Rage Within the Machine?
Political Cynicism Among Candidates and Party Leaders

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Abstract

Does our political process encourage cynical politicians who stray from our democratic ideals? This paper uses new national surveys of state legislative candidates and county-level party leaders to develop the first recent measures of cynicism among political elites. My findings suggest that political cynicism operates very differently among politicians than it does among ordinary Americans. In contrast to research on the *spiral of cynicism* in the general public, I find evidence of a *spiral of trust* among politicians: experienced elites tend to be less cynical than newcomers. And consistent with research showing that cynicism's effects are tempered by political sophistication, I find that cynical politicians are no more likely to express polarized views, to oppose government action, or to ignore their constituents. These findings suggest that the very nature of holding office may discourage cynicism and its most problematic effects.

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"The most hardhearted [Republican lawmakers] believe cutting benefits will give people an incentive to get back to work. The most cynical are hoping for widespread misery, which they can then pin on 'Obama's economy' for political gain in the elections this fall."

New York Times Editorial Board, January 15, 2014

"[Senator Hillary Clinton's] effort to tug on Americans' heartstrings instead of explaining her Wall Street ties—on a day that the scars of 9/11 were exposed anew—was at best botched rhetoric. At worst it was the type of cynical move that Mrs. Clinton would have condemned in Republicans."

New York Times Editorial Board, November 15, 2015

"Predictions that Mr. Sanders's supporters could migrate to Donald Trump in the fall are overstated, despite Mr. Trump's cynical efforts to woo them."

New York Times Editorial Board, May 3, 2016

"It is already clear that voter suppression engineered in Republican-controlled statehouses will be a sorry part of the election dynamic this year. Ordinary citizens deserve better than such cynical gamesmanship, particularly from professional politicians who should be the most conscientious of all."

New York Times Editorial Board, June 13, 2016

"The backtracking by Mr. Johnson and his allies has exposed the venality and cynicism of their [Brexit] campaign — unfortunately for Britain, far too late."

New York Times Editorial Board, June 28, 2016

Journalists and political observers routinely accuse politicians of behaving cynically. But just how cynical are political leaders? Is cynicism rewarded—or even effectively required—by our electoral and governing institutions? And, perhaps more importantly, do cynical politicians behave differently in ways that harm our political process?

To date, there has been almost no research on political cynicism among politicians in the United States. Scholarship on the psychological dispositions of political elites flourished in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., Miller and Stokes [1958] 1984). Since then, however, scholars of political psychology have focused primarily on citizens, not elites (e.g., Huddy, Sears, and Levy 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009; Lodge and Taber 2013; Stenner 2005), and scholars of elite decision-making have focused primarily on leaders' strategic environments, not their political psychology (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Arnold 1990; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Mayhew 1974; Rohde 1991; but see, for instance, Burden 2007).

Questions about political cynicism among politicians seem well worth asking, however.

In the general public, political cynicism is associated with a wide range of potentially concerning outcomes, including political disengagement (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Patterson 1993; Lau and Erber 1990; Macedo 2005; Skocpol 2003; but see Austin and Pinkelton 1995; Miller 1974; Niemi and Weisberg 2001; Sears and Citrin 1982; Southwell and Pirch 2003), polarization (Ansolabeher and Iyengar 1995), opposition to public service provision (Hetherington 2005), lawbreaking (Tyler 1998), anti-government actions (Martin 2010), and even the collapse of government legitimacy itself (Easton 1965; 1975). The normative stakes are high: if cynical politicians think and behave like cynical citizens, it could have serious consequences for gridlock, corruption, and democratic government.

More broadly, developing a richer understanding of the political psychology of elites is probably a worthwhile goal in itself. Why shouldn't we know as much about how politicians experience heuristics, implicit attitudes, stereotypes, emotions, prejudices, and cynicism as we know about how these psychological forces play out in the general public? Politicians are people, too, after all (and influential people, at that). Political scientists should understand not just how their strategic environments influence their choices, but also how their minds work.

This paper uses new national surveys of state legislative candidates and county-level political party leaders to develop the first recent measures of political cynicism among politicians or political elites (I use the terms interchangeably here). With these data, I focus on two important questions: do our political institutions promote or encourage cynicism among elites (in keeping with research on the *spiral of cynicism* among ordinary citizens; e.g., Cappella and Jamieson 1997) and do cynical politicians behave differently (in ways that parallel the negative effects of cynicism many scholars have observed in the general public)?

My findings suggest that political cynicism operates very differently among politicians

than it does among ordinary citizens. In contrast to research on the spiral of cynicism in the general public, I find evidence of a *spiral of trust* among elites: experienced politicians tend to be less cynical than newcomers (perhaps because cynical politicians are less likely to stay in office, or perhaps because the cynics who remain in office become less cynical over time). Moreover, consistent with research suggesting that the effects of cynicism are muted by political sophistication (e.g., Rahn and Hirshorn 1999; Valentino, Beckmann, and Burh 2001), I find that cynical politicians tend to think and behave like other leaders in most ways: they are no more likely to express polarized views, to oppose government action, or to ignore their constituents. In sharp contrast to media portrayals of politics as game that rewards the cynical, these findings suggest that the very nature of holding office may discourage elites from exhibiting cynicism and its most normatively concerning effects.

Cynical Politicians?

Historically, *cynicism* has been defined as the belief that others are motivated purely by self-interest. In this view, a cynic is someone who thinks that other people are only looking out for themselves—and who therefore tends to behave in self-interested ways him/herself. In popular usage (and modern political discourse), however, cynicism has often taken on a broader meaning more in line with *The Cambridge English Dictionary*'s definition, "not trusting or respecting the goodness of other people and their actions." In this expanded view, a cynic is simply someone who has a persistent low opinion of how others make decisions.

Political cynicism, in turn, is usually defined as distrust of or low opinions about how *people in politics and government* make decisions. It is often distinguished from other related forms of political disaffection, such as apathy (simply not caring), disengagement (not

participating), or declinism (believing that politics is in a state of irreversible decline; see, for instance, Austin and Pinkleton 1995; Schenck-Hamlin, Procter, and Rumsey 2000).

To date, most research on political cynicism has focused on how cynicism in the general public is related to political media, particularly negative advertising or coverage (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Kaid et al 2000; Dardis, Shen, and Edwards 2008; Schenck-Hamlin, Procter, and Rumsey 2000; but see Kaid and Postelnicu 2005; Pinkleton, Um, and Austin 2002), political satire (Guggenheim, Kwak, and Campbell 2011), and media depicting politicians as strategic rather than issue-focused (Jackson 2011). The most widely-accepted perspective in this literature is probably Cappella and Jamieson (1997)'s *spiral of cynicism* theory, which argues that the news portrays politics as a game and focuses not on issues or policy, but on popularity and strategy. Although viewers find this kind of coverage entertaining (Hamilton 2004), it also promotes political cynicism and disengagement, creating a sort of spiral. A cynical public thinks that politics is a game; news that caters to that perspective makes the public more cynical (see also de Vreese 2004; de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008; Hibbing and Theiss-Moore 1995; Lipset and Schneider 1983; Pederson 2012; Valentino, Beckmann, and Burh 2001).

Political cynicism in the general public, in turn, has been linked to a wide range of outcomes, including several normatively concerning behaviors (but see Citrin 1974; Citrin and Muste 1999; Eisinger 2000; Sears and Citrin 1982). In principle, negative views about government could drive people to engage in democratic politics more passionately and thoughtfully; in practice, however, most studies find that cynical people are less engaged and more apathetic (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Ansolabeher and Iyengar 1995; Patterson 1993; Lau and Erber 1990; Macedo 2005; Skocpol 2003; but see Austin and Pinkelton 1995; Miller 1974; Niemi and Weisberg 2001; but see Southwell and Pirch 2003). People who are more

cynical are more likely to abandon the two major parties (Peterson and Wrighton 1998; Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984; Howell and Pagan 1988; Chressanthis 1990; Chressanthis and Shaffer 1993; Howell 1994) and react more negatively to news about political scandals (Dancey 2012). They are more opposed to public service provision and more likely to favor the status quo over enacting new policies (Hetherington 1998; 2005; Robinson 2014). They are more polarized (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995), less willing to comply with government laws (Tyler 1998), and more willing to protest or act against the government (Martin 2010). In many respects, cynical citizens effectively give up on politics and government.

Could the same be true of politicians? Could public office be the hotbed of cynicism it is often depicted as? It is at least theoretically conceivable. Political elites might exhibit a spiral of cynicism similar to what scholars find in the public; they might become more cynical the longer they stay in office, either because they are exposed to more political gamesmanship over time (*persuasion effects*), or because cynics are somehow drawn to office or have advantages that help them stay there (*replacement effects*). Cynical politicians could in turn exhibit any of the behaviors associated with cynicism in the general public: they might be more polarized, more opposed to government action, more likely to defect from their parties, more likely to ignore their constituents, or more likely to break the law (*behavior effects*).

Then again, political elites differ from ordinary citizens in many important ways, and theories of mass political psychology may not always apply neatly to politicians. When it comes to political cynicism, there are at least three characteristics of elites that might disrupt the processes that occur in the general public.

The first is that *politicians are a self-selected group*. When a member of the general public becomes fed up with politics and government, they remain a member of the general public

(and increase the average level of cynicism). When politicians become fed up with politics and government, however, they have the option to simply quit working in politics—and thereby remove themselves from the pool of politicians (a *replacement effect*). Many theories of candidate entry would lead us to expect exactly that: people seek office when the benefits exceed the costs (e.g., Black 1972). If politicians with a low opinion of other leaders get less utility from work in government, they may choose to simply disengage (as cynical citizens often do). Politicians are undoubtedly exposed to a great deal of gamsmanship and non-issue-focused discourse, but the self-selected nature of holding office may powerfully disrupt the usual spiral of cynicism. Just as the hottest sweat molecules evaporate and leave us cooler, the most cynical politicians may leave office and thereby reduce the overall level of cynicism among the elite.

