Mediation, Peacekeeping and the Severity of Civil War

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Abstract: One of the proposed benefits of third-party involvement that has been offered to justify its use is that it helps reduce the severity of conflict. Existing work finding that peacekeeping operations reduce battle-related fatalities considers peacekeeping in isolation from other forms of third-party diplomatic involvement, such as mediation. We argue that mediation has its own effect on patterns of violence. Moreover, we argue that peacekeeping and mediation can have an interactive effect, in which each enhance the violence-reducing potential of the other. Using monthly data on battle-related deaths in African intra-state conflicts, we find that mediation is associated with reduced bloodshed. We also find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. In addition, we find that mediation and peacekeeping efforts reinforce one another, although each type of involvement is also able to reduce battlefield fatalities independently.
Since at least the end of the Cold War, the international community has devoted substantial attention to trying to resolve internal conflicts. A growing literature has developed examining the effect of actions such as peacekeeping and mediation on the termination of civil wars and the duration of peace following ceasefires. While some studies have considered how third-party conflict management efforts are interdependent (Melin 2015; Diehl and Regan 2015; Wall and Druckman 2013; Owsiak 2011; Walter 2002), most research considers the impacts of mediation and peacekeeping separately.

Studies have shown that third-party conflict management, such as mediation and peacekeeping, pose long-term tradeoffs that impede self-enforcing negotiated settlements. Werner and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2011) find that heavy-handed third-party efforts to reach an agreement can undermine peace's endurance in the absence of ongoing third-party involvement. Greig and Diehl (2005) observe that peacekeeping undermines combatants’ incentives to earnestly negotiate a full settlement. Similarly, some studies find that the best hope for lasting peace stems not from peacekeeping or third-party guarantees, but from decisive military victory (e.g., Licklider 1995; Toft 2010). For similar reasons, Luttwak (1999) provocatively called for readers to “give war a chance” at bringing about clear outcomes that can be a stronger foundation for enduring peace.

Even if third parties struggle to contribute to self-sustaining bargained settlements, they may produce other benefits that justify their use. One such benefit is the attenuation of the violence. Indeed, Luttwak’s argument is so provocative because he is essentially arguing that the certainty of violence in the present can be preferable to a more fragile peace in the future regardless of whether the immediate threat of violence decreases. In contrast, Beardsley (2011) argues that in many cases mediation is well-justified as a means to stop the killing at least in the short-run, even at the expense of some long-term fragility. Similarly, Greig and Diehl (2005) premise their argument about the
struggles for peacekeeping to produce full settlements on the assumption that peacekeeping does well to reduce violence.

But do mediators and peacekeepers actually reduce violence? Bercovitch and Diehl (1997) do not find that mediation has much of an effect on violence severity in enduring interstate rivalries. Cases such as Bosnia and Rwanda in which mass atrocities occurred on the watch of UN peacekeepers provide obvious fodder for the view that third parties are not useful for violence reduction. One study, by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014), however, does find peacekeeping associated with lower levels of battle-related fatalities, although they consider peacekeeping in isolation from third-party diplomatic involvement.

In this article, we argue that international actors can work to reduce the level of violence in ongoing civil wars. In particular, we argue that mediators can contribute to a reduction in violence by facilitating negotiated settlements and by creating lulls during which negotiations can occur. We also expect peacekeeping to reduce civil war violence, for reasons similar to the arguments of Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014, hereafter HKS). Moreover, we argue that the mechanisms through which mediation and peacekeeping can help attenuate violence are both additive—the mediators help reduce violence in ways that peacekeeping operations alone cannot and vice versa—and interactive—mediation and peacekeeping reinforce one another and may even depend on one another.

We examine these expectations in an analysis of all intra-state conflict-months in Africa from 1989 to 2008. Since mediated peace processes and peacekeeping deployments often occur in close temporal proximity, it is important to examine their distinct contributions to reductions in armed violence within the same empirical framework. We find, consistent with our expectations, that mediation leads to a dramatic decline in battlefield casualties. We also find, consistent with HKS, that peacekeeping reduces battlefield casualties. In addition to these independent effects, we find
that mediation and peacekeeping have a conditional effect wherein the presence of both leads to a greater reduction in battlefield fatalities. We find also that this interaction is driven primarily by mediation and peacekeeping occurring simultaneously rather than by a sequencing in which mediation precedes peacekeepers. These results illustrate that mediation and peacekeeping can have important positive impacts on conflict beyond complete termination.

**International Action and Violence Reduction**

International actors are quite active in the management of internal disputes. In South Sudan, the UN is conducting a peacekeeping mission while various international organizations, governments, and non-governmental organizations promote negotiation among warring parties. The civil war in Syria has experienced a different pattern of international efforts to reduce violence—while the UN Security Council has remained so polarized that it has done little more than condemn extreme violence, other UN entities, along with the Arab League, have been more active. Joint envoys of these international organizations and other representatives of various governments have worked to facilitate negotiations to try to end the violence.

We argue that international actors can contribute to a reduction of violence in ongoing civil wars through both mediation and peacekeeping. Both occur frequently and, as discussed below, have been the subject of rich scholarship. The existing work, however, primarily focuses on conflict termination, with little attention paid to reductions in violence short of completely ending conflict.

We begin by arguing that the severity of violence is driven by two main factors. The first is the failure of the parties to efficiently bargain. When states and rebels are unable to reach settlements that both prefer to continued conflict, using lethal force is a strong signal of resolve as well as a means to diminish the threat of the opposing group. Second, conflicts are more severe
when there are less external constraints on the use of violence. Violence will abound when perpetrators can act with impunity from punishment.

We argue that third-party involvement in the form of mediation and peacekeeping can reduce the severity of violence by both enhancing the efficiency of bargaining and imposing strong constraints on violence. We posit mechanisms by which mediation and peacekeeping have this effect independently; others rely on the combination of mediation and peacekeeping.

