Universities and professional associations usually are organized in ways that tend to separate scholars in adjoining disciplines and perhaps even to promote stereotypes of each other and their scholarly endeavors. The seemingly natural areas of scholarly convergence between diplomatic historians and political scientists who focus on international relations have been underexploited, but there are also some signs that this may be changing. These include recent essays suggesting ways in which the two disciplines can contribute to each other; a number of prizewinning dissertations, later turned into books, by political scientists that effectively combine political science theories and historical materials; collaborative efforts among scholars in the two disciplines; interdisciplinary journals such as *International Security* that provide an outlet for historians and political scientists with common interests; and creation of a new section, “International History and Politics,” within the American Political Science Association.¹

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This essay is an effort to contribute further to an exchange of ideas between the two disciplines by describing some of the theories, approaches, and "models" political scientists have used in their research on international relations during recent decades. A brief essay cannot do justice to the entire range of theoretical approaches that may be found in the current literature, but perhaps those described here, when combined with citations of some representative works, will provide diplomatic historians with a useful, if sketchy, map showing some of the more prominent landmarks in a neighboring discipline.

The most enduring “great debate” among students and practitioners of international relations has pitted realism against various challengers. Because "classical realism" is the most venerable and persisting theory of international relations, it provides a good starting point and baseline for comparison with competing models. Robert Gilpin may have been engaging in hyperbole when he questioned whether our understanding of international relations has advanced significantly since Thucydides, but one must acknowledge that the latter's analysis of the Peloponnesian War includes concepts that are not foreign to contemporary students of balance-of-power politics.  

Following a discussion of classical realism, an examination of “modern realism” or “neo-realism” will identify the continuities and differences between the two approaches. The essay then turns to several models that challenge one or more core premises of both classical and modern realism. The first three challengers focus on the system level: Global-Society/Complex-
Interdependence/Liberal-Institutionalism, Marxist/World System/Dependency, and constructivism. Subsequent sections discuss several “decision-making models, all of which share a skepticism about the adequacy of theories that focus on the structure of the international system while neglecting political processes within units that comprise the system.

Several limitations should be stated at the outset. Each of the systemic and decision-making approaches described below is a composite of several models; limitations of space have made it necessary to focus on the common denominators rather than on subtle differences among them. This discussion will pay little attention to the second “great debate,” centering mostly on methodological issues; for example, what Stanley Hoffmann called “the battle of the literates versus the numerates.” Efforts of some political scientists to develop "formal" or mathematical approaches to international relations are neglected here; such abstract models are likely to be of limited interest to historians. The “post modern” challenge to all other theories and methodologies--the third “great debate”--will only briefly be described and evaluated. With these caveats, let me turn now to classical realism, the first of the systematic models to be discussed in this essay.

Realism

There have always been Americans, such as Alexander Hamilton, who viewed international relations from a realist perspective, but its contemporary intellectual roots are largely European. Three important figures of the interwar period probably had the greatest impact on American scholarship: diplomat-historian E. H. Carr, geographer Nicholas Spykman, and political theorist Hans Morgenthau. Other Europeans who have contributed significantly to realist thought include John Herz, Raymond Aron, Hedley Bull, and Martin Wight, while
notable Americans of this school include scholars Arnold Wolfers and Norman Graebner, diplomat George Kennan, journalist Walter Lippmann, and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.5

Although realists do not constitute a homogeneous school--any more than do any of the others discussed in this essay--most of them share at least five core premises about international relations. To begin with, they view as central questions the causes of war and the conditions of peace. They also regard the structure of the international system as a necessary if not always sufficient explanation for many aspects of international relations. According to classical realists, "structural anarchy," or the absence of a central authority to settle disputes, is the essential feature of the contemporary system, and it gives rise to the "security dilemma":
in a self-help system one nation's search for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries insecure, any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all others in the system absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms races and other types of hostile interactions. Consequently, the question of relative capabilities is a crucial factor. Efforts to deal with this central element of the international system constitute the driving force behind the relations of units within the system; those that fail to cope will not survive. Thus, unlike "idealists" and some "liberal internationalists," classical realists view conflict as a natural state of affairs rather than as a consequence that can be attributed to historical circumstances, evil leaders, flawed sociopolitical systems, or inadequate international understanding and education.

A third premise that unites classical realists is their focus on geographically-based groups as the central actors in the international system. During other periods the primary entities may have been city states or empires, but at least since the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), sovereign states have been the dominant units. Classical realists also agree that state behavior is rational.
The assumption behind this fourth premise is that states are guided by the logic of the "national interest," usually defined in terms of survival, security, power, and relative capabilities. Although the national interest may vary according to specific circumstances, the similarity of motives among nations permits the analyst to reconstruct the logic of policymakers in their pursuit of national interests--what Morgenthau called the "rational hypothesis"--and to avoid the fallacies of "concern with motives and concern with ideological preferences."6

Finally, the state can also be conceptualized as a *unitary* actor. Because the central problems for states are starkly defined by the nature of the international system, their actions are primarily a response to external rather than domestic political forces. According to Stephen Krasner, for example, the state "can be treated as an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated with power and the general interest of the society."7 Classical realists, however, sometimes use domestic politics, especially the alleged deficiencies of public opinion, as a residual category to explain deviations from "rational" policies.

Realism has been the dominant model of international relations during at least the past six decades because it seemed to provide a useful framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order in the face of serial aggressions in the Far East and Europe, World War II, and the Cold War. Nevertheless, the classical versions articulated by Morgenthau and others have received a good deal of critical scrutiny. The critics have included scholars who accept the basic premises of realism but who found that in at least four important respects these theories lacked sufficient precision and rigor.

Classical realism has usually been grounded in a pessimistic theory of human nature, either a theological version (for example, Saint Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr) or a secular one (for example, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau). Egoism and self-interested behavior are not
limited to a few evil or misguided leaders but are basic to *homo politicus* and thus are at the core of a realist theory. But because human nature, if it means anything, is a constant rather than a variable, it is an unsatisfactory explanation for the full range of international relations. If human nature explains war and conflict, what accounts for peace and cooperation? In order to avoid this problem, most modern realists have turned their attention from human nature to the structure of the international system to explain state behavior.\(^8\)

In addition, critics have noted a lack of precision and even contradictions in the way classical realists use such core concepts as "power," "national interest," and "balance of power."\(^9\) They also see possible contradictions between the central descriptive and prescriptive elements of realism. On the one hand, nations and their leaders "think and act in terms of interests defined as power," but, on the other, statesmen are urged to exercise prudence and self-restraint, as well as to recognize the legitimate interests of other nations.\(^10\) Power plays a central role in classical realism, but the correlation between relative power balances and political outcomes is often less than compelling, suggesting the need to enrich analyses with other variables. Moreover, the distinction between “power as capabilities” and "usable options" is especially important in the nuclear age, as the United States discovered in Vietnam and the Soviets learned in Afghanistan. The terrorist attack on New York and Washington of September 11, 2001, even more dramatically illustrated the disjunction between material capabilities and political impact.

Although classical realists have typically looked to history and political science for insights and evidence, the search for greater precision has led many modern realists to look elsewhere for appropriate models, analogies, metaphors, and insights. The discipline of choice is often economics, from which modern realists have borrowed a number of tools and concepts,
including rational choice, expected utility, theories of firms and markets, bargaining theory, and game theory.

The quest for precision has yielded a rich harvest of theories and models, and a somewhat less bountiful crop of supporting empirical applications. Drawing in part on game theory, Morton Kaplan described several types of international systems—for example, balance-of-power, loose bipolar, tight bipolar, universal, hierarchical, and unit-veto. He then outlined the essential rules that constitute these systems. For example, the rules for a balance-of-power system are: "(1) increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight; (2) fight rather than fail to increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor; (4) oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the system; (5) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizational principles; and (6) permit defeated or constrained essential actors to re-enter the system." Richard Rosecrance, David Singer, Karl Deutsch, Bruce Russett, and many others, although not necessarily realists, also have developed models that seek to understand international relations by virtue of system-level explanations.

Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, the most prominent effort to develop a rigorous and parsimonious model of "modern" or "structural" realism, has tended to define the terms of a vigorous debate during the past two decades. It follows and builds upon another enormously influential book in which Waltz developed the Rousseauian position that a theory of war must include the system level (what he called the "third image") and not just first (theories of human nature) or second (state attributes) images. Why war? Because there is nothing in the system to prevent it.
Theory of International Relations is grounded in analogies from microeconomics: international politics and foreign policy are analogous to markets and firms. Oligopoly theory is used to illuminate the dynamics of interdependent choice in a self-help anarchical system. Waltz explicitly limits his attention to a structural theory of international systems, eschewing the task of linking it to a theory of foreign policy. Indeed, he doubts that the two can be joined in a single theory and he is highly critical of many system-level analysts, including Morton Kaplan, Stanley Hoffmann, Richard Rosecrance, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, and others, charging them with various errors, including "reductionism," that is, defining the system in terms of the attributes or interactions of the units.

In order to avoid reductionism and to gain parsimony, Waltz erects his theory on the foundations of three core propositions that define the structure of the international system. The first concentrates on the principles by which the system is ordered. The contemporary system is anarchic and decentralized rather than hierarchical; although they differ in many respects, each unit (state) is formally equal. A second defining proposition is the character of the units. An anarchic system is composed of sovereign units and therefore the functions that they perform are also similar; for example, all have the task of providing for their own security. In contrast, a hierarchical system would be characterized by some type of division of labor. Finally, there is the distribution of capabilities among units in the system. Although capabilities are a unit-level attribute, the distribution of capabilities is a system-level concept. A change in any of these elements constitutes a change in system structure. The first element of structure as defined by Waltz is a quasi-constant because the ordering principle rarely changes, and the second element drops out of the analysis because the functions of units are similar as long as the system...
remains anarchic. Thus, the third attribute, the distribution of capabilities, plays the central role in Waltz's model.

Waltz uses his theory to deduce the central characteristics of international relations. These include some nonobvious propositions about the contemporary international system. For example, with respect to system stability (defined as maintenance of its anarchic character and no consequential variation in the number of major actors) he concludes that, because a bipolar system reduces uncertainty, it is more stable than alternative structures. Furthermore, he contends that because interdependence has declined rather than increased during the twentieth century, this trend has actually contributed to stability, and he argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons may contribute to rather than erode system stability.16

Waltz's effort to bring rigor and parsimony to realism has stimulated a good deal of further research, but it has not escaped controversy and criticism.17 Most of the vigorous debate has centered on four alleged deficiencies relating to interests and preferences, system change, misallocation of variables between the system and unit levels, and an inability to explain outcomes.

Specifically, a spare structural approach suffers from an inability to identify completely the nature and sources of interests and preferences because these are unlikely to derive solely from the structure of the system. Ideology or domestic politics may often be at least as important. Consequently, the model is also unable to specify adequately how interests and preferences may change. The three defining characteristics of system structure are not sufficiently sensitive to specify the sources and dynamics of system change. The critics buttress their claim that the model is too static by pointing to Waltz's assertion that there has only been a single structural change in the international system during the past three centuries.
Another drawback is the restrictive definition of system properties, which leads Waltz to misplace, and therefore neglect, elements of international relations that properly belong at the system level. Critics have focused on his treatment of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and interdependence. Waltz labels these as unit-level properties, whereas some of his critics assert that they are in fact attributes of the system.

Finally, the distribution of capabilities explains outcomes in international affairs only in the most general way, falling short of answering the questions that are of central interest to many analysts. For example, the distribution of power at the end of World War II would have enabled one to predict the rivalry that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union (as de Tocqueville did more than a century earlier) but it would have been inadequate for explaining the pattern of relations between these two nations--the Cold War rather than withdrawal into isolationism by either or both, a division of the world into spheres of influence, or World War III. In order to do so, it is necessary to explore political processes within states--at minimum within the United States and the Soviet Union--as well as between them.

Robert Gilpin shares the core assumptions of modern realism, but his study of War and Change in World Politics also attempts to cope with some of the criticism leveled at Waltz’s theory by focusing on the dynamics of system change. In doing so, Gilpin also seeks to avoid the criticism that the Waltz theory is largely ahistorical. Drawing upon both economic and sociological theory, his model is based on five core propositions. The first is that the international system is in a state of equilibrium if no state believes that it is profitable to attempt to change it. Second, a state will attempt to change the status quo of the international system if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. Related to this is the proposition that a state will seek change through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further
change equal or exceed the marginal benefits. Moreover, when an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the economic costs of maintaining the status quo (expenditures for military forces, support for allies, etc.) tend to rise faster than the resources needed to do so. An equilibrium exists when no powerful state believes that a change in the system would yield additional net benefits. Finally, if the resulting disequilibrium between the existing governance of the international system and the redistribution of power is not resolved, the system will be changed and a new equilibrium reflecting the distribution of relative capabilities will be established.\textsuperscript{18}

Unlike Waltz, Gilpin includes state-level processes in order to explain change. Differential economic growth rates among nations—a structural-systemic level variable—play a vital role in his explanation for the rise and decline of great powers, but his model also includes propositions about the law of diminishing returns on investments, the impact of affluence on martial spirit and on the ratio of consumption to investment, and structural change in the economy.\textsuperscript{19} Table 1 summarizes some key elements of realism. It also contrasts them to other models of international relations—Global-Society/Complex-Interdependence, Marxist/World System/Dependency, and constructivism, to which we now turn.

**Global Society, Interdependence, Institutionalism**

Just as there are variants of realism, there are several Global-Society/Complex-Independence/Liberal Institutionalism (GS/CI/LI) models, but this discussion focuses on two common denominators; they all challenge the first and third core propositions of realism identified earlier, asserting that inordinate attention to the war/peace issue and the nation-state renders it an increasingly anachronistic model of global relations.\textsuperscript{20}
The agenda of critical problems confronting states has been vastly expanded during the twentieth century. Attention to the issues of war and peace is by no means misdirected, according to proponents of a GS/CI/LI perspective, but concerns for welfare, modernization, the environment, and the like are today no less potent sources of motivation and action. It is important to stress that the potential for cooperative action arises from self-interest, not from some utopian attribution of altruism to state leaders. Institution building to reduce uncertainty, information costs, and fears of perfidy; improved international education and communication to ameliorate fears and antagonisms based on misinformation and misperceptions; and the positive-sum possibilities of such activities as trade are but a few of the ways, according to the GS/CI/LI perspective, by which states may jointly gain and thus mitigate, if not eliminate, the harshest features of a self-help international system. The diffusion of knowledge and technology, combined with the globalization of communications, has vastly increased popular expectations. The resulting demands have outstripped resources and the ability of sovereign states to cope effectively with them. Interdependence and institution building arise from an inability of even the most powerful states to cope, or to do so unilaterally or at acceptable levels of cost and risk, with issues ranging from terrorism to trade, from immigration to environmental threats, and from AIDS to new strains of tuberculosis.  

Paralleling the widening agenda of critical issues is the expansion of actors whose behavior can have a significant impact beyond national boundaries; indeed, the cumulative effects of their actions can have profound consequences for the international system. Thus, although states continue to be the most important international actors, they possess a declining ability to control their own destinies. The aggregate effect of actions by multitudes of nonstate actors can have potent effects that transcend political boundaries. These may include such powerful or
highly visible nonstate organizations as Exxon, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or the Palestine Liberation Organization, and even shadowy ones such as the al Qaeda group that claimed to have carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the cumulative effects of decisions by less powerful actors may also have profound international consequences. For example, decisions by thousands of individuals, mutual funds, banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions to sell securities on 19 October 1987 not only resulted in an unprecedented “crash” on Wall Street but also within hours its consequences were felt throughout the entire global financial system. The difficulties of containing economic problems within a single country were also illustrated by the international consequences of difficulties in Thailand, Mexico and Russia during the late 1990s.

The widening agenda of critical issues, most of which lack a purely national solution, has also led to creation of new actors that transcend political boundaries; for example, international organizations, transnational organizations, nongovernment organizations, multinational corporations, and the like. Thus, not only does an exclusive focus on the war/peace issue fail to capture the complexities of contemporary international life but it also blinds the analyst to the institutions, processes, and norms that self-interested states may use to mitigate some features of an anarchic system. In short, according to GS/CI/LI perspectives, analysts of a partially globalized world may incorporate elements of realism (anarchy, self-interest, rationality, etc.) as a necessary starting point, but these are not sufficient for an adequate understanding.

