Fall 2001

NOTE: GRADING DETAILS, AND A VARIETY OF OTHER COURSE INFORMATION, 

ARE AVAILABLE AT BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE

FOR PRACTICE PROBLEMS, AND OLD EXAMS, CLICK HERE
WHAT IS PUBLIC POLICY?
8/28	Introduction: What is Public Policy Analysis? Reading: Munger, Chapter 1
8/29	Introductory Meeting in Sections
8/30	NO CLASS!WORK ON FIRST POLICY MEMO—GLOBAL WARMING
9/4	Elements of Policy Analysis: The Case of Global Warming Due: Memo on Global Warming
9/5	Section 1 Discuss  (1) Global Warming as a Policy Problem (2) Memo-Writing
UNIT I: INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
9/6	Theory of Games I Reading: Thomas C. Schelling, "What is Game Theory?" from Choice and Consequence, Harvard University Press, 1984. Andrew M. Colman, Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction , Pergamon Press, 1982, chapters 3,4.  Dixit and Nalebuff, Chapters 1 and 2
9/11	Theory of Games II Reading: Andrew M. Colman, Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction , Pergamon Press, 1982, chapters 6 and 8.  **  Douglas R. Hofstader, "The Prisoner's Dilemma Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation," from Metamagical Themas, Basic Books, 1985  Dixit and Nalebuff, Chapters 3, 4, and 5
9/12	Section 2  DUE: Problem Set 1
9/13	Conflicting Bases of Legitimacy:Expertise, Government, and Markets Reading: Munger, Chapter 2
9/18	Markets Reading: Munger, Chapter 3, and “A Prison Camp Economy”.  Charles Wolf, Markets or Governments, chapters 1&2.  Baumol & Blinder, Total and Marginal Utility, pp. 97-101.
9/19	Section 3 DUE: Problem Set 2
9/20	Market Failures I Reading: Russell Hardin, Collective Action; Baltimore, Johns Hopkins/Resources for the Future; Chapters 1 &2, pp. 6-35.  Munger, Chapter 4 Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, no. 3, pp. 1-8.  DUE: Policy Memo 1
9/25	Market Failures II Reading:Munger, Chapters 5 and 7
9/26	Section 4 DUE: Problem Set 3 NOTE:  DUE Tuesday, 10-2
9/27	Negotiations I Reading: Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Chapters 1, 3, 4.  Thomas C. Schelling, "An Essay on Bargaining," in The Strategy of Conflict.
10/2	Negotiations II Reading: Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Chapters 10 and 11.  Dixit and Nalebuff, Chapters 8 and 11
10/3	Section 5  Review for Midterm
10/4	** MIDTERM 1**
UNIT 2: VALUING SOCIAL OUTCOMES
10/9	What is the Public Interest? Reading: Munger, “A Place of One’s Own”,and Chapter 6 Dixit and Nalebuff, Chapter 10
10/10	Section 5
10/11	Social Welfare and Income Distribution Reading:Munger, Chapter 8 John Bonner, "Social Welfare," from Introduction to the Theory of Social Choice, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986.  Harvey Rosen, " Income Distribution:  Conceptual Issues." from Public Finance, pp. 157-169.
10/16	No Class:Fall Break!!
10/17	Section 6 DUE: Problem Set 4
10/18	Introduction to Cost-Benefit Analysis:Measurement, Standing, and Distribution Reading: Munger, Chapter 11.  William N. Trumball, "Who Has Standing in Cost-Benefit Analysis?" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 210-218.  "The Battle of Alamodome: Henry Cisneros and the San Antonio Stadium," Kennedy School of Government case study  "CBA and Environmental Decision Making :  An Overview," National Center for Env. Decision Making Research  "Cost Benefit Primer" Resources for the Future
10/23	Evaluating Future Benefits and Costs Reading: Munger, Chapter 10
10/24	Section 7 DUE: Problem Set 5
10/25	Issues in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Valuing Life and Health Readings:  Paul R. Portney, "The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1994, pp. 3-17.  ** "Matters of Life and Death: Defunding Organ Transplants in the State of Arizona," Kennedy School of Government case study  Kenneth J. Arrow et al, "Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?"Science, vol. 272, April 1996.
10/30	Issues in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Social Security Reform Readings:  Munger, pp. 271-279 Concord Coalition Social Security Administration
10/31	Section 8  DUE: Problem Set 6
UNIT 3: DECIDING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
11/1	Introduction to Decision Analysis Reading: Munger, Chapter 9, pp. 280-309.  Robert D. Behn and James W. Vaupel, "Thinking About Uncertainty," Chapter 4 of Quick Analysis for Busy Decisionmakers, pp. 71-100.  DUE: Policy Memo 2
11/6	Decision Analysis II. Reading: Munger, Chapter 9, pp. 309-321
11/7	Section 9 DUE: Problem Set 7
11/8	Bayes Theorem and the Value of Information Reading: Stokey and Zeckhauser, Chapter 12, pp. 219-229  John Markoff, "Microsoft Sees Software 'Agent' as Way to Avoid Distractions," New York Times, July 17, 2000.
11/13	Utility Theory, Subjective Valuation, and Risk Aversion Selected Lecture Slides Reading: Stokey and Zeckhauser, Chapter 12, pp. 237-254
11/14	Section 10  DUE: Problem Set 8
11/15	Behavioral Foundations of Choice Reading:  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "The Psychology of Preferences "  Scientific American, January 1982.  George Ainsley and Nick Haslam, " Hyperbolic Discounting" in George Loewenstein and Jon Elster, eds. Choice Over Time, New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1992.  Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond, Chapters 2 and 7, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
11/20	**MIDTERM II**
11/21-11/25	No Class or Section—Thanksgiving Break!!
UNIT 4: FORMULATING POLITICAL STRATEGY
11/27	Policy Analysis and Politics Reading: Robert Behn, "Policy Analysis and Policy Politics," Policy Analysis, 1981, pp. 199-226.  ** William Greider, "The Education of David Stockman," Atlantic Monthly, December 1981, pp.27-54.
11/28	Section 11 DUE: Problem Set 9
11/29	Politics as Rational Choice I Reading: James Madison, The Federalist, #10.  James N. Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch, The Calculus of Consent, Chapter 4 .  Articles on Clinton's efforts to reform health care.  Median-Voter Models: Shepsle and Bonchek, Analyzing Politics, selected pages.
12/4	Politics as Rational Choice II Reading: Terry Moe, The Organization of Interests, Chapter 2.  Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Chapters 11 and 12. Legislative Models: Baron and Ferejohn, "Bargaining in Legislatures" APSR, 1989. Pressure-Group Models: Mueller, Dennis, Public Choice II, selections, and Tollison, Robert, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey." DUE: Policy Memo 3
12/5	Section 12
12/6	Symbolic Politics and Strategy Reading: Kenneth Burke, On Symbols and Society, pp. 53-74.  Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight" in The Interpretation of Cultures, pp. 412-453.  Deborah Stone, "Symbols, part 1"  (Chapter 6 in Policy Paradox and Political Reason.  Michael Munger, Senate Rules Committee Testimony on Campaign Finance Reform, April 5, 2000 DUE: Policy Memo 4
12/10	**FINAL EXAM**   Time:  2:00 pm - 5:00 pm

