

**ATILA ABDULKADİROĞLU**  
Garonzik Family Professor of Economics  
Duke University, Department of Economics  
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### **Academic Positions**

Duke University  
Department of Economics  
Professor, July 2010-present  
Associate Professor, July 2006-June 2010

National Bureau of Economic Research  
Faculty Research Associate, 2016-present

Columbia University  
Department of Economics  
Associate Professor (tenured in January 2006), July 2004 – June 2006  
Assistant Professor, July 2001 - June 2004

Northwestern University  
Department of Economics and the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and  
Management Science (CMS-EMS) at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management  
Assistant Professor, July 2000-June 2001

### **Education**

University of Rochester, Rochester, NY

Ph.D. Economics, April 2000  
Dissertation: *Essays on Real Life Assignment Problems*  
Supervisor: William Thomson  
M.A. Economics, September 1998

Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

M.A. Economics, July 1995.  
B.S. Electrical and Electronics Engineering, June 1993

### **Research Interests**

Mechanism Design, Market Design, Economics of Education

## **Honors, Awards, Fellowships and Scholarships**

Laura and John Arnold Foundation Research Grant, 2018 – 2021, with Josh Angrist and Parag Pathak

National Science Foundation, (SES- 1426541), 2014-2017, with Josh Angrist and Parag Pathak

Project: *Research Design Meets Market Design*

National Science Foundation, NSF Career Award (SES-0449946), 2005-2010

Project: *Theoretical and Practical Mechanism Design with an emphasis on Public School Choice*

The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship, 2003-2006

Mac Donald Fellow, Columbia University, Summer 2004

ISERP Research Grant, Columbia University, 2004 (with Till Von Wachter)

The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, 1999-2000

Kaplan Award, Best Graduate GPA, University of Rochester, 1998

University of Rochester Summer Research Grant, 1997

W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy Research Grant, 1996-1997

University of Rochester Fellowship and Tuition Scholarship, 1995-1999

Bilkent University Fellowship and Tuition Scholarship, 1989-1993, 1993-1995

## **Publications**

“Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design”  
with Joshua D. Angrist, Yusuke Narita and Parag Pathak, *Econometrica*, forthcoming

"Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching"  
with Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Olivier Tercieux, *American Economic Review: Insights*, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 2020 (Pp. 425-42)

"Do Parents Value School Effectiveness?"  
with Parag A. Pathak, Jonathan Schellenberg and Christopher R. Walters, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 110, No. 5, May 2020 (pp. 1502-39)

“Free to Choose: Can School Choice Reduce Student Achievement?”

with Parag A. Pathak and Christopher Walters, *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 10(1), 2018

“The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match” with Nikhil Agarwal and Parag Pathak, *American Economic Review* Vol. 107, No. 12, December 2017 (pp. 3635-89)

“Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation” with Joshua D. Angrist, Yusuke Narita and Parag Pathak, *Econometrica*, Volume 85, Issue 5, September 2017, Pages 1373–1432

“Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago’s Exam Schools” with Joshua D. Angrist, Yusuke Narita, Parag A. Pathak and Roman A. Zarate, *American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings*, 107(5), 2017

"Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston" with Josh Angrist, Peter Hull and Parag Pathak, *American Economic Review*, 2016, 106(7), pp. 1878-1920

“Expanding “Choice” in School Choice” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Yosuke Yasuda), *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 2015, 7(1): 1-42

“The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools” (with Joshua Angrist and Parag Pathak), *Econometrica*, Vol. 82, No. 1, January, 2014, 137–196

“Trust, Reciprocity and Favors in Cooperative Relationships” (with Kyle Bagwell), *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, Vol. 5, No.2, May 2013, 213-59.

“School Choice,” Handbook of Market Design, edited by Zvika Neeman, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and Nir Vulkan, 2013

“Matching Markets: Theory and Practice” (with Tayfun Sönmez), *Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory and Applications, Tenth World Congress, Volume II*, 2013

"Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots," (with Joshua D. Angrist, Susan M. Dynarski, Thomas J. Kane and Parag Pathak) *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2011, 126(2): 699-748

"Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the Boston Mechanism Reconsidered," (with Yeon-Koo Che and Yosuke Yasuda) *American Economic Review*, 2011, 101(1): 399-410

“Strategy Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match” (with Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth) *American Economic Review*, 99(5): 1954-1978, 2009

“College Admissions with Affirmative Action” *International Journal of Game Theory*, 2005, 33: 535-549

“The New York City High School Match” (with Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth) *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 2005, May, 95: 364-367

“The Boston Public School Match” (with Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 2005, May, 95: 368-371

“Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach” (with Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver) *Social Choice and Welfare*, 2004, 22: 515-538

“School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach” (with Tayfun Sönmez) *American Economic Review*, 2003, 93-3: 729-747

“Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments” (with Tayfun Sönmez), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2003, 112: 157-172

“Unemployment Insurance and the Role of Self-Insurance” (with Burhanettin Kuruşçu and Ayşegül Şahin), *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 2002, 3: 681-703

“House Allocation with Existing Tenants” (with Tayfun Sönmez), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 1999, 88: 233-260

“Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems” (with Tayfun Sönmez), *Econometrica*, 1998, 66: 689-701

### **Working Papers and Ongoing Work**

“School Assignment by Match Quality” with Umut M. Dur and Aram Grigoryan March 2021, NBER Working Paper 28512

“Priority-based Assignment with Reserves and Quotas” with Aram Grigoryan

“Efficient and Envy Minimal Matching” with Aram Grigoryan

“Matching with Complementarities” with Aram Grigoryan

“Small High Schools and Student Achievement: Lottery-Based Evidence from New York” with Weiwei Hu and Parag Pathak, October 2013, NBER Working Paper 19576

“The Optimal Chips Mechanism in a Model of Favors” with Kyle Bagwell

“Generalized Matching for School Choice”

“Controlled School Choice” (a preliminary draft available upon request via email).

“The Role of Priorities in Assigning Indivisible Objects: A Characterization of Top Trading Cycles” (with Yeon-Koo Che)

“Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism” (with Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) The National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2006, w11965

## **Professional Activities**

Editor-in-Chief, *The Review of Economic Design*, November 2004 – December 2018

Associate Editor, *B. E. Journals in Theoretical Economics*, November 2006 – 2008

Member, The Turkish Academy of Science, June 2012 – present

Board Member, Scientific Advisory Board, Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum, July 2012 – present

Board Director, The Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice, 2012 – January 2019

## **Other Services**

### Referee

*American Economic Review, The B.E. Journals in Macroeconomics, The B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics, Econometrica, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Mathematical Social Sciences, Review of Economic Design, Review of Economic Dynamics, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, National Science Foundation, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.*

### Conference Organizer

ERID Conference on Roth and Sotomayor: Twenty Years After, Duke University  
May 2010

### Discussant

AEA Meetings, Washington, DC, January 2003.

### Program Committee Member

AEA Meetings, 2017  
Annual Meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics, Florence, July 2004  
Biannual Meeting of the Society of Economic Design, New York, July 2002

### Plenary Session Organizer

North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, Durham, NC,  
June 2007

## **Conference and Seminar Presentations**

"Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design"  
Rice (2018), NYU (2019)

“School Choice: Using Matching Theory to Allocate Seats in Schools”  
Economists as Engineers, AEA 2017

“Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation”

Wharton (2015), NBER Education & Labor Meeting (Summer 2015), NBER Market Design Meeting (October 2015), NBER Summer Institute (July 2016)

“The Welfare Effects of Coordinated School Assignment: Evidence from the NYC High School Match”

Oxford (2012), Maryland (2012), LSE (2013), Warwick University (2013)

“Matching Markets: Theory and Practice” Invited talk, joint with Tayfun Sönmez,  
Econometric Society World Congress, Shanghai, China, August 2010

“Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The ‘Boston’ Mechanism Reconsidered”

Harvard University – Al Roth’s Market Design Course (2009), University of Virginia (2009), Johns Hopkins (2010), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (2010)

“Generalized Matching for School Choice”

Public Economic Theory Meetings, Istanbul 2010

“Market Design for School Choice” (Invited lecture)

WCU/BK Summer Economic Program: Market Design, Networks, and Information, Yonsei University, South Korea, 2009

“Expanding “Choice” in School Choice”

Mini-conference on Matching at Caltech (February 2008), Carnegie Mellon University (March 2008), University of Maryland (March 2008), Biannual Meetings of the Society of Economic Design, Ann Arbor, MI (June 2008), College of William and Mary (October 2008), Summer Workshop in Economic Theory, Koc University (2009), Harvard University – Al Roth’s Market Design Course (2009), SUNY Albany (2013)

“Strategy Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match”

University of Texas at Austin (November 2005), Georgetown University (November 2005), University of Florida (March 2007), Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (May 2007), Hong Kong University (May 2007), The Workshop on Matching: Theory, Applications and Experiments, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain (June 2007), College of William and Mary (October 2008), Stern Business School, NYU (October 2008)

“Controlled School Choice”

Biannual Meetings of the Society of Economic Design, Bodrum, Turkey (July 2006), NYU (2010)

