Why do members of congress support agricultural protection?∗

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ABSTRACT

It seems paradoxical that until recently, developed countries have continued subsidizing agriculture even though their agricultural sectors had been declining in relative importance since the middle of the 20th century. What drives support for agricultural protection—the broad array of subsidies to farmers and taxes and quotas imposed on agricultural imports—in developed countries? We answer this question by testing three competing hypotheses about what drives support for agricultural protection in the US: (i) legislator preferences, (ii) electoral incentives, or (iii) lobbying. Using data on the roll call votes of the members of the 106th through the 110th Congresses (1999–2009) and the scores given to each legislator by the Farm Bureau, our findings suggest that electoral incentives explain a great deal of the variation in support for agricultural protection, but that legislator preferences and lobbying might play a role, too. Moreover, legislator preferences and electoral incentives appear to be substitutes for one another. Why does Congress support agricultural protection? Because many members have electoral incentives to—and because many of those who do not still have other personal or strategic interests at stake.

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Introduction

Most developed countries subsidize agriculture heavily even though their agricultural sectors have steadily declined in importance relative to their manufacturing and services sectors since the 1950s. In developing countries, by contrast, the agricultural sector often remains much more important than the manufacturing and services sectors, but governments tend to tax farmers and subsidize food consumers. Scholars have termed this pattern the “developmental paradox” (Lindert, 1991; Anderson, 1993; Barrett, 1999; Bellemare et al., 2014).

Why should countries be more likely to protect agriculture as their GDP per capita increases (Anderson and Hayami, 1986; World Bank, 1986)? In developing countries, the answer seems to be that urban elites pressure governments to subsidize food consumption, often via the threat of social unrest (Lipton, 1977; Bates, 1981; Bellemare, 2014). In developed countries, however, scholars have struggled to come to a consensus about why agricultural policy is tilted toward agricultural producers.
Four explanations for agricultural protection—the broad array of subsidies to farmers and taxes and quotas imposed on agricultural imports—have so far been suggested (de Gorter and Swinnen, 2002):

1. **Legislator preferences:** Lawmakers vote according to their personal policy preferences.4

2. **Electoral incentives:** Voters prefer agricultural protection, and re-election-oriented policy makers follow their lead (Downs, 1957; Coughlin, 1992).

3. **Lobbying:** Interest groups representing agricultural producers lobby policy makers and contribute to the re-election campaigns of those who support agriculture (Olson, 1971; Becker, 1983).5

4. **Institutions:** A country’s political institutions encourage agricultural protection.

As shown in Table 1, which reviews the literature on what agricultural protection, scholars have found evidence to support most of these explanations: electoral incentives (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1993; Swinnen, 1994), lobbying (Vesenko, 1989; Abler, 1991; Hansen, 1991; Brooks et al., 1998; Sheingate, 2003; Alvarez, 2005; Gawande and Hoekman, 2006; Bullock and Coggins, 2008), and institutions (Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Park and Jensen, 2007; Thies and Porche, 2007; Assman et al., 2012; Klop and de Haan, forthcoming) all seem to contribute to policy outcomes on agricultural issues. As Table 1 indicates, however, the researchers who have studied each of these explanations have typically focused on just one or two of these factors at a time. Moreover, most have focused on aggregate-level measures: although each hypothesis is premised on micro-level theories about how politicians make decisions (e.g., that those who receive more money from agricultural lobbyists tend to support agricultural causes), scholars have seldom tested these theories with data on how individual politicians make decisions about agricultural policy.

In this article, we explore how preferences, electoral incentives, and lobbying can influence legislative action on agricultural policy in the United States Congress. We focus on the 106th through 110th Congresses (1999–2009), the relatively short period in US agricultural history during which lawmakers passed two of the most significant agriculture bills in the last few decades: the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act and the 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy (FCE) Act. These bills are part of a long legislative tradition of subsidizing farmers via the so-called “farm bill,” the ongoing “legislative package that renews America’s farm subsidy entitlement system every five years or so” (Paarlberg, 2011). Using data on how individual members voted on these farm bills6 and how members were rated by the American Farm Bureau Federation—a leading agricultural advocacy organization—we simultaneously test the micro-level underpinnings of several explanations for agricultural protection.

Knowing what drives support for agricultural protection is important for two reasons. First, in this era of budget austerity, it is important to know what determines support for a set of measures which most academic economists decry as wasteful (Schmitz et al., 2010). The 2008 US farm bill cost the average American taxpayer $3175 over five years, or about $635 annually from 2008 to 2012.7 Second, to the extent that one wants to change the way agricultural policy is made, it is important to know whether one should aim to change who gets involved in politics, change the electoral system, or reform campaign finance to “get money out of politics.” And although we cannot claim that our results are causal given our use of observational data, our findings are remarkably consistent across dependent variables and specifications, which helps alleviate concerns about endogeneity.

To determine why members of Congress support agricultural protection, we analyze three sets of outcomes: (i) the scores legislators receive from the American Farm Bureau Federation (hereafter the Farm Bureau), (ii) how legislators voted on the 2002 farm bill, and (iii) how legislators voted on the 2008 farm bill. We focus on three variables of interest: (i) the proportion of a legislator’s career spent working as a farm owner, which we use as a proxy for a legislator’s preference for supporting agriculture, (ii) the proportion of a legislator’s constituents who are themselves farmers, which we use to measure electoral incentives,8 and (iii) the amount of money a legislator received from agricultural political action committees (PACs), which we use to measure lobbying. To help with identification, we also include district-specific controls (poverty rate, median income, constituent ideology), legislator-specific controls (agricultural committee membership, party affiliation, age, and gender) as well as state, chamber (i.e., House or Senate), and congressional term fixed effects wherever applicable.

