

ments offer compelling contrasts that provide a rich commentary on DuBois's study.

The most interesting disagreement pertains to the ongoing debate over DuBois's explanation of the subordination of blacks. In *Philadelphia* he links the "Negro Problem" to the oppressive effects of slavery and ongoing racism as well as to the morality of blacks. Within Katz and Sugrue's volume, DuBois is both assailed for being captive to the antiquated mindset of his era and valorized for transcending it. Some of its sponsors and contemporary reviewers regarded *Philadelphia* as too radical. In their respective chapters here, Tera W. Hunter and Antonio McDaniel consider DuBois overly accommodating to contemporary whites in critiquing the moral vice (e.g., prostitution, gambling, "the drink habit") of blacks.

In other chapters, Mia Bay, Robert Gregg, and Thomas C. Holt commend the conceptual advances of *Philadelphia* away from dominant perspectives of the day—biological understandings of race, grand theories, and biblically based arguments. More specifically, as Elijah Anderson, Jacqueline Jones, and Mia Bay emphasize, DuBois was clear about the causal direction of his argument: The social pathology of the black community was the result of slavery, racism, and poverty. Anderson argues that this relationship, which DuBois identified, provided the roots of the current plight of the "underclass." Hunter and McDaniel draw the same parallel but attack both the historical and contemporary versions of the argument as racist and moralistic. This broad range of critique is hardly surprising given the social context in which DuBois worked, and in which he has been interpreted.

DuBois contributed to the methodological foundation of modern sociology, but anticipated and illuminated the inchoate pressures that would become known as the postmodern condition. In some sense, he negotiated middle ground between the untenable certainties of modernist grand theorizing and the nihilism of extreme postmodernism. Central to this adjudication was an understanding that social history is comprised of a contingent series of actions (Holt).

DuBois was explicit about both his devotion to science and the use of it for advocacy (Gregg). From the beginning of his career, he demonstrated awareness of the context in, and the

audience to, which he was writing (McDaniel). He wrote in 1939:

I do not for a moment doubt that my Negro descent and narrow group culture have in many cases predisposed me to interpret my facts too favorably for my race; but there is little danger of long misleading here, for the champions of white folk are legion. The Negro has long been the clown of history; the football of anthropology; and the slave of industry. . . . I realize that the truth of history lies not in the mouths of partisans but rather in the calm Science that sits between. Her cause I seek to serve, and wherever I fail, I am at least paying Truth the respect of earnest effort. (p. 94)

As he came to recognize the biases that infect the practice of sociology and history over the course of several decades, Gregg explains, DuBois moved from uncritical positivism to a Marxist orientation. However, a two-pronged approach, a type of engaged empiricism, was evident throughout his career: First, he sought to use rigorous scientific research to explain the facts of social life. At the same time, the research questions that drove his scholarship and the use of findings were closely aligned with a broader agenda of political and moral advocacy. The weighting of these pursuits certainly varied over time, but both were components of DuBois's work, including his most definitively sociological scholarship, *The Philadelphia Negro*. Social scientists interested in the likely problems of the twenty-first century associated with stratification and the city will find this volume compelling and worthy of DuBois's legacy.

From Savage to Negro: Anthropology and the Construction of Race, 1896–1954, by **Lee D. Baker**. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 325 pp. \$40.00 cloth. ISBN: 0-520-21167-7. \$17.95 paper. ISBN: 0-520-21168-5.

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The social sciences began at a time when biology dominated the study of race. But early in the twentieth century, biology's scientific racism gave way to a racially egalitarian perspective. In this work Lee D. Baker seeks to explain this historic movement within one social science—anthropology. He identifies two Supreme Court

decisions that anchor the transformation from the Court's legitimacy of scientific racism (*Plessy v. Ferguson*, 1896) to the legal reversal of that legitimacy (*Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 1954).

At the outset and throughout the book, Baker claims for anthropology the primary role in that transformation, as well as in the social-scientific study of race: "Researching, theorizing, and classifying racial groups has always been the province of anthropology" (p. 2). And "since its inception in the eighteenth century, American anthropology has been the science that takes the explanation of race and culture as its central charge" (p. 3). Later in the book, he argues that "in 1954, when ideas of racial equality and the law became wedded, the discipline was selectively appropriated to validate claims about racial equality," and claims that "throughout the twentieth century, anthropology reigned over its scientific domain—race" (p. 207). Perhaps so, but one might argue that sociology has described in detail the movement of American blacks from the rural South to the urban North, as well as all the troublesome consequences that followed from that significant change. Has anthropology given more detailed attention to race in the United States than sociology has?

If Baker is correct historically, there were major differences in the movement of anthropology and sociology from a position of scientific racism to one of asserting racial equality. He seems not to recognize that in those early days sociology and anthropology were not sharply differentiated disciplines, and much more scholarly interaction occurred between them then than now. As Baker sees it, the major transforming factor for anthropology was the influence of Franz Boas, who, by separating race and culture and by giving to African culture a much higher status than sociologists did, made it possible to argue persuasively against the notion that black people, ranked anthropologically as "savages," were incapable of becoming "civilized." Boas broke new ground not by arguing that blacks were the intellectual equals of whites. Instead, as Baker puts it, "although deferring to findings of physical anthropologists about racial inferiority, Boas demonstrated there was considerable overlap of 'so called' racial characteristics, imploring that no fact 'has been found yet which would prove beyond a doubt that it will be impossible for certain races to attain a higher civilization'" (p. 105).

