Philipp Sadowski


PUBLISHED AND FORTHCOMING PAPERS

Magical Thinking: A Representation Result, with Brendan Daley [April 2016]
Theoretical Economics, forthcoming
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Supplementary Appendix

Overeagerness [August 2016]
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming
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A Theory of Subjective Learning, with David Dillenberger, Juan Lleras, and Norio Takeoka [September 2014]
Some results previously appeared in "Subjective Learning" with David Dillenberger.
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 153, 287-312
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Dynamic Preference for Flexibility, with R. Vijay Krishna [May 2014]
Econometrica, Vol 82(2), 655-704
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Contingent Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior [May 2013]
Theoretical Economics, Vol 8, 503-534
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Ashamed to be Selfish, with David Dillenberger [January 2012]
Theoretical Economics, Vol 7, 99-124
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WORKING PAPERS

Subjective Information Choice Processes with David Dillenberger and R. Vijay Krishna [November 2017]
Abstract
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Supplementary Appendix

Inertial Behavior and Generalized Partition with David Dillenberger [May 2016]
Some results previously appeared in "Subjective Learning" with David Dillenberger. This paper supersedes ERID-132.
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Preferences with Taste Shock Representations: Price Volatility and the Liquidity Premium,
with R. Vijay Krishna [June 2016]
Abstract: If price volatility is caused in some part by taste shocks, then it should be positively correlated with the liquidity premium. Our argument is based on Krishna and Sadowski (2014), who provide foundations for a representation of dynamic choice with taste shocks, and show that volatility in tastes corresponds to a desire to maintain flexibility. To formally connect volatile tastes to price volatility and preference for flexibility to the liquidity premium, we analyze a modified simple Lucas tree economy, where the representative agent is uncertain about his degree of future risk aversion, and where the productive asset cannot be traded in every period, while rights to output can. We show that a representative agent with a higher degree of uncertainty about his future risk aversion implies a higher liquidity premium (ie a lower price for the illiquid asset) and more price volatility.

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Randomly Evolving Tastes and Delayed Commitment, with R. Vijay Krishna [June 2016]
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Department of Economics, Duke University, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708, USA | 919 660 1821 | p.sadowski (at) duke (dot) edu