#### **Part IV:**

# DeFi Risks and Opportunities 2. Governance, DNS, Oracle Risk, DEX and Custodial Risks

(i) Governance Attack

# What is governance risk?

- For some protocols, such as Uniswap, programming risk is the sole threat to the protocol because the application is autonomous and controlled by smart contracts.
- Other DeFi applications rely on more than just autonomous computer code.

# What is governance risk?

- For example, MakerDAO, the decentralized credit facility described earlier, is reliant on a human-controlled governance process that actively adjusts protocol parameters to keep the system solvent.
- Many other DeFi protocols use similar systems and rely on humans to actively manage protocol risk.
- This introduces a new risk, governance risk, which is unique to the DeFi landscape.

# Protocol governance

- Protocol governance refers to the representative or liquid democratic mechanisms that enable changes in the protocol.
- To participate in the governance process, users and investors must acquire a token that has been explicitly assigned protocol governance rights on a liquid marketplace.
- Once acquired, holders use these tokens to vote on protocol changes and guide future direction.

# 51% (or less)

- Governance tokens usually have a fixed supply that assists in resisting attempts by anyone to acquire a majority (51%), nevertheless they expose the protocol to the risk of control by a malicious actor.
- The founders often control traditional fintech companies, which reduces the risk of an external party influencing or changing the company's direction or product.

# 51% (or less)

- DeFi protocols, however, are vulnerable to attack as soon as the decentralized governance system launches.
- Any financially equipped adversary can simply acquire a majority of liquid governance tokens to gain control of the protocol and steal funds.
- A financially equipped adversary can attack a protocol if the potential profit exceeds the cost of attack.

# March 13, 2021 \$TSD governance attack

- Hacker amasses governance token
- Devs held only 9% of governance
- Hacker votes to mint him/herselfs
   11.5 quintillion \$TSD
- Hacker dumps 11.8 billion on Pancakeswap DEX



#### Thread



#### **True Seigniorage Dollar** @TrueSeigniorage · Mar 13

A malicious attacker has just utilized \$TSD DAO to mint 11.8 billion tokens to his own account and sold all to Pancakeswap. Here is what happened:

1. Due to long Debt phase, people unbond from DAO because they no longer have rewards from expansion..

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#### True Seigniorage Dollar @TrueSeigniorage · Mar 13

2. Dev account has only 9% of the DAO. We failed once when proposing the Implementation to enable the crosschain bridge. In this case, Dev account does not have enough stack to vote against the attacker.

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#### **True Seigniorage Dollar** @TrueSeigniorage · Mar 13

3. What has been done by him? He gradually bought \$TSD at low price to accumulate until he has more than 33% of the DAO. Then he proposed an Implementation and voted for it. Because he possess enough stack to finish the voting process, the Implementation went through successfully

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#### True Seigniorage Dollar @TrueSeigniorage · Mar 13

In the Implementation, the attacker added code to mint for himself 11.8 billion \$TSD. Then he sold all of the tokens to Pancakeswap. That's sad, it is an attack but it is how a decentralized DAO works.







#### True Seigniorage Dollar (TSD) Price Chart



# Risks: Governance risk: Delegation

#### Andreessen Horowitz

#### Open Sourcing Our Token Delegate Program - Andreessen Horowitz

Over the last year we've worked with dozens of delegates across a number of leading protocols. Here are some of the best practices that we've identified.


Yesterday at 6:00 PM (169 kB) \*



Over the last year we've built a delegation program around these exact principles. We've used it to delegate well over half of our voting power in protocols like Compound, Uniswap and Celo to a broad network of qualified delegates. These include: leading non-profits like <u>Kiva</u> and <u>Mercy Corps</u>; global businesses like <u>Deutsche Telekom</u>; crypto startups like <u>Gauntlet</u>, <u>Argent</u>, and <u>Dharma</u>; university organizations like <u>Stanford Blockchain Club</u> and <u>Blockchain at Columbia</u>; and upand-coming community leaders like <u>Getty Hill</u>.

