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COMPANION TO  
HERODOTUS

EDITED BY

EGBERT J. BAKKER  
IRENE J. F. DE JONG  
HANS VAN WEES



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CHAPTER ONE

THE MAKING OF HISTORY:  
HERODOTUS' *HISTORIES* *APODEXIS*

Egbert J. Bakker

Action, in so far as it engages in founding and preserving political bodies, creates the condition for remembrance, that is, for history.

Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*

Most readers of Herodotus' work call it *History*, or the *Historiaz*. The name is doubly motivated. Not only does it follow Herodotus himself in the way in which he refers to his own literary and intellectual achievement; it also views Herodotus through the tradition of which we have made him the 'father'. As the term *historia* (or *historiē* as Herodotus would have pronounced it) comes closer to us on its long way from the fifth century BCE through Greek Antiquity, it becomes more and more closely associated with writing, as appears from its joining with the verbal root *graphē*, to form such composite concepts as *historiographos* or *historiographia*. Such 'writing of history', however, is quite alien to Herodotus' understanding of *historiē*. 'History' for him is not an object of study, something you write, or write about; it is an intellectual tool and a communicative activity. The essential link for him is not with *graphē* but with another verbal idea, as appears from the most famous mention of *historiē* in history, in the Proem to Herodotus' *Historiaz*:<sup>1</sup>

Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησέος ἱστορίας ἀποδέξις ἦδε, ὃς μίητε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μίητε ἔργα μετέλλατε καὶ θάμνηστέ, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις ἀποδοξάμενα. ἀκλέα γένηται, τὰ τε ὅλλα καὶ δὴ ἦν αἰτίην ἐρολήμενον ἀλλήλοισι.

<sup>1</sup>This is the *apodexis* of the *historiē* of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, put forth to prevent what has been made to happen by men from fading

<sup>1</sup> Translations of passages from Herodotus in this chapter are my own.

with time, and (to prevent) great and marvellous deeds, some accomplished by Greeks, others by barbarians, from losing fame, and in particular through what *athiz* they came to war with each other.

There are blanks left in the translation: this chapter, in dealing with Herodotus' *historiē* as the prehistory of our notion of 'history', does not want to take too much for granted. So we will make the meaning not only of *historiē*, but also of *apodexis*, the object of investigation. The latter term is the action noun of the verbal idea *apo-deixi*, which will concern us in particular. Our main source of information will be the evidence that Herodotus' *Historiēs* provides itself as it has come down to us through the ages. And the first evidence we have to face is the interpretation of the Proem as the primary context of *historiēs apodexis*.

Herodotus' first sentence, to begin with, seems to lack precision in the way in which it delimits the work's subject. While Thucydides tells us exactly that his subject is the Peloponnesian War, and that he started working on it from its very beginning, Herodotus does not tell us that the subject of his work is the Persian Wars. What he indicates is at the same time much broader than that subject—*erga megala* 'great accomplishments', for example, can be understood as including 'monuments', 'architectural achievements'<sup>2</sup>—and narrower: according to the wording of the Proem, his *historiē* will concern not so much the war itself as its *athiz*, another term, usually translated as 'cause', whose interpretation is at stake.

Nor does the narrative itself seem to do much to remedy the problem. Its long 'digressions' and varied subject matter have prompted various hypotheses concerning the unity and publication of the work, each betraying in its own way the preconceptions of the time. The lack of a clear focus on a well-defined subject has been explained as due to genetic factors. The work as we have it was seen as showing signs of an intellectual development by which Herodotus passed through various stages, from the travelling geographer and ethnographer who wrote the Egyptian *logos* that is now our Book Two, to the historian who left us Books Seven through Nine, and who, it was thought, had made much progress toward the Thucydidean ideal of the objective historian.<sup>3</sup> The tension between history and geo-

graphy, between the present and the past, was resolved through the history of the work itself.

This 'analytic' standpoint provoked, on the analogy of the Homeric Question, a 'Unitarian' reaction on the part of scholars who viewed Herodotus' work as historical *ab ovo*: for them, geography and ethnography are part of the overall historiographical conception of the *Historiēs*.<sup>4</sup> The ensuing 'unity' was not unproblematic, and often it was necessary to depict Herodotus as somehow incapable, or, rather, 'not yet' capable of making the distinctions and decisions that are normal for historiography as we understand it, or to impose on himself the kind of limitations we associate with purposeful writing. A variant version of this idea presents us a Herodotus who is capable of those things, but who is hampered by the constraints of an 'archaic', paratactic way of expression (Immerwahr (1966) 7). In more recent times, 'archaic style' and its associated concepts has come to be replaced by 'orality',<sup>5</sup> and the supposed lack of focus in Herodotus' choice of subject matter is seen as simply due to the fact that the intellectual context in which he wrote was 'predisciplinary', unfamiliar with the modern boundaries between geography, anthropology, and history.<sup>6</sup>

In all these cases, the implicit question seems to be whether Herodotus was the first historian, a good or bad historian, merely a historian *avant la lettre*, or a historian at all. Herodotus is set against some modern notion of 'history', a norm to which he either conforms only in the course of his intellectual development, or not (yet) quite, in some way or another. In part, the modern reception of Herodotus has been the search for attenuating circumstances. It is only in the most recent research that the terms 'historian' or 'history' have come to be charged with cultural weight. The Herodotus that emerges is viewed in a way that entirely suppresses any modern notion of 'history'—not without new controversy, as we shall see.

Forman (1971a); an analytic reading of Herodotus' first sentence itself is offered in Hommel (1981).

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Regenbogen (1930b); Pohlenz (1937); Immerwahr (1966), Cobet (1971), Dreier (1972). For the problem of unity in the *Historiēs*, see de Jong, this volume (Ch. 11).

<sup>3</sup> E.g., Lang (1984); on 'oral strategies' in Herodotus, see also Slings; this volume (Ch. 3).

<sup>4</sup> Evans (1991) 3, Thomas (2000) 161 ff. See also the problem of Herodotus' 'reliability' as discussed by Cartledge and Greenwood in this volume (Ch. 15).

<sup>2</sup> Most authoritatively Jacoby (1913) 275 ff.; cf. De Sanctis (1926), Powell (1939), Latte (1958) 7 ('Er hat nicht als Historiker begonnen, sondern ist es geworden').

*Interpreting the Proem*

Any attempt to understand Herodotus' notion of 'history' must start from Herodotus' own use of the term *historiē* in the Proem, to which we now return. At stake is not only the term's lexical value, but also the way it functions in the syntax of the Proem. This rich sentence is best taken as a tripartite structure, beginning with a phrase characterizing the work as a whole, and inscribing the name of its author in it (1), followed by two negative purpose clauses of parallel structure in which the work's intended achievements are specified (2a and b), and rounded off with an indirect question that has at first sight an unclear relation to what precedes (3). Following the analysis of Tilman Krischer, we can present the construction as follows:<sup>6</sup>

## 1. Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἦδε.

## 2. ὥς α) μήτε

(β) ἐξ ἀνθρώπων

(γ) τῶ χρόνῳ ἐξήγηται,

## b) μήτε

(β) τὰ μὲν Ἑλλήσσι, τὰ δὲ Βαρβάροις

(γ) ἀποδεχθέντα,

(γ) ἀκλεῖν γένηται,

## 3. τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν Ἀσσίησσι.

Krischer has pointed out that the problematic final *colon* (3) is best explained when we assume that Herodotus' proem is modelled in its syntactic articulation on a typical epic Proem. The last clause,<sup>3</sup> in the presentation above, reaches back to the first clause, thus complementing it and ensuring the coherence of the Proem.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore,

<sup>6</sup> Krischer (1965) 159–60; cf. Nagy (1990) 217, the latter analysing *colon* 3 as an indirect question; cf. Erbe (1956) 215, who analyses it as a relative clause (see also Lang (1987) 204); critical grammatical discussion in Drexler (1972) 3–11. A different articulation of the sentence is presented in Hommel (1981) 277 ff. Erbe (1992) 123–5 reviews the scholarship on the Proem, rightly pointing out that any attempt to see the Proem as announcing the *content* of the *Historiē* is likely to create confusion.

<sup>7</sup> Compare the proem of the *Iliad*, where 1. 6 ἐξ ὅθι τὰ κλισία διαστήτην ἐπίστανε from the moment at which they stood first apart in quarrel' picks up μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεὸς of the first line. See Krischer (1965) 162; Nagy (1990) 220–1 n. 34; on Homer specifically, see Bakker (1997c) 293. Krischer notes that the indication of Herodotus'

just as in epic, the final clause of the proem provides the link with the beginning of the narrative proper: it contains the word *aitiēn* 'cause', which is picked up in the first sentence beyond the proem in the form of *aitiōus* 'guilty', 'responsible':<sup>8</sup>

Ἡροδότων μὲν νῦν οἱ Λόγιοι Φοίνικας αἰτίους φασὶ γενέσθαι τῆς διασπῆς.  
(1.1.1)

Now the chroniclers of the Persians claim that the Phoenicians have been responsible for the conflict (lit. 'difference').

Beyond syntax and stylistics, the important semantic and conceptual consequence of Krischer's analysis is that the semantic nuclei of the first and last clause, *historiēs apodexis* and *aitiēn*, are connected with each other: Herodotus' project is the *historiē* of an *aitiē*, whatever sense we will attribute to these terms in the final analysis.<sup>9</sup> A further Homeric echo can be detected in the *cola* (α) and (γ) of 2b: great deeds and their connection with *kleos*. This important detail will concern us later on.

