Weber: Objectivity in Social Science
Key element we want to take from this reading are Weber’s thoughts about “ideal types” You might also take a quick look at the discussion of ideal types in “Basic Sociological Terms.”
The ideal typical concept will help to develop out skill in imputation in research: it is no "hypothesis" but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. … An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffusion, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construc…. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia." (p211)
An ideal type is "...a matter of constructing relationships which our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hens as 'objectively possible' and which appear as adequate from the nomological standpoint." (p.212)
This raises some interesting problems for notions of “objectivity” – particularly if by such we mean “truth as nature hands it to us.”
Weber is arguing that nature cannot just hand us facts, unfiltered by prior ideas. Our sets of concepts clearly shape the way we see the world:
"It is possible, or rather, it must be accepted as certain that numerous, indeed a very great many, utopias of this sort can be worked out, of which none is like another, and none of which can be observed in empirical reality as an actually existing economic system, but each of which however claims that it is a representation of the idea of capitalistic culture." (p.212)
“Inasmuch as the ‘points of view’ from which [ideal types] can become significant for us are very diverse, the most varied criteria can be applied to the selection of the traits which are to enter into the construction of an ideal-typical view of a particular culture.” (212)
Weber raises a set of cautions about constructing ideal types:
(1) But variety does not necessarily imply moral bias. MW is very careful to caution against thinking of “ideal” as “desired” – it’s a logical abstraction, and should not become a normative projection:
“…we should emphasize that the idea of an ethical imperative, of a ‘model’ of wheat ‘ought’ to exist is to be carefully distinguished from the analytical construct, which is ‘ideal’ in the strictly logical sense of the term.” (p.212)
To be effect, then, the principles used to construct deal types must be systematic and clear (p.213).
(2) We can’t confuse the model with reality – reality is much more diverse than our models of the process might suggest.
(3) We need to be sure we don’t treat the aspects we identify as a model for future action – as the thing other should do. – we don’t want these to become moral judgments about what is valuable or important in a given setting.
Summing up:
“The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us.
…
The ‘objectivity’ of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas.” (p.216)
However, while our ideas about the world are always contingent on the categories of thought we have at our disposal, this doesn’t mean we should keep traipsing after multiple viewpoints:
“On the contrary, nothing should be more sharply emphasized than the proposition that the knowledge of the cultural significance of concrete historical events and patterns is exclusively and solely the final end which, among other means, concept-construction and the criticism of constructs seek to serve.”
Basic Sociological Terms
This piece is the start of Economy and Society, and is an attempt to lay out the basic tools of sociology.
1. The definition of Sociology and of Social Action
"Sociology is a science concerning itself with the
interpretive understanding of social action Dan thereby with a causal
explanation of its course and consequences." Action is relates to
how an actor attaches 'subjective meaning' to his behavior (be it covert or
overt) and it is 'social' to the extent that its subjective meaning takes
account of the behavior of others.
A. Methodological Foundations
1. Meaning
(a) the actual existing meaning of a particular actor or the average meaning
given to a group of actors or (b) the theoretically conceived pure type of
subjective meaning attributed to the actor/group. (p.178)
2. Distinguishing meaningful action from simple reaction is difficult, and purely historical / traditional actions are often both active and reactive.
3. All interpretation of meaning strives for clarity and verifiable
accuracy. The basis for certainty can be due to (a) rational means
[logic, math] or (b) emotional / emphatic or artistic. Action is
rationally evident when we can place the action-elements in the intended
context unambiguously. Empathic understanding is obtained when one can grasp the emotional context.
For methodological reasons, it is preferable to treat all all irrational action as deviation from an ideal-typical
rational course of action. This makes it possible to analyze how
differences from rationality affect the outcome.
"The construction of a purely rational course of action in such cases
serves the sociologist as a type (ideal type) which has the merit of clear
understandability and lack of ambiguity." (p.179)
Weber is careful to point out that this rationality is a method and should not be the substance of sociology. The question of rationality in social life is an empirical one.