The second characteristic of elites that might alter how political cynicism operates is that *elites are vetted*, that is, politicians depend on approval from voters and elite actors to become and remain politicians. Just as self-selection might remove the most cynical politicians, voters and gatekeepers might remove them, too (another potential source of *replacement effects*). Of course, they might just as well reward cynics; politics is sometimes portrayed as a cutthroat endeavor where only the callous survive. In general, however, voters tend to dislike politicians they perceive as cynical, and it is at least conceivable that cynicism—a low opinion of how people in government make decisions—might also alienate elite gatekeepers (if cynics are less willing to cooperate, less likely to collaborate, less likely to ask for help, and so on; e.g., Stavrova and Ehlebracht 2016).

Moreover, the fact that politicians are vetted by voters and gatekeepers could potentially *reduce* the cynicism of the elites who succeed in politics (a *persuasion effect*). People like being favorably evaluated, and a favorable evaluation often improves a person's opinion of those doing

the evaluating. Success in politics could work the same way: winners might come to hold more favorable attitudes about the electorate and the selectorate ("They can't be that foolish, because they chose me!"). Elites can only remain elites if voters and other elites affirm them at regular intervals, and that might screen out some cynics—and improve how those who aren't screened out feel about politics and government.

The third characteristic of elites that might influence how we extend research on public cynicisms is that *elites tend to be highly sophisticated;* they are smarter and more knowledgeable about politics than the average citizen. In the general public, people with high levels of political sophistication are less likely to become cynical when exposed to news about politics (*persuasion*), and even those who are cynical tend not to exhibit the negative effects of cynicism (*behavior effects*) (e.g., Valentino, Beckmann, and Burh 2001, Rahn and Hirshorn 1999; but see de Vreese 2005; de Vreese and Elebans 2008). If the same is true for politicians, we might not expect the logic of the spiral of cynicism to apply to them at all. Moreover, we might not expect cynical politicians to behave all that differently from other elites. Although cynics in the general public are more likely to give up on politics and government, elite cynics might behave more or less like other elites.

Table 1 summarizes each of these expectations. Exposure to political gamesmanship can breed cynicism, and it is not out of the question that politicians might become more cynical the longer they serve in office. But the countervailing circumstances by which elites are self-selected, vetted, and essentially required to be highly sophisticated might also create a sort of *spiral of trust:* our political institutions might discourage cynics from self-selecting in, might screen cynics out, might make cynics less cynical by affirming them, and might recruit sophisticated people who don't respond to political games with cynicism in the first place. The

Table 1: Hypotheses about Elite Cynicism

Holding office makes people . . .	more cynical	less cynical
replacement effects	cynics opt in (self-selection) cynicism is an asset (vetting)	cynics opt out (self-selection) cynicism is a liability (vetting)
persuasion effects	politics promotes cynicism	winning is affirming (vetting) politics has no effect (sophist.)

Cynical politicians are . . .	worse	no different
behavior effects	cynics give up on government	cynicism has no effect (sophist.)

cynics who do become politicians, moreover, may not think or behave all that differently than other leaders (because the effects of cynicism are small among the politically sophisticated).

In other words, the very nature of holding office may actually discourage cynicism *and* its negative consequences. Democracy will always have it bad apples, but the rules of the game may make them less common—and less likely to spoil the bunch.

Measuring Elite Cynicism

To test these hypotheses, I analyzed the only recent surveys of politicians in the US (to my knowledge) that include questions about political cynicism: the 2012 National Candidate Study (or *NCS*) and the 2013 National Survey of Party Leaders (*NSPL*). The National Candidate Study is a confidential self-completed survey administered online and in print to the 10,131 people running for state legislature nationwide in August of 2012 (Broockman et al 2012; see also Broockman and Skovron 2015; Carnes and Hansen forthcoming). The National Survey of Party Leaders is a confidential, self-completed survey administered online and in print to the 6,219 chairs of the county-level (or equivalent) branches of the Republican and Democratic

parties in November of 2013 (Broockman et al 2013). Both surveys achieved high response rates by the standards of elite surveys—19% for the NCS (1,907 responses) and 18% for the NSPL (1,118 responses)—and both surveys' response rates were well-balanced on observable characteristics like party, region, gender, occupation, and election outcomes (for more information, see the Survey Details section in the Appendix). And—importantly for present purposes—both surveys included questions designed to measure political cynicism among candidates and party leaders.

Of course, state legislative candidates and county party leaders are by no means the only politicians who might be cynical, or whose cynicism might be detrimental to democratic politics. However, state candidates and county party chairs are a good starting point for research on elite cynicism. State- and county-level governments are consequential, and they often serve as stepping stones between local and national offices. Unlike city-level politicians, moreover, state and county elites can be identified easily and reliably, and unlike national leaders, state and county elites are far more willing to participate in academic studies. It is always possible that cynicism may work differently among other kinds of politicians, of course, but state legislative candidates and county party chairs are ideal for a first cut at questions about elite cynicism.

The National Candidate Study and National Survey of Party Leaders each included batteries of questions that asked politicians what they thought about government, political accountability, and voters in their area. There is no universally-accepted measure of political cynicism in the literature; most studies create simple indexes using responses to four or more questions that ask what people think about government and political officials, like the "trust in government" questions on the American National Election Study (Dancey 2012; Erber and Lau 1990; Kaid and Postelnicu 2005; Lariscy, Tinkham, and Sweeser 2011; Miller 1974; 1983;

Peterson and Wrighton 1998; Valentino, Beckmann, and Burh 2001), the Ansolabehere and Iyengar items (see Ansolabeher and Iyengar 1995; Dardis, Shen, and Edwards 2008), or others (e.g., Austin and Pinkleton 1995; Pinkleton, Um, and Austin 2002; Brandts et al 2010; Fu et al 2011; van Dalen, Albaek, and de Vreese 2011).[1]

Following this approach—and adapting it for the elite population being studied—the NCS asked state legislative candidates whether citizens in their areas know who in government to blame for public policy (answering no signified cynicism), whether voters myopically base their choices on recent events (answering yes signified cynicism), whether moderate candidates win more votes than extremists (answering no), whether the media holds politicians accountable (no), whether primary and general election voters choose who to vote for based on candidates' issue positions (no), whether voters sometimes base their choices on outcomes completely unrelated to politics (yes), whether money can buy elections (yes), and whether voters reward incumbents who deliver meaningful benefits (no). The NSPL asked county party chairs five of the items from the NCS—whether citizens know who to blame (no), whether the news holds

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[1] Of course, this approach has also drawn criticism; as one study put it, "Most scholars simply use the standard survey items on 'trust in government,' without questioning their validity or even wondering what political trust actually refers to, or what place the concept could have in democratic society" (Hooghe 2011, 270; see also Quenette 2013). There have been attempts to expand on the approach—for instance, by asking people to rate candidates on traits like integrity and competence (Schenck-Hamlin, Procter, and Rumsey 2000)—but those efforts have yet to yield a more compelling alternative. Reassuringly, some studies find that "there is basically only one form of political trust," that is, that different kinds of trust-in-government or cynicism measures all tap the same underlying psychological disposition (e.g., Hooghe 2011).

politicians accountable (no), whether general election voters decide based on the issues (no), whether voters base their choices on irrelevant information (yes), and whether money matters most in elections (yes)—as well as four new items—whether the party leader was satisfied with the quality of the political process (no), whether special interests have too much power (yes), whether politicians make choices based on what's in the public's interest (no), and whether Democrats and Republicans simply can't agree on anything (yes). (For complete wordings, see the Question Wording section in the Appendix).

In the NCS, each candidate was asked all nine items. In the NSPL, each party leader was asked six of the nine cynicism items at random. Using these data, I created a simple index for each survey (following the practice used to compute the ANES trust in government index) by calculating the percentage of cynical responses each candidate or party leader gave across all of the cynicism questions he or she answered.

Figure 1 plots the percentages of state legislative candidates (black bars) and county party leaders (grey bars) who gave the cynical or distrusting answer to each of the individual questions on the NCS and NSPL. For the two items modeled on ANES trust in government questions—whether special interests and too powerful and whether politicians usually do what's in the public interest—Figure 1 also plots the percentages of respondents in the general public who gave cynical answers (denoted with asterisks) from the ANES Cumulative Data File.

Several patterns immediately stand out in Figure 1. First, large percentages of both party leaders and candidates say they agree with cynical statements about voters and government: on all but a few items, at least 45% of these elites said that they agreed—and many items elicited cynical answers from more than 60% of elites. Second, cynicism tended to be higher among candidates than party leaders: on the items that were asked to both groups, candidates were at

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Figure 1: Cynicism Among Candidates and Party Leaders

Voters don't know who to blame — 86% (black), 63% (gray)
Voters are myopic — 66%
Moderates don't win elections — 60%
Media doesn't hold gov't accountable — 59%, 58%
Issues don't matter to primary voters — 59%
Issues don't matter to gen elec voters — 51%, 49%
I'm not satisfied with political process — 48%
Special interests are too powerful — 47%, The Public * 79%
Voters care about irrelevant info — 45%, 39%
Politicians ignore public interest — 35%, * 78%
Money matters most in elections — 31%, 25%
Dems and Reps can't agree on anything — 30%
Voters don't reward real benefits — 18%

■ State Leg. Candidates
■ County Party Leaders

Sources: Broockman et al (2012), Broockman et al (2013), American National Election Studies (2014). *Note*: Bars report percentages of respondents who gave the cynical answer in response to each item. Complete question wordings are listed in the appendix.

least as cynical as party leaders and sometimes considerably more cynical (a finding that suggests that the elites believed their answers were confidential and responded sincerely; candidates, who have more to lose from public backlash to their answers, were *more* likely to give cynical responses). And, third, on the two items most closely related to questions that have been administered to the general public, politicians (in both cases, state legislative candidates) scored considerably lower on political cynicism (consistent—albeit in a very limited way—with the possibility that holding office screens out and/or reduces cynicism).

Figure 2 plots the distribution of the composite cynicism scores I created, separately for

Figure 2: The Distributions of Cynicism Scores

Sources: Broockman et al (2012), Broockman et al (2013).

state legislative candidates (again, black bars) and county party leaders (grey bars). The left

panels plot the distributions of scores using all of the questions in each survey; the right panels

plots scores computed using only the five questions that were common across the two surveys.

Viewed this way, it is easy to see, again, that state legislative candidates scored higher on

cynicism measures than county party leaders—the distribution of cynicism scores was further to

the right for both the full set of questions and the set of five questions asked to both samples.

Using these composite scores, we can test several of the hypotheses outlined in Table 1.

