

Frison places *Survival by Hunting* along a continuum that begins with Richard Lee and Irven DeVore (1968) and travels through Lewis Binford (1978). His is very much a book grounded in middle-range theory. In most cases Frison uses what he knows from direct experience as keystones to bridge apparent gaps between what is essential to the process of hunting and what is preserved in the material record. A species-by-species examination of game animal behavior in separate chapters becomes the means to reexamine important faunal assemblages and to reassess archaeological assumptions. Although Frison writes in the context of hunting and hunter-gatherers on North America's northern plains, his insights are ecumenical in nature. Frison employs uniformitarian principles to discuss a wide range of topics, from the ins-and-outs of hunting with an atlatl to probable herd behavior at buffalo jumps, all of which reinforce a single, simple message. Hunting for a living requires reservoirs of learned behavior. According to Frison, an initial "dissatisfaction with ethnographic and archaeological interpretations of human hunters and hunting that fail to acknowledge the years of experience and the accumulation of knowledge of animal behavior required to become a successful hunter" (Frison 2004:xiii) eventually became the nine chapters of this book. He offers an important understanding of hunting that often goes beyond received wisdom in the literature. For example, Frison found that a hunter attempting to sneak up quietly on bedded-down elk is usually discovered by the herd, which charges off as a group allowing only an occasional glimpse of their rear ends. It is a recipe for going hungry. However, elk emit a distinctive scent. A knowledgeable hunter scouts out the leeward side of timber stands, locates elk by smell, and then runs directly into the herd. The ensuing confusion causes the animals to mill about in panic, paying little attention to the hunter's presence. We would all do well to incorporate the things Frison can teach us into our thinking.

This is a true book filled with moments of truth that will be cited by hunter-gatherer archaeologists in general and Paleoindian archaeologists in particular for a long time to come.

#### REFERENCES CITED

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1978 *Nunamiut Ethnoarchaeology*. New York: Academic Press.  
Lee, Richard, and Irven DeVore, eds.  
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**Melville J. Herskovits and the Racial Politics of Knowledge.** Jerry Gershenhorn. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004. 339 pp.

#### LEE D. BAKER

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Every anthropologist knows who Melville J. Herskovits is, right? When listing Franz Boas's most influential students,

he is the one sandwiched somewhere between Kroeber, Lowie, Benedict, and Mead. Herskovits founded the anthropology department at Northwestern, helped organize the African Studies Association (ASA), and conducted ethnographic research in Surinam to document African survivals in the New World. Oh, yeah, did he not have a wife that helped him conduct fieldwork among the Maroons? For the majority of anthropologists, this is the biographic outline that comes to mind. Historian Jerry Gershenhorn's brilliant new book simply explodes this flat and uninformed sketch by offering a detailed and textured portrait of a complex and energetic scholar who almost single-handedly developed a uniquely U.S. anthropology of Africans, on both sides of the Atlantic. Over the course of his career, he emerged as a particularly powerful figure in both anthropology and area studies, and although he was always shrewd, he never hesitated to publicly challenge or undermine such powerful figures as Gunnar Myrdal, E. Franklin Frazier, W.E.B. Du Bois, Carter G. Woodson, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Gershenhorn frames his powerful and lucid intellectual biography by identifying specific tensions and particular contradictions that arise from Herskovits's "embrace of cultural relativism, his attack on racial and cultural hierarchy, and his conceptualization of Negro studies" (p. 9).

Meticulously researched, Gershenhorn develops a captivating narrative divided into seven long but well-executed chapters that document the major twists and turns in Herskovits's career. Focusing on the racial politics of knowledge, Gershenhorn provides more than a description of Herskovits's past; he gives the reader the tools, for example, to reconcile Johnnetta B. Cole's belief that "Herskovits had a special place in his heart for African American students," and St. Clair Drake's statement that he "never attempted to recruit and train Afro-Americans" (p. 198). Above all, Gershenhorn provides answers and much needed context to better understand why the legacy of Herskovits remains so ambivalent within African American studies, ambiguous within anthropology, yet so well defined in African Studies.

From the beginning of his career to the end, Herskovits's research agenda was set and shaped by the funding he could secure. Gershenhorn is at his best when he describes the tug-of-war between the research Herskovits wanted to pursue and the research he was forced to produce for the National Research Council (NRC), the Social Science Research Council, and the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations—the major sources of Herskovits's funds. For example, in 1923, Herskovits' first major research project was an assessment of "physical and psychological variability within a racially mixed population" of Negroes in Harlem. It was funded by the NRC despite the fact that Herskovits "never even took an anthropometry class at Columbia" (p. 29).

