How shall cosmopolitanism be conceived in relation to globalization, capitalism, and modernity? The geopolitical imaginary nourished by the term and processes of globalization lays claim to the homogeneity of the planet from above—economically, politically, and culturally. The term cosmopolitanism is, instead, used as a counter to globalization, although not necessarily in the sense of globalization from below. Globalization from below invokes, rather, the reactions to globalization from those populations and geohistorical areas of the planet that suffer the consequences of the global economy. There are, then, local histories that plan and project global designs and others that have to live with them. Cosmopolitanism is not easily aligned to either side of globalization, although the term implies a global project. How shall we understand cosmopolitanism in relation to these alternatives?

Let's assume then that globalization is a set of designs to manage the world while cosmopolitanism is a set of projects toward planetary conviviality. The first global design of the modern world was Christianity, a cause and a consequence of the incorporation of the Americas into the global vision of an orbis christianus. It preceded the civilizing mission, the intent to civilize the world under the model of the modern European nation-states. The global design of Christianity was part of the European Renaissance and was constitutive of modernity and of its darker side, coloniality. The global design of the civilizing mission was part of the European Enlightenment and of a new configuration of modernity/coloniality. The cosmopolitan project corresponding to Christianity's global design was mainly articulated by Francisco de Vitoria at the University of Salamanca while the civilizing global design was mainly articulated by Immanuel Kant at the University of Königsberg.

In other words, cosmopolitan projects, albeit with significant differences, have been at work during both moments of modernity. The first was a religious project; the second was secular. Both, however, were linked to coloniality and to the emergence of the modern/colonial world. Coloniality, in other words, is the hidden face of modernity and its very condition of possibility. The colonization of the Americas in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, and of Africa and Asia in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, consolidated an idea of the West: a geopolitical image that exhibits chronological movement. Three overlapping macronarratives emerge from this image. In the first narrative, the West originates temporally in Greece and moves northwest of the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic. In the second narrative, the West is defined by the modern world that originated with the Renaissance and with the expansion of capitalism through the Atlantic commercial circuit. In the third narrative, Western modernity is located in Northern Europe, where it bears the distinctive trademark of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. While the first narrative emphasizes the geographical marker West as the keyword of its ideological formation, the second and third link the West more strongly with modernity. Coloniality as the constitutive side of modernity emerges from these latter two narratives, which, in consequence, link cosmopolitanism intrinsically to coloniality. By this I do not mean that it is improper to conceive and analyze cosmopolitan projects beyond these parameters, as Sheldon Pollock does in this issue of *Public Culture*. I am stating simply that I will look at cosmopolitan projects within the scope of the modern/colonial world—that is, located chronologically in the 1500s and spatially in the northwest Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. While it is possible to imagine a history that, like Hegel's, begins with the origin of humanity, it is also possible to tell stories with different beginnings, which is no less arbitrary than to proclaim the beginning with the origin of humanity or of Western civilization. The crucial point is not when
the beginning is located but why and from where. That is: What are the geohistorical and ideological formations that shape the frame of such a macronarrative? Narratives of cosmopolitan orientation could be either managerial (what I call \textit{global designs}--as in Christianity, \textit{\[End Page 722\]} nineteenth-century imperialism, or late-twentieth-century neoliberal globalization) or emancipatory (what I call \textit{cosmopolitanism}--as in Vitoria, Kant, or Karl Marx, leaving aside the differences in each of these projects), even if they are oblivious to the saying of the people that are supposed to be emancipated. The need for a critical cosmopolitanism arises from the shortcomings of both.

My story begins, then, with the emergence of the modern/colonial world and of modernity/coloniality, as well as with the assumption that cosmopolitan narratives have been performed from the perspective of modernity. That coloniality remains difficult to understand as the darker side of modernity is due to the fact that most stories of modernity have been told from the perspective of modernity itself, including, of course, those told by its internal critics. In consequence, I see a need to reconceive cosmopolitanism from the perspective of coloniality (this is what I call \textit{critical cosmopolitanism}) and within the frame of the modern/colonial world. It should be conceived historically as from the sixteenth century until today, and geographically in the interplay between a growing capitalism in the Mediterranean and the (North) Atlantic and a growing colonialism in other areas of the planet.

In this scenario I need to distinguish, on the one hand, cosmopolitanism from global designs and, on the other, cosmopolitan projects from critical cosmopolitanism. While global designs are driven by the will to control and homogenize (either from the right or from the left, as in the Christian and civilizing mission or in the planetary revolution of the proletariat), cosmopolitan projects can be complementary or dissenting with regard to global designs. This is the tension we find in Vitoria, Kant, and Marx, for example. In the sixteenth century, the Christian mission embraced both global designs of conversion and the justification of war, on the one hand, and a dissenting position that recognized the "rights of the people" that were being suppressed and erased by Christian global designs, on the other. A similar argument could be made with respect to the global design articulated by the civilizing mission as a colonial project and the "rights of man and of the citizen"---this argument opens up a critical perspective on global designs, although global designs were historically contradictory (for example, the Haitian revolution). The civilizing and Christian missions shared colonization as their final orientation, while cosmopolitan projects such as Vitoria’s and Kant’s were attentive to the dangers and the excesses of global designs. Today, the modernizing mission that displaced the Christian and civilizing missions after World War II (having the global market as its final destination) is witness to the revival of cosmopolitan projects that are attentive to the dangers and excesses of global designs. Rather than having fomented globalization from \textit{\[End Page 723\]} below, cosmopolitan projects--since the inception of the modern/colonial world--have provided a critical perspective on global designs, as well as on fundamentalist projects that originated and justified themselves in local histories, both national and religious.

The cosmopolitan projects I have identified arose from within modernity, however, and, as such, they have failed to escape the ideological frame imposed by global designs themselves. Thus, their critical dimensions must be distinguished from what I will here articulate as critical cosmopolitanism, which I conceive as the necessary project of an increasingly transnational (and postnational) world. In a subsequent section of this essay, I illustrate the distinction between cosmopolitan projects from the perspective of modernity and critical cosmopolitanism from the exteriority of modernity (that is, coloniality). By \textit{exteriority} I do not mean something lying untouched beyond capitalism and modernity, but the outside that is needed by the inside. Thus, exteriority is indeed the borderland seen from the perspective of those "to be included," as they have no other option. Critical cosmopolitanism, in the last analysis, emerges precisely as the need to discover other options beyond both benevolent recognition (Taylor 1992) and humanitarian pleas for inclusion (Habermas 1998). Thus, while cosmopolitan projects are critical
from inside modernity itself, critical cosmopolitanism comprises projects located in the exteriority and issuing forth from the colonial difference.

