562F – Tech Driven Transformation

Part IV: DeFi Risks and Opportunities

Campbell R. Harvey Duke University and NBER

Learning Experience Outline

Four courses in **DeFi and the Future of Finance:**

- I. DeFi Infrastructure
- II. DeFi Primitives
- III. DeFi Deep Dive

IV. DeFi Risks and Opportunities

- 1. Smart Contract Risk
- 2. Governance, DNS, Oracle, DEX Risk, and Custodial Risks
- 3. Scaling Risk
- 4. Regulatory Risk and Environmental Risk
- 5. The Future Winners and Losers

Overview

A new set of risks

- While DeFi can eliminate counterparty risk, as with any innovative technology, the innovations introduce a new set of risks.
- In order to provide users and institutions with a robust and faulttolerant system capable of handling new financial applications at scale, we must confront these risks.
- Without proper risk mitigation, DeFi will remain an exploratory technology, restricting its use, adoption, and appeal.

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Part IV: DeFi Risks and Opportunities 1. Smart Contract Risk (i) Types of Exploits

Hack

- Over the past decade, crypto-focused products, primarily exchanges, have repeatedly been <u>hacked</u>.
- Whereas many of these hacks happened because of poor security practices, they demonstrate an important point: software is uniquely vulnerable to hacks and developer malpractice.
- Blockchains can remove traditional financial risks, such as counterparty risk, with their unique properties, but DeFi is built on code.

Attack vector

- This software foundation gives attackers a larger attack surface than the threat vectors of traditional financial institutions.
- Public blockchains are open systems.
- Anyone can view and interact with code on a blockchain after the code is deployed.
- Given that this code is often responsible for storing and transferring blockchain native financial assets, it introduces a new, unique risk.
- This new attack vector is termed *smart contract risk*.

Audit

- DeFi's foundation is public code known as a smart contract.
- The implementation is new to mainstream engineering practice. Practices that will help reduce the risk of smart contract bugs and programming errors are still under development.
- The recent hacks of The DAO, <u>DForce</u> and <u>bZx d</u>emonstrate the fragility of smart contract programming.
- Auditing firms, such as <u>Quantstamp</u>, <u>Trail of Bits</u>, and <u>Peckshield</u>, are emerging to fill this gap in best practices and smart contract expertise.

Sources of risk

- Smart Contract risk can take the form of a logic error in the code or an economic exploit in which an attacker can withdraw funds from the platform beyond the intended functionality.
- The former can take the form of any typical software bug in the code.

Example: Logic error

- Suppose we have a smart contract which is intended to be able to escrow deposits from a particular ERC-20 from any user and transfer the entire balance to the winner of a lottery.
- The contract keeps track of how many tokens it has internally, and uses that internal number as the amount when performing the transfer.
- The bug will belong here in our hypothetical contract.

Example: Logic error

- The internal number will, due to a rounding error, be slightly higher than the actual balance of tokens the contract holds.
- When it tries to transfer, it will transfer "too much" and the execution will fail.
- If there was no failsafe put into place, the tokens are functionally locked within the protocol. Informally these are known as "bricked" funds and cannot be recovered.

Example: Economic exploit

- An economic exploit would be more subtle.
- There would be no explicit failure in the logic of the code, but rather an opportunity for an economically equipped adversary to influence market conditions in such a way as to profit inappropriately at the contract's expense.
- For example, let's assume a contract takes the role of an exchange between two tokens. It determines the price by looking at the exchange rate of another similar contract elsewhere on chain and offering that rate with a minor adjustment.

Example: Economic exploit

- The other exchange is playing the role of a price oracle
- The possibility for an economic exploit arises when the oracle exchange has significantly lower liquidity when compared to the primary exchange
- A financially equipped adversary can <u>sell</u> heavily on the oracle exchange to manipulate the price, then proceed to purchase far more on the primary exchange to capitalize on the price movement. The net effect is that the attacker was able to manufacture a discounted price on a high liquidity exchange by manipulating a low liquidity oracle.

Example: Economic exploit – flash attack

- Economic exploits become even trickier when considering that flash loans essentially allow any Ethereum user to become financially equipped for a single transaction.
- Special care must be used when designing protocols such that they cannot be manipulated by massive market volatility within a single transaction.
- An economic exploit which utilizes a flash loan can be referred to as a *flash attack*.

Key features of flash loans

- No collateral
- No duration
- No counterparty risk
- No interest rate

How is this possible?

