemis, the oracles, the epiphany, games, or the piety and past benefactions of the Magnesians,” and so must respond “to the first Magnesian effort, in which they asked baldly for inviolability without ‘revealing’ all the oracular testimonia (66.27), and without requesting crowned games for Artemis; nor of course would they invite Aetolians to the games for the Greeks of Asia” (Rigsby 1996: 192). Moreover, a fragmentary stele found at Delphi in 1936 records the Aetolians’ acceptance of the games, making no mention—but it is fragmentary—of inviolability (Asylia 78); though the partially named stratêgos (Μα[- - - , line 6) is not otherwise known, the wording of the decree suggests contemporaneity with the others of 208. Together, the two decrees tell us that the Aetolians

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7 On Thonemann’s new restoration (see above), there were no games for the Greeks of Asia.

8 The decree is too fragmentary to preserve the names of the Magnesian envoys, so that we cannot control the date with reference to other places to which the same envoys may have gone.
recognized the Magnesian games on one occasion, in 208, and inviolability on another, in the second *stratêgia* of Agelaos, whenever that was.

The chronology is a mess.\(^9\) Agelaos is attested as *stratêgos* in 217/16 (Plb. 5.107.6) and 206/5 (*SEG* 38 1476.79), though in neither case do we know the iteration. Rigsby has argued that Agelaos’s second term belongs to 222/21\(^{10}\) and the decree to the end of his tenure, i.e. late summer 221, before the autumnal solstice.\(^11\) The Aetolian *fasti* could be juggled to accommodate.\(^{12}\) But few have thought that Magnesia should have received the hieromnemonic vote (*Asylia* 67.20–21) so early. Flacelière, who could know neither the Aetolian recognition of the Magnesian games (*Asylia* 78) nor the Aetolian letter

\(^9\) Some of the following is summarized at Rigsby 1996: 191.

\(^10\) Ariston and Skopas were *stratêgoi* in 221/20 and 220/19 (4.5.1, 4.27.1). Rigsby is followed by Scholten 2000: 191n98, 280n93, and 197, who suggests also that Magnesia’s admission to the Amphictyony in 221 “may perhaps represent some sort of anti-Antigonid initiative. Magnesia, after all, borders Karia, site of Doson’s recent Aegean adventures. Furthermore, it is at least possible that this award of an Amphiktyonic vote was justified by the traditional prerogative of the Magnesians of Thessalia, who had not exercised it since the Antigonids had consolidated their hold on the region” (198n120).

\(^11\) Klaffenbach had dated *Asylia* 67 (IG 9.1\(^2\).1 4.c) to 224/23. Such hardly seems possible, as it would mean that the Aetolian League conferred inviolability before Magnesia received divine instruction to seek it out, in 221. He reasoned that the Skopas attested as *grammateus* in that decree is the same as the Skopas attested as *stratêgos* in 220/19 (Plb. 4.5.1), so that his term as scribe ought to precede his tenure of the *stratêgia*: “*Verisimilimum igitur est Agelaum c. a. 224/23 iterum praetura functum esse*” (p.6). In other words, 224/23 is only an estimate based on the assumption that the two references point to the same Skopas. But the name is not terribly rare and when we recall that the Pantaleon attested as hippocarch in 206/5 (but see below, where I argue that he was not hippocarch in 206/5) is not thought to be the Pantaleon who was *stratêgos* only a few years before in 214/13, or that one Agelaos was *stratêgos* in 217/16 and another hippocarch in 214/13, we may justly wonder whether we have in Skopas two references or two men; Klaffenbach is followed by Grainger 2000: 81–82, though he posits a different, homonymous, Agelaos at *SEG* 38 1476.79, which he dates to 205/4, evidently a slip for 206/5, for at p. 71 he assigns Agelaos to 206/5, where the same Agelaos is indicated to have held the *stratêgia* for the third time in both 217/16 and 206/5; see also pp. 18–19; also idem 1999: 263–64, 343n19, also 556 (where the same duplication, for 217/16 and 206/5, appears).

\(^12\) Klaffenbach had suggested that Pantaleon’s fourth term (IG 9.1\(^2\).1 169A.8) belonged somewhere around 222; Grainger assigns it to 222/21. We know that Pantaleon’s fifth term was in 214/13 (IG 9.1\(^2\).1 31.B.144–145) and what must have been his first was in 242/41 (Plut. *Arat.* 33), so that the second, third, and fourth, none of whose actual location in time is known, need only be spread out across those two decades. Thus, Agelaos’s second term could fit in 222/21 as Rigsby suggests, leaving free 236/35, 235/34, 233/32–227/26, 225/24, and 224/23 to accommodate Pantaleon’s second, third, and fourth terms, as well as Agelaos’s putative first.
to Xanthos (SEG 38 1476.79–88), already suggested (1937: 323–25) that the Aetolian recognition of Magnesian inviolability and conferral of the hieromnemonic vote should fall just before the inaugural celebration of the newly reclassified games. Gauthier, Bousquet, Lefèvre, and Sánchez have agreed with the spirit of Flacelière’s proposition, suggesting that Agelaos’s second term must have fallen between 217/16 and 206/5, the last objecting that Rigsby’s date of 222/21 is tempting but does not explain why the Magnesians did not send representatives until the end of the century.13 This is a well-known puzzle and one of which Rigsby is aware: the Magnesians are not attested as having taken their Amphictyonic seat until 203/2.14 Evidence for votes in the period between 221 and 203 is admittedly slim. The inscriptions are few and fragmentary. An intact Amphictyonic decree from 221/20 contains a roster of *hieromnêmones* that lacks a Magnesian vote,15 but this does not rule for or against Rigsby’s proposed date. For Aetolians, whose year commenced after the autumnal equinox, July/August 221 fell at the end of the calendar year, whereas at Delphi that period fell near the year’s start. The Magnesians might not have had enough time, after receipt of the Aetolian decree, to send a delegate to the autumn session, whose voters that decree records. The same may apply to a contemporary catalogue of victors in the Soteria, but we should have thought to find Magnesian delegates in six other Amphictyonic documents from this period.16 We might imagine the Magnesians taking a year or two to send a delegate to the Amphictyony, but what could have held them up for more than a decade? The earlier the date of *Asylia* 67, the longer the period in which Magnesians failed inexplicably to occupy the seat to which they were entitled.

Thus, a date between 217/16 and 206/5 for Agelaos’s second term and *Asylia* 67 is attractive, but is the proposed range viable? Could Agelaos’s second *stratêgia* have fallen between 217/16 and 206/5? It is clear from Klaffenbach’s

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14 CID 4 97 (203/2); subsequently: 98 (201/0), 99 (201/0), 101 (193/92); 100 (194/93) is restored. Rigsby 1996: 191–92.

15 CID 4 74; unless it dates from 225/24: CID 4 pp. 16–21, with table on p. 24. If the date is 221/20, then the inscription could be taken to confirm that Klaffenbach’s date of 224/23 is excluded.

16 CID 4 75 (date same as 74); 79 (217/16, or 221/20), 84 and 85 (209/8, or 213/12, or 210/9), 87 (206/5, or 212–10 or 207/6), 95 and 96 (204/3?, or 206/5 or 205/4); for all of these dates see CID 4 pp. 16–21, with table on p. 24.
brilliant reconstruction of the Aetolian _fasti_ that repeat office-holders tended to wait six to eight years between iterations. Assume then that Agelaos waited at least three years between terms; can the _fasti_ accommodate him between 214/13 and 209/8? Only three years are open: 214/13, 213/12, and 209/8. It has long been recognized that Straton’s two attested terms belonged to the last few years of the third century, and Klaffenbach could fit them in only at 213/12 and 206/5 (IG 9.1.1.1 28 [with note], 59B, 96). The latter is now precluded by SEG 38 1476.79, which informs that Agelaos was _stratēgos_. We might move Straton’s first tenure to 216/15, which is open, but what to do with his second? So, 213/12 might open up to fit Agelaos, but only if we can find two open years for Straton’s first and second. We encounter similar problems at 209/8. Klaffenbach had assigned Philleas, who must also belong to these last years of the century, to 208/7, a year now assigned to Ma[ (Asylia 78.7); thus, Grainger bumped Philleas up to 209/8. But that is where Klaffenbach had put Lykos, whom Grainger appears to have erased from history. Now, Pantaleon’s fifth term might be moved from 214/13 to 216/15, where Klaffenbach thought it might go, now that Lattamos, whom Klaffenbach had assigned to 216/15, might belong to 205/4, but not if Straton’s first has been moved to 216/15. It should be clear that in the packed roster of these years we have little room to maneuver. And the series is tighter still, now that Funke (2000) has shown that we must fit two terms of Arkison in the last two decades of the third century. In short, within the range 217/16–206/5 three years might be made to accommodate Agelaos’s second term (214/13, 213/12, 209/8), but none is without serious difficulties, in no case do the data favor a particular year, and once the five combined terms of Straton, Arkison, and Lykos are added it does not seem possible to squeeze in Agelaos between 217/16 and 206/5.

17 Archedamos of Pholas held the _stratēgia_ in 191/90 and again in 188/87, but no other Aetolian _stratēgos_ was returned to office after so short an interval. Even if this exception is “a sign of the electorate inclining to a known quantity in a time of shock and upheaval,” it throws the evident rule—articulated in neither literary nor documentary sources—into high relief. On iteration of office, including interesting observations on diachronic trends in the ratio of first-timers to repeat office-holders, see Grainger 1999: 503–5, quote at 504.

18 Skopas was _stratēgos_ in 212/11 (Livy 26.24.7), Dorimachos in 211/10 (Plb. 9.42.1; cf. Walbank 1967: 185; I follow here Klaffenbach, IG 9.1.1.1 p. 25, n. on 290), and Pyrrias in 210/9 (IG 9.1.1.1 29.1–2; Livy 27.30.1).

19 Grainger 2000: 310 seems to pretend that it does not exist, citing IG 9.1.1.1 28.1–2, but giving Straton only one term.

20 Lykos: IG 9.1.1.1 190.10 = IG 12.2.16. He is absent from Grainger 2000: 222.

Can we cut this knot in two? To review, two datable offices of Agelaos are known, in 217/16 and 206/5; he is also known to have served a term counted as his second, whose date is unknown. All scholars, whether they have preferred an earlier (Klaffenbach, Rigsby) or later (Flacelière, Gauthier, Bousquet, Lefèvre, Sánchez) date for Asylia 67 agree that its silence regarding games, oracle, etc., must indicate a date before the campaign of 208. That silence, however, establishes only that the two decrees recognizing inviolability and games (Asylia 67, 78) arose at different times. All have assumed that the acceptance of inviolability preceded that of the games. I propose instead that it followed; that 206/5 was Agelaos’s second term, so that the League recognized the Magnesian games in 208 and inviolability two years later, in 206/5. This would minimize the problem of unattested Amphictyonic votes and reduce the log-jam of Aetolian stratēgoi in the last two decades of the third century, for we would no longer have to find Agelaos’s second term between 217/16 and 206/5. It would also remove the Aetolian decree from a class of data unique unto itself, early recognition of inviolability alone, and add it to the well-known group of late acceptances.22

If we assign Asylia 67 to 206/5, then we must move not only Agelaos’s second stratēgia to that date but also the hipparchy of Polemarchos and the

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22 Rome’s acceptance fell after 208 (Rigsby 1996: 580–85). The Seleucids’ (Asylia 69, 70) very likely belong to 205: Rigsby 1996: 196. Four other cities followed (Asylia 128–31). None of these situations is precisely parallel with that of the Aetolians, for in all of them there was no initial visit of 208 to begin with, only subsequent ones. Nevertheless, they serve as salient reminder that the Magnesians did not consider their diplomatic job complete in 208, or even after the inaugural celebration of the crowned games. The ambassadors who found Antiochus in the east in 205 are unknown from other missions, attested only at Asylia 69.3–4, 70.2–3, and 111.31–32. That ambassadors are otherwise unattested in the archive does not necessarily prove anything about chronology (e.g. that such missions ought to have taken place before or after the main effort in 208), but of the inscriptions that preserve ambassadors’ names only 12 name ambassadors who are not otherwise preserved in the archive. In 34 other instances one or more ambassador is shared in clusters: Asylia 69, 70, 111 (to Antiochus III, Antioch in Persis); 73, 84, 87, 97, 98 (Boeotian and Phocian Leagues, Athens, Chalkis, Eretria); 79, 81, 82 (Delphi, Acarnanian and Epirote Leagues); 85, 86, 94–96 (Same, Ithaka, Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnos); 88–93, 122 (perhaps doubtful as the heavily restored text would invert the order of Lampetos and Philiskos; though similar inversion appears to have taken place in 99 and 100), 124 (Megalopolis, Achaean League, Argos, Sikyon, Corinth, Messene, and two unknown cities); 99, 100 (Delos and Paros); 104–7 (Rhodes, Knidos, Kos, and an unknown city); 125, 126 (Antioch in Pisidia and another Antioch); 127, 103 (an unknown city and the guild of Dionysiac artists).
grammateia of Skopas.\textsuperscript{23} One text would seem to stand in the way. Bousquet suggested that the three men called simply and erroneously “stratêgoi” in the well-known Xanthian inscription of that date, Agelaos, Pantaleon, and Molossos, were federal stratêgos, hipparch, and scribe, respectively.\textsuperscript{24} But the claim has no basis in the text itself and I know of no similarly imprecise treatment of Aetolian magistrates, which could have risked offending, for in the zero-sum world of honor, to increase that of the lesser magistrates was to diminish that of the elected stratêgos. There is no reason to doubt that Agelaos was the federal stratêgos, but also none to think that Pantaleon and Molossos were hipparch and scribe; they could have been local worthies on extraordinary appointment to assist the stratêgos in a matter of epistolographic diplomacy.\textsuperscript{25} There is no evidence for the idea that Pantaleon and Molossos were federal magistrates rather than extraordinary appointees in the temporary service of their stratêgos, under whose title they were evidently and erroneously grouped.