The distinctions I have drawn between global designs and cosmopolitan projects, and between cosmopolitan projects and critical cosmopolitanism, presuppose the complex geopolitical scenario that I am exploring in this essay. I examine three historical and complementary moments, and sketch a fourth, all of which define the profile of the modern/colonial world from the sixteenth century until today. The four moments shall be conceived not within a linear narrative of succession but, rather, in terms of their diachronic contradictions and geohistorical locations. The ideological configuration of one moment does not vanish when the second moment arrives but is reconfigured. The Renaissance did not disappear with the Enlightenment! Museums, tourism, media, scholarly centers, and journals bear witness to the fact. Neither did liberalism vanish with the emergence of Marxism, nor Christianity after its displacement by liberal and Marxist projects. Keeping in mind diachronic contradictions in the density of the imaginary of the modern/colonial world, we can conceive these three moments each as defined by a particular global design. The fourth moment--after the end of the Cold War--can be characterized as a new form of colonization in a postnational world. [End Page 724]

The first of these designs corresponds to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, and to the Christian mission. The second corresponds to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to French and English colonialism, and to the civilizing mission. The third corresponds to the second half of the twentieth century, to U.S. and transnational (global) colonialism, and to the modernizing mission. Today we witness a transition to a fourth moment, in which the ideologies of development and modernization anchored in leading national projects are being displaced by the transnational ideology of the market—that is, by neoliberalism as an emergent civilizational project. In each case examined—and this is the main argument of my essay—the question of rights (rights of the people, of men, of the citizen, or of human beings) erupts as, and still remains, a hindrance to cosmopolitan projects.

Given that in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries rights were discussed in relation to humans and (Christian) believers, that from the eighteenth century onward rights were discussed in terms of man and national citizenship, and that since World War II rights have been discussed in terms of humanity, critical cosmopolitanism today faces at least two critical issues: human rights and global citizenship to be defined across the colonial difference (see the last section of this essay). Critical cosmopolitanism must negotiate both human rights and global citizenship without losing the historical dimension in which each is reconceived today in the colonial horizon of modernity. Let’s explore in more detail (the coexistence of) the three moments (religion, nation, ideology) in the constitution of the modern/colonial world in order to better understand the present scenario in which critical cosmopolitanism became thinkable.

From Orbis Universalis and Occidentalism to Cosmo-polis and Eurocentrism

In the imaginary of the modern world or, if you prefer, in the macronarrative of Western civilization, everything imaginable began in Greece. Since my own interests and personal investments are historically framed in the emergence and consolidation of the modern/colonial world during the sixteenth century, I do not look for antecedents of cosmo-polis among the Greeks. I posit a different beginning: the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit in the sixteenth century that linked the Spanish Crown with capitalist entrepreneurs from Genoa, with Christian missionaries, with Amerindian elites, and with African slaves. I argue that a new sense of international and intercultural relations emerged at that time, and it helped to consolidate the idea of European Christianity and to inscribe the colonial difference that became the historical foundation of modernity/coloniality. [End Page 725] The final victory of Christianity over Islam in 1492, the conversion of Amerindians to Christianity after Hernán Cortés's victory over the Aztec
“emperor” Moctecuzoma, the arrival of Franciscan missionaries to dialogue with the Aztec wise men, the arrival of Vasco da Gama at India in 1498, the entry of the Jesuits into China around 1580, the massive contingent of African slaves in the Americas--these are the landmarks of macronarratives whose beginnings lie not in Greece but in the sixteenth century and in the making of planetary colonial differences. Let us call this the macronarrative of the modern/colonial world from the perspective of coloniality that has been suppressed by hegemonic stories of and from modernity.

In the sixteenth century, the emerging hegemonic imaginary of modernity was built around the figures of orbis and, more specifically, orbis universalis christianus. The idea of orbis universalis received support from Renaissance cartography. The sixteenth century was the first time in the history of humankind that a world map was drawn on which the continents of Africa, Asia, America, and Europe could be connected on the basis of empirical information. The diversity of local cosmographies in complex civilizations (of China, India, Islam, Europe, Tawantinsuyu, Anahuac) were unified and subsumed by a world map drawn by cartographers of Christian Europe. The map, rather than the Internet, was the first step of the imaginary of the modern/colonial world that we today call globalization (Mignolo 1998: 35-52). Orbis, not cosmos (as in the eighteenth century), was the preferred figure of speech, and it was a vital figure in the Christian imaginary. The emergence of this imaginary happened in tandem with that of the Atlantic commercial circuit, at a particular stage of historical capitalism/colonialism that was also the initial configuration of modernity/coloniality. I even suggest that it was with the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit, and at that particular historical moment of the Christian world, that the matrix for global designs in the modern/colonial world was produced--a matrix, as imaginary, in which we continue to live and in relation to which there is need to reflect on past cosmopolitan projects and on the future of critical cosmopolitanism.

There is a specific local history to which Christian global design responds that is quite complex. I summarize here a few of its aspects, most of which are related to the internal conflicts of Christianity during the second half of the sixteenth century. First, the religious war that concluded with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) created the conditions and the need to look for a rational society that would transcend and avoid previous horrors. Second, the law of nature provided an attractive alternative to the design of God with which to imagine a society that replicated the regularities of nature. Third, since this law of nature applied to the universe (or at least to the solar system), the regulation of society by its principles could be conceived as universal, or at least planetary. Fourth, the path toward a universal secularism or a secular universalism was laid open by competing interpretations within Christianity and continuing conflicts between the three religions of the book: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam--all of which worked to render dubious the universality of the Christian God. The law of nature could now be declared universal precisely when a Christian God no longer could. Thus, a "natural"-based idea of cosmopolitanism and universal history came together in one stroke.

Within this local history, I am interested in a particular aspect of the idea of cosmo-polis: its relation to the idea of nation-state. Once God became questionable, the pope and the emperor became questionable as well, and orbis christianus lost its power to unify communities. In the sixteenth century, the church and the state emerged as institutional replacements for the pope and the emperor. As the church continued to be questioned by an increasingly secular world and as the state became sovereign, the category of the infidel (gentiles, Jews, pagans) that comprised the population exterior to the orbis christianus (Höffner [1947] 1957: 289-335) was reconverted into that of the foreigner (Kristeva 1991: 127-68; Held 1995: 48-99). If Christians were those who inhabited the interior of a transnational orbis christianus, citizens were inhabitants of the new, emergent space of the nation-state; in consequence, the Renaissance idea of man was also reconverted and given center stage, thus transcending the division of citizen and foreigner (Gordon 1995).
Michel-Rolph Trouillot has recently underlined this point in an argument that explains the silence surrounding the Haitian revolution. Philosophers who during the Renaissance asked themselves "What is man?", Trouillot (1995: 75) writes, "could not escape the fact that colonization was going on as they spoke. Men (Europeans) were conquering, killing, dominating, and slaving other beings thought to be equally human, if only by some." The famous debates of Valladolid, between Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de Las Casas about the degree of humanity of the Amerindian, bears witness to this convergence of events (Ramos et al. 1984). However, the eighteenth century obscured the religious cosmpolitanism based on the rights of the people and supplanted it with a national cosmopolitanism based on the rights of man and of the citizen.