Pundits9 (and some prior research, e.g., Brooks and Carter, 1995) often blame the farm lobby for policies that protect agriculture. In contrast, our results suggest that electoral incentives are what primarily drives legislative action on agricultural policy.10 We also find that lobbying and legislators’ own preferences seem to matter, but to a much lesser extent. In line with Swinnen’s (2010) exhortation that researchers should focus on the interactions between various explanations for agricultural policy, we also find that a legislator’s preferences and electoral incentives appear to be substitutes for one another. Why does Congress support agricultural protection? Because many members appear to have electoral incentives to—and because many of those who don’t seem to have other personal or strategic interests at stake.

**Background and theoretical framework**

**A brief history of US agricultural policy**

The history of agricultural protection in the United States dates back to 1862, when the Homestead Act and the Morrill Act were adopted and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) was

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4 We treat preferences as distinct from ideology throughout this paper. In practical terms, this means we account for preferences by controlling for whether respondents have spent time working in agriculture prior to getting elected to Congress, and we account for ideology by controlling for party affiliation. Poole and Rosenthal (1996) look at whether legislators behave as ideologues or as agents of their constituents.

5 Unfortunately, we can only measure lobbying in the form of contributions to agricultural political action committees (PACs), and we cannot measure other kinds of lobbying (e.g., writing to or calling one’s representatives). As such, our estimate of the

6 As Ferriejohn (1986) noted, farm bills are typically the result of a legislative logroll between rural and urban lawmakers, with the former voting in favor of the agricultural protection (e.g., farm subsidies) and the latter voting in favor of the nutrition programs (e.g., food stamps) contained in the farm bill. In order to disentangle support for agriculture from support for nutrition programs, the empirical work below controls for the poverty rate in a legislator’s district, which proxies for the number of food stamp recipients in the same district.

7 There were 90.7 million taxpayers in the US in 2008 (Internal Revenue Service, 2013), and the budget of the 2008 farm bill was $288 billion (US Government Printing Office, 2013a). Note, however, that about 80% of farm bill resources go to programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, i.e., food stamps. Still, the fact remains that the voting behavior we study impacts the entirety of the resources dedicated to the farm bill.

8 Specifically, our measure of electoral incentives—the proportion of farmers in a Congressional district—is a proxy for how much of the electorate in a given district is a priori in favor of agricultural protection, since it not only captures the proportion of farmers, but it also proxies for the number of people who derive a livelihood from agriculture (e.g., farm workers; dealers of seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, and farm implements; agricultural credit officers; etc.) in a district.

9 The belief that lobbying drives much of agricultural policy is shared by both sides of the political divide. On the left, see for example Nestle (2013). On the right, see chapter 18 of the Cato Institute’s (2009) Handbook for Policy Makers.

10 It is entirely possible, however, that electoral incentives have themselves been shaped by lobbying. For example, the farm lobby, through sustained effort over the years, might have managed to focus voter attention on agriculture-related topics, which would not be captured by the measure of lobbying we use in this paper.
Table 1
Findings in the literature on the political economy of agricultural protection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Preferences of politicians</th>
<th>Electoral incentives</th>
<th>Lobbying</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alvarez (2005)</td>
<td>“Inconclusive evidence of correlation between money and favorable legislative behavior.”</td>
<td>No data analysis. Primarily a literature review. Also discusses the economic importance of the sector but does not directly discuss how this could affect voting behavior.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Abler (1991)</td>
<td>Campaign contributions are used to help elect people who are predisposed to support sugar and dairy programs.</td>
<td>Evidence that pro- and anti-sugar interests have been able to “buy” favorable votes.</td>
<td>Cross-country study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooks et al. (1998)</td>
<td>Campaign contributions are used to help elect people predisposed to support sugar and dairy programs.</td>
<td>Tendency for support to agriculture to decrease with the proportion of the population in agriculture.</td>
<td>Cross-country study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Gorter and Swinnen (2002)</td>
<td>“In federal systems where the upper house has a territorial constituency, the marginal effect on producer support is negative.”</td>
<td>Tendency for support to agriculture to decrease with the proportion of the population in agriculture.</td>
<td>Cross-country study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gawande and Hoekman (2006)</td>
<td>“A senator’s personal ideological convictions is significant in explaining and predicting votes of US Senators.”</td>
<td>Public agricultural spending increases under the influence of upcoming elections.</td>
<td>Cross-country analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitra et al. (2003)</td>
<td>“Our model reconciles the apparent contradiction between models of self-interested politicians and of governments motivated by social concerns.”</td>
<td>Tendency for support to agriculture to decrease with the proportion of the population in agriculture.</td>
<td>Cross-country study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thies and Porche (2007)</td>
<td>“In federal systems where the upper house has a territorial constituency, the marginal effect on producer support is negative.”</td>
<td>“Interest-group money bends agricultural policy in the United States.”</td>
<td>Cross-country study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vesenka (1989)</td>
<td>“Contributions from agricultural political action committees are insignificant in explaining and predicting the US Senate’s votes on eight 1981 and six 1985 Farm Bill amendments.”</td>
<td>Public agricultural spending increases under the influence of upcoming elections.</td>
<td>Cross-country study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
established by Abraham Lincoln, who called it the “people’s department.” The Homestead Act gave federal land to settlers under the legal doctrine of homesteading, whereby someone gains ownership of a plot of land by virtue of clearing and cultivating it (Allen, 1991). The Morrill Act, for its part, gave birth to the network of land grant universities, and the Hatch Act of 1887 created a corresponding network of agricultural experiment stations which, to this day, still fund agricultural research. The USDA implements policies related to agriculture, forestry, and food, and it oversees the various agencies in charge of implementing those policies. As Knutson et al. (2007: 87) note, until the Great Depression, US agricultural policy focused largely on “development, research, education, and information.”

