The primary objective of this line of research is to advance our understanding of the economic and political consequences of competition law and policy.  The economic effects of the adoption and implementation of competition laws have been the focus of a substantial body of work, mostly by economists/in Economics.  While the research desing and specific findings vary, most of the systematic empirical analyses of economic effects find that competition law and policy is effective in fostering market competition, prompting lower prices, spurring greater efficiency, and generally delivering the intended economic benefits.  This existing research about the consequences of antitrust serves as the backdrop for much of the research about the causes of antitrust law and enforcement, as well as more broadly competition policy, undertaken as part of the project on "The Politics, Law and Economic of Market Competition."
Notwithstanding the largely consistent thrust of the findings, the specific findings of previous work on the economic effects of competition law and policy vary quite a bit, especially for research that examines macro-economic effects.  Moreover, prior research often does not yield much insight into the institutional context and/or the socio-political conditions under which the examined economic benefits are more or less likely.  Our work seeks to complement the existing research through a theoretical focus on the political and institutional conditions that are more or less likely to render competition policy effective, a substantive focus on the very important and highly policy-relevant (but at the aggregate level under-researched) effect of competition law and policy on innovation, and/or a different geographic focus.  In addition, our research seeks to improve upon existing work with the help of new, better data.
Much less is known about the political effects of competition law and policy, even though concerns about the political consequences of high concentrations of economic power—and of the manipulations of markets—were among the central motivations for the adoption of the first modern competition laws in democratic market economies.  Our research on competition advocacy as an anti-rent-seeking policy focuses directly on what are most direclty political effects of competition policy.