Baker suggests that Boas and DuBois reached ‘strikingly similar yet different understandings of racial categories and cultural patterns contemporaneously’ (p. 107). This should not be surprising given the roots of each man’s education in German humanism, stressing inductive method backed up by empirical descriptive and historical data.

Boas had certain advantages because he was white, well situated in the academy, and viewed as an ‘objective’ scientist (in contrast to the ‘racial vindication’ genre pioneered by DuBois (p. 107)). Boas was active in DuBois’ various enterprises, with a commitment transcending empathy engendered by experience of anti-Semitism. Racism offended the canons of social science.

DuBois attempted to balance ‘black nationalism and racial integration’ (p. 110) through pragmatic strategies balancing apparent contradictions. Like Boas, DuBois dissociated race from culture and language, expecting scientific knowledge to enable a richer democracy. DuBois pioneered social science community studies, predating the models for ‘cultural diversity premised on racial equality’ of Boas, W. I. Thomas, and Lloyd Warner (p. 115). These studies, however, were ignored in public discourse adulating Gunnar Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma* (1944) sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation and propounding an elitist status quo. Only after World War II did the glaring contradictions between segregation and democracy become apparent and facilitate Civil Rights victories which cited Boasian science as justification for equal treatment.

Contemporary Supreme Court sanction for a colour-blind society protecting individuals but not groups dismantles the attainments of the Civil Rights movement, ostensibly on anthropological authority. The new racialist paradigm accepts anthropological demonstration that races are not biologically real, but systematically ignores the corollary that cultural constructions have real-world consequences. Race is dismissed and racism is excluded from public discourse. Special cultural histories are ignored. Baker challenges anthropologists, both biological and cultural, to enter the public arena, questioning the morality and scientific credibility of ‘government-sponsored racism’ (p. 6). Anthropology’s own ethical standards, at least within the Boasian/Americanist paradigm, seem to demand such a role.

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**Mathematics and Logic**


Historians of ancient Greek mathematics have traditionally focused on the propositions or logical content of the argumentation found in the numerous treatises that have survived from antiquity. In this book, Reviel Netz breaks with this scholarly tradition by concentrating on the form of the mathematical argumentation found in these treatises rather than its content. The results are quite surprising and well worth the critical attention of any professional historian or general reader who is interested in ancient Greek mathematics. Indeed, this is an important, pioneering work that is bound to change the way in which we view this subject.

The basic idea in Netz’s analysis is that careful study of how ancient mathematical argumentation or deduction is presented will disclose valuable information about the practices of the ancient mathematicians themselves, practices that constitute the implicit or underlying part of what it was to do mathematics.

Netz begins in chapter 1 with the use of lettered diagrams and the familiar but inadequately appreciated fact that it is common for the written text to introduce letters without specifying them fully or at all. This means, he argues, that the diagram is a necessary part of the proof and cannot be reconstructed from the text in so far as the text takes the diagram for granted. In fact, Netz explains, the ancient Greeks seem to have viewed the diagram as the metonym or characteristic part of the proof that could serve to represent the whole. For Netz, it is important to understand, however, that this whole is a finite, well determined domain of discourse, since the letters used in the diagrams and text are not symbols but indices designating the particular points and so forth that they actually stand near.