When the Great Depression hit rural areas especially hard, policy makers expanded agricultural protection. Following the stock market crash of October 1929, agricultural commodity prices fell by about 60% (Cochrane, 1958). Many individuals were forced to migrate in search of work, a phenomenon Steinbeck immortalized in The Grapes of Wrath. Rural households struggled to make a living, and the average farm family’s income was less than half that of the average non-farm family (Paarlberg, 2011).

In response, the flurry of New Deal legislation included the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933 (Skocpol and Finegold, 1982), which added a host of agricultural protection measures. The most important were price supports, which set the prices of selected agricultural commodities equal to purchasing power parity for the period 1910–1914, which had seen high commodity prices and farm incomes (Knutson et al., 2007). The AAA was modified and extended in 1938 and then again in 1949. Ever since, the farm bill has been a part of US public policy: “every farm bill since 1949 has been a further amendment to the 1938 act, with a fixed termination date” (Knutson et al., 2007: 88).

When America became involved in World War II, millions of people left rural areas to join the war effort or to take manufacturing jobs in urban centers. Labor became ever scarcer in rural areas and, as a result, the agricultural sector developed several labor-saving technologies that allowed for increasing returns to scale in agriculture. Farms became bigger and fewer in number (Paarlberg, 2011). As farms consolidated, the price supports adopted in 1933 eventually proved unsustainable. At first, they were replaced by flexible price supports, which were set at less than 100 percent of the 1910–1914 parity values (Knutson et al., 2007). By the 1970s, price supports had effectively become income supports for farmers. Lawmakers allowed prices to fall below the levels they had achieved during the price-support era. In exchange, the government began granting farmers direct payments tied to farm prices, often referred to as “coupled payments.” Coupled payments proved too costly, however, and the 1996 farm bill—the Federal Agriculture Investment and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 (US Government Printing Office, 2013b)—decoupled direct payments and food prices and authorized direct payments to farmers regardless of the quantities they produced or the prices of their crops. By decoupling payments from price and quantity, lawmakers hoped to bring an end to the market distortions that price supports had created: In principle, farmers could receive government subsidies while still allowing the market to dictate which crops were most valuable. In the span of just a few decades, American agricultural policy had moved from a system of price supports to a system of direct transfers.

This system of direct transfers was renewed and expanded in the 2002 and 2008 farm bills (US Government Printing Office, 2013c,d). The 2002 farm bill renewed the direct payments enacted by the 1996 farm bill, but it also introduced countercyclical payments and commodity loan rates, which were continued in 2008. The 2008 farm bill, which took effect at the height of the 2008 food crisis, added the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program, a form of revenue insurance for farmers (Schmitz et al., 2010). Food prices had reached a 30-year high, and the ACRE program “cleverly used the high income levels of [farmers in] 2008 as a baseline from which farmers would be able to make claims for added compensation in the event prices subsequently fell, which of course they soon did” (Paarlberg, 2011). Of course, there was a certain discontinuity between the two farm bills: since the mid-2000s, agricultural policy has become entangled with environmental or energy policy via biofuels (de Gorter and Just, 2009). Overall, however, 2002 and 2008 were good years for agricultural protection.13

The political economy of US agricultural policy

Why have lawmakers worked so hard to protect agriculture? As Paarlberg (2011) explains, the process by which the farm bill is renewed (and usually expanded) every five to seven years is supported by an iron triangle composed of (i) the House and Senate Agricultural Committees, whose members are often advocates of agricultural protection, (ii) the USDA, whose very existence is justified in great part by its administering agricultural protection programs, and (iii) the farm lobby, which works to extract as much money as possible for farmers, and which contributes to the campaigns of sympathetic members of Congress.

First, the House and Senate Agricultural Committees draft each farm bill. Paarlberg (2011:100) notes:

The secret to every farm bill’s success in Congress is the lead role played by the House and Senate Agriculture Committees, where members from farm states and farm districts enjoy a dominant presence and are rewarded for their legislative efforts with generous campaign contributions from the farm lobby, which is built around organizations representing the farmers who get the subsidies. The Agriculture Committees draft the legislation that goes to the floor for a final vote, and in the drafting process they take care to satisfy the minimum needs of both Republican and Democratic members to ensure bipartisan support. The final package is what students of legislative politics call a committee-based logroll.

Once the Agricultural Committees draft a farm bill, the proposed legislation is sent to the House and Senate for floor action. Both the House and Senate place the legislation on their calendars, the bills are debated, and then votes take place. If a majority of the members of a chamber vote “Yea,” the bill passes. This is the first of the three most common major votes on any farm bill, and we will refer to this vote as the vote on passage for the remainder of this paper.

If the House and Senate pass different versions of the farm bill, the two chambers appoint an ad hoc conference committee to iron out the differences. If the conference committee reaches an agreement, the reconciled bill is then sent to each chamber for approval. This is the second of the three major votes on most farm bills, and we will refer to this vote as the conference vote.

13 Obviously, this brief historical overview of US agricultural policy is in no way meant to be an exhaustive survey. The reader interested in a more exhaustive discussion of US agricultural protection is encouraged to consult Orden et al. (1999), Paarlberg and Paarlberg (2000), Gardner (2006), Knutson et al. (2007), Schmitz et al. (2010), and Paarlberg (2011).
If both chambers pass an identical farm bill, it heads to the President who may sign it into law or veto it. If the President vetoes, the bill is sent back to Congress with the President’s reasons for vetoing the bill. Both chambers then have the option to vote to override the President’s veto, but overriding a presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in each chamber. This is the third of the three major votes that are possible on a farm bill, and we will refer to it as the veto override vote. The 2002 farm bill, for instance, was passed in slightly different forms in the House and Senate, reconciled in conference committee, passed in conference votes in both chambers, then signed into law by the president. The 2008 farm bill, on the other hand, was passed in different forms, reconciled in conference, passed in conference votes, and then vetoed by George W. Bush. Congress voted to override President Bush’s veto, however, and the extension became law.