The GS/CI/LI models recognize that international behavior and outcomes arise from a multiplicity of motives, not merely the imperatives of systemic power balances. They also alert us to the fact that important international processes originate not only in the actions of states but
also in the aggregated behavior of other actors. These models enable the analyst to deal with a broader agenda of critical issues; they also force one to contemplate a richer menu of demands, processes, and outcomes than would be derived from realist models, and thus, they are more sensitive to the possibility that politics of trade, currency, immigration, health, the environment, or energy may significantly and systematically differ from those typically associated with security issues.

A point of some disagreement among theorists lumped together here under the GS/CI/LI rubric centers on the importance and future prospects of the nation-state. The state serves as the starting point for analysts who focus on the ways in which these self-interested actors may pursue gains and reduce risks and uncertainties by various means, including creation of institutions. They view the importance of the nation-state as a given for at least the foreseeable future.

Other theorists regard the sovereign territorial state as in a process of irreversible decline, partly because the revolution in communications is widening the horizons and thus providing competition for loyalties of its citizens, partly because states are increasingly incapable of meeting the expanding expectations of its subjects; the “revolution of rising expectations” is not limited to less developed countries. Theirs is a largely utilitarian view of the state in which national sentiments and loyalties depend importantly on continuing favorable answers to the question: “what have you done for me lately?” However, these analysts may be underestimating the potency of nationalism and the durability of the state. Several decades ago one of them wrote that “the nation is declining in its importance as a political unit to which allegiances are attached.”22 Objectively, nationalism may be an anachronism but, for better or worse, powerful loyalties are still attached to states. The suggestion that, because even some
well-established nations have experienced independence movements among ethnic, cultural, or religious minorities, the territorial state is in an irreversible decline is not wholly persuasive. In virtually every region of the world there are groups that seek to create or restore geographically-based entities in which its members may enjoy the status and privileges associated with sovereign territorial statehood. Events since 1989 in Eastern Europe, parts of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Quebec, Turkey, and elsewhere, seem to indicate that obituaries for nationalism may be somewhat premature.

The notion that such powerful nonnational actors as major multinational corporations (MNCs) will soon transcend the nation-state seems equally premature. International drug rings do appear capable of challenging and perhaps even dominating national authorities in Colombia, Panama, and some other states. But the pattern of outcomes in confrontations between MNCs and states, including cases involving major expropriations of corporate properties, indicate that even relatively weak nations are not always the hapless pawns of MNCs. The 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated once again that even the most powerful states that also enjoy a favorable geographical location cannot provide absolute safety for their populations. Perhaps paradoxically, these attacks and the resulting responses also reconfirmed the continuing importance of the state in world politics.

Underlying the GS/CI/LI critique of realist theories is the view that the latter are too wedded to the past and are thus incapable of dealing adequately with change. Even if global dynamics arise from multiple sources (including nonstate actors), however the actions of states and their agents would appear to remain the major sources of change in the international system. The third group of systemic theories to be considered, the Marxist/World
System/Dependency (M/WS/D) models, further downplays the role of the nation-state even further.

**Marxism, World Systems, Dependency**

Many of the distinctions among M/WS/D theories are lost by treating them together and by focusing on their common features, but in the brief description possible here only common denominators will be presented. These models challenge both the war/peace and state-centered features of realism, but they do so in ways that differ sharply from challenges of GS/CI/LI models. Rather than focusing on war and peace, these theories direct attention to quite different issues, including uneven development, poverty, and exploitation within and between nations. These conditions, arising from the dynamics of the modes of production and exchange, and they must be incorporated into any analysis of intra- and inter-nation conflict.

According to adherents of these models, the key groups within and between nations are classes and their agents: As Immanuel Wallerstein put it, “in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world system in existence, the world capitalist world-economy.” The “world capitalist system" is characterized by a highly unequal division of labor between the periphery and core. Those at the periphery are essentially the drawers of water and the hewers of wood whereas the latter appropriate the surplus of the entire world economy. This critical feature of the world system not only gives rise to and perpetuates a widening rather than narrowing gap between the wealthy core and poor periphery but also to a dependency relationship from which the latter are unable to break loose. Moreover, the class structure within the core, characterized by a growing gap between capital and labor, is faithfully reproduced in the periphery so that elites there share with their counterparts in the core an
interest in perpetuating the system. Thus, in contrast to many realist theories, M/WS/D models encompass and integrate theories of both the global and domestic arenas.

M/WS/D models have been subjected to trenchant critiques.\textsuperscript{25} The state, nationalism, security dilemmas, and related concerns are at the theoretical periphery rather than at the core. “Capitalism was from the beginning an affair of the world-economy,” Wallerstein asserts, “not of nation-states.”\textsuperscript{26} A virtue of many M/WS/D theories is that they take a long historical perspective on world affairs rather than merely focusing on contemporary issues. Yet, by neglecting nation-states and the dynamics arising from their efforts to deal with security in an anarchical system--or at best relegating these actors and motivations to a minor role--M/WS/D models are open to question, much as would be analyses of \textit{Hamlet} that neglect the central character and his motivations.

Finally, the earlier observations about the persistence of nationalism as an element of international relations seem equally appropriate here. Perhaps national loyalties can be dismissed as prime examples of "false consciousness," but even in areas that experienced two generations of one-party Communist rule, as in China, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Estonia, there was scant evidence that feelings of solidarity with workers in the Soviet Union or elsewhere replaced nationalist sentiments.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent events have rendered Marxist theories somewhat problematic, but the gap between rich and poor states has, if anything, become more acute during the past decade. Globalization has helped some Third World countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, but it has done little for most African countries. This condition has given rise to two somewhat related explanation for disparities, not only between
the industrial west and the rest of the world, but also among countries that gained their independence since 1945.

The first focuses on geography. One analyst notes, for example, that landlocked countries in tropical zones have serious disadvantages in coping with such health problems as malaria and in overcoming the high costs of land transportation for exporting their goods. The second cluster of theories purporting to explain uneven development point to cultural differences. Neither of these theories is new; Max Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is a classic illustration of a cultural explanation for development.

While geographical and cultural theories have enjoyed some revival recently, they have also provoked spirited debates, in part because of highly dubious uses in the past. Unlike Marxist theories, they also appear to place the primary responsibility for under-development on the poor countries themselves, and they seem to offer limited prospects for coping with the problem because neither geography nor culture can easily be changed. Proponents of these theories respond that a proper diagnosis of the roots of under-development is a necessary condition for its amelioration; for example through aid programs that target public health and transportation infrastructure needs.

**Constructivism**

Although the theories described to this point tended to dominate debates during the past century, “constructivism” has recently emerged as a significant approach to world politics. Unlike many “post-modernists” (discussed in the next section), most constructivists work within the theoretical and epistemological premises of the social sciences, and they generally seek to expand rather than undermine the purview of other theoretical perspectives. As with
other approaches summarized in this essay, constructivists do not constitute a monolithic perspective, but they do share some key ideas, the first of which is that the environment in which states act is social and ideational as well as material. Money provides a good example of the construction of social reality. If money is limited to metals such as gold and silver, then it has value because the metal itself is valuable, and its use constitutes a form of barter. For reasons of convenience and to expand the money supply, modern governments have also designated bits of colored paper and base metals to serve as money although they have little if any intrinsic value; that they are valuable and can be used as a medium of exchange is the result of a construction of economic reality.30

In their emphasis on the construction of social reality, its proponents challenge the materialist basis of the approaches discussed above. Because the social gives meaning to the material, many core concepts, including anarchy, power, national interest, security dilemma, and others, are seen as socially constructed rather than as the ineluctable consequences of system structures. Moreover, interests and identities--for example, those who are designated as “allies” or “enemies”--are also social constructs, the products of human agency, rather than structurally determined. The title of a widely-cited work by Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” provides something of the flavor of the constructionist perspective. Wendt shows that because anarchy can have multiple meanings for different actors, it may give rise to a wider range of behaviors than postulated by realism.31

Constructivists have also shown that ideas and norms sometimes compete with, shape, or even trump material interests. Although not labeled as a constructivist analysis, an early study of John Foster Dulles’ policies toward the USSR revealed that he constructed a model of the Soviet system, based largely on his lifelong study of Lenin’s writings. Brutal Soviet foreign
policies during the Stalin era provided ample support for Dulles’ model, but the more variegated policies of those who came to power in the Kremlin after the Soviet dictator’s death in 1953 were also interpreted in ways suggesting that Dulles’ model was largely impervious to any evidence that might call it into question.\(^{32}\) The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union have triggered off a lively debate among proponents of ideational and material interpretations of the acceptance by Mikhail Gorbachev of domestic reforms and collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.\(^{33}\)

At this point, constructivism is less a theory than an approach. It has been used to analyze the origins, development, and consequences of norms and cultures in a broad range of settings.\(^{34}\) It might offer an especially fruitful contribution to the persisting debates, described below, on the “democratic peace” thesis. The constructivist approach is of relatively recent vintage, but it bears considerable resemblance to the venerable social science dictum that we all perceive our environment through the lenses of belief systems, and thus that, “It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.”\(^{35}\) This also illustrates the tendency for each generation of political scientists to reinvent, if not the whole wheel, at least some parts of it.