\textit{b. Gonnoi and the Other Omissions}

If these suggestions be accepted, then in putting to rest one puzzle, we revive another. For, if we strike from history the long conjectured mission of 221, as I think we must, then we also undercut a potent explanation for the fact that twelve authorities recognized the games, but seem to have declined or ignored

\textsuperscript{23} Asylia 67.1–3: στραταγέοντος Ἀγελάου Ναυπακτίου τὸ | δεύτερον, ἵππαρχόντος Πολεμάρχου Θυρισκαίου, γραμματεύοντος Σκόπα Τριχονέος.

\textsuperscript{24} Bousquet 1988: 26 [SEG 38 1476.70].

\textsuperscript{25} Aetolian statesmen traveled in hierarchically arranged groups, the unknown led by standing or former stratêgos: Pyrrias, stratêgos in 210/9 (Livy 27.30.1; IG 9.1\textsuperscript{1}.1 29.1–2), was the chief Aetolian delegate (\textit{princeps legationis}) of a group of military strategists in 199 (Livy 31.46.2). See also Thoas (App. Syr. 46): Αὐτιόχος δ’ ἥκον Αἰτωλῶν πρέσβεις, ἀν Ὁδᾶς ἤρχεν. In 198/97, Aetolia dispatched to Rome a group of envoys, who included Alexander Isios, who had only just begun what would be a lengthy diplomatic career, Damokritos, the stratêgos for 200/199, Dikaiarchos, son of Alexander and brother of the famous stratêgos Thoas, who would be stratêgos in 195/94, an otherwise unknown Polemarchos of Arsinoe, Lamios of Ambracia, also otherwise unknown, and a handful of others (Plb. 18.10.9–10). Magistrates certainly read in groups and they may well have written collaboratively as well; the sole surviving letter written to the Aetolians addresses the \textit{synedroi} (restored but likely), stratêgos, and hipparch (\textit{I.Cret.} 2 v 19 [Syll.\textsuperscript{1} 622.B.1–2]): \textit{ὦ εὔχων οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἡ πόλις Αἰτωλῶν συνέδροις καὶ τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τοῖς ἰππάρχοις χαίρειν. See also Plb. 4.26.3–5. We know but a single inscribed letter from an Aetolian stratêgos and his name alone appears in the salutation (IG 9.1\textsuperscript{1}.1 187.14): [Δικαίαρχος Μαγνη[θ]έου τῶν βουλῶν καὶ τῶν ἰππάρχων χαίρειν, introduced in the inscription by the indented header, παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν].
the request to accept Magnesian inviolability: Attalos and the Seleucid kings (*Asylia* 68–70), Argos, Sikyon, and Chalkis (90, 91, 97), Delos (99), Rhodes (104), Antioch in Persis (111), the Aetolian League and Delphi (78 and 79), although if I am right about the date of *Asylia* 67, the Aetolians later rectified the matter, and finally the odd case of Gonnoi (83). Why refuse? Welles thought that kings with aspirations to territorial expansion in the Maeander valley withheld recognizing Magnesian inviolability, but as Rigsby pointed out not all of those who omitted to recognize *asylia* were allies of such kings and Ptolemy, who did accept (*Asylia* 71), was not without such aspirations. Giovannini saw constitutional constraints: for subject cities and league members, matters of serious foreign policy such as the recognition of inviolability fell outside and above the purview of their narrow autonomy. But as Rigsby points out Corinth (*Asylia* 92) and Megalopolis (88), both members of the Achaean League, recognized Magnesia’s *asylia*, and though Chalkis (97) and Eretria (98) were both Antigonid subjects, the latter alone accepted *asylia*; besides, the political and military implications of this honor were slight.29

Neither theory explains enough. In their place Rigsby proposes two other attractive explanations. Carelessness might account for the inconsistent recognition of *asylia*: four states do not mention inviolability in the preambles to their decrees, but do accept it in the decrees proper, and one mentions *asylia* in the preamble but in the body of the decree accepts, concisely, “what they ask, in accordance with the god’s oracle.” This is appealing but perhaps explains too much. Carelessness can always be invoked. Careless as the drafters of these decrees may have been, not one of them was so lax as to record recognition

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27 I leave off *Asylia* 131, since it appears to date well after the main effort of 208.
28 Rigsby 1996: 182; Welles 1934: 147. In an inversion of Welles’ logic, Grainger 1999: 251, seems to imply that *Asylia* 67 (but note that the citations are reversed in nn29 and 31) is part of a “new expansionist process . . . in the late 220s.”
29 Giovannini 1977: 465–72 (echoed by Ma 1999: 157); Rigsby 1996: 182–83. Implications: Rigsby 1996: 13–17, 22–25. Cf. Jones 2000: 58 on the three nearly contemporary bids for *asylia* (Magnesia, Teos, and Alabanda), “It was a crucial moment, in which a successful claim for immunity might save a city from pillage or destruction.” Flashar 1999 argues that Kolophon’s bid for *asylia* was modeled on Magnesia’s and was both an act of real religion and a gesture of political rivalry. Buraselis 2004 argues that the Koan bid of 242 was political in nature.
30 Rigsby 1996: 183; the four are Delphi (*Asylia* 79), Corinth (92), Corcyra (94), and Tralles (129); Knidos (105.26–27): ἀποδέξασθαι ἃ ἀξιοῦ[ντι ἀκολού]|θως τῶι τοῦ θεοῦ χρησμῶι.
31 Nielsen and Roy 1998: 38n129, observe that several of the “other Arcadians” included at the bottom of the Megalopolitan decree were not members of the Arcadian
of *asylia* but not the games. Rigsby proposes a second explanation, which we have encountered already, namely that those who were silent on the matter of *asylia* in 208, and had been thought therefore to have declined, had simply accepted already in 221. He suggests that while these early acceptances are yet unknown in the archive, we do find that of the Aetolian League. But if my suggestion is correct theirs was not an early acceptance but a late one.

There is clearly a problem here. In attempting to solve it scholars have asked why an invitee might decline to recognize inviolability. In other words, interpretation has for the most part begun with a binary division of data: acceptance or refusal. Rigsby, however, has redefined the question, fruitfully in my view. For in positing scribal carelessness or prior acceptance as potential causes for silence, he has opened the door to the possibility that, in effect, there were no refusals. This, I think, was the case. And while there may have been no mission of 221 with which to explain the curious silences, the decrees show that there was more to the diplomatic exchange than simple recognition and rejection. Instead, we see a range of reactions, which, I propose, explains the variations in the inscribed record of acceptances.

The decree of Gonnoi is in effect the cutting edge of the argument that silence about *asylia* in 208 indicates prior acceptance in 221. Thessalian Gonnoi resolved in 208 to accept the newly enhanced games “Since the Magnesians on the Maeander . . . having their city and territory sacred and inviolable to Artemis Leukophryene and increasing their piety toward the gods . . .” announced the sacrifice and festival, etc. (*Asylia* 83.4–8):

\[
\text{ἐπειδὴ Μάγνητες ὁὶ ἐπὶ Μαιάνδρου . . . ἔχοντες | τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἱερὰν καὶ ἄσυλον τῆς Αρτέμιδος τῆς Λευοκοφρυηνῆς καὶ αὔξοντες τὴν πρὸς τοὺς | θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν.}
\]

This could suggest that inviolability was at the time of the decree’s passage a fact to which one—the Gonnesis, anyway—could point. In a sense it was: Gonnoi was not the first city to be approached in the campaign of 208, and ambassadors may well have spoken officially or off the record of other cities’ acceptance. Absent the theory of a first mission in 221, we might have

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32 One of the Ptolemies recognized inviolability of the Koan Asklepieion after reiterating that the ambassadors had informed him that the Amphictyons had already voted on the matter and that envoys had been dispatched to the other kings, nations, and cities (*Asylia* 8.8–13). The Smyrnaean invitation was evidently accompanied by a letter from Seleukos, stating that he had already acknowledged the city’s inviolability and urging the Greek world to do likewise (*Asylia* 7.2–6, with p. 95). Corcyra appears to have been
concluded that the Gonneis referred simply to an already widespread acceptance. Only if we assume the existence of the earlier mission is it reasonable to take their “presumption that [inviolability] already exists” as indication “that they had granted inviolability already in 221 B.C.” (Rigsby 1996: 210).

But if nothing in this awkward participial phrase points to refusal, neither does it ring of prior acceptance. “Since they have their city and territory sacred and inviolable” would have been an improbable way to stress, in appropriately self-congratulatory tones, a city’s own prior magnanimous grant, a strange way to say “since we have already recognized their city and territory as sacred and inviolable.” Perhaps Gonnoi’s odd response reflects the oddity of the request. Aigeira recognized Koan inviolability with a tone of surprise, accepting since “it is a belief also of the city and of the Achaeans that temples are inviolable” (Asylia 18.7-8, with p. 31); Pella decreed that “asylia belong to the temple [sc. of Asklepios, at Kos], even as it does to other temples” (Asylia 23.12–13). These two recognitions took place in 242, relatively early in the history of territorial inviolability, when we must excuse curiosity at what seemed tautologous. *Hiera are hiera.* Who doubted? But the honor was always something of a redundancy, so that one might wonder whether the Gonneis’ reply (that the status exists already) is yet another expression of “surprise at an anomalous request” (Rigsby 1996: 22–25, quote at 22).33 The parallel is not exact: Asklepios’s temple was obviously sacred and inviolable in a way that Magnesian territory was not, and when Kos sought recognition from Gonnoi in 242 the Thessalian city assented clearly and without a hint of surprise (SEG 53.2 850). But the Koans do not appear to have stressed the oracular demand for inviolability nearly so much as the Magnesians did (Rigsby 1996: 106). It was clear to all that the Magnesians were acting on command of the god, so that Gonnoi may well have deemed the status a fact already, whatever they answered. Thus, on being invited to legislate the obvious

asked to accept the Magnesian invitation “even as the Greek cities” do / are doing / have done (Asylia 94.16–17): παραδέχαμένους, καθώς και αἱ πόλεις αἱ Ἑλλανίδες; although, as Rigsby observes (1996: 228) we cannot know whether this meant to assert that Greek cities had already accepted or that any reasonable city would be expected to accept. At Epidamnus, the ambassadors read civic decrees bestowing honors on their city (Asylia 96.14–16: παρανέγνωσαν δὲ | καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα | αἱ πόλεις ἐν οἷς ἦν καταγεγραμμένοι: although, as Rigsby suggests (1996: 233), there is no reference here to games or inviolability so that these honors more likely originated in the past, not during the present campaign.