4. The only way to make sense of things sociologically is to understand their meaning for the actors involved.
5. Understanding can be of two types (a) Direct observational (i.e. of sentences, facial expressions, and so forth) or (b) explanatory understanding. HEre we understand the motive which guides action we observe. THis consists of placing an act in a meaningful and inclusive context.
"Thus for a science which is concerned with the subjective meaning of action, explanation requires a grasp of the complex of meaning in which an actual course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs." (180)
6. Understanding involves the interpretive grasp of meaning in one of the following contexts:
While ideal types may seem plausible, in al cases comparison w. the actual course of events is is indispensable. (though this is only possible in rare cases. Everywhere else we need to approximate as best we can. Often we have only the 'imaginary experiment' of thinking away particular elements of a chain of motivation and thereby arriving at a causal judgment.
7. Motive: a complex of subjective meanings which seems to the actor or to an observer to account for the conduct in question.
A given account of a motive is causally adequate insofar as, given established generalizations from experience, there is a probability that it will always occur in the same way. Statistical uniformity's are adequate generalizations only insofar as they they manifest understandable subjective meaning. These are what interest sociologists.
8. Other things are important, but only as stimuli, conditions, etc.
9. Action ... exists only as the behavior of one or more individual human beings. Thinking on lower levels (cells, bio-chemical reactions, etc.) are interesting, but do not lead to subjective understandings. For other purposes it may be useful to treat states and other collectivity's as actors, such as in law. "But for the subjective interpretation of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated as soley the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons..."
The subjective interpretation of action has at least 3 relations to these other aggregates:
"First this functional frame of reference is convenient
for purposes of practical illustration and for provisional orientation
" but they should not be refined. Second, "in certain
circumstances this is the only available way of determining just what processes
of social action it is important to understand in order to explain a given
situation.... but this is only the beginning of sociological analysis as
here understood." (p.182) This is a
valuable and necessary first step, but only a first step.
10. Sociological "laws" - or generalizations from typical probabilities observed, "are both understandable and definite in the highest degree insofar as the typically observed point of action can be understood in terms of the purely rational pursuit of an end." It is when the means to such actions are clearly determined by the context, that it becomes clear that purely psychological approaches fail.
11. Sociology differs from history in that we seek generalizable
uniformities and processes -- type concepts, which are different from the exact
data proposed in a particular case by historians. We offer greater
precision in concepts as a trade for precision in empirical cases, which makes
it possible for us to move from context to context. "In all cases, ..., sociological analysis both abstracts from reality and
at the same time helps us to understand it, in that it shows with what degree
of approximation a concrete historical phenomena can be subsumed under one or
more of these concepts." (p.184)
Not as well, that while we seek a
subjective understanding, actors may not be aware of these motivations
themselves. They often act out of 'habit'.
B. Social Action.
1. Social action is oriented toward others. These can be past, present, or future, known or unknown.
2. Not every kind of action is social action. Overt action is non-social if it is oriented solely to the behavior of inanimate objects. I.e. religious activity is not social if is simply for individual contemplation or prayer.
3. Not all contact is social (like a collision of two cyclists) if it is merely a natural accident. But the discussion that follows would be.
4. Social action is not identical to similar actions across many people or every action influenced by other people. I.e. putting up umbrellas is not social action. Neither is simple imitation of others, if it is entirely reactive. In all these cases, the borderline is quite indefinite.
2. Types of social action.
There are 4 orientations of social action:
[It is a good exercise to ask whether any of these types are
different. Is it possible to refer to everything, on some level, as any
of the other 3?]
1. Strictly traditional behavior is often NOT social, but a
matter of purely automatic reaction
2. Purely affectual behavior also stands on the
borderline of what can be "meaningfully" oriented - such as emotional
reactions
3. Value-rationality differs from affectual in its
conscious formulation of the ultimate values guiding the action. These
are people acting on their convictions, regardless of the outcome.
4. Action s instrumentally rational when the end,
means and secondary results are all rationally taken into consideration and
weighed.
5. It would be very unusual to find any type of social action
that was solely one of these ways, nor is this thought to be an exhaustive
list.