But if the Homeric reminiscence is unmistakable, so is the parallel with more contemporary stylistics. The two purpose clauses in the middle (2a–b), with their symmetrical internal structure (isocolon) and their identical closing sounds (homoioteleuton), conform to the style that had become popular in sophistic contemporary rhetoric, mainly due to the Sicilian orator Gorgias.<sup>10</sup>

Herodotus' Proem, then, displays a curious mixture of old and new. We may ask whether this co-existence of epic and sophistic elements is confined to stylistics or extends into thought and *mentalité* as well. The latter possibility is rejected by Krischer ((1965) 165),

name and the characterization of his work functionally occupies the slot of the invocation of the Muse(s) in the traditional epic proem (on the relation between *itropiē* and the Muses, see pages 27–28 below). Doubts as to the epic connotations of Herodotus' syntax in Hommel (1981) 281 n. 44, who analyses (pp. 284–7) the final *colon* as a later addition, an editorial intervention on Herodotus' part to make the Proem reflect the new historical turn the work has taken in the course of its development.

<sup>8</sup> Krischer (1965) 160; Nagy (1987) 180; cf. Latteiner (1989) 15. The first epic parallel is the proem of the *Iliad*, in which the phrase διασπῆτην ἐπίστανε 'the two of them stood away from each other quarrelling' in line 6 is picked up by ἐπίδη 'in quarrel' (8) in the beginning of the narrative.

<sup>9</sup> For a different interpretation of the Proem, and of *aitiēn* in particular, see van Wees, this volume (Ch. 14) p. 321.

<sup>10</sup> Kennedy (1963) 64–5; on the influence of sophistic rhetoric on Herodotus' style, see Jacoby (1913) 333; Aly (1921) 286–96; general remarks in Latteiner (1989) 19.

who holds that the epic parallel testifies to Herodotus' acknowledging epic as a stylistic and literary model, not his continuing the Homeric tradition of conferring *kleos* to the heroes of the past. Yet the position of Herodotus between the poetic tradition of the past and the intellectual developments of the present is by no means clear. In particular the meaning of the crucial phrase *historiā aphodaxis* has recently become the center of a controversy that fully confirms Herodotus' enigmatic status.

*Historiā aphodaxis* is usually rendered with such expressions as 'publication of research' or 'public exposition of an inquiry'.<sup>11</sup> It remains to be seen, however, whether these translations are of much help. 'Publication' is no less a culturally determined concept than is 'history' or 'research', and we may ask what it might have meant for Herodotus' work to have been 'published' in its original intellectual context. The notion of publication, in fact, becomes increasingly important in recent research, suggesting that the old controversy between the analytic and the unitarian approach has never been really resolved. Exactly *what* is being 'published' according to this phrase: an ethnographical core or the work as we have it? And what does 'published' mean? Does *aphodaxis* apply to the work as a whole or to the oral delivery of its parts? Some scholars have recently endorsed the latter possibility, arguing that 'publication' is an anachronistic concept that does not capture the reality of the reception of Herodotus' *Inquiry* by its original public. Rather, they argue, we must think of 'prepublication' of 'work in progress' in the form of lectures.<sup>12</sup>

The idea of Herodotus presenting his work orally, for which there

<sup>11</sup> E.g., 'performance [literally, 'display'] of the enquiries' (Gould (1989) 17); 'demonstration of his research' (Latener (1989) 7); 'public presentation' (Nagy (1990) 217); 'exposer son enquête' (Rayen (1997) 82). *Ἀφοδάξις*, the Ionian form for *ἀφοδάξις*, is just as *ἐπιθέξις* (*epithēxis*) a *nomen actionis* derived from the verbal root *deik-* 'show', 'display', 'point'. In Herodotus' Ionian, another verbal root, *dek-* (for Attic *de-*) 'receive', 'accept', yields in principle the same form (cf. *ἐπέδειψεν* (Hdt. 7.3.5)); aorist forms of either verb are also identical: (*ἀπέδειξε* from (*ἀπο*)/*deiknō* and (*ἐπέδειξε* from (*ἐπι*)/*deiknō*). Some scholars (most recently Rosen (1993)) actually go so far as to view *ἀποδείξις* as a form of *ἀπο-δέκω*, which would turn Herodotus into a receiver of established tradition, rather than one who expounds original, individual research. See Erbsse's (1995) reaction. Nagy (1987) 176 n. 3 speaks of a 'conflation' of the two verbs. See also the comments by Lang (1987) 203 and Nagy's reply (1987) 209.

<sup>12</sup> Evans (1991) 90, 99–100, Thomas (1992) 125–6; (1993); (2000) 257–60 (see further below).

is some ancient anecdotal evidence,<sup>13</sup> has been entertained in particular by Rosalind Thomas, who has sought to locate Herodotus' work in the world of early scientific discourse as is evidenced by the mode of presentation of many of the treatises in the Hippocratic corpus. Herodotus' work, especially the Egyptian *logos*, she argues, displays the same agonistic and combative tone that G. E. R. Lloyd signals in the early Hippocratic writers and that must go back to sessions at which knowledge was transmitted, and contested, orally.<sup>14</sup>

Thomas' notion of the publication of Herodotean *historiā* envisages oral presentation and reception of ideas, while explicitly allowing for the existence of written texts. Such a blend of the spoken and the written is the realm of rhetorical *aphodaxis*. According to a recent account, this term denotes 'the displaying or revealing (orally) of what was already in existence beforehand—that is, the discourse written'.<sup>15</sup> This idea of 'display' is for Thomas very close to Herodotus' *aphodaxis*, which she conceives of as the kind of proof characteristic of the sophistic and rhetorical milieu of the end of the fifth century: the emphatic assertion and demonstration of one's own *historiā* 'research' conducted in competition with others. One of the treatises in the Hippocratic corpus opens in fact in a particularly suggestive way from the point of view of Herodotus' Proem.<sup>16</sup>

Ἐπει δὲ τέχνην κερτοῖνται τὸ τὰς τέχνας αἰτιοποιεῖν, ὅς μὲν οὖν τὰ οὐ  
τοῦτο διακρινούμενοι, οὐχ ὁ ἐργὸν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ ἰστορίαις οἰκείαις ἐπιθέλειν  
νοεῦμενοι. (Hipp. *De arte* 1)

Some there are who have made an art of viliifying the arts, though they consider, not that they are accomplishing the object I mention, but that they are making a display of their own knowledge.

For Thomas, the parallelism between *historiā* ... *epitēzin* here and Herodotus' own *historiā aphodaxis* 'provides the most vivid suggestion that Herodotus' opening sentence had contemporary connotations within the contemporary quest for knowledge. It also implies that the ideas of proof and demonstration might rapidly imply or shade into display, and then into the display lecture. Herodotus seems then, in his very first sentence, to be using the fashionable language of

<sup>13</sup> E.g., Lucian, *Herodotus* 1 (on Herodotus performing at the Olympic Games). Cf. Pohlenz (1937) 208, Powell (1939) 32 ff.; critical discussion in Johnson (1994).

<sup>14</sup> Thomas (1993); (2000) 249 ff.; Lloyd (1979) 86–98; see also Hornblower (1987) 20.

<sup>15</sup> Cole (1991) 89.

<sup>16</sup> Tr. Jones (1923) 191.

the time, language which had precise connotations in a period where, increasingly, any display of erudition and knowledge could be made in an oral presentation, an *epideixis*.<sup>17</sup>

It remains to be seen, however, whether the preverbs *apo-* and *epi-* are so easily interchangeable; but before we turn to that question, we need to address an alternative modern approach, rejected by Thomas, which seeks to situate Herodotus' project, not in contemporary scientific thought, but within the perspective of the general Greek preoccupation with the past. Herodotus in this perspective, put forward by Gregory Nagy in particular, is not so much a scientist as a *logios*, a master of prose narrative, whose function it is, along with the *ooides*, the epic poet, to confer *kleos*. Nagy characterizes Herodotus' work as 'the product of conventions in an oral tradition of prose'.<sup>18</sup> In this account, *apodeixis* is not 'proof' or 'display', nor a one-time event, a display lecture or *epideixis*, but a 'public presentation', a performance, a link in a chain of transmission starting with the events in the past and ending with the public exposition of Herodotus' *historiē*.

The Proem, in fact, invites us to pay more attention to Herodotus' interest in the past than Thomas would allow. There is a concern with *kleos*, expressed in the two parallel negative purpose clauses, whether or not we consider that concern to be epic in mentality. The second of those two clauses (2b, β), furthermore, contains a second occurrence of the verbal idea *apo-deik*. The crucial attribute of the 'great and wondrous deeds of Greeks and barbarians', whose *kleos* should not be lost, is that they are *apodokhianta*, which Nagy translates as 'performed'.<sup>19</sup> For Nagy, there is a relation between the achievements of the past and Herodotus' *apodeixis* in the present: 'performing a deed is the equivalence of publicly displaying a deed because it is ultimately being publicly displayed by the *History* of Herodotus'.<sup>20</sup> *Apodeixis*, then, according to Nagy, is the proclamation of *kleos* in an ongoing oral tradition, as against the insistence on

proof, display, and personal achievement that is inherent in Thomas' account of the term.

Herodotus could hardly have been pulled in two more different directions. Against Thomas' modern scientific Herodotus, firmly rooted in contemporary intellectual debate, we have Nagy's conception of a prose storyteller who subsumes the preceding epic tradition. The term *apodeixis* is crucial for either position, but neither 'proof/display' nor 'public performance' exhausts its semantics, as we will see. In fact, both positions leave aspects of the term unexplored that make possible a more integrative interpretation, yielding a Herodotus whose 'proof' in the present, is not incompatible with his rendering of the past.

