.m:2
II.
Ontological expression
3.4 The interpretation of the attributes
As we have seen, the
Spinozian theory of the attribute solves
many
problems, but it also raises many others.
One of the most
serious
difficulties is that it poses the threat of an idealist or
subjectivist
tendency in Spinoza's thought. We
can identify this
problem
in the very definition of the attribute: "By attribute I
understand
what the intellect perceives of a substance, as
constituting
its essence." [Ethics ID4, my emphasis] One of the
problems
which presents itself immediately is that the definition
grants
a certain priority to the attribute of thought over the other
attributes:
thought is the means of perceiving all the attributes of
substance,
including thought itself. Several
examples illustrating
the
role of the attribute, such as those in Letter 9 to De Vries, give
an even
more problematic explanation. In
this letter Spinoza offers
two
examples of how in the attributes "one and the same thing can be
designated
by two names." The first of
these two is perhaps the more
problematic:
"I say that by Isreal I understand the third patriarch; I
understand
the same by Jacob, the name which was given him because he
had
seized his brother's heel."
The distinction here is merely
nominal
and, more importantly, the difference resides not in the
object
perceived but in the perceiving subject, not directly in being
but in
the intellect.
In Spinoza studies
there is a long-standing controversy over the
interpretation
of the attributes. (9) The nucleus
of the dispute
involves
the position of the attribute with respect to substance on
one
side and with respect to the intellect on the other: it is a
question
of the priority of ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi. The
idealist
or subjectivist interpretation defines the attribute
primarily
as a form of knowledge and not as a form of being. Hegel's
presentation
in the Science of Logic is the seminal reading in this
tradition.
(10) As we noted above, Hegel
conceives of the attribute
as the
determination or limitation of substance which is dependent on
the
intellect and which "proceeds outside the absolute", [538] that is
"which
appears as external and immediate over against substance."
[537] Martial Gueroult points out that there
is a logical
contradiction
in this reading which weakens the foundations of
Spinozian
ontology: the attributes cannot be dependent on the
intellect
because the intellect is a mode of thought and therefore
ontologically
posterior to the attributes.
"En effet, si les
attributs
r‚sultaient de l'id‚e que l'entendement se fait de la
substance,
l'entendement leur serait ant‚rieur, et par cons‚quent
ant‚rieur
… l'attribut dont il est le mode, ce qui est absurde." [I,
50] Hegel himself recognizes this
contradiction but seems to credit
it to
an error in the Spinozian system rather than to a fault of his
interpretation.
[537] However, the primary issue
at stake here, I
would
maintain, is not the logical contradiction of the subjectivist
reading,
but rather the priority which it grants to the intellect: the
question,
I repeat, is the relative import of the ratio essendi and
the ratio
cognoscendi in the system as a whole.
Deleuze provides us
with an alternative reading, an objectivist,
ontological
interpretation of the attributes.
When Spinoza presents
the
attribute as merely a way of knowing or conceiving, such as in
Letter
9, he is giving only a partial or simplified explanation of the
attributes
real role. [52] The attribute does
not depend on the
intellect;
on the contrary, the intellect plays merely a secondary
role in
the functioning of the attributes, as an objective and
invisible
agent of representation.
"Tous les attributs formellement
distincts
sont rapport‚s par l'entendement … une substance
ontologiquement
une. Mais l'entendement ne fait
que reproduire
objectivement
la nature des formes qu'il appr‚hende." [56] In other
words,
the relation of the attributes to substance is prior to and
independent
of the intellect's apprehension of this relation; the
intellect
merely reproduces in objective or cognitive terms the primary
ontological
relation. The ratio essendi is
prior to the ratio
cognoscendi. This objectivist interpretation
succeeds in preserving
the
ontological integrity of the system and it resolves the
contradiction
posed by granting a foundational role to the intellect
in the
theory of the attributes.