Atomicity of Ethereum transactions

Yearn.finance

- Yearn.Finance is a yield aggregator, through which users can deposit funds in pools — or vaults — which are then deployed to other DeFi protocols in an effort to generate yields for those depositors.
- Complex exploit with over <u>160 nested</u> transactions



Yearn Finance suffers exploit, says \$2.8 million stolen by attacker out of \$11 million loss



February 4, 2021, 5:38PM EST · 1 min read

February 3, 2021

1 Etherscan	All Filters 🗸	Search by Address / Txn Hash		
Eth: \$1,709.17 (+5.00%) 🔊 168 Gwei		Home	Blockchain 🗸	Tokens 🗸
Transaction Details				
Sponsored: AAX - Predict the BTC Price	and earn up to 1000 USDT Free. Visit AAX.com now!			
Overview Internal Txns Logs (254)	State Comments			
⑦ Transaction Hash:	0x6dc268706818d1e6503739950abc5ba2211fc6b45	1e54244da7b1e226	6b12e027 [
⑦ Status:	Success			
⑦ Block:	11792334 6666 Block Confirmations			
⑦ Timestamp:		TC) 🛈 Confirmed	within 31 secs	
③ From:	0x14ec0cd2acee4ce37260b925f74648127a889a28	(Yearn (yDai) Exploi	iter) 🗘	

\$200m Flash loan – with no collateral

⑦ Interacted With (To):

L TRANSFER 215,035.171940600397346616 Ether From Wrapped Ether To → 0x62494b3ed9663334e57f23...

L TRANSFER 215,035.1719,0600397346616 Ether From 0x62494b3ed9663334e57f23... To → Compound Ether

- └─ TRANSFER 215,035.17 940600397346616 Ether From Compound Ether To → 0x62494b3ed9663334e57f23...
- └ TRANSFER 215,030.171940600397346616 Ether From 0x62494b3ed9663334e57f23... To → Wrapped Ether

L TRANSFER 5 Ether From 0x62494b3ed9663334e57f23... To → Yearn (yDai) Exploiter

Transaction Action:

Borrow 116,920.396944223800915079 Ether From 2 dYdX

▶ Supply 215,035.171940600397346616 Ether To 🔊 Compound

- ▶ Borrow 126,945,116.6393679705276416 🖶 DAI From 🔊 Compound
- Borrow 134,000,000 (Source Lange USDC From Compound)
- ▶ Repay 126,945,116.6393679705276416 🖶 DAI To 款 Compound
- Repay 134,000,000 ③ USDC To S Compound
- Withdraw 215,035.171940600397346616 Ether From S Compound
- ▶ Swap 153,258.252632 💎 USDT For 93.30329749673893679 Ether On 🦄 Uniswap
- Flash Loan 98,114.774996376596431537 Ether From @ Aave Protocol V2
- Repay 116,920.396944223800915081 Ether To W dYdX

161 token transfers. Just displaying the first 10.

⑦ Tokens Transferred: 161

From dYdX: Solo Margin	То	0x62494b3ed96633	For	116,920.396944223800915079 (\$202,217,334.13) 💬 Wrapped Ethe (WETH)
From Aave: aWETH Toke	То	0x62494b3ed96633	For	98,114.774996376596431537 (\$169,692,446.80) 💬 Wrapped Ethe (WETH)
From Compound Ether	То	0x62494b3ed96633	For	10,733,973.29750223 (\$368,389,963.57) Compound Eth (cETH)
From Compound Dai	То	0x62494b3ed96633	For	126,945,116.6393679705276416 (\$126,945,116.64)
• From Compound USD Coin	То	0x62494b3ed96633	For	134,000,000 (\$134,000,000.00) 🍥 USD Coin (USDC)
• From 0x62494b3ed96633	То	Curve.fi: DAI/USDC/	For	33,930,282.286591266737094656 (\$33,930,282.29) ∋ Dai Stableco (DAI)
• From 0x62494b3ed96633	То	Curve.fi: DAI/USDC/	For	134,000,000 (\$134,000,000.00) 🍥 USD Coin (USDC)
• From 0x0000000000000	То	0x62494b3ed96633	For	165,737,119.612224186410140871 🛟 Curve.fi DAI (3Crv)
• From 0x62494b3ed96633	То	0x000000000000	For	164,762,431.868951093225613357 Ş Curve.fi DAI (3Crv)
• From Curve.fi: DAI/USDC/	То	0x62494b3ed96633	For	163,753,457.777563 (\$163,753,457.78) 💎 Tether USD (USDT)
• From 0x62494b3ed96633	То	0xacd43e627e6435	For	93,014,834.352776703790546945 (\$93,014,834.35) D ai Stableco (DAI)
Scroll for more ¥				