*Mediation*

Many civil wars experience early third-party efforts to assist negotiations. The UN in particular—via the Secretary-General, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General or the Department of Political Affairs—often deploys mediators to seek a peaceful solution to these conflicts. Mediation can contribute directly to a reduction of violence in two ways. First, mediators can ease the path to bargained settlements. In this regard, a number of studies have concluded that, once the non-random assignment of mediation is addressed, mediation makes negotiated settlement more likely (e.g., Beber 2012; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). Mediators facilitate the flow of information—e.g., by facilitating communication and fact-finding—which can help parties overcome uncertainty and mistrust (Kydd 2003, 2006; Savun 2008). While Fey and Ramsay (2010) question how mediators can independently gather private information about the disputing parties, intermediaries can more indirectly reduce the transaction costs of negotiation and the learning that takes place as the disputants make offers and counter-offers akin to Ramsay’s (2011) negotiation model. DeRouen and Möller (2013), for example, find that face-to-face mediated talks do especially well in reaching short-term settlements.

Mediators can also affect the perceived costs and benefits of reaching a settlement by offering carrots and sticks. Wilkenfeld et al. (2003), Schrodt and Gerner (2004), and Beardsley et al.
(2006) find that mediators that use leverage to help resolve a dispute tend to be more successful. Intermediaries can offer material support to make settlement more attractive—the promise by President Carter for the United States to deliver continued economic and development aid to Egypt contingent upon its signing the 1979 treaty with Israel is a canonical example. On the flip side, mediators can threaten to withdraw material support—akin to Gerald Ford's threat to “reassess” the provision of military aid from the USA to Israel when negotiations for a second Sinai agreement stalled (Stein 1999: 176). This type of dynamic is observable in civil wars as well. In the Angolan Civil War, on the recommendation of the UN-appointed mediator, Alioune Blondin Beye, the UN Security Council threatened to freeze the financial assets of Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) if the organization did not disarm and withdraw from occupied territories. Mediators can also threaten to withdraw diplomatic support that could affect the geostrategic positioning of the adversaries, akin to Jimmy Carter's threats to Anwar Sadat at Camp David—that Egypt would be less secure in preventing the Soviet Union and radical Arabs from gaining a foothold in the region without staunch US support (Carter 1982: 392). Alioune Blondin Beye practiced a similar strategy in Angola, threatening in 1998 to publicly resign his position as UN envoy to Angola if UNITA did not carry out its obligations under the Lusaka accords.

Second, the process of mediation can create short-term episodes of peace during which the parties negotiate. This mechanism relates to the argument above that the levels of external constraints can explain periods of severe violence. Mediators are an important external audience that can assign culpability for illegal uses of force. If a third party pushes for a peace process and combatants refuse to talk, the third party will be more likely to turn to alternative forms of pressure. In addition to threatening tangible punitive measures, such as sanctions or military intervention, mediators might publicly blame an intransigent party and try to mobilize international and domestic stakeholders against them. For example, James Baker threatened to “leave the dead cat on the
doorstep” of the parties most responsible for scuttling the Madrid peace process (Baker 1999: 188). Pausing at least temporarily to talk is a cheap way for the combatants to keep unwanted external punishment at arms-length.

In this way, mediation can lead to limited ceasefires meant to facilitate substantive peace talks, such as that agreed to by the Sierra Leone government and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in May 1999. This ceasefire was achieved with the mediation of US envoy Jesse Jackson and did not address the underlying dispute behind the violence. The ceasefire merely sought to "freeze" the frontline and establish a truce during which more substantive peace talks would occur. Even though the resultant peace talks failed to end the conflict, the intervening truce served to reduce violence in the short term. A similar strategy is for mediators to pursue "localized ceasefires," which seek to achieve peace for shorter times and in limited areas as confidence- and trust-building measures for combatants (Chounet-Cambas 2011, 29). This was a strategy pursued by UN mediators in the Croat-Serb conflict in 1993, whereby they sought to resolve potential disputes and violations at the commander-to-commander level.

Related, mediators can help the parties take incremental steps toward a comprehensive peace agreement. For example, in 2001, while not a comprehensive settlement, under the auspices of Congolese president Laurent Kabila, both the Burundian government and the CNDD-FDD rebel group agreed to withdraw their forces from border regions in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This was despite the rebels still rejecting the 2000 Arusha peace agreement, which was meant to end the civil war in Burundi. While not terminating the conflict, such an incremental step substantially reduced armed violence.

In many cases, these negotiated settlements fail to fully resolve conflicts, and resultant ceasefire agreements often break down in the long run (Beardsley 2011). However, the limited breakthroughs remain meaningful when some, even if not all, of the combatants agree to stop
fighting. Such was the case in the Burundian Civil War, where, under South African auspices, the rebel CNDD-FDD signed a ceasefire in 2002 and a power-sharing agreement in 2003, while the National Forces for Liberation (FNL) continued to fight until 2008 (Cunningham 2011, Ch. 4). The violence continued, though likely at a substantially lower level and over a narrower area than if the CNDD-FDD had remained on the battlefield. In this way a step-by-step mediated peace process can lead to a decrease in violence even if it does not end the war (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006).

Richmond (1998) warns about disputants pursuing mediation for “devious objectives”—i.e., using peace talks to rearm and regroup. Yet even here, the use of mediation to stall might be worthwhile from a humanitarian perspective, since it still reduces violence in the short-term.

These two mechanisms give rise to the observable expectation that periods of mediation should be accompanied by reduced violence. Moreover, the two mechanisms point to different additional observable expectations that allow for them to be examined separately. The mechanism related to the process of creating space for negotiations would entail that both direct and indirect involvement (shuttle diplomacy)—a distinction discussed in greater detail below—would be associated with a reduction in hostilities. This expectation relates to the argument that it is the mere holding of talks that contributes to violence reduction and not the substance of the talks. In contrast, it follows that the mechanism related to bargaining efficiency creates the expectation that reductions in violence should be especially tied to direct involvement by the mediator. Existing scholarship has shown that mediators are much more likely to contribute to a bargained settlement the more substantively involved they are (Smith and Stam 2003; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003; Beardsley et al. 2006; Sisk 2009; Beardsley 2011).