The sixteenth-century debates, which took place in Valladolid and were followed up in the University of Salamanca, are of extreme relevance in world history, and yet they were forgotten during the eighteenth century. However, they are becoming relevant today to discussions of group and individual rights, as well as migration and multiculturalism (Pérez Luño 1992). The debates fostered the inquiries of philosopher-theologians in the Salamanca school, who examined the ethical and legal circumstances of Spaniards in the Indias Occidentales, or the New World. They remain crucial to world history not merely because they focused on the human nature of Amerindians and the right of Spaniards to declare war, enslave Amerindians, and take possession of their land and bodies --their repercussions travel further.

The debates broke out several decades after the triumph of Christianity over the Moors and the Jews, which was followed by the expulsion of both groups from the Iberian Peninsula. The debates were indirectly but powerfully related to the initiation of massive contingents of slaves brought from Africa. Since Amerindians were considered vassals of the king and serfs of God, they were assigned a niche above Africans in the chain of being, which meant that, theoretically, they were not to be enslaved.

Several cities in sixteenth-century Europe (Salamanca [Spain], Coimbra [Portugal], Rome [Italy], Paris [France], Lovaina [the Netherlands], and Dilinga and Ingolstadt [Germany]) were busy with this legal and theological investigation and were concerned with the Valladolid debates. The "Indian doubt," as it developed, was defined around two issues: the right of Amerindians to the possession of their land, and the right of Spaniards to declare war against Indians. As is well known, the debates drew the attention of Vitoria and led him to a series of legal-theological inquiries, motivated by an interest in the behavior of Spaniards in the New World. These inquiries circulated in Europe first in manuscript form and later as the book entitled *Relectio de Indis* (Vitoria ([1539] 1967). In published form, the inquiries were organized into three major issues: (1) whether Amerindians were true "owners" of their lands and other properties and in control of their own social organization; (2) whether instead the emperor and the pope were "owners" and had the right to control both Amerindians and other non-Christian people (infidels); and (3) what the "legal entitlements" were that justified (from a Spanish point of view) Spanish domination of Amerindians.

In today's terminology, Vitoria's inquiry was principally concerned with the idea of "the inclusion of the other." The political aspects of society and international relations were examined with the assumption that there is a "natural right" that every human and rational being (under Greek/Christian parameters) has. Vitoria extended the principle of natural right to the "rights of the people" to adjudicate new questions of international relations raised by developments in the New World. Theology in Vitoria (as opposed to philosophy in Kant) was the ultimate ground on which to examine all kinds of human relations among individuals and among nations (pueblos, people). But the inquiries included also a profound ethical concern: to be a Christian meant to be self-conscious and to act consciously on behalf of the common good. Of course, Christian ethical concerns were to Vitoria no less honest or earnest than philosophical concerns were to philosophers of the Enlightenment, and the law of nature is of course no better warranty with which to build arguments on behalf of the common good than are natural rights. There was not in Vitoria a fully developed notion of the state, as there would be in the eighteenth
century, but neither was one necessary given historical conditions. While Vitoria's horizon was
the planetary scope open to sixteenth-century Renaissance intellectuals, the Enlightenment
operated with a different set of concerns—namely, European peace and the construction of the
Europe of nations. A conception of the state, however, did begin to emerge in Vitoria, although it
remained coupled with the church: Vitoria removed the emperor and pope as "owners" of the
world and of all imaginable communities, and he conceived the religion-state as the civil and
spiritual order of society. The cosmo-politan ideology of possession enjoyed by the pope and
emperor was replaced by Vitoria's proposal in favor of international relations based on the "rights
of the people" (community, nation). *Derecho de gentes*, which required the discussion and
regulation of theology and jurisprudence, were then assigned to the religion-state instead of to the
pope and emperor.

When in the third part of *Relectio de Indis*, Vitoria examined the "legal entitlements" that justified
war against the Indians, he proceeded to enunciate a series of "fundamental rights" for people--
nations of human communities—the violation of which was justification of war. Vitoria had a vision
of a "natural society" grounded in communication, conviviality, and international collaboration.
Vitoria's utopia was cosmo-polis, a planetary society or a world community of religion-states
founded on the principle of natural right (instead of on the law of nature) and subject to the
regulation of the religion-state. The fact that the "Indian doubt" was prompted at the same time as
the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit—a crucial step in the formation of capitalism after
Christianity obtained victory over the Moors and the Jews—justifies conceiving this moment as the
historical foundation of modernity/coloniality, or, if you prefer, as the historical foundation of the
modern/colonial world system to which Kant and the European Enlightenment contributed to
transform and expand. I have the impression that if one stripped Vitoria of his religious principles,
replaced *Derecho de gentes* with philosophy, and the concern to deal with difference in
humanity with a straightforward classification of people by nations, color, and continents, what
one would obtain indeed would be Kant. Is that much of a difference? In my view it is not. These
are two different faces of the same imaginary—the imaginary of the modern/colonial world as an
interstate system regulated by the coloniality of power. The reason the "Indian doubt," the "rights
of the people," and the Christian idea of orbis were erased in the eighteenth century is another
matter and one of the issues with which I deal below.

Relevant to my argument, however, was a change that Vitoria introduced into the principle
established by Gaius, the Roman jurist who related *ius naturalis* (natural law) to *homines* (human
beings). Vitoria replaced homines by *gentes* (people)—perhaps an almost imperceptible change,
but one of enormous significance. Vitoria was facing a situation in which the gentes in question
had been previously unknown to Christianity and obviously were not clearly homines. Certainly
there was a difference between the Amerindians on the one hand and the Moors, Jews, or
Chinese on the other. But this was precisely the difference that would become the historical
foundation of colonial differences. Thus, it was no longer the question of thinking of men or
human beings (homines) but of thinking of different people within a new structure of power and
rights: the right to possess, the right to dispossess, the right to govern those outside the Christian
realm. Vitoria began to rethink the international order (the cosmo-polis) from the perspective of
the New World events and from the need to accommodate, in that international order, what he
called "the barbarians," that is, the Amerindians. On the one hand, Vitoria had orbis christianus as
the final horizon on which he would justify the rights of barbarians and pagans; on the other, he
had a spectrum of Christian-European "nations" already established in the sixteenth-century
imaginary (Castile, France, Italy). Interaction between the two levels was never made explicit by
Vitoria; he treated them as equals in his thinking on international rights and international
communication, although it was obvious at the time that barbarians or pagans were considered
unequal to the French or Italians. More explicit in Vitoria, however, was the balance between the
rights of commerce, peregrination, and settlement on the one hand and the rights Castilians have
to preach and convert Amerindians on the other. This was the domain in which the religion-state
became instrumental as a replacement for the emperor and the pope in international relations,
and in which a Christian cosmopolitanism was advanced as a correction of the Castilian crown's global designs. [End Page 730]

**Cosmo-polis, Eurocentrism, and the Rights of Man and of the Citizen**

In the sixteenth century, "the rights of the people" had been formulated within a planetary consciousness—the planetary consciousness of the orbis christianus with the Occident as the frame of reference. In the eighteenth century, the "rights of man and of the citizen" was formulated instead within the planetary consciousness of a cosmo-polis analogous to the law of nature, with Europe—the Europe of nations, specifically—as the frame of reference. There was a change but within the system, or, better yet, within the imaginary of the modern/colonial world system.