33 Chaniotis 1996: 67 takes it as a fundamental principle that “inviolability of every sanctuary” was “a right probably as old as the sanctuaries themselves.”
Aigeira and the Achaeans wondered, “Why not?” whereas Gonnoi may have worried, “Why bother?” not so much refusing as failing to be bothered to make much of declaring the existence of something that the city felt existed already. Whether Magnesia wished to take this as acceptance or refusal was their choice. When would Gonnoi have complained? Whether Gonnoi saw its decree as an act of refusal to recognize Magnesian inviolability or simply an omission to legislate the status quo is likewise a matter for speculation. One thing, however, is clear: if Gonnoi’s failure to mention a prior grant would be surprising, humble silence from so many other authorities—three of them kings, who were ever quick to remind the world of their magnanimity—would be shocking, even incredible.

The ambiguous Greek of Gonnoi’s decree does not support an argument for prior acceptance. On a similar line of thought, the understated royal references to the games “and the rest” vel sim. might be seen not as refusals but rather as attempts to accede to a request so basic that it did not necessarily or always arouse royal zeal. So, Attalos accepts the games, mentions that he has ordered an offering of first-fruits, that his subject cities would do likewise, at his request, and that “also in the other matters [he] would increase the contest just as the people requests”. Now, we might hesitate to think that so bland a phrase as “the other matters” (ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις) could have covered the issue of inviolability, but Tralles is known, if a few years later, to have recognized Magnesian asylia (Asylia 129.17-18). This could suggest that the Attalid king had no qualms asking subjects to recognize Magnesian inviolability, as Seleukos did for another city (Asylia 7.2–6), but was reluctant to make much of the matter himself; that his response shows not so much silence as understatement.

Likewise, the Seleucids appear to have inclined toward reserve rather than rejection, citing the Magnesians’ proclamation of “the games and the other things that the people voted to accomplish” (τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὰλλα ἡ ἐψήφισται ὁ δήμος συντελεῖν, Asylia 69.6–7, 70.6–7). What other things? Apollo’s oracle spoke only of pious honor (τοῖς σεβόμενοι) and inviolability. The latter needed no interpretation. The former was construed as the creation of crowned games, and justified by the fact that others had acted similarly in the past (Asylia 66.18–24). The success of their venture was measured by the invitees’ decisions to “honor (τιμᾶν) Artemis Leukophryene and that the city

34 Asylia 68.21–23: καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ καθ’ ὅσον ὁ δήμος [αἰτεῖται] συναγερµένος τὸν ἀγῶνα [ — — ].
35 Asylia 129.17–18; perhaps the city authoring 130 did too: Rigsby 1996: 278.
36 Asylia 66.7–10: [λῶ]ν εἶµεν καὶ ἄµεινον τοῖς σεβὸς Ἀπόλλωνα Πυθιόν καὶ Ἀρτεµιν Λευκοφρυήνην (honoring) καὶ τάν [π]ῶλον καὶ τᾶν χῶραν τὰν Μαγνήτου τῶν ἐπὶ Μαυάνδρος [—Iερὰν καὶ ἄσυνον νοµιζόντοις (inviolability).
and territory of the Magnesians be inviolable” (*Asylia* 66.32–33). These were their two requests: games, which included sacrifices, and the rest, i.e. inviolability.37 Philip may have been similarly understated. “[T]hough his letter is almost completely lost [*Asylia* 72], Chalcis, a city in his possession and writing at his command,” Welles observed (1934: 147), “writes [*Asylia* 97] much of the games, but nothing of the ἄσυλία.” Chalkis received an invitation from Magnesia and a letter from Philip. Meanwhile, Eretria, whose decree says nothing of a letter from Philip, accepted both games and inviolability. Maybe Chalkis’ neighbor had not yet received the king’s command (so Rigsby 1996: 236), but we have already seen that Hellenistic royalty could be understated in their correspondence on the matter, relegating ἄσυλία among “the other matters.” Perhaps we see here on Euboia two different interpretive strategies. Chalkis played it safe, invoking Philip’s letter, acceding to his explicit recommendations (accepting the games), and passing over what was veiled and implied (recognizing inviolability), passing over “the other things.” The Eretrians, by contrast, acted as most cities had, accepting both explicitly. In other words, we may see in these neighbors’ responses indications of local sentiment and sensibility rather than of a monarch’s puppet strings—and we shall see below that their responses were determined also by the very different utterances that the Magnesian envoys brought them.

Unlike Chalkis, Antioch in Persis says nothing of directives from its masters (*Asylia* 111),38 but like its Seleucid lords (*Asylia* 69, 70) it refers only to the games. Here again, the significance is open to interpretation. If we believe that the Seleucids’ “other things” pointed obliquely to ἄσυλία, as I think probable, then Antioch may either have missed the understatement or taken it to urge refusal. If “the other things” denoted otherwise, then Antioch may have been toeing the line, conforming to a royal refusal whose cause and intent are utterly obscure to us. If these Hellenistic kings were coy about responding to

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37 Cf. Welles 1934: 148: “By the expression τὰλλα may be meant the σπονδαί and the θυσίαι, etc., enumerated in many of the replies. It cannot well include the ἄσυλία, concerning which the letter maintains significant silence.” The former claim is but assertion, the latter circular. No one has doubted that the Knidians’ decision “to accept the things that they request in accordance with the god’s oracle” indicated anything other than acceptance of both games and ἄσυλία (105.26–27). There is but a fine line between “the things” and “the other things,” and no evidence to suggest that either could not have encompassed ἄσυλία.

38 Its silence notwithstanding, Ma 1999: 157 sees in *Asylia* 69.25–29 (γεγράφαμεν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τεταγμένοις, ὅπως καὶ αἱ πόλεις ἀκολούθως ἀποδέξωνται; “We have written also those in charge of affairs, so that the cities too may accept likewise”) royal “interference with full participation in the intra-polied life.” But cf. Rigsby 1996: 196.
the less palpable of the two requests, we can only guess at their motives, just as we can only guess at Ptolemy’s reasons for behaving otherwise.39

Kings were not alone in accepting asylia as among mere “things.” Rhodes resolved to “accept graciously the sacrifice that they jointly offer to Artemis Leukophryene and the other things, and see to the joint increase of the things decreed by them, as they ask.”40 Knidos voted “to accept what [the ambassadors] ask, in accordance with the god’s oracle” (Asylia 105.26: ἀποδέξασθαι ἀ ἀξιοῦ[ντι ἀκολοῦ]θας τῶι τοῦ θεοῦ χρησμῶι). What the Magnesians asked the Knidians was “that the people receive and enhance the honors voted by them to the goddess” (105.17–19: τὸν δὰμον ἀποδέξασθαι καὶ σγγα[ύ]ξειν τὰς ἐγνωρισμένας ὑπ’ ἀυτῶ[ν] τ[μάς] ταῖ θεᾶι). Their response is in effect no different from that of Rhodes, but no one has seen refusal or prior acceptance in their decree. We must, therefore, admit that if Knidos could acknowledge inviolability by accepting “what they ask,” then Rhodes could accept it as one of “the things,” and so could the Hellenistic kings. When Attalos and the Seleucids acknowledged “the other matters/things” they were responding, I suggest, in a manner like that of Rhodes and Knidos. Perhaps by downgrading the contents of the Magnesians’ request to mere “things” Rhodes, Knidos, and the Hellenistic kings maintained their status as benevolent grantors, but in such a way as not to appear prevailed upon. This might be construed as a dignified (and it does seem excessively so) way to acknowledge a small request.

Of the remaining decrees that do not mention asylia and so have been taken to imply early acceptances, none seems more likely to have indicated such than any of the above. The Aetolian League may have omitted to acknowledge asylia in 208, only to accept it two years later (more on this below). Delphi’s acceptance decree is in a very poor state of preservation, but if van Effenterre’s plausible restoration at Asylia 79.23–24 is correct, then Delphi did acknowledge inviolability in 208. The highly compressed decrees of Argos (90), Sikyon (91), and Delos (99) offer little ground on which to erect an argument for much of anything, whether refusal in 208 or acceptance in 221.

39 “Ptolemy alone of the kings explicitly recognizes the inviolability of Magnesia” (Rigsby 1996: 198). This is a reasonable inference. His letter alone refers to the request (Asylia 71.11–13: καὶ | περὶ | τοῦ | νομι[ζειν τὴν πόλιν και τὴν | χώραν ἱερὰν καὶ ἄσυλον. But the letter breaks at the point where he would have mentioned his acceptance of asylia (20–22): [ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τὸν ἀγῶνα | στεφανίτην καθ | ἠξιοῦτε] ἀποδέχεται καὶ συνεπιμελεῖται τοῦ συναύξεσθαι τὰ ἐψαφισμένα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κα[θ]άπερ | ἄξιοντι.

None of them even recapitulates the Magnesians’ request in the preamble; the decrees of Argos and Sikyon follow brief mention of submission of the decree and “discussion” with similarly brief decrees recognizing the games.\(^41\) The extremely abbreviated decree of Delos merely reports the Magnesians’ announcement of the games (\textit{Asylia} 99.4–6) and recognizes them, “as the ambassadors ask” (8: καθὰ παρακαλῶν).\(^42\)

Not one of these dozen cases gives independent cause to conclude that silence (or in the case of Gonnoi, ambiguous reference to the status quo) in 208 tells of acceptance in 221. Whatever the precise motives here, we see that reactions to Magnesia’s campaign of invitations were more complicated than simple acceptance or refusal. What the Aigeirans and Achaeans had accepted as a strange redundancy, the Gonneis appear to have brushed off with language that looks like acceptance with a dismissive shrug. Others may have accepted with an air of cool detachment, accepting “things.”\(^43\) The Achaean acceptance of the Magnesian request in 208 seems to voice yet another feeling. For in their decree we may find an oblique indication that even willing cities might bristle at being schooled in the dictates of piety and reciprocity. The Magnesian ambassador showed the Achaeans the Magnesian decree and the supporting oracle (\textit{Asylia} 89.4–9), discussed the rest of the decree’s particulars, explained the epiphany of the goddess and Magnesia’s good deeds toward the Greeks (89.9–15), and invited the Achaeans to accept the city’s invitations (89.15–20). This was standard. But he apparently concluded by pointing out that in heeding Magnesia’s requests the Achaeans would not only increase the honor of Artemis, but also satisfy the requirement of the oracle and—in a phrase so elliptical as to suggest corruption—the reciprocity owed to another for prior good deeds (89.20–24). At this point in the decree, the syntax is interrupted by a parenthetical statement, independent of the preceding string of genitives absolute,\(^44\) in which the Achaeans assert

\(^41\) \textit{Asylia} 90 (Argos) with p. 223: “I hesitate to take such a clipped statement as evidence that Argos deliberately did not recognize \textit{asylia}; perhaps this was not requested by the Magnesians (on the theory that Argos had recognized it in 221).” Both Argos and Sikyon claimed to be following the Achaeans in their acceptance: Rigsby 1996: 223, 224.

\(^42\) Rigsby 1996: 237: “The decree is of the utmost brevity and does not grant \textit{asylia}. Here as elsewhere, I suggest that the Delians were not motivated by military designs upon the Maeander Valley but rather had recognized \textit{asylia} in 221.”

\(^43\) Slater and Summa 2006: 277, with n11, see a political element to the festal upgrade, stressing that “Festival upgrades were more likely to succeed with royal support and oracles,” and doubting Robert’s insistence (1936: 18) that no such considerations obtained.

\(^44\) These ought to form the only statement of cause for the decree: “Since the ambassador came asking as follows, the Achaeans resolved . . .”
that it is their custom to increase honors for those who do so for them: τοῖς δὲ Ἀχαιοῖς πάτριόν ἐστι συναύξειν τὰς τιμὰς τὰς παρ’ ἐκάστοις ὅσοι καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς συν’ [αὐ]ξοντι (89.24–27). This is a statement of fact, not a justification for action (not “Since, therefore, it is Achaean custom . . . it is decreed”). The precise tone is irrecoverable, but the intrusion into boilerplate is noteworthy and gives cause to wonder whether the Achaeans’ pride was stung at the ambassador’s apparent supposition that they had to be reminded of the rules of reciprocity.45 Insulted or not, the Achaeans did recognize both games and inviolability (89.27–33), perhaps feeling mildly snubbed, but not to the point of refusal. The decrees, then, do not reveal a universe in which all responses were flat acceptance or flat refusal, but one in which even accepting authorities could be coy, subtle, bewildered, or even peeved. All of this could affect the wording of their decrees, especially the preambles, and none of it need imply refusal in 208 or prior acceptance in 221.