If the mere process matters, we should similarly not expect that the co-occurrence of peacekeeping much affects the association between mediation and violence reduction. Alternatively, if the effect is via a more efficient bargaining process, then while mediation can have an independent


effect, we would expect the effect to be even greater in combination with peacekeeping, as peacekeeping can address bargaining concerns related to credible commitments that are not as well-suited for mediation. In a later section, we present an argument for the conditional effect of mediation and peacekeeping.

H1 (Base Mediation Hypothesis): Periods of mediation are associated with violence reduction.

H1a (Mediation Process Hypothesis): Periods of either direct or indirect mediation are associated with violence reduction.

Peacekeeping

While the UN has operated peacekeeping missions since 1948, the use of peacekeeping has increased dramatically since the Cold War. UN Peacekeepers are currently deployed in missions in several conflict-torn countries, including the Central African Republic, Mali, Haiti, the DRC, and South Sudan. While in some cases, peacekeepers are deployed to monitor the implementation of a peace agreement, these missions are also often deployed while hostilities are ongoing.

Peacekeeping serves at least two functions that could lead to a reduction in violence, and these relate directly to the drivers of conflict severity discussed above. First, peacekeepers can present an external constraint when they are positioned between combatants. One trend over the past decade is for many peacekeeping missions to have more robust mandates, rooted in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to use force against entities that threaten to disrupt the peace processes (Hultman 2013). The threat of the use of force may help deter violations. In a sense, peacekeepers help fill voids in state capacity to enforce order. Indeed, Blair (2017) has found that in situations characterized by effective and responsive peacekeepers, individuals comply well with peacekeeping
efforts and thereby confer some legitimacy to the peacekeepers. Moreover, Ruggeri et al. (2017) find that peacekeeping reduces the duration of conflict locally.

Second, as with mediation, peacekeepers can help parties reach efficient bargains that can either fully resolve wars or at least reduce the incentives for violence. Peace processes often break down during, or in anticipation of, the implementation phase, leading Walter (1997) to argue that commitment problems are the “critical barrier” to resolving civil wars. Fortna (2008) argues that peacekeepers can observe and publicize participants’ commitment to ceasefires—or lack thereof—helping to overcome commitment problems, enhancing the efficiency of bargaining, and thereby decreasing the incentives to use violence. In situations in which actors have incentives for non-compliance because they consider the potential for unambiguous detection to be sufficiently low, the peacekeepers can alter those calculations and deter would-be cheaters. When peacekeeping works well, all parties can step into a ceasefire with greater confidence that they will not be made vulnerable by undetected noncompliance by their opponents.

Both of these mechanisms point to the common expectation that periods of peacekeeping are associated with reductions in violence. The external constraint mechanism would entail that peacekeeping has a direct and independent effect on violence reduction. The bargaining efficiency mechanism could suggest that peacekeeping has an independent effect, but additionally that the strength of its effect is enhanced by mediation. We discuss this potential interactive relationship below.

H2 (Peacekeeping Hypothesis): Periods of peacekeeping are associated with violence reduction.
We expect that mediation and peacekeeping will have independent, additive, effects on conflict severity. We also expect that mediation and peacekeeping interact to make the other more effective. Bargaining efficient settlements in civil war requires both identifying a substantive agreement that parties prefer to continued conflict and enabling the parties to overcome commitment problems that prevent implementation. Mediation and peacekeeping have effects on separate parts of the bargaining process—mediation primarily helps parties identify and sign substantive agreements, and peacekeeping helps them to implement the agreements. The combination of mediation and peacekeeping is likely to be particularly effective at reducing violence. In the absence of the other, the full potential of mediation and peacekeeping to reduce violence is not likely to be realized.

Regarding mediation, Smith and Stam (2003) posit that third parties depend on material incentives to move disputants toward a peace settlement, and that mediation without material incentives is unlikely to make progress. From this logic, mediation without peacekeeping or other forms of enforcement is not likely to provide much benefit, but mediation backed by force deployments will be much more productive. Relatedly, Beardsley (2013) finds that mediation without peacekeeping fails to resolve time inconsistency problems that contribute to conflict relapse.

The effect of peacekeeping on violence reduction may also be enhanced by the presence of mediation. Establishing local peace requires much more than a commitment to the implementation of a peace agreement by the top leaderships of the armed actors. Reconciliation and dispute management processes that are particular to local communities are also needed—as communities have to contend with the co-existence of competing factions that may not be in step with the elites that negotiated the terms of the settlement. While peacekeeping missions can help reduce the potential for local-level disputes to turn violent, peacekeeping forces are not well suited for addressing the underlying issues. Mediators can augment the efforts of peacekeepers to promote local order by promoting cooperation and resolution among local factions. For example, the UN
mission in Croatia in 1993 combined a sizeable peacekeeping deployment (at least 10,000 troops) with a strategy of negotiating "local" ceasefires between Serb and Croat commanders and setting up phone connections between local combatants to resolve disputes. It is plausible that the peacekeepers would not have been as effective if the infrastructure for local dispute resolution had not been in place.

We expect that the presence of peacekeeping and mediation each enhance the violence-reducing effect of the other. The expectation of an interactive effect is rooted in a necessary-condition argument. For actors to move toward de-escalation as part of more efficient bargaining, it is necessary for progress to be made in negotiating a settlement and for actors to trust that it can be implemented. Without progress on the commitment problem, clarity on the potential terms of agreement are not likely to stop violence. Likewise, solving the commitment problem is not likely to contribute to de-escalation if the actors cannot land on mutually-acceptable terms. The co-occurrence of mediation and peacekeeping allows for progress on both fronts.

This interactive effect could occur when peacekeeping and mediation are present at the same time, as peacekeepers help disputants to overcome commitment problems and monitor agreements, while mediators facilitate the flow of information, help to identify areas of substantive agreement, and provide political cover.

H3: (Reinforcing Hypothesis): The conflict-reducing effect of mediation is strongest when peacekeeping operations are in place, and the conflict-reducing effect of peacekeeping is strongest when mediation takes place simultaneously.