Why did members of Congress do so much to shepherd these bills through the legislative process, even at the expense of following through on a veto showdown with President Bush? The four explanations that seem most promising are lawmaker preferences, electoral incentives, lobbying, and political institutions. Perhaps lawmakers personally favor aggressive agricultural protections. Perhaps their constituents pressure them to support agriculture. Perhaps lobbyists do. Or perhaps the institutional environment has somehow stacked the deck in agriculture’s favor.

Unfortunately, we cannot test institutional explanations in this paper: the relevant features of the institutional environment (e.g., delegated authority to committees, iron triangles, the different geographical constituencies of the House and Senate, and so on) have been essentially constant during the period when we have relevant data. Instead, we focus on legislator preferences, electoral incentives, and lobbying. Previous empirical research on this topic suggests that all three explanations hold promise. Research on interest groups and the welfare of their constituents (see Hall and Deardorff, 2006; Hall and Wayman, 2006) and economics (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Denzau and Munger conclude that interest groups focus on legislators whose constituencies are indifferent or rationally ignorant about the groups’ preferred policies. In other words, voters who have a preference for those policies not only get their way in their own districts, but also in other districts where voters do not care or are rationally ignorant about those policies. Grossman and Helpman conclude that legislators trade off campaign contributions from interest groups and the welfare of their constituents (see also Grossman and Helpman, 1996). There are good reasons to suspect that lawmakers’ own preferences matter, too: a growing body of research has shown that legislators often vote their own views on the issues before them (for a useful review, see Burden, 2007).

**Empirical framework**

Which of these explanations carries the most weight? To date, scholars have never examined all three in conjunction at the individual level, as shown in Table 1. That is, we do not know how important lawmaker preferences (as distinct from ideology), electoral incentives, and lobbying are relative to one another when legislators make important decisions about agricultural protection policies (though a handful of studies have tackled two simultaneously; see, for example, Brooks, 1997).

**Estimation strategy**

In the empirical application below, we model legislative action on major farm bills as a function of all three factors and a host of controls. We focus on five measures of how legislators voted on the 2002 and 2008 farm bills: the passage and committee votes in 2002 and the passage, committee, and veto override votes in 2008. Although farm bills are omnibus bills that cover both agricultural protection and nutrition programs, we argue below that including the poverty rate in a district as a control variable allows isolating voting in favor of agricultural protection.

The core equation we estimate is

\[ y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta_p x_{ijt} + \beta_e e_{ijt} + \beta_l l_{ijt} + \gamma X_{ijt} + \delta_1 d_1 + \delta_2 d_2 + \delta_3 d_3 + \epsilon_{ijt}. \]  

14 Our approach also cannot account for logrolling, the practice whereby members of Congress trade favors, in which one member will vote another one’s preference on an issue in expectation of the other voting the one’s preference on a different issue.

predicted probabilities outside of the [0, 1] interval, and it suffers from heteroskedasticity due to the Bernoulli structure of the variance of binary variables—these shortcomings are irrelevant in this application. First, since we are not interested in forecasting future votes, it does not matter that predicted probabilities can in theory lie outside of the [0, 1] interval; what matters instead is to accurately estimate the coefficient associated with each variable of interest. Moreover, our use of robust standard errors throughout eliminates concerns about heteroskedasticity. Additionally, the LPM offers three distinct advantages over nonlinear procedures such as the probit or logit. First, it prevents coefficient estimates from being identified as a result of the specific distribution assumed for the error term. Second, it produces coefficient estimates that can be easily interpreted as elasticities without extra computations. Third, and most importantly for the application at hand, it does not suffer from the incidental parameter problem one encounters when incorporating fixed effects to nonlinear procedures such as the probit or logit (Heckman, 1981).

Of course, we must note an important limitation up front. On each of the five bills we examine, some legislators simply do not cast votes.17 As a result, many do not have Farm Bureau scores (though almost all have Friend of the Farm Bureau indicators) during the three Congresses for which we have Farm Bureau score data. Although there is a burgeoning area of research devoted to dealing with abstention—and, more importantly, strategic abstention—from roll call votes (Rosas et al., 2012), the methods developed require data which we simply do not have. We thus assume that in this context, votes are missing at random, a common assumption in the case of missing data. Again, our Friend of the Farm Bureau measure should help to further alleviate concerns about this limitation, but it is worth noting here.

**Identification strategy**

In any application, there are three possible sources of statistical endogeneity that can compromise the identification of causal relationships:

1. **Unobserved heterogeneity:** The controls on the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. (1) might fail to account for some important nonrandom differences between legislators, and those differences are correlated with the variables on the RHS of Eq. (1).
2. **Measurement error:** One or more of the variables in Eq. (1) might be measured with error.
3. **Reverse causality or simultaneity:** Changes in the dependent variable might induce changes in one or more of the explanatory variables.

In most analyses of cross-sectional data, unobserved heterogeneity is the most likely source of prospective endogeneity. Indeed, although the right-hand side of Eq. (1) includes a rich set of controls, we can never rule out the possibility that we have missed something important. Simply put, our results are not causal estimates; they are associations, which can be useful for testing competing explanations of legislative action (e.g., if lobbying drives legislators to support farms, we should observe an association between lobbying and support for farms) but which are not the same as causal evidence (since we cannot definitively rule out that something correlated with lobbying was really doing the work).