Nonetheless, we must recognize that
we
cannot maintain this thesis without a certain strain. Let us
return,
for example, to the definition of the attributes: "By
attribute
I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as
constituting
its essence." [Ethics ID4, my emphasis] How can the
objectivist
interpretation account for this "quod intellectus de
substantiƒ
percipit" without giving a foundational role to the
intellect? (And we should note that reference to
the original Latin
offers
us no way out in this dilemma.)
Furthermore, even if we are to
accept
the intellect as secondary in the foundation of the attribute,
how are
we to understand what Deleuze describes as its "objective
reproduction"
of the nature of the forms it apprehends?
This
"reproduction"
is certainly a very weak conception of expression.
Deleuze does not seem
to be disturbed by these problems and he
does
not treat this issue in any depth.
What is clear, however, is
the
insistence of Deleuze's effort to preserve the ontological
integrity
of the system and combat any priority of thought over the
other
attributes, even when this effort seems to go against clear
statements
in the text.
Remark:
Althusser reading: speculation and production
The controversy which
poses the alternative between a
subjectivist
and an objectivist reading of the attributes is not merely
a
philological issue to be debated among Latinists; neither is it an
issue
which poses Deleuze's perspective as different merely from the
Hegelian
perspective. Rather, when we
broaden our vision we can see
that
Deleuze's objectivist reading marks him as largely out of synch
with
the intellectual movements of his times, as sustaining a
precariously
minoritarian theoretical position.
The intellectual
hegemony
in 1960s France of the "masters of suspicion", the partisans
of the
trilogy Marx-Nietzsche-Freud, (11) while to an extent anti-
Hegelian,
have to be counted nonetheless (if we can allow ourselves a
transposition
to the terrain of the Spinozian controversy) on the side
of a
subjectivist reading of the attributes.
The various "mots
d'ordre"
which spring up from different camps throughout the French
intellectual
scene in this period all insist on the foundational role
of the
intellect, of the ratio cognoscendi: consider, for example, the
importance
of the widely diffuse discourse on "vision", on the seen
and the
non-seen, or rather the focus on "interpretation" as a
privileged
field of investigation. Deleuze's
proposition of an
objectivist
ontological speculation in Spinoza runs counter to this
entire
stream of thought; the general trend, in fact, seems to
constitute
a forceful attack on Deleuze's position.
So as not to fall
into abstract generalization, let us briefly
investigate
Althusser's reading of Marx as an example, perhaps not a
representative
example but certainly an influential one.
One element
that
Althusser wants to bring into focus, and to bring into question,
is the
act of reading itself: reading Marx's Capital, reading the
classical
economists, reading capitalist society.
Althusser wants us
to find
in Marx a revolution in the theory of knowledge: "il faut
totalement
remanier l'id‚e qu'on se fait de la connaissance,
abandonner
le mythe sp‚culaire de la vision, et de la lecture
imm‚diates,
et concevoir la connaissance comme production." [Lire le
Capital
23] We can distinguish two
elements in Althusser's effort to
conceive
of knowledge as a production.
First, we must grasp that
there
is a distinction between the object of knowledge and the real
object
-- or, to follow Althusser in a Spinozian example, there is a
distinction
between the idea of a circle and a really existing circle.
[46
ff.] As a second step, however, we
must recognize that the
importance
of this distinction lies in the fact that the two domains
exist
under different conditions: while the real object is given, the
thought
object is produced in a specific relation to reality. "Qu'il
existe
entre la pens‚e-du-r‚el et ce r‚el un rapport, cela ne fait
aucun
doute, mais c'est un rapport de connaissance ...." [107]
Althusser's
insistence on the centrality of ratio cognoscendi is a
characteristic
common to all phenomenological speculation. Before we
can
consider real things in themselves, according to phenomenologists,
we must
consider how these things are presented to our consciousness,
to our
intellect. This is where the
Spinozian attribute reappears at
the
heart of the discussion: quod intellectus de substantiƒ percipit.
Althusser's
strategy of reading, along with phenomenological
speculation
in general, coincides perfectly with a subjectivist
interpretation
of the attribute. Subjectivist
reading puts an end to
the
myth of pure speculation, of a "specular" speculation: there is no
innocent
or objective reading of the world, of society, of political
economy.