https://a16z.com/2021/08/26/open-sourcing-our-token-delegate-program/

# Risks: Governance risk: Delegation



https://snapshot.org/#/fei.eth/proposal/0x10c7f6e54aa2572a5437d0a7604058463f294f3e739ea07b5e94e35c685a3c39

697: Innovation and Cryptoventures

#### **Part IV:**

# DeFi Risks and Opportunities 2. Governance, DNS, Oracle Risk, DEX and Custodial Risks

(ii) DNS Attack

# Risks: DNS attack

#### DNS

- Hacker takes over domain name service and tricks user into giving private key
- This type of attack is <u>not special to DeFi</u> it is a common cyber threat
- However, it contains special lessons for those active in the DeFi space

Risks: DNS attack



March 15, 2021

# DeFi Projects Cream Finance, PancakeSwap Hit With 'DNS Hijacks'

The hijacker appears to be asking users to input the 12-word seed phrase unique to each crypto wallet in order to steal funds.

# Risks: DNS attack



PancakeSwap <a>#BSC</a> @PancakeSwap <a>23h</a>

This is now confirmed.

DO NOT go to the Pancakeswap site until we confirm it is all clear.

NEVER EVER input your seed phrase or private keys on a website.

We are working on recovery now.

Sorry for the trouble.





Our DNS has been compromised by a third party; some users are seeing requests for seed phrase on app.cream.finance. DO NOT enter your seed phrase.

We will never ask you to submit any private key or seed phrases.

9:10 AM · Mar 15, 2021











Copy link to Tweet

Mar 15, 2021 at 11:00 a.m. EDT Updated Mar 15, 2021 at 1:30 p.m. EDT



**Update (March 15, 17:30 UTC):** PancakeSwap says it has regained access to the DNS. Cream is still working to resolve the issue.

#### **Part IV:**

# DeFi Risks and Opportunities Covernments DNS Oracle Rick DEV and Custodial R

2. Governance, DNS, Oracle Risk, DEX and Custodial Risks (iii) Oracle Attack

#### What is oracle risk?

- Oracles are one of the last unsolved problems in DeFi and are required by most DeFi protocols in order to function correctly.
- Fundamentally, oracles aim to answer the simple question: How can off-chain data be securely reported on chain?
- Without oracles, blockchains are completely self-encapsulated and have no knowledge of the outside world other than the transactions added to the native blockchain.

#### What is oracle risk?

- Many DeFi protocols require access to secure, tamper-resistant asset prices to ensure that routine actions, such as liquidations and prediction market resolutions, function correctly.
- Protocol reliance on these data feeds introduces oracle risk.
- If an oracle's *Cost of Corruption* is ever less than an attacker's potential *Profit from Corruption*, the oracle is extremely vulnerable to attack.

# Types: Shelling-point oracle

- This oracle relies on the owners of a fixed-supply token to vote on the outcome of an event or report the price of an asset.
- Examples of this type of oracle include <u>Augur</u> and <u>UMA</u>.
- While Schelling-point oracles preserve the decentralization components of protocols that rely on them, they suffer from slow times to resolution.

# Types: API oracle

- These oracles are centralized entities that respond asynchronously to requests for data or prices.
- Examples include <u>Provable</u>, <u>Oraclize</u>, and <u>Chainlink</u>. All systems relying on API-based oracles, must trust the data provider to respond accurately to all queries.

# Types: Application-specific oracle service

- This type of oracle is used by Maker and Compound.
- Its design differs based on the requirements of the protocol it was developed for.
- For example, Compound relies on a single data provider that the Compound team controls to provide all on-chain price data to the Compound oracle.

# Highest risk

- Oracles, as they exist today, represent the highest risk to DeFi protocols that rely on them.
- All on-chain oracles are vulnerable to <u>front-running</u>, and <u>millions of</u> dollars have been lost due to arbitrageurs.
- Additionally, oracle services, including <u>Chainlink</u> and Maker, have suffered <u>crippling outages</u> with catastrophic downstream effects.
- Until oracles are blockchain native, hardened, and proven resilient, they represent the largest systemic threat to DeFi today.