Flash attack

C.R.E.A.M. v1

- \$130m exploit
- Complex exploit involved 68 assets

Bloomberg

Cryptocurrencies

DeFi Protocol Cream Finance Loses \$130 Million in Latest **Crypto Hack**

By Emily Graffeo +Follow October 27, 2021, 1:34 PM EDT

- Cream suffers another major flash loan attack in 2021
- Ethereum-based lending protocol is looking into incident

Cream Finance 🍦 @CreamdotFinance · 2h

Our Ethereum C.R.E.A.M. v1 lending markets were exploited and liquidity was removed on October 27, 1354 UTC. The attacker removed a total of ~\$130m USD worth of tokens from these markets, using this address: etherscan.io/address/0x2435...

No other markets were impacted.



etherscan.io Address 0x24354d31bc9d90f62fe5f2454709c32... The Address 0x24354d31bc9d90f62fe5f2454709c32049cf86...

October 27, 2021

\$2.1b Flash loan – with no collateral

Transaction Action:

Flash attack

▶ Swap 1,873.9338 2532388653625 Ether For 7,453,002.766252 ⑥ USDC On 為 Uniswap V3

Flash Loan 524,102.159298234706604104 Ether From @ Aave Protocol V2

▶ Swap 6,360,562.839915 ⑥ USDC For 6,356,534.901208345789354257 🖶 DAI On 為 Uniswap V3

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x0fe2542079644e107cbf13690eb9c2c65963ccb79089ff96bfaf8dced2331c92

Poly Network

 "Poly Network, a protocol for swapping cryptocurrency, including bitcoin, announced on Tuesday that it was hacked, resulting in the loss of \$611 million. The hack is suspected to be the largest fraud in "decentralized finance," or DeFi, in history."



Poly Network

@PolyNetwork2

Poly Network is a group for realizing blockchain interoperability, building the next generation internet.

NEWS Newsweek

\$611 Million in Cryptocurrencies Stolen in Massive Hack

BY EMMA MAYER ON 8/10/21 AT 12:16 PM EDT

Poly Network

• To exploit or not to exploit? That is the question.



The \$600 million Poly Network hacker has published part one of a "Q&A": #polynetworkhack

Q & A, PART ONE:

Q: WHY HACKING?

A: FOR FUN :)

Q: WHY POLY NETWORK?

A: CROSS CHAIN HACKING IS HOT

Q: WHY TRANSFERING TOKENS? A: TO KEEP IT SAFE. [No Title]

WHEN SPOTTING THE BUG, I HAD A MIXED FEELING. ASK YOURSELF WHAT TO DO HAD YOU FACING SO MUCH FORTUNE. ASKING THE PROJECT TEAM POLITELY SO THAT THEY CAN FIX IT? ANYONE COULD BE THE TRAITOR GIVEN ONE BILLION! I CAN TRUST NOBODY! THE ONLY SOLUTION I CAN COME UP WITH IS SAVING IT IN A _TRUSTED_ ACCOUNT WHILE KEEPING MYSELF _ANONYMOUS_ AND _SAFE_.

NOW EVEDVONE CHELLC & CENCE OF CONCOTDARY THETHED? NOT WE BUT HUO

Bloomberg

August 26, 2021

Cryptocurrencies Victim of Biggest DeFi Hack Says All Funds Have Been Returned

By <u>Olga Kharif</u> August 26, 2021, 1:12 PM EDT



Poly Network @PolyNetwork2 · Aug 26 ···· Yay! #PolyNetwork has completed the recovery of all #PolyNetworkExploit affected user assets. (approx. worth \$610M)

#PolyBridge has now restored cross-chain functionality for a total of 59 assets. Other advanced functions will be gradually restored.

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Part IV: DeFi Risks and Opportunities 1. Smart Contract Risk (ii) The DAO

The DAO and DForce

- The classic failure of a smart contract was The DAO
- A similar failure occurred recently with DForce.