**Decision Making**

Many advocates of realism recognize that it cannot offer fine-grained analyses of foreign policy behavior and, as noted earlier, Waltz denies that it is desirable or even possible to combine theories of international relations and foreign policy. Decision-making models challenge the premises that it is fruitful to conceptualize the nation as a unitary rational actor whose behavior can adequately be explained by reference to the system structure--the second,
fourth, and fifth realist propositions identified earlier--because individuals, groups, and organizations acting in the name of the state are also sensitive to domestic pressures and constraints, including elite maintenance, electoral politics, public opinion, interests groups, ideological preferences, and bureaucratic politics. Such core concepts as "the national interest" are not defined solely by the international system, much less by its structure alone, but they are also likely to reflect elements within the domestic political arena. Thus, rather than assuming with the realists that the state can be conceptualized as a "black box"--that the domestic political processes are unnecessary for explaining the sources of its external behavior--decision-making analysts believe one must indeed take these internal processes into account, with special attention directed at policymakers.

At the broadest level of analyses within the "black box," the past two decades have witnessed a burgeoning literature and heated controversies on the "democratic peace," arising from the finding that, while democracies are no less likely to engage in wars, they do not fight each other. The literature is far too vast to discuss in any detail in this brief essay. Some of the debate is about minutiae (does Britain's pro forma declaration of war on Finland during World War II constitute a crucial disconfirming case?), but parts of it engage such central issues as the role of institutions (transparent policymaking) in allaying fears of perfidy or of norms (the culture of compromise) in reducing or eliminating wars between democracies. Suffice it to say that proponents and critics of democratic peace thesis line up mostly along realist-liberal lines. The democratic peace thesis is especially troubling to realists for at least three reasons. It runs counter to a long tradition, espoused by Alexis de Tocqueville, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Henry Kissinger, and other notable realists, that depicts democracies as seriously disadvantaged in conducting foreign affairs. Moreover, the thesis
democracies may behave differently directly challenges a core premise of structural realism. As Waltz notes, “If the democratic peace thesis is right, structural realist theory is wrong.”37 At the policy level, few realists are comfortable with espousal by the first Bush and Clinton administrations of “democracy promotion” abroad as a vital goal of American diplomacy, at least at the rhetorical level, usually denouncing it as an invitation to hopeless crusading, or as “international social work” worthy of Mother Theresa but not of the world’s sole superpower.38

To reconstruct how nations deal with each other, it is necessary to view the situation through the eyes of those who act in the name of the state: decision makers and the group and bureaucratic-organizational contexts within which they act. Table 2 provides an overview of three major types of decision-making models, beginning with the bureaucratic-organizational models.39

**Bureaucratic and organizational politics**

Traditional models of complex organizations and bureaucracy emphasized the benefits of a division of labor, hierarchy, and centralization, coupled with expertise, rationality, and obedience. They also assumed that clear boundaries should be maintained between politics and decision making, on the one hand, and administration and implementation on the other. Following pioneering works by Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon and James March, and others, more recent theories depict organizations quite differently.40 The central premise is that decision making in bureaucratic organizations is not constrained only by the legal and formal norms that are intended to enhance the rational and eliminate the capricious aspects of bureaucratic behavior. There is an *emphasis* upon rather than a denial of the political character of bureaucracies, as well as on other "informal" aspects of organizational behavior. Complex
organizations are composed of individuals and units with conflicting perceptions, values, and interests that may arise from parochial self-interest ("what is best for my bureau is also best for my career"), and also from different perceptions of issues arising ineluctably from a division of labor ("where you stand depends on where you sit"). Organizational norms and memories, prior policy commitments, inertia, and standard operating procedures may shape and perhaps distort the structuring of problems, channeling of information, use of expertise, the range of options that may be considered, and implementation of executive decisions. Consequently, organizational decision making is essentially political in character, dominated by bargaining for resources, roles and missions, and by compromise rather than analysis.41

An ample literature of case studies on budgeting, weapons acquisitions, military doctrine, and similar situations confirms that foreign and defense policy bureaucracies rarely conform to the Weberian “ideal type” of rational organization.42 Some analysts assert that crises may provide the motivation and means for reducing some of the nonrational aspects of bureaucratic behavior: crises are likely to push decisions to the top of the organization where a higher quality of intelligence is available; information is more likely to enter the top of the hierarchy directly, reducing the distorting effects of information processing through several levels of the organization; and broader, less parochial values may be invoked. Short decision time in crises reduces the opportunities for decision making by bargaining, log rolling, incrementalism, lowest-common-denominator values, “muddling through,” and the like.43

Even studies of international crises from a bureaucratic-organizational perspective, however, are not uniformly sanguine about decision making in such circumstances. Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis identified several critical bureaucratic malfunctions concerning dispersal of American aircraft in Florida, the location of the naval
blockade, and grounding of weather-reconnaissance flights from Alaska that might stray over the USSR. Richard Neustadt's study of two crises involving the United States and Great Britain revealed significant misperceptions of each other's interests and policy processes. And an examination of three American nuclear alerts found substantial gaps in understanding and communication between policymakers and the military leaders who were responsible for implementing the alerts.44

Critics of some organizational-bureaucratic models have directed their attention to several points.45 They assert, for instance, that the emphasis on bureaucratic bargaining fails to differentiate adequately between the positions of the participants. In the American system, the president is not just another player in a complex bureaucratic game. Not only must he ultimately decide but he also selects who the other players will be, a process that may be crucial in shaping the ultimate decisions. If General Matthew Ridgway and Attorney General Robert Kennedy played key roles in the American decisions not to intervene in Indochina in 1954 and not to bomb or invade Cuba in 1962, it was because Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy chose to accept their advice rather than that of other officials. Also, the conception of bureaucratic bargaining tends to emphasize its nonrational elements to the exclusion of genuine intellectual differences that may be rooted in broader concerns, including disagreements on what national interests, if any, are at stake in a situation. Indeed, properly managed, decision processes that promote and legitimize "multiple advocacy" among officials may facilitate high-quality decisions.46

These models may be especially useful for understanding the slippage between executive decisions and foreign policy actions that may arise during implementation, but they may be less valuable for explaining the decisions themselves. Allison's study of the Cuban
missile crisis does not indicate an especially strong correlation between bureaucratic roles and evaluations of the situation or policy recommendations, as predicted by his "Model III" (bureaucratic politics), and recently published transcripts of deliberations during the crisis do not offer more supporting evidence for that model.47 Yet Allison does present some compelling evidence concerning policy implementation that casts considerable doubt on the adequacy of traditional realist conceptions of the unitary rational actor.

Small group politics

Another decision-making model used by some political scientists supplements bureaucratic-organizational models by narrowing the field of view to foreign policy decisions within small-group contexts. Some analysts have drawn upon sociology and social psychology to assess the impact of various types of group dynamics on decision making.48 Underlying these models are the premises that the group is not merely the sum of its members (thus decisions emerging from the group are likely to be different from what a simple aggregation of individual preferences and abilities might suggest), and that group dynamics can have a significant impact on the substance and quality of decisions.