Cosmo-polis recently has been linked to the hidden agenda of modernity and traced back to the seventeenth century in Western Europe, north of the Iberian Peninsula (Toulmin 1990). In the postnational historical context of the 1990s, the same issue was reformulated in terms of national diversity and cosmopolitanism (Cheah and Robbins 1998) and by refashioning Kant's cosmopolitan ideas (McCarthy 1999). In the same vein, but two decades earlier, cosmopolitanism was attached to the idea of the National State and located in Germany (Meinecke 1970). What is missing from all of these approaches to cosmopolitanism, however, is the link with the sixteenth century. This is not simply a historiographical claim, but a substantial one with significance for the present. Multiculturalism today has its roots in the sixteenth century, in the inception of the modern/colonial world, in the struggles of jurist/theologians like Vitoria or missionaries like Las Casas, which where at the time similar to the struggles of postliberal thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas. If Kant needs today to be amended to include multiculturalism in his cosmopolitan view as Thomas McCarthy (1999) suggests, we must return to the roots of the idea—that is, to the sixteenth century and the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula, to the "Indian doubt" and the beginnings of the massive contingent of African slaves in the Americas.

There are two historical and two structural issues that I would like to retain from the previous section in order to understand cosmopolitan thinking in the eighteenth century and its oblivion of sixteenth-century legacies. The two historical issues are the Thirty Years' War that concluded with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the French Revolution in the 1700s. The structural aspects are the connections made at that point between the law of nature (cosmos) and the ideal society (polis). One of the consequences of the structural aspect was to derive *ius cosmopoliticum* from the law of nature as a model for social organization. For eighteenth-century intellectuals in France, England, and Germany, theirs was the [End Page 731] beginning. And such a beginning (that is, the oblivion of Vitoria and the concern for the "inclusion of the other") was grounded in the making of the imperial difference—shifting the Iberian Peninsula to the past and casting it as the South of Europe (Cassano 1996; Dainotto forthcoming). By the same token, the colonial difference was rearticulated when French and German philosophy recast the Americas (its nature and its people) in the light of the "new" ideas of the Enlightenment instead of the "old" ideas of the Renaissance (Gerbi [1955] 1982; Mignolo 2000: 49-90). Their beginning is still reproduced today as far as the eighteenth century is accepted as the "origin" of modernity. From this perspective, the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit that created the conditions for capitalist expansion and French revolution remains relegated to a premodern world. The imperial difference was drawn in the eighteenth century even as a cosmopolitan society was being thought out. It was simultaneous to (and part of the same move as) the rearticulation of the colonial difference with respect to the Americas and to the emergence of Orientalism to locate Asia and Africa in the imaginary of the modern/colonial world. This "beginning" (that is, the South of Europe as the location of the imperial difference and the North as the heart of Europe) is still the beginning for contemporary thinkers such as Habermas and Charles Taylor, among others. The "other" beginning instead, that of the modern/colonial world, is more complex and planetary.
It connects the commercial circuits before European hegemony (Abu-Lughod 1989) with the emergent Mediterranean capitalism of the period (Braudel 1979; Arrighi 1994) and with the displacement of capitalist expansion from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic (Dussel 1998: 3-31; Mignolo 2000: 3-48).

Why is this historical moment of the making of the imperial difference and the rearticulation of the colonial differences with the Americas and the emergence of Orientalism relevant to my discussion on cosmopolitanism? Not, of course, because of national pride or historical accuracy, but because of the impediment that the linear macronarrative constructed from the perspective of modernity (from the Greeks to the today) presents to the macronarratives told from the perspective of coloniality (the making and rearticulation of the colonial and imperial differences). Bearing this conceptual and historical frame in mind (that is, the modern/colonial world system), there are at least two ways to enter critically into Kant's signal contribution to cosmopolitanism and, simultaneously, his racial underpinning and Eurocentric bias. One would be to start with an analysis of his writings on history from a cosmopolitan point of view and on perpetual peace (Kant [1785] 1996, [1795] 1963; McCarthy 1999). The other would be to start from his lectures on anthropology, which he began in 1772 and published in 1797 (Van De Pitte 1996). In these lectures, Kant's Eurocentrism enters clearly into conflict with his cosmopolitan ideals (Eze 1997: 103-40; Serequeberhan 1997: 141-61; Dussel 1995: 65-76, 1998: 129-62). The first reading of Kant will take us to Habermas and Taylor. The second reading will return us to the sixteenth century, to Las Casas and Vitoria, to the relations between Europe, Africa, and America, and from there onward to Kant's racial classification of the planet by skin color and continental divides.

Let me explore these ideas by bringing into the picture the connections of cosmopolitanism with Eurocentrism. Enrique Dussel, an Argentinian philosopher resident in Mexico and one of the founders of the philosophy of liberation in Latin America, linked modernity with Eurocentrism and proposed the notion of "transmodernity" as a way out of the impasses of postliberal and postmodern critiques of modernity. Dussel argues that if modernity includes a rational concept of emancipation, it also should be pointed out that, at the same time, it developed an irrational myth, a justification for genocidal violence. While "postmodernists criticize modern reason as a reason of terror," Dussel (1995: 66) writes, "we criticize modern reason because of the irrational myth that it conceals." The pronoun we here precisely situates the enunciation in the colonial difference, in the irreducible difference of the exteriority of the modern/colonial world. Much like the slave who understands the logic of the master and of the slave while the master only understands the master's logic, Dussel's argument reveals the limits of modernity and makes visible the possibility and the need to speak from the perspective of coloniality. Thus, there is a need for Dussel (as there is for African philosophers—e.g., Eze 1997) to read Kant from the perspective of coloniality (that is, from the colonial difference), and not only critically but from within modernity itself (that is, from a universal perspective without colonial differences). Dussel observes that,