With data on elites' political experience, for instance, we can test the top-line implications of the

spiral of cynicism and spiral of trust theories:

- If there is a spiral of cynicism among politicians, politicians who have held office longer should exhibit more cynicism than newcomers. If there is a spiral of trust, we should observe that those who have held office longer are less cynical.

With the NCS (which includes information about which candidates ultimately won), we can also test one implication of the hypothesis that *replacement effects* are responsible:

- If there is a spiral of cynicism among politicians *that is mediated by replacement*, more cynical politicians should be more likely to win elections, other thing equal. Likewise, if there is a spiral of trust that is mediated by replacement, more cynical politicians should be less likely to win elections, other thing equal.

We can also test one implication of the vetting mechanism using the NCS, namely, whether cynical politicians report receiving more or less encouragement to run for public office from elites like party and interest group leaders:

- If there is a spiral of cynicism among politicians *that is mediated by elite vetting*, more cynical politicians should be more likely to report receiving encouragement from gatekeepers, other thing equal. Likewise, if there is a spiral of trust that is mediated by vetting, more cynical politicians should be less likely to report receiving encouragement.

And with the National Survey of Party Leaders (which asked party chairs whether they wanted to run for elected office in the future), we can test the implications of the *self-selection* argument:

- If there is a spiral of cynicism among politicians *that is mediated by self-selection*, more cynical elites should express more interest in running in future elections. If there is a spiral of trust that is mediated by self-selection, more cynical elites should be less interested in running for public office in the future.

Finally, with the NCS (which includes a number of questions about legislators' political attitudes

and conduct), we can determine whether cynical politicians exhibit the kinds of behavioral differences documented in research on the general public.

- If cynical politicians behave like cynical citizens, they should be more likely to disengage from electoral or governing politics, defect from their parties, polarize ideologically, oppose government action, and/or engage in illegal activities. If politicians' heightened political sophistication mutes the effects of cynicism, on the other hand, cynical politicians should not differ from other leaders on these kinds of measures.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to test for the *persuasion effects* summarized in Table 1. The NCS and NSPL are one-time snapshots of their elite populations; without panel data that repeatedly measure cynicism in a fixed group of politicians, we cannot identify any persuasion effects that might mediate the relationship between holding office and cynicism.

Even so, the NCS and the NSPL provide a one-of-a-kind opportunity to observe how political cynicism operates within the political elite. They allow us to ask whether elites who have been in office longer are more or less cynical, whether cynical politicians are more or less likely to win elections, whether cynical politicians receive more or less encouragement from elites, whether cynical politicians are more or less interested in running for office, and whether cynical politicians think and behave differently.

Do our political institutions promote cynicism, or do they naturally fight it? How much of a threat do cynical politicians pose to democratic government?

**Spirals of Cynicism or Spirals of Trust?**

Figure 3 begins to answer these questions by plotting the differences in average cynicism scores among different subgroups of state legislative candidates (above the dashed line) and

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party leaders (below the dashed line). The figure reports both simple differences from *t*-tests (black bars) and differences from regression models (grey bars) estimated with a wide range of controls (in the NCS sample, I controlled for the candidate's party, gender, race, occupation, age, education, legislature squire index, district population, district racial makeup, district income, and state indicators; with the NSPL, I could control for the party leader's party, gender, race, household income, and state indicators; see Appendix Table A1 for complete results).

The first two pairs of bars in Figure 3 test the top-line claims of the spiral of trust and spiral of cynicism theories, namely, the idea that politicians who have held office longer tend to be more or less cynical than newcomers. The National Candidate Study (but not the NSPL, unfortunately) asked state legislative candidates whether they had ever previously been elected to a position in government, and whether they had ever been appointed to a government position. Figure 3 plots the differences in average cynicism scores between candidates who had previously been elected (vs. those who had not) and candidates who had previously been appointed (vs. those who had not).

Consistent with the spiral of trust theory, candidates who had previously held elected office had statistically significantly lower average cynicism scores than candidates who had never held office, both in simple *t*-tests (which found that they were 10 percentage points less likely to express cynical attitudes) and regression models (which found differences of 3 percentage points). Likewise, candidates who had previously been appointed were less cynical in *t*-tests (by 3 percentage points), although the gap disappeared in the regression model, which controlled for legislator and district characteristics as well as the other measures in Figure 3 (previously elected, eventual winner, encouraged and discouraged by elites).

Viewed this way, the data provided no evidence to support the common assertion that

Figure 3: Elite Cynicism and Officeholding

Sources: Broockman et al (2012; 2013).
Note: Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Table A1. Statistically significant differences are noted; unlabeled bars were not significant at $p < 0.05$.

politics is a game for the cynical. Among state legislative candidates, political cynicism was

more common among the rookies, not the veterans.

Was replacement part of the explanation? The National Candidate Study also included

data on which candidates went on to win their elections. Figure 3 plots the difference in average

cynicism scores between eventual winners and eventual losers. Consistent with the idea that the

elite cycle of trust is mediated by replacement, the soon-to-be winners in the National Candidate

Study were vastly less cynical on average than those who would go on to lose. In simple *t*-tests,

soon-to-be-winners were 43 percentage points less likely to give cynical answers; in regression

models, they were 9 percentage points less cynical. Far from being an asset in state legislative

elections, political cynicism appeared to be a mark of impending defeat.

It was also weakly associated with reduced support from political elites (consistent with the idea that elite vetting plays a role as a sub-mechanism behind any replacement and/or persuasion effects that might exist). The National Candidate Study included one item that asked candidates whether any of a wide range of actors had encouraged and/or discouraged them when they were first considering running for office.[2] Using these data, I identified the candidates who had been both encouraged and discouraged by *electoral gatekeepers*: party leaders, interest group leaders, or sitting politicians at the national, state, or local levels.

As Figure 3 illustrates, candidates who had been encouraged to run by electoral gatekeepers were slightly less cynical on average, although the differences were not statistically significant. Likewise, candidates who had been discouraged from running by elite gatekeepers were more cynical, and the gaps were statistically significant in simple *t*-tests (though just shy of conventional significance levels in a regression model that related cynicism to controls and to the other outcome variables listed in Figure 3). Although statistically imprecise, these findings were generally consistent with the idea that the so-called "selectorate" discourages cynical candidates—and were squarely at odds with the idea that cynicism endows politicians with special advantages in electoral politics.

The only piece of the larger spiral of trust theory that was not supported in this analysis

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[2] The question asked, "When you first ran for political office, did any of the following people encourage or discourage you from running? (check all that apply) National leaders in my political party, State leaders in my political party, County or local leaders in my political party, Sitting politicians, Other local community leaders, National interest or community groups, Local interest or community groups, A formal candidate training program, My employer, Members of my family, Members of the media, Other."

was the self-selection hypothesis. The last set of results in Figure 3 uses data from the National Survey of Party Leaders to plot the differences in cynicism between party leaders who hoped to run for public office one day and party leaders who did not (unfortunately, the National Candidate Study did not ask about candidates' ambition to run for future offices).[3] There was essentially no difference in the NSPL: party leaders who hope to run one day were no more or less cynical than party leaders who lacked ambition. In this sample, at least, self-selection did not appear to be an important part of the larger relationship between holding office and political cynicism.

In general, however, the evidence was largely in line with the spiral of trust theory. The differences documented in Figure 3 sharply contrast the popular idea that politics is a game for the cynical. To the contrary, candidates with more experience in office tend to be less cynical than newcomers. Candidates who are cynical tend to lose more often, and tend to report being discouraged by important gatekeepers more often. Far from being a breeding-ground for political cynicism, our political institutions seem to promote a positive view of politics and government.

Do Cynical Politicians Behave Differently?

Moreover, politica elites may not exhibit many of the negative effects of political cynicism. Figure 4 uses data from the National Candidate Study to plot differences in how more and less cynical candidates answered questions about their general political ideology, their views on specific issues, how much they interact with constituents, and where they turn for advice.

If cynical politicians behave like cynical citizens, they should be more likely to disengage

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[3] The question asked, "Have you ever run for elected office?" and gave the options, "No, and I never want to run," "Not yet, but I hope to run one day," and "Yes."

from electoral or governing politics, defect from their parties, polarize ideologically, oppose

government action, and/or engage in illegal activities. With the National Candidate Study, it was

possible to test several of these hunches. I focused on four possibilities, namely, that cynical

politicians are more likely to express polarized views (an obvious parallel to the polarization

observed among cynics in the public), that cynical politicians might be more likely to oppose

government action (another potential parallel), that cynical politicians are more likely to ignore

their constituents (if, like ordinary citizens, they generally withdraw from electoral politics), and

that they are less likely to look to their parties for advice about policy (if, like ordinary citizens,

cynical politicians tend to exhibit less party loyalty).

Polarization and Opposition to Government. The first pairs of bars in each panel of

Figure 4 use data from a standard seven-point ideology question to test whether cynical

politicians are more polarized. Because my cynicism measure was a continuous score (the

percentage of questions each candidate answered cynically), I first grouped candidates into those

who gave the cynical answer more than 66% of the time and those who gave the cynical answer

less than 33% of the time. The black bars in Figure 4 represent the differences between those

groups (with *p* values from simple *t*-tests reported for statistically significant gaps). The grey

bars in Figure 4 report coefficient estimates from regression models that related each variable on

the vertical axis to political cynicism (the proportion of questions answered cynically) and to a

wide range of control variables (the candidate's gender, race, age, education, and occupation;

whether the candidate was discouraged by elites; whether the candidate had ever run, been

elected, or been appointed; the state legislature's professionalization score; and the district's

racial makeup, median household income, and population; see Appendix Tables A2 and A3).

To test the polarization hypothesis, I divided the NCS sample between Democrats and

Republicans. As the first pair of bars in Figure 4 illustrate, however, I found no evidence that cynical candidates were polarized, or generally opposed to government action. On the standard seven-point political ideology question (rescaled here to range between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most conservative category), cynical Democrats had slightly more liberal attitudes, but the differences were modest—2 percentage points in the *t*-test and 5 percentage points in the regression model—and were not statistically significant. The gaps were even smaller among Republicans (right panel): cynical candidates were almost exactly as ideologically conservative as non-cynics. In contrast to the idea that cynics are polarized or opposed to government action—and consistent with the idea that politically sophisticated people tend not to differ all that much based on cynicism—these results found that cynical candidates were ideologically similar to other candidates.