At first sight,
Althusser's critique, which in this respect is
representative
of a general intellectual movement, seems to fall
directly
and heavily on Deleuze's objectivist reading of the
attributes. Deleuze gives the intellect precisely
the "specular" role
which
Althusser denounces: "l'entendement ne fait que reproduire
objectivement
la nature des formes qu'il appr‚hende." [56] How can
Deleuze
possibly maintain the theory of a specular, objective
intellect? How, when the entire French
philosophical community is
focusing
on the productive nature of knowledge, can Deleuze relegate
the
apprehension of the intellect to a reproductive role? We are
certainly
faced with conflicting positions here.
Deleuze's philosophy
is not
a phenomenology. However, when we
examine the matter closely,
we find
that in certain respects the Althusserian critique does not in
fact
directly address Deleuze's argument.
First of all, Deleuze is
not
ignoring the centrality of production; rather, he gives the
functioning
of the intellect a reproductive role in the theory of the
attribute,
because the primary production is elsewhere. We have
emphasized
throughout our reading of Deleuze's various works that his
ontology
is founded on the conception that being is a productive
dynamic:
in the Bergson study we related this conception to the causal
discourse
of the Scholastics and in Spinoza we can trace it to
Renaissance
naturalism. We could summarize
Deleuze's ontology in
precisely
these terms: being is production in direct, immediate and
absolutely
positive terms. Every discussion
of causality and
difference
is based on this foundation. With
this in mind, we can
interpret
Deleuze's position on the reproductive role of the intellect
as
principally an affirmation of the productive role of being. Thus,
we can
hazard a preliminary Deleuzian response to our first
Althusserian
critique: bringing cognitive production to center stage
in
philosophy masks the fundamental productive dynamic of being which
is really
antecedent to the intellect, in logical and ontological
terms.
This first response,
however, can only serve partially to deflect
the
critique, not answer it. We can
approach a more adequate
explanation
of Deleuze's position if we bring into question the
domains
of knowledge. While Deleuze's
speculation does claim an
objective
representation, it applies merely to a very specific domain.
Society,
capital and its economy are not appropriate objects of
speculation;
rather, in Deleuze, speculation is brought to bear
exclusively
on ontological issues and, as we have insisted at length,
it
arrives at very few and very simple ontological principles.
Against
a phenomenological speculation, Deleuze poses a purely
ontological
speculation. What would it mean to
conceive of this
ontological
speculation as production? We
would have to say, in line
with a
subjectivist ontology, that singularity, univocity and power
are not
principles of being (as real objects), but rather they are
products
of our intellectual activity (as objects of our knowledge).
In
other words, we would have to say that they are not actually
principles
of being, but rather "quod intellectus de substantiƒ
percipit". This sujectivization of being would
undermine the
ontological
foundation of all of Spinoza's thought.
Deleuze, then,
tries
to preserve the specificity of ontology within its specific
domain. What lies outside of the realm of
ontological speculation is
treated
by Deleuze in empirical terms: it is the foundation of
Deleuze's
conception of practice.
This second Deleuzian
response, however, is still open to a
further
Althusserian critique. The
recognition of the production
involved
in knowledge and its distinction from reality, according to
Althusser,
is defining factor of all materialism: "si on le respect
pas, on
tombe immanquablement soit dans l'id‚alisme sp‚culatif soit
dans
l'id‚alisme empiriste." [107]
Althusser's materialist and
phenomenological
speculation is precisely what allows him to propose
his
famous concept of practice within theory, "la th‚orie de la
pratique
th‚orique." Deleuze, then,
appears as an idealist on both
sides
of this practico-theoretical synthesis: a speculative idealist
and an
empirical idealist held loosely together in one philosophy.
