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ORO

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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM ORO-T-222

Target Analysis and Media in Propaganda to Audiences Abroad

by

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PREFACE

The need for manuals for use in training of personnel for psychological warfare operations was discussed in several interested agencies in the spring of 1951. Several other major requirements for research needed in relation to psychological warfare were considered at the same time. A conference held at the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base at that time was the occasion for initial consideration of ways and means of providing for these needs.

The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare of the Army took an active interest in the problems presented, and in the upshot it was agreed that the Operations Research Office should undertake to play the coordinating role and provide major effort for the provision of training manuals, while some other projects were undertaken by other agencies.

The preparation of training manuals is not an ordinary or normal task for an operations research agency. The Operations Research Office would not regard the preparation of such manuals on military subjects in general as part of its proper mission for the Army. At the time in question, however, it was a fact that the small staff engaged in operations research in psychological warfare in the Operations Research Office was the only such staff available to undertake such a task. It was also a fact that the lack of such training manuals as were desired reflected the lack of organization of knowledge and theory of psychological warfare, which was a hampering circumstance for operations research in the subject as well as for planning and operations in the same connection.

The preparation of a training manual presents a number of problems that permit no direct and precise scientific solution. At what level of knowledge and intelligence and interest on the part of the student should the text be aimed? How far should the text take sides in matters on which leading experts are in controversy? How far should the beginning student, whatever level is assumed, be led into the technical refinements of the problem in an initial study course? How far should he be made an expert

himself, or how far should it be assumed that he will be subject to varied assignments of which psychological warfare may be only one and a temporary one at that?

We will not claim pretentious certainty concerning the assumptions we have made as to the answers to these questions. We have tried to prepare what amounts to an intelligent and intelligible text for students of college caliber who do not have previous serious background in the subject and who are not embarking on professional careers or seeking graduate degrees in this particular field.

It should also be mentioned that we have no illusion that the present text can stand, or should stand, as too good to be improved. It should serve especially as a focus for critical consideration of what such a text should be, of how it can be improved, of tests as to its adequacy, and of improved versions based on further experience.

This volume is one of three that were undertaken at the start of the program two years ago. It is concerned primarily with the media of communication—leaflets, radio, etc. The first volume is intended as a general introduction to the principles and practices of psychological warfare; the third will constitute a casebook of practical examples of psychological warfare techniques.

GEORGE S. PETTEE

Chevy Chase, Md.
May, 1953

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE SELECTION AND USE OF MEDIA

SCOPE OF VOLUME

The means of communication between the sender of a propaganda message and his target audience are the principal subjects of this book. We call these means of communication the media of psychological warfare. While the major ones are print, radio, and film, there are, as the table of contents indicates, important subdivisions of these media, and other media as well.

The present volume discusses the principles governing the use of all significant psychological warfare media. It does not attempt to survey the world's media resources, or to teach how to write propaganda, or announce broadcasts, or actually operate the media it discusses.

An understanding of the nature and use of the media of psychological warfare is, of course, only one part of the total task of understanding the planning and conduct of psychological warfare.

In the first place, media problems are distinct from problems of policy and theme. Policy consists of the goals, both ultimate and instrumental, of the propagandist's superior authority. The propagandist receives policy in the form of directives, but (although to a varying extent) himself supplies the instrumental goals, which the high policy officers are not always able to set.

In addition, the propagandist selects the propaganda themes. Propaganda themes (also called media loading) are the specific demands, appeals, and other content of his messages. They are instrumental policy translated into effective symbols. They are the symbols that are chosen and emitted by the propagandist. Thus the question whether to attack the person of a ruler of a hostile country (for example, Hirohito and Hitler in World War II) is first an instrumental policy question and secondly a theme problem. The propagandist is concerned to some extent with the policy, but is entirely responsible for the symbols that make up

the theme, that is, with "how to say it." But the present volume does not discuss themes or content, save as this is necessary in explaining the use of media.

Another part of psychological warfare consists of knowing and employing certain aspects of the psychological principles of human behavior, which are the subject matter of another study in this series (ORO-T-214, The Nature of Psychological Warfare, in press). Psychological warfare must, however, rely on the principles of social sciences other than psychology, especially political sociology. Part of the task of this volume is to present the principles of the social sciences other than psychology, insofar as these are relevant to psywar.

In order to stimulate the attitudinal and behavioral changes described in ORO-T-214, which requires taking into account the known political sociology of the target, psychological warfare must solve other important operating problems. Besides understanding the uses of media, the selection of themes, and the principles of human behavior, the psywar operator must, for example, be a competent manager of personnel, equipment, and organization. In order to bring about a desired change in a target audience, the operator should concretely try (a) to employ properly skilled personnel, (b) use correct behavioral principles, (c) get together adequate equipment, and organize it in a system appropriate to his purpose, (d) set up correct administrative procedures, and, finally, (e) reach his target through the most appropriate media. Any major failure of the operator on any of these points will notably impair his operation. Each resource is necessary to the operation; the perfect mission employs each skillfully. In practice, all combine to produce the intended result.

The interdependence of the several bodies of knowledge involved in a psychological warfare operation is brought out in the following abbreviated illustration from psychological warfare by the Air Force. The Air Force psychological warfare organization drops a leaflet on an enemy neighborhood. The leaflet is intended to explain why military necessity requires the operator's forces to strike at enemy war factories located in residential areas. The stated action employs theme (military necessity), organization (Air Force psywar procedures), psywar personnel (determining the target, writing the material), equipment (planes, presses, leaflet bombs), media (the air-dropped leaflet), and principles of human behavior (the process by which this target population undergoes changes in attitude, as determined by social and psychological studies).

The principles contained and the practices recommended in the present volume regarding media, therefore, must be viewed as conditional upon the availability of the other resources mentioned. The volume will set forth, where possible, correct principles relating to all of them. But the emphasis throughout will be on media. The volume is, therefore, only a partial statement of the problems of psychological warfare.