　　After the seven-point ideology scale, the National Candidate Study also included a lengthy battery of issue position questions that tapped candidates' views on topics ranging from universal healthcare and the Bush tax cuts to same-sex marriage and abstinence-only education. Figure 4 plots the differences between cynics and non-cynics on each of the 13 issue items. Within each party, just one question out of 13 elicited a statistically significant difference between cynics and non-cynics, about what we would expect by chance alone. Moreover, even the non-significant results did not consistently suggest that cynical politicians were more conservative or more polarized: cynical Republican candidates were more likely to oppose government health care and support criminalizing abortions, but they were also more likely to oppose the Bush tax cuts and to oppose privatizing Social Security. Cynical Democrats were more likely to support same-sex marriage, but also less likely to support business regulation and government efforts to combat economic inequality. There were essentially no meaningful

Figure 4: Cynicism, Attitudes, and Conduct Among State Legislative Candidates

Source: Broockman et al (2012).
Note: Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. Statistically significant differences are noted; unlabeled bars were not significant at $p < 0.05$.

patterns in the data: for the most part, cynical politicians tend to think like other politicians.

Constituents. They tend to spend at least as much time interacting with their constituents, too. The NCS included questions that asked candidates how they spent their time on the campaign trail, that is, how many hours they spent interacting with voters, attending public

events, and raising money from donors.[4] If cynical politicians tend to withdraw from the public, this question should have picked up differences in the proportions of their time that they devote to meeting with the public or with constituent groups (as opposed to other campaign activities, like raising money). It did not, however. The typical cynical Democrat in the NCS devoted almost exactly the same share of his or her time to contacting voters, attending public meetings, meeting voters at events, and meeting community leaders (compare to a non-cynical Democrat). On the Republican side, the results suggested that cynical politicians simply balance their constituent-focused time differently—by spending significantly more time contacting voters one-on-one and significantly less time attending public meetings or meeting with voters at events.

Party Loyalty. The only measure on which cynical politicians seemed to resemble cynical citizens was an item that asked candidates whether they turned to party leaders for advice about unfamiliar policies. The NCS asked all candidates, "When you aren't sure whether a new proposal would make good policy, which of the following are particularly important sources of information?" and listed as one possibility, "Your party leadership." If cynical politicians tend to gravitate away from their parties—just as cynical citizens often lose interest in the two major parties—this item should have captured that difference.

In simple *t*-tests, cynical Republican candidates were 14 percentage points less likely to say they would turn to party leaders, and cynical Democratic candidates were 17 percentage

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[4] Specifically, the question asked, "How many hours per week do you typically spend on the following campaign activities? Personally contacting voters one-on-one (e.g., knocking on their doors), Raising money, Attending public community meetings to speak to groups of voters (e.g., at civics clubs), Meeting voters one-on-one at public events (e.g., county fairs), and Meeting privately with community leaders (e.g., civic club Presidents, church pastors).

points less likely. These results were just shy of statistical significance in follow-up regression models, but the point estimates were still substantively large. In the general public, cynicism has been linked to polarization, opposition to government action, disengagement, and party disloyalty. In this sample of state legislative candidates, I found mixed evidence of a lowered reliance on party leaders, and not much else.

The National Survey of Party Leaders had fewer questions suitable for this analysis, but those items were squarely in line with the results reported in Figure 4. The NSPL included a seven-point ideology question, for instance, and in both *t*-tests and simple regression models, the differences between more and less cynical party leaders were substantively tiny and statistically non-significant. It also included questions that asked respondents whether they agreed that "We need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems" or that "The free market can handle these problems without government being involved." Again, I found no evidence of polarization or opposition to government action among cynical party leaders; their responses were substantively and statistically indistinguishable from the responses given by less cynical party leaders. Like the National Candidate Study, the National Survey of Party Leaders did not yield any concrete evidence that cynical politicians are all that different from other leaders.

Rage Within the Machine?

Political observers frequently accuse politicians of behaving cynically, and warn of the dire consequences that follow from political cynicism among the elite. Scholarly research has lagged behind these warnings; I know of no prior study that has attempted to measure cynicism within the political elite or study its causes or consequences.

Up front, there are good reasons to be skeptical about popular depictions of politics as a game that rewards cynicism. Politicians, after all, are a self-selected group that is vetted by voters and elites and that is highly politically sophisticated by its very nature. Politics could be a game that rewards cynics, but it could also be a process that drive cynics away, mutes cynicism, and depresses the negative consequences of cynicism.

Consistent with this rosier line of reasoning, my analysis of political cynicism among state legislative candidates and county-level party leaders finds that politicians who have held office longer tend to be less cynical, that cynical politicians are less likely to win elections, that cynics receive less encouragement from elite gatekeepers, and that cynical politicians think and behave about like other leaders in most ways (although perhaps they are less likely to look to party leaders for advice). I do not find evidence that cynics are less interested in running, and I cannot test the hypothesis that holding office actually reduces politicians' cynicism, but overall the available data suggest that the very nature of holding office may discourage cynicism—in contrast to the spiral of cynicism observed in the general public—and its most normatively troubling consequences.

Table 2 summarizes my original hypotheses, this time noting which were not supported in this analysis (struck through) and which have yet to be tested (shaded grey). A great deal more work could still be done, of course. Although my findings are consistent with the hypothesis that cynics are more likely to lose bids for office, it is also possible that those who win become less cynical over time (as a result of being favorably evaluated by voters, party leaders, and so on). The analysis in this paper could not measure any such persuasion effects that might exist, let alone identify the specific mechanisms that give rise to them.

Moreover, this study has only analyzed two samples of data on political elites; research

Table 2: Revisiting Hypotheses about Elite Cynicism

Holding office makes people . . .	~~**more cynical**~~	**less cynical**
replacement effects	~~cynics opt in (self-selection)~~ ~~cynicism is an asset (vetting)~~	~~cynics opt out (self-selection)~~ cynicism is a liability (vetting)
persuasion effects	~~politics promotes cynicism~~	winning is affirming (vetting) politics has no effect (sophist.) ** not yet tested*
Cynical politicians are . . .	~~**worse**~~	**no different**
behavior effects	~~cynics give up on government~~	cynicism has no effect (sophist.)

on politicians in other levels and branches of government is an important next step. And this study has only examined four different hunches about how cynics in office might differ from other elites; new surveys asking more questions about politicians' views and choices might yet uncover differences between more and less cynical politicians.

As it stands, however, the available data suggest that political cynicism works differently among politicians than it does in the general public. Elites are different from ordinary citizens in important ways, and many patterns that we observe in the general public may not play out in exactly the same fashion among elites (e.g., Carnes and Lupu 2016). In contrast to research on the *spiral of cynicism* in the general public, I find evidence of a *spiral of trust* among politicians: experienced elites tend to be less cynical than newcomers. And consistent with research showing that cynicism's effects are tempered by political sophistication, I find that cynical politicians are no more likely to express polarized views, oppose government action, or ignore their constituents. These findings suggest that the very nature of holding office may discourage political cynicism and its most problematic effects—and that the political psychology of elites may differ from the psychology of the general public in important ways.

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Appendix

Survey Details

The 2012 National Candidate Study

In August 2012, the National Candidate Study was administered to the 10,131 people running for state legislature nationwide at that time. The researchers first collected email or physical mailing addresses for every registered candidate from Project Vote Smart. Most legislators had both; 306 (3%) had neither, leaving a total of 9,825 candidates who could be contacted. In mid-August, the researchers sent three waves of email solicitations to the 7,444 candidates with known e-mail addresses. After receiving 1,318 responses to the emailed version of the survey, the researchers then sent a print version of the survey to a randomly-selected sample of 5,000 candidates who had not responded (and for whom a physical address was known). An additional 589 candidates returned this paper survey, which left a total sample of 1,907 state legislative candidates.

The survey's response rate (19%) was roughly double the response rate of a typical public opinion survey conducted at that time. And the responses appeared to capture the views of a representative sample of candidates. About half of respondents were Republican, about half won their races, and there were no obvious regional or occupational differences in response rates. The only potential nonresponse bias detected was that candidates running unopposed were less likely to complete the survey, perhaps because they were not checking email or physical mail at their campaign addresses.

The 2013 National Survey of Party Leaders

The researchers began by first collecting the email and/or physical mailing addresses of the leaders or chairs of every county-level (or equivalent)[5] branches of the Republican and Democratic parties nationwide in the Spring of 2013. (Nine states were excluded because neither party posted contact information for county-level officials: GA, IN, IA, KY, MI, NH, NM, OK, and WI.) The researchers were able to obtain both email and physical mailing addresses for most party chairs; in this survey, they sent materials simultaneously to both sets of addresses. The researchers first sent postcards and pre-survey emails to each party chair, then followed up a week later with a full letter and/or email inviting the chair to complete the survey. (If both a mailing address and an email address were available, the researchers attempted to contact party leaders both ways.)

Of the 6,219 chairs who were contacted, 1,118 completed the survey (18%), a response rate comparable to recent self-completed surveys of sitting politicians. There were no obvious regional differences in response rates, and rates were nearly identical for Republican and Democratic party chairs (18.0% and 17.9%, respectively) and for party leaders previously identified as men and women (18.2% and 18.5%; among party leaders whose genders were not known, the response rate was 16.5%).

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[5] Some states do not have county parties but instead have parties at the parish (LA), borough (AK), district (ND), city (CT), or sub-city (MA Dems) level.