We could also anticipate that peacekeepers may have a greater effect when mediation precedes their deployment. If mediation helps parties to identify agreements as a catalyst for violence reduction, this effect may linger after the mediation is finished and still amplify the effect of peacekeeping. The identification of possible mutually-acceptable bargains could come at an earlier
stage in the peace process and still shape the efficacy of later peacekeeping. A persistent effect that does not depend on ongoing mediation could also manifest as large peacekeeping forces may take time to fully deploy. Mediators, meanwhile, can be active much more rapidly than peacekeeping contingents. This was the case with the UNAVEM III mission in Angola, which took several months to deploy because of political wrangling among contributing and donor nations and the hazards of heavily mined roads in Angola (Hill 2005, 203). While peacekeeping missions are in the process of deploying, diplomats may serve an important "stop-gap" role in addressing disputes between combatants so the transition to a peacekeeping operation goes smoothly.

H3a: (Sequential Hypothesis): The conflict-reducing effect of peacekeeping is strongest when mediation has occurred prior to the deployment of peacekeepers.

Research Design
To test our hypotheses, we examine the correlates of the monthly counts of battle-related fatalities in active African intra-state armed conflicts from 1989-2008. While we attempt to rule out many plausible confounds and alternative explanations, it is important to note that, like most of the existing quantitative work on third-party intervention, we are unable to leverage exogenous sources of variation to provide strict causal identification. Fortna (2008) and Gilligan and Stedman (2003), for example, argue and find that peacekeeping operations are more likely to deploy to the most difficult conflicts, which will affect the ability to observe a pacifying effect of peacekeeping. Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) have posited that mediation is likely to occur in the most difficult conflicts, and Wall and Druckman (2003) have found that peacekeepers are more likely to employ a wider variety of mediation strategies in more severe conflicts; however, Lefler (2015) finds that state-based mediation is more likely in conflicts with a greater propensity for resolution.
We posit, however, that strict causal identification has limited utility in understanding the potential impact of third-party processes, as if the interventions could ever be switched on and off as exogenous treatments. Diplomatic and peacekeeping interventions arise from negotiated processes among protagonists and third parties. Those processes themselves are likely to be an important determinant of the trajectory of de-escalation that would not be captured by exogenous assignment of the treatment. That is, we are principally interested in correlational inference in this study—we are interested in whether the cases that have various types of third-party intervention have different patterns of violence than cases that do not, and we anticipate that the processes that led to the occurrence of those interventions actually contribute to those observed patterns. Furthermore, an alternative explanation contending that any positive associations between major third-party peacemaking initiatives and violence reductions are the product of the international actors cherry-picking their interventions is inconsistent with existing work on third-party conflict management, which finds that conflict-management efforts by the most prolific third party, the UN, tend to be directed at "hard cases," not conflicts that are already more likely to de-escalate (e.g., Fortna 2008; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Wall and Druckman 2003).

**Dependent Variable**

To capture fine-grained temporal variation in conflict violence, we use HKS's monthly counts of battle-related deaths in a government-rebel conflict dyad—from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) dyadic dataset (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). To obtain monthly counts of battle-related deaths, HKS use the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED—Sundberg & Melander 2013; Croicu & Sundberg 2017). We aggregate the dyad-level counts of battle deaths in HKS to the conflict-month—the unit of analysis—since several of our independent variables are coded at the conflict level. Months during an active conflict in which no
battle-deaths are observed in the GED are coded as having 0 battle-deaths. We treat conflicts as active until 12 months after the most recent non-zero count of battle-deaths. Out of 2648 conflict-months in our data, 1165 (44%) experienced at least one battle-death, with a maximum of 6964 battle deaths. The proportion of conflict-months with no battle-deaths is higher than those with at least one battle-death (56.00%). Further, the size of the standard deviation (199.9) relative to the mean (46.3) indicates that the dependent variable is substantially over-dispersed. These two factors drive our choice of a zero-inflated negative binomial model for the analysis.

*Independent Variables*

We focus on third-party conflict management efforts of two types—peacekeeping and mediation. To measure peacekeeping deployments, we use the main independent variable from HKS’s study—a one-month lag of Kathman’s (2013) monthly counts (in thousands) of the number of peacekeeping troops deployed to a specific conflict, which they find exerts a consistently negative effect on conflict violence. HKS differentiate between three types of peacekeepers—troops, police, and military observers. HKS find that peacekeeping troops exert a consistently significant effect in ameliorating conflict violence, so we focus on peacekeeping troops in our analysis. By including their key independent variable in the analysis, we are able to examine whether their finding on peacekeeping holds when we include variables measuring mediation effort and with a modified modeling approach.

To examine the effect of mediation efforts, we use two main measures of these actions. The first is a measure of third-party direct mediation from the Managing Intra-state Conflict (MIC) data (Melander and Uexkull 2011)—a binary indicator coded as 1 if a given conflict-month sees “direct talks”—face-to-face talks between the two primary parties of the dyad in the presence of the third-party. An example would be the African Union-mediated discussions held in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania in 2005 between the Sudanese government and two Darfur rebel groups—the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement. The second is a measure of indirect mediation—a binary indicator coded as 1 if a given conflict-month experienced “indirect third-party talks” according to the MIC data. Indirect talks involve situations in which the third-party “shuttles” between disputants, as Henry Kissinger did during the disengagement talks following the October 1973 war in the Middle East, without face-to-face negotiations.

To test H3a—regarding the effect of peacekeeping conditional on prior mediation—we coded "mediation legacy" versions of both the indirect and direct mediation indicators, taking into account mediation that occurred prior to peacekeeping. These indicators were coded as one if there was mediation either two, three, four, five, or six months prior to a given conflict-month. When interacted with the peacekeeping measure, this models the effect of peacekeeping conditional on mediation that occurred prior to the peacekeeping observed in that conflict-month, given that the peacekeeper measure is lagged by one month.

We separately include a binary indicator generated from the MIC data for third-party diplomatic action outside of mediation, which includes bilateral third-party engagement, unclear third-party participation in talks, good offices, and fact-finding missions. An example of this would be the meeting the President of Uganda held with the British Minister of International Development and Cooperation in 2004 regarding conflict in the north of the country. These talks were bilateral, because while they pertained to the Ugandan government's conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), they did not involve the LRA. When third-party activity continues across multiple months, each month is coded as having experienced the activity. In auxiliary analyses discussed below, we distinguish between UN and non-UN third parties, and also use the MIC data to code a variable for whether a non-UN peacekeeping mission was deployed in each month.