METHOD OF PROCEEDING

The next chapter attempts a preliminary discussion of the development and purpose of psychological warfare missions. In Part II we turn to the analysis of the target, a problem of highest importance to the media operator, since it is upon correct appraisal of the present state of readiness and receptivity of the target that the success or failure of a mission depends. The problem of target appraisal is a complex one, involving nothing less than a maximum understanding of the psychological and social characteristics of a given human society or group. Little can be said about the selection and use of media of psychological warfare without knowing the kind of job that is to be done. Just as a mechanic will select one tool for one job and a different tool for another, the psychological warfare operator will choose one medium for transmitting his message at one time and a different medium or combination of media at another time. Unlike the mechanic, however, the psychological warfare operator invariably has a complex objective, a complicated and partially inaccessible audience, a never negligible area of ignorance about the target audience, a control over his media that is partial at best, and a scarcity of media resources to choose from.

Part II, while it emphasizes the analysis of target audiences, has the additional important function of discussing generally how the type of audience affects the choice of media. However, only the most general references to the use of media is to be found in Part II, which deals with principles concerning use of media that can be expected to apply to all media. It remains for the chapters of Part III to discuss the particular media and their uses, and note their unique capacities and unique limitations.

Finally, Part III discusses the strategy and tactics of using several media together, which is common practice in psychological warfare missions. It deals with the relation of propaganda to other ways of influencing audiences abroad, particularly the use of military force and economic measures.

CHAPTER II

DETERMINATION OF MISSION

A mission is an operational formula for moving from the idea of a change in the target, as conceived by the operator, to the actual change. It asserts what is to be done, how it is to be done, who will do it, and when it will be done. Missions may be highly general in character, in which case the formula will describe a projected psychological warfare campaign. They may be less general, and consist of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. Or they may be specific and highly limited, in which case we may think of them as psychological warfare actions. Decisions concerning the choice of media or media most appropriate to a given psychological warfare mission must, clearly, depend on what they are intended to accomplish.

DIRECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE DONE

Missions are founded on directives. "Directive" has no fixed and generally accepted meaning in administrative practice, and can therefore be defined here in a manner that is useful in propaganda. Let us think of a directive as an order to realize a situation that is considered to be beneficial to the program of a given level of command. It is generally non-operational as of when it descends from one level of command to another, primarily because the operators on a given level of command are, generally speaking, the only ones who can convert a directive into an operational formula, that is, a mission. However, framing directives is the affair of the directing authority, and the directive may be framed as a mission if that authority sees fit to frame it that way.

The directives and subsequent missions given the psychological warfare operators are for the most part intended to advance propaganda missions previously laid down. Thus a grant of funds and

authority to institute new shortwave broadcasts, or to form a new combat propaganda company, will reflect the higher echelon's conception of the tasks and needs of psychological warfare. Sometimes, however, a directive or mission will do the reverse of that—for example, require the deliberate handicapping or even abandonment of psychological warfare operations in favor of some other major commitment of a military, economic, or political character. In such instances, the propaganda operator needs to remind himself of the essentially partial role of psychological warfare in the total frame of positive action.

Any psychological warfare act or operation is subject to overall policy control, which guides the campaign or program, and determines the coordination of the constituent operations. Policies, for example, unconditional surrender as a demand of the Allies in 1944, are often decided upon without taking psychological warfare capabilities as such fully into consideration. Probably psychological warfare would have been in a better position to help end hostilities in World War II at an early date if easier conditions for surrender had been authorized. However that may be, the operator is charged with working on a given situation, not setting policy for the nation. Even if the surrender terms and hence the psychological warfare mission had been made more difficult than they were, the correct response for the operator would have been to mobilize his psychological warfare resourcefulness behind the stated policy.

Often, of course, policy-makers decide on psychological warfare campaigns with great regard to the receptivity of the audience. Often, however, and especially under field conditions, psychological warfare is subordinated to other means. An example is combat propaganda, where force is the master of the situation. Enemy troops under fire are, generally speaking, scarcely receptive to psychological warfare. They are frequently reachable only by very short messages, communicated in leaflets or over loudspeakers. Enemy troops may, however, be induced to listen by mobilizing the motive of self-preservation, since it is easier for them than for members of the enemy's civilian population, and under their police control, to desert to our side. The most receptive audience, by contrast, may be civilian groups in Allied or neutral states. Because high policy toward such states is often guided in large part by psychological considerations, operations directed at civilian groups would normally be in a better position to make the most of psychological warfare capabilities than those

directed at combat personnel, although propaganda has a role to play in either case.

Design of the mission will normally occur after the commander and his staff have set forth the situation, the plan of action, the timing, and such details as to method of execution as will insure coordinated action by the whole command. The psychological warfare planners must then identify the target audience, and form a clear idea of the behavior or attitude that the psychological warfare communication or message is intended to produce. In other words, the mission, as finally interpreted by psychological warfare personnel, must designate not merely the target audience as it is, but the target audience as it is to be after the change. Such further interpretations of or supplements to the command or policy directive as are needed to remove ambiguities for the psychological warfare unit will normally be made at this stage.

PLANNING AND TIMING

A well-planned mission is a mission that is expressed in a scientific design, in which all the elements of the operational formula acquire a maximum of clarity and precision based on knowledge of the relevant facts and relationships. Ideally, all missions should be planned, and the important steps in any mission include a sufficient analysis of the target audience to identify its psychological vulnerabilities, to suggest the appropriate content or message, to indicate the appropriate media, and to estimate the results. These matters will be treated in their proper place. At this point, however, we must speak of the timing of missions.

The success of any psychological warfare mission, no matter how competently the mission has been planned, depends in large part on its timing. What is told the target audience is almost never something everybody knows. Often, for example, it is a short piece of real news or the report of a real and recent event, the idea being that the audience can check it and, having found it correct, will conclude that the sender is reliable, accept his position on the issues at stake, and reject that of his enemies, or any other position incompatible with his. It is thus a matter of primary importance to so time the psychological warfare message that the message will be reinforced, and its psychological effects intensified, by events; and vice versa.