Groups often perform better than individuals in coping with complex tasks owing to diverse perspectives and talents, an effective division of labor, and high-quality debates on definitions of the situation and prescriptions for dealing with it. Groups may also provide decision-makers with emotional and other types of support that may facilitate coping with complex problems. Conversely, they may exert pressures for conformity to group norms, thereby inhibiting the search for information and policy options, ruling out the legitimacy of some options, curtailing independent evaluation, and suppressing some forms of intragroup
conflict that might serve to clarify goals, values, and options. Classic experiments have revealed the extent to which group members will suppress their beliefs and judgments when faced with a majority adhering to the contrary view, even a counterfactual one.49

Drawing on historical case studies, social psychologist Irving Janis has identified a different variant of group dynamics, which he labels "groupthink" to distinguish it from the more familiar type of conformity pressure on "deviant" members of the group.50 Janis challenges the conventional wisdom that strong cohesion among group members invariably enhances performance. Under certain conditions, strong cohesion can markedly degrade the group's performance in decision making. Members of a cohesive group may, as a means of dealing with the stresses of having to cope with consequential problems and in order to bolster self-esteem, increase the frequency and intensity of face-to-face interaction, resulting in greater identification with the group and less competition within it; "concurrence seeking" may displace or erode reality-testing and sound information processing and judgment. As a consequence, groups may be afflicted by unwarranted feelings of optimism and invulnerability, stereotyped images of adversaries, and inattention to warnings. Janis's analyses of both "successful" (the Marshall Plan, the Cuban missile crisis) and "unsuccessful" (Munich Conference of 1938, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs invasion) cases indicate that "groupthink" or other decision-making pathologies are not inevitable, and he develops some guidelines for avoiding them.51

**Individual leaders**

Still other decision-making analysts focus on the individual policymaker, emphasizing the gap between the demands of the classical model of rational decision making and the substantial
body of theory and evidence about various constraints that come into play in even relatively simple choice situations.\textsuperscript{52} Drawing upon cognitive psychology, these models go well beyond some of the earlier formulations that drew upon psychodynamic theories to identify various types of psychopathologies among political leaders: paranoia, authoritarianism, the displacement of private motives on public objects, etc.\textsuperscript{53} Efforts to include information-processing behavior of the individual decision maker have been directed at the cognitive and motivational constraints that, in varying degrees, affect the decision-making performance of "normal" rather than pathological subjects. Thus, attention is directed to all leaders, not merely those, such as Hitler or Stalin, who display symptoms of clinical abnormalities.

Many challenges to the classical model have focused on limited human capabilities for objectively rational decision making. The cognitive constraints on rationality include limits on the individual's capacity to receive, process, and assimilate information about the situation; an inability to identify the entire set of policy alternatives; fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of each option; and an inability to order preferences on a single utility scale.\textsuperscript{54} These have given rise to several competing conceptions of the decision maker and his or her strategies for dealing with complexity, uncertainty, incomplete or contradictory information and, paradoxically, information overload. They variously characterize the decision maker as a problem solver, naive or intuitive scientist, cognitive balancer, dissonance avoider, information seeker, cybernetic information processor, and reluctant decision maker.

Three of these conceptions seem especially relevant for foreign policy analysis. The first views the decision-maker as a "bounded rationalist" who seeks satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. As Herbert Simon has put it, "the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problem
whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world--or even a reasonable approximation of such objective rationality." Moreover, it is not practical for the decision maker to seek optimal choices; for example, because of the costs of searching for information. Related to this is the concept of the individual as a "cognitive miser," one who seeks to simplify complex problems and to find short cuts to problem solving.

Another approach is to look at the decision-maker as an "error prone intuitive scientist" who is likely to commit a broad range of inferential mistakes. Thus, rather than emphasizing the limits on search, information processing, and the like, this conception views the decision maker as the victim of flawed decision rules who uses data poorly. There are tendencies to underuse rate data in making judgments, believe in the "law of small numbers," underuse diagnostic information, overweight low probabilities and underweight high ones, and violate other requirements of consistency and coherence.56

The final perspective emphasizes the forces that dominate the policymaker, forces that will not or cannot be controlled.57 Decision-makers are not merely rational calculators; important decisions generate conflict, and a reluctance to make irrevocable choices often results in behavior that reduces the quality of decisions. These models direct the analyst's attention to policymakers' belief systems, images of relevant actors, perceptions, information-processing strategies, heuristics, certain personality traits (ability to tolerate ambiguity, cognitive complexity, etc.), and their impact on decision-making performance.

Despite this diversity of perspectives and the difficulty of choosing between cognitive and motivational models, there has been some convergence on several types of constraints that may affect decision processes.58 One involves the consequences of efforts to achieve cognitive consistency on perceptions and information processing. Several kinds of systematic bias have
been identified in both experimental and historical studies. Policymakers have a propensity to assimilate and interpret information in ways that conform to rather than challenge existing beliefs, preferences, hopes, and expectations. They may deny the need to confront tradeoffs between values by persuading themselves that an option will satisfy all of them, and indulge in rationalizations to bolster the selected option while denigrating others.

A comparison of a pair of two-term conservative Republican presidents may be used to illustrate the point about coping with tradeoffs. Both came to office vowing to improve national security policy and to balance the federal budget. President Eisenhower, recognizing the tradeoff between these goals, pursued security policies that reduced defense expenditures--for example, the “New Look” policy that placed greater reliance on nuclear weapons, and alliance policies that permitted maintenance of global commitments at lower cost. Despite widespread demands for vastly increased defense spending after the Soviet space capsule Sputnik was successfully placed in orbit around the earth, Eisenhower refused to give in; indeed, he left office famously warning of the dangers of the “military-industrial complex.” The result was a period of balanced budgets in which surpluses in some years offset deficits in others. In contrast, President Reagan denied any tradeoffs between defense expenditures and budget deficits by positing that major tax cuts would stimulate the economy to produce increases in government revenues. The results proved otherwise as the Reagan years were marked by annual deficits ranging between $79 billion and $221 billion.

An extensive literature on styles of attribution has revealed several types of systematic bias. Perhaps the most important for foreign policy is the basic attribution error--a tendency to explain the adversary's behavior in terms of his characteristics (for example, inherent aggressiveness or hostility) rather then in terms of the context or situation, while attributing
one's own behavior to the latter (for example, legitimate security needs arising from a
dangerous and uncertain environment) rather than to the former. A somewhat related type of
double standard has been noted by George Kennan: "Now is it our view that we should take
account only of their [Soviet] capabilities, disregarding their intentions, but we should expect
them to take account only of our supposed intentions, disregarding our capabilities?"\textsuperscript{59}

Analysts also have illustrated the effect on decisions of policymakers' assumptions about
order and predictability in the environment. Whereas a policymaker may have an acute
appreciation of the disorderly environment in which he or she operates (arising, for example,
from domestic political processes), there is a tendency to assume that others, especially
adversaries, are free of such constraints. Graham Allison, Robert Jervis, and others have
demonstrated that decision makers tend to believe that the realist "unitary rational actor" is the
appropriate representation of the opponent's decision processes and, thus, whatever happens is
the direct result of deliberate choices.\textsuperscript{60}

Several models linking crisis-induced stress to decision processes have been developed
and used in foreign policy studies.\textsuperscript{61} Irving Janis and Leon Mann have developed a more
general conflict-theory model that conceives of man as a "reluctant decision maker" and focuses
upon "when, how and why psychological stress generated by decisional conflict imposes
limitations on the rationality of a person's decisions."\textsuperscript{62} One may employ five strategies for
coping with a situation requiring a decision: unconflicted adherence to existing policy,
unconflicted change, defensive avoidance, hypervigilance, and vigilant decision making. The
first four strategies are likely to yield low-quality decisions owing to an incomplete search for
information, appraisal of the situation and options, and contingency planning, whereas vigilant
decision making, characterized by a more adequate performance of vital tasks, is more likely to
result in a high quality choice. The factors that will affect the employment of decision styles are information about risks, expectations of finding a better option, and time for adequate search and deliberation.