Appendix

Question Wordings

NCS wording	NSPL wording	ANES wording	Figure wording
When voters don't like a particular public policy, they usually know who in government to blame.	When voters in my area don't like a particular public policy, they usually know who in government to blame.		Voters don't know who to blame
When deciding whether to re-elect incumbets, voters usually base their choices on only very recent events (e.g., the performance of the economy over the past few months only).			Voters are mypoic
Moderate candidates and politicians win significantly more votes.			Moderates don't win elections
The news media in my area pay close attention to whether elected officials are serving the public interest.	The news media in my area pay close attention to whether elected officials are serving the public interest.		Media doesn't hold gov't accountable
Most voters in my primary election decided who to vote for based on the issues.			Issues don't matter to primary voters
Most voters in my general election will decide who to vote for based on the issues.	Most voters in my area decide who to vote for based on the issues.		Issues don't matter to gen elec voters
	Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the political process in my area.		I'm not satisfied with political process
	Special interests have too much political power in my area.	Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?	Special interests too powerful
Voters sometimes decide whether to vote for incumbents based on things completely unrelated to politics, like whether their favorite football team recently won a game.	Voters in my county sometimes decide whether to vote for incumbents based on things completely unrelated to politics, like whether their favorite football team recently won a game.		Voters care about irrelevant info
	Politicians in my area make	How much of the time	Politicians ignore

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	decisions based on what they think is in the public interest.	do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?	public interest
The most important factor in who wins elections is who raises the most money.	The most important factor in who wins elections in my area is who raises the most money.		Money matters most in elections
	Democrats and Republicans in my area can't agree on anything.		Dems and Reps can't agree on anything
Voters reward incumbents who deliver meaningful benefits to them and their communities, such as aid after a disaster or important new roads.			Voters don't reward real benefits

Appendix

Table A1: Complete Regression Results from Figure 3

National Candidate Study		National Survey of Party Leaders	
Won before = no (omitted)	0.000	Ever run = unknown (omitted)	0.000
	(.)		(.)
Won before = yes	-0.028*	Ever run = No, and I never want to	0.180
	(0.013)		(0.165)
Won before = unknown	0.042	Ever run = Not yet, but I hope to run one day	0.162
	(0.051)		(0.166)
Appointed = no (omitted)	0.000	Ever run = Yes, I already have run	0.219
	(.)		(0.164)
Appointed = yes	0.003	Household Income = unknown (omitted)	0.000
	(0.013)		(.)
Appointed = unkonwn	-0.023	Household Income = $100,000 - $150,000	-0.021
	(0.043)		(0.127)
Lost election = no (omitted)	0.000	Household Income = $30,000 - $50,000	-0.070
	(.)		(0.128)

Lost election = yes	0.091***	Household Income = $50,000 - $75,000	-0.035
	(0.013)		(0.127)
Discouraged = no (omitted)	0.000	Household Income = $75,000 - $100,000	-0.094
	(.)		(0.127)
Discouraged = yes	0.023	Household Income = Over $150,000	-0.036
	(0.013)		(0.129)
Encouraged = no (omitted)	0.000	Household Income = Rather not say	0.068
	(.)		(0.129)
Encouraged = yes	-0.009	Household Income = Under $30,000	0.014
	(0.023)		(0.133)
Party = Rep (omitted)	0.000	Gender = unknown (omitted)	0.000
	(.)		(.)
Party = Democrat	0.040***	Gender = Female	-0.054
	(0.012)		(0.118)
Party = Unknown	0.079**	Gender = Male	-0.070
	(0.029)		(0.117)

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Gender = Male (omitted)	0.000	White = No (omitted)	0.000
	(.)		(.)
Gender = Female	-0.008	White = Yes	0.145*
	(0.015)		(0.065)
Gender = Unknown	-0.007	Black = No (omitted)	0.000
	(0.014)		(.)
White = no (omitted)	0.000	Black = Yes	0.005
	(.)		(0.088)
White = yes	0.013	Hispanic/Latino = No (Omitted)	0.000
	(0.019)		(.)
White = unknown	-0.005	Hispanic/Latino = Yes	0.203*
	(0.068)		(0.079)
Occupation = Technical Professional (omitted)	0.000	Asian/Pacific Islander = No (omitted)	0.000
	(.)		(.)
Occupation = Business owner / executive	-0.013	Asian/Pacific Islander = Yes	0.320*
	(0.021)		(0.143)
Occupation = Business Employee	-0.024	Native American = No (Omitted)	0.000
	(0.021)		(.)

Appendix

Occupation = Farm Owner / Manager	-0.010	Native American = Yes	0.058
	(0.033)		(0.072)
Occupation = Military / Law Enforcement	0.006	Other Race = No (Omitted)	0.000
	(0.034)		(.)
Occupation = Lawyer	-0.037	Other Race = Yes	0.158*
	(0.037)		(0.074)
Occupation = Politician / Staff	-0.019	Party = Democrat (omitted)	0.000
	(0.031)		(.)
Occupation = Service-based Professional	-0.032	Party = Republican	-0.165***
	(0.020)		(0.023)
Occupation = Worker	-0.010	State = AK	-0.110
	(0.033)		(0.199)
Occupation = other	-0.003	State = AL	-0.167
	(0.024)		(0.183)
Age = 18-25 (omitted)	0.000	State = AR	-0.083
	(.)		(0.198)
Age = 26-34	-0.084*	State = AZ	-0.095

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Appendix

	(0.040)		(0.261)
Age = 35-44	-0.095*	State = CA	-0.178
	(0.039)		(0.188)
Age = 45-54	-0.098*	State = CO	-0.228
	(0.038)		(0.182)
Age = 55-64	-0.115**	State = CT	-0.262
	(0.038)		(0.174)
Age = 65+	-0.165***	State = FL	-0.121
	(0.039)		(0.181)
Age = unknown	-0.199	State = GA	-0.042
	(0.145)		(0.175)
Education = grade school (omitted)	0.000	State = HI	0.196
	(.)		(0.329)
Education = High school or equivalent	-0.247	State = IA	-0.128
	(0.198)		(0.175)
Education = Vocational/technical school (2 year)	-0.289	State = ID	-0.156
	(0.200)		(0.186)

Appendix

Education = Some college	-0.225	State = IL	-0.248
	(0.196)		(0.174)
Education = College degree	-0.194	State = IN	-0.182
	(0.196)		(0.177)
Education = Master's degree	-0.171	State = KS	-0.140
	(0.196)		(0.176)
Education = Law degree	-0.177	State = KY	-0.057
	(0.198)		(0.177)
Education = Other professional degree (e.g., MD, MBA)	-0.235	State = LA	0.391
	(0.197)		(0.330)
Education = Doctoral degree	-0.236	State = MA	-0.282
	(0.197)		(0.169)
Education = Other	-0.223	State = MD	-0.099
	(0.198)		(0.205)
State Squire Index (continuous)	0.944	State = ME	-0.084
	(1.461)		(0.202)
District Population (continuous)	0.000*	State = MI	-0.039
	(0.000)		(0.176)

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Appendix

District Percent White (continuous)	-0.015	State = MN	-0.197
	(0.041)		(0.185)
District Median Household Income (continuous)	-0.000	State = MO	-0.008
	(0.000)		(0.174)
State=AK	-0.205	State = MS	0.076
	(0.245)		(0.182)
State=AR	0.019	State = MT	-0.057
	(0.081)		(0.179)
State = AZ	-0.108	State = NC	-0.011
	(0.253)		(0.177)
State = CA	-0.521	State = ND	-0.003
	(0.825)		(0.187)
State = CO	-0.044	State = NE	-0.026
	(0.209)		(0.236)
State = CT	-0.068	State = NH	-0.573*
	(0.192)		(0.234)
State = DE	-0.087	State = NJ	0.049
	(0.136)		(0.234)

Appendix

State = FL	-0.050	State = NM	-0.076
	(0.239)		(0.208)
State = GA	0.040	State = NV	-0.172
	(0.091)		(0.220)
State = HI	-0.112	State = NY	-0.193
	(0.250)		(0.192)
State = IA	-0.090	State = OH	-0.235
	(0.164)		(0.180)
State = ID	0.002	State = OK	-0.040
	(0.118)		(0.220)
State = IL	-0.200	State = OR	0.074
	(0.294)		(0.197)
State = IN	0.009	State = PA	-0.057
	(0.076)		(0.176)
State = KS	0.026	State = RI	-0.332
	(0.100)		(0.233)
State = KY	-0.097	State = SC	-0.134
	(0.136)		(0.204)

Appendix

State = ME	0.011	State = SD	-0.028
	(0.059)		(0.194)
State = MI	-0.185	State = TN	-0.033
	(0.409)		(0.175)
State = MN	-0.062	State = TX	-0.148
	(0.160)		(0.170)
State = MO	-0.007	State = UT	0.042
	(0.167)		(0.190)
State = MT	0.058	State = VA	-0.077
	(0.048)		(0.178)
State = NC	-0.171	State = VT	-0.411
	(0.222)		(0.218)
State = ND	-0.031	State = WA	-0.124
	(0.065)		(0.181)
State = NE	-0.015	State = WI	-0.061
	(0.164)		(0.181)
State = NH	0.087	State = WV	-0.140
	(0.068)		(0.185)
State = NJ	0.177	State = WY	0.000

Appendix

	(0.331)		(.)
State = NM	-0.075	Intercept	0.396
	(0.087)		(0.234)
State = NV	-0.085	N	805
	(0.123)	R-sq	0.188
State = NY	-0.414		
	(0.611)		
State = OH	-0.236		
	(0.356)		
State = OK	0.006		
	(0.190)		
State = OR	-0.047		
	(0.148)		
State = PA	-0.256		
	(0.405)		
State = RI	-0.091		
	(0.118)		
State = SC	-0.064		
	(0.107)		

Appendix

State = SD	0.040
	(0.052)
State = TN	0.047
	(0.106)
State = TX	-0.121
	(0.205)
State = UT	0.007
	(0.046)
State = VT	-0.142
	(0.125)
State = WA	-0.071
	(0.200)
State = WI	-0.304
	(0.550)
State = WV (omitted)	0.000
	(.)
State = WY (omitted)	0.000
	(.)

Appendix

Intercept	0.700**
	(0.226)
N	1408
R-sq	0.215

Notes: Cells report coefficients (with clustered standard errors in parentheses). All variables are indicators unless otherwise noted. $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$, two-tailed.