But messages that are not essentially news also need to be correctly timed. The effect of a message may be of short or long

duration; in either case, however, the chances are that it can be obtained only as the result of a momentary condition of the target. The expert propagandist clicks his shutter at the moment when the audience has assumed the appropriate position, and, prior to seizing that moment he has also prepared his action like the expert cameraman, by anticipating what will be in front of him and by adjusting his resources to the anticipated situation.

Such expert timing of psychological warfare operations, like most sound psychological warfare planning, depends almost entirely upon the accuracy, relevance, and scope of the available intelligence. If all the wished-for intelligence were available, it would be easy to time the psychological warfare operation correctly. But the intelligence available normally falls far short of that which is wished for. Most decisions on timing are thus based on whatever the available intelligence indicates concerning the relative readiness of the target audience to receive (that is, accept) the psychological warfare message.

The results of such analysis are seldom clear-cut. Usually, indeed, they are so very general that the psychological warfare operator finds himself choosing among several dates for the execution of the mission. All he can then do is adjust his arrangements so as to be able to act as soon as the evidence indicates any likelihood of support from current events, postponing any action likely to be offset by events, recent, current, or prospective, about which the audience would presumably know.

A key principle governing visual and auditory media actions is that the operator gains great psychological advantage by being the first to get through to the target audience with word on any controversial development. If the opposing side reaches the audience first with its version, the operator is placed automatically in a defensive position, regardless of the truth and forcefulness of his argument. Anything he says tends to dignify, to some extent, the lies or half-truths of the enemy.

A development of such stature as the United States announcement of plans for the European Recovery Program, for instance, should be explained and exploited fully by the announcing side before the opposing side can concoct and disseminate an attack based on charges of "dollar imperialism." Similarly, certain actions of military authorities in a combat zone, especially those requiring civilian cooperation, should be explained fully through visual and auditory media before the enemy's propaganda has an opportunity to turn it to his advantage.

Close coordination of policy and planning, beginning at the highest levels of government and continuing down through all intervening strata to the level of the psychological warfare operator, is an absolute prerequisite to such alert exploitation of potential psywar material. When such coordination exists, the operator knows in advance about those actions of his government and its allies, or of military commanders in his area, that call for handling of the kind here in question. He can have his staff alerted, his source materials at hand, his photography and layout ready, his writing and editing completed, and his presses ready to roll, and thus greatly improve his chances of catching the enemy off balance.

In connection with the principle of "getting there first," the role of silence is important. It cannot be assumed, when news of an important development is made public somewhere in the world, that it will fail to reach the operator's audience simply because the operator's own output says nothing about it. With the modern world's intricate network of press and radio, "grapevine" systems, fast transportation, and other means of communication, there is no assurance that any piece of information, once made public, will fail to reach any corner of the globe. In highly civilized areas, even in time of war or other emergency, any important news item is likely to become known in some way, and fairly quickly.

Thus it should never be assumed that keeping silent about a distasteful fact will suppress it, and the operator should assume that his target audience will learn of it. He must, to be sure, make or obtain a policy decision as to whether to include the distasteful item in his own output, or to remain silent about it, but if he does the latter it should be for some other reason than the belief that the target audience can be kept in ignorance of the item. If he decides to include it, he should apply the principle of "getting there first." In short: Whenever the operator remains silent on any important issue he should do so as a matter of deliberate policy—for example, to avoid dignifying an enemy falsehood through recognition.

SECURITY RESTRICTED INFORMATION

PART II

GENERAL TARGET ANALYSIS AS APPLIED TO MEDIA SELECTION

SECURITY RESTRICTED INFORMATION

CHAPTER III

IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET

WHAT A TARGET IS

A target is the aggregate of persons a psychological warfare campaign, operation, or action seeks to reach through its message. Thus, targets may range from the highly general (for example, the Iron Curtain peoples, the Italian Catholics, the Asiatics) to the quite specific (Company B of the 119th Regiment, the journalists of the USSR, the leaders of the Indian Congress Party), depending on the nature of the mission. The psychological warfare audience is defined as all actual recipients of a message. Thus the audience may be either smaller or larger than the target.

The directive behind a psychological warfare mission often does not specify exactly the persons or groups at whom the operation or campaign is to be directed. For example, a directive to lower the enemy's production may or may not mention that the persons most directly concerned with enemy production, that is, the managers and workers in industry, are to be the targets. If the goal is to spread confusion and distrust among high policy-makers, the appropriate target groups, i.e., the military high command, the upper echelons of the diplomatic staff, or the top ranks of the administrative bureaucracy, may or may not be mentioned in the relevant directive. But the mission must identify the target groups, and fit them into the plan.

A particular target, or set of targets, may be approached by different means (openly or covertly, by radio or leaflets, and so forth). The correct mode of approach depends, of course, on the ends sought by the psychological warfare mission, as well as on those characteristics of the target that limit the choice among alternative modes of approach. By way of exaggerated example, one would not seek to induce slowdowns on the part of the enemy's working class population by distributing among it historical treatises of a highly scholarly character. Similarly, one would not

seek to sow distrust among top ranking diplomats by beaming broadcasts to which the mass of the population might listen.

We may postpone until later sections the numerous problems that arise in selecting the proper approach to a target. Here it is enough to emphasize the sequence or flow from mission to target: that is, the fact that mission should determine target, and not vice versa. It happens all too frequently in psychological warfare operations that ease of access to one target rather than another, or the medium specialist's greater technical competence in one medium than another, is permitted to distort and blur the specific ends the mission is supposed to realize. To attempt to address various targets more or less at random merely because of their easy accessibility, without any clear guiding purpose, is to reduce a psywar operation to sheer futility.

WHERE TARGETS COME FROM

Specification of the target is, then, a matter that is closely tied up with the nature of the mission confronting the psychological warfare operator. As was indicated in Chapter II (Determination of Mission), however, psychological warfare missions are articulated on at least three levels—the campaign, the operation, and the action. As missions assume greater generality or specificity, because of the level at which they are conceived, so do their respective targets. Even without major policy changes being effected, therefore, the fluctuating course of international politics and of wars necessitates constant redefinition and realignment of psychological warfare missions and targets.