#### **Part IV:**

# DeFi Risks and Opportunities 2. Governance, DNS, Oracle Risk, DEX and Custodial Risks (iv) DEX Risk

#### What is DEX risk?

- The DEX landscape on Ethereum consists of two dominant types, Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and order-book exchanges.
- Both types of DEXs vary in architecture and have differing risk profiles.

#### AMM DEX

- AMMs, however, are the most popular DEX to date, because they allow users to trustlessly and securely exchange assets, while removing traditional counterparty risk.
- By storing exchange liquidity in a trustless smart contract, AMMs give users instant access to quotes on an exchange pair.

#### CFMM DEX

- Uniswap is the best-known example of an AMM, also known as a Constant-Function Market Maker (CFMM).
- Uniswap relies on the product of two assets to determine an exchange price.
- The amount of liquidity in the pool determines the slippage when assets are exchanged during a transaction.

#### CFMM DEX

- CFMMs such as Uniswap optimize for user experience and convenience, but sacrifice absolute returns. CFMM liquidity providers (LPs) earn yield by depositing assets into a pool, because the pool takes a fee for every trade (LPs benefit from high trading volume).
- This allows the pool to attract liquidity, but exposes LPs to smart contract risk and impermanent loss.

#### CFMM DEX

- Impermanent loss occurs when two assets in a pool have uncorrelated returns and high volatilities.
- These properties allow arbitrageurs to profit from the asset volatilities and price differences, reducing the temporary returns for LPs and exposing them to risk if an asset moves sharply in price.
- Some AMMs, such as <u>Cap</u>, are able to reduce impermanent loss by using an oracle to determine exchange prices and dynamically adjusting a pricing curve to prevent arbitrageurs from exploiting LPs, but impermanent loss remains a large problem with most AMMs used today.

#### On-chain order-book DEX

- On-chain order-book DEXs have a different but prevalent set of risks.
- These exchanges suffer from the scalability issues inherited from the underlying blockchain they run atop of, and are often vulnerable to front running by sophisticated arbitrage bots.
- Order-book DEXs also often have large spreads due to the presence of low-sophistication market makers.
- Order-book DEXs are often forced to rely on a single market maker for each asset pair.

# Off-chain order-book DEX

- Several decentralized exchanges use an entirely off-chain order book, retaining the benefits of a noncustodial DEX, while circumventing the market making and scaling problems posed by on-chain order-book DEXs.
- These exchanges function by settling all position entries and exits on chain, while maintaining a limit-order book entirely off chain.
- This allows the DEX to avoid the scaling and UX issues faced by onchain order-book DEXs, but also presents a separate set of problems around regulatory compliance.

#### **Part IV:**

# DeFi Risks and Opportunities Covernment DNS Oracle Bisk DEV and Custodial I

2. Governance, DNS, Oracle Risk, DEX and Custodial Risks (v) Custodial Risk

#### What is custodial risk?

- Cryptocurrency ownership is guaranteed by the possession of a private key — a long random number that cannot be guessed. For Bitcoin and Ethereum, the private keys are 256 bits or 64 hexadecimal characters.
- Private keys are used via a digital signature algorithm to sign transactions. Hence, you need your private key to "spend".
- Custodial risk is when you lose your private key.
- Both individual users and institutions (corporations, endowments, etc.) are subject to custodial risk.