3. THE MAGNESIANS’ REQUESTS

We find variation not only in the responses, but in the Magnesians’ requests as well. The format of the decrees accepting Magnesia’s requests takes a fairly predictable shape: Since Magnesia (1) sent ambassadors who, e.g., explained the oracle, recalled Magnesia’s good deeds, or its kinship with the receiving city, announced the games, etc., and since they (2) requested X, Y, and Z, it is therefore decreed . . . These acceptance decrees demonstrate the typical diplomatic tendency toward verbal coalescence, responses closely mirroring the formal requests of the Magnesian ambassadors, so that the acceptance decrees show a great many commonalities of language and phrasing (Chaniotis 1999). There is a fair degree of variation in that first part of the cities’ recapitulation of the Magnesians’ diplomatic utterances, which Chaniotis (1999) has carefully tabulated, with a view to reconstructing a putative master decree on which Magnesia requested recognition.46 That second part, however, in which accepting cities not only described what the Magnesians did (e.g. explained the oracle), but also quoted—albeit in indirect address—the request (e.g. since they requested that we do X, Y, and Z), tends to show variation bound by a strict pattern hitherto unrecognized.

45 I take this to be implicit in Rigsby’s remark (1996: 222), “They respond with an observation of their own (δ[ὲ] … ἐστι κτλ.).” The sentiment itself is neither novel nor alien to acceptances of inviolability: e.g. Asylia 84.14–16 (Phocian league), 85.15–16 (Same), 88.18–20 (Megalopolis), 93.21–23 (Messene), 96.25 (Epidamnos).

46 Some of this prefigured already in Laqueur 1927: 32–39. This is the bureaucratic and diplomatic complement to the tendency of the decrees to mirror “argumentation . . . presuppositions and thought-patterns”: Gehrke 2001: 294–95.
The ambassadors, who traveled mostly in teams of three, arrived with papers in hand: the decree by which the city of Magnesia decided to create the games and request *asylia*\(^{47}\) and other supporting documentation. They delivered a speech in which they told of the oracle, explained Magnesia’s good deeds, often referred to unique aspects of the recipient’s relationship with Magnesia, and requested recognition. Since the acceptance decrees tend to recapitulate this material in detail, the ambassadors must have handed over copies of the speech after delivery.\(^{48}\) Then, they waited for the authorities to draft and pass an acceptance decree, which they carried home to Magnesia, or else perhaps departed in expectation of future delivery. Now, if the wording of the acceptance decrees reflected and echoed an aspect of the Magnesian ambassadors’ presentations it surely mirrored their speeches,\(^{49}\) not the Magnesian decree; there is no indication that Magnesia passed a separate decree for every authority that it approached or a master decree that governed the precise language to be deployed by the ambassadors severally.\(^{50}\) Such would

\(^{47}\) This decree is not *Asylia* 66—although it is perhaps there alluded to at 17–18: [ἐψηφίσαν] το— and does not survive. It is alluded to very often in the archive, e.g. *Asylia* 68.5–6, 81.14–15, 89.4, 92.3, 95.7–8, 111.33–34: ἀποδόντος τὸ ψάφισμα vel sim.

\(^{48}\) Or else, one reader kindly suggests, both speakers and audience relied on memory (to produce consistent speeches and decrees that echoed them faithfully). I should not wish to suggest that any party involved relied entirely on memory or entirely on accompanying paper, but I am inclined to think, with Kern 1901: 509–11, that the Magnesian ambassadors did come armed with a variety of written documentation. Note especially the reference to local Magnesian chroniclers (*Asylia* 96.13–14): [ἱστοριαγράφων τῶν συγγεγραφόν των] τὰς Μαγνήτων πρᾶξεις, the implication of documentary proof of Magnesian magnanimity going back to 369 (*Asylia* 88.25–29; Chaniotis 1988: T 7), the handing over of decrees, whether that authorizing the initiative (examples in note above) or past honorary decrees (*Asylia* 85.9–10, 86.9–10, 96.14–15 with pp. 213, 233): παρανέγνωσαν δὲ | καὶ τὰ ψαφίσματα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῖς παρὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν (96.14–15). The heavily documentary nature of this diplomatic enterprise seems clear enough.

\(^{49}\) What Sumi 2004: 83 calls the “presentation text,” which included, he suggests, (a) a report of the epiphany and oracle, (b) a request to recognize Magnesian inviolability, (c) a declaration of Magnesia’s friendship or kinship with the invitee, (d) a record of Magnesian benefactions to Greeks, and (e) an invitation to participate in the newly enhanced games, which is roughly the conclusion of Chaniotis 1999.

\(^{50}\) Here I diverge from one facet of Chaniotis’ conclusion (1999) that a compilation of the clauses, to whose assembly Sumi 2004 attaches the label “presentation text” (see above), would show us something like the master copy of a decree in which the Magnesians framed their request; I do not believe that there was a single master decree that determined the language of the individual requests, but rather many custom speeches, which were accompanied by a dossier of copies of supporting documents, one of which was the Magnesian decree authorizing the games. His general conclusion, however, that the wording of the acceptance
have been unnecessary, overkill. Moreover, if the ambassadors composed their speeches extemporaneously then, inasmuch as the acceptance decrees echoed their words, we should expect to find significant, and essentially patternless, variation in the recapitulation of the Magnesians’ requests. We do not. Thus, we know that the ambassadors spoke from a script. If there was but a single script then we should expect to find near uniformity in the acceptance decrees’ reference to the Magnesians’ specific requests. We do not. Thus, we know that the ambassadors delivered several discrete versions of the request to different cities.

These versions fall into two clear categories of utterance, which we might designate “suggestive” and “direct.” The great majority of the decrees that preserve a recapitulation of the Magnesians’ request (παρεκάλεσαν . . . vel sim.), 29 of 36 decrees, fall under the former category. In these cases the embassies did not explicitly “ask for” recognition of asylia. They quoted the oracle in which the god proclaimed Magnesian inviolability an “agreeable” thing, and they often explained it, but they are not said explicitly to have “asked that their city and territory be inviolable.” They quoted the divine directive but did not re-issue it as an overt request in their own words. This suggestive version came in two clear types: they either “request acceptance of the sacrifice and/or truce and/or games etc., which they established for Artemis Leukophryene,” or “request acceptance and/or enhancement of the honors voted to Artemis Leukophryene.” For example:


παρεκάλουν ἀποδέξαμένους τοὺς πολίτας συναύξειν τὰς ἐψηφισμένας τιμὰς τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ Λευκῷφρυηνή. *Asylia* 97.15–17 (Chalkis).

Variations on these two basic types of “suggestive” request are relatively few in number and narrow in scope (see Table 1a below). In a minority of cases (7 of 36), however, the ambassadors did re-issue the god’s commandment as a request in their own words, for example:

παρακαλέντω<ν> ὡς ἀποδέχη|ται ἡ πόλις τάν πανάγυριν καὶ ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ τὸν ἀγῷνα στεφανίαν ἰσοπύθιον τόν τε μου[σικ]όν καὶ γυμνικόν καὶ
The two basic types of the “direct” version differ only in the inclusion of the qualification “as the god at Delphi commanded them in an oracle,” such that we might speak of virtually no variation in the family of rarer, “direct” requests (see Table 1b below).

Now, however directly, explicitly, bluntly the Magnesians asked for recognition of the games, when it came to inviolability, their request came in these two distinct versions. That Magnesia desired and sought acceptance of inviolability from everyone, regardless of which version of the petition its ambassadors delivered, was clear and cannot have escaped anyone’s notice. But the suggestive version was an indirect speech act; simply to invoke and quote the oracle was to ask without asking, a diplomatic nicety.

Not all decrees recapitulated the Magnesians’ requests, but those that do (and preserve that section) allow classification of their requests by the two versions, with a small number of variant types (Tables 1a and 1b below).

A number of observations follow from this taxonomy. First, the very clear difference of wording between types and the narrow band of variation within each discrete version and type of the request proves that the Magnesian ambassadors delivered presentations from multiple “archetypes.” Next, of the seven decrees framed in answer to the direct version of the request, not one can be said positively to have failed to grant *asylia* in explicit terms. The decree of the Boeotian League (*Asylia* 73) is too fragmentary to assess with certainty; that of Messene (93) might have granted such in the fragmentary lines 23–25. The others recognized the status as clearly as it was requested.

51 The sole outlier to this arrangement is the decree of Klazomenai, whose strangely ornate style sets it apart from the rest of the archive (*Asylia* 102.20–23, embassy otherwise unattested): παρεκάλουν συν[ε]πελαβέ*σθαι* τῆς τοῦ δήμου σπουδῆς καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἀκολούθως | [τ]οῖς προϋπάρχουσιν πρὸς αὑτὰς ταῖς πόλεσιν διὰ προγόνων φιλαν[θρώ]- ι[ο]ις.

52 *Asylia* 84.19–20; 87.29–30; 88.36–37 (καὶ τὰν πόλιν καὶ τὰν χώραν | εἶναι αὐτῶν ἱερὰν, καθὼς ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησεν καὶ ἀξίοσίν | οἱ παραγεγονότες πρεσβευταὶ καὶ θεωροὶ), with p. 220: “‘Sacred’ seems to be thought a sufficient answer, even though ‘sacred and inviolable’ was in the request (18);” 89.30–32; 98.16–17.
A. Suggestive Version

Type I (to accept the sacrifice and truce and games, which the city created)

92.6-10 (Corinth, Embassy V):

parakalountes ἀποδέξασθαι | τάν πόλιν τῶν Κορινθίων
tάν θυσίαν καὶ τάν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄγωνας
οὐς τίθητι ἀ πόλις ἢ τῶν Μαγνητῶν | τάι Αρτέμιτι τάι Λευκομηναί τόν τε μουσικόν καὶ τόν | γυμνικόν καὶ ἱππικόν ἱσοπύθιον

85.10–12 (Same, Embassy IV)

parakalountων | ἀποδεξασθαί
τάν τε θυσίαν καὶ τάν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ τόν ἄγωνα
ὁν τίθεντι ταὶ Αρτέμιτι ταὶ Λευκομηναί στεφανίταν ἱσοπύθιον ταῖς τιμαῖς

120.19–21 (Syracuse, Embassy partially preserved but otherwise unattested)

parakaleóntων ἀποδέξασθαι
tάν θυσίαν καὶ τόν ἄγων | να,
ὁν τίθεντι ταὶ Αρτέμιτι ταὶ Λευκομηναί στεφανί | ταῖς ἱσοπύθιον ταῖς τιμαῖς

79.10–12: (Delphi, Embassy III)

parakalósan ἀποδέξασθαι
tας | τε [θυσίας καὶ ἐκεχειρίας καὶ] τόν ἄγωνα
ὁν τίθεντι ταὶ Αρτέμιτι | ταὶ Λευκομηναί στεφανί νυταν ἱσοπύθιον ταῖς τιμαῖς

103.5–9 (Artists, Embassy otherwise unattested)

parakalο[ου]ν τὴν θυσίαν προς 
ἀποδέξασθαι καὶ
τὴν παινι][γυμνίαν καὶ τὸν ἄγωνα | 
ὁν τίθεασι [Μάγνητης μουσικόν καὶ] γυμνικόν καὶ 
πικὸν τήρῃ ἀρχηγόν τῆς πόλεως 
Ἀρτέμι[δι] | ἱσοπύθιον ἱσοπύθιον

96.21–22 (Epidamnmos, Embassy IV)

parakalουν δὲ καὶ ἀμέτρατα ὀικεῖους καὶ φίλους
ἀποδέξασθαι
tὰν τὴ[ν θυσίαν καὶ τάν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ τὸν ἄγωνα στεφανίταν ἱσοπύθιον ταῖς τιμαῖς
(note: missing relative clause, but seems to belong to this group; see …ταῖς τιμαῖς)