Kant's answer to the question posed by the title of his essay "What Is Enlightenment?" is now more than two centuries old. "Enlightenment is the exodus of humanity by its own effort from the state of guilty immaturity," he wrote. "Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why the greater part of humanity remains pleasurably in this state of immaturity." For Kant, immaturity, or adolescence, is a culpable state, laziness and cowardice is existential ethos: the unmundig. Today, we would ask him: an African in Africa or as a slave in the United States in the eighteenth century; an Indian in Mexico or a Latin American mestizo: should all of these subjects be considered to reside in a state of guilty immaturity? (Dussel 1995: 68)
In fact, Kant's judgment regarding the American or Amerindian was complemented by his view of the African and the Hindu, for to him they all shared an incapacity for moral maturity, owing to their common ineptitude and proximity to nature. African philosopher Emmanuel Eze (1997: 117-19) provides several examples in which Kant states that the race of the Americans cannot be educated since they lack any motivating force, they are devoid of affect and passion, and they hardly speak and do not caress each other. Kant introduces then the race of the Negroes, who are completely opposite of the Americans: the Negroes are full of affect and passion, very lively but vain; as such, they can be educated, but only as servants or slaves. Kant continues, in tune with the naturalist and philosophic discourses of his time, by noting that inhabitants of the hottest zones are, in general, idle and lazy--qualities that are only correctable by government and force (Gerbi [1955] 1982: 414-18).

In part II of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, devoted to "Classification," Kant's argument ([1797] 1996) comes into full force. It begins with a consideration of the character of the person, moves next to the character of the sexes and then to the character of nations, and concludes with speculation on the characters of races and species. The fact that the "person" is Kant's beginning and reference point is already indicative of the presuppositions implied in the universal neutral imaginary that for him constitutes the person. Kant obviously was not thinking about the Amerindians, the Africans, or the Hindus as paradigmatic examples of his characterization. "Person" was for Kant an empty signifier around which all differences may be accommodated and classified. Also, "person" is the unit upon which sexes and nations are built (Gregor 1993: 50-75). But let us pause for a while over Kant's discourse on the character of nations, since it more strictly relates to cosmopolitanism. Cosmo-polis implies the possibilities and the capabilities of people (*populus*) to live together, and the unity of the people is organized around the concept of nation. A nation, for Kant, "is not (like the ground on which it is located) a possession patrimonium. It is a society of men whom no one other than the nation itself can command or dispose of. Since, like a tree, each nation has its own roots, to incorporate it into another nation as a graft, denies its existence as a moral person, turns into a thing, and thus contradicts the concept of the original contract, without which a people (Volk) has no right" (Kant [1795] 1963: para. no. 344). [End Page 734]

A nation has roots, and a state has laws, and people have rights. But, of course, the character of each nation varies, and a successful cosmopolitanism and a perpetual peace would very much depend on the characters of (peoples in) nations and on the state they constitute together. Thus, England and France (and Germany, by implication of the enunciating agency) are "the two most civilized nations on earth" ([1797] 1996: 226). The fact that they constantly feud because of their different characters does not diminish their standing as paragons of civilization. Thus, the French and the English are the first national characters Kant describes in the section entitled "The Characters of the Nations." The third national character is the Spanish. And this makes sense, since Kant's order of things is not alphabetical but imperial: Spain, the empire in decay, follows England and France, the new and emerging imperial nations. The first feature that Kant observes in the Spaniards is that they "evolved from the mixture of European blood with Arabian (Moorish) blood." And (or perhaps) because of this the Spaniard "displays in his public and private behavior a certain solemnity; even the peasant expresses a consciousness of his own dignity toward his master, to whom he is lawfully obedient" (Kant [1797] 1996: 231). Kant further adds: "The Spaniard's bad side is that he does not learn from foreigners; that he does not travel in order to get acquainted with other nations; that he is centuries behind in the sciences. He resists any reform; he is proud of not having to work; he is of a romantic quality of spirit, as the bullfight shows; he is cruel, as the former auto-da-fe shows; and he displays in his taste an origin that is partly non-European" ([1797] 1996: 231-32).

The entire philosophical debates of the sixteenth century, the contributions of Las Casas and Vitoria, are here abandoned in the name of the negative features of national characters. The mixture of Spaniard with Moorish blood sets the character of the nation in racial terms; this time not in relation to Africa, Asia, or the Americas, but to Europe itself--the South of Europe. In this
regard, Kant contributed to drawing the imperial difference between the modern/North (England, France, Germany) and the traditional/South (Spain, Portugal, Italy). Russians, Turks, Greeks, and Armenians belong to a third division of national character. While still within Europe, these nations do not belong to the core, as Kant paved the way for Hegel's tripartite division of Europe: the core (England, France, and Germany), the south, and the northeast (Hegel [1822] 1956: 102). Thus, according to Kant's geopolitical distribution of national characters that anticipates Hegel's geopolitical distribution of Europe, Kant's cosmopolitanism presupposes that it could only be thought out from one particular geopolitical location: that of the heart of Europe, of the most civilized nations. Indeed, we owe much to Kant's [End Page 735] cosmopolitanism, although we must not forget that it plagued the inception of national ideology with racial prejudgment. It is not difficult to agree with both Vitoria and Kant on their ideas of justice, equality, rights, and planetary peace. But it remains difficult to carry these ideas further without clearing up the Renaissance and Enlightenment prejudices that surrounded concepts of race and manhood. One of the tasks of critical cosmopolitanism is precisely clearing up the encumbrances of the past. The other is to point toward the future.

For instance, when Kant thinks in terms of "all nations of the earth" ([1795] 1963: 121; para. no. 62) he assumes that the entire planet eventually will be organized by the terms he has envisioned for Western Europe and will be defined by his description of national characters. With this scenario in mind, our options today are several. One would be to update Kant, as McCarthy does (1999: 191-92) and to account for the multiculturalism of the postnational world in which we live and which was less foreseeable to Kant (Habermas 1998). Another would be to start from Vitoria and to learn how multiculturalism was handled in the sixteenth century, in a Christian (prenational) world faced for the first time with a planetary horizon--a globo-polis perhaps. However, Vitoria in the sixteenth century and Kant in the eighteenth century belong to the same "world"--the modern/colonial world. They are divided by the imperial difference of the eighteenth-century European imaginary. It is necessary, then, to reestablish the commonality between both cosmopolitan projects that was obscured by the convergence of industrial capitalism, cosmopolitanism, and the civilizing mission.

Today, in a postnational moment of the same modern/colonial world, the problems of rights, justice, equality, and so on are thought out by way of inclusion, as Vitoria and the Salamanca school did in the sixteenth century. But inclusion doesn't seem to be the solution to cosmopolitanism any longer, insofar as it presupposes that the agency that establishes the inclusion is itself beyond inclusion: "he" being already within the frame from which it is possible to think "inclusion." Today, silenced and marginalized voices are bringing themselves into the conversation of cosmopolitan projects, rather than waiting to be included. Inclusion is always a reformatory project. Bringing themselves into the conversation is a transformative project that takes the form of border thinking or border epistemology—that is, the alternative to separatism is border thinking, the recognition and transformation of the hegemonic imaginary from the perspectives of people [End Page 736] in subaltern positions. Border thinking then becomes a "tool" of the project of critical cosmopolitanism.