Yet in spite of the apparent difference between Thomas' and Nagy's positions there is agreement in that both take *apodeixis* to refer to the oral delivery of Herodotus' work, and in this they are not alone among modern authors.<sup>21</sup> As we begin to understand more of the composition, publication, reception, and transmission of discourses in times other than our own, to say that there is an 'oral' component to prose works of the fifth and fourth centuries comes close to being a truism. True, for Herodotus' work in particular we can be more specific and the case for at least an oral reception is easier than in the case of Thucydides or Xenophon.<sup>22</sup> As Thomas notes herself, Herodotus' own voice is abundantly present in the form of the grammatical first person, most often in the ethnographical passages, but not infrequently in the narrative sections as well.<sup>23</sup> There is a constant concern with the marking of the beginning and end of sections, and on numerous occasions Herodotus refers back to what precedes, using the 'real time' temporal adverbs *proteron* 'earlier' and

<sup>17</sup> E.g., Gould (1989) 17; Evans (1991) 3; Hartog (1991) 285; assessment of the 'orality' of the term in Miles (1999) sect. 8. It is worth pointing out that this whole discussion (including the controversy between Nagy and Thomas) suffers from a fundamental and persistent ambiguity in the use of the term 'oral', in that it refers both to the 'mentality' or 'conception' of a discourse ('oral' vs. 'literary') and to its mode of presentation ('oral' vs. 'written'). For discussion, see Bakker (1999a) 29–37.

<sup>22</sup> See, e.g., Pohlenz (1937) 208–10; Lang (1964); Munson (1993).

<sup>23</sup> Thomas (1993) 240–1; Dewald (1987) 150 as well as Ch. 12 in this volume. Thomas uses the first-person verbs as an argument against the idea of the 'oral storyteller', who she thinks is much less present in the text. Signs of speaking in Homer, however, may be less straightforward, but they are unmistakable once noticed; see Bakker (1997a). Against Thomas' and Dewald's stance with regard to the first person in the *Historia*, see Svenbro (1993) 150, who approaches the first person in Herodotus and other historians as a necessary 'fiction'.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas (2000) 262–3; cf. (1993) 242–43.

<sup>18</sup> Nagy (1987) 175; (1990) 224, arguing on the basis of a parallelism of *λόγος* ( glossed as 'masters of speech', *ibid.* 223) and *δοῦδος*. See also Hartog (1991) 285 (English tr. p. 276), referring to Havetock (1963) 53–4 n. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Nagy (1987) 178.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*; see also Erbes (1956) 211, who stresses the parallelism of *ἱστοροῦν* *ἀποδεικνύναι* and *ἔργων* *ἀποδεικνύναι*, on which, see further below, pages 24–28.

*hazetron* 'later', the same adverbs that are also used for the temporal relationships between the events recounted in the narrative.<sup>24</sup> We are surely entitled to infer from these apparent attempts at monitoring the information flow that Herodotus is working hard, noticeably, to facilitate the reception of his work to a listening public.<sup>25</sup>

But all this is not our point. The question is whether the idea of the oral delivery of *logoi* is expressed *as such* by the noun *apodexis*. Does Herodotus refer in the opening words of what must be the published, ostensibly written version of his work, to its oral delivery? Or if that work *is*, as an integrated whole, meant to be orally delivered after all, would not a reference to its own, oral, mode of presentation be redundant? If *apodexis* merely refers to the medium of presentation, why is the term present at all, and did not Herodotus simply call his work '*historiē*'? The second occurrence of the verbal idea *apodexis* in the proem may help us realize that there is more to *apodexis* than what meets the eye at first sight, and that *historiēs apodexis* is a phrase consisting of two key terms in Herodotus' intellectual and conceptual vocabulary. It also invites us to study Herodotus' own use of those terms in some detail, and to bring that internal evidence to bear on the interpretation of the proem. A survey of Herodotus' own use of the nouns *historiē* and *apodexis* and the verbs *historēzin* and *apodexasthai* reveals that *historiēs apodexis*, far from being a mere title or a characterization of the 'medial' aspects of the work, is a bold, even provocative, expression stating nothing less than the communicative purpose and ambition of Herodotus' work. What it says was apparently new and not obvious, and sufficiently marked for the subsequent historiographical tradition to avoid it studiously.<sup>26</sup> In the following sections, we will first deal with *historiē* and then with *apodexis*; a picture will emerge in which these terms are not only two

<sup>24</sup> On beginning and end of sections, see Immerwahr (1966) 52–8; Dewald (1987) 164–5. The importance of the particles *μεν* *δη* . . . *δε* in this process is demonstrated in Bakker (1993). On pointing backward and ahead, see also de Jong, this volume (Ch. 11) pp. 256–263.

<sup>25</sup> Three times a forward cross-reference remains unfulfilled. It is to be noted that in these cases Herodotus does not use *ὑπέρον* (2.101.2, referring to 2.149.1), but an explicit mention of *λόγοι* (1.106.2 *ἐν ἐτέροισι λόγοισι*, on the fall of Ninwech; 1.184 *ἐν τοῖσι Ἀσσυρίοισι λόγοισι*, on the Babylonian kings; 7.213 *ἐν τοῖσι ὀνόμοις λόγοισι*, on the death of the traitor Ephialtes). Are these references to parts of the work that were never written or to lectures that were never incorporated in the final redaction? Cf. Nagy (1990) 235 n. 91. See also Röslér, this volume (Ch. 4, note 17) and Cobet (Ch. 17, note 40).

<sup>26</sup> Hornblower (1987) 8–11. But see pages 31–32 at the end of this chapter.

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constituents of a famous syntagma, but also two interrelated concepts, whose semantics, and pragmatics, blend to form a unified whole.

#### Historiē: Interrogation and Difference

The abstract noun *historiē* as well as the verb *historēō* are etymologically related to the verbal root *hid-/uid-/uidō-* 'see', 'know'. This might yield the idea of gathering knowledge through actual perception, autopsy, as the central meaning of *historiē*.<sup>27</sup> Such a meaning would seem to be in concordance with the idea of Herodotus the critical researcher that has recently been proposed by Thomas, as we saw. Her understanding of *historiē* presents us with a Herodotus who is not sifting traditions and probing the past, but investigating natural phenomena in the present, such as the nature of the mysterious Nile.<sup>28</sup> Again we may contrast Thomas' views with those of Nagy, who sees in *historiē* an essentially juridical concept: the investigation of the cause of the war between Greeks and barbarians.<sup>29</sup> This highlights the relation between *historiē* and *aitiē*, which, as we saw, is something the syntactic articulation of the Proem invites us to do.

This relation is, in fact, more significant than is commonly supposed, since Herodotus is not the only contemporary writer to present his *historiē* in this way. We can observe that in early medical and scientific writings there is a mutual expectancy between *historia* and *aitia*. The author of the Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient Medicine*, for example, states that knowledge about 'nature' (*phusis*) is impossible without knowledge of man, and that the latter involves '*historiē* to know (*eidenai*) what man is and through what cause (*di' hōias aitiās*) he comes to be what he is' (ch. 20). Similarly, Socrates in the *Phaedo* (96a) tells that in his youth he had a passion for 'natural science' (*peri phusōs historian*) which he specifies as 'knowing (*eidenai*) the causes (*aitias*) of each thing'. In the scientific treatises of Aristotle, especially those dealing with 'natural history', the connection between *historia* and *aitia* is also well attested.<sup>30</sup> Apparently, *historiē* is

<sup>27</sup> Snell (1924) 59–71; Nagy (1990) 250; Dewald (1987) 153 n. 16; Darto-Peschanski (1987) 184 ('recherche sur le terrain'); Thomas (2000) 164.

<sup>28</sup> Thomas (2000) 161–7.

<sup>29</sup> Nagy (1990) 259–62.

<sup>30</sup> E.g., *De Caelo* 298b2; *Hist. an.* 491a11–12; *Inessu an.* 704b7–11; *Part. an.* 646a8–12; 696b14–17.

not for Herodotus alone the search for what 'causes' the subject of investigation.<sup>31</sup>

The difference between the natural historians and Herodotus the historian is that for the latter *aitē* is not a matter of nature or the human body but of human behaviour (we recall the *ta genomena ex anthropōn* of the Proem). And so the 'cause' of the researcher's object of study does take on the sense of 'guilt' or 'responsibility'. In fact, the agent noun from which *historiē* morphologically derives, *histōr* (or *histōrē*), is used in that very semantic sphere. The term does not occur in Herodotus, but is attested in archaic poetry and inscriptions in the sense of 'judge', 'adjudicator', or 'witness (to an oath)'.<sup>32</sup> Even though Herodotus never uses the term, his work shows, as Robert Connor ((1993) 9) has noted, 'a remarkable similarity to the way *histōrs* functioned in early Greek society'.

Just as *aphodexis*, then, *historiē* can and has been used to push Herodotus into two almost mutually exclusive directions: the search for a guilty, 'responsible' agent in the conflict between the Greeks and the barbarians, as Nagy would have it, and the critical geography and ethnography advocated by Thomas, notably in the Egyptian *logos*. For the assessment of the difference between the two positions it is relevant to observe that Thomas' account obscures the fact that the direct object of Herodotus' *historiē* of Egypt, both grammatically and notionally, is not the land or its mysterious river, but people interrogated, informants: it is the Egyptians themselves who tell Herodotus about the wonders of their land.<sup>33</sup> This is not to deny that *historiē* in contemporary medical writing may pertain to the authority of the researcher having seen for himself, but from this it does not follow that Herodotus' project is identical to the natural

<sup>31</sup> On *aitēn* in Hippocratic and other contemporary texts, see also Saugé (1992) 257 ff., who stresses, even for scientific texts, the link with *aitēiv* (ἄικτιν) 'demand satisfaction (from an accused party)'. See further below, p. 18.