We are less concerned about measurement error. Eq. (1) controls for a wide range of factors that should capture a legislator’s preferences for food policy programs such as the SNAP: not only do we account for a legislator’s age, gender, party affiliation, state, and Congress, we also control for the poverty rate (which proxies for the number of food stamp or SNAP recipients) as well as for the median income (which, once the poverty rate is included, proxies for inequality) in the legislator’s district. In other words, although it is certainly possible that a legislator’s vote on a farm bill encompasses more than her vote on agricultural protection, it is highly unlikely that this significantly compromises the identification of our results given our control variables. Additionally, our use of Farm Bureau-related variables (i.e., Farm Bureau scores, and the indicator for whether a legislator is a Friend of the Farm Bureau) provides a consistency check on the farm bill results: those variables home in on agricultural protection and ignore other kinds of policy.

Finally, except as regards the Farm Bureau-related variables, the issue of reverse causality is largely irrelevant in this context. Indeed, it is impossible for a legislator’s vote on a farm bill to cause a legislator to have received more money from agricultural PACs in the preceding election. And though it is certainly possible that the two are jointly determined because agricultural PACs contribute to a legislator’s re-election campaign in the hope that, once elected, his votes will favor agriculture, legislators can do whatever they want once elected. Likewise, it is unlikely that a legislator’s vote on a farm bill causes changes in the proportion of that legislator’s constituents who work as farmers, and it is simply impossible that it causes the legislator to have spent more time working as a farmer.

Still, the empirical results in this paper rely on observational data, so we cannot claim to have identified causal relationships between our three variables of interest (i.e., preferences, electoral incentives, and lobbying) and support for agricultural protection. The relationship between lobbyists, voters, and legislators is complex, after all. PACs routinely lobby legislators who they expect to vote their way, and many PACs try to change legislators’ personal views about the issues at hand, either by trying to persuade them or trying to replace them (by donating to their opponents). Likewise, legislators’ personal views depend in part on the kinds of people voters elect, which in turn depends on voters’ preferences.

However, if we want to understand what drives agricultural protection in the US, we have to start somewhere. We cannot randomly assign legislators to have certain kinds of constituents, certain kinds of preferences, or certain kinds of relationships with interest groups. Likewise, finding a valid instrumental variable (IV)—a variable that explains either a legislator’s preferences, the preferences of her constituents, or how much she receives in agricultural PAC contributions, but which is itself uncorrelated with the legislator’s voting behavior—is difficult enough for any one of these three variables, and finding valid IVs for all three would be a Herculean task. We can, however, use observational data to determine whether the associations implied by extant theories really exist in the complex world of congressional decision making.

16 Moreover, in the presence of heteroskedasticity, the use of robust standard errors with the probit or logit (or any other nonlinear procedure) yields inconsistent coefficient estimates. As Giles (2013) informally noted in a discussion of the topic: “What use is a consistent standard error when the point estimate is inconsistent?” See Greene (2012:692) for a formal treatment.

17 Note that the issue of misclassification (i.e., zero responses recorded as ones or one responses recorded as zeroes) can be a serious threat to identification in an LPM (Hausman et al., 1999). This is not a problem here, however, given that the votes of members of Congress are public, that those votes are carefully recorded, and that they are under a considerable amount of scrutiny from various stakeholders.

18 Although the Food Research and Action Center (FRAC) has made available congressional district-level data on the number of food stamp or SNAP recipients, those data are for 2011, and so we cannot use them for our analysis, which stops in 2009. See FRAC (2011) for the data.
the preferences of voters.

that politician’s voters. Levitt (1998), for example, shows that PACs influence politics gets elected can be the result of sustained effort by lobbyists, or of the preferences of some combination of the three? To answer these questions, we need those policies? When agricultural interests lobby them aggressively?

mote agricultural interests. 

ers themselves should be more likely to support policies that pro-
elected to Congress. All else equal, legislators who were farm own-
attitudes toward economic issues like agricultural subsidies, how-
consistently more likely to support farmers. 

we identified lawmakers who previously worked as farmers using data from the Congressional Leadership and Social Status (CLASS) dataset (Carnes, 2011), the only existing database that contains detailed information about the professional backgrounds of a large sample of American legislators. The CLASS dataset includes a wide range of biographical data for each of the 783 legislators.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>(Std. Dev.)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Dependent variables**

- Farm Bill 2002 Passage Vote (Indicator) 0.689 (0.463) 511
- Farm Bill 2002 Conference Vote (Indicator) 0.662 (0.473) 518
- Farm Bill 2008 Passage Vote (Indicator) 0.602 (0.490) 515
- Farm Bill 2008 Conference Vote (Indicator) 0.767 (0.423) 520
- Farm Bill 2008 Veto Vote (Indicator) 0.765 (0.424) 520
- Farm Bureau Score 0.612 (0.269) 906
- Friend of the Farm Bureau (Indicator) 0.483 (0.500) 2699

**Variables of interest**

- Proposition of Career Spent in Agriculture 0.022 (0.091) 2715
- Proposition of Agricultural Constituents 0.058 (0.011) 2715
- Contributions from Agricultural PACs ($1000) 22.942 (33.590) 2715

**District characteristics**

- Poverty Rate 0.123 (0.054) 2715
- Median Income ($1,000) 43.159 (10.301) 2715
- Proportion of Republican Constituents 0.522 (0.079) 2680

**Legislator characteristics**

- Republican (Indicator) 0.511 (0.500) 2714
- Member of House Agricultural Committee (Indicator) 0.131 (0.337) 2676
- Member of Senate Agricultural Committee (Indicator) 0.038 (0.190) 2715
- Female (Indicator) 0.142 (0.349) 2715
- Age (Years) 56.069 (10.050) 2715
- 106th Congress (Indicator) 0.200 (0.400) 2715
- 107th Congress (Indicator) 0.200 (0.400) 2715
- 108th Congress (Indicator) 0.199 (0.399) 2715
- 109th Congress (Indicator) 0.199 (0.399) 2715
- 110th Congress (Indicator) 0.202 (0.402) 2715

Data and descriptive statistics

Do lawmakers support agriculture when they personally prefer policies that protect farmers? When their constituents prefer those policies? When agricultural interests lobby them aggressively? Or is the average lawmaker’s support for agricultural protection due some combination of the three? To answer these questions, we need data on what lawmakers want, what their constituents want, and how much lawmakers are lobbied by agricultural interests.