**Human Rights: The Changing Face of the Modern/Colonial World Imaginary**

Vitoria and Kant anchored cosmopolitan projects and conceptualizations of rights that responded to specific needs: for Vitoria, the inclusion of the Amerindians; for Kant, the redefinitions of person and citizen in the consolidation of the Europe of nations and the emergence of new forms of colonialism. The "United Nations Declaration of Human Rights" ([1948] 1997) that followed World War II also responded to the changing faces of the coloniality of power in the modern/colonial world (Koshy 1999: 1-32). During the Cold War, human rights were connected to the defense of the Western world against the danger of communism, as if communism was not an outcome of the Western world. At the conclusion of the Cold War, human rights became linked to world trade
and to the diversity of capitalism (Raghavan 1990; Koshy 1999: 20-30). Neither Vitoria nor Kant had to deal with a world in which the state took a leading role in a conflicting discussion over human rights (Tolley 1987).

The conclusion of World War II reconfigured the scenario of a narrative of which the first chapter was written by the Salamanca school, and the second by Kant's conception of a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view--of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan rights. This chapter of Western history could be read today as a prolegomenon to a model for planetary liberal democracy. It ended, however, with the postwar realization that such dreams were no longer viable (Friedman 1962). Decolonization in Africa and Asia brought to the foreground an experience that Kant could not have foreseen when British and French colonization were not yet fully in place. The nation-state alone and Europe were on Kant's horizon, and less so colonization. Curiously enough, the scenario that presented itself after World War II brought us back to Vitoria and the Salamanca school. Not curiously enough, the Cold War and the intensification of the conflict between the two previous phases of the modern/colonial world system left the exteriority of the system in the shade, as an expectant Third World contemplated the struggle between the First and the Second. Coloniality remained hidden behind the struggle of modernity. The horrors of National Socialism that contributed to the transformation of the "rights of man and of the citizen" into "human rights" were horrors whose traces stretch back to the sixteenth century (the expulsion of Jews from Spain) and to the eighteenth century (the imaginary of national characters). During the Cold War, human rights as a strategy to control communism was similar to the control of pagans, infidels, and barbarians by the model of international relations devised by the Salamanca school, or of foreigners by the model of relations urged by Kant. Thus, while for Vitoria and the Salamanca school the master discourse was theology, and for Kant and the Enlightenment it was philosophy, after World War II the master discourse was political economy (Hayek [1944] 1994; Friedman 1962; Brzezinski 1970; Cooper 1973).

The "United Nations Declaration of Human Rights" ([1948] 1997), which followed by a few years the constitution of the United Nations, announced, paradoxically, the closure of the nation-state and international laws as conceived since Kant. A couple of decades later, dependency theory in Latin America voiced the concern that international relations were indeed relations of dependency. Theoreticians who supported transnational corporations did not agree with that view. In one stroke, they put a closure to Kant's trust in the nation and transformed dependency into interdependency (that is, with the 1973 Trilateral Commission between the United States, Europe, and Japan). They ended the sovereignty of the nation-state and revamped the language of developing underdeveloped nations as an alternative to communism. Thus, as communists (and no longer pagans, infidels, or foreigners) represented the danger to the system, parallel to decolonization in Asia and Africa, dictatorial regimes were ascending in Latin America (Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina). Human rights commissions, no doubt, played a fundamental role in abating the atrocities of dictatorial regimes, at the same time that human rights served as an instrument to promote liberal democracy against communism. During the Cold War, the world was divided into three geopolitical areas, and human rights were caught in the middle of the transformation of liberal into neoliberal democratic projects. In this battle within the new imperial borders of the modern world, the problem was no longer the racial South, as in Kant's time, but the communist East. Decolonized countries were striving for a nation-state, at the same time that the ideologues of the new world order no longer believed in them. Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1970 was promoting interdependence--apparently a good ground for cosmopolitanism--while despising the nation-state. He believed, or at least said, that "on the formal plane, politics as a global process operates much as they [nation-states] did in the past, but the inner reality of that process is increasingly shaped by forces whose influence or scope transcend national lines" (1970: 8). [End Page 738]

Interdependence redraws the lines of the imperial difference (now between the First and the Second Worlds) and the colonial difference (now between the First and the Third Worlds) either
by the process of decolonization through nation-building (Asia and Africa) or military dictatorship (Latin America). But, from Vitoria to Brzezinski, through Kant, the modern/colonial world kept on growing and transforming itself, while simultaneously maintaining the colonial space as derivative, rather than as constitutive, of modernity. Alternatives to human rights have been removed from the question, and one of the consequences has been to elicit suspicious responses (China’s position on human rights) to suspicious proposals (Western ambiguities on human rights).

The difficulties I am trying to convey here have been cast in different words by Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, a lawyer and Muslim advocate for human rights. He points out that the universality of human rights is undermined by both Western and non-Western cultural relativism.

Similar to the claims of some elites in non-Western societies that their own cultural norms should prevail over international human rights standards, Western elites are claiming an exclusive right to prescribe the essential concept and normative content of human rights for all societies to implement. Both types of relativism not only take a variety of conceptual and practical forms, but also play an insidious role in inhibiting even the possibilities of imagining supplementary or alternative conceptions and implementation strategies. (An-Na’im 1994: 8)

This dilemma calls for a radical reconceptualization of the human rights paradigm as the next step toward cosmopolitan values (ethics) and regulations (politics). And this will be the topic of my next and last section.

**Border Thinking: A Next Step toward a Cosmo-politan Order**

I have shown three stages of cosmopolitan projects of the modern/colonial world system or, if you prefer, of modernity/coloniality. In the first, cosmopolitanism faced the difficulties of dealing with pagans, infidels, and barbarians. It was a religious and racial configuration. In the second, cosmopolitanism faced the difficulties of communities without states and the dangers of the foreigners that, at that point in time, were the foreigners at the edge of the Europe of nations. In the third stage, communists replaced pagans and infidels, barbarians and foreigners, [End Page 739] as the difficulties of cosmopolitan society were reassessed. Today the scenario Kant was observing has changed again with the “dangers” presented by recent African immigration to Europe and Latin Americans to the United States. Religious exclusion, national exclusion, ideological exclusion, and ethnic exclusion have several elements in common: first, the identification of frontiers and exteriority; second, the racial component in the making of the frontier as colonial difference (linked to religion in the first instance and to nationalism in the second); and third, the ideological component in the remaking of the imperial difference during the third historical stage (liberalism versus socialism within the modern/colonial world). Ethnicity became a crucial trademark after the end of the Cold War, although its roots had already been established in connection with religion and nationalism. While there is a temporal succession that links the three stages and projects them onto the current post-Cold War globalization, they are each constitutive of the modern/colonial world and cohabit today, as Kosovo clearly bears witness to. Furthermore, the three stages that I am reconstituting historically but that are the “ground” of the present, are successive and complementary moments in the struggle for the survival and hegemony of the North Atlantic or, if you wish, the reconstituted face of the Western world.