To put the above in other terms, missions and targets are supplied to the psychological warfare operator from a variety of sources and, depending on their specificity and duration, encompass different levels of psychological warfare operation. This can be roughly illustrated by considering, for example, US psychological warfare in a country like Italy during recent years.

Since World War II the broad policy aim of the United States in Italy has been to strengthen democratic and pro-American tendencies and weaken Communist, anti-American tendencies. By maintaining programs of economic and military aid and establishing friendly relations with democratic parties and groups in Italy, the United States has sought to change attitudes in a direction congenial to that aim. Because the policy is broad and sustained, we may think of our psychological warfare in Italy as a

campaign, whose mission is to convince the Italians that cooperation with the United States and other Western nations is their best bet.

At the campaign level, the target is usually no more specific than in this instance, that is, a whole nation or people.

Under the impact of changing international political developments, somewhat more specific missions and targets arise, and provide the focus for what we may call psychological warfare operations. For example, the embarrassed silence of the Italian Communist Party prior to the Yugoslav-Kremlin split on the question of the future status of Trieste, offered a suitable opportunity for psychological warfare to point out to Italian patriots that the Communist Party was more concerned with furthering Russian and Yugoslav interests than Italian national interests. More recently, Communist exploitation of the growing restlessness of southern Italian farmers over the problem of land reform has resulted in a more defensive operational mission for psychological warfare: to convince the Italian farmers that this problem can best be solved through democratic procedures, and that the Communist pattern of collectivization would ultimately give them a lot less than it would take away.

Still other missions and targets, of a more specific nature and of shorter duration, emerge from the course of everyday political developments and from events in general, e.g., the rather sudden and dramatic Titoist defection of two Italian Communist Party leaders in early 1951. This is the domain of the psychological warfare action. The event might, for example, have given rise to a psychological warfare action presenting it as a sign of growing dissension in Communist ranks and of the increasing strength and success of Western policies. Such persons as borderline Communists and sympathetic non-party members could have been urged, in a further action, to follow the example of the two dissidents, and thus place Italian interests over those of Soviet dominated international Communism.

PROBLEMS IN TARGET DELIMITATION

Although it is advisable for the psychological warfare operator to define his target as precisely as possible on the basis of the assigned mission, to speak as if targets could be identified or pin-pointed with any such accuracy in actual operations would be unrealistic. Ordinarily the actual audience, the audience that can

be reached by a message, is not exactly coterminous with the target, if for no other reason than that not all those within range of a message will be interested in it. Thus it is not certain that the message will be delivered even though the target is well within range.

By way of example, let us assume that a naval operation is to be reinforced by psychological warfare messages designed to demoralize or soften up the personnel of a certain shore battery, and that radio and loudspeakers are the chosen media. Despite the accuracy with which it is possible to identify the group for whom the message is intended, it would be unrealistic to describe that group as the audience for the radio message. The audience of the radio message would be the undifferentiated mass of people within earshot either of some receiver tuned to the psychological warfare broadcast, or of the airborne or waterborne loudspeaker. Whether the shore-battery unit listens or does not listen will depend upon the skill with which the target is analyzed, and upon the degree to which the analysis shows how to attract the attention of the particular group for whom the message was designed.

As a further example, let us assume that an Air Force commander directs his psychological warfare staff to persuade a foreign country that it would be to its advantage for the United States to acquire air bases within its territory. Where the mission is so general, the entire population of the country in question is one of the targets at which psywar must aim, but only one. The mission, in other words, requires other more specific targets. The population's elite, for example, becomes a target in its own right, because it has a disproportionate influence on the policies of the government regarding the lease of bases. To what degree such individuals are accessible, that is, can be reached by the Air Force psychological warfare, and what media they can best be reached by (for example, articles in the foreign press, documentary films, personal letters), can be determined only by special target analysis.

Again we may assume that the psychological warfare mission is to render United States policy toward India more acceptable to India. In this case the major target is of course India as a whole. Analysis of the target "India" will, however, reveal many groups that should be exploited as special targets, and the operator's task becomes that of selecting the media best able to carry the appropriate messages to each of these groups.

CHAPTER IV

PHYSICAL ACCESSIBILITY OF TARGET

CONSIDERATIONS OF SPACE

Communication between any two minds presupposes certain physical conditions that will allow a message, however communicated, to be carried from the speaker to the person addressed.

The first of the physical obstacles to communication that comes to mind is space. Sustained scientific effort to overcome this obstacle is what largely explains the number of media now available. By means of telephonic nets and electronic magnification of the voice, one individual may now talk to large numbers, whether collected in one place or widely separated, and whatever their distance from the speaker. With somewhat greater difficulty, persons at a distance can now see pictures of real or simulated events.

Despite the fact that meanings can now be communicated by radio, television, and writing to any point on the globe, the distance obstacle has not been entirely removed. The greater the distance, in general, and the fewer of the human senses called into play, the less forcefully the communication is delivered. A radio broadcast is normally less satisfactory to listen to than the same speech heard in the studio; the very fact that it is broadcast prevents the finer adjustment of message to audience that the lecture hall encourages. With radio, there is also the obstacle of time. In order to attract and hold an audience, one must broadcast at times when listening is easy, and be as brief as possible.

There are also difficulties attaching to long-distance communication by writing, as a substitute for face-to-face conversation. A book, to be sure, can present the writer's view on a large subject in greater fullness and with greater conviction than it can normally be presented in face-to-face conversation. Books are, however, expensive to produce, and make great demands

upon their readers; in general, therefore, they do not lend themselves to psychological warfare purposes. Unlike most other media written communications, on the other hand, once delivered to potential readers, let the reader set his own time and place for the actual reception of the message.

The selection of media for long-distance communication should always be guided by an effort to approximate the effects of direct contact between sender and audience members as much as conditions permit. Where possible, moreover, more than one medium should be used.

The middle-range media like loudspeakers, radio, and leaflets are affected to some extent by the target's topography. A highly mountainous terrain and a widely dispersed audience are naturally more difficult to cover than a flat terrain and a concentrated audience. This difficulty may require shorter messages, more frequent transmissions, and more time.