For most sociologists, however, the abandonment of scientific racism came about in the second decade of the century, when they learned from the geneticists that biology's claims about the racial inferiority of the nonwhite races lacked convincing proof. In that same decade they also discarded social evolutionary theory; and they were challenged by psychologists, who introduced the new IQ test and claimed that race and class were the basis for significant differentials in IQ scores. The resultant controversy over IQ lasted until at least the 1930s, when the claim that IQ was an inherited quality began to give way to the counter-thesis that IQ differentials derived from differences in the social environment, further encouraging the nature-versus-nurture debate.

But there is no discussion of any of these issues in *From Savage to Negro*. Is it possible that anthropology was untouched by these events, or that Baker simply missed them? (Baker did once address the IQ issue: In his last chapter he critiqued *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*, by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, as a "revival" of the IQ debate, but he traces that debate only as far back as the work of Arthur Jensen in the early 1970s.)

Baker makes other mistakes and omissions. For example, in his discussion of the Social Darwinists, he includes John Wesley Powell among them. But, by the evidence of Baker's own analysis, Powell was not a Social Darwinist. Baker seems not to know what to make of the biographical material he has on Powell. He also fails to note that in the 1920s and 1930s sociologists largely supported assimilation while anthropologists were cultural pluralists, or to ask why that was so. Independently of that, he notes the brief anthropological interest in studying what folk cultures were still alive in the United States, but he seems unaware that sociologists were also studying folk people at that same time, though not necessarily for the same reasons.

Baker completes his analysis with Chapter 9, "Anthropology and the Fourteenth Amendment," examining the legal struggle that culminated in the 1954 *Brown* decision. It is a detailed exposition, mostly about the legal processes by which the historic decision was achieved. The decisive factor, according to Baker, was the work of Boas, W.E.B. DuBois, and the Howard University social scientists (including sociologist E. Franklin Frazier) in helping the NAACP

lawyers draft a successful appeal to the Supreme Court.

But that does not complete the book; there is also a Chapter 10, "The Color Blind Bind." While Chapter 9 ends in 1954, Chapter 10 jumps forward 40 years to the 1990s. It is not about anthropology but about the current quarrels over color blindness, the denial of validity to the concept of race, and the reassertion of racial differences by IQ. The message warns against the deleterious consequences of advocating color blindness, of abandoning the concept of race, and of substituting the concept of ethnicity for race. It is a familiar ideological stance that is not confined to anthropology and does not belong in the book. It can only detract from its claim to be a scholarly work.

Revisioning Gender, edited by **Myra Marx Ferree**, **Judith Lorber**, and **Beth B. Hess**. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999. 500 pp. \$73.50 cloth. ISBN: 0-7619-0616-9. \$35.95 paper. ISBN: 0-7619-0617-7.

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Like its precursor *Analyzing Gender* (1987), this anthology reviews current feminist scholarship in the sociology of gender. The editors' purpose is to review research on gender from the past decade and show how the questions in this field have evolved. The collection is organized in five sections—"Reconceptualizing Gender," "The Macrosocial Organization of Gender," "Gender, Discourse, and Culture," "Gender in Social Institutions," and "Gendering the Person"—each reflecting different themes in feminist scholarship. Although mostly sociological in their perspective, the articles reflect the interdisciplinary approach that has characterized feminist studies from the start. The anthology provides a good overview of the major questions within feminist sociology and will be useful both for scholars studying gender and for those who want an intellectual profile of gender studies.

The collection emphasizes several major themes: the social construction of gender, the intersecting influences of race, class, and gender, and the significance of a global perspective on gender. Most of the articles give an overview of the intellectual trends in a given area of study, showing how major questions have evolved. For

example, Anette Borchorst reviews the different feminist perspectives on the state, showing how questions about authority and patriarchy have developed and arguing that gender is fundamental in structuring the state. Likewise, Patricia Yancey Martin and David Collinson give an excellent overview of the central themes emerging from studies of gender and organizations, identifying new questions for research in this area.

The strongest theme in the book is the idea, central to feminist studies, that gender is a social construction. These articles bring new dimensions to this long-standing idea, including debate about the presumed distinction between sex and gender. As Joan Wallach Scott argues in her essay on gender and politics, the distinction typically made between sex and gender is now being questioned by many feminist scholars who recognize, as Robert Connell argues in his contribution, that even bodies "do not stand outside of . . . history" (p. 454). Several essays in the collection show how by problematizing gender as a social category, we begin to see more fluidity and transgression across presumed dichotomous categories. Judith Lorber's essay on gender and sexuality is particularly strong in this regard.

Throughout this volume, authors emphasize the idea that gender is *both* a social structure *and* a social process. Thus, whereas earlier studies of "sex roles" underplayed the role of human agency in the social construction of gender, new scholarship emphasizes the ever-fluid character of gender—not only in the construction of people, but also in the construction and organization of institutions. Thus, Lisa Brush's article on gender and work shows that dichotomizing work and family has obscured the intersection of productive and reproductive work. Shari Dworkin and Michael Messner reveal the institutional contradictions in new roles for women in sports, but also show how sports continue to market and reproduce gender. Anne Roschelle reviews the intersecting influence of culture and social structure on family poverty. Patricia Hill Collins demonstrates how institutional practices and the structure of science evolve from the intersections of race, class, and gender and shape the content of scientific knowledge, but obscure the presence of women of color in science.

One of the organizing principles in this anthology is the distinction frequently made between macrosocial and microsocial organization. On reading these essays, one sees how this