A final approach we should consider attempts to show the impact of personal traits on decision making. Typologies that are intended to link leadership traits to decision-making behavior abound, but systematic research demonstrating such links is in much shorter supply. Still, some efforts have borne fruit. Margaret Hermann has developed a scheme for analyzing leaders' public statements of unquestioned authorship for eight variables: nationalism, belief in one's ability to control the environment, need for power, need for affiliation, ability to differentiate environments, distrust of others, self-confidence, and task emphasis. The scheme has been tested with impressive results on a broad range of contemporary leaders.63 Alexander George has reformulated Nathan Leites's concept of "operational code" into five philosophical and five instrumental beliefs that are intended to describe politically relevant core beliefs, stimulating a number of empirical studies and, more recently, further significant conceptual revisions.64 Finally, several psychologists have developed and tested the concept of "integrative complexity," defined as the ability to make subtle distinction along multiple dimensions, flexibility, and the integration of large amounts of diverse information to make coherent judgments.65 A standard content analysis technique has been used for research on documentary materials generated by top decision makers in a wide range of international crises.66

Decision-making approaches permit the analyst to overcome many limitations of the systemic models described earlier, but they also impose increasingly heavy data burdens on the analyst. Moreover, there is a danger that adding levels of analysis may result in an undisciplined proliferation of categories and variables. It may then become increasingly
difficult to determine which are more or less important, and ad hoc explanations for individual cases erode the possibilities for broader generalizations across cases. Several well-designed, multicase, decision-making studies, however, indicate that these and other traps are not unavoidable.67

Post-modern challenges

The field of international relations has gone through three “great debates” during the past century. The first, pitting the venerable realist tradition against various challengers, was summarized above. The second, centered on disagreements about the virtues and limitations of quantification (“if you can’t count it, it doesn’t count” versus “if you can count it, that ain’t it”) and, more recently, on “formal modeling.” Although those arguments persist in various guises, they have been bypassed in this essay.

The most recent debate, in many respects the most fundamental of the three, is the “post-modern” challenges to all of the theories and models described above.68 The intellectual foundations of post-modernism are largely in the humanities, but the current debates extend well beyond issues of humanistic versus social science perspectives on world politics. They are rooted in epistemology: what can we know? Rather than addressing the validity of specific variables, levels of analysis, or methodologies, most post-modernists challenges the premise that the social world constitutes an objective, knowable reality that is amenable to systematic description and analysis.

Although realism has been a prime target, all existing theories and methodologies are in the cross-hairs of post-modern critics who, as Pauline Rosenau noted, “soundly and swiftly dismiss international political economy, realism (and neorealism), regime theory, game theory, rational
actor models, integration theory, transnational approaches, world system analysis and the liberal tradition in general.” Nor are any of the conventional methodologies employed by political scientists or diplomatic historians spared.

Some versions of post-modernism label “evidence” and “truth” as meaningless concepts, and they are critical of categories, classification, generalization, and conclusions. Nor is there any objective language by which knowledge can be transmitted; the choice of language unjustifiably grants privileged positions to one perspective or another. Thus, the task of the observer is to deconstruct “texts” (everything is a “text”). Each one creates a unique “reading” of the matter under consideration, none can ultimately be deemed superior to any other, and there are no guidelines for choosing among them.

Taken at face value, the ability of these post-modernist perspectives to shed light on the central issues of world affairs seems problematic, and thus their contributions to either political science or diplomatic history would appear to be quite modest. Indeed, they appear to undermine the foundations of both undertakings, eliminating conventional research methods and aspirations for the cumulation of knowledge. Moreover, if one rejects the feasibility of research standards because they necessarily “privilege” some theories or methodologies, does that not also rule out judgments of works by Holocaust deniers or of conspiracy buffs who write, for example, about the Kennedy assassination or the Pearl Harbor attack?

Even more moderate versions of post-modernism are skeptical of theories and methods based on reason and Western logic, but works of this genre have occasionally offered insightful critiques of conventional theories, methodologies and concepts. The proclivity of more than a few political scientists for reifying a false image of the “scientific method” and for overlooking the pervasiveness of less elegant methodologies offers an inviting target. However, such
thoughtful critical analyses are certainly not the unique province of post-modern authors; critiques of naive perspectives on scientific methods, for example, have abounded in political science and history journals for several decades.

Finally, most post-modernists are highly critical of other approaches because they have failed to come up with viable solutions for mankind’s most pressing problems, including war, poverty, and oppression. Though some progress has been made on all these fronts, not even a modern-day Pangloss would declare victory on any of them. But what does post-modernist nihilism offer along these lines? Jarvis makes the point nicely:

In what sense, however, can this approach [post-modernism] be at all adequate for the subject of International Relations? What, for example, do the literary devices of irony and textuality say to Somalian refugees who flee from famine and warlords or to Ethiopian rebels who fight in the desert plains against a government in Addis Ababa? How does the notion of textual deconstruction speak to Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who fight one another among the ruins of the former Yugoslavia? How do totalitarian narratives or logocentric binary logic feature in the deliberation of policy bureaucrats or in negotiations over international trade or the formulation of international law? Should those concerned with human rights or those who take it upon themselves to study relationships between nation-states begin by contemplating epistemological fiats and ontological disputes?71

Quite aside from the emptiness of its message for those with a concern to improving the human condition, the stylistic wretchedness of most post-modern prose ensures that it will have scant impact on the real world.

Conclusion
The study of international relations and foreign policy has always been an eclectic undertaking, with extensive borrowing from disciplines other than political science and history. At the most general level, the primary differences today tend to be between two broad approaches. Analysts of the first school focus on the structure of the international system, often borrowing from economics for models, analogies, insights, and metaphors, with an emphasis on rational preferences and strategy and how these tend to be shaped and constrained by the structure of the international system. Decision-making analysts, meanwhile, display a concern for internal political processes and tend to borrow from psychology and social psychology in order to understand better the limits and barriers to information processing and rational choice. For many purposes both approaches are necessary and neither is sufficient. Neglect of the system structure and its constraints may result in analyses that depict policymakers as relatively free agents with an almost unrestricted menu of choices, limited only by the scope of their ambitions and the resources at their disposal. At worst, this type of analysis can degenerate into Manichean explanations that depict foreign policies of the "bad guys" as the external manifestation of inherently flawed leaders or domestic structures, whereas the "good guys" only react from necessity.

Conversely, neglect of foreign policy decision making not only leaves one unable to explain fully the dynamics of international relations, but many important aspects of a nation's external behavior will be inexplicable. Advocates of the realist model have often argued its superiority for understanding the "high" politics of deterrence, containment, alliances, crises, and wars, if not necessarily for "low" politics. But there are several rejoinders to this line of reasoning. First, the low politics of trade, currencies, and other issues that are usually sensitive to domestic pressures are becoming an increasingly important element of international relations.
The George W. Bush administration came into office vowing to replace the “mushy” policies of its predecessor with “hard headed realism” based on self-defined national interests. Yet its actions have shown a consistent willingness to subordinate those interests to those of such favored domestic constituencies as the energy, steel and soft lumber industries, and the National Rifle Association. Second, the growing literature on the putative domain par excellence of realism, including deterrence, crises, and wars, raises substantial doubts about the universal validity of the realist model even for these issues. Finally, exclusive reliance on realist models and their assumptions of rationality may lead to unwarranted complacency about dangers in the international system. Nuclear weapons and other features of the system have no doubt contributed to the "long peace" between major powers. At the same time, however, a narrow focus on power balances, "correlations of forces," and other features of the international system will result in neglect of dangers--for example, the command, communication, control, intelligence problem or inadequate information processing--that can only be identified and analyzed by a decision-making perspective.

At a very general level, this conclusion parallels that drawn three decades ago by the foremost contemporary proponent of modern realism: The third image (system structure) is necessary for understanding the context of international behavior, whereas the first and second images (decision makers and domestic political processes) are needed to understand dynamics within the system. But to acknowledge the existence of various levels of analysis is not enough. What the investigator wants to explain and the level of specificity and comprehensiveness to be sought should determine which level(s) of analysis are relevant and necessary. In this connection, it is essential to distinguish between two different dependent variables: foreign policy decisions by states, on the one hand, and the outcomes of policy and
interactions between two or more states, on the other. Political scientists studying international relations are increasingly disciplining their use of multiple levels of analysis in studying outcomes that cannot be adequately explained via only a single level of analysis.\textsuperscript{77}

A renowned diplomatic historian asserted that most theories of international relations flunked a critical test by failing to forecast the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{78} The end of the Cold War has also led some theorists to look outside the social sciences and humanities for appropriate metaphors and models, but these are beyond the scope of the present essay.\textsuperscript{79} This conclusion speculates on the related question of how well the theories discussed above might help political scientists and historians understand global relations in the post-Cold War world. Dramatic events since the late 1980s have posed serious challenges to several of the system level theories, but we should be wary of writing premature obituaries for any of them, or engaging in “naive (single case) falsification.” Further, in 2002, only a little more than a decade after disintegration of the Soviet Union and less than a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some caution about declaring that major events and trends are irreversible seems warranted.