Clearly,
Deleuze's conception of practice does not escape Althusser's
indictment:
"il suffit de prononcer le mot de pratique, qui pris en
son
acception id‚ologique (id‚aliste ou empiriste) n'est que l'image
en
miroir, le contre-connotation de la th‚orie (le couple de
®contraires¯
pratique et th‚orie composant les deux termes d'un champ
sp‚culaire),
pour d‚celer le jeu de mots que en est le siŠge." [69]
Deleuze's
practice, which pretends to be autonomous, is merely the
compliant
specular counterpart to objectivist and idealist speculation
in a
fraudulent word game. Finally,
drawing on Althusser's favorite
text,
the Theses on Feuerbach, we have to level the accusation that
Deleuze's
philosophy can have no practical power; it can merely
attempt
to think the world, not change it.
Now, with the critique of
practice,
we have touched the heart of the matter, but we do not yet
have
control of the terms to investigate it further. We need, first,
to
follow Deleuze's elaboration of the constitutive power of practice
in
Spinoza's thought. Althusser's
challenge, though, can serve for
the
present as a critical axis to orient our discussion.
3.5 Combatting the privileges of thought:
Spinoza's parallelisms
We must return now to
consider in greater depth Deleuze's
treatment
of the attributes. Deleuze
develops his idea of the
equality
of the attributes into a theory of ontological parallelism.
(12) We should note that the idea of a
parallelism of the attributes
does
not constitute another principle of being; rather it is simply a
logical
extension or development of the idea of the univocity of
being. If being is always and everywhere said
in the same way, then
the
attributes must be equal expressions.
In other words, if viewed
from
above univocity appears as the absolute uniformity of the whole,
then
viewed from below it appears as the equal participation of all
the
constituent parts. We can identify
three elements which
constitute
Deleuze's theory of ontological parallelism: autonomy,
equality
and unity. The autonomy of the
attributes should be
understood
foremost as a rejection of the Cartesian conception of the
primacy
of the mind over the body. Spinoza
claims, in opposition to
Descartes,
that the mind neither controls nor suffers from the body,
and
similarly the body neither controls nor suffers from the mind.
There
is a real separation between the attributes. Spinoza conceives
the
mind, then, as a "spiritual automaton" [TdIE 85] because in
thinking
the mind obeys only the laws of thought. [cf. Deleuze 126]
The
same, of course, must be said of the body: that is, the body is a
corporeal
automaton because in movement and rest the body obeys only
the
laws of extension. This conception
of the autonomy of the
attributes
rests on one of the principles of efficient causality: in as
much as
two things are different, one cannot be the cause of the
other.
[cf. IP3] The attributes, then,
constitute independent series
of
cause and effect.
The proposition of
parallelism, however, goes beyond a mere
separation
between the attributes. "The
order and connection of ideas
is the
same as the order and connection of things." [IIP7] Spinoza's
proposition
claims not only that the attributes are autonomous but
also
that they are organized in a parallel order. "En effet,
l'identit‚
de connexion ne signifie pas seulement une autonomie des
s‚ries
correspondantes, mais une isonomie, c'est-…-dire une ‚galit‚ de
principe
entre s‚ries autonomes ou ind‚pendantes." [95] A second
component
of parallelism, then, is the establishment of an equality of
principle
among all the attributes, specifically between the two
attributes
accessible to us, thought and extension.
This is the
complete
rejection of the Cartesian position: not only is the body
formally
independent of the mind, but it is also equal to the mind in
principle. We must understand equality of
principle here in terms of
ontological
participation. The body and the
mind both participate in
being
in autonomous but equal ways. Once
again, this proposition
follows
directly from the principle of univocity: corporeality and
thought
are equal expressions of being, said in the same voice.
We can already
recognize that equality does not suffice to
explain
ontological parallelism: the different attributes are not only
equal
expressions of being they are, in a certain sense, the same
expression.
In other words, the modes of each attribute are the same
from
the point of view of substance.
"Dieu produit en mˆme temps dans
tous
les attributs: il produit dans le mˆme ordre, il y a donc
correspondance
entre modes d'attributs diff‚rents.
Mais, parce que
ces
attributs sont r‚ellement distincts, cette correspondance ou
identit‚
d'ordre exclut toute action causale des uns sur les autres.