78.2–4 (Aetolian Lg, Embassy not preserved)

ἀγίαν | νῦν οἱ πρεσβευταὶ 
δέχεσθαι
τὰν | τε θυσίαν καὶ τὸν ἄγωνα ταὶ Αρτέμιτι ταὶ Λευκομηναί στεφανί | ταῖς ἱσοπύθιον
(note: missing relative clause, but seems to belong to this group; see …ταῖς τιμαῖς)

69.13–16 (Antiochus III, Embassy I)

parakalountes ἀποδέξασθαι
στεφανίτην ἱσοπύθιον | τὸν ἄγωνα
ὁν τίθετε τῇ θεϊ διὰ πεν | [τ]αετηρίδος

70.12–15 (Antiochus son of Antiochus III, Embassy I)

parakalουντες ἀποδέξασθαι
STEPHAI\[ΤΗΝ ΙΟΣΟΠΘΙΟΝ ΤΟΝ ΆΓΩΝΑ
Οὐν τίθετε τῇ | θεί

111.37–39 (Antioch in Persis, dated 205 BC, Embassy I)
παρεκάλουν | ἀποδέξασθαι
τὸν ἄγωνα στεφανίτην
οὐν συντελεῖν | οὐν Ἀρτέμιδι Λευκοφρυνῆι κατὰ τὸν | θεόν ἁρπαμόν

71.13–16 (Ptolemy IV, Embassy otherwise unattested)
παρεκλήθην; δὲ | καὶ ἐγὼ
ἀποδέξασθαι
τὸν ἄγωνα ἀπὸ[δείξασθαι]
οἶ[α | οἵς | οἴ | οἱ] | ἦμεν ἐπὶ[ηγεγέλκατε αὐτῶν

68.5–13: Attalos I (Embassy otherwise unattested)
πα[pα] | καλεῖτε τὸν ἄγωνα
οὐ τίθετε | τῇ | Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ | Λευκοφρυνῆ; | μουσικὸν καὶ γυμνικὸν καὶ ἵππον
ἀποδέξασθαι
στεφανίτην | Ιοσπόθιον,
καὶ αὐτοὶ διελέξθησαν | οἱ | ἀθλοῦσιν τοῖς γεγεγραμένοις | η̄':' θεοί καὶ τὰς ὑπ' ἐμὲ πόλεις | ἀποδέξασθαι ομοίως

_Type 1.a_

130.7–10 (Unknown Attalid city, dated 197–159, Embassy not preserved)
παρεκάλουν ἤμας
ἀποδέξασθαι
τὴν [την] νήγυρυν καὶ τὴν θυ[ν] | οἰαν καὶ τὸν ἄγωνα στεφανίτην ιοσπόθιον μουσικόν
γυμνικὸν ἵππον
ὁν τὴν [θην] ἀπὸ [- [- -] | ἐς σεληνῇ δευτέραν τοῖς ἀθλοῦσιν [τοῖς ἀθλοῦσιν] ἐπάνω | οἷαλεῖα το καὶ ἀσύλαια | κατευέμενοι | εἰς τοὺς θεοὶς καὶ τὸλα τὰ προγεγραμμένα | [να - - -]

131.7–10 (Unknown Attalid city, dated 159–138, Embassy otherwise unattested)
παρεκαλοῦντες
παρεκάλουσθαι
τὴν τὴν θυσίαν καὶ παλήγυρυν καὶ ἀκοληγμένην ἵστατον μουσικὸν το καὶ γυμνικὸν καὶ ἵππον
ὁν συντελεῖσθαι τῇ ἁρπαγμένη τῇ οἴ][δε] Ἀρτέμιδι Λευκοφρυνῆ | ηῇ διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐν Δέλφοις μαντείας

_Type 2 (to accept and/or enhance the honors voted to the goddess)_

97.15–17 (Chalkis, Embassy II)
παρεκάλουν
ἀποδεξάμενον τοὺς πολίτας
συναύ [ξιν]
tάς ἐπ' [ηο] | οἱμένας τιμᾶς τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ | Λευκοφρυνή

82.5–18, esp. 17–18 (Epirote League, Embassy III)
ἀξίους καὶ | παρεκάλουσθαι | οἱμένας τιμᾶς Ἀρτέμιδι | Λευκο | φρυνή

95.23–25 (Apollonia, Embassy IV)
παρακαλοῦν[το]ν | ἀποδέξασθαι τὸν ἄγωνα καὶ
συναύ [ξιν]
tάς [η]ομένας τιμᾶς | θεοί
100.22–24 (Paros, Embassy VI)
παρακαλοῦσαι καὶ ἡμᾶς κ[σι] ἄξιο[ν]
ἀποδέξασθαι τε τῶν ἀγὼ[να κ]σι
συν[α] ἄξιε[ν]
τά[ις] ἐγκριμένας τιμᾶς τῇ θε̣[α̣]

105.16–19 (Knidos, Embassy VII)
πα[ρακαλεύν]τι τὸν δάμον
ἀποδέξασθαι καὶ
συνα[δ] ἄξι[εν]
τάς ἐγκριμένας ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶ[ν] τῷ[μᾶς] | ταῖ θε̣[α]

125.a.12–14 (Antioch in Pisidia?, Embassy VIII)
ἀπαρακαλέσωμαι
συνα[δε] ἄξιε[ν]

107.8–9 (Unknown City, Embassy VII)
παρακαλοῦσιν τὸν δήμου
συν[α] ἄξιε[ν]

129.8–9 (Trelles, Embassy otherwise unattested)
ἄξιο[ν]σι
συνα[δε] ἄξιε[ν]
τάς ἐγκριμένας τῇ θε̣[α] τῷ[μᾶς] ἀκολούθως τῷ τοῦ θεού χρησιμοί

113.14–17 (Unknown, Embassy partially preserved but otherwise unattested)
πα[ρακαλοῦσιν καὶ] ἄξιο[ν] συν[α] τῶν δήμου
προ[δ] ἄξιε[θα] καὶ

112.12–14 (Unknown, Embassy partially preserved but otherwise unattested)
παρακαλοῦσιν καὶ ἄξιο[ν] συν[α] τῶν δήμου
προ[δ] ἄξιε[θα]

106.10–13 (Kos, Embassy VII) Note affinity with Type 3 below: μετέχειν
[π]αρακαλ[ε]ύντι τὸν δάμον
μετέχειν
τῶν | συντελεύμε[να] καὶ
ἀποδέξασθε τα | ἄξιο[μεν]α
συν[α] ἄξιε[ν]
τάς ἐγκριμένας | τιμᾶς τα[ὶ θε̣[α]}

Type 3 (to share in the sacrifice)
94.16–20 (Corecyra, Embassy IV)
παρακάλουν τε καὶ Διονυτο δεῖν
παραδεξα[μέ]νοι, καθὼς καὶ αἱ πόλεις αἱ Ἑλλανιδε[ς],
μετέχειν
τάς τῇ θυσίας | καὶ τοῦ ἀγώνος καὶ
ἀποστέλλει διαρι[κ]έτω καὶ ἐκαστάκης ὁ χρόνος περί [ικῃ] τaqu[π]ετρετρίδος, τοὺς
κοινοβιομοιοῦτας τὰς τῇ θυσίας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν τιμῶν παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς

101.16–19 (Mytilene?, Embassy partially preserved but otherwise unattested)
παρακαλείοι τοῦ δα[μ]φιλοῦ έστατα καὶ συγγένης<υ>
81.23–26 (Acarnanian Lg, Embassy III)

παρακαλούντων τῶν ὑπερὰ τοις οἰκείοι τε καὶ φίλοι
 μετεξέχεωντι

tάν θυσίαν καὶ τὰς παναγύρις καὶ τὰν ἐκεῖ[παν]

Table 1a: Suggestive version of Magnesians’ request: (1) to accept the sacrifice and truce and games, which the city created, (2) to accept and/or enhance the honors voted to the goddess, (3) to share in the sacrifice etc. For the numbers assigned to the various embassies see Table 2 below.

B. Direct Version

Type I (to receive the festival etc., and that the city and territory be inviolable)

88.13–18 (Megapolis, Embassy V)

παρακαλοῦντων

ὡς ἀποδέχεται ταῖς ἀπολίσις

tῶν πανάγυρων καὶ ἐκείρισιν καὶ τῶν ἀγὼν παραστάτες ἑσπερίδοι τοὺς τῆς μου[υ]κ[τοί] λα[υ]

89.15–20 (Achaean League, Embassy V)

παρακαλοῦντος τοὺς ἄρχοντας

ἀκολούθοι τῶν πανάγυρων καὶ ἐκείρισιν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων παραστάτων τοὺς τῆς μου[υ]κ[τοί] λα[υ]

93.16–21 (Messene, Embassy V)

παρακαλοῦντων,

ὅτι ἀποδέχεται τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Ἀρχαῖοι

87.15–20 (Athens, Embassy II)

παρακαλοῦσαν, καὶ τὰς παναγύρις καὶ τὰς ἐκεῖ[παν]

Table 1a: Suggestive version of Magnesians’ request: (1) to accept the sacrifice and truce and games, which the city created, (2) to accept and/or enhance the honors voted to the goddess, (3) to share in the sacrifice etc. For the numbers assigned to the various embassies see Table 2 below.

Type I.a (to receive the festival etc., and that the city and territory be inviolable, per Delphi)

73.12–17 (Boeotian League, Embassy II)

παρακαλοῦσαν μετὰ πάσας σπουδὰς καὶ φιλοτιμίας

ἀποδέχοντες

τῶν τοὺς θυσίας καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖρισιν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων καὶ τῶν ἀριστοκρατῶν ἑσπερίδοι

84.10–14 (Phocian League, Embassy II)

παρακαλοῦσαν μετὰ πάσας σπουδὰς καὶ φιλοτιμίας

ἀποδέχονται τοὺς Φοῖκες

τῶν ἀγώνων καὶ τῶν ἀριστοκρατῶν ἑσπερίδοι

87.15–20 (Athens, Embassy II)

παρακαλοῦσαν μετὰ πάσας σπουδὰς καὶ φιλοτιμίας
By contrast, Corcyra and Corinth were not specifically asked to accept *asylia*, and did not even mention it in the preambles to their decrees, but granted the honor nonetheless (94.1–20, 35–36; 92.1–10); they knew that the request was implicit in the suggestive version of the presentation. The majority of authorities that received the suggestive version did mention *asylia* in the preambles and did grant the honor. Moreover, all of the decrees that omit to acknowledge *asylia* or else “accept things” *vel sim.* were issued in response to the suggestive version of the request. No one who received the direct version decided to “accept things.” In other words, the majority was “asked without being asked” and most answered the subaudible request with an explicit and unambiguous grant of inviolability; a few, however, answered with similarly suggestive decrees—understated responses to understood questions, acceptance of “things.” The small minority who received the direct petition, answered in kind with clear assent.

Furthermore, because many acceptance decrees record the names of the Magnesian ambassadors, we are able to map our classification of the versions and types of the requests on to the embassies who delivered them (See Table 2 below).