<sup>32</sup> Attested usage of *histōr/histōrōs*: *Il.* 18.501, 23.486; Hes. *WGD* 792; Soph. *E.* 850; Plat. *Crat.* 406b3; Hipp. *Oath* 2 (it is ironic that the term should be used in the Hippocratic oath in this juridical sense). See also Nagy (1990) 250–9. In Dewald (1987) 153 ff. the notion of *histōr* is used metaphorically, as a narratological function: the authorial persona of the *Historiēs*; cf. her more recent views in Ch. 12, pp. 271–2 below. See also Carledge and Greenwood, this volume (Ch. 15 note 21).

<sup>33</sup> E.g., the investigation of the Nile: *ιστορέων γνώριος ἦν τινος δὲνομαν ἔχει ὁ Νεῖλος*, 2.19.3; *ἔλεγον* . . . ποί . . . ιστορέωντι, 2.113.1. Cf. already Pohlenz (1937) 44 ('die eigenartige Isotopie, das Verbot von Augenzeugen, von dem, was nur durch Hörensagen überliefert ist').

and medical science of his day, as Thomas implies; rather, we have to allow for the possibility that Herodotus borrows contemporary terminology to establish the authority of an enterprise that is entirely his own: investigating the past, and scrutinizing the traditions that give access to it, instead of receiving and accepting them wholesale.

Herodotus often stresses his 'having seen', most frequently and conspicuously in his account of his researches of the Egyptians and the Scythians, but the proper term in his vocabulary for autopsy and observation is not *historiē* or its cognate expressions. That concept can actually be contrasted with autopsy, as a means to gain information through *hearing*.<sup>34</sup>

*Ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός οὐδὲν εἰδόμενον παθεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε μὲν ἄλλο ἐπὶ μακρότατον ἐπιβόησεν, μέγρη μὲν Ἐλεφαντίνης πόλιος αὐτότερος ἔλαβον, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦτου ἕκαστῆ ἴσθη ιστορέωεν.* (2.29.1)

I have not been able to learn anything from anyone else, but this much I have further been able to gather as far as I could, having come myself as far as the city of Elephantine as an eyewitness, and beyond that point making my researches through hearing.

Yet *historiē* is not merely a matter of listening either. In another well-known passage, Herodotus contrasts *historiē* as *critical* listening, along with *opsis* 'seeing' and *gnōmē* 'opinion', to the more passive reception of accounts (*logos*) as he heard them:

*Μέγρη μὲν τοῦτου ὄντος τε ἐμῆ καὶ πλεῖστη καὶ ιστορίῃ ταῦτα λέγουσά εἰσι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε Αἰγυπτίωνος ἔργουσι λόγους ἐπέωεν κατά τὰ ἕκαστον· προσέονται δὲ τι αὐτοῖσιν καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ὄψεως.* (2.99.1)

Up to that point my own observation as well as my judgment and my inquiry are at the basis of what is said, but from now on I will be presenting Egyptian accounts as I heard them; still, there will be an element of personal observation in it.

*Historiē*, then, seems to be looking through the eyes of one's informants and making up for their imperfect point of view by the power of judgment and discrimination. Needless to say, *historiē* is the interrogation of specially selected informants, and aims at proving or disproving their view of the truth. The concept is therefore obviously connected with knowing, but it does not necessarily involve actual seeing as source of knowledge. For this reason, another etymology

<sup>34</sup> On this passage, see also Saugé (1992) 252; on the next passage (2.99.1), see Carledge and Greenwood, this volume (Ch. 15), p. 355.



has recently been proposed by Edwin Floyd, who derives *historiē* (and *historiā*) not from the root *wid-* but from the verb *hizim* 'to seat'.<sup>35</sup> This yields the idea of convening two or more parties and listening to what they have to say. This would certainly suit the earliest occurrence of *historiā* at *Iliad* 18.501, in the description of the juridical scene on the Shield of Achilles, where the juridical sense of 'judge', 'arbiter' is particularly clear.

We do not have to decide whether or not the alternative etymology is linguistically correct to see that the semantic idea behind it provides a plausible interpretation of Herodotus' own conception of *historiā*. The core of the concept is not so much seeing yourself as acquiring knowledge through the interrogation of others who have seen, and who therefore know, or claim they know. This applies to the characters in the narrative no less than to the narrator: they, too, may be interested in what is beyond perception, remote in space or time. Croesus the Lydian king, for example, 'inquired' (*historōn*) which of the Greek states were the most powerful, and in doing so (*historōn*) found out that the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians were dominant at the time (1.56.1-2). And the Egyptian priests claimed they had secure knowledge about Menelaus' stay in Egypt through their own 'investigations' (*historiēsi*, 2.119.3).

The result of Croesus' and the Egyptian priests' investigations is self-evident and incontrovertible, as in the case of some of Herodotus' own researches. Concerning the question as to the real nature of Heracles, for example, Herodotus can report that 'the results of the investigation (*ta historiēmata*) indicate clearly (*delōi saphēōs*) that Heracles is an old god' (2.44.5). It remains, however, that *historiē* is not first-degree, absolute knowledge based on perception, but relative knowledge, an approximation of the facts of the matter, based on a judicious assessment of the pretended first-hand knowledge of others. Sometimes Herodotus states explicitly that his inquiries have yielded only partial and limited results: 'so far as I have been able to reach in my investigation'.<sup>36</sup> And the *logoi* resulting from an investigation may be

conflicting.<sup>37</sup> There may be 'difference' between them, as he informs us in his discussion of the number of Scythians:

Παρθος δὲ τὸ Σκυθέων οὐκ οἶός τε ἐξηντην ἄνθρωπος τοῦθῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ διαφόρους λόγους περὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἔκρουεν (4.81.1)

As for the multitude of the Scythians, I have not been able to learn anything about it with precision: I heard different versions about their number.

Herodotus' *historiē* may aim, among other things, at knowledge about subjects of scientific interest, such as the sources of the Nile or the demography of Scythia, but its basic material is language, *logoi*. And *historiē* proceeds through judgment and discrimination, as an implicit dialogue between the opinions of the researcher and those of his informants.

*Historiē*, as Herodotus' *History* implicitly informs us, is always a question to which the information solicited is a response; it therefore always provides a context for whatever the interrogated informant has to say. For an illustration of this idea, let us return to the beginning of the narrative. We saw already that the idea *ait-* (*aitiān*, *aitōus*, 'guilt(y)', 'responsibility/responsible') serves as conjoining device linking the Proem to the narrative and setting the latter in motion. Since the Proem explicitly links *historiē* to the *aitiē* of the war, we can safely assume that *historiē* is at work from the very start of the narrative. Even though the investigation into the mythical 'cause' of the conflict is a dead end for Herodotus himself, soon to be abandoned for more meaningful research, it does provide a basic insight into the semantics, indeed, pragmatics, of *historiē*. To repeat the first sentence of Herodotus' account proper, as it emanates from the Proem:

Περσέων μὲν πῦν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ Φοινίκας αἰτίους φασὶ γενέσθαι τῆς διαφθοῆς. (1.1.1)

Now the chroniclers of the Persians claim that the Phoenicians have been responsible for the conflict (lit. 'difference').

The conflict between the Greeks and the Persians is reformulated as a *diaphorē*, literally, a 'difference', 'variance'. We can imagine what the Persian *logoi* 'say' (*phasin*) as a response to a question of the

<sup>35</sup> Floyd (1990) 161. Floyd bases his objections to the traditional etymology primarily on the rough breathing on ἱστορίαν, ἱστορία (which is not easy to harmonize with the verbal root *hid-*). As Rosen (1993) 146 n. 1 points out, however, the collocation of the suffix -τιον with a reduplicated present stem ἱστ-ειν (<\*st-sd) is not without problems either.

<sup>36</sup> 2.34.1 ἐπὶ ὅσων μακρότατον ἱστορήσασθαι ἔβηκεσθαι. 4.192.3 ὅσων ἤματις ἱστορήσασθαι ἐπὶ μακρότατον οἶσὶ τε ἐξηντησάμεθα ἔβηκεσθαι.

<sup>37</sup> E.g., Dewald (1987); Connor (1993).

*histor*: 'Who according to your national tradition are *aitoi* of the 'difference' between the Greeks and the Persians?' Or even, in an imagined courtroom: 'The Greeks consider you guilty of the *diaphorē*. What do you have to say in defence?' The very state of being *aitios*, in fact, is the obligation to 'respond', as in English 'responsible'.

The verb used for demanding satisfaction from a 'responsible' party is the etymologically connected *aitō*, which is used several times in the Persians' account as it is rendered in Herodotus' indirect discourse: the Colchian king sent heralds to Greece to 'demand satisfaction (*aitēin dikas*) for the rape of Medea and demand back (*ap-aitēin*) his daughter' (1.2.3). A little later, both in mythical time and in Herodotus' story time, the Greeks will do exactly the same for Helen in Troy.<sup>38</sup> This mutual demanding of satisfaction does not stop with the earliest dealings between the Greeks and the barbarians; it continues into the *historiē* of which Herodotus gives us here the results: the Persian *logoi* apparently speak in defence, claiming that in having launched a wholesale attack on Troy the Greeks are the real *aitoi tas diaphoras*. The end of this imaginary 'trial' is well known. Herodotus leaves this inconclusive case for what it is and turns to the man whom he 'knows' (*oidō*) to have started the hostilities against the Greeks (1.5.3). But meanwhile he *has* given *logoi* on the subject, and he *has* shown their difference.