Parce
que ces attributs sont tous ‚gaux, il y a identit‚ de connexion
entre ces
modes qui diff‚rent par l'attribut.
Parce que ces attributs
constituent
une seule et mˆme substance, ces modes qui diffŠrent par
l'attribut
forment une seule et mˆme modification." [97] The
substantial
modification (modificatio) is the unity of modes which are
produced
in parallel in the different attributes by a single affection
of
substance. The concept of the
modification itself is the
demonstration
of what Deleuze's calls the ontological parallelism: the
modes
produced autonomously and equally in the different attributes
appear
as a unity from the point of view of substance in the form of
the
substantial modification. In
Deleuze's interpretation this theory
of
Spinozian parallelism functions not so much as an analysis of the
organization
of being, (13) but rather as a central lesson for
speculation,
one which will guide us throughout our study of the
Ethics:
every proposition we affirm with regard to one of the
attributes
must be affirmed equally with regard to the other
attribute. In other words, each time we recognize
an aspect of the
structure
or function of the mind we must ask ourselves how we can
recognize
a parallel structure or function of the body, and vice
versa. (For example, if we are to affirm a
certain nature of a true
idea of
the mind, we must also affirm a parallel nature of a true act
of the
body.) (14)
Deleuze's reading of
ontological parallelism is an original
interpretation
in Spinoza studies. The beautiful
simplicity of it
consists
in the fact that it follows very directly from the principle
of
univocity. If being is expressed
always and everywhere in the same
voice,
then all its attributes must be structured as parallel
expressions;
the substantial unity of the modification, which straddles
the
different attributes, testifies to the univocity of being.
Further,
the difficulties which we focused on above regarding the
priority
of thought in the foundation of the attribute seem to be
resolved
(or at least left behind) by the theory of the equality and
ontological
parallelism of the attributes. We
should recognize,
nonetheless,
that while Deleuze's interpretation fits very well with
the
general spirit of Spinoza's ontological system, it does not agree
with
Spinoza's actual statement in Proposition 7: "The order and
connection
of ideas is the same as the order and connection of
things."
[IIP7] Deleuze recognizes that
here Spinoza is not proposing
an
ontological parallelism but rather an epistemological parallelism.
[99] This parallelism is not established
equally among the various
attributes,
but rather it focuses primarily on the attribute of
thought,
establishing the relationship between an idea and its
"object"
[res ideata, objectum ideae]. The
problem is posed most
clearly
in the corollary of this proposition: "God's actual power of
thinking
is equal to his actual power of acting." [P7C] To appreciate
the
depth of this problem, we must keep in mind that "action" in
Spinoza's
terminology does not refer only to the movement and rest of
the
body, but equally to all the attributes. [See for example IIID3]
This
formula of P7C, then, is proposing an equality, but not the
equality
of the mind and the body; on the contrary, the essence of
thought
(the power of thinking) is equated to the essence of being
(the
power of acting). Therefore, we
are thrown back on the same
problematic
terrain of the subjectivist interpretation of the
attribute.
Deleuze certainly recognizes
this as a serious problem. Once
again
we are confronted by what seems to be a Spinozian tendency to
privilege
thought over the other attributes.
The theory of
epistemological
parallelism, Deleuze claims, "nous force … conf‚rer …
l'attribut
pens‚e un singulier privilŠge: cet attribut doit contenir
autant
d'id‚es irr‚ducibles qu'il y a de modes d'attributs diff‚rents,
bien
plus, autant d'id‚es qu'il y a d'attributs. Ce privilŠge
apparaŒt
en contradiction flagrante avec toutes les exigences du
parall‚lisme
ontologique." [100] The
privilege which seems to be
accorded
to thought here goes against the general design of the
ontological
system. In a first attempt to
resolve this problem,
Deleuze
explains that in the scholium to this proposition Spinoza
proceeds
from the epistemological parallelism to the ontological
parallelism,
generalizing the case of thought (of the idea and its
object)
to all of the attributes. In this
way, Deleuze proposes
epistemological
parallelism as secondary, as merely a "detour" [99]
for
reaching ontological parallelism, the more profound theory. This
reading,
however, is not very well substantiated in the text. The
scholium
is somewhat suggestive of ontological parallelism but
certainly
does not state it clearly; the most suggestive supporting
statement,
in fact, is very weak: "I understand the same concerning
the
other attributes." [IIP7S] I
did not think that this difficulty
should
draw into question Deleuze's proposal of an ontological
parallelism:
indeed there is sufficient evidence elsewhere in
Spinoza's
work to support this thesis. The
task here is to find a way
to
reconcile the two parallelisms so that they do not contradict one
another:
or better, to discover a way of avoiding the epistemological
parallelism
altogether.