The DAO

- Purpose: Venture Capital Fund for blockchain based investments that would be directed by investors (owners of the DAO token)
- Smart contract on Ethereum blockchain designed by <u>Slock.it</u>
- Vision: no management structure, no Board of Directors, no employees
- Code was open-source
- The DAO was stateless (not tied to any country) so not obvious how it would (or could) be regulated



The DAO

- Launched –April 4-April 30, 2016 on Ethereum block 1428757 with a crowdsale to fund the organization.
- Ether value about \$150 million by May 21 (about 14% of all ether at the time).
- DAO tokens were traded on various exchanges by May 28
- Early example of tokenizing ether



Etherscan

Eth: \$267.20 (-2.49%)	Home Blockchain - T	ok(
Block #1428757		
Feature Tip: Track historical data po	oints of any address with the analytics module !	
Overview Comments		
⑦ Block Height:	1428757 < >	
⑦ Timestamp:	() 1384 days 18 hrs ago (Apr-30-2016 01:42:58 AM +UTC)	
⑦ Transactions:	1 transaction and 3 contract internal transactions in this block	
⑦ Mined by:	0x06328211d9ee493e0c02234650f9ee55dd4d164e in 5 secs	
⑦ Block Reward:	5.11953823515 Ether (5 + 0.11953823515)	
⑦ Uncles Reward:	0	
⑦ Difficulty:	32,880,398,612,201	
⑦ Total Difficulty:	16,443,445,477,812,616,341	
⑦ Size:	13,824 bytes	
⑦ Gas Used:	3,711,215 (78.75%)	
⑦ Gas Limit:	4,712,388	
⑦ Extra Data:	010400/Geth/go1.5.1/linux (Hex:0xd783010400844765746887676f312e352e31856c696e7578)	
⑦ Hash:	0x17fea357e1a1a514b45d45db586c272a7415f8eb8aeb4aa1dcaf87e56f34ca59	
⑦ Parent Hash:	0x24caf7385e9bc711deaae286f8f2d7f79058be48b1ad76540974cf61a3fddeb7	
⑦ Sha3Uncles:	0x1dcc4de8dec75d7aab85b567b6ccd41ad312451b948a7413f0a142fd40d49347	
⑦ Nonce:	0xdc2855e6a0c4be0d	

All Filters V Search by Address



All	-	Currencies -	Assets -	USD -				Next 100 \rightarrow View All
^ #	Na	me	Market Cap	Price	Available Supply	Volume (24h)	% Change (24h)	Price Graph (7d)
1	8	Bitcoin	\$ 11,459,744,792	\$ 731.67	15,662,450 BTC	\$ 154,246,000	7.09 %	
2	÷	Ethereum	\$ 1,527,999,289	\$ 18.85	81,060,110 ETH	\$ 22,585,100	1.42 %	
3	0	Litecoin	\$ 250,487,328	\$ 5.42	46,242,676 LTC	\$ 4,773,220	4.25 %	m
4	-:	Ripple	\$ 236,709,866	\$ 0.006789	34,868,679,462 XRP *	\$ 3,391,510	-4.55 %	
5	Ð	The DAO	\$ 205,587,485	\$ 0.175300	1,172,775,159 DAO *	\$ 1,901,380	3.35 %	



Reentrancy Bug

- June 9, 2016, two developers reported that most Ethereum based contracts that managed funds were vulnerable to a bug that could empty funds.
- June 12, 2016 Stephan Tual, founder of Slock.it reported that The DAO code was not vulnerable to this exploit.



Reentrancy Bug

- Crucial part of code had two lines in the wrong order (allowing withdrawal of ether repeatedly before checking if the attacker was entitled to withdraw)
- Suppose you have \$100 in a bank account. Think of bringing the bank teller a stack of \$100 withdrawal slips and the teller gives you \$100 for each one until the bank runs out of money. At that point, they register the \$100 debit and have no idea you took everything.

https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook/blob/develop/appdx-forks-history.asciidoc



The DAO

- June 17, 2016 The DAO attacked and user gained access to about \$50 million of ETH (30% of ether in the contract)
- Simultaneously, another group, Robin Hood Group (RHG), used the same exploit (but promised to return all ether to the original owners) (they got the remaining 70%)



The DAO

- Funds put in a 28-day holding period (as per the contract) before they could be withdrawn
- Community debated what to do with a July 20 deadline (end of 28-day period): should they rewrite history by hard forking?

https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook/blob/develop/appdx-forks-history.asciidoc



All	•	Currencies -	Assets -	USD -				Next 100 \rightarrow View All
^ #	Na	ame	Market Cap	Price	Available Supply	Volume (24h)	% Change (24h)	Price Graph (7d)
1	8	Bitcoin	\$ 11 ,601,336,569	\$ 740.49	15,667,150 BTC	\$ 292,422,000	0.72 %	
2	\$	Ethereum	\$ 1 ,344,508,652	\$ 16.58	81,100,025 ETH	\$ 78,067,600	-15.46 %	
3	0	Litecoin	\$ 250,234,196	\$ 5.41	46,260,851 LTC	\$ 12,661,100	0.17 %	
4	-:	Ripple	\$ 234,018,766	\$ 0.006666	35,108,326,973 XRP *	\$ 2,869,430	-0.63 %	
5	Ð	The DAO	\$ 91,336,316	\$ 0.077881	1,172,775,159 DAO *	\$ 6,282,860	-56.52 %	