The results of this mapping are striking. They reveal not only that the ambassadors delivered speeches from multiple archetypes, but also that the distribution of such did not correspond precisely to the personnel or itineraries of the embassies. Embassy 2 delivered the slightly fuller type of the direct version (B.1a) to the Boeotian League, Phocian League, Athens, and Eretria, and the second type of the suggestive version (A.2) to Chalkis. Embassy 5 delivered the first type of the direct version (B.1) to Megalopolis, the Achaean League and Messene, and the first type of the suggestive version (A.1) to Corinth. Embassy 3 delivered the three types of the suggestive ver-

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Table 1b: Direct version of Magnesians’ request: (1) to accept the sacrifice etc., which the city created, and that the city and territory be inviolable (1.a) to accept the sacrifice etc., which the city created, and that the city and territory be inviolable, per the oracle. For the numbers assigned to the various embassies see Table 2 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version of Request</th>
<th>Asylla</th>
<th>First Seat</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Embassy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Philiskos s. Pythagoras</td>
<td>Konon s. Diomisyos</td>
<td>Lampetos s. Pythagoras</td>
<td>Megalopolis</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Philiskos s. Pythagoras</td>
<td>Konon s. Diomisyos</td>
<td>Lampetos s. Pythagoras</td>
<td>Sicyon</td>
<td>Achaean Lg.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Philiskos s. Pythagoras</td>
<td>Konon s. Diomisyos</td>
<td>Lampetos s. Pythagoras</td>
<td>Messene</td>
<td>Achaean Lg.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Philiskos s. Pythagoras</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Achaean Lg.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Demetrios s. Amphistathos</td>
<td>Melosos s. Kallichthon</td>
<td>Kallichrones s. Iphicrates</td>
<td>Delos</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Melosos s. Kallichthon</td>
<td>Demetrios s. Amphistathos</td>
<td>Kallichrones s. Iphicrates</td>
<td>Paros</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Lampson s. Phainias</td>
<td>Diogoras</td>
<td>Pythodemos</td>
<td>Rhodes</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Lampson s. Phainias</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Achaean Lg.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Lampson s. Phainias</td>
<td>Diogoras</td>
<td>Pythodemos</td>
<td>Kos</td>
<td>Achaean Lg.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Lykomedes s. Lykomedes</td>
<td>Demetrios s. Demophon</td>
<td>Dionysarchos s. Anaxagoras</td>
<td>Ant. Pis.</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>Lykomedes s. Lykomedes</td>
<td>Demetrios s. Demophon</td>
<td>Dionysarchos s. Anaxagoras</td>
<td>Ant. Pis.</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The number assigned to each Embassy does not intend to prioritize chronology or any other criterion.
2 Request not repeated in decree.
3 Too fragmentary to assign to a Version.

Table 2: Magnesian ambassadors arranged by Embassy; stemma at left indicates versions of ambassadors' requests (see Tables 1a and 1b).
Magnesian Inviolability

Thus, the variation that we see in the acceptance decrees is not the result of refusals in 208 or acceptance in 221. Rather, it was conditioned, I suggest, by the version of the question put to the issuing authority and that particular authority’s inclination (a) to reflect the precise wording of the literal suggestive request, or else (b) to respond openly and clearly to the implicit part of Magnesia’s petition. That is, the variation tells not of international politics and intrigue, but of local legislative sensibility, from cautious acknowledgement of exactly what was requested and nothing more, to open acknowledgement of both explicit and implicit facets of the request, to slightly dismissive acceptance of “things” or “what they ask.”

The case of Embassy 2 is illuminating. The ambassadors Apollonophanes, Euboulos, and Lykomedes approached the Boeotian and Phocian Leagues (Asylia 73, 84), Athens (87), and the Euboian neighbors Chalkis and Eretria (97, 98). In a departure from the most common approach, the ambassadors asked directly for recognition of Magnesian inviolability, clearly deploying almost identical boilerplate in four of their five audiences: with all due honor, they requested acceptance of the crowned games “and that their city and territory be sacred and inviolable,” as Apollo stipulated (see Table 1b above). But at Chalkis they not only received a different answer, as we have seen already, but they also brought a different request. There, they deployed the more suggestive formula that looms so large in the archive, delivering the decree, mentioning the epiphany and the Magnesians’ good deeds, and inviting Chalkis to increase the honors voted to the goddess (see Table 1a above). They are not said to have requested Chalkis’ recognition of Magnesian asylia and they did not receive it either. Thus, an explanation for the fact that Eretria accepted and Chalkis did not is perhaps not to be discovered in the possibility that Philip’s letter had found its way to the former but not the latter (Rigsby 1996: 236). For, the ambassadors must have left Magnesia with scripts of one sort for the Boeotian League, Phocian League, Athens, and Eretria, and of another for Chalkis; the different answer was to some extent influenced months in advance by the decision to bring one version of the request to Chalkis and another to the others.53 Thus, Chalkis’ omission may have been innocent of political machination. Chalkis had in hand the more suggestive version of the Magnesian request and also a letter from Philip, which may likewise have

53 Unless, having learned of Philip’s letter or some other piece of intelligence the ambassadors decided, in mid-course as it were, that it was for some reason more prudent to deploy the suggestive version.
reiterated similarly indirect formulary. Faced with such a paper trail, the city may well have taken the road of caution, or even missed a cue. Anyway, if they offered ambiguous language in response to the suggestive language of the Magnesians, they were certainly not the only authority to do so.

Thus, the alleged refusals/omissions seem to be far fewer than thought and are to be explained neither from military or constitutional exigencies, as Welles and Giovannini proposed, nor by carelessness or the putative mission of 221, as Rigsby suggests. The reality was much more mundane. Diplomacy was always a delicate matter, and variation in the wording of the requests was at least partly responsible for variation in the responses. To some invitees, Magnesia’s very request will have seemed strange. Some accepted anyway, others may have neglected to codify the obvious. Insult might have followed if the envoys were felt to be too pushy in their pursuit of honor. Some might have bristled and accepted anyway, others refused. For some kings and cities a busy schedule may have left scant space or inclination to fuss over veiled requests for vain honor, and so it may have seemed best simply to accept “the things” and move on.

But why did the requests vary in the first place? The answer, I think, is once again mundane, arising from logistical considerations. The city of Magnesia had to mobilize a massive amount of paperwork in service of this initiative. Ambassadors may have carried written copies of the oracle or the Magnesian decree authorizing the games and pursuit of *asylia* to dozens of cities. But this was a small matter compared to the effort that would have been required to write customized speeches for delivery at upwards of 100 discrete locations, many of which made detailed reference to ancient friendships or past good deeds. This task must have demanded many hours of painstaking research, and then composition; in at least one case the drafters of the Magnesian presentations adduced a Magnesian decree that was more than 150 years old.\(^\text{54}\) I suggest that this large and important project was not assigned to a single person, but rather distributed among a handful of individuals or committees; that these working groups were then assigned the duty of drafting the speeches for some specified number of invited authorities, whose order and association need not have been determined solely or rigidly by geography, political circumstance, or ambassadorial itineraries; that these groups composed under

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Magnesian Inviolability

a mandate to make the twofold nature of the Magnesian request clear—games and *asylia*—but with the freedom to decide precise wording, and that as these groups wrote speech after speech they naturally consolidated into boilerplate some or all of the features that were often repeated throughout the speeches assigned to them; finally, that when the order and itinerary of the embassies were decided the speeches were then distributed—and so broken from their original sortition—to the correct embassies. Such a scenario would account for the patterns that we find in the decrees and their distribution across embassies and geographical regions. No politics; no military considerations; no refusals; no prior acceptance; just the simple facts that the form of the question could affect the form of the answer, and that the question was written several different ways by several different committees. The causes of what has looked like refusal or prior acceptance are administrative and boring, not political and exciting.

But if these suggestions be accepted, and if I am right about the date of Aetolia’s recognition of Magnesian inviolability, why did the Aetolian League accept the games in 208 and inviolability two years later, in 206/5? To be sure, it was not fearful of misinterpreting a letter from a Philip or an Antiochus. And as far as their decree tells, the ambassadors merely “renewed their friendship with the nation and made clear the goodwill that the Magnesians hold toward the League of the Aetolians;”55 nothing here suggests even a faint connection with the diplomatic language circulated in 208. Nevertheless, we have seen that curiosity over the form, scope, and necessity of the honor may have arisen elsewhere in 208, and something similar could have occurred with the Aetolians. In 208 the Aetolians had recognized territorial inviolability on but one other known occasion. This was in answer to the Tenian request, perhaps in the third quarter of the third century, but that text is in such wretched state of preservation that Rigsby cautions that it “need not be an *asylia* decree” at all (*Asylia* 54, with p. 157). In other words, the Magnesians may have been the first ever to request this particular honor from the Aetolian League. The Aetolians clearly sought to understand the bid by analogy with personal inviolability, grants of which they extended in great numbers and with whose form, logic, and law they were doubtless more comfortable. In the Magnesian decree they merely adapted that language to another, analogous but quite dissimilar application (Rigsby 1996: 192). Their acceptance of Tean *asylia* likewise frames territorial inviolability as a different flavor of personal inviolability (*Asylia* 132, with p. 294). Moreover, two decades later, when the

55 *Asylia* 67.6–9: τάν τε οἰκείοια τά τάν ποτί τό έθνος ἄνενεώσαντο καὶ τάν εὐνοιαν ἐνεφάνιζαν ἄν ἔχοντι ποτί τό κοινόν | τῶν Αἰτωλῶν Μάγνητες.
League recognized Pergamene *asylia*, it still maintained the same conceptual framework (*Asylia* 178, with p. 374).

This rigid inclination to view a novel form of honor (even long after it ceased to be novel) through the lens of traditional, analogous legal practice suggests the type of surprise and confusion to which the Magnesians’ “anomalous request” of 208 may have given rise. When they arrived and sought, perhaps with understated formulary, territorial inviolability, the Aetolians’ inclination would have been—as it remained long after—to draw up a decree of personal inviolability. Such might have been found wanting after it had been brought home to Magnesia; the misconstruction would certainly have been odd in the light of the acceptance by Calydon and a host of other Aetolian cities (*Asylia* 77). Or, perhaps the Aetolians received the suggestive version but missed the cue; they *did* properly accept the games (*Asylia* 78). This too would have stood out against the Calydonian acceptance. The newly revamped games were not run until 207 and the massive archive was not inscribed before 206/5, as its inclusion of the Seleucid letters proves.\(^{56}\) Perhaps the monumental task of ordering the decrees and planning their inscription in the Magnesian agora brought to light a gap in the record that had been forgotten, suppressed, or tabled for another day: Aetolia had accepted the games but missed or else not quite understood the request for *asylia*, and so had to be asked again. If so, then their acceptance is unique, for no other state is known to have been approached a second time. But that decree was always unique. And if I am right, then there were no true refusals,\(^{57}\) little need for Magnesia to have made other second approaches, and scant hope of our finding evidence of such. Besides, the Magnesians’ primary objective in 206 may not have been filling a hole in the roster of states who had recognized inviolability, but perhaps securing a seat on the Amphictyony, in which case we might do better not to think of this chiefly as a “second” request at all.

4. A PROCESS DERAILED

The Magnesians’ own account of the episode (*Asylia* 66) gives no reason to think that there was an initial mission in 221. Neither, I have argued, do the

\(^{56}\) By the second iteration of the festival in 203: Ebert 1982: 216.

\(^{57}\) It bears underscoring, and might always have been mentioned, that Magnesia must have regarded all of the acceptance decrees as endorsing both requests; all in effect fell under the heading of “the kings and the other Greeks,” who “voted … to honor Artemis Leukophryene and that the city and territory of the Magnesians be inviolable (*Asylia* 66.30–33, with Slater and Summa 290: ἀποδεξάμενων τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐπρέσβευσαν, κατὰ ἐθνοῦ καὶ πόλεως ψηφίσαμεν τιμᾶν Ἀρτεμιν ἐνοχρηστὴν καὶ ἅγιην τῆς Μαγνήτου πόλιν καὶ χώραν.}
Aetolian decree thought to belong to 222/21 (Asylia 67), the decree of Gonnoi (Asylia 83), or the omissions that have been taken variously to indicate refusal in 208 or acceptance in 221 (Asylia 68–70, 78, 79, 90, 91, 97, 111). The Greek world could not have refused Magnesia in 221, for Magnesia did not put the question until 208. If the world did not derail Magnesia’s plans, who did?

Whatever their first actions were (a vote, a discussion, an intention: [ἐψηφίσαν] το, 66.17), the Magnesians’ attempts at implementation were stymied. When, by whom, and why are unstated and remain a puzzle. The temporal designation “in the stephanephorate of Moiragoras” (Asylia 66.24–25) could limit Magnesia’s revelation of the oracle “also to others” (28–29), the city’s failure (24), or both; the Greek does not express whether this failure took place in 221/20, 208/7, or at any date or dates in between, only that some sort of failure preceded success. Moreover, the nature of their initial actions is unknown: the ambiguous ἐπιβάλομεν hardly need imply diplomatic missions.