Deleuze embarks,
then, on a more involved discussion in order to
address
this task. The immediate object of
this discussion is to
rework
the interpretation of the epistemological parallelism proposed
in
IIP7. The fundamental goal,
though, which we should keep in mind
through
this complex argument, is to combat the privileges of thought
and
thereby preserve the ontological foundation of the philosophical
framework. We must be careful, Deleuze begins, not
to confuse the
attributes
of being with the powers of being: "la distinction des
puissances
et des attributs a une importance essentielle dans le
spinozisme."
[103] While being has an infinity
of attributes, it has
only
two powers: the power to exist and act and the power to think and
know.
[103] The first power, the power
to exist, is the formal
essence
of God. All the attributes
participate equally in this
essence,
in the power to exist, as formally distinct expressions.
This is
a restatement of ontological parallelism.
The second power,
then,
the power to think, is the objective essence of God. "L'essence
absolue
de Dieu est formelle dans les attributs qui constituent sa
nature,
objective dans l'id‚e qui repr‚sente n‚cessairement cette
nature."
[105] The same attributes which
are distinguished formally
in God
are distinguished objectively in the idea of God. This
formulation
of the two powers gives Deleuze the opportunity to combat
the notion
of the eminence of thought over the other attributes by
subsuming
the epistemological perspective within the ontological.
"L'attribut
pens‚e est … la puissance de penser ce que tous les
attributs
(y compris la pens‚e) sont … la puissance d'exister et
d'agir."
[107] This slippage between powers
and attributes sets the
terms
for a priority between the two powers.
Even though Deleuze
affirmed
earlier that the powers are in some sense equal, here we find
that
the power to think (objective essence) is dependent on the power
to
exist (formal essence): "l'ˆtre objectif ne serait rien s'il
n'avait
lui-mˆme un ˆtre formel dans l'attribut pens‚e." [107]
Deleuze's
claim of the priority of the ontological power (the power to
exist)
over the epistemological power (the power to think) preserves
the
equality among the attributes.
Finally, however,
there arises yet another case in which it
appears
that thought is privileged over the other attributes: in the
mind
there are not only ideas which correspond to objects (res
ideata),
but there are also ideas of these ideas, and still other
ideas
of these ideas of ideas, and so on to infinity. "D'o— ce
dernier
privilŠge de l'attribut pens‚e, qui fonde une capacit‚ de
l'id‚e
de se r‚fl‚chir … l'infini. Il
arrive … Spinoza de dire que
l'id‚e
de l'id‚e a, avec l'id‚e, le mˆme rapport que l'id‚e avec son
objet."
[111] Before we enter into the
details of this argument,
which
can easily seem tedious and arcane, we should try to recognize
what is
at stake here. Several
commentators have argued that the
problem
of the idea of the idea in Spinoza is the problem of
consciousness,
or rather the problem of the reflection of the mind.