June 17, 2016

The DAO

- July 20, 2016 hard fork at block 1,920,000 and rewrote history returning the DAO directed ether to the investors
- The old protocol became Ethereum Classic (ETC) preserved history (and immutability property). RHG now needs to return 70% of the ETH to the original investors







The DAO is a security

- July 26, 2016 The SEC rules that DAO tokens were "securities" subject to federal securities laws.
- ...issuers of distributed ledger or blockchain technology-based securities must register offers and sales of such securities unless a valid exemption applies. Those participating in unregistered offerings also may be liable for violations of the securities laws. Additionally, securities exchanges providing for trading in these securities must register unless they are exempt. The purpose of the registration provisions of the federal securities laws is to ensure that investors are sold investments that include all the proper disclosures and are subject to regulatory scrutiny for investors' protection.

Hard forks vs. soft forks

- Soft forks are relatively minor software changes
- Soft forks are software upgrades that are backward compatible with previous versions
- Nodes do not need to upgrade to new version to form consensus

Hard forks vs. soft forks

- Hard forks are major software changes
- Hard forks are not backward compatible with previous versions
- Nodes need to follow new rules for consensus
- Hard forks can be planned or contentious (ETC)

Hard forks examples

- Consensus change: PoW to PoS
- Block size
- Mining algorithm (SHA-256 to alternative)

https://www.mycryptopedia.com/hard-fork-soft-fork-explained/



ETC was contentious hard fork

 If you owned 10 ETH at the time of the fork, your new balance would be 10 ETH (on forked new Ethereum) and 10 ETC (on ETC original blockchain).



ETH hash rate 22x ETC

Ethereum, Ethereum Classic Hashrate historical chart

Average hashrate (hash/s) per day

Share: 🔰 😇 🕊 🖒 🕇 🍪



Hard forks examples

- EIP-1159 "London" upgrade proposed by Vitalik Buterin
- Scheduled for August 4 or 5, 2021
- Key innovation is to simplify fees.
 - Users pay a "base fee" which is automatically calculated by the wallet
 - Base fee does not go the miner it is burned (so reduces ETH inflation)
 - Users can add a "tip" which does go to the miner to speed up transactions
- EIP-1559 is not Ethereum 2.0 which is an even bigger change

Mechanics

- A new token, TKN, is launched on a DEX
- It comes with a very high reward for offering liquidity (high interest rate)
- Retail investors are attracted and offer liquidity (contribute ETH and TKN to the liquidity pool)
- Once the pool is large enough, the original developers (who hold a lot of TKN, sell everything on the DEX causing price of TKN to drop to near zero). That is a rug pull.

The SQUID cryptocurrency peaked at a price of \$2,861 before plummeting to \$0 around 5:40 a.m. ET., according to the website CoinMarketCap. This kind of theft, commonly called a "rug pull" by crypto investors, happens when the creators of the crypto quickly cash out their coins for real money, draining the liquidity pool from the exchange.

GIZMODO



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Squid Game Cryptocurrency Scammers Make Off With \$3.3 Million

The SQUID coin scam was covered uncritically by mainstream news outlets.

By Matt Novak

Yesterday 7:10AM | Comments (102) | Alerts



Image: Netflix

The anonymous hucksters behind a *Squid Game* cryptocurrency have officially pulled the rug on the project, making off with an estimated \$<u>3.38 million</u>.

Squid Game to USD Chart

[] ...



Red flags

- Illiterate white paper with unfounded claims
- Promoted with fake Elon Musk tweets
- Telegram set up to disallow comments
- Not approved for trading on Coinbase or Binance
- "The "schedule" for the crypto's rollout is also filled with red flags, including a claim that there will be "hiring for Asia and Europe Market." What does that mean? You guess is as good as ours, but it's almost certainly bullshit."

https://gizmodo.com/new-squid-game-cryptocurrency-launches-as-obvious-scam-1847961584

Summary

- Not all smart contracts are smart
- Once contract is deployed, it cannot be "fixed"

Other attacks

• Origin (reentrancy) November 2020:

https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/84804/defi-protocol-origin-attack-7-million-lost

https://hacken.io/researches-and-investigations/biggest-defi-hacks-of-2020-report/ https://www.cybavo.com/blog/defi-hacks-2021/