The attempt to retrace the earliest *aitiē* for the 'difference' between the Greeks and the barbarians points up a case of precisely what Herodotus' work, as presented in the Proem, claims to be able to prevent: 'things made to happen by men' (*genomena ex anthrōpōn*) that have become 'fading' [or extinct] with time', *tōi khronōi exitōla*.<sup>39</sup> Yet the very impossibility of the recovery of these remote events reveals an essential aspect of Herodotus' *historiē*: its inherently dialogic nature. The search for the *aitiē* of human behaviour generates new human behaviour in the form of language: opinions that answer the *histor*'s question, responding to each other, contradicting each other, either rejected or accepted by the discriminating investigator. *Historiē*, in other words, takes the *diaphorē* 'difference, conflict' of the historical

process to a new, semantic, level, since it creates the space for a *diaphorē* between two or more *logoi*, always including the *histor*'s own.

The beginning of the narrative merely puts in practice this essential aspect of Herodotus' method. Later on he will explain at various points. 'Let anyone to whom such things are credible', he says at 2.123.1, 'do what they want to do with what the Egyptians say; I myself stick to the principle that underlies all of my account: I write what I heard being said by either party.' An even fuller disclosure is prompted by the controversial subject of the role of Argos in the war with Xerxes: 'Whether Xerxes sent a herald to Argos with this message', he says (7.152.1), 'and whether messengers from Argos went to Sousa to interrogate Aroxcerxes about their friendship I cannot say with certainty (*ouk . . . atthēōs*), nor do I express an opinion (*gnōmēn* . . . *apophanomat*)<sup>40</sup> on these matters other than the one expressed by the Argives themselves'. These words are complemented a few lines later with the following declaration.<sup>41</sup>

Ἐγὼ δὲ δοεῖμαι λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πεθεοῦμαι γὰρ μὲν οὐ κατανάστασιν δοεῖμαι (καὶ μὴ τοῦτο τὸ ἐμός ἐγέτω ἐς κἀνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου). (7.152.3)

I am bound to record [lit. 'say', *legōn*] what is being said, but I am not at all bound to believe it—and this word (*phōs*) will hold true for the whole of my account.

In light of these statements of method, the phrase *ta genomena ex anthrōpōn* from the Proem acquires a new and essential meaning: 'things made to happen by men' is not limited to things done, but includes things said. *Historiē* as conducted by Herodotus provides a forum for the works *and* the words of the past. Conflict, difference, is in the nature of the object of Herodotus' *historiē*, which presents itself as the search for an *aitiē* of a difference; but it is also the *product* of Herodotus' *historiē*, in the conflicting *logoi* for which *historiē* provides the context. In investigating the causes of the conflict, the *histor* becomes responsible for what his project purports to investigate: he becomes *aitios diaphorēs* 'responsible for difference'. We shall see in the next sections how a study of *phōdaxis* complements this deep connection between the researcher and the characters of the story he tells.

<sup>38</sup> 1.3.2 ἀναστῆναι τε Ἐλεῖνον καὶ δίκας τῆς ἀπρόσθητος αἰτιῆς. Cf. 2.118.3; 4.164.1; 8.114.1. On the relation between αἰτός and αἰτέω in this light, see also Sange (1992) 257 ff., who goes as far as to gloss αἰτή as 'demande de réparation' rather than 'cause'.

<sup>39</sup> See also Dewald (1987) 169.

<sup>40</sup> This negative phrase is significant in light of the formula γνῶμην ἀποδέχεσθαι (rather than τροποποιεῖσθαι); see note 47 below.

<sup>41</sup> On this passage, see Jacoby (1913) 408–9. See also 3.3.1; 3.9.2. See also Cartledge and Greenwood, this volume (Ch. 15, p. 356).

Apodexis: *Proof in Context*

In his discussion of the size of Egypt, Herodotus criticizes the erroneous ideas of the Ionians. The argumentation requires him to use three times the verb *apodēiknumi*:

If we want to accept what the Ionians maintain about Egypt (who hold that Egypt is only the Delta [...]), then we would be proving (*ἀποδείκνουμεν ὅτι*) that at some point the Egyptians did not have a country at all. (2.15.1)

So if my reasoning about these matters is correct, the Ionians have false ideas about Egypt. But suppose the opinion of the Ionians is right: then I am proving (*ἀποδείκνυμι*) that the Greeks and the Ionians themselves do not know how to count. (2.16.1)

My claim that the extent of Egypt is such as I am proving in my present discourse (*ἀποδείκνυμι τῷ λόγῳ*) is also confirmed by an oracle of Ammon about which I learned after my own opinion (*τῆς εἰσεσότης γνώμης*) about Egypt was formed. (2.18.1)

This is of course the world of demonstration and proof that Thomas highlights.<sup>42</sup> It is, however, important to note that *apodēiknumi* is not merely a matter of 'proof', but also the *act* of proving something, as a response to a specific situation. In the first two instances, this situation is given in a conditional clause in which the Ionians' opinion is expressed, hypothetically. In the first example, the idea that Egypt is only the Delta is shown to be invalid, since it amounts to a manifestly absurd claim. The act of *apodēiknumai* is not performed for its own sake, but is invoked, as the inevitable consequence of a false belief. Likewise, in the second example, Herodotus' 'proof' that the Greeks cannot count is conditioned by a specific context. Without that context, the act of proving would not have taken place. Similarly, in the last passage, Herodotus' demonstration of the size of Egypt is prompted by the Greeks' ignorance. In another geographical passage, the proof required by a given claim cannot take place, supposedly due to lacking or insufficient *historiē*:

τὸν δὲ Ἰακωνὸν λόγον μὲν λέγουσι ὅτι ἡλίον ἀνατολάειν ἀρξάμενον γῆν περι-  
 ρᾶσαν πέσειν, ἔγρηθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀποδείκνύουσι. (4.8.2)

They [sc. the Greeks] say in their account that Oceanus, starting from the East, is flowing all around the world, but they do not prove this with hard fact.

The mutual expectancy between proof and context is here a matter of the polar contrast between *logōtā* and *ergōtā*, which is underscored by the use of *men . . . de*: proof is required and anticipated, but does not follow.

The notion of context remains equally important also when we leave the agonistic sphere of proof and opposing claims: each and every instance of the verbal idea *apo-deik-* in the *Histories* is an act that is performed as a response to a specific situation. The shepherd in the story of Cyrus' birth, who says he is ready to 'show' (*apodēiknumai*, 1.113.2; cf. 1.110.3) the body of the infant does so at a specific request: he has to prove to Harpagos that the newborn prince is dead in order to avoid severe punishment; the Persians who 'show' (*apodēiknumi*, 1.136.1) their children do so for a specific purpose: special gifts are promised by the king for the man who has the most numerous offspring; the Egyptians who 'showed' the body of their father (2.136.2) did so as part of a well-defined transaction: as borrowers they were required by law to provide a security to the lender; the army division that was required to 'bring' (*apodēiknain*, 8.35.2) the treasures of Delphi to Xerxes acted on specific military orders.

This contextualization of the act of 'deixis' is due to the force of the preverb; on account of its meaning 'back again' (LSJ D.4), *apō-* can lend a supplementary contextual dimension to the basic meaning of a verb.<sup>43</sup> In the case of verbs denoting speech, the addition of *apo-* turns the sensibility to context into an immediately dialogic sense: *apo-logomai* 'speak in return', 'defend oneself against', *apo-krinomai* 'reason in return', 'answer'. In a recent study of *apo-phlegma* as a 'performance of wisdom', Joseph Russo has aptly formulated this as 'the sense of giving back an utterance particularly called forth by the social context operating upon the speakers'.<sup>44</sup>

At this point it may be useful to change the preverb and turn for a moment to *epi-deik-*. Herodotus' usage clearly shows that far from being synonyms, the two verbs have very specific and different meanings. When Candaulus' wife says to Gyges that her husband has 'shown her naked' (*eme epedeikato gymnaī*, 1.11.5), she means the gratuitous display of her body, uncalled for and not in response to any

<sup>43</sup> E.g., *apo-didōmi* 'give back what is expected', *apo-kechōrtai* 'return what is due', 'restore', *apo-dechthō* 'receive what is one's due', *an-aratō* 'demand back' (p. 18 above).

<sup>44</sup> Russo (1997) 59.

<sup>42</sup> Thomas (2000) 176, with discussion of the passages cited. See also Darbo-Peschanski (1987) 161.

previous request. When Croesus' servants 'show' (*epedeikusan*, 1.30.1) Solon the king's vast treasures, the unnecessary display fails to impress the king's guest and so misses its point. The action noun *epideixis* occurs once, in the sense of 'surprising spectacle', used for the he-goat that mounted a woman in full view of everybody (2.46.4). On account of the meaning of *epi-* ('besides', 'in addition to') the act of *epi-deiknūnai* may create a certain distance between the display and its witnesses: the spectacle is an addition to a given context, or its witnesses are external spectators of the display.

The examples of *epi-deik* and *apo-deik* reveal a further difference, which will prove important for the meaning of *apodeixis* in the Proem. The object of *epideixis* is always shown as is; it existed before it was shown or displayed and is not changed or modified by it. Zeus shows his face to Heracles (2.42.2) or Atossa her breast to Democedes (3.135.2) in acts of *epideixis* that leave the objects shown unaffected. What is 'shown' in an act denoted by *apo-deik*, by contrast, is always changed in the act, and may not even have existed before. The person or thing pointed at in an act of *apodeiknūnai* acquires a new function according to the requirements of the context. *Apodeiknūnai* is 'proving' that the person or thing 'pointed at' is different from what he or she was before; thus the verb frequently means 'assign a specific function', 'appoint',<sup>45</sup> and Herodotus expresses the healing of Darius' foot by Democedes as 'he proved him to be healthy' (*hugiea min eonta apodeixas*, 3.130.3; cf. 3.134.1).