# Types of Custodianship

- <u>Self-Custody</u>: Build our own solution
  - In-house or commercial solutions that store crypto assets
  - Solely responsible for assets and not insured against unexpected events
- Partial Custody: Your own wallet + external solution
  - Includes 2-FA and multi-signature solutions (e.g., BitGo)
  - Aligns with needs of retail and high net-worth clients
- Third-party Custody: Hire a managed solution
  - Fully maintained by service provider(s)
  - Aligns with needs of institutions, needed by regulatory bodies

#### Retail Users

- Retail users have a choice between custodial and non-custodial wallets
  - Non-Custodial Wallet (Self-Custody): User has full control of keys
    - E.g., Hardware wallet, Web wallet (MetaMask keys stored in browser), Desktop wallet (Electrum stored on machine), Mobile Paper wallet
  - Custodial Wallet (Third Party Custody): 3rd party holds access to private keys
    - E.g., Coinbase, Binance
    - Users are subject to KYC/AML regulation

The New Hork Times

# Lost Passwords Lock Millionaires Out of Their Bitcoin Fortunes

Bitcoin owners are getting rich because the cryptocurrency has soared. But what happens when you can't tap that wealth because you forgot the password to your digital wallet?

Stefan Thomas, a German-born programmer living in San Francisco, has two guesses left to figure out a password that is worth, as of this week, about \$220 million.

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/technology/bitcoin-passwords-wallets-fortunes.html

# MINIMIZE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH LOST OR STOLEN DRIVES

Self-defending IronKey Basic drives are hardened to stand up to malware or mischief, so confidential data stays where it belongs. And after 10 failed consecutive password attempts, the device will either self-destruct or reset (if previously enabled) back to its default state.



# Exchange Hacks

- Several exchanges have been hacked, highlighting the security risk of cryptocurrencies
  - Mt. Gox (2011-2014) 850k Bitcoin
  - Bitfloor (2012) 24k Bitcoin
  - Bittfinex (2016) 120k Bitcoin
  - Coincheck (2018) 523 million NEM (Worth \$500 million at the time)
  - Binance (2019) 7k Bitcoin
- Stolen cryptocurrency is often not completely recovered

# Delegating custody

- If you delegate the ownership of your private keys, say to an exchange, there is risk the exchange will be hacked and the keys stolen.
- Exchanges keep most of the private keys in "cold storage" (either on a drive not connected to the Internet or hard copy in a physical vault)
- Some exchanges, like Coinbase, are insured. However, the insurance is only as good as the health of the insurer.

### Infrastructure by Custodians

- Wallet
  - Hot Internet-connected solutions; fast and frictionless
  - Cold Air-gapped or internet-isolated solutions; slower but very secure
- Storage Mechanism
  - Software Digital platforms storing data on the internet or a network segment
  - Hardware Specially built electronic devices storing data (e.g., Hardware Security Modules)
- Access Protocols
  - Multi Party Computation Single signature computed by a distributed set of users
  - Multi-Sig Uses multiple signatures from distinct private keys to secure a wallet



# Example of Infrastructure - Splitting keys

- Companies like BitGo offer multi-signature solutions
- Three keys:
  - Owner has two keys and BitGo holds one.
  - 2 of 3 keys can be used for a transaction
  - A hack of BitGo's key is useless because a single key cannot spend
- If a user loses one key, there is a backup

### Concerns around custodianship

- Latency vs Speed
  - Trading at low latency = having fast access to funds
  - But this raises questions around security and proper verification
- New Coins
  - Custodians don't support all newly invented coins for compliance
  - Some coins are offered in some countries and not in others
- Staking
  - Transaction validation on a PoS chain, can be done independently or through a custodian
  - Choose custodian wallet for staking based on proper care and due-diligence

# Top Custodians

- Coinbase Trust
- Bitgo
- Fidelity Digital Assets
- Bakkt Warehouse
- Kingdom Trust
- Several Banks looking into developing solutions – ING, BBVA, Northern Trust

# Institutions looking into Crypto

- Facebook
- Visa
- PayPal
- Mastercard
- Goldman Sachs
- IBM

# Regulatory Environment

- In the past, a lack of custody solutions has been a main reason why hedge and mutual funds could not invest in crypto
- Legal and regulatory environments for custodians and institutions have not been clearly defined
  - Custody Rule of Investment Adviser Act of 1940 Institution with \$150 million AUM needs a licensed custodian
- Federally charted banks are allowed to provide crypto custodial services