In some cases, to be sure, distance is not an obstacle, but rather increases the effectiveness of psywar symbols. Certain radio and leaflet messages undoubtedly impress the target audience more deeply than the same messages would have if communicated face-to-face. No clear principle can be advanced to define and explain such cases, but examples may be given from the field of domestic (as contrasted with international) communication. Radio advertising can make an article of merchandise seem more desirable than it would be if merely displayed on a merchant's shelves. Many people would rather view theatrical productions from the second balcony than from the orchestra stalls.

TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Our ability to communicate a message depends upon the media of communication at our disposal. Even if the target has been accurately identified, is within range, and is clearly seen in terms of its relative vulnerabilities, it cannot be successfully attacked by psychological warfare unless the necessary facilities are available. Without presses, messages cannot be communicated by print. Without transmitters, communication by radio is out of the question. If no mechanical facilities are available at all, the operator finds himself back in the seventeenth century, when psychological warfare was waged by deeds, word of mouth, and handwritten letters, and was virtually incapable of attempting the missions expected of him in the twentieth century.

Psywar planning must also take into account the technical facilities available to the audience. Radio broadcasts to the target audience are sheer waste unless its members have radio receivers, and tune them to the required frequency. Written communications are meaningless to illiterates, or to an audience unfamiliar with the language in which the psywar messages are expressed.

Moreover, even if psychological warfare has the necessary physical facilities at its disposal and there is no physical barrier at the receiving end, communication is by no means assured. The failure may be due to any one of a variety of local conditions —for example, a competing official broadcast at the same time as ours, or an event that diverts the attention of the potential audience from our message.

Another determinant of accessibility includes the several types of obstacle that the target audience, or the officials who control it, may set up to block the reception of our messages.

No complete listing of such obstacles can be given here, because they are so dependent on local conditions of time and circumstance. The most obvious ones are the jamming of our radio frequencies, the imposition of severe penalties on both military and civilian personnel who listen to our broadcasts or read our publications, and systematic efforts by the authorities who control the target audience to anticipate our messages and to tell the audience whatever will best serve to prevent them from listening to it or reading it, or to counteract what we tell them even if we get their attention.

Any psychological warfare mission depends for its successful accomplishment, then, on considerations of space, on the mechanical adequacy of the sender's facilities, on the adequacy of the audience's receiving facilities, and on the degree to which there are technical and legal obstacles to reception of the sender's messages.

CHAPTER V

CULTURAL DISTANCE BETWEEN TARGET AND SENDER

In addition to the physical and technological barriers already mentioned, there are the numerous cultural differences between sender and target that may act as barriers to effective communication. Only the most important of these can be mentioned here, and these only with a caveat, namely: that the relation of any specific cultural barrier to psychological warfare's task differs greatly from target to target.

LANGUAGE

Language is the most apparent psycho-cultural barrier that psychological warfare must overcome. For effective communication is clearly impossible unless the sender speaks, reads, or writes the language of the audience with reasonable fluency.

Language fluency is a matter not merely of correct grammatical form, but also of the more subtle aspects of linguistic behavior—inflection, innuendo, rhythm and color, and sensitivity to the level of address called for by a given message. We need only to remind ourselves of the awkward, often amusing, malapropisms of the foreigner learning English in order to recognize the degree to which these more subtle linguistic skills influence the effectiveness of the spoken or written word.

This is not to suggest, however, that psychological warfare communications are always ineffective when the sender does not have perfect command of the target language. A number of students are of the opinion that psychological warfare has commonly applied the standard of language fluency (particularly as regards impeccable accent) too rigidly and without due regard to other factors entering into the sender-target relation. In general, it may be said that the necessity for perfect speech and accent varies with (a) the kind of content to be transmitted,

and (b) the role the sender is to play before the target audience. By way of illustration, we may note some situations in which considerable language fluency is highly desirable:

Where we are engaged in black propaganda, and it is important to convey the impression that the speaker is "one of us";

Where the complexity of the message is such that full and careful attention is demanded of the target audience, and where, therefore, words and locutions inviting misunderstanding can throw the listener or reader off.

Some situations in which perfect speech and accent are less important, possibly even disadvantageous, are:

Conjunctures in which the psychological warfare communication is itself so significant to the listener as to reduce other considerations to irrelevance (as it is when we are telling enemy soldiers, for example, how to desert, or escape from a hopeless trap, or when we are telling enemy civilians about an imminent air raid);

Where we are engaged in certain types of white operations and wish to avoid the suspicion we may evoke in the target audience by, for example, using their language with excessive skill. In this connection, Linebarger (Psychological Warfare, Infantry Journal Press, Washington, 1948, p. 59) remarks:

> ...with the perfect speaker of the enemy language there is always the question, 'What is that guy doing over there?' A traitor is less appealing than an open enemy spokesman; a traitor has to be sensationally good to get across at all...The perfect speaker, whether enemy renegade or friendly linguist has an inglorious role at the beginning of war, when enemy morale is high and the enemy population has not had time to think over the problem of changing sides.

In military government and consolidation operations, where a certain amount of linguistic ineptness on the part of the persons in authority serves to maintain a desirable social and personal distance between them and the audience and to impart a quality of firmness to the orders and regulations they issue;

Where there is reason to believe that an occasional slip will sound sympathique (as it might from a girl disc-jockey).

HISTORY

The history of a target nation, region, or populace also places sharp limits on the messages, appeals, and campaigns that can

be directed at it. The futility and positive danger involved in addressing a psywar target in terms of the history, experiences, and outlook of the sender's own nation, region, or class simply cannot be over-stressed. Even clear intellectual awareness of this pitfall on the part of the operator is no sure guarantee against the outcropping of his culturally induced biases, prejudices, and misconceptions, and these in some circumstances can be very damaging to the mission in hand.

Awareness of the historical background and traditional aspirations of the target, then, enables the psychological warfare operator to direct more meaningful, more realistic-sounding, and thus more persuasive propaganda at it. This is especially true when the operation calls for ideological or "think" propaganda, since it is on this level of generality that the psychological warfare operator is most likely to ignore the historical barrier that separates him from his audience. Himself impressed with the fine-sounding character of such terms as "democracy," "representative government," "a free press," "high standard of living," etc., all of which have a special meaning within his own historical and cultural traditions, he forgets that these terms, if they mean anything at all to foreign audiences, mean something very different from what he understands by them.