The examples of *apo-deik* shown thus far are all in the active voice. They display semantic features that are relevant for our purpose, but we move closer to the meaning of *apodeixis* in the Proem when we turn to the instances where *apo-deik* is used in the middle voice.<sup>46</sup> We will see that the middle voice, in accordance with its basic meaning, stresses the involvement of the subject in the act, which yields the idea of personal achievement as an important feature of the semantics of *apodeixis*.

### Recording Accomplishment

The dialogic 'giving back' to a context, which, as we saw, is the sense of the preverb *apo-*, is central in the important Herodotean phrase *apodekasthai tēn gnōmēn* which I will translate as 'perform/put into practice one's opinion'. This expression is used frequently by Herodotus for situations of speech and decision-making in his narrative. The act of *apodekasthai* is not simply the expression or presentation of an opinion or a belief *touti court*, but a constructive contribution to an evolving communicative reality. The *gnōmē* is pointed out not as a display for its own sake, but in response to other *gnōmēi* or with the intention of shaping subsequent ones. In fact, it may be in overt conflict with other views presented in the particular context. For example, when all of Cyrus' advisers suggest that the Persians await the attack of the army of Queen Tomynis, Croesus alone, 'finding fault' (*mephōmenos*) with this advice, presents a view that is opposed to the opinion at hand (*apedeiktunō manthēn tēi prokēmenēi gnōmēi*, 1.207.1); similarly, when Mardonios has spoken in favour of invading Greece, no one of the Persians present dares 'present an opinion against the one at hand' (*gnōmēn apodeiktunasthai antitēn tēi prokēmenēi*, 7.10.1).<sup>47</sup>

When Herodotus' own *gnōmē* is the object of the verb *apodekasthai*, the sense of conflict and difference of opinion is equally strong: on the subject of the importance of the contribution of the Athenians to the war with Xerxes, Herodotus says that he is obliged to put forth a view (*gnōmēn apodekasthai*) that will not please everybody:

Ἐπιβοῦσα ἀνωρκταῖη ἐξέπροβατο γυῖανυ ἀκοδῆσθεσθαί ἐπιφθονοῦ μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεονῶν ἀνφθάρων, ὄμιος δέ, τῆ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀλαθές, οὐκ ἐκτροχίστω. (7.139.1)

At this point I cannot but put forth an opinion which in fact is odious to the majority; still, in so far as it seems to me a matter of true fact, I will not withhold it.

<sup>47</sup> Other examples: 1.170.1, 1.171.1; 1.207.1 (μειφόμενος); 3.74.4; 3.81.3; 3.160.1; 4.97.2; 4.98.2; 4.137.3; 6.41.3; 6.43.3; 7.3.1; 7.6.5; 7.10.1 (ἀντιπρὸς τῷ προκειμένῳ); 7.46.1; 7.99.3; 8.68a1; 8.108.2 (ἐναντιῶν); 9.58.3 (disapproval: δειλοτέρην). Notice that the supposedly synonymous phrase ἀποφαινομένη τὴν γνώμην (e.g. 1.40; 1.207.2; 2.120.5; 3.71.1; 7.88.2; 7.52.1; 7.143.3; 7.152.1; 8.49.1; 9.5.2) appears to be more neutral, and does not convey the same sense of controversy and conflict (the underlined examples represent Herodotus' own opinion; see also note 40 above).

<sup>45</sup> 1.124.3; 1.125.2; 1.127.2; 1.162.2; 3.63.2; 4.167.1; 5.25.1; 5.25.2; 5.32; 5.32; 5.64.1; 5.83.3; 5.97.3; 5.99.2; 6.57.2; 6.94.2; 6.95.1; 7.2.1; 7.3.4; 7.4.1; 7.81.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Erhse (1956) 209–11.

Without the Athenians, Greece would surely have fallen into Persian hands, despite the *apodeixis* of *megala erga* on the part of the Spartans. The mysterious behaviour of the Nile yields another characteristic moment:

Εἰ δὲ θεῖ μελλώμενον γνώμας τὴς ποδοκμηθένος αὐτὸν περὶ τῶν ἀπορῶν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἀποδείκασθαι, φράσα δὲ ὅ τῃ μοι δοκεῖται πλῆθυσθεῖσαι ὁ Νεῖλος τοῦ θεοῦτος. (2.24.1)

If I must, after criticizing the theories mentioned, put forth a view myself about things invisible, I will say what is to my mind the cause of the flooding of the Nile in the summer.

Herodotus' personal *gnōmē* is here obviously part of his *historiē* of a controversial topic, a matter of scientific proof and argument, but again we observe that Herodotus' own practice is similar to that of characters in his tale outside scientific contexts.<sup>48</sup> The *apodeixis* of *historiē* apparently has something in common with the *apodeixis* of a *gnōmē*, with counselling and deliberation.<sup>49</sup> Both deal with difference.

It has something in common also with an equally important type of behaviour in the historical process. The verb *apodekasmasthai* is frequently combined, as early as the Proem, as we saw, with the standard phrase *erga megala*, yielding a formula that denotes a key concept in Herodotus' thought and work.<sup>50</sup> The use of *apodekasmasthai erga megala* is especially frequent in Book Two, where the record of achievement of the Egyptians and their kings is being reviewed, but it remains common throughout the *Historiēs*.<sup>51</sup> In the Battle of Salamis, the Aeginetians, for example, are said to have 'performed noteworthy deeds' (*erga apodekasmato logou axia*, 8.91); and in the Battle of Plataea by far the best' (*aristos makrōn*) on the Greek side was Aristodemos, the sole survivor of the three hundred Spartiates who had died earlier at Thermopylae, who wanted to make up for this dishonour: desiring to die a most glorious death, he 'left the ranks in his battle rage and wrought great deeds' (*hussōnta te kai ekleptonta tēn kaxin erga apodekasmasthai megala*, 9.71.3).

The idea of 'achievement' expressed with *erga megala apodekasmasthai* is so central to the meaning of *apo-deik* that even without any object

the verb continues to convey the idea of personal accomplishment. In the Battle of Plataea, for example, the allied troops of the Persian army 'led without accomplishing anything' (*oute ti apodekasmatos ephairgon*, 9.67). The nature of the accomplishment can also be expressed with a more specific term substituted for *erga megala*: of the remarkable works of irrigation of Queen Semiramis of Assyria we learn that she 'accomplished dykes all across the plain, very much worth visiting' (*apodekasmato klēmata ana to pedion eonta axiotheiāta*, 1.184).

The direct relevance of this sense of *apo-deik* for the interpretation of *historiēs apodeixis* in the Proem is underscored by the fact that all of the four other actual occurrences of the action noun *apodeixis* in the *Historiēs* are used to convey the sense of 'achievement' or 'accomplishment'. Croesus advises Cyrus to cross over to the territory of the Massagetae and lure Queen Tomyris' army with a sumptuous banquet, which will 'leave' to Cyrus' army the 'accomplishment of great deeds' (*leipeiati apodeixis ergōn megalon*, 1.207.7); Egyptian priests assure Herodotus that 'no record of achievement' (*oudemian ergōn apodeixin*, 2.101.1) exists for the remaining kings from the list; the common memorial of the Twelve Kings of Egypt, a labyrinth situated a little above Lake Moeris, surpassed in cost and labour all the 'walls and public works' (*teichēta te kai ergōn apodeixin*, 2.148.2) of the Greeks; and, finally, Mardonius' assessment of the military situation after the defeat of the Persian fleet at Salamis was that his Persian troops were not responsible for it, and 'anxious for achievement' (*boulomenoisi sphin genoi' an apodeixis*, 8.101.2).

In all these cases it is obvious that no accomplishment or achievement whatsoever precedes the *apodeixis*. The *apodeixis* of great deeds is their accomplishment, their enactment, *not* their display or showing. Those of the Medes and Persians who proved their virtue in the Battle of Plataea (*apodekasmato aretas*, 9.40) did not make a mere display, but they proved their worth in the very situation.<sup>52</sup> Before we proceed with asking what this means for the *apodeixis* of Herodotus' own *historiē*, we have to address another question. If the essence of the act of *apodeixis* is its contextualization and 'situatedness', as was

<sup>48</sup> In the two remaining instances, 2.146.1 and 8.8.3, the context is again conflict between accounts.

<sup>49</sup> On the relation between *istoropōn* and *gnōmā*, see also Saugé (1992) 11.

<sup>50</sup> See also Erbsse (1956) 211.

<sup>51</sup> On *ἐργα μεγάλα* (τε καὶ θαυραστά), see Raubitschek (1939).

<sup>52</sup> Cf. 1.176.1; 7.23.3; 7.223.4. There is an instructive difference between 7.24 (Ἐπίσης) θάλασσαν τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκασθαι καὶ ἠμυδροῦσα ἀναστῆσαι and Thuc. 6.47.1 ἐπιδείξασθαι... τῆς δύναμιν τῆς Ἀθηναίων κόλασε (cf. Thuc. 6.31.4). Xerxes wanted to prove his power by leaving a great achievement to posterity (see below), whereas the Athenians merely wanted to display their military force.

suggested above, then what is the context for the *apodeixis* of great deeds as we see it throughout the *Historiēs*? We move in the direction of an answer to this question when we consider another typically Herodotean phrase.