Table A2: Regression Results from Figure 4 (Democrats Only)

	(1) Ideol	(2) Health care	(3) Bush tax cuts	(4) Reduce reg	(5) Reduce inequality	(6) Regulate climate	(7) No gov health	(8) Abolish welfare	(9) Domestic surve	(10) Crim. aborition	(11) Same-sex marriage	(12) Abst. only	(13) Aff. action	(14) Priv. SS	(15) Cont. Voters	(16) Public Mtgs.	(17) Voters at Mtgs.	(18) Group Mtgs.	(19) Ask Party Ldrs.
Cynicism Proportion	-0.055	-0.035	-0.010	-0.113	-0.056	-0.003	-0.043	0.014	-0.083	0.002	0.111	-0.061	-0.262**	-0.074	-0.003	-0.038	-0.003	-0.016	-0.156
	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.084)	(0.067)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.020)	(0.091)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.033)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.085)
Gender = male (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender = female	-0.039**	-0.008	0.009	-0.053	-0.032	0.013	-0.014	-0.009	0.007	-0.069*	0.050	-0.005	0.089	0.019	0.025	-0.007	-0.009	-0.026**	0.103*
	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.047)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.044)
Gender = unknown	-0.010	0.022	0.029	-0.051	0.045	-0.014	-0.023	-0.001	0.068	-0.030	0.007	0.002	0.009	-0.016	0.034	-0.014	-0.014	-0.021*	0.022
	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.041)
White = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
White = yes	-0.024	0.000	0.004	0.027	-0.011	-0.017	-0.042	-0.016	0.080	-0.032	0.025	-0.001	-0.217***	-0.151**	0.045	0.009	-0.046**	-0.006	-0.018
	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.059)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.055)
White = unknown	-0.261**	-0.283	0.203	0.066	-0.251	-0.295*	0.195	0.300***	-0.272	-0.209	0.173	-0.041	-0.169	0.119	0.043	0.108	0.012	-0.073	0.002
	(0.092)	(0.153)	(0.169)	(0.263)	(0.212)	(0.143)	(0.160)	(0.064)	(0.281)	(0.198)	(0.197)	(0.106)	(0.285)	(0.278)	(0.131)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.055)	(0.274)
Occupation = Technical Professional (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Occupation = Business owner / executive	0.043	0.032	-0.011	0.089	-0.013	0.034	-0.026	-0.037*	0.057	0.104	-0.107*	0.007	0.028	0.047	0.013	0.011	-0.041	0.024	0.041
	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.075)	(0.059)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.018)	(0.079)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.029)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.075)
Occupation = Business Employee	0.040	0.008	-0.015	0.028	-0.012	0.058	-0.032	-0.030	0.108	0.125*	-0.059	-0.017	-0.079	0.078	0.000	0.020	-0.035	-0.002	0.002
	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.016)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.070)
Occupation = Farm Owner / Manager	0.107	-0.117	0.062	0.145	-0.175	-0.111	0.077	-0.035	0.235	0.118	-0.347**	0.137*	-0.032	0.087	0.150	-0.029	-0.109*	-0.033	-0.047
	(0.055)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.158)	(0.143)	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.037)	(0.170)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.060)	(0.172)	(0.159)	(0.079)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.157)
Occupation = Military / Law Enforcement	0.047	-0.054	-0.058	-0.033	-0.058	-0.017	0.005	-0.037	0.208	0.102	-0.141	-0.049	-0.135	0.173	0.043	0.029	-0.044	-0.024	-0.204
	(0.041)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.114)	(0.092)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.028)	(0.121)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.046)	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.058)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.118)
Occupation = Lawyer	0.094*	-0.024	0.130	0.108	-0.076	0.045	-0.027	-0.050	0.083	0.161*	-0.028	-0.038	-0.067	-0.016	0.023	0.018	-0.014	-0.031	0.088
	(0.037)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.111)	(0.088)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.026)	(0.119)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.044)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.111)
Occupation = Politician / Staff	0.006	0.025	0.096	-0.090	-0.018	0.065	-0.007	0.012	-0.013	0.109	-0.045	-0.012	0.148	0.022	-0.007	0.037	-0.042	0.026	0.007
	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.089)	(0.073)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.021)	(0.094)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.035)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.090)
Occupation = Service-based Professional	0.009	0.040	-0.041	-0.047	-0.007	0.026	-0.036	-0.023	0.035	0.093*	-0.020	0.004	0.038	0.000	0.031	0.007	-0.031	0.002	0.021
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.064)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.015)	(0.067)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.064)
Occupation = Worker	0.028	0.021	-0.086	-0.098	0.100	-0.034	-0.031	0.001	-0.060	0.090	0.013	0.068	0.053	-0.043	0.101	0.002	-0.082*	-0.002	-0.139
	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.106)	(0.084)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.025)	(0.111)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.042)	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.054)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.107)
Occupation = other	-0.001	0.052	-0.108*	-0.048	0.016	0.049	-0.080	-0.040*	0.044	0.116*	0.006	-0.008	0.111	-0.098	0.014	0.022	-0.025	-0.010	0.024

	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.075)	(0.060)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.018)	(0.080)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.029)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.076)
Discouraged = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Discouraged = yes	0.055***	0.013	0.020	0.039	-0.042	0.004	0.029	0.007	0.004	0.005	0.001	-0.004	-0.017	0.077	-0.005	-0.026*	0.003	0.004	-0.037
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.043)
Discouraged = unknown	0.024	-0.101	0.071	-0.069	-0.080	-0.089	0.149*	-0.005	-0.050	-0.027	-0.041	0.131**	-0.055	0.127	0.085	-0.054	-0.011	0.004	-0.038
	(0.037)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.105)	(0.087)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.026)	(0.112)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.042)	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.053)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.110)
Run before = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Run before = yes	-0.013	-0.012	-0.038	0.006	-0.006	-0.008	-0.003	0.002	-0.005	-0.051	0.032	-0.005	0.026	-0.118**	-0.014	0.016	0.001	0.002	-0.033
	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.042)
Run before = unknown	0.024	0.042	0.039	0.070	-0.022	-0.048	0.026	-0.008	0.026	-0.145	-0.159	0.057	-0.152	0.132	-0.076	0.000	0.028	0.004	-0.235
	(0.047)	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.133)	(0.108)	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.032)	(0.142)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.054)	(0.150)	(0.141)	(0.072)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.139)
Won before = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Won before = yes	0.013	-0.034	-0.007	-0.001	0.035	-0.022	0.007	-0.001	0.058	0.052	0.034	0.002	-0.007	0.029	-0.012	-0.005	0.000	0.019*	-0.045
	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.044)
Won before = unknown	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Appointed = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Appendix

Appointed = yes	0.002	-0.023	-0.024	0.016	0.065*	0.018	0.015	-0.001	0.066	0.022	0.008	0.016	-0.012	0.031	-0.035	0.003	0.016	0.009	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.041)
Appointed = unknown	-0.049	-0.021	0.019	-0.025	0.176	0.093	-0.089	-0.012	0.277	-0.022	0.094	-0.064	-0.236	0.047	0.070	-0.007	-0.008	-0.020	0.263
	(0.046)	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.132)	(0.111)	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.033)	(0.147)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.055)	(0.156)	(0.145)	(0.066)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.137)
Age = 18-25 (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age = 26-34	0.127*	-0.058	0.094	0.233	-0.109	-0.089	0.013	0.024	0.051	0.174	-0.089	0.025	-0.359*	0.407*	0.031	-0.004	-0.014	-0.026	-0.227
	(0.052)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.150)	(0.120)	(0.081)	(0.090)	(0.036)	(0.159)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.060)	(0.161)	(0.158)	(0.074)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.155)
Age = 35-44	0.150**	-0.074	0.151	0.266	-0.153	-0.068	-0.026	0.026	0.066	0.149	-0.141	0.041	-0.262	0.339*	-0.051	0.024	0.012	-0.018	-0.153
	(0.051)	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.145)	(0.117)	(0.078)	(0.088)	(0.035)	(0.155)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.058)	(0.157)	(0.153)	(0.072)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.150)
Age = 45-54	0.142**	-0.061	0.110	0.236	-0.133	-0.081	0.012	0.025	-0.010	0.164	-0.191	0.059	-0.225	0.257	-0.022	0.019	0.038	-0.035	-0.187
	(0.050)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.142)	(0.115)	(0.077)	(0.086)	(0.034)	(0.152)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.057)	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.071)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.148)
Age = 55-64	0.143**	-0.070	0.125	0.317*	-0.191	-0.080	-0.025	0.034	0.006	0.209*	-0.192	0.063	-0.191	0.353*	-0.069	0.028	0.060	-0.033	-0.100
	(0.049)	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.140)	(0.113)	(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.034)	(0.150)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.056)	(0.152)	(0.148)	(0.070)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.146)
Age = 65+	0.124*	0.013	0.132	0.264	-0.155	-0.062	-0.022	0.012	0.070	0.189	-0.142	0.045	-0.285	0.303*	-0.067	0.026	0.081	-0.025	-0.021
	(0.050)	(0.083)	(0.092)	(0.143)	(0.116)	(0.078)	(0.087)	(0.035)	(0.153)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.057)	(0.155)	(0.151)	(0.071)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.149)
Age = unknown	0.339*	0.033	0.046	0.972*	-0.191	-0.155	0.020	0.031	0.314	0.065	-0.217	0.099	0.638	-0.017	-0.327	-0.018	0.416**	-0.000	-0.612
	(0.170)	(0.283)	(0.313)	(0.484)	(0.393)	(0.264)	(0.295)	(0.118)	(0.519)	(0.365)	(0.363)	(0.195)	(0.529)	(0.513)	(0.241)	(0.133)	(0.143)	(0.101)	(0.504)
Education = grade school (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Education = High school or equivalent																			
	0.058	-0.203	0.095	0.437	-0.063	-0.187	0.144	-0.009	-0.213	0.352	-0.413	0.055	-0.714	0.532	0.099	-0.065	0.006	-0.139	0.073
	(0.163)	(0.272)	(0.301)	(0.467)	(0.377)	(0.253)	(0.285)	(0.113)	(0.500)	(0.354)	(0.351)	(0.188)	(0.507)	(0.494)	(0.234)	(0.129)	(0.139)	(0.098)	(0.485)
Education = Vocational/technical school (2 year)																			
	-0.024	-0.190	0.017	0.046	-0.257	-0.015	-0.039	-0.024	-0.551	0.039	-0.202	0.044	-0.657	0.330	0.203	-0.032	-0.018	-0.167	0.065
	(0.164)	(0.273)	(0.301)	(0.468)	(0.378)	(0.254)	(0.285)	(0.113)	(0.500)	(0.352)	(0.351)	(0.188)	(0.507)	(0.495)	(0.235)	(0.130)	(0.139)	(0.099)	(0.487)
Education = Some college	-0.024	-0.105	0.201	0.332	-0.057	-0.096	0.055	0.008	-0.408	0.262	-0.178	0.042	-0.790	0.636	0.148	-0.044	0.041	-0.180	0.159
	(0.158)	(0.264)	(0.291)	(0.453)	(0.365)	(0.245)	(0.275)	(0.110)	(0.483)	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.182)	(0.490)	(0.478)	(0.225)	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.095)	(0.471)
Education = College degree	-0.051	-0.094	0.107	0.237	-0.035	-0.109	0.037	-0.008	-0.365	0.188	-0.090	0.009	-0.645	0.515	0.177	-0.040	0.003	-0.180	0.094
	(0.158)	(0.263)	(0.290)	(0.451)	(0.364)	(0.244)	(0.274)	(0.109)	(0.481)	(0.339)	(0.338)	(0.181)	(0.488)	(0.476)	(0.224)	(0.124)	(0.133)	(0.094)	(0.469)
Education = Master's degree	-0.065	-0.097	0.065	0.207	0.000	-0.063	0.008	-0.018	-0.406	0.152	-0.080	-0.003	-0.574	0.529	0.177	-0.037	-0.000	-0.174	0.132
	(0.158)	(0.263)	(0.290)	(0.451)	(0.364)	(0.245)	(0.274)	(0.109)	(0.481)	(0.339)	(0.338)	(0.181)	(0.488)	(0.476)	(0.224)	(0.124)	(0.133)	(0.094)	(0.469)
Education = Law degree	-0.114	-0.101	-0.026	0.148	0.051	-0.101	0.013	0.012	-0.432	0.092	-0.101	0.005	-0.476	0.446	0.136	-0.040	-0.019	-0.135	0.148
	(0.160)	(0.267)	(0.295)	(0.458)	(0.370)	(0.249)	(0.278)	(0.111)	(0.490)	(0.344)	(0.344)	(0.184)	(0.496)	(0.484)	(0.228)	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.096)	(0.477)
Education = Other professional degree (e.g., MD, MBA)																			
	0.012	-0.187	0.051	0.367	-0.149	-0.020	0.042	-0.022	-0.389	0.216	-0.053	-0.032	-0.549	0.606	0.188	-0.054	0.018	-0.193*	-0.007
	(0.160)	(0.267)	(0.295)	(0.458)	(0.370)	(0.249)	(0.279)	(0.111)	(0.489)	(0.345)	(0.344)	(0.184)	(0.498)	(0.484)	(0.228)	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.096)	(0.477)
Education = Doctoral degree																			
	-0.106	-0.084	0.037	0.187	-0.020	-0.027	-0.003	0.008	-0.430	0.205	-0.079	-0.021	-0.615	0.510	0.213	-0.061	-0.014	-0.205*	0.119