*Table 1: Third-party action in armed conflicts in Africa (1989-2008)*

17 18
Table 1 shows the frequency of each type of action in the 2,648 conflict-months contained in our data. These descriptive statistics show that approximately 13% of conflict months contained peacekeeping. Mediation is a bit less common, but still takes place in more than 10% of conflict months. Of those conflict-months where mediation takes place, 32.46% see concurrent peacekeeper deployments. With regards to the legacy of mediation, a little more than 23% of conflict months in the data had mediation between two and six months prior, while 57.22% of conflict-months with peacekeeper deployments saw mediation between two and six months prior.

Modeling Conflict Violence

To model conflict violence we use a zero-inflated negative binomial regression and cluster standard errors on each conflict. This model not only accounts for the over-dispersion of battle-deaths, but also models separately the correlates of the absence of violence—the "0s" in the count of battle-deaths—and the correlates of the counts of violence for the cases with non-zero battle-deaths. More than half of the conflict-months in our data have zero battle-deaths, which is suggestive that separate processes are driving the occurrence of any battles and the severity of the battles that do occur.
With a zero-inflated model, we are able to specify separately equations of "no violence" and "violence severity." We include our key explanatory variables in both parts of the model in order to ascertain their effect on both the presence of violence and its severity. We include control variables in either part of the zero-inflated model depending on our expectation of whether the variable is likely to affect the opportunity for battles to occur (no violence), the severity of the battles that do occur (severity), or both.

In line with HKS, we include in both stages a count of the number of different rebel organizations active in a conflict, as multiparty conflicts have been shown to be more intense and resistant to resolution (Cunningham 2011). Also in both stages of the model, we include a cumulative average rate of the number of battle deaths—i.e., the number of battle-deaths in the conflict up to that point, divided by the number of months the conflict has been active. This allows us to account for baseline levels of violence and some of the potential for serial dependence in the data.

In just the "zero" stage of the model we include a binary measure of whether or not there is a ceasefire agreement, used by HKS, because we expect that a ceasefire is most relevant to whether or not there is an opportunity for battles to occur. We also include a measure of the duration of the current episode of conflict, as well as a cubic polynomial of the number of months in the conflict in which there has been no violence to account for temporal dependence for the binary outcome of "no violence." In just the "count" stage of the model, which measures conflict severity, we include from HKS the relative strength of the rebel group in the conflict in a five-level ordinal scale and the natural log of the state's population because conflicts with weak rebel groups and in low-population states have less potential to escalate, but we have less reason to expect these variables to be associated with the complete end of violence.
Results

Tables 2 and 3 show the results from our main analysis, reporting the coefficients as incidence-rate ratios—where values greater than 1 indicate a positive effect and less than 1 indicate a negative effect. The greater the distance from 1—in either direction—the greater the magnitude of the effect. The results for both the "No battle-related violence (BRV)" and "BRV count" stages of the zero-inflated model are reported separately. The dependent variable in the "No BRV" stage is the absence of violence, so a coefficient greater than "1" indicates that the given variable makes any violence less likely.

We conduct three sets of analyses. In the first, we examine the separate effects of direct and indirect mediation and peacekeeping, testing hypotheses H1 and H1a, and H2. In the second, we interact HKS's measure of peacekeeping troops with both types of mediation in order to test H3—that peacekeeping and mediation complement each other in reducing conflict violence. In the third (presented in Table 3) we examine the effect of the legacy of mediation (both direct and indirect) independently, and then we interact it with peacekeeping troops to test H3a.

The analyses in Table 2 support the violence-reducing effect of peacekeeping identified by HKS, supporting H2. In both count models, a greater number of peacekeeping troops is associated with fewer battle-related fatalities, and the effect is statistically significant. The sign on the coefficient is as expected in the inflation models (showing that more peacekeepers make zero battle-related deaths more likely), but these results are not statistically significant. In the model that interacts peacekeeping troops with both types of mediation, the coefficient on peacekeeping troops is less than one (a negative effect on violence) and significant in the count portion of the model, indicating that even absent mediation, peacekeeping troops still reduce conflict violence. Given that we analyze the effect of peacekeeping at the conflict-month rather than dyad-month level, and that we control
for other forms of third-party involvement, these analyses provide further support for the findings in HKS that peacekeeping troops reduce the severity of civil conflicts.
## Table 2: Third-party intervention and conflict violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third-Party Activity and Battle-Related Fatalities</th>
<th>PKO, MIC BRV count</th>
<th>No BRV</th>
<th>PKO, MIC interaction BRV count</th>
<th>No BRV</th>
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<td>PKO troops (lag, per 1,000)</td>
<td>0.917</td>
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<td>0.924</td>
<td>1.014</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(0.490)</td>
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<td>MIC mediation (lag)</td>
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<td>1.751</td>
<td>0.706</td>
<td>1.679</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC indirect mediation (lag)</td>
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<td>1.082</td>
<td>1.396</td>
<td>1.123</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.444)</td>
<td>(0.795)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
<td>(0.701)</td>
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<td>PKO troops X indirect mediation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.903</td>
<td>0.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.311</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>1.307</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.076</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>1.076</td>
<td>0.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2.179</td>
<td>2.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior battle-related violence rate</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>0.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Episode duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel strength</td>
<td>1.575</td>
<td>1.567</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>1.256</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacemonths</td>
<td>4.632</td>
<td>4.615</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacemonths2</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacemonths3</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.298</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>1.383</td>
<td>0.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.799)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.758)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
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<td>alpha</td>
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<td>2.051</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2637</td>
<td>2637</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Values are incidence-rate ratios; p-values in parentheses
In support of H1, we also find strong evidence that third-party direct mediation exerts a strong pacifying effect at both stages of the model. This suggests that mediation is associated with reductions in conflict violence at all levels of conflict, even to the point of leading to no fatal violence. In the model that interacts peacekeeping troops with mediation, the effect for direct mediation alone is still significant at the .10 level in both stages of the model, and the direction is as expected, suggesting that even absent concurrent peacekeepers, mediation reduces conflict violence. However, while H1 is supported, H1a, which anticipates that both direct and indirect mediation will exert a pacifying effect, is not. In both models, the coefficient in the count portion suggests that indirect mediation is associated with increased violence, though this effect is not even weakly significant (p>.40). The findings indicate that to be most effective in reducing violence, third-party diplomacy should be in the form of face-to-face talks between belligerents overseen by the third-party, consistent with DeRouen and Möller (2013).