"Democracy," for example, has no fixed meaning that all or even most audiences will associate with it, although it has come to have a great positive emotional connotation practically everywhere. We find it meaning "representative government" in some parts of the world, "economic freedom" in other parts, and totalitarianism in still other parts.

RELIGION AND MORAL SENTIMENT

Knowledge of a target's religious practices and dominant moral sentiments is indispensable to psychological warfare, because it is largely from these areas that a people's most sacred symbols are derived. The religious practices and moral sentiments of sender and target often have little or nothing in common, and the fact that this is true offers psychological warfare countless opportunities to antagonize and offend the target audience without knowing it is doing so. This can easily produce a boomerang effect, that is, behavior or attitudes the reverse of those intended by the operators. Such seemingly superficial matters, from the average American point of view, as the prohibition of

pork in Moslem culture, the sacredness of the cow in Hindu culture, the deification of the Emperor in Japan, the holiness of the religious ascetic through much of Southeast Asia, and the reverence for the Madonna in countries of Roman Catholic faith can, in the absence of careful handling on the part of psychological warfare planners, become formidable blocks to effective communication. For example, a Moslem may react with disgust to the propagandist's description of plenty on the typical American table because of a casual or passing reference to roast ham. Similarly, an Italian may deeply resent a jest about motherhood or virginity, because of the close association between these ideas and the Madonna-Child symbol.

The above is particularly true in technologically backward areas of the world, where social life is still permeated with sacred elements. Even in Europe and America, for that matter, the sacred elements persist, and are ignored by the propagandist at his peril. Consider, in this connection, such symbols as the royal family in England, the Constitution in the United States, Wagnerian opera in Germany, Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union. Each, in its respective country, is held in such awe by so many people that any satirical or derogatory reference to it in psychological warfare would be sure to prove costly.

WIT AND HUMOR

Closely related to the problems discussed in the preceding section are those relating to the use of wit and humor in psychological warfare operations. This calls for great caution on the part of the operator, who may easily be tempted to go too far with it by the wish to avoid an exaggerated tone of seriousness in his output.

The first important consideration to bear in mind is that targets differ greatly as regards what they consider witty and humorous. This statement applies not only to the subject matter regarded as appropriate for jokes, anecdotes, and comedy, but equally to the way a given subject matter must be handled if it is to get a laugh or smile. The choices here are numerous: directness versus subtlety, activity versus passivity, intellectual versus emotional connotations, logic versus absurdity, and so forth. A British cartoon of the thirties showed a bakery shop, empty of customers, featuring a sale of hot cakes. It was thought funny enough to be awarded a prize in England, but Americans

saw in it only an example of the Englishman's "feeble" sense of humor. French witticisms treating the foibles of sex and married life are likely to be thought vulgar in certain circles in the United States, while Europeans regard the slapstick of American film comedies as sadistic and inane.

Since nothing falls quite so flat as an unsuccessful joke, and since humor and wit are among the more subtle aspects of cultural expression, only a considerable human sensitivity plus an initimate knowledge of the target culture can enable the psychological warfare operator to know when to try to be funny and when not to.

Even assuming this factor of cultural variability effectively mastered, however, a second important consideration regarding wit and humor is that of the broad strategic timing of humorous materials by psychological warfare.

One of the major psychological functions of wit and humor is to offer people a socially approved outlet for the expression of covert, often repressed, hostile sentiments, particularly as these feelings relate to symbols of authority and socially sanctioned modes of behavior and belief. The many jokes and anecdotes about political leaders, bureaucrats, and the Army that are always going the rounds, as well as those on taboo subjects such as sex, illustrate this aspect of human behavior very well. When they originate with "one's own kind," jokes also provide an acceptable type of self-criticism, permitting people to express "in private" and "in jest" the kind of thing they would prefer the world to remain ignorant of. The implications for black propaganda, for example, leap to the eye.

Wit and humor offer many opportunities for activating, reinforcing, and directing resentment at selected persons and practices in a target society. During the early stages of a war, when morale in the target society is still fairly high and living conditions still relatively comfortable, the careful planting of a joke, or the judicious circulation of one already in currency, can help to keep local sources of discontent fresh in people's minds, and thus prepare them for later, more overt, attacks by psychological warfare on these points. Typical of such jokes is one popular in Germany during the time of Hitler's much heralded forthcoming invasion of England.

> Hitler and Goering are in a rowboat in the Channel, both rowing feverishly away from the shore of England:
> Hitler: How far from England are we, Hermann?
> Goering: A good distance, Adolph. No one can see us.
> Hitler: Good! Now I can try walking on the water.

Some precaution must be exercised by psychological warfare in this area, to make sure, on the one hand, that the jokes and anecdotes have a ring of genuineness, and on the other that the cathartic relief afforded by them is not so great as to significantly diminish the irritant effect of the sources of discontent.

Interestingly enough, when irritation becomes too great and sources of discontent too obvious to all in the target society, the propagandistic value of wit and humor declines. People in severe distress, for example, people who have been bombed out, are short of food or bereaved, are in no mood to laugh; even the occasional chuckle to be heard among such people has a hollow tone. In such situations, psychological warfare must avoid making light of the sources of people's discontent, which are oppressively apparent to all. Instead a more serious and somber tone, in line with the operation's ultimate objectives, should be adopted.

INVIDIOUS COMPARISON BETWEEN TARGET AND SENDER

By invidious comparison between target and sender we mean the kind of comparison, intended or unintended, that excites an unfavorable emotional response in the target toward the sender's purposes. Perhaps the most important for American propaganda beamed to foreign audiences is the kind of comparison that evokes feelings of envy because of the high disparity between the standard of living in America and that in foreign countries, and because of the image millions of foreigners have of America as a land of great material luxury.