Measuring legislators’ personal views on public policy can be challenging. The last representative survey that asked members of Congress about their personal opinions was conducted in the late 1950s (Miller and Stokes, 1963). We can easily tap legislators’ attitudes toward economic issues like agricultural subsidies, however, by studying what they did for a living before they were elected to Congress. All else equal, legislators who were farm owners themselves should be more likely to support policies that promote agricultural interests.

We identified lawmakers who previously worked as farmers using data from the Congressional Leadership and Social Status (CLASS) dataset (Carnes, 2011), the only existing database that contains detailed information about the professional backgrounds of a large sample of American legislators. The CLASS dataset includes a wide range of biographical data for each of the 783 legislators who served in the 106th through 110th Congresses (1999–2008), including information about all of the jobs the legislator had before serving in Congress. We focus here on the percentage of each member’s pre-congressional career spent working as a farm owner or manager. If legislators sometimes vote with an eye to their own policy preferences, as Carnes (2012, 2013) shows, former farmers in Congress should be more likely to support policies that benefit farmers.

Likewise, if legislators vote with an eye to their constituents’ preferences, those who represent larger numbers of farmers should be more likely to support agriculture. As a simple test of this idea, we examined the CLASS dataset’s measure of the proportion of each legislator’s constituents who work as farm owners or managers. Of course, most people who work in agriculture are farm employees, not farm owners. We focus here on owners and managers—who stand to reap the most immediate benefits from agricultural subsidies—although studying the concentration of farm employees in a district would probably produce similar findings (since the proportion of farm workers in a district is highly correlated with the proportion of farm owners.) Lawmakers who represent greater numbers of farm owners tend to represent greater numbers of farm workers, too—and those lawmakers usually have strong electoral incentives to keep federal dollars flowing to agriculture.

To measure lobbying on behalf of agriculture, we simply computed the amount of money each legislator received from agricultural PACs during each congressional term using Federal Elections Commission data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics (2012). With these data, we can easily determine whether lawmakers who receive more money from farm PACs are more likely to vote to fund agriculture. Table 2 lists the complete descriptive statistics for all of the variables in our analysis during each congressional term and when we pool observations across all five Congresses.

Measured this way, legislator preferences, constituent preferences, and agricultural lobbying each predict substantial differences in how legislators vote on farm issues. In Fig. 1, we have simply divided legislators by party (Democrats on the left, Republicans on the right) and then by whether the legislator ever worked as a farm owner or manager before serving in Congress (non-farmers are gray, farmers are black). The first five panels plot the percentages of legislators who voted in favor of agriculture on each of the individual roll call votes we have singled out. The last two panels plot the average Farm Bureau score members received and the percentage of members who were designated “Friends of the Farm Bureau.” With one exception (Democrats voting on the conference report for the 2002 agriculture bill), legislators who had worked as farm owners always scored higher on average than those who did not. These gaps were almost always statistically significant for Republican lawmakers, and the difference was significant among legislators from both parties when we examined which members were designated Friends of the Farm Bureau, our most comprehensive measure of support for agriculture. Consistent with the idea that legislators vote on farm policy with an eye to their preferences, members of Congress who had worked as farmers were consistently more likely to support farmers.

Likewise, members whose constituents included more farm owners were more likely to support pro-agriculture legislation. Fig. 2 repeats the analysis in Fig. 1, this time dividing lawmakers by whether they represented a district or state where more than 2% of people worked as farm owners or managers (i.e., about double the national average). Across the board, legislators who represented greater numbers of farmers were more likely to...
support agriculture.

The same was true when we divided legislators by whether they received more than $25,000 from agricultural PACs. As Fig. 3 illustrates, lawmakers who received more money from farm groups were more likely to support agriculture in each of the roll call votes we examined and on both of the Farm Bureau scores. Like legislators who worked as farmers and legislators who represented farmers, legislators who received more money from farm PACs were more likely to support agriculture.

**Fig. 1.** Do legislators who were farmers vote differently?
Fig. 2. Do legislators from districts with a larger share of farmers vote differently?
Fig. 3. Do legislators who receive substantial amounts of agricultural PAC money vote differently?
Estimation results and discussion

Of course, there is a great deal of overlap between the three variables: the legislators who receive more money from agricultural PACs are often the legislators who worked as farmers and who represent farmers. To disentangle the effects of the three variables, we estimated the regressions described in Eq. (1) above.