The first two models in Table 3 allow us to further examine the effect of mediation by looking at the independent effect of a legacy of mediation on battlefield violence. Those models show that, while mediation two to six months before the current month is correlated with a decrease in battlefield deaths, the relationship is not statistically significant. In the model of no battlefield fatalities, however, the variable is statistically significant, suggesting that prior mediation can contribute to no battlefield fatalities in a month, potentially through producing an agreement. We find no statistically significant effect of the legacy of indirect mediation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third-Party Activity and Battle-Related Fatalities</th>
<th>PKO, MIC</th>
<th>PKO, MIC interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRV count</td>
<td>No BRV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO troops (lag, per 1,000)</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td>1.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediation legacy</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>1.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
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<td>Indirect mediation legacy</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.853</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.904)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO troops X mediation legacy</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>0.972</td>
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<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(0.489)</td>
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<td>PKO troops X indirect mediation legacy</td>
<td>1.104</td>
<td>1.212</td>
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<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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<td>MIC other diplomacy</td>
<td>1.309</td>
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<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>Number of rebel groups</td>
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<td>0.883</td>
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<td>(0.107)</td>
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<td>Ceasefire</td>
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<td>2.069</td>
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<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prior battle-related violence rate</td>
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<td>0.996</td>
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<td>(0.042)</td>
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<td>4.477</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacemonths3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode duration</td>
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<td>0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rebel strength</td>
<td>1.538</td>
<td>1.521</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>Population (ln)</td>
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<td>(0.030)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.837</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.522)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
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**alpha**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PKO, MIC</th>
<th>PKO, MIC interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>alpha</td>
<td>2.071</td>
<td>2.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
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</table>

**Observations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PKO, MIC</th>
<th>PKO, MIC interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,628</td>
<td>2,628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values are incidence-rate ratios; p-values in parentheses
In terms of substantive effects, turning to the model in Table 2 without interactions, predictions generated from the model suggest that a conflict-month that has had no direct mediation in the prior month is expected to see approximately 52 battle-deaths on average, while a conflict-month that has seen third-party mediation is expected to see 30.\textsuperscript{27} This effect is particularly striking when we compare it to predicted fatality counts for different levels of peacekeeping generated from the same model and find the predicted number of battle-deaths does not drop to 30 until deployments reach approximately 6,000,\textsuperscript{28} suggesting that direct mediation is associated with a very strong pacifying effect relative to other third-party interventions.

It is important to stress that these results for mediation are robust to the inclusion of HKS' peacekeepers measure as well as a dummy variable for non-UN peacekeeping (see Appendix), which demonstrates that diplomatic efforts do not necessarily require accompanying "boots on the ground" to reduce violence. This is not to suggest that mediation is a replacement for peacekeepers, since we also find, as discussed below, that mediation and peacekeeping have positive interactive potential.

We do not find strong evidence that other types of third-party action are able to reduce conflict violence. Non-mediation diplomacy (from the MIC data), is associated with increased violence. It is likely that this correlation stems from a selection effect, whereby severely violent conflicts are more likely to attract third-party action (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). Unlike peacekeeper deployments and mediation, it may be that non-mediatory diplomacy by itself is unable to subdue the severe violence of the conflicts to which it is directed. In this way, the positive correlation with violence of non-mediation diplomacy reduces the plausibility of selection effects explaining our main findings regarding the negative correlations pertaining to the mediation and peacekeeping variables. Such an explanation would need to explain why some types of third-party peacemaking attempts are going to the "easy" cases while others are going to the more difficult ones.
As an additional check into the potential for selection effects, we examined the trends of violence around mediation to see if mediation occurs as violence in conflicts is already trending downwards. As demonstrated in Figure 2, mediation typically occurs when there has been significant prior violence. The negative numbers on the x-axis in the figure can be thought of as the time until mediation occurs, and the positive numbers as the time since mediation occurred. We see considerable amounts of violence before mediation, and little afterward. Moreover, we do not see a downward trend in violence that precedes mediation, as if the conflicts were heading toward peace or already had peace at the time of mediation.

Figure 2: Trends of violence around mediation attempts

*Conditional Effects*
In the analysis shown in Table 2 we explicitly modeled the effects of mediation and peacekeeping, conditional on the co-occurrence of the other, by including in our model an interaction of mediation with HKS' measure of peacekeeping troops. Figure 3 plots the predicted battle-deaths against different levels of peacekeeping, conditional on mediation, both direct and indirect. The figure shows that the conditional effect identified in the count equation in Table 2 is statistically significant across the full range of peacekeeping, as the confidence intervals never cross. In addition, Figure 3 shows that the interaction has a large substantive effect. The proportional difference between conflict months with and without mediation grows across levels of peacekeepers. Figure 3 shows, for example, that at 0 peacekeepers months without mediation are associated with almost 60 battle deaths and those with mediation almost 40, a decline of approximately 33%. At 10,000 peacekeeping troops, months without mediation have about 30 deaths and those without about 5, a reduction of over 80%. Taken together, the analyses in Table 2 and substantive results in Figure 3 suggest that peacekeeping and mediation reduce violence independently and interact with each other to have an even greater violence-reducing effect.

In contrast, the plot of the interaction of peacekeepers and indirect mediation indicates that the effect of indirect mediation is not statistically significant across a range of peacekeeper
deployments. Direct mediation has a complementary effect with peacekeeper deployments, but not indirect mediation.