Gershenhorn's most valuable contribution to the study of the history of anthropology involves his careful and creative description of the complicated debate over black culture, and the role of so-called "African survivals." After

Melville and his wife Frances completed two trips to Surinam, he wrote a “major interpretive essay in which he argued that African cultural influence extended throughout the Americas” (p. 77). This was the first in a series of books and articles that pitted the well-meaning cultural relativist against established sociologists like E. Franklin Frazier who, “throughout his career . . . rejected the influence of African culture on American blacks” (p. 101). It also pitted him against funding agencies that consistently supported research that focused on U.S. race relations, not black people’s culture. By following Herskovits’s career, and the money that churned in its wake, one comes away with a stunning realization that both the foundations, as well as the AAA leadership, made it clear that there was little interest in developing Negro anthropology in the Americas, although there was a compelling interest to develop anthropological research in Africa, especially in the context of the Cold War and the rise of area studies.

**Cubeo Hehénewa Religious Thought: Metaphysics of a Northwestern Amazonian People.** Irving Goldman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 438 pp.

#### JANET CHERNELA

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Irving Goldman’s lifelong anthropological project spanned 75 years, during which he remained remarkably current with the switchback paths, reinventions, and reconstructions of a discipline in transformation. Goldman was born in 1911, began graduate study in 1936, and passed away in 2002, prior to the completion of *Cubeo Hehénewa Religious Thought*. The book was to be the apogee of his cumulative corpus on the Cubeo, which began with his 1939 doctoral field study. That fieldwork, under the supervision of Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and others, was the first conducted by a U.S. anthropologist in the Upper Amazon.

In many ways, Goldman’s work exemplifies the best of those seven decades of anthropology. He retained a characteristically Boasian commitment to precision in fieldwork, and a disciplined proximity between description and analysis. Yet many of the themes and points taken up in Goldman’s most recent work speak to issues that emerged in the anthropology of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

Between his pioneering Amazonian fieldwork and his return to the Amazon three decades later, Goldman conducted research among Kwakiutl and Polynesian societies, for whom rank plays a key role in group and individual identities. Those endeavors, significant contributions in their own right, also informed Goldman’s ongoing revision of his portrayal of Cubeo society.

Rank in Amazonian anthropology has been relatively unexplored; indeed, it was vehemently denied until fairly recently. The literature on Amazonian societies universally presented them as egalitarian. Two kinds of contrasts fur-

thered this prevailing view: (1) a comparison with Andean societies showing a contrast between the stratified polities of the highlands and the relatively egalitarian, acephalous societies of the lowlands; and (2) a temporal distinction supported by archaeological findings that showed organizational attributes of precontact Amazonian sites absent in contemporary communities. In the cumulative anthropological text, that which was salient about Amazonia was its egalitarian “ethos.” Amazonian polities were described as “tribes without heads,” emphasizing weakness in leadership. Goldman was one of the first to point to the empirically untenable position of “absolutist egalitarianism,” even as it was taboo to do so.

Although Goldman’s early monograph on the Cubeo presents substantial insights into ranked statuses and relationships, his exploration of the phenomenon was limited by a number of factors, one being the disregard of the subject by the Bahúkiwa, the low-ranking sib with whom he worked. Goldman makes up for this in his newest work. In order to examine rank more thoroughly, Goldman made two new field excursions to the Amazon—one at age 57, the other at age 68. In these visits, he purposely sought high-ranking elders with knowledge and interest in ranking.

As Goldman makes clear in this book, rank is but one expression of an ontology that is itself primary. His more inclusive project is the question of “being Cubeo.” Unlike Boas, Goldman’s approach is based in the premise that a phenomenon may be revealed only from within itself. In this pursuit, he shows the influences of Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and others for whom ontology is the bedrock from which all else emerges. Goldman’s goal in *Cubeo Hehénewa Religious Thought* is to build an understanding of Cubeo “being”—not unlike Heidegger’s “Seinsfrage”—from the bottom up.

Working from ritual practice and narrative, Goldman derives a set of tentative generating principles underlying Cubeo notions of “existence”:

The spiritual center of th[e] . . . cosmos is the dyad of *uméndú* and *hábokú*, a coupling that combines metaphysical and social conceptions of forces. *Uméndú* is a principle, while *hábokú* is a being. The nature of this being is also divided, revealing still another, a “sub-dyad,” one which represents the animal or plant dominant in its sphere; . . . the other is the interior of *hábokú*. That interior is, in Cubeo vernacular, a “person.” . . . In the end there is no thought of a general *umé* or of *uméndú*, only of universal and variable substance as diversified as life itself. [p. 357]

From these underlying postulates emerge physical and developmental states, as well as all social relations—including warfare, kinship, lineality, marriage, and hierarchy.

In an afterword, Stephen Hugh-Jones refers to Goldman’s work as “salvage ethnography.” Indeed, the highly specialized curing, and other narrative skills, may soon be lost. But the goal of Goldman’s project—the deeper, generative principles underlying Cubeo existence—are