By whom, then, and why was this process dragged out? Starting with Kern, most have seen a failure of diplomacy; the ambassadors were simply told, “No,” were “fobbed off.”58 Interpretation of the narrative rests in large

58 Kern 1901; “fobbed off”: Rigsby 1996: 189, following LSJ. Slater and Summa 2006: 282–84, echo and expand on Kern and Rigsby (more below). Sumi 2004: 79, “rebuffed.” Dignas 2002: 44, has it that the “civic decree to celebrate crowned games in honour of the goddess was boycotted by other cities.” Dušanić 1983 seems to confuse religion with political and military alliance: “the first Panhellenic Leukophryena . . . discreetly reflects a political collaboration of Philip V and the Magnesians, which bore, c. 207 b.c., on several parts of the Greek and Hellenistic world” (18); “The festival with its corollaries, the asylia in the first place, was intended to strengthen the international position of the Magnesians versus their dangerous or rival neighbors, Miletus . . ., Attalus I and certain Carians. But the choice of Magnesia’s allies inevitably varied in the eventful period of c. 220–200 b.c., bearing to some degree on the modalities of the organization of the Games. We are entitled to assume some Magneto-Macedonian contacts adumbrating the diplomatic cooperation discussed here as early as Antigonus Doson’s Carian campaign and its immediate aftermath . . .; nevertheless, these contacts did not produce the Panhellenic Leukophryena at once” (44), for “Magnesia’s regards for the Seleucid claims in her neighbourhood may have prevented the city to exploit its Macedonian affinities or to start with the Great Leukophryena in 221/20” (45); he even goes so far as to suggest that the Magnesian ambassadors were in fact spying for Philip. I do not see how the evidence substantiates this ambitious, and rather curious, argument. Sumi 2004: 80 finds it remarkable that in Asylia 66 “[a]ll political motives have been suppressed.” I do not know what would constitute evidence for suppression; we are told that the Magnesians’ apparent “failure to acknowledge the role of the kings is especially striking when we consider that many of the newly established panhellenic festivals in the third century
measure on our understanding this verb, \( \pi\alpha\rho\varepsilon\lambda\kappa\omega\sigma\theta\varepsilon\theta\varsigma \) (av). For Ebert there was no refusal, but mere waiting: the sense was neutral, indicating only that the process was slow, since the Magnesians were awaiting construction of the altar and temple before inaugurating the new, quadrennial games. But in that case we would expect some reference to the temple’s construction, itself an event to brag about.\(^59\) And, as Riggsby observes (1996: 189), the passive voice of the colorful \( \pi\alpha\rho\varepsilon\lambda\kappa\omega \) can hardly have been neutral; its tone here, as in the papyri, is defensive. In ancient documents, the verb indicates failure to meet clear obligations. In Ptolemaic papyri, its use in contexts of failure to render property, goods, or loans is almost formulaic.\(^60\) It describes the failure of officials to push paper, as required, through the administrative machine,\(^61\) or of an individual to appear at a pre-appointed meeting.\(^62\) In the Lydian confession inscriptions, it flags tarrying in performing required acts for whose neglect the god rains down pain and misery.\(^63\) In the Roman period, it refers to judicial delay.\(^64\) In other words, this verb did not suit a reasonable negative

\(^{59}\) Ebert 1982: 211, also 205; similarly, Kern 1901: 496–99, against a similar proposition. The Phocian grant of inviolability for Tenedos draws a connection between inviolability and (re)construction of the temple of Poseidon: Asyila 53.5–7, with p. 156. On Hermogenes’ temple at Magnesia see the bibliography gathered at SEG 40 999, to which add Rumscheid 1999 and 1994: 25–28; Schädler 1991: 301–12.

\(^{60}\) P.Cair.Zen. 3 59299.4–5: \( \pi\alpha\rho\varepsilon\lambda\kappa\omega \) ύν καὶ οὐκ ἀποδιδοὺς; 59351.3: καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀποδίδοντος αὐτῶι καὶ ἀπαιτοῦντος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀποδέδωκεν, ἀλλὰ παρείλκυκέν με ἕως τοῦ νῦν; 59355.108: πλέκει γὰρ χρόνον [ν παρέλκω] θα διὰ τὴν Φ[λυσούνσιον: οὐκ] ἐν οὔτῃ; P.Enteux. 32.9: οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ παρέλκει; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ἀποδέδωκε; 55.14: ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὁμολογοducible

\(^{61}\) P.Enteux. 75.9–10; P.Cair.Zen. 3 59341a.22–25. Even SB 18 13253.6–11 indicates more than simple delay, emphasizing the failure of an existing obligation.

\(^{62}\) P.Zen.Pestm. 29.3.

\(^{63}\) Petzl 1994: 65 [SEG 38 1235] (ca. 200 c.e.): Μηνι Ἀλλοττηνᾶς Άρφᾶς | Γλύκωνος εὔχατο, εἰ | τεκνόσε γεναμένη | τῆς εὐχῆς παρέλκυσε, | καὶ ἐκόλομεν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐκλύσεν ἐγνασαί | τάς δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ; Petzl 63.4–15 [SEG 39 1277] (132/33 c.e.); same pattern at Petzl 1994: 71 [SEG 35 1164] (159/60 c.e.); see also the cognate formulation at SEG 54 1225.4–6: ἐχρονύλκεσε καὶ οὐκ ἀπέδωκε.

\(^{64}\) P.Col. 10 266.17 (179–181 c.e.); SB 3 7173.22 (second century c.e.); 4 7404.48 (117–138), copy of P.Fam.Tebt. 24.90; P.Strasb. 8 709.11 (second century c.e.). See also Chrest.Mitt. 88.v.30 (ca. 141 c.e.), delaying implementation of ruling; 237.15 (149 c.e.), delay in repayment; also P.Mich. 8 489.8–9 (second century c.e.).
response to a reasonable request.\textsuperscript{65} Rather, its domain was reluctance to fulfill obligations. This was the language of unacceptable stalling, not reasoned refusal, of dragging out, not turning aside.\textsuperscript{66} If in 221, cities had been asked to acknowledge the games and status of Magnesia and had simply declined, the Magnesians would not have been “dragged around,” but turned down.\textsuperscript{67} For them to have been dragged around under these circumstances the invited cities would have to have failed to meet a known obligation. They would have to have said, for example, that they would assent to Magnesia’s request and then not have done so.\textsuperscript{68} That a few cities might have agreed and then dallied for more than a decade is perhaps conceivable. But that many dozens would have exhibited procedurally identical duplicity is incredible.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{65} The semantic range may carry over into the simplex form as well; delayed trials (SEG 26 677.3-4): [περί] τε τῶν ἐλκομένων ἐνκλημάτων; delayed payment of public loans (Migeotte Souscr 34.9–13): ἐπείδει ἀ πολί[ς] | ἐν δανείοις πλείνοντας ὑπάρχει δι[έ] τος πεστάντας αὐτά πολέμοι κα[ί] | χρόνος εἰδε πλείνοντας ἐλκονθαί τά | δάνεια; also perhaps to the compound ἐφέλκω; an official praised for not being “distracted” by private matters (IG 4\textsuperscript{e} 749.10; OGIS 328): οὐ<δ>ὲν ἐφελκο[μέ]νον τῶν ἱδωτικῶν οὐδ’ ἀπ’ ὀρθῆς.

\textsuperscript{66} Compare Prusias’s complaint with Byzantium: Plb. 4.49.1.

\textsuperscript{67} In their recent re-edition of the text, Slater and Summa 2006: 282–84, follow Rigsby and Kern, explaining the failure of the mission in 221 by suggesting that the Magnesians’ “first mistake was in not publicizing the oracular basis for [the festal upgrade], i.e. in not getting their theoriat in place, not having an advertising strategy with the Greeks of Asia;” That “[t]he Magnesians, it seems, had the right idea, but did not go about it effectively, and failed; their failure, as they claim, was in not advertising their oracle, and not making successful overtures to the Greeks of Asia.” But the inscription claims no reason for failure, saying nothing about insufficient advertising and nothing to indicate that any overtures, successful or not, were made. Moreover, the text does not frame the revelation as the decisive factor leading to the success of the venture. More worrisome, it is not even certain that the object of their revelation was the oracle, for that too is not only a modern restoration but one with plausible alternatives on record; for Asylia 66.27–28, ἔπεξεια[ν πάνθ’ ἄ] ἐκέχρηστο[ν]; Matthaiou suggests restoring ἐψήφισ[ε]το instead: in Krebs 1990: 105n24. They suggest also (2006: 284–89) that the first campaign failed because the Magnesians did not stipulate that the games were not only crowned but isopythic; that once
The documents, then, speak to the tone of παρηλκύσθησαν in a single voice. Literary sources not only agree, but also furnish context to explain the rhetorical force and application of the word. The three instances given by LSJ (παρέλκω II, simply “Pass. to be delayed”), are far from neutral in connotation. The first passage refers to Achaean troop-pay so long in arrears that the mercenaries ceased to follow orders and even dissolved, all attributed to the “impotence” of their leader (Plb. 5.30.1–7, esp. 6), the second to a quarter-century of justice delayed by war and faction (Plb. 22.4.1–12), and the third to the restoration of court cases that had foundered under the civic upheaval that brought Cincinnatus to the dictatorship (D.H. 10.17.3–20.4). In none of these cases, do we find neutral reference to blameless delay; all represented failure to enact required business, whether the payment of troops or the timely conduct of justice. But in none is the syntactical agent of the passive verb stated. In all three passages, circumstances were complex, not necessarily admitting of such simplifying blame. On whom to pin systemic judicial collapse that attends prolonged war? Whom to blame for persistent failure of radical legislation at the heart of the “conflict of the orders”? In the passive, this verb does not indicate excusable delay, simple and unfraught, but neither does it demand an explicit agent, and that, given the situation at Magnesia, was its rhetorical beauty. It allowed the city to vent its collective frustration by confessing to having failed to act upon the god’s will promptly, while pointing a finger at no one at all. Those Magnesians who had held up the process were not named; those who had long been pressing for action refrained from name-calling. Even for Greeks steeped in a culture of competition, a moment of decreed thanksgiving was not the occasion to vent anger at friends of long standing who had just agreed to elevate Magnesia to international prominence. The religiously charged occasion called rather for the self-reflective gratitude of one who had at last been able to activate the god’s will and so to find good fortune, a polite confession of Magnesia’s own failing rather than a rude accusation of other cities.

this was made clear, in 208, everyone signed on. None of this confirms the existence of a mission in 221. Rather, this conjectured narrative proceeds from the assumption that such a mission existed in the first place. It is ingenious but contingent. If we had reason to believe that there was a mission in 221, this might well be added to a list of numerous conjectured causes for failure.

70 Not that this keeps Polybius from the simplistic insistence that the political-military-economic crisis in the Achaean ranks was entirely owing to the impotence of the Achaean general Eperatos, who was “feckless by nature and scorned by all” and, as Polybius does not decline to reveal, stealthily undermined by Philip and both Younger and Elder Arati: Plb. 5.1.6–12 (quote at 5.1.7).
Rome’s conflict of the orders furnishes another example of this rhetorically
pregnant passive. In 455 B.C., the Roman tribunes Lucius Icilius and Lucius
Alienus “promised that they would again propose the law concerning the
land-allotment, which had been derailed (παρειλκυσμένον) for thirty years,
and also that concerning the isonomia, which the tribunes before them had
proposed but not put to a vote.”71 The episode hints at the sort of problems that
might have led to the fourteen years of delay at Magnesia, reminding that the
measure might have been mooted but not proposed, proposed but not voted
upon, voted upon but not implemented; the crucial word is restored (Asylia
66.17–18: [ἐψηφίσαν]|το).72 We cannot know exactly what went wrong, only
that the narrative gives no reason to think that the cause(s) was external, from
another city or cities. Now, we are not concerned here with the historicity
or constitutionality of the tribunes’ measure. Nor need we press Dionysius’s
credibility (Cornell 1995: 262). The crucial fact is that Dionysius describes
this second proposal as part of a gesture at reason and moderation on the part
of the tribunes (10.35.3). They were steering cautiously between the many,
some of whom had been urging secession, and the senate, who had only just
been won over by the constitutional novelty initiated by the tribunes. The
former would have wanted stirring tones of blame, the latter freedom from
named implication. And so, in reconstructing his vision of the plausible and
the necessary in Greek idiom, Dionysius has the tribunes deploy the verb
in the ambiguously accusing passive, without an expressed agent: plebeians
would imagine a finger pointed at the senate en bloc and individual senators
a finger pointed at their colleagues, but not themselves. The tribunes’ posi-
tion was rather like that of the drafters of the Magnesian decree, and so, in
Dionysius’s imagined Greek, was their tone. His internal audience heard not
quite conciliation, but instead the sort of rhetorical compromise to which

71 D. H. 10.35.5: προθήσειν γὰρ αὖθις τὸν τε περὶ τῆς κληρουχίας νόμον ἔτη τριάκοντα
παρειλκυσμένον καὶ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἰσονομίας, ὃν οἱ πρὸ αὐτῶν δήμαρχοι προθέντες οὐκ ἐπεψήφισαν. Livy’s account of the episode is much thinner than Dionysius’s; for spe-
cific reference to the “delay” see Livy 3.31.2: [The tribunes said that] pudere se numeri
sui nequiquam aucti, si ea res aeque suo biennio iaceret ac toto superiore lustro iacuisset.
Ogilvie 1965: 447 suggests that the sense of iaceret, “lie dormant,” was “colloquial” and
“racy.” Thirty years: this ought to refer to the consul Spurius Cassius’s proposed land
reform of 486 (Livy 2.41.1–9). The former “law” must be the act of 486 that modern
scholars have dubbed, after Livy’s periphrasis, the lex Icilia de Aventino publicando: See
D. H. 10.31.1–10.32.5, Livy 3.31.1, 3.32.6–7; with Flach 1994: 95–98, to whose copious
bibliography add Oliviero 1997; also Carsana 2001; Cornell 1995: 261–62.