An example of the interactive effect of peacekeeping and simultaneous direct mediation can be found in the ceasefire that was signed between the rebel forces of Laurent Nkunda and the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the North Kivu region in 2008. The ceasefire was brokered via talks facilitated by a UN Special Envoy and was backed up by UN peacekeeper deployments to the buffer zone established by the ceasefire between Nkunda’s and the DRC’s forces. Establishing the ceasefire only became possible after both the demarcation of the buffer zone could be established and peacekeeping forces were deployed to monitor and secure the buffer zone—progress on both fronts was a necessary condition for de-escalation, which was only possible with both mediation and peacekeeping efforts. While the ceasefire ultimately failed to yield a durable settlement, it provided a short respite from the fighting in North Kivu that would have likely produced many more fatalities if it had not been first agreed to thanks to UN mediation and then also enforced by UN peacekeepers.

In partial contrast, the break in the fighting that took place in and around Monrovia in July 2003 during the Liberian civil war offers an example of the effect of mediation with sequential but not concurrent deployment of peacekeepers. Talks between Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Liberian government mediated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led LURD’s leadership to instruct its fighters to stop attacking and hold their positions in and around Monrovia but to defend themselves if attacked by government forces. Government forces stated that they were adopting a similar posture. This led to decreased but continued violence in some areas of the city. Critically, at this time, while an ECOWAS-led peacekeeping force was scheduled to be deployed, peacekeepers had not yet arrived in the country. While ECOWAS’ mediation led to some decreases in violence, continued clashes did occur as the
mutual reliance on self-restraint was not sufficient to prevent all uses of force. The concurrent deployment of peacekeepers to the space between combatants, as in the case of North Kivu in 2008, would have more strongly incentivized the parties to follow through on their commitments.

The last two models in Table 3 test H3a, regarding the impact of prior mediation on peacekeeping, by interacting the HKS peacekeeping measure with a binary indicator of whether or not there was mediation between two to six months prior to the conflict month—which is one month prior to the one-month lag of the HKS measure. In the count model, the IRR is below one, as expected, suggesting that prior mediation enhances the effect of peacekeeping. In the model examining whether there were any battlefield deaths, the sign is the opposite of the expectation.

Figure 4 plots the predicted battle-deaths against different levels of peacekeeping, conditional on mediation two–six months prior. Examining the curves, we see that while concurrent direct mediation exerts a significant pacifying effect at a broad range of peacekeeping levels (Figure 3), mediation legacy only has a discernable violence-reducing effect at a narrower range of peacekeeping levels (Figure 4). As with the analysis of concurrent mediation, the effect of indirect mediation legacy is not statistically significant across a range of peacekeeper deployments.
We also conducted analyses including both the mediation legacy and concurrent mediation indicators and their interactions with the HKS peacekeeping measure. Tables of these results are available in the appendix (Table A1), while Figure 5 compares the effect of direct concurrent mediation and direct mediation legacy—when included together in the same model—across a range of peacekeeping levels. This comparison demonstrates that even when accounting for the past history of mediation, mediation concurrent with peacekeeping exerts a substantial statistically significant effect across a broad range of peacekeeping levels, while the same is not true for mediation legacy. This provides strong support for H3 regarding the ability of concurrent mediation to reinforce peacekeeping, but demonstrates that the "sequential" hypothesis (H3a)—that the effect of peacekeeping is strongest when there is past mediation—is not supported.
Figure 5: Comparing concurrent (left) and legacy (right) direct mediation in same analysis

We show similar curves for concurrent indirect mediation and indirect mediation legacy across different peacekeeping levels in the appendix (Figure A1), demonstrating that neither have a significant effect on violence across a range of peacekeeping levels. Given the finding that the strongest and most significant effect is for concurrent, direct mediation, our additional analyses and robustness checks will include an interaction of direct mediation with peacekeepers; they do not interact indirect mediation or mediation legacy with peacekeepers.

Additional Analyses

We conduct a series of additional analyses to further examine the relationship between mediation, peacekeeping, and battlefield fatalities. We briefly describe these analyses here and present tables in the appendix. First, we conduct further analyses to address the more general concern that the effects we observe stem from third-party intervention being more likely to go to conflicts where violence is already decreasing. HKS include in their analysis a measure of "Battle Violence Change"—the change in the three-month moving average of battle-related violence between the previous three dyad-months and the three months prior to this (HKS, 13). We do the same (Table A2 in the appendix), aggregating the dyad-month measure to conflict-month. We find no substantive changes
in our results, providing confidence that mediation and peacekeeping actually serve to reduce violence.

Second, we examine whether the identity of the third-party intervener drives the results here. The UN is the most prolific actor in international conflict management, and we consider the possibility for the findings to be solely driven by UN activity. In further analyses, we separate UN interventions from those enacted by other third-parties. Table A3 (appendix) shows results from a model which includes a dummy variable from the MIC for a non-UN peacekeeping mission and a variable that splits the direct and indirect MIC mediation dummies into UN and non-UN mediation. The results show that the non-UN peacekeeping dummy is positively (but not significantly) associated with the count of battle-deaths in a conflict while negatively (and significantly) associated with instances of no battle-deaths. This may reflect the previously-discussed selection effect whereby third-party action is more likely in particularly severe conflicts. Presumably it is not that non-UN peacekeepers make the incidence of violence more likely, but their efforts are not effective enough to overcome the selection effect, whereas UN deployments are. This is not to claim that all non-UN peacekeepers are ineffective. However, the results are suggestive of a particularly strong pacifying effect for UN missions.

In terms of mediation, UN activity drives its overall efficacy. In the analysis without the interaction with peacekeepers, the coefficients indicate that UN mediation is both negatively associated with the count of battle-deaths and positively associated with incidence of no battle-deaths, though in the latter the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. The results for non-UN mediation are also suggestive of a pacifying effect, but in neither portion of the models is the effect significant at conventional levels. With the interaction terms, we observed that UN direct mediation exerts a strong, statistically significant pacifying effect across a range of peacekeeping levels, while non-UN mediation does not have the same strong impact.
Conclusion

Over the last two decades, international actors have devoted increasing attention to managing intrastate conflicts. A substantial body of research has suggested that various efforts can make significant contributions to the resolution of intrastate conflict. Despite these efforts, however, a large number of civil wars are still fought. Our analysis suggests that the positive effect of international efforts is not limited to conflict resolution. Rather, peacekeeping and mediation can actually reduce the level of killing in ongoing wars as well as resolve them. Although work by HKS has explored the relationship between peacekeeping and conflict severity, this study is the first to show a violence-reducing effect of mediation and the first to examine the interactive effect of mediation and peacekeeping.