                                                         **  Required for class discussion on listed date.

Course Information

Introduction

This course begins with the proposition that good intentions are not enough. For most real policy problems, it is simply not clear what should be done, or often even

what the choices are. Translating good intentions into good decisions requires the ability to analyze situations systematically. Decision makers need to deal with

uncertainty, to make tradeoffs among conflicting interests, and to develop a strategy for working with other parties to achieve the chosen objective. 

This is a "how to" course on decision making in the public sector. The techniques it covers are applicable to private sector decisions as well, but most of the

references in this course will be to problems facing public policymakers: the manager of a public utility, the director of a welfare program, the mayor of a city, or the

president of the United States. 

The course is divided into four sections, each of which corresponds to a different analytic task policy makers must perform. 

I. Individual Interests and Collective Action 

II. Valuing Social Outcomes 

III. Deciding Under Uncertainty 

IV. Formulating Political Strategy 

Although it is useful to make distinctions about these roles, the course is not intended to be four separate and unrelated modules. In the real world, policy problems

require the policymaker to wear several or all of these hats at once. The challenge, therefore, is not merely to master a collection of individual techniques, but also to

know when and how to use them together. 

Course Requirements

Weekly Problems and Short Memos -- Ungraded but required. 

Policy Memoranda -- One of the goals in this course is to help you develop your skill at writing short, effective policy memos, a form of writing stressed in many

public policy courses. There are four memo assignments. 

Exams -- There are two midterm exams and a comprehensive final exam. 

Class Participation -- You are required to attend and participate in discussion sections, and turn in weekly problems. 

All assignments are due at the beginning of class (or section meeting) on the day indicated in the syllabus.Late papers and problem sets will be penalized one

letter grade step per day, with a new day defined as starting at midnight.If a paper is due on Tuesday and you turn it in on Wednesday, then your grade

would drop two grade steps (e.g. from a B+ to a B-). 

Classroom Mechanics -- Classroom norms of behavior are particularly important in a large course.To minimize distractions for other students in the class, please

remember the following: come to class on time, do not talk in class, and do not read the paper in class (horizontally or vertically).Students are not allowed to

consume food or drink in the Sanford Institute lecture halls.Once you are in class do not get up and come back into the classroom. 

Section Meetings

Section attendance is a required component of the class. Section meetings are intended to help you understand the material covered in class and prepare for

assignments. Graded assignments will be returned and discussed in section meetings. 

Teaching assistants will also be available at other times for individual assistance. 

Grading

Grades will be calculated on the basis of the memos, exams, and participation. The course components will be weighted as follows: 

Memos: 30% (6%,7%,8%,9%) 

Midterm Exams: 30% (15% each) 

Final Exam: 30% 

Participation: 10% 

Grading will be done jointly by the teaching assistants and Professor Vigdor. If you believe there is some problem with a grade you have received, talk first with your teaching assistant. 

Exam regrade policy:Professors and TAs are only human, and mistakes do get made in grading exams.If you believe that an error was made in grading your

exam, you may submit it to your TA for a regrade.You must also submit a brief description in writing of what you believe the error to be along with your exam. 

When an exam is submitted for a regrade, the entire examination will be regarded and the new score will be final.Since grading mistakes are made in both

directions, this means that your score may go up, go down or remain unchanged. 

Please note that this policy does not apply to point totals that have been incorrectly added.If this is the case, return your exam to your TA along with a note

explaining the addition error and you will be credited with the correct number of points. 

Cooperative Learning Policy

The public policy department encourages cooperative learning in its courses. In this course, you are encouraged to study for exams together and to work on problem sets with your classmates. You may also discuss the memo assignments with each other, but the actual writing must be your own work. You may not discuss memo assignments or problems with past students of this class.