Throughout the *Historiēs*, Herodotus imparts to the players in the historical process the desire to distinguish themselves in the eyes of posterity, to leave signs by which their existence on earth can be remembered. The typical phrase for this is *mnēmōnon* (*mnēmōnōn*) *lēpēsthai* 'to leave things (of oneself) to be remembered'. The *mnēmōnon* is usually an artifact or monument, but not necessarily so. Examples of *mnēmōnōna* include the waterworks of Queen Nitocris of Babylonia (1.185.1, 186.1), the gigantic statues erected by Sesostris in front of the temple of Hephæstus (2.110.1), the brick pyramid of Asychis (2.136.3), but also the *bon mot* of Dieneceus the Lacedaemonian belonging to the oral tradition feeding on the Battle of Thermopylae (7.226.2). All of these examples belong to the sphere of *apodeixis ergōn megalōn*. The description of the *mnēmōnōna* of Queen Nitocris follows closely on that of the achievements of Queen Semiramis for which, as we saw, the verb *apodeixai* is used; the description of Asychis' pyramid is part of a list of the achievements of this king, rounded off with the phrase *katōn men tosanōta apodeixasthai* ('this [king], then, is said to have achieved this much', 2.136.4). The two phrases *apodeixasthai* (*erga megala*) and *mnēmōnōna* (*lēpēsthai*), in fact, are very much in each other's semantic orbit. The latter can be the direct object of the former (*apodeixasthai mnēmōnōna*, 'to have achieved things to be remembered', 2.101.2, said of the Propylaea of King Moeris), and the two phrases can complement each other in one complex expression (e.g., *elthein te dunamin apodeixasthai kai mnēmōnōna lēpēsthai*, 'wanting to put his power in practice and to leave achievements to be remembered', 7.24, said of Xerxes and the canal through the Athos Peninsula).<sup>55</sup>

Turning now to the question as to the context of the *apodeixis ergōn megalōn*, we notice that there is a reciprocity between on the one hand the intentions of the Greeks and barbarians engaged in the making of history and on the other hand the intentions of Herodotus himself in making his *historiē*. The desire to leave *mnēmōnōna* is mirrored and answered by Herodotus' wish to record them as *erga megala*

*apodeiktēnōta*. In other words, what is recorded *wants* to be recorded and the context in which the deed is performed and accomplished is nothing other than posterity, more specifically, the *Historiēs* of Herodotus.

We are reminded here of the heroic condition as presented by the *Iliad*, in particular of Hector, who speaks about the future at various moments, e.g.:<sup>54</sup>

μη μὲν δόμονδ' ἔχει καὶ ἀρκέως ἀπολοῦμαι,  
ὁδὸν μὲν ἔβησας τὴν καὶ εὐρομένωτον τυθέσθαι. (Il. 22.304–5)

It will certainly not be without great effort and great fame that I perish; no, that will happen after I have accomplished a great deed, for people of the future to hear about.

Hector uses a negative compound form of the root *klei(w)-* (*akleioō*) to designate an undesirable state in the future, and he combines the root (*w/leg* (a morphological alternative to (*w/erg* in *ergon*)) with *mega* (*mega thesas*): a way of speaking that points ahead to the future of Herodotus' Proem with its intention not to let *megala erga* become *akleā*.<sup>55</sup>

It looks as if Herodotus, as the present argument progresses, is becoming more and more dependent on the Homeric conception of heroic achievement. Yet in spite of the reminiscence there is an essential difference. For Hector and the epic tradition that envelops him, great deeds carry their own *kleos*, perpetuated unproblematically through epic poetry under the authority of the Muse. If there is a lack of *kleos* in the future, this is due to a hero's not performing a great deed in the present.<sup>56</sup> To this epic scenario, Herodotus opposes the destructive force of time, the substance that makes human achievements lose colour and lustre (the *tai khronōi exilia* from the Proem).<sup>57</sup> Without proper recording, any great deed, however heroic,

<sup>54</sup> Also Il. 7.89–91, where he thinks of the tomb of one of his defeated opponents as a sign pointing to the past, Hector's glorious present; see also Cobet (Ch. 17) and Boeckler (Ch. 5), this volume (p. 389 and p. 99, resp.), as well as Bakker (1997a) 165–6; (1997b) 33. On Herodotus and epic intentions, see also Erbse (1992) 122. Within Herodotus' narrative, cf. 6.109.3, 7.220.2.

<sup>55</sup> See also Pellucchia (1992) 74 n. 23.

<sup>56</sup> This happens in the *Historiēs* at 9.72.2, where Callicrates, in truly Homeric manner 'the most beautiful man in the Greek camp', died without having been able to accomplish (*ἀνοδέξασθαι*) a great deed; ironically, he does get his *kleos*, in the framework of Herodotus' *apodeixis*. On this passage, see also Nagy (1987) 178.

<sup>57</sup> On *ἐξίτηλα*, see Moles (1999) sect. 8, who argues that this term creates an

<sup>55</sup> On *ἀνοδέξασθαι* and its connection with *ἀνοδέξασθαι*, see also Drexler (1972) 23–5.

will lose its *kleos*. But recording is not a matter of merely receiving the report from the past; it takes selection, discrimination, and research. In Herodotus' conception, *historiē*, with its positive results and the questions which it leaves or raises, has taken over the authority of poetic memory and the Muses.<sup>58</sup>

We can now reappraise the seemingly unnecessary rendering, in indirect discourse, of the stories of reciprocal bride-stealing that the Persian *logoi* adduce as the *aitiē* of the conflict between the Greeks and the barbarians. Such mythologizing, the domain of myth, poetic memory, and the Muses, is unable to answer the questions that *historiē* poses. But *historiē* remains linked with the Muses as source and safeguard of information. Homer, when faced with the intimidating number (*plēthos*) of the Greek leaders in the Trojan War (*Il.* 2.488), uses this moment to confess to his human shortcomings and invoke the Muses to assist him. When Herodotus finds himself confronting a similar problem (i.e., the number of Scythians (*plēthos*), 4.81.1, see pages 16–17 above), he offers us a sentence that reads as a conscious stylistic evocation of the famous Homeric passage; but he gives us at the same time one of his most characteristic descriptions of *historiē* as a matter of 'differing *logoi*'. The difference between human shortcomings and divine vision has yielded to a difference between human visions. The intellectual load of discriminating between them is a heavy one, and accordingly *apodexis* is not only the *accomplishment* of great deeds, but also their *recording*, which cannot fail to become a great accomplishment itself, a *mega ergon*, in the process.<sup>59</sup>

#### *Herodotus, Thucydides, and the Making of History*

The Herodotus that emerges from the foregoing discussion of *historiē* and *apodexis* is neither an oral storyteller nor an accomplished modern scientist. Or rather he is both, using the vocabulary of the lat-

<sup>58</sup> 'Inscrptional' atmosphere, either in its genealogical sense of 'extinct' (cf. 5.39.2), which points to funerary monuments, or in the sense of 'fading', which would contrast the durability of Herodotus' work with the transient nature of material artifacts. On the Proem as an inscription, see pages 29–32 below.

<sup>59</sup> See also Darbo-Peschanski (1987), 162; Boedeker, this volume, Ch. 5, p. 100.

<sup>60</sup> One may wonder whether Herodotus was aware of the parallel with Telemachus, who set out on a voyage to inquire after the *kleos* of his father (*Od.* 3.82), to win *kleos* himself in the process (*Od.* 1.95).

ter to revolutionize the practice of the former. *Historiē*, the term of choice for contemporary critical research based on autopsy, becomes in Herodotus' hands a displaced viewing, a critical examination of the opinion of those who have seen. Herodotus shares with the epic poet his not having been on the spot and his not having seen, but he makes up for it, even appropriating an authority that is denied to the epic poet, by adopting the intellectual stance of the day.

*Historiē*, then, is not merely 'research', nor is *apodexis* merely its 'publication' or 'presentation'; *apodexis*, as we see it develop in the course of the *Histories*, appears to be, rather, the enactment of an accomplishment. Within the framework of the *Histories* and in the historical reality that it evokes, *historiē* is what makes *apodexis* possible, either in the form of opinions presented by historical personalities or as a matter of accomplishment on the part of agents in the historical process: the great achievements of the past that become an *apodexis* specifically in the context of Herodotus' *History*. And, significantly, both the opinions and the accomplishments create 'difference', in the form of either controversy in debate or conflict in history, of which the *diaphorē* between the Greeks and the barbarians is the overarching example.

But 'difference' is more than something that is represented *within* Herodotus' rendering of the past; as we saw, the very process of *historiē* is a matter of difference as it reveals conflicting accounts of problematic subject matter, not to mention the cases where Herodotus' own opinion is overtly controversial. To the extent that Herodotus' *historiē* itself leaves questions unanswered or raises problems, the final decision is deferred to the *Histories'* public, then and now. Anyone who reads Herodotus' work is invited to judge the achievements of the past through the achievement of Herodotus himself, which writing has prevented from becoming 'faded with time'.<sup>60</sup> In being asked to conduct their own *historiē*, Herodotus' future audiences make possible the *apodexis* of Herodotus himself.

In this light we can consider a final element of the Proem, to which too little attention has been paid: the deictic pronoun *hēle* which modifies *historiē* *apodexis*. This pronoun, as it is used in narrative, is often treated, without much overt discussion, as the cataphoric pronoun that points ahead to what follows in the text.<sup>61</sup> This

<sup>60</sup> On 'writing', see also the contribution of Rosler (Ch. 4) to this volume.