I suspect that it is possible now to talk more specifically about a fourth stage, perhaps a postmodern/postcolonial moment, of the modern/colonial world, which I have been announcing in the previous paragraph and in which current discussions on cosmopolitanism are taking place—a stage that Immanuel Wallerstein (1999) described as the “end of the world as we know it.” It also may be possible now to have a “cosmopolitan manifesto” to deal with the “world risk society” (Beck 1999). The erasure of the imperial difference that sustained the Cold War and the current
process of its relocation in China brings us back to a situation closer to the one faced by Vitoria: imagining conviviality across religious and racial divides. Global coloniality is drawing a new scenario. Capitalism is no longer concentrating in the Mediterranean (as in Vitoria’s time) or in the Europe of nations and the North Atlantic (as in Kant’s time) when liberalism went together with Christian Protestantism and skin color began to replace blood and religion in the reconfiguration of the colonial difference. At that time, capital, labor control, and whiteness became the new paradigm under which the colonial difference was redefined. In the second half of the twentieth century but more so after the end of the Cold War, capitalism is crossing the former colonial difference with the Orient and relocating it as imperial difference with China—thereby entering territories in which Christianity, liberalism, and whiteness are alien categories. Perhaps Samuel Huntington (1996) had a similar scenario in mind when he proposed that in the future, wars would be motivated by the clash of civilizations rather than by economic reasons. Which means that when capitalism crosses the colonial difference, it brings civilizations into conflicts of a different order. In any event, relevant to my argument is the fact that while capitalism expands, and the rage for accumulation daily escapes further beyond control (for instance, the weakening of nation-states or the irrational exuberance of the market), racial and religious conflicts emerge as new impediments to the possibility of cosmopolitan societies.

The new situation we are facing in the fourth stage is that cosmopolitanism (and democracy) can no longer be articulated from one point of view, within a single logic, a mono-logic (if benevolent) discourse from the political right or left. Vitoria, Kant, the ideologues of interdependence, the champions of development, and the neoliberal managers believing, or saying, that technology will lift poverty left little room for those on the other side of the colonial difference. And, obviously, managed cosmopolitanism could (and more likely will) remain as a benevolent form of control. In the New World order, how can critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism be thought out without falling into the traps of cultural relativism (and the reproduction of the colonial difference) as pointed out by An-Na’im? I have been suggesting, and now will move to justify, that cultural relativism should be dissolved into colonial difference and that the colonial difference should be identified as the location for the critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism that confronts managerial global designs of ideologues and executives of the network society. Instead of cosmopolitanism managed from above (that is, global designs), I am proposing cosmopolitanism, critical and dialogic, emerging from the various spatial and historical locations of the colonial difference (Mignolo 2000). In this vein, I interpret the claim made by An-Na’im.

Replacing cultural differences with the colonial difference helps change the terms, and not only the content, of the conversation: Culture is the term that in the eighteenth century and in the Western secular world replaced religion in a new discourse of colonial expansion (Dirks 1992). The notion of cultural relativism transformed coloniality of power into a semantic problem. If we accept that actions, objects, beliefs, and so on are culture-relative, we hide the coloniality of power from which different cultures came into being in the first place. The problem, then, is not to accommodate cosmopolitanism to cultural relativism, but to dissolve cultural relativism and to focus on the coloniality of power and the colonial difference produced, reproduced, and maintained by global designs. Critical cosmopolitanism and new democratic projects imply negotiating the coloniality of power and the colonial difference in a world controlled by global capitalism (Redrado 2000). Rights of man or human rights, of course, would have to be negotiated across gender lines (Wollstonecraft [1792] 1997; Beijing Declaration [1995] 1997), but also across the coloniality of power that structured and still structures the modern/colonial world around the racially grounded colonial difference. Human rights can no longer be accepted as having a content that Vitoria, Kant, and the United Nations discovered and possessed. Such expressions, as well as democracy and cosmopolitanism, shall be conceived as connectors in the struggle to overcome coloniality of power from the perspective of the colonial difference, rather than as full-fledged words with specific Western content. By connectors I do not mean empty signifiers that preserve the terms as the property of European Enlightenment while they promote benevolent inclusion of the Other or making room for the multicultural.
The Zapatistas have used the word *democracy*, although it has different meanings for them than it has for the Mexican government. Democracy for the Zapatistas is not conceptualized in terms of European political philosophy but in terms of Maya social organization based on reciprocity, communal (instead of individual) values, the value of wisdom rather than epistemology, and so forth. The Mexican government does not possess the correct interpretation of democracy, under which the Other will be included. But, for that matter, neither do the Zapatistas have the right interpretation. However, the Zapatistas have no choice but to use the word that political hegemony imposed, although using the word doesn't mean bending to its mono-logic interpretation. Once democracy is singled out by the Zapatistas, it becomes a connector through which liberal concepts of democracy and indigenous concepts of reciprocity and community social organization for the common good must come to terms. Border thinking is what I am naming the political and ethical move from the Zapatistas' perspective, by displacing the concept of democracy. Border thinking is not a possibility, at this point, from the perspective of the Mexican government, although it is a need from subaltern positions. In this line of argument, a new abstract universal (such as Vitoria's, or Kant's, which replaced Vitoria's, or the ideologies of transnationalism, which replaced Kant's abstract universal) is no longer either possible or desirable. [End Page 742]