Because envy is an unstable emotion, seldom found in a pure state, it is too unpredictable for psychological warfare to attempt to use. Usually, moreover, it has defensive accompaniments, such as, resentment of the envied, feeling of moral superiority toward the envied, or attempts to put the envied out of one's mind. When such defensive reactions are brought into play, a further barrier toward successful penetration by psychological warfare is set up in the target audience.

This is not to deny that there are occasions when it might serve psychological warfare purposes to excite envy in a target audience (for example, when the envy can be directed at a third party, whom the sender wishes the target to dislike). For the most part, however, propaganda that touches upon invidious themes is to be avoided. This may seem to contradict the practice of many famous propagandists of the past, insofar as they

have sought to arouse the envy of their target audiences by "demonstrating" the "superior" strength, morality, wealth, or well-being of the nation for whom they were speaking. But such propaganda attempts are based upon hope that the target population will reach the conclusion that they are inferior to the propagandist's fellow-countrymen, that they have nothing worth fighting for, and that by joining the enemy they have everything to gain. And there is little factual evidence to suggest that this tack has ever met with much success, particularly where the audience is hostile to begin with. Apart from the difficulty involved in "demonstrating" the sending nation's superiority, the very attempt more often than not engenders the kind of psychological block within the target individual that we have mentioned repeatedly above.

Even when the sender is reasonably well-intentioned, and merely wishes to call attention to contrasts in standards of living, production, military strength, etc., in an objective and rational fashion, there is always the danger that the target will conveniently misconstrue the message as boastful, or dismiss it as "just propaganda." An instance of this danger is the case of a number of Ukrainian deserters to Germany during World War II, who were selected by the German authorities to be shown the advanced farming methods that prevailed in Germany, so that they might subsequently imitate them. At first the Ukrainian deserters reacted with envy, but soon dismissed the prosperous German farmer as someone whose only concern in life was the number of pigs on his farm. Many Europeans react in this manner to the American way of life, when they see American films or read American magazines that depict the numerous luxuries the typical American family enjoys.

Invidious comparisons by the sender are known to have adverse effects at the combat psychological warfare level also. Accumulated experience in front line leaflet distribution and loudspeaker broadcasting has demonstrated, for example, that surrender appeals that in any way call into question the fighting ability or honor of the enemy soldier are predestined to fail. Since the fact of surrender is, on the most favorable showing, accompanied by feelings of guilt and shame, combat propaganda must assiduously avoid saying anything likely to intensify such feelings.

A modicum of sensitivity regarding the foibles of human nature, together with an appreciation of the image others have of the sender, is generally enough to prevent the operator from falling into the error of invidious comparison. Furthermore,

the harm done by invidious comparisons is frequently of short duration, and can afterwards be counteracted by well-calculated psywar themes. A frequent mission for psychological warfare, indeed, is that of mitigating the hurt pride and abused sensitivities of foreign audiences resulting from the invidious comparisons perpetrated by thoughtless tourists and careless officials, or from quasi-official statements and actions.

UNIVERSAL MESSAGES

The major emphasis in this chapter thus far has been on how factors like language, religion, and history constitute barriers to effective communication between sender and target. We turn now to a condition which, by contrast, frequently facilitates effective penetration of the target.

This subject can perhaps best be introduced by first reiterating what has been said above in another connection. Just as there is no clear-cut set of psychological appeals that may be addressed to all audiences under all circumstances, there is no set of political beliefs to which all audiences will respond. Political ideologies and attitudes vary strikingly from nation to nation. Furthermore, as has been indicated, the meaning given one and the same word, for example, democracy, varies from place to place. Hence the operator must exercise extreme care in using political appeals.

Nevertheless, the twentieth century is par excellence the age of severe and world-wide ideological disturbance, in which a pattern of revolutionary demands is clearly observable. The symbol of revolution (that of a "peaceful" revolution, especially) has a positive connotation for most target audiences, and can be effectively used by propagandists on behalf of pretty much any ideological position. A psychological warfare operation cannot, therefore, afford to cut itself off from ideological propaganda.

Inquiry into the content of the appeals that are succeeding in the world propaganda fray at the present time reveals that there is ready acceptance, at least on the verbal level, for certain key ideas, knowledge which may make the operator's task notably easier. Seventy-five of the 83 nations of the world have "written constitutions." Of these 75 nations, 59 have constitutional provisions declaring that sovereignty rests with the people. The great majority of constitutions enumerate various "guaranteed rights" akin to the bills of rights of the American federal and

state constitutions. Loyalty to the constitution, popular sovereignty, and civil rights are, therefore, powerful symbols for propaganda purposes. A recent study* emphasizes the following points about guarantees of rights.

> The rights of the people most frequently mentioned in national constitutions relate to assembly and association, conscience and religion, correspondence and domicile (inviolability), education, equality, health and motherhood, individual liberty and fair legal processes, labor, movement within and to and from the nation, nonretroactivity of law, petition, property, social security, and freedom of speech and press.
>
> About 79 percent of the national constitutions contain clauses respecting the right of assembly and association; 79 percent respecting rights of conscience and religion; 79 percent respecting secrecy of correspondence and inviolability of domicile; 78 percent respecting education; 71 percent respecting equality; 47 percent respecting health and motherhood; 86 percent respecting rights of individual liberty and fair legal processes; 56 percent respecting labor; 47½ percent respecting rights of movement within, and to and from the nation; 35 percent respecting the nonretroactivity of laws; 64 percent respecting the right to petition; 80 percent respecting property rights; 51 percent respecting social security; and 81 percent respecting freedom of speech and the press.

These facts show the basic political beliefs to which large portions of the world are verbally committed. A number of the rights mentioned are, recognizably, direct descendants of the American and French Revolutions. Others derive from the socialist and communist revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The operator, in any case, should make it his business to find out what rights the masses of the target population respond to as symbols and, within the meaning and limits of his directives, should exploit them vigorously as bases for his propaganda themes.