<sup>61</sup> As in the common formula to introduce direct speech *ἐκεῖτε τὰδε* 'spoke as

would imply that Herodotus himself, in the act of writing, is the deictic centre of the Proem: 'what follows (i.e., what I have before me) is the *historiēs apodexis* of Herodotus of Halicarnassus', or 'the *historiēs apodexis* of Herodotus of Halicarnassus is as follows'. Such a discourse-internal function of *hēde*, however, does not exhaust the possibilities of this demonstrative; indeed, the cataphoric use of *hōde* is not even its primary function. When used in interactive discourse contexts, the proper *locus* of this proximal deictic element, *hōde* is typically discourse-external, either marking something as close to the speaker and the hearer, or referring to the discourse itself, even to the speaker himself in the act of uttering it.<sup>62</sup>

This would mean for the Proem that the deictic centre of *historiēs apodexis hēde* is constituted by the reader, who is conceived of as standing before Herodotus' monumental achievement.<sup>63</sup> The deictic orientation of the prologue would then become that of an inscription.<sup>64</sup> As is known, dedicatory or funeral inscriptions can refer to themselves as *tautē sēma* or *tautē mnēmā* 'this tomb/monument here', locating themselves as close with respect to the passerby, the monument's reader.<sup>65</sup> The passerby, cast by the monument's inscription in the role of speaker, is made the *origo* of a deictic act that will be performed as long as the monument is standing, and read. Herodotus' first words thus become an implicit version of the *sphragis* of the corollary, e.g., 1.112; 1.36.2, etc.; or the cases where *ōde*, used predicatively, refers ahead to the content of, e.g., a *tyōphn*, e.g., 1.132.1; 2.17.4; 2.17, etc. Cf. Kühner-Gerth (1898–1904) 1: 646. See also de Jong, this volume (Ch. 11), p. 259.

<sup>62</sup> Thus, Herodotus can present things as close to himself and his public, e.g., 1.1.1 τῆδε τὴν θάλασσαν 'this sea', as opposed to the Red Sea mentioned just before; 2.106.4; 4.118.1 τῆδε τὴν ἡέραρον, as opposed to τῆ θηταίῳ τῆ ἐτέρη (it is not necessary to take this use of the deictic as a trace of oral delivery of the work; it seems preferable to see the deictic as uttered within the deictic centre of the Greeks, regardless of a specific moment). For the link between *ōde* and the first grammatical person, see, e.g., *ōde toi rapetun* as uttered by young Cynus before Asvages (Hdt. 1.115.3); cf. Svenbro (1993) 33 ff. (see note 63) and Bakker (1999b) 10 on Hesiod's self-presentation at *Th.* 24.

<sup>63</sup> On the future orientation of the *Historiēs*, see also Rosler (Ch. 4, this volume), 64. For this idea, see now Moles (1999), with extensive discussion also of Thucydides 1.21–22 in this connection, and, earlier, Svenbro (1993) 149–50, focussing on the author's referring to himself in the third person as a 'monumental' way of saying.

<sup>64</sup> In other words, the monument is 'speaking' of itself in the third person. See Svenbro (1993) 26–34, who argues that this deictic orientation was preceded by an 'ego-centric' phase, in which the monument 'spoke' in the first person, with the transition point somewhere around the middle of the 6th cent. BCE. A simple example is the dedicatory epigram cited by Thucydides (6.54): ἐπιτύλα τὸδ' ἦς ἀργῆς Ηειοτόροπος Ἰππίων υἱὸς | ὄψεκεν Ἀρόλλωνος Πυθίων ἐν τειλέει.

puns of Theognidean elegy, which actually cites its readers or listeners (the difference is immaterial) in the act of acknowledging the authenticity of the text before them: 'And so will every one say: "These are the words (*phē*) of Theognis of Megara, who is named among all humans."<sup>66</sup>

If Herodotus' Proem is understood along these lines, then its deictic orientation underscores what our study of *apo-deixis* in the *Historiēs* had already revealed: the recording of 'great monuments' (architectural or otherwise) becomes a great monument itself, an achievement on a par with the *megala erga apodoktimēta*, whose *kleos* it intends to preserve.<sup>67</sup> In speaking of *apodexis hēde*, then, Herodotus appears to be no less oriented toward the future of his work than is Thucydides, who famously characterizes his own work as a *kēmā es aei*, 'a possession for all time'.<sup>68</sup>

The understanding of *apodexis* that I have proposed in the preceding pages, in fact, may shed light on Thucydides' supposed reference to Herodotus. The focus of interest is the phrase in which Thucydides describes the kind of ephemeral public utterance to which he pretends to oppose his own durable creation: *agōnizma es to paraktēna akōnēn* 'a performance to be listened to in the immediate present' (1.22.4). The phrase presumably conveys the idea of the intention to please an immediate, contemporary, audience. *Agōnizma* is usually taken as 'declamation' or as 'competitively presented lecture', but a recent survey of the earliest occurrences of the term in fifth-century texts goes in a slightly different direction. According to William Johnson, *agōnizma* means 'the accomplishment of a notable act' with a focus 'not so much on the intrinsic value of the achievement as (on) the popular favour that it brings'.<sup>69</sup> Under such an understanding,

<sup>66</sup> Theogn. 22–3 (cf. 20: τοιοῦτ' ἔσται).

<sup>67</sup> On Herodotus' future-oriented stance, see also Connor (1987) 258, Lareiner (1989) 5n8 as well as Raftaub, this volume (Ch. 7). For the opposite view that Herodotus is not interested in reaching beyond his immediate audience (Thucydides supposed hint at 1.22.4, but see below), see, e.g., Fornara (1971a) 60.

<sup>68</sup> Moles (1999) section 4 discusses κτῆμα as 'monument'. The future orientation of Thucydides' undertaking is also apparent in the aorist verb (ἔθηκεν) ἐπέπεσεν, which occurs in the Proem as well as in the recurrent formula for the end of a year (Th. 2.103.2, etc.): the verb ('Thucydides) has written' implies the time of a reader in the future, see Bakker (1997d) 30.

<sup>69</sup> Johnson (1994) 232–8; citation p. 233. Johnson notes that in Thucydides the term *tyōvōvōv* usually means the glory that results from a notable achievement; the term is used (7.56.2) to represent the Syracusans' own characterization of their victory over the Athenians.



the term begins to resonate with respect to Herodotus' *apodexis*, and may even be meant to supplant it consciously: the choice of *agônismos* would subtly present Herodotus' work as a mere achievement in the present, devoid, unlike Thucydides' own work, of lasting importance for the future.

However that may be, and whether or not Thucydides' choice of words betrays an indirect challenge to the monumental aspirations of Herodotus' work as a competitor for the favour of future audiences, an essential difference between the two remains. Where Thucydides sees his work, polished and authoritative, as a standard for analysing the events of the future, which will always be comparable given the constancy of human nature (*kata to anthrôpinon*, 1.22.4), Herodotus, more involved in the actual process of *historiê* and intent on *showing it in practice*, asks his future audiences to be more involved as well. Far from pleasing the crowd in an immediate present, Herodotus' *apodexis*, as we have seen, does not shun controversy, and looks ahead to the audience of the future. In reading the inscription on his monument, we not only become, implicitly, speakers who acknowledge Herodotus' achievement; we are also are cast in Herodotus' own role. Standing not before the publication or presentation of the Inquiry, but before the Inquiry *itself*, its enactment, we are asked to do what Herodotus did himself: to listen critically, to question, and to judge. We are also asked to do what Herodotus did with the monuments and *megala erga* he encountered: to record. The present volume is among the many proofs that Herodotus achieved what he aspired to.

## CHAPTER TWO

### HERODOTUS AND ATHENS<sup>1</sup>

John Moles

Most older scholarship considered Herodotus an admirer both of Persian-war and contemporary Athens.<sup>2</sup> This view had diverse props: Herodotus' presence in Athens in the 440s and perhaps later; an ancient tradition that he was a supporter, even flatterer, of Athens, which allegedly paid him; his knowledge of the city, its history (hypothetically largely Alcmaeonid-derived and Alcmaeonid and Periclean in sympathy) and its political terminology and gossip; his supposed membership of 'Pericles' intellectual circle'; Pericles' alleged Panhellenic appeal; and Herodotus' praises of Athens.<sup>3</sup> Strasburger and others<sup>4</sup> attacked some of these props, whose quality certainly varies. But the question involves *all* the problems of interpreting Herodotus.

Modern critics seek to interpret texts rather than uncover their writers' beliefs. Notwithstanding theories of 'constructed' or 'implied' authors, Herodotus problematizes the distinction. His is the 'voice' of the text:<sup>5</sup> he repeatedly obtrudes his own person.<sup>6</sup> The uncertainties of Herodotus' work multiply the problems. His final production was

<sup>1</sup> Jacoby (1913) 226–42; Wells (1923) 151–61; Kleinkecht (1940); Strasburger (1955); Harvey (1966); Legrand (1966) 104–13; Fornara (1971a) 37–58, 75–91; Gillis (1979) 1–13, 45–58; Hart (1982) 168–74; Evans (1979b); (1991) 92–4; Forrest (1984); Raaflaub (1987); Ostwald (1991); Stadler (1992); Derow (1995); Moles (1996); Romm (1998) 52–5, 185–90.

<sup>2</sup> Meyer (1899) 198; Jacoby (1913) 240, 357–60; Schmidt and Staehlin (1959/1934) I 2: 580; Pohlenz (1937) 185; Powell (1939) 81, 88; Myers (1953) 12; Ehrenberg (1954) 137; dissentient older scholarship: How and Wells (1928) 1: 7–8, 447–8; Focke (1927) 27–8.

<sup>3</sup> Jacoby (1913) 226–42; How and Wells (1928) 1: 6–7, 41–3; Myers (1953) 10–13; Legrand (1966) 29–37; Evans (1979b); Gould (1989) 14–18; Podlecki (1977) (Herodotus never in Athens) is untenable.

<sup>4</sup> Strasburger (1955); Fornara (1971a) 37–58; Forrest (1984); Raaflaub (1987); Thomas (1989); Ostwald (1991); Stadler (1992); Derow (1995); Moles (1996); *contra* Harvey (1966); Evans (1979b).

<sup>5</sup> Svenbro (1993) 150; Moles (1999).

<sup>6</sup> Marincola (1987) 122 n. 5, 137; Dewald (1987); and Ch. 12 in this volume.