The abstract universal is what hegemonic perspectives provide, be they neoliberal or neo-Marxist. The perspective from the colonial difference (illustrated in the dilemma formulated by An-Na'im and further developed with the example of the Zapatistas) instead opens the possibility of imagining border thinking as the necessary condition for a future critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism. Such a critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism itself leads toward "diversality," instead of toward a new universality grounded (again) "on the potential of democratic politicization as the true European legacy from ancient Greece onward" (Zizek 1998: 1009). A new universalism recasting the democratic potential of the European legacy is not necessarily a solution to the vicious circle between (neo)liberal globalization and "regressive forms of fundamentalist hatred" (Zizek 1998: 1009). It is hard to imagine that the entire planet would endorse the democratic potential of "the European legacy from ancient Greece onward." The entire planet could, in fact, endorse a democratic, just, and cosmopolitan project as far as democracy and justice are detached from their "fundamental" European heritage, from Greece onward, and they are taken as connectors around which critical cosmopolitanism would be articulated. Epistemic diversality shall be the ground for political and ethical cosmopolitan projects. In other words, diversity as a universal project (that is, diversality) shall be the aim instead of longing for a new abstract universal and rehearsing a new universality grounded in the "true" Greek or Enlightenment legacy. Diversality as the horizon of critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism presupposes border thinking or border epistemology grounded on the critique of all possible fundamentalism (Western and non-Western, national and religious, neoliberal and neosocialist) and on the faith in accumulation at any cost that sustains capitalist organizations of the economy (Mignolo 2000). Since diversality (or diversity as a universal project) emerges from the experience of coloniality of power and the colonial difference, it cannot be reduced to a new form of cultural relativism but should be thought out as new forms of projecting and imagining, ethically and politically, from subaltern perspectives. As Manuel Castells (1997: 109) puts it, the Zapatistas, American militia, and Aum Shinrikyo are all social movements that act politically against globalization and against the state. My preference for the Zapatistas and not for the other two is an ethical rather than a political choice. Diversality as a universal project, then, shall be simultaneously ethical, political, and philosophical. It cannot be identified, either, with oppositional violence beyond the European Union and the United States. And of course, by definition, it cannot be located in the hegemonic global designs that have been the target of critical reflections in this essay. As John Rawls would word it in his explorations on the [End Page 743] "law (instead of the right) of peoples," diversality as a universal project shall be identified with "the honest non-liberal people" (Rawls 1999: 90, see also 89-128). But also with "the honest non-Western people or people of color" that Rawls, following Kant, doesn't have in his horizon.
Critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism as a regulative principle demands yielding generously ("convivially" said Vitoria; "friendly" said Kant) toward diversity as a universal and cosmopolitan project in which everyone participates instead of "being participated." Such a regulative principle shall replace and displace the abstract universal cosmopolitan ideals (Christian, liberal, socialist, neoliberal) that had helped (and continue to help) to hold together the modern/colonial world system and to preserve the managerial role of the North Atlantic. And here is when the local histories and global designs come into the picture. While cosmopolitanism was thought out and projected from particular local histories (that became the local history of the modern world system) positioned to devise and enact global designs, other local histories in the planet had to deal with those global designs that were, at the same time, abstract universals (Christian, liberal, or socialist). For that reason, cosmopolitanism today has to become border thinking, critical and dialogic, from the perspective of those local histories that had to deal all along with global designs. Diversality should be the relentless practice of critical and dialogical cosmopolitanism rather than a blueprint of a future and ideal society projected from a single point of view (that of the abstract universal) that will return us (again!) to the Greek paradigm and to European legacies (Zizek 1998).

Conclusion

I suggested, at the beginning, that cosmopolitanism is linked to human rights and, indirectly, to democracy. I suggested further that these expressions would be taken as connectors for critical and dialogic cosmopolitan conversations, rather than as blueprints or master plans to be imposed worldwide. Thus, critical and dialogical cosmopolitanism demands a different conceptualization of human rights and democracy; and, of course, of citizenship, a notion that belongs to the ideology of the nation-state. If all human beings are rational, as had been recognized by Vitoria and Kant and the United Nations, then let it be. But then "natural rights" or the "law of nature" can hardly be the only principles upon which rationality and the rationality of society shall be defended. To "let it be" means to take seriously "human rationality" as another connector that will contribute to erase the coloniality of power ingrained in the very conceptualization of "natural rights" and the "law of nature" as models for human cosmo-polis. At this point in history, a critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism leading to diversity as a universal project can only be devised and enacted from the colonial difference.

I have also assumed a framework in which the three cosmopolitan designs with human rights implications were also linked to three different stages of the modern/colonial world system: the Spanish empire and Portuguese colonialism (Vitoria); the British empire and French and German colonialism (Kant), and U.S. imperialism (human rights). All three cosmopolitan designs shall be seen not only as a chronological order but also as the synchronic coexistence of an enduring concern articulated first through Christianity as a planetary ideology, second around the nation-state and the law as grounds for the second phase of colonialism, and third as the need to regulate the planetary conflict between democracy and socialism during the Cold War. I concluded by arguing for diversality as a universal project and for border thinking as a necessary epistemology upon which critical cosmopolitanism shall be articulated in a postnational world order governed by global capitalism and new forms of coloniality.

Finally, my argument intended to be from a subaltern perspective (which implies not inferiority but awareness of a subaltern position in a current geopolitical distribution of epistemic power). In a sense, it is an argument for globalization from below; at the same time, it is an argument for the geopolitically diversal— that is, one that conceives diversity as a (cosmopolitan) universal project. If you can imagine Western civilization as a large circle with a series of satellite circles intersecting the larger one but disconnected from each other, diversality will be the project that connects the diverse subaltern satellites appropriating and transforming Western global designs. Diversality can be imagined as a new medievalism, a pluricentric world built on the ruins of ancient, non-Western cultures and civilizations with the debris of Western civilization. A cosmopolitanism that only connects from the center of the large circle outward, and leaves the
outer places disconnected from each other, would be a cosmopolitanism from above, like Vitoria's and Kant's cosmopolitanism in the past and Rawls's and Habermas's cosmopolitanism today, and like the implications of human rights discourse, according to which only one philosophy has it "right."


Notes

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1. Vitoria's notion of a "natural right" is not quite like Kant's "natural law," which indirectly obscured the question of "the other" that recently became Jürgen Habermas's (1998) concern.

2. I am here repeating a well-known story (Cassirer [1932] 1951) and displacing it with a reading that takes the perspective of "Man of Colors," rather than the perspective of the "White Man's Burden" (Gordon 1995).

3. Dussel (1998: 411-20) has confronted Habermas, Taylor, and Rawls from the perspective of the philosophy of liberation. Dussel's argument is grounded in the relevance of the sixteenth-century debates on the humanity of Amerindians and their relevance to current debates on multiculturalism, recognition, and "people rights" (as Vitoria and now Rawls call it).

4. In 1973, David Rockefeller, then-CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank, initiated the Trilateral Commission. President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was its main ideologue.

5. An-Na'IM's observation at this point could be applied to Vitoria, Kant, and the "United Nations Declaration of Human Rights."

6. "Cosmopolitan desires" can no longer emanate from the same epistemic location of global designs, unless "cosmopolitanism" is conceived as a new global design from the left and converted into a "cosmopolitan manifesto" (Beck 1999: 1-18). Among the many issues cosmopolitan (postnational) projects will have to deal with is what is often called "intercultural critique" and "cultural differences" (Beck 1998: 99-116; Fornet-Betancourt 1994). The main problem here is to change the terms of the conversation from cultural to colonial difference. A world risk society has coloniality of power imbedded into it and the reproduction of colonial differences in a planetary and postnational scale.

Works Cited