72 Kent Rigsby suggests to me the attractive restoration, [ἐσκέπτον]|το, “First of those
dwelling in Asia, they looked into establishing a crowned competition.”
political necessity gives birth, a sound familiar to polities ancient and modern (“Mistakes were made”).

The defensive tone, then, surely does not reveal a city unable to stifle resentment at having been rejected many years before. Such ingratitude does not ring true. Instead, the tone arises, I propose, from the city’s inability to conceal more than a decade of embarrassing inaction. Magnesia had failed to fulfill its obligations. The Magnesians were derailed; not, however, by the allegedly invited cities—who, whatever Magnesia’s best hopes, would have been under no obligation to agree to its request—but by themselves. Once the city resolved to hold the festival, any failure to undertake preparations toward that end would have been a delay of the sort decried with the verb παρέλκω. And delay in these circumstances is understandable. Games and glory may well have been voted in harmonious tones, but discord is more often the song when piety, finance, and political willpower raise their voices. An undertaking of this scale cannot have won unanimous support in all its details, so that we may justly wonder whether the delay so ambiguously alluded to was a failure to implement a religious enterprise that was more attractive in concept than execution. It takes time, effort, and will to prepare for a major festival, and in this case it took considerable research too. Failure takes many forms and causes are not always external.

In that context, the tone of the phrase φιλιῶν μιμησκόμενοι πατρίων (Asylia 66.26–27) is appropriate. The tense of μιμησκόμενοι is present and so likely implies time contemporary with ἐπέδειξα; in other words, their recollection was a diplomatic gesture, an accompaniment to the god’s words, as much a reminder as remembrance. Such memory was as old as Homer, and to recall distant connections, as anyone who recognized the names Glaukos and Diomedes knew, was to invoke a time and status protected by the gods. “So other cities,” it is true, “remember’ their kinship and friendship with Magnesia” (Rigsby 1996: 189), but not without prompting; they remembered when Magnesian ambassadors appeared, request in hand. For the recipients of Magnesian embassies, “to remember” was face-saving euphemism for “to be persuaded,” and to remember one’s ancestral connections was to be won over by the words of those who would use those connections as leverage.

73 Slater and Summa 2006: 276, observe of the verb, “It clearly is a polite term for ‘were frustrated.’” Some must have been, and the use of the ambiguous passive without explicit agent is surely a kind of politeness strategy.

74 So perhaps added significance is in the Milesians’ contention that many had proclaimed their inviolability “unasked” (Syll. 590.16, with Rigsby 1996: 174–75). Cities often remember reactively. For memory as quid pro quo, see e.g. IG 2 448.82–84; 555.10–11; 1326.23–27; SEG 28 60.83–86. On “ruler cult as social memory” in Hellenistic cities see
This type of memory was a concession. The Magnesian envoys, by contrast, activated that other sort of memory, the kind that Isocrates associated with reasoned arrogance and righteous struggle for hegemony (Paneg. 25). This was the memory of one pressing a claim, memory pro-actively adduced in another’s face. But even there, the act is concessive: the initiating party joins in recalling mutual obligations rather than making unilateral demands. Magnesian envoys carried the god’s oracle in one hand and collective memory in the other. But long before they left town this same act of recollection had to be carried out at Magnesia. Those in favor of inviting the world to accept Magnesian inviolability and the new crowned games had to remember and remind their peers of the many, and sometimes tenuous, connections that Magnesia had with the dozens of Greek poleis to whom envoys would be sent. This may even be explicit in the potentially ambiguous text, for as Welles’ translation of the passage seems to indicate, the force of the circumstantial participle may straddle the realms of time and cause: “When acting on this decision, they were disregarded . . . they remembered all this and unfolded their project to others” (1934: 146). In other words, the Magnesians not only reminded others of the right thing to do, but had to remind themselves as well. Again, the tone is pious, an admission of past inaction, cloaked in the celebration of memory, confession not accusation. Confession, and perhaps a tinge of regret too. In failing to activate the god’s wishes promptly Magnesia not only disappointed Olympus but missed a golden opportunity to found its crowned games before its rival Miletos, whose crowned Didymeia were first celebrated in 215, 211, or 207, an embarrassment whose painful recollection might only be justified by the assertion that Magnesia had at least had the idea first, before Miletos. Hence Magnesia’s close attention to the date of their decision to upgrade the games and pursue the honor of inviolability (Asylia 66.11–16), to which Thonemann (2007: 152–153, 159–160) calls attention.

Ma 1999: 219–28. Emperors too remember in reaction to others’ initiatives: e.g. IG 7 2711.28–29.

Or whatever it was that was once written at Asylia 66.26–27: φιλιῶν μιμησκόμενοι πατρίων. I find no suitably similar invocation of “ancestral friendships,” which has the tin ring of redundancy. One of the chief conceits of such international friendships is that all of them were ancient. An old friendship was like an old grandmother. I wonder whether the Magnesians might not have called to mind ancestral gods (τῶν θεῶν μιμησκόμενοι πατρίων), or oaths (ὅρκων), or customs (νόμων); the situation called also for simple, unqualified recollection of ta patria, that most effective all-purpose justification. But in that case we would have to add the article before patriōn or else settle for bad Greek (e.g. τῶν ἀναμιμησκόμενοι πατρίων). On remembrance as a tool of persuasion, particularly in religious context: Chaniotis 2003: 189–90.
Our text speaks in a single voice for the entire community. But the words παρηλκύσθησαι and μνησκόμενοι belong to the background, and the background to all civic utterance is discussion and almost inevitably disagreement. By reaching into the distant past, however, to a sacred time shielded from the petty disputes of the present, by remembering the kind of kinship and friendship that are protected by the god, Magnesians were able to secure support for the venture from the right parties at home, without which they could not even bring their appeal to their peers abroad. Their success was proof enough of the gods’ approval. But the tone had to be right. Past partisanship, praise and blame, are not the stuff of this narrative, whose happy occasion—total acceptance and widespread glory—called for conciliatory tones: Magnesians backed themselves into a corner, derailing the wishes of the god, but Magnesians also remembered the way out. Such is the way, often enough, with oracles. The narrative reveals more of normal religious behavior than of extraordinary politics.76 Magnesians’ efforts were not derailed by others, but by themselves. As far as invitations were concerned, the Magnesians, I suggest, did not try and fail, but rather failed to try—until 208.

5. CONCLUSION
There was no mission of 221, and whatever the Magnesians’ first actions were, they were not stymied by others, but by themselves. When they did succeed in 208 (and later, to include the Seleucid and late Attalid responses) far fewer authorities refused to recognize Magnesian inviolability than scholars have thought: just possibly Antioch in Persis, or maybe even Chalkis, although in both cases I doubt it, and probably no one else. None of those who apparently omitted to mention inviolability in 208 or later, did so because they had accepted it already in 221; they were simply following a tradition of formulating diplomatic responses that closely adhered to diplomatic requests, so that their precise wording was in some senses determined by differences in the versions of the request put to the Greek world by Magnesia. The Aetolians’ recognition of asylia does not represent an unexplained early acceptance, but rather a later correction, necessitated, perhaps, by their propensity to misconstrue the legal and honorific nature of territorial inviolability. That decree, and the second stratêgia of Agelaos, belongs to 206/5, not 222/21 and not to the years between 217/16 and 206/5.

These are many and varied conclusions, growing from far-ranging lines of argument, but their cumulative effect is to sustain a historical narrative that

76 For the different, and fascinating, matter of cessation or interruption of cult, rather than failure of a new (partly) cultic project to get off the ground, see Habicht 2006.
is straightforward and timeless. The principal framework for interpreting this episode in Magnesia’s history has been political or diplomatic failure on an international scale, a Hellenistic polis competing for honor with its peers and being roundly rejected. But the failure was local and, so far as we can tell, primarily religious. Familiar too. It began with a god’s order to act upon oracles that had piled up, unheeded. Apollo seconded. What followed then was not an international battle for honor, one city vying with the rest of the world and losing, its best pious efforts confounded by rival poleis, but a city-state wrestling with its obligations to the god, and faltering in the face of divine commandment. This may be the oldest religious commonplace known to man. The god requests action, which the individual or city is slow to understand or undertake. Eventually, however, the correct path is surmised, right religion enacted, and god and man pleased.

Magnesia followed, I suggest, in this venerable tradition of foot-dragging. The precise cause of their delay is beyond recovery. Why was any city slow to take on the gods’ work? Cost, effort, personal enmities? Or could there have been disagreement over what would have constituted sufficient honor. After all, Apollo mentioned asylia alone; the games were the product of Magnesian exegesis, and novel at that. Whatever the answer, this chapter in Hellenistic history reminds us what students and practitioners of religion know well: that before god, man’s instinct runs more quickly to objection than obeisance;

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77 Reluctance was a commonplace and as such has no bearing on the oft-repeated claim of Delphic decline; on the continuing vitality of Apollo’s Delphic oracle in the period see Rougemont 2001.

78 So the dozens of Lydian confession inscriptions tell of non-compliance, divine retribution, and, upon eventual execution of the god’s will, happy endings: Petzl 1994, since whose publication many new confession inscriptions have appeared. On this body of material see recent bibliography assembled at SEG 54 1881. The phenomenon was not limited to Roman Lydia; compare for example the experience of Amphimnastos, a fisherman who failed to deliver a tithe promised to Asklepios, had his catch torched by lightning in punishment, and upon confession and prayer to the god saw his fish miraculously re-vivified: IG 4² 123.21–29 (47). For a parallel tradition in southern Arabia: Sima 1999. So also, more than one ailing patient scoffed at the inscribed testimonies to Epidaurian Asclepius’s powers before going to sleep and learning better: IG 4² 121.22–33 (3), 34–41 (4). For Zoilos the Aspendian, it took dream visions and repeated bouts of grave illness before he took steps to give Sarapis the temple that the god had demanded: P.Cair.Zen. 1 59034, a tale of local piety not imperial religious program: Rigsby 2001. The wanderings of Aeneas paint the same portrait. Parallels could be multiplied.

79 Asylia 66.16–18, with Thonemann 155: πρῶτοι (novel) στεφανίζων τῇ ἁγίᾳ θείᾳ τῶν κατοικούντων τῆς Ἀσίας ἐψηφίσαν τῷ τὴν ἐκδοχὴν τοῦ χρησμοῦ ταύτῃ λαβόντες (exegesis).
that piety is a process, a journey not a destination, and that the road is often rocky and the traveler hesitant. This religious pattern was of course a literary topos with a long and distinguished lineage, worthy in its own right of careful study, but for the Greeks at Magnesia its truth was as old as god and as current as could be.

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Magnesian Inviolability