Table 3 reports the results of four regression specifications that use our most comprehensive measure of support for agricultural protection, i.e., our indicator variable for whether each member was designated a Friend of the Farm Bureau during each of the five Congresses covered by the CLASS dataset. In each specification, we control for the poverty rate and the median income in each legislator’s district, whether a legislator is a member of the House or Senate agricultural committee, the legislator’s party (an indicator for whether a legislator is a Republican), the partisanship of the legislator’s constituents (the proportion of constituents who identified as Republicans in the National Annenberg Election Study), the legislator’s gender (an indicator for women), the legislators age, the legislator’s state (not shown for brevity), whether the legislator is a Senator, and the Congress (also not shown). In the first specification in Table 3, we included our measure of the proportion of each legislator’s own pre-congressional career he or she spent working as a farm owner or manager. In the second specification, we included a measure of the proportion of the legislator’s constituents who are farm owners or managers. In the third specification, we included the logarithm of the amount of contributions the legislator received from agricultural PACs. The fourth specification includes all three variables of interest: our measures of legislator preferences, constituent preferences, and lobbying activity.

As Table 3 illustrates, all three variables of interest were associated with significant differences in how legislators voted on agricultural policy. Legislators who spent the entirety of their pre-congressional career working as farm owners or managers are 27 percentage points more likely to be Friends of the Farm Bureau (column 1), but this decreases to 15 percentage points and is no longer significant once other mechanisms of support for agricultural protection are controlled for (column 4). Likewise, for a one percentage point increase in the proportion of a legislator’s constituents who work in agriculture, that legislator was 33 percentage points more likely to be a Friend of the Farm Bureau (column 2), but this decreases to 25 percentage points once other mechanisms of support for agricultural protection are controlled for (column 4). Though the estimated coefficients for the proportion of constituents who work in agriculture might seem high, note that this is due to the conditioning domain: for more than 99% of our sample, that proportion was less than 5%, and the mean of this variable is less than 1%. Given those very small percentages, for the average legislator in our sample, a one percentage point increase in the proportion of constituents who work in agriculture really means a 100% increase in the number of their constituents who work in agriculture, i.e., the difference between having 1% of constituents employed in agriculture versus having 2% working in agriculture. Lastly, for every additional $1,000 tranche received from agricultural PACs, a legislator was 1.9% more likely to be a Friend of the Farm Bureau, but this decreases to

Table 3
OLS Estimation results for Friends of the Farm Bureau.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Dependent Variable: = 1 if Friend of the Farm Bureau; = 0 Otherwise)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Career in Agriculture</td>
<td>0.274***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Farm Constituents</td>
<td>3.326***</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.487***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.723)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.753)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Agricultural PAC Contributions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.016***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate in District</td>
<td>-0.764**</td>
<td>-0.536*</td>
<td>-0.723**</td>
<td>-0.909**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.369)</td>
<td>(0.376)</td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income in District ($1000)</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Member of House Agricultural Committee</td>
<td>0.126***</td>
<td>0.118**</td>
<td>0.126***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Senate Agricultural Committee</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.386***</td>
<td>0.189***</td>
<td>0.375***</td>
<td>0.374***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Republican Constituents</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.925***</td>
<td>0.648***</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
<td>0.672***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2628</td>
<td>2628</td>
<td>2628</td>
<td>2628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.

Note that in all of our specifications, we regress a binary outcome on the logarithm of the amount of money received from agricultural PACs in 1000s of dollar. As such, the estimated coefficient for the logarithm of agricultural PAC contributions cannot be interpreted as an elasticity. To be interpreted as such, the estimated coefficient has to be divided by how much money a legislator has received to recover. That is, when \( y = x + \beta \ln(i), \) \( \frac{\partial y}{\partial i} = \beta / i. \) This last ratio can be computed in one of two ways: at means (i.e., computing \( \beta / \bar{i} \)), or taking the mean thereof (i.e., computing \( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\beta / i) \)). We opt for the latter approach.
1.8% (column 4) once other mechanisms of support for agricultural legislation are controlled for. Note, however, that the fact that the coefficient on PAC contributions does not change much with the inclusion of other variables suggest that lobbying has an effect all of its own, i.e., that very little of what it captures is captured by lawmaker preferences for agriculture or by electoral incentives.

In Table 4, we re-estimate the last specification in Table 3 (our most complete specification, which includes all three of our explanatory variables; the controls; as well as state, chamber, and Congress fixed effects), this time using each of the dependent variables from Figs. 1–3. Several patterns immediately stand out. First, an increase in a district’s poverty rate is associated with a decrease in the likelihood that a legislator will support agriculture, often significantly so. In contrast, an increase in the median income in a district (which, once the poverty rate is controlled for, controls for income inequality) is also associated with a decrease in the likelihood that a legislator will support agriculture. In other words, legislators who represent constituencies with more poverty and more inequality tend to be more likely to vote against agricultural protection. Second, the effect of agricultural committee membership appears to differ depending on whether one is in the House or in the Senate: members of the House Agricultural Committee are anywhere from 7 to 16 percentage points more likely to vote in favor of agricultural protection, but members of the Senate Agricultural Committee are consistently less likely to vote in favor of agricultural protection. Third, the Republican indicator—which captures how much more likely Republican lawmaker are to support the legislation in question, how much higher they score on the Farm Bureau scores, or how much more likely they are to be a Friend of the Farm Bureau—changes signs. Fourth, on each of the major agricultural subsidy bills we examined, Republicans were less likely to support the bill than Democrats or independents. Surprisingly, however, the Farm Bureau tended to rate Republicans more favorably: on the broader set of agricultural policies up for grabs in each Congress, Republicans tend to side with farmers more often than Democrats. Fifth, Senators seem more likely to vote in favor of agricultural protection than members of the House of Representatives.

Of the three factors we considered—legislator preferences, electoral incentives, and lobbying—electoral incentives were the most consistently associated with legislative action on farm bills: in all but two specifications, the proportion of a legislator’s constituents who were farmers was significantly associated with a greater likelihood of supporting agricultural protection. Legislators’ own preferences were significantly associated with pro-farmer voting in just one specification. Lobbying in two.