The global society/complex interdependence/liberal institutionalism theories have fared relatively better than either structural realism or various Marxist theories. For example, creation of the World Trade Organization and progress toward economic unification of Europe, although not without detours and setbacks, would appear to provide significant support for the view that, even in an anarchic world, major powers may find that it is in their self-interest to establish and maintain institutions for cooperating and overcoming the constraints of the “relative gains” problem. Woodrow Wilson’s thesis that a world of democratic nations will be more peaceful has also enjoyed some revival, at least among analysts who attach significance to the fact that democratic nations have been able to establish “zones of peace” among themselves.
Wilson’s diagnosis that self-determination also supports peace may be correct in the abstract, but universal application of that principle is neither feasible nor desirable, if only because it would result in immense bloodshed; the peaceful divorces of Norway and Sweden in 1905 and of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 are unfortunately not the norm. Although it appears that economic interests have come to dominate nationalist, ethnic, or religious passions among most industrial democracies, the evidence is far less assuring in other areas, including parts of the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

Recent events appear to have created an especially difficult challenge for structural realism; although it provides a parsimonious and elegant theory, its deficiencies are likely to become more rather than less apparent in the post-Cold War world. Its weaknesses in dealing with questions of system change and in specifying policy preferences other than survival and security are likely to be magnified. Moreover, whereas classical realism includes some attractive prescriptive features (caution, humility, warnings against mistaking one’s preferences for the moral laws of the universe), neorealism is an especially weak source of policy-relevant theory. Indeed, some of the prescriptions put forward by neo-realists, such as letting Germany join the nuclear club, or urging Ukraine to keep its nuclear weapons seem reckless. In addition to European economic cooperation, specific events that seem inexplicable by structural realism include Soviet acquiescence in the collapse of its empire and peaceful transformation of the system structure. The persistence of NATO, more than a decade after disappearance of the threat that gave rise to its creation, has also confounded realist predictions that it would not long survive the end of the Cold War; in 1993, Waltz asserted: “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are.” The problem cannot be resolved by definition: asserting that NATO is no longer an alliance because its original adversary has collapsed. Nor can the theory
be saved by a tautology: claiming that the Cold War ended, exactly as predicted by structural realism, “only when the bipolar structure of the world disappeared.”83 These developments are especially telling because structural realism is explicitly touted as a theory of major powers. Although proponents of realism are not ready to concede that events of the past decade have raised some serious questions about its validity, as distinguished a realist is Robert Tucker has characterized structural realism as “more questionable than ever.”84

More importantly, even though the possibility of war among major powers cannot be dismissed and proliferation may place nuclear weapons into the hands of leaders with little stake in maintaining the status quo, national interests and even conceptions of national security have increasingly come to be defined in ways that transcend the power balances that lie at the core of structural realism. The expanded agenda of national interests, combined with the trend toward greater democracy in many parts of the world, suggests that we are entering an era in which the relative potency of systemic and domestic forces in shaping and constraining international affairs is moving toward the latter. The frequency of internal wars that have become international conflicts--the list includes but is not limited to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Congo, and several parts of the former Yugoslavia--suggests that “failed states” may compete with international aggression as the major source of war.85 Such issues as trade, immigration, the environment, and others, can be expected to enhance the impact of domestic actors--including legislatures, public opinion, and ethnic, religious, economic, and perhaps even regional interest groups--while reducing the ability of executives to dominate the process on the grounds, so frequently invoked during times of war and crises, that the adept pursuit of national interests requires secrecy, flexibility, and the ability to act with speed on the basis of classified information.
If that prognosis is anywhere near the mark, it should enhance the value of decision-making models, some of which were discussed above, that encompass domestic political processes. Whatever their strengths and weaknesses, these models seem less vulnerable to such major events as the end of the Cold War. Most policymaking will continue to be made by leaders in small groups, with supports and constraints from bureaucracies. Moreover, even if nation-states are having to share the global center stage with a plethora of non-state actors, decision-making concepts such as information processing, satisficing, bureaucratic politics, groupthink, and many of the others described above can be applied equally well to the World Trade Organization, NATO, OPEC, and the like.

Which of these models and approaches are likely to be of interest and utility to the diplomatic historian? Clearly there is no one answer: political scientists are unable to agree on a single multilevel approach to international relations and foreign policy; thus they are hardly in a position to offer a single recommendation to historians. In the absence of the often-sought but always-elusive unified theory of human behavior that could provide a model for all seasons and all reasons, one must ask at least one further question: a model for what purpose? For example, in some circumstances, such as research on major international crises, it may be important to obtain systematic evidence on the beliefs and other intellectual baggage that key policymakers bring to their deliberations. Some of the approaches described above should prove very helpful in this respect. Conversely, there are many other research problems for which the historian would quite properly decide that this type of analysis requires far more effort than could possibly be justified by the benefits to be gained.

Of the systemic approaches described here, little needs to be said about classical realism because its main features, as well as its strengths and weaknesses, are familiar to most
diplomatic historians. Those who focus on security issues can hardly neglect its central premises and concepts. Waltz’s version of structural realism is likely to have more limited appeal to historians, especially if they take seriously his doubts about being able to incorporate foreign policy into it. It may perhaps serve to raise consciousness about the importance of the systemic context within which international relations take place, but that may not be a major gain; after all, such concepts as "balance of power" have long been a standard part of the diplomatic historian's vocabulary.

The Global-Society/Complex-Interdependence/Liberal Institutionalism models will be helpful to historians with an interest in the evolution of the international system and with the growing disjuncture between demands on states and their ability to meet them, the "sovereignty gap." One need not be very venturesome to predict that this gap will grow rather than narrow. Historians of international and transnational organizations are also likely to find useful concepts and insights in these models.

It is much less clear that the Marxist/World System/Dependency theories will provide useful new insights to historians. If one has difficulty in accepting certain assumptions as true by definition—for example, that there has been and is today a single "world capitalist system"—then the kinds of analyses that follow are likely to seem flawed. Most diplomatic historians also would have difficulty in accepting models that relegate the state to a secondary role. Finally, whereas proponents of GS/CI/LI models can point with considerable justification to current events and trends that would appear to make them more rather than less relevant in the future, supporters of the M/WS/D models have a much more difficult task in this respect. The declining legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism as the basis for government does not, of course, necessarily invalidate social science theories that draw upon Marx, Lenin, and their intellectual
heirs. It might, however, at least be the occasion for second thoughts, especially because Marx and his followers have always placed a heavy emphasis on an intimate connection between theory and practice.

Although the three decision-making models sometimes include jargon that may be jarring to the historian, many of the underlying concepts are familiar. Much of diplomatic history has traditionally focused on the decisions, actions, and interactions of national leaders who operate in group contexts, such as cabinets or ad hoc advisory groups, and who draw upon the resources of such bureaucracies as foreign and defense ministries or the armed forces. The three types of models described above typically draw heavily upon psychology, social psychology, organizational theory, and other social sciences; thus for the historian they open some important windows to these fields. For example, theories and concepts of “information processing” by individuals, groups, and organizations should prove very useful.

Decision-making models may also appeal to diplomatic historians for another important reason. Political scientists who are accustomed to working with fairly accessible “hard” information such as figures on gross national products, defense budgets, battle casualties, alliance commitments, UN votes, trade, investments, and the like, often feel that the data requirements of decision-making models are excessive. This is precisely the area in which the historian has a decided comparative advantage, for the relevant data are usually to be found in the paper or electronic trails left by policymakers, and they are most likely to be unearthed by archival research. For purposes of organization this essay has focused on some major distinctions between theoretical perspectives. This should not be read, however, as ruling out efforts to build bridges between them, as urged in several recent essays.86
Perhaps the appropriate point on which to conclude this essay is to reverse the question posed earlier: Ask not only what can the political scientist contribute to the diplomatic historian but ask also what can the diplomatic historian contribute to the political scientist. At the very least political scientists could learn a great deal about the validity of their own models if historians would use them and offer critical assessments of their strengths and limitations.