Sylvain
Zac, for example, poses the concept in this way: "La
conscience
est l'id‚e de l'id‚e. Elle est
unie … l'ƒme comme l'ƒme
est
unie au corps." [L'id‚e de vie 128, see also 121-8] While Deleuze
does
not pose the issue in these terms, Zac's proposition makes clear
the
danger presented for Deleuze by this Spinozian example. The idea
of the
idea, as consciousness, seems to be constructing an interiority
within
the mind which, as Zac says, is united with the mind as the
mind is
united with the body. The
principal threat of interiority in
this
case is the creation of a priority of the mind over the body and
the
subsumption of the dynamic of being within a mental dynamic of
reflection. Therefore, it is quite clear that when
Deleuze approaches
this
issue his main concern will be to preserve the equality of the
attributes. The basic problem, then, can be posed
quite simply.
While
the idea and its object are conceived under two separate
attributes,
the idea of the idea and the idea are both conceived under
the attribute
of thought. What does it mean,
then, to say that there
is the
same relationship between the idea and the object as there is
between
the idea of the idea and the idea?
The claim that the two
cases
constitute the same relationship seems to be giving thought the
capacity
to subsume the relationship to all of the attributes within
itself:
its priority as the attribute of reflection seems to give it
the
capacity to reproduce the inter-attribute dynamic completely
within
thought itself.
Deleuze once again
calls on the distinction of powers to address
this
difficulty: the two cases cannot be considered the same when
considered
from the point of view of attributes, he argues, but only
when
considered from the point of view of powers. [110-1] In other
words,
the common relationship in the two cases should be explained by
refering
the first term to the formal power and and the second to the
objective
power. The first case is very
simple. The res ideata, as a
mode of
being (pertaining to one of the attributes), has a certain
power
to exist and it is thus an expression of formal essence. The
idea of
this object, however, refers not to the power to exist but to
the
power to think and it is thus an expression of objective essence.
We can
apply this same logic to the second case because an idea is
also a
mode of being: a mode of thought, just like a mode of any
attribute,
can be refered to the power to exist, as formal essence.
When an
idea is thus conceived we can relate another idea to that
idea,
refering now to the power to think: this idea of the idea is an
expression
of objective essence. The common
relationship which
Spinoza
is refering to, then, is that in each case the two terms refer
to two
different powers: the power to exist and the power to think.
This
similarity, however, points to an important difference when we
consider
the two cases from the point of view of the attributes. In
the
first, case there is a formal distinction between an idea and its
object
because they are modes of different attributes. In the second
case,
though, between the idea of the idea and the idea, there is not
formal
distinction because they are both modes of thought. "ApparaŒt
de ce
point de vue l'unit‚ de l'id‚e et de l'id‚e de l'id‚e, en tant
qu'elles
sont donn‚es en Dieu avec la mˆme n‚cessit‚, de la mˆme
puissance
de penser. DŠs lors, il n'y a plus
qu'une distinction de
raison
entre les deux id‚es: l'id‚e de l'id‚e, c'est la forme de
l'id‚e,
rapport‚e comme telle … la puissance de penser." [111]
Deleuze
is satisfied with this solution.
He has answered the
intellectualist
challenge posed by consciousness by a reference to the
different
powers and finally to the ontological hierarchy of
distinctions. The distinction involved in the dynamic
of
consciousness
is not the real distinction which founds being, not the
formal
distinction which differentiates the attributes, but merely a
conceptual
distinction (distinction de raison).
We can pose this
clearly
in Bergsonian terms: consciousness does not mark a difference
of
nature, but merely a difference of degree. We have to admit,
nonetheless,
that the mind's capacity for reflection (consciousness,
the
idea of the idea) gives thought a certain privilege over the other
attributes. Deleuze's argument, however, drawing on
the different
powers
and distinctions, attempts to show that this privilege is
ontologically
insignificant.
Remark:
From Forschung to Darstellung
In the previous
section we have analyzed several examples of
Deleuze's
effort to preserve the univocity of being on the basis of an
ontological
parallelism among the attributes.
The opponent in each
case is
an intellectualist reading of Spinoza's epistemology, which at
several
points seems to give a real privilege to thought; Deleuze's
strategy,
which we have seen already several times in our study, is to
subordinate
ratio cognoscendi to ratio essendi.