- “Experience in New York City” (co-presented with Neil Dorosin)  
Eric M. Mindich Conference on “Designing Choice”, Harvard University (April 2006)
- “Trust, Reciprocity and Favors in Cooperative Relationships”  
Annual Meetings of the Social Choice and Welfare Society, Istanbul, Turkey (July 2006), Tel Aviv University (May 2006), University of Haifa (May 2006), Rutgers University (April 2006), University of British Columbia (March 2006), University of Pennsylvania (December 2005), London School of Economics (June 2005), University College London (June 2005), University of Maryland (April 2005), New York University (November 2004), Annual Meetings of the Society of Economic Dynamics, Florence, Italy (July 2004)
- “Mechanism Design and Market Design” (invited graduate lecture)  
New York University (February 2005)
- “The New York City High School Match”  
American Economic Association Meetings 2005, Philadelphia, PA, Practical Mechanism Design: Four Matches
- “School Choice in NYC and Boston”  
Duke University (January 2006), University of Texas at Austin (November 2005), Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, Market Design Conference (December 2004)
- “Better Mechanism Design”  
Stanford University (November 2004), Rice University (November 2004), University of Texas at Austin (November 2004), ESSET Symposium, CEPR, Gerzensee, Switzerland (July 2004)
- “Practical Mechanism Design and School Choice” (invited graduate lecture)  
Stanford University (May 2004)
- “College Admissions with Affirmative Action”  
California Institute of Technology (February 2004), SUNY Albany (February 2004), University of Montreal (December 2003), Yale University (November 2003), Duke University (November 2003), Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) Summer Workshop (August 2003), Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, Evanston, Illinois (June 2003), University of Rochester (May 2003), London Business School (April 2003)
- “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach”  
London Business School (April 2003), Tulane University, Department of Economics (October 2002), Conference on Economic Design, SED 2002, New York (July 2002), Harvard University, Harvard-MIT Joint Theory Seminar (April 2002)
- “Mechanism Design with Tacit Collusion”  
New York University (November 2002), ESSET Symposium, Center for Economic Policy Research, Gerzensee, Switzerland (July 2002)

“School Choice: A Solution to the Student Assignment Problem”.

Columbia University (January 2001), Conference on Economic Design, SED 2000, Istanbul, Turkey (June 2000)

“Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments”

University of Maryland (February 2000), University of California, Santa Barbara (January 2000), Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management (MEDS) and Department of Economics (January 2000), California Institute of Technology (January 2000), University of Southern California (January 2000), Carnegie Mellon University (January 2000), Southeast Economic Theory Conference, Washington D.C. (November 1999), Midwest Economic Theory Meeting, Urbana-Champaign, IL (October 1999)

“House Allocation with Existing Tenants”

Midwest Economic Theory Meeting, Ann Arbor, MI (October 1998)

## **Teaching Experience**

### **Graduate teaching**

Duke University

Econometrics of Matching Spring 2017-present

Market Design, Spring 2007, Fall 2007, Fall 2008, Spring 2010, Spring 2011

Graduate Microeconomics, Fall 2006, Fall 2007, Fall 2008

Tel Aviv University

Market Design (two-week mini course, May 2006)

Columbia University

Market Design, Spring 2006

Microeconomics Colloquium, Fall 2003, Spring 2004, Fall 2004, Spring 2005, Fall 2005, Spring 2006

Advanced Topics in Economic Analysis: Theory and Applications, Spring 2002, Spring 2003, Spring 2004

Advanced Topics in Contract Theory: Theory and Applications, Northwestern University, Spring 2001

### **Undergraduate teaching**

Duke University

Intermediate Microeconomics, Spring 2011 - present

Columbia University

Intermediate Microeconomics, Fall 2001, Fall 2002, Fall 2003

Principle of Economics, Summer 2002

Intermediate Macroeconomics, Summer 2002

Microeconomic Senior Seminar, Fall 2001, Fall 2002

Northwestern University

Intermediate Microeconomics, Winter 2001  
Mathematical Economics, Spring 2001

### **Department and University Service**

#### Duke University

Economics Department Senior Recruiting Committee, 2010  
Economics Department Junior Recruiting Committee, 2006 - 2008  
Academic Council, 2007 – 2009

#### Columbia University

Weekly Economic Theory Seminar Organizer, Spring 2003 – Spring 2006  
Microeconomic Theory Field Exam Committee, 2001 – 2006  
Graduate Financial Aid and Prizes Committee, 2004-2005, 2005-2006  
PhD Placement Committee, 2005 - 2006  
Junior Recruiting Committee, 2002 - 2003  
PhD Admissions Committee, 2001 - 2002