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
	(0.159)	(0.265)	(0.292)	(0.454)	(0.367)	(0.246)	(0.276)	(0.110)	(0.485)	(0.341)	(0.341)	(0.182)	(0.492)	(0.480)	(0.226)	(0.125)	(0.134)	(0.095)	(0.473)
Education = Other	-0.025	-0.077	0.157	0.246	-0.153	-0.135	0.161	-0.015	-0.429	0.158	-0.048	-0.025	-0.778	0.537	0.145	-0.055	-0.002	-0.159	0.094
	(0.161)	(0.268)	(0.296)	(0.462)	(0.373)	(0.250)	(0.280)	(0.112)	(0.492)	(0.346)	(0.346)	(0.185)	(0.499)	(0.487)	(0.229)	(0.127)	(0.136)	(0.096)	(0.479)
State squire index (continuous)	-0.183**	0.045	0.025	-0.111	0.231	0.094	-0.166	0.004	0.109	-0.205	0.193	-0.092	0.307	0.053	0.177	-0.085	-0.092	-0.031	-0.432*
	(0.061)	(0.103)	(0.113)	(0.180)	(0.145)	(0.097)	(0.107)	(0.043)	(0.193)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.071)	(0.195)	(0.187)	(0.091)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.182)
District proportion white	0.046	0.002	0.048	-0.029	-0.009	-0.026	0.069	0.017	-0.277**	0.028	-0.006	-0.059	-0.150	-0.001	0.012	-0.017	0.092**	-0.025	-0.027
	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.094)	(0.075)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.022)	(0.101)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.095)
District median HH income	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000**	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000***	-0.000**	0.000***	-0.000*	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000***	0.000***	0.000**	0.000*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	0.369*	1.038***	-0.112	-0.111	1.005*	1.014***	0.149	0.005	0.794	-0.191	0.862*	0.096	1.832***	-0.300	0.109	0.243	0.193	0.371***	0.528
	(0.170)	(0.283)	(0.312)	(0.486)	(0.392)	(0.263)	(0.295)	(0.118)	(0.518)	(0.365)	(0.364)	(0.195)	(0.526)	(0.513)	(0.242)	(0.134)	(0.143)	(0.102)	(0.505)
N	772	765	760	736	750	751	763	766	729	760	757	761	745	756	725	725	725	725	782
R-sq	0.126	0.070	0.072	0.069	0.056	0.066	0.054	0.075	0.059	0.067	0.111	0.073	0.144	0.085	0.178	0.082	0.133	0.121	0.086

Notes: Cells report coefficients (with clustered standard errors in parentheses). All variables are indicators unless otherwise noted. $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$, two-tailed.

Table A3: Regression Results from Figure 4 (Republicans Only)

	(1) Ideol	(2) Health care	(3) Bush tax cuts	(4) Reduce reg	(5) Reduce inequality	(6) Regulate climate	(7) No gov health	(8) Abolish welfare	(9) Domestic surve	(10) Crim. abortion	(11) Same-sex marriage	(12) Abst. only	(13) Aff. action	(14) Priv. SS	(15) Cont. Voters	(16) Public Mtgs.	(17) Voters at Mtgs.	(18) Group Mtgs.	(19) Ask Party Ldrs.
Cynicism Proportion	-0.016	0.001	-0.092	0.001	-0.026	-0.029	0.107	0.158	0.146	0.062	0.015	-0.005	-0.027	-0.108*	0.109*	-0.102***	-0.079*	-0.004	-0.165
	(0.023)	(0.051)	(0.079)	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.080)	(0.106)	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.088)
Gender = male (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender = female	-0.039**	0.010	-0.056	-0.001	-0.119**	0.028	-0.016	-0.038	0.068	-0.015	0.071	-0.052	0.010	0.041	0.023	-0.004	-0.003	-0.024	0.061
	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.057)
Gender = unknown	-0.020	0.009	-0.008	-0.040*	-0.045	0.036	0.021	-0.020	0.027	-0.069	0.003	-0.014	0.022	0.035	0.071**	-0.026	-0.039*	-0.020	0.040
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.042)
White = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
White = yes	-0.002	-0.014	0.167**	0.028	-0.137**	0.071	0.040	-0.152*	-0.041	0.028	-0.003	0.024	-0.068*	-0.005	-0.014	0.000	0.010	-0.005	-0.014
	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.064)
White = unknown	0.095	-0.092	0.141	0.096	-0.244	-0.140	0.199	-0.113	-0.330	0.333	-0.251	0.034	-0.124	0.023	0.188	-0.072	-0.112	-0.019	-0.233
	(0.057)	(0.113)	(0.173)	(0.088)	(0.162)	(0.208)	(0.181)	(0.281)	(0.262)	(0.244)	(0.177)	(0.256)	(0.086)	(0.128)	(0.145)	(0.076)	(0.086)	(0.062)	(0.199)
Occupation = Technical Professional (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Appendix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
Occupation = Business owner / executive	0.016	-0.077*	0.004	-0.031	-0.004	0.014	0.041	0.016	0.038	-0.087	-0.046	-0.058	-0.001	-0.007	-0.044	-0.000	-0.006	0.005	0.081
	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.061)
Occupation = Business Employee	0.018	-0.062	-0.015	-0.037	-0.005	-0.010	-0.001	-0.015	0.048	-0.073	-0.034	-0.080	0.001	-0.026	-0.071	0.010	0.017	0.012	0.075
	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.056)	(0.028)	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.063)
Occupation = Farm Owner / Manager	0.010	-0.035	-0.096	-0.047	0.025	0.059	0.038	-0.022	0.134	-0.179	0.023	-0.244*	0.079*	-0.027	-0.030	0.025	0.019	-0.036	0.099
	(0.023)	(0.051)	(0.079)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.079)	(0.104)	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.089)
Occupation = Military / Law Enforcement	0.007	-0.085	0.121	0.006	0.029	-0.116	0.032	0.203	0.105	-0.147	0.016	-0.063	-0.032	0.045	-0.015	-0.033	-0.037	-0.008	0.048
	(0.026)	(0.059)	(0.087)	(0.044)	(0.076)	(0.107)	(0.091)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.127)	(0.090)	(0.121)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.099)
Occupation = Lawyer	0.043	-0.140	0.011	-0.021	-0.182	-0.206	0.025	0.055	-0.076	0.156	-0.125	0.309	-0.108	-0.116	-0.198*	0.091*	-0.019	0.055	-0.021
	(0.035)	(0.079)	(0.121)	(0.062)	(0.106)	(0.146)	(0.122)	(0.153)	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.122)	(0.160)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.035)	(0.134)
Occupation = Politician / Staff	-0.009	0.036	-0.185	-0.065	0.190*	0.118	-0.129	-0.030	0.139	-0.165	-0.004	-0.189	0.095	-0.042	-0.076	0.057	-0.016	0.008	0.261*
	(0.031)	(0.068)	(0.108)	(0.053)	(0.088)	(0.126)	(0.109)	(0.137)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.107)	(0.140)	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.120)
Occupation = Service-based Professional	0.018	-0.018	0.005	-0.031	0.016	0.072	-0.007	0.043	0.117	0.005	-0.042	-0.026	-0.026	-0.031	-0.021	0.007	-0.014	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.064)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.065)	(0.087)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.073)
Occupation = Worker	-0.100**	0.228**	-0.159	-0.183**	0.190*	0.351**	-0.297*	-0.174	-0.083	-0.152	-0.054	-0.043	0.213***	-0.109	-0.074	-0.016	0.041	-0.017	-0.132
	(0.033)	(0.073)	(0.120)	(0.059)	(0.094)	(0.134)	(0.117)	(0.142)	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.114)	(0.149)	(0.055)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.129)