The Deleuzian
arguments
certainly have a very strong foundation in Spinoza's
ontology,
in the ontological parallelism of the attributes, but
nonetheless
these arguments appear weak when in Spinoza's psychology
and
epistemology the problem of privilege continually reappears. To a
certain
extent, the privileges of thought and the problem of the
attributes
should be explained as a residue of Cartesianism in
Spinoza's
thought, but finally this explanation is not sufficient on
its
own. The theory of the attributes
remains a problem in Deleuze's
Spinoza.
Some readers of
Spinoza, who like Deleuze recognize the
centrality
of the univocity of being, have tried to resolve this
problem
by claiming an evolution in Spinoza's thought: Negri, for
example,
argues that the theory of the attributes disappears as
Spinoza
proceeds from the pantheistic utopia, which characterizes the
first
phase of his thought, to the constitutive disutopia of his
maturity. The attributes do indeed disappear from
the Ethics after
Part II
(with only a brief reappearance in Part V) and Negri links
this
fact to historical evidence that Spinoza drafted the Ethics
during
two distinct periods, from 1661 to 1665 and from 1670 to 1675.
Negri
argues, then, that Spinoza's philosophical transformation
between
these two periods precipitates the rejection of the
attributes. Negri's argument has come under serious
critique, but it
clearly
points to two issues which, even if we are to question his
explanation,
must be addressed: the theory of the attributes is not
easily
compatible with Spinoza's mature thought and the attributes are
absent
from the later half of the Ethics.
It seems to me that
there is alternative or complementary
explanation
to account for the disappearance of the attributes which
is
available in Deleuze's work itself.
We could argue, consistently
with
Deleuze's interpretation I believe, that thought is privileged in
the
theory of the attributes only in limited or accidental terms:
thought
is the principle means of human speculation and the theory of
the
attributes is linked to a mode of inquiry. If we imagine that
there
is something substantial about the priority of thought over the
other
attributes, we are merely confusing the form of our research
with
the nature of being. The
attributes appear in the Ethics not as
a form
of being, but as a mode of inquiry, as a scientific Forschung.
Marx
makes clear the distinction between Forschung and Darstellung,
between
the mode of inquiry and the mode of presentation. "Of course
the
method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry.
The
latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its
different
forms of development and to track down their inner
connection. Only after this work has been done can
the real movement
be
appropriately presented." [Capital, vol. I, 102] Therefore, the
two
phases of Spinoza's thought, which Negri proposes historically,
can be
identified with two moments or approaches in Spinoza's work.
(15) The Forschung of the Ethics, the moment
of speculation, relies
on the
theory of the attributes "to track down the inner connection"
of
being. Thought is given a certain
priority in this moment, as the
model
of our speculation. "Only
after this work has been done," Marx
says,
"can the real movement be appropriately presented." What does
it mean
to present appropriately the real movement of being? Here it
means
to present being as it makes itself, in the process of its
constitution:
the Spinozian Darstellung refers to practice. When the
moment
of research is complete, therefore, after Part II, the
attributes
no longer have a role and they drop out of the discussion.
In
other words, as we move forward in Spinoza's system of emendation,
as we
shift from speculation to practice, any priority of thought
gradually
disappears. In fact, Deleuze
presents a very powerful
argument
that Spinoza's theory of practice initially privileges the
attribute
of extension: the body is the model of practice. This seems
to me,
then, a consistent Deleuzian explanation of the questions of
priority:
in our research of being, in the moment of speculation, the
mind
plays the initial role of model; similarly, in Spinoza's
Darstellung,
in our practice of being, the body plays a parallel role.
How does Spinoza make
this shift from Forschung to Darstellung,
from
speculation to practice? Deleuze's
work makes cleat that the
hinge
or the pivot which articulates these two moments is the thematic
of
power. Spinoza's discussion of
power carries the developed
ontological
foundation on to the terrain of practice.
It
constitutes,
as we claimed earlier, the fundamental passage, the
Nietzschean
transmutation: the hour of midnight.
The speculative
Forschung
of power merges with its practical Darstellung. Let us turn
our
attention, then, to Spinoza's development of the thematic of
power.