These findings are important, because they suggest that international actions have a violence-reducing effect that has, with the exception of peacekeeping, to date been unrecognized. Many of the conflicts that receive the most international attention—such as those in Syria and South Sudan—are incredibly bloody, and the level of violence can suggest that the ability of third parties to do anything constructive is limited. Our analyses suggest, however, that, on average, civil wars would be even bloodier without international efforts. The presence of severe armed conflict in the face of international intervention does not necessarily represent the categorical failure of international efforts.

The results suggest that scholars and policymakers evaluating the success of international efforts should use a broader metric than conflict resolution. To fully gauge the effectiveness of third-party efforts, researchers should examine the severity of violence as well. This is particularly important in the context of analyses that suggest that strategies such as peacekeeping and mediation may lead to a short-term decrease in hostilities at the cost of potential conflict recurrence (Werner
and Yuen 2005; Beardsley 2011). This trade-off may very well exist but determining whether these strategies still are worthwhile requires fully understanding the impact they have on the dynamics of conflict, such as the level of violence.

The analysis here also suggests that efficacy in third-party efforts requires the investment of significant resources. We did not find much of a pacifying effect for indirect mediation. Rather, direct mediation and concurrent deployments of UN peacekeepers—both of which require substantial attention and commitment—have the largest effects. Much of the discussion of conflict management efforts by states and bodies such as the UN focuses on the costs, and these costs can be substantial. We show that the benefits can be as well.

Author’s Note

Replication data are available via the journal’s website. Authors are listed in alphabetical order, equal authorship applied. A previous version of this paper was presented at the DC Area IR Workshop, May 25, 2016; the Folke Bernadotte Academy conference Research for Peace, Stockholm, Sweden, June 7-9, 2015; the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco, September 3-6, 2015; the Political Violence Workshop at the School of International Service at American University, September 16, 2015.

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**Supplemental Material**

Supplementary material is available for this article online.
 Works Cited


Croicu, Mihai and Ralph Sundberg. 2017. “UCDP GED Codebook version 17.2”, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University


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1 See, for example, Walter 2002, Bercovitch and Gartner 2008, Doyle and Sambanis 2006, and Fortna 2008. Additionally, some work suggests that international actors can have a preventive effect, helping to deter the outbreak of civil war (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2017b) or escalation of low-level conflict (Karreth and Tir 2013).

2 Lacina (2006) similarly proposes that the severity of violence is a function of both opportunity and willingness factors among combatants.
We are interested in the effects of mediation and peacekeeping, additively and interactively, and it is infeasible, given the challenge of identifying valid instruments (Beber 2012) and limited data, to estimate a model that instruments for mediation, peacekeeping and their co-occurrence, either in an instrumental-variable/generalized method of moments (GMM) framework or with simultaneous seemingly-unrelated regression (SUR) equations. All of these methods require the identification of exogenous sources of variation that meet exclusion restrictions, which would demand the identification of exogenous sources of variation in mediation, exogenous sources of variation in peacekeeping, and exogenous sources of variation in the co-occurrence of mediation and peacekeeping.

HKS' count includes government and rebel combatants as well as noncombatants killed as a result of battle-related violence.

With this set-up, there may be more than one conflict in a given country at the same time, as the UCDP data treat incompatibilities over separate territories as separate conflicts but lump all center-seeking rebel groups into one conflict.

This differs slightly from HKS, who use a 24-month period. While our results are robust for the 24-month period, we doubt that information about how many fatalities occurred after mediation efforts in the midst of two years of relative peace can tell us much about the conflict-reducing potential of those efforts.

These descriptive statistics are for the subset of conflict months with non-missing observations on the mediation and peacekeeping variables described below.

HKS find that police exert no statistically significant effect on conflict violence and that there is a positive association between military observers and conflict violence.
In this way we test for an immediate effect of mediation efforts. The mediation legacy variable discussed above examines the potential for downstream benefits of mediation.

Data for the MIC variables is only for 1993-2008.

In terms of descriptive statistics, the average number of peacekeeping troops deployed in a given conflict-month in our data is 892.90, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 29,209. The standard deviation is 3,238.770.

Although the overlap accounts for just over 3% (87 of 2648) of the total conflict months in the data, these 87 cases represent over 25% of the total conflicts in the data—the likelihood that a given conflict experiences the co-occurrence of mediation and peacekeeping is not rare.

A Vuong test of the zero-inflated models shown in Table 2 confirm the appropriateness of the zero-inflated model, rejecting the null hypothesis that a conventional negative binomial regression is appropriate at p<.0001.

From the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom, Hogbladh, and Wallensteen 2006).

See Carter and Signorino (2010).

From Cunningham et al's (2009) Non-state Actor Dataset.

From the CINC data (Singer et al. 1972).

The predictions are 52.157 battle-deaths (42.725, 61.590) and 29.984 battle-deaths (21.663, 38.305), respectively (95% confidence intervals in parentheses).

On average, the predicted number of battle deaths in a given month with a prior month deployment of 6,000 peacekeeping troops is 29.328 (23.319, 35.337), whereas the predicted count of battle-deaths with no peacekeepers is 50.646 (42.606, 58.686).

Figure 2 includes all the armed conflicts that had an instance of mediation during a time window of no more than twelve months of "peace." When there are multiple instances of mediation, the time since mediation resets—we do not consider these as time until mediation. When the armed conflicts have more than twelve months without any battle-related fatalities, they are eligible to start counting as time until mediation again (the time until mediation includes both cases that have yet to experience any mediation and cases that entered into a prolonged period of peace after mediation but then conflict relapsed).


32 IRIN. 7/24/2003. “Liberia: Lull in fighting allows Monrovia residents to search for food.”