A Note on Sources

Contributions to and debates about theories of international relations take place within both books and journals. While it is impossible to forecast the books that may, in the future, be useful in this respect, it may be helpful to identify some journals that are likely to be especially fruitful sources of theoretical developments and controversies. This list is limited to U.S.-based journals. Many others published in Europe, Japan, Israel, South Korea and elsewhere may also include relevant articles.

The top mainline political science journals include American Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, and American Journal of Political Science. APSR has published some major articles in international relations and foreign policy, especially in recent years, and each issue has a section devoted to book reviews. However, all three of these journals tend to place greater emphasis on American politics. That is especially true of JP and AJPS.

International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, and World Politics are the most important sources of articles that bear on theoretical issues. Many of the authors are political scientists, but diplomatic historians, economists, sociologists and other social scientists are also frequently represented on their pages. These journals are indispensable for anyone interested in following
theoretical developments and debates. Of the six, only *World Politics* regularly features extended book reviews.

*Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy* are largely focused on current affairs, but on occasion essays in these journals have been authored by major contributors to current debates about theoretical issues. Both include book reviews, but they are often relatively brief.

The best source of book reviews is *International Studies Reviews*, which, along with *International Studies Quarterly*, is a publication of the International Studies Association. It features both extended review essays and shorter critical assessments of single books. *ISR* regularly includes reviews of books published in languages other than English.
Table 1. *Four models of the international system*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Global Society</th>
<th>Marxism</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of model</strong></td>
<td>Classical: descriptive and normative</td>
<td>Descriptive and normative</td>
<td>Descriptive and normative</td>
<td>Descriptive and normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modern: deductive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central problems</strong></td>
<td>Causes of war</td>
<td>Broad agenda of social, economic, and environmental issues arising from gap between demands and resources</td>
<td>Inequality and exploitation</td>
<td>Content, sources, and consequences of state identities and interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conditions of peace</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uneven development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conception of current international system</strong></td>
<td>Structural anarchy</td>
<td>Global society</td>
<td>World capitalist system</td>
<td>Environment in which states take action is social as well as material; the social gives meaning to the material world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure conceived in terms of material capabilities</td>
<td>(structure varies by issue-area)</td>
<td>Structure conceived in terms of material capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key actors</strong></td>
<td>Geographically based units (tribes, city-states, sovereign states, etc.)</td>
<td>Highly permeable states plus a broad range of non-state actors, including IOs, IGOs, NGOs, and individuals</td>
<td>Classes and their agents</td>
<td>States with socially constructed identities and interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central motivations</strong></td>
<td>National interest</td>
<td>Security and a wider range of human needs and wants</td>
<td>Class interests</td>
<td>Different rather than uniform. Interests based on identities rather than fixed by structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loyalties</strong></td>
<td>To geographically based groups (from tribes to sovereign states)</td>
<td>Loyalties to state may be declining to emerging global norms, values and institutions and/or to sub-national groups</td>
<td>To class values and interests that transcend those of the state</td>
<td>To states, at least for the intermediate future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central processes</strong></td>
<td>Search for security and survival</td>
<td>Aggregate effects of decisions by national and non-national levels</td>
<td>Modes of production and exchange</td>
<td>Actors behave on the basis of socially constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International division of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National actors</td>
<td>How units (not limited to nation-states) cope with a growing agenda of threats and opportunities arising from human wants</td>
<td>Labor in a world capitalist system</td>
<td>Identities and interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Likelihood of system transformation**

- Low (basic structural elements of system have revealed an ability to persist despite many other kinds of changes)
- Moderate in the direction of the model (owing to the rapid pace of technological change, etc.)
- High in the direction of the model (owing to inherent contradictions within the world capitalist system)
- Indeterminate; change in social identities is both possible and difficult

**Sources of theory, insights, and evidence**

- Politics
- History
- Economics (especially modern realists)
- Broad range of social sciences
- Natural and technological sciences
- Marxist-Leninist theory (several variants)
- Sociology
- Social psychology
- Anthropology/cultural studies
### Table 2. Three models of decision making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptualization of decision making</th>
<th>Bureaucratic politics</th>
<th>Group dynamics</th>
<th>Individual decision making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision making as the result of bargaining within bureaucratic organizations</td>
<td>Decision making as the product of group interaction</td>
<td>Decision making as the result of individual choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Premises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaucratic politics</th>
<th>Group dynamics</th>
<th>Individual decision making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central organizational values are imperfectly internalized</td>
<td>Most decisions are made by small elite groups</td>
<td>Importance of subjective appraisal (definition of the situation) and cognitive processes (information processing, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational behavior is political behavior</td>
<td>Group is different than the sum of its members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure and SOPs affect substance and quality of decisions</td>
<td>Group dynamics affect substance and quality of decisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Constraints on rational decision making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaucratic politics</th>
<th>Group dynamics</th>
<th>Individual decision making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperfect information, resulting from: centralization, hierarchy, and specialization Organizational inertia Conflict between individual and organizational utilities Bureaucratic politics and bargaining dominate decision making and implementation of decisions</td>
<td>Groups may be more effective for some tasks, less for others Pressures for conformity Risk-taking propensity of groups (controversial) Quality of leadership “Groupthink”</td>
<td>Cognitive limits on rationality Information processing distorted by cognitive consistency dynamics (unmotivated biases) Systematic and motivated biases in causal analysis Individual differences in abilities related to decision making (e.g., problem-solving ability, tolerance of ambiguity, defensiveness and anxiety, information seeking, etc.) Cognitive dissonance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Sources of theory, insights, and evidence

| Bureaucratic politics | Organization theory Sociology of bureaucracies | Social psychology Sociology of small groups | Cognitive psychology Dynamic psychology |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
ENDNOTES


14 For a debate on whether neorealism may be extended to cover foreign policies as well as international politics, see Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy,” *Security Studies* 6
(Autumn 1996), pp. 7-53; and a rejoinder by Waltz, “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy,” in the same issue of *Security Studies*, pp. 54-57.


Organization is an indispensable source. See especially the 50th anniversary issue edited by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner.

21 For an excellent overview of the challenges of creating effective yet non-oppressive institutions--the “Governance Dilemma”--to cope with such issues, see Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” American Political Science Review 95 (March 2001): 1-13.


29 For example, the writings of Karl Haushofer were used (or misused) by the Nazis to justify German expansion into the “Eurasian Heartland;” and in *The Geography of Intellect*, Stefen Possony and Nathaniel Weyl propounded the racist thesis that intelligence is related to climate; the warmer the climate from which various racial groups originated, the lower their intellectual capacities.


Some representative works include Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK, 1999);


There are also models that link types of polities with foreign policy. Two of the more prominent twentieth-century versions—the Leninist and Wilsonian—have been effectively criticized by Waltz in *Man, the State, and War*. Although space limitations preclude a discussion here, for some research along these lines see, among others,


42 The literature is huge. See, for example, Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914* (Cambridge, MA, 1969; Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*.


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53 See, for example, Harold Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1931).

54 March and Simon, *Organizations*, 113.


Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, 3.


Integrative simplicity, on the other hand, is characterized by simple responses, gross distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage.


70 Prominent post-modern students of world affairs include Hayward Alker, Jim George, Richard Ashley, Michael Shapiro, James Der Derian, Christine Sylvester, and R.B.J. Walker.

71 D.S.L. Jarvis, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism* (Columbia, SC, 2000), 197-98. For both substance and clarity, reform-minded social scientists are urged to compare the writing of Ashley and his

72 The classic overview of the field and the disciplines that have contributed to it is Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York, 1955).


76 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 238.


80 Although the concept of self-determination is generally associated with liberals, in the wake of civil wars within the former Yugoslavia, two prominent realists have suggested redrawing the map of the Balkans to reflect ethnic identities. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, “Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing,” *New York Times* (April 19, 1999), p. A27.


83 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 19, 39.