*Amos J. Peaslee, *Constitution of Nations*, 1950, p. 9.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL DIFFERENCES AND SUB-TARGET PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter major emphasis was placed on how such factors as language, history, and religion separate the sender from foreign audiences, and thereby create problems as regards the psychological accessibility of these audiences. No mention was made of the fact that peoples and societies generally vary within themselves in these same respects. Nations like the Soviet Union, China, Switzerland, and India are, for example, multilingual. Nations like the United States, India, Germany, Nigeria, etc., permit or even encourage the practice of more than one major form of religion. And different regions within one and the same country (for example, the north and south in the United States, Bavaria and Prussia in Germany, England and Scotland in the United Kingdom, and Georgia, the Ukraine, and Great Russia in the Soviet Union) frequently have significantly different historical backgrounds and traditions.

These variations within countries are, of course, of utmost significance for problems of target and audience analysis. It is of the utmost importance to address the target in the spoken tongue rather than in "official" or highfalutin language, for example, and cultural variations from class to class and region to region are highly relevant to the choice of symbolism and phrasing for propaganda appeals. For example, the operator addressing Germany must know whether he can use Luther as a hero-symbol without at the same time offending Catholic Bavaria, or whether, in addressing the Soviet Union, he can compare Soviet imperialism with the conquests of Genghis Khan without at the same time offending the peoples of Soviet Asia.

When broad cultural differences of this sort are not present, and the target population is relatively homogeneous with respect to language, history, and religion (as in France, Sweden, Holland,

Norway), there tend to be crucial intra-national and intra-societal variations that psychological warfare must take into account in analyzing audiences and in directing propaganda at them. What we have in mind here are class and prestige differences, political divisions, occupational differentiations, all of which must receive attention in psychological warfare's long-range research and analysis activities.

Before undertaking to discuss the nature and significance of these social groupings, we must pause to ask what is meant by the term "society." Having answered this question, we can place the subsequent discussion of types of social variation found within society in its proper perspective.

SOCIETY: UNITY THROUGH DIVERSITY

The term society always denotes some working together by a group of people toward some commonly held ends and purposes. This is true equally where it is applied loosely, as to a club or association, and when it is applied strictly, as to a community or nation. It does not imply an absolute identity of interest among the people concerned; neither does it imply complete harmony of action, or absolute, unperturbed social integration. Only among the most primitive and homogeneous of peoples is there to be found anything remotely approaching that kind of unity. What the term does imply is a degree of reciprocity, an amount of functional integration among tasks, shared understanding between and among group members, sufficient to hold them together. Populations that do not meet these minimal requirements do not in any proper sense constitute societies.

One fact of primary importance for an understanding of the structure of society is this: a society is differentiated. Indeed, a society is today regarded as "advanced" just to the extent that it is differentiated. It is differentiated just with respect to such natural biological factors as age, sex, hereditary talents and abilities, etc. It is further differentiated with respect to such social factors as class, occupation, political power, and prestige. The various social strata, interest groups, or political divisions, arising from these distinctions may be thought of as comprising the significant social segments of a society. And in order for a society to continue to function as a society, the relations governing the behavior of these segments toward each other must be to some extent harmonious, and to some extent integrated around certain commonly held ends and purposes.

The essence of society is compromise and adjustment, whether through force or through aribtration and consent, of the conflicting claims put forward by the various segments mentioned as they compete for certain relatively scarce values such as, power, wealth, security, and prestige. This applies especially to modern industrial societies, whose complexity renders inevitable the problem of potential or incipient conflict between rival segments. During normal times, most societies are able to carry on in such fashion that discord of a totally demoralizing character and open strife can be avoided. But in time of war or crisis, when a nation's efforts must be geared to a few urgent purposes, the need for a higher and more perfect unity becomes extremely urgent.

War, and modern total war in particular, seeks to achieve two complementary goals: (a) so to disrupt and demoralize the social system of the enemy as to impair his war potential and prevent continuance of the war; and (b) so to strengthen and solidify the integration of diverse segments as to insure military victory.

As has often been reiterated in these chapters, psychological warfare is but one component of this vast enterprise. Thus it is incumbent upon the psychological warfare operator to gain an understanding of the divisive forces within society, so that he may contribute to their accentuation in enemy nations and their attenuation in his own and allied nations.

In the following sections of this chapter a number of dimensions of social analysis are presented, and the character and extent of these divisive elements are examined. The dimensions of social analysis to be discussed are: distribution of income; occupational structure; prestige classes; social stratification in space; social classes; social mobility; elite-mass configuration; and major institutional targets.

These analytical dimensions may be thought of as categories into which fall the various significant social and economic groupings, such as, classes, status groups, elites, political parties, and others, that frequently comprise the targets of the psychological warfare mission. Different values, sentiments, and expectations are clustered around these groupings; an understanding of them helps those responsible for psywar missions to make sounder inferences with respect to both the proper mode of approach and the appropriate medium for each target, and with respect to the relationship between different targets. For example, an understanding of the relationship between managers and workers in industry can identify the subject matters and themes of interest to each and to both. Similarly, a knowledge of

the media preferences and leisure habits of the working population may indicate the proper medium for a psychological warfare message directed at that group.

Although the central focus of what follows is on how patterns of stratification in society impinge on problems of media selection and utilization, attention will also be given to their implications for detecting and analyzing strengths and vulnerabilities in target societies. It must be borne in mind, however, that social characteristics relevant to target accessibility and approaches vary from time to time, place to place, and situation to situation.

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

The distribution of income, whether this be thought of in terms of goods or money, is one important index of differentiation among target groups within a society or community. Since income is unequally distributed in all modern societies, once we know how it is distributed within a given population we can at once make useful inferences regarding the relative accessibility of different classes, occupational groups, and regions to the various media of communication. It is known, for instance, that very few industrial and farm workers in the Soviet Union can afford a wireless radio set. Wireless sets there are mainly in the hands of salaried officials, party officers, professionals, and managers. Thus such radio programs as the Soviet worker can hear come chiefly over wired receivers, the content of which is controlled by centrally located wireless receivers, in turn controlled by centrally located, government-operated broadcasting stations. Thus, the selection of radio as a medium of psychological warfare operations beamed at the Soviet Union poses special problems concerning possible audiences and appropriate content.