In some sense, these results should come as no surprise: when high-profile legislation is on the table, legislators always worry about how their choices might be used against them come election time (Arnold, 1990). When legislators consider lower-profile policies, however, they have more leeway. When we examine composite measures of how legislators behave on a wide range of important agricultural issues (columns 6 and 7 of Table 4), we find that both lobbying and electoral incentives matter. However, when we narrow our focus to roll call voting on two highly-visible bills, the importance of lobbying and legislator preferences is less clear: the coefficients have the expected signs, but the relationships are considerably noisier. Why do lawmakers in the U.S. subsidize agri-
culture? Part of the explanation seems to be that many of them personally favor agriculture, and part of the explanation seems to be that many of them have strong ties to groups that lobby on behalf of farmers. But the single most important factor seems to be that so many legislators represent constituents who stand to benefit from agricultural subsidies.

Do any of our three variables of interest substitute for or complement one another? As a simple test, Table 5 replicates the regression specifications from Table 4, this time adding terms that interact each pair of our three explanatory variables. Modeled this way, the independent importance of legislator preferences and constituent preferences is clearer: the coefficients for legislators’ own backgrounds in farming are statistically significant in three of the roll call vote specifications. Working as a farmer and representing farmers seem to be strong substitutes for one another. A legislator who worked as a farmer and represents a large number of farmers will tend to vote like a legislator who only had one of those qualities. When legislators decide to support farmers, it may be because their constituents compel them to, or it may because they personally believe that supporting farmers is good public policy. In places where farming is not a major industry, electing a farmer to Congress boosts the chances that the legislator will support agriculture; in places where agriculture is king, lawmakers tend to support farmers regardless of their backgrounds.

That said, because farmers never constitute a majority of constituents in the data, it is a priori possible that more constituents lose than win from this state of affairs if one assumes that farmers all benefit and all non-farmers lose out from agricultural protection, since only a minority of farmers are favored by such policies. But this is an oversimplification, as it ignores the spillover effects of those farmers in their congressional districts. Farms, for example, tend to hire people from their districts to work on their farms, and in many farm districts, there often are a number of businesses (e.g., farm implement dealerships) that have developed as a consequence of there being farms in the district.

Summary and conclusions

Starting from the observation that as GDP per capita increases, a country is more likely to support agriculture—the so-called developmental paradox (Lindert, 1991; Barrett, 1999)—we have sought to answer the question “Why do members of Congress support agricultural protection?” Using data on the members of the 106th through 110th US Congresses, we have tested three hypotheses. Specifically, we have looked at whether legislator preferences, electoral incentives, or lobbying drive two sets of measures related to agricultural protection, roll call votes on the 2002 and 2008 farm bills and for Farm Bureau measures.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>2002 farm bill</th>
<th>2008 farm bill</th>
<th>Farm Bureau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Conf.</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Career in Agriculture</td>
<td>1.005***</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Agricultural PAC Contributions</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Career in Agriculture</td>
<td>-0.028**</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Agricultural PAC Contributions</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Agricultural PAC Contributions</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
<td>-0.969</td>
<td>-0.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Farm Constituents</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Summary and conclusions

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<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\* p < 0.1.
\** p < 0.05.
\*** p < 0.01.
bills, Farm Bureau scores, and the “Friend of the Farm Bureau” designation.

Although all three of our competing hypotheses explain some of the variation in support for agricultural protection, the one explanation that almost always explains support for agricultural protection is the electoral pressure a legislator faces, i.e., the proportion of her constituents who are farm owners or farm managers. Moreover, we find that a legislator’s preferences for agricultural protection and the degree of electoral pressure he faces appear to be substitutes for one another.

This is not to say that lobbying doesn’t matter. If agricultural PAC contributions were irrelevant to legislative outcomes, those PACs would presumably find other ways to spend their money. At the margin, however, agricultural PACs do not seem to be simply “buying votes.” As others have noted, PACs give to legislators not to change their votes but to influence who gets elected (Abler, 1991) and to mobilize allies to do work behind the scenes (Hall and Wayman, 1990). Generally speaking, our findings are close to those of Vesenka (1989), who found that PACs explain very little but that ideology (i.e., party affiliation) explains quite a bit of variation in support for agricultural protection.

Our approach, of course, has a few important limitations. First and foremost is our inability to make causal statements. Our data are observational and we do not have an experimental research design: it would be a mistake to conclude that the relationships discussed above are causal. This is simply an inherent feature of most studies of legislative decision making. Our observational data can help us test the observable implications of causal theories about agricultural protection in Congress, but a complete causal statement will have to wait for future research.

Second, much of the action on any given farm bill occurs at the committee level, i.e., well before the vast majority of legislators cast a vote, and our data do not allow us to study what goes on in committees beyond controlling for agricultural committee membership. Another promising direction for future research, then, might be to explore in greater detail the role of the House and Senate Agricultural Committee membership—or the role of prior legislative precedent as a form of “path dependence” that shapes the bills that eventually come to a floor vote.

Finally, although our results are not causal, they have important practical implications for reformers. The most consistent predictor of support for agricultural protection is the proportion of a legislator’s constituents who are farm owners or farm managers. But those voters can only play an important role in the policy-making process if other voters are in the dark about the costs they shoulder when Congress enacts agricultural protections (Becker, 1983). The solution, then, may be to educate voters about the costs and benefits of agricultural policy. In addition, our findings have clear implications for advocates of agricultural protection as well. Those who want to see more support for agriculture in Congress could benefit by working to elect more legislators who personally support agricultural protection. Our findings suggest one promising group: If you want Congress to protect farm owners, it may be wise to elect more farm owners. And if you want Congress to stop protecting farmers, it may be wise to stop electing them.

References