Appendix

Occupation = other	0.014	-0.038	0.043	0.012	0.022	0.045	0.047	0.106	-0.057	0.069	0.014	-0.142	-0.016	-0.122**	0.045	-0.012	-0.028	-0.026	0.074
	(0.020)	(0.044)	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.083)	(0.071)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.069)	(0.092)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.077)
Discouraged = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Discouraged = yes	-0.011	0.027	-0.063	-0.030	0.094**	0.004	-0.061	0.014	-0.049	-0.020	0.058	-0.010	-0.016	-0.016	-0.041	-0.006	0.015	-0.001	0.050
	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.054)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.046)
Discouraged = unknown	0.008	0.022	0.058	0.013	-0.050	0.126	0.003	-0.150	-0.038	-0.026	-0.090	0.091	-0.046	0.098	0.049	0.035	-0.089*	0.024	-0.095
	(0.028)	(0.066)	(0.094)	(0.050)	(0.085)	(0.126)	(0.098)	(0.128)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.096)	(0.130)	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.109)
Run before = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Run before = yes	-0.007	-0.031	0.017	-0.002	-0.036	-0.006	0.018	0.061	-0.071	-0.075	-0.003	-0.076	0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.004	0.002	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.042)
Run before = unknown	-0.053	-0.085	-0.223	0.034	-0.147	0.070	0.196	0.004	0.329	-0.583	0.216	-0.528	0.015	-0.007	0.068	-0.016	-0.059	-0.067	0.527*
	(0.064)	(0.139)	(0.213)	(0.109)	(0.180)	(0.256)	(0.223)	(0.271)	(0.290)	(0.366)	(0.217)	(0.347)	(0.106)	(0.143)	(0.173)	(0.091)	(0.102)	(0.074)	(0.246)
Won before = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Won before = yes	-0.013	0.001	0.043	0.015	-0.036	0.037	-0.015	-0.109*	0.109*	0.011	0.016	0.010	0.014	0.016	-0.047	0.023	0.025	0.020	0.004
	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.045)
Won before = unknown	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Appointed = no (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Appointed = yes	-0.008	0.013	-0.035	0.022	0.005	-0.022	0.049	0.001	-0.040	-0.037	0.003	-0.054	0.036	-0.020	-0.040	0.013	-0.003	0.021	0.021
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.041)
Appointed = unknown	-0.090*	0.063	-0.140	0.036	0.235	-0.153	-0.195	-0.102	-0.127	0.121	-0.220	0.034	-0.052	0.111	-0.080	-0.029	-0.022	0.048	-0.273
	(0.042)	(0.100)	(0.141)	(0.078)	(0.128)	(0.184)	(0.160)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.215)	(0.170)	(0.224)	(0.076)	(0.103)	(0.108)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.163)
Age = 18-25 (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age = 26-34	0.020	-0.001	0.198*	0.049	-0.104	0.028	0.119	-0.102	0.057	-0.057	0.151	0.054	-0.047	0.052	0.066	-0.002	0.011	-0.060*	0.047
	(0.030)	(0.065)	(0.100)	(0.051)	(0.084)	(0.120)	(0.104)	(0.129)	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.102)	(0.134)	(0.049)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.114)
Age = 35-44	0.060*	-0.012	0.207*	0.027	-0.066	-0.132	0.055	-0.127	0.094	-0.060	-0.064	0.147	-0.020	0.066	0.061	0.001	-0.015	-0.045	0.042
	(0.028)	(0.062)	(0.094)	(0.048)	(0.080)	(0.114)	(0.099)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.097)	(0.126)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.109)
Age = 45-54	0.046	-0.057	0.116	0.021	-0.124	-0.136	0.049	-0.172	0.025	-0.046	-0.119	0.137	-0.059	-0.022	0.046	-0.009	0.004	-0.046	0.059
	(0.027)	(0.060)	(0.092)	(0.047)	(0.077)	(0.110)	(0.096)	(0.120)	(0.124)	(0.128)	(0.093)	(0.122)	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.105)
Age = 55-64	0.034	-0.009	0.099	-0.019	-0.098	-0.053	0.044	-0.240*	0.206	-0.050	-0.112	0.182	-0.038	-0.045	0.024	0.006	0.020	-0.046	0.016
	(0.027)	(0.059)	(0.091)	(0.046)	(0.077)	(0.109)	(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.128)	(0.093)	(0.121)	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.104)
Age = 65+	0.016	0.045	0.114	-0.073	-0.091	-0.072	0.023	-0.229	0.269*	-0.100	-0.139	0.153	-0.035	-0.000	0.022	0.023	0.027	-0.062*	0.016
	(0.028)	(0.062)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.080)	(0.114)	(0.099)	(0.124)	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.097)	(0.127)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.109)

Age = unknown	0.068	-0.061	0.286	0.031	-0.216	-0.332	-0.822*	-0.399	0.613	-0.407	-0.285	0.943	-0.145	-0.948***	-0.066	-0.040	0.012	0.085	-0.232
	(0.111)	(0.243)	(0.373)	(0.190)	(0.315)	(0.447)	(0.390)	(0.475)	(0.507)	(0.523)	(0.379)	(0.496)	(0.185)	(0.250)	(0.245)	(0.129)	(0.145)	(0.105)	(0.430)
Education = grade school (omitted)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education = High school or equivalent	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education = Vocational/technical school (2 year)	-0.051	0.124	0.039	0.075	-0.213	0.160	0.037	0.073	0.017	-0.053	0.188	0.110	-0.005	-0.035	0.202*	0.020	-0.140*	-0.061	0.064
	(0.038)	(0.081)	(0.129)	(0.067)	(0.110)	(0.154)	(0.138)	(0.168)	(0.181)	(0.182)	(0.135)	(0.176)	(0.064)	(0.085)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.143)
Education = Some college	-0.030	0.009	-0.010	0.053	-0.093	0.069	0.031	0.046	-0.033	0.138	-0.020	-0.008	-0.080	-0.044	0.071	-0.032	-0.040	-0.000	0.137
	(0.025)	(0.055)	(0.085)	(0.043)	(0.073)	(0.100)	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.087)	(0.112)	(0.041)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.095)
Education = College degree	-0.052*	0.039	-0.030	0.030	-0.095	0.011	0.065	-0.054	0.080	0.078	0.035	-0.025	-0.060	-0.029	0.127*	-0.026	-0.103**	-0.003	0.146
	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.080)	(0.040)	(0.069)	(0.094)	(0.082)	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.114)	(0.081)	(0.104)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.088)
Education = Master's degree	-0.049	-0.006	-0.050	0.018	-0.175*	0.019	0.015	-0.103	0.012	0.068	0.052	-0.092	-0.056	-0.002	0.059	-0.013	-0.061	0.000	0.180
	(0.025)	(0.055)	(0.085)	(0.043)	(0.074)	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.088)	(0.112)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.096)
Education = Law degree	-0.063	0.098	-0.070	0.043	0.007	0.272	0.060	-0.168	0.068	-0.195	0.039	-0.469**	0.026	-0.028	0.205*	-0.073	-0.056	-0.040	0.282
	(0.038)	(0.085)	(0.131)	(0.067)	(0.115)	(0.157)	(0.134)	(0.167)	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.135)	(0.175)	(0.065)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.146)
Education = Other professional degree (e.g., MD, MBA)	-0.023	-0.010	-0.053	0.074	-0.189*	-0.014	0.070	0.109	0.006	-0.051	0.031	-0.137	-0.083	-0.023	0.078	-0.013	-0.065	-0.001	0.215

	(0.030)	(0.064)	(0.099)	(0.050)	(0.085)	(0.118)	(0.102)	(0.125)	(0.136)	(0.143)	(0.101)	(0.132)	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.112)
Education = Doctoral degree	-0.078*	0.030	0.060	0.046	-0.147	0.138	0.002	-0.207	0.247	-0.027	0.022	-0.192	-0.050	-0.013	0.083	-0.056	-0.079	-0.023	0.230
	(0.032)	(0.068)	(0.106)	(0.053)	(0.091)	(0.125)	(0.109)	(0.133)	(0.148)	(0.154)	(0.108)	(0.141)	(0.052)	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.119)
Education = Other	-0.090**	0.066	-0.015	0.059	-0.189	0.027	0.085	-0.243	-0.004	-0.144	0.207	-0.013	-0.090	0.048	0.118	-0.038	-0.050	-0.025	0.085
	(0.034)	(0.074)	(0.113)	(0.057)	(0.097)	(0.141)	(0.118)	(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.165)	(0.120)	(0.155)	(0.057)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.127)
State squire index (continuous)	0.060	0.054	-0.204	-0.034	-0.021	0.239	-0.131	-0.091	0.541*	0.057	0.233	-0.193	-0.008	0.041	0.136	-0.016	0.004	-0.108*	-0.225
	(0.050)	(0.108)	(0.167)	(0.084)	(0.143)	(0.202)	(0.173)	(0.213)	(0.230)	(0.233)	(0.170)	(0.223)	(0.082)	(0.111)	(0.117)	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.189)
District proportion white	-0.002	-0.109	0.054	0.039	-0.020	0.006	0.044	0.144	-0.049	0.163	-0.119	0.043	0.064	-0.068	0.132*	-0.052	0.032	-0.032	0.147
	(0.029)	(0.062)	(0.096)	(0.049)	(0.082)	(0.117)	(0.100)	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.099)	(0.130)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.109)
District median HH income	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000**	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000*	0.000	-0.000**	0.000**	0.000	0.000	-0.000**	0.000**	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	0.864***	0.197	0.596***	0.906***	0.562***	0.059	0.650***	0.468*	0.131	0.465	0.154	0.454*	0.154	1.055***	0.200	0.239***	0.291***	0.198***	-0.097
	(0.051)	(0.111)	(0.170)	(0.086)	(0.145)	(0.206)	(0.178)	(0.219)	(0.234)	(0.243)	(0.174)	(0.227)	(0.084)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.194)
N	608	598	592	607	589	583	600	581	584	584	589	577	597	599	544	544	544	544	618
R-sq	0.097	0.088	0.076	0.080	0.118	0.063	0.059	0.087	0.098	0.060	0.101	0.078	0.103	0.103	0.160	0.151	0.133	0.095	0.070

Notes: Cells report coefficients (with clustered standard errors in parentheses). All variables are indicators unless otherwise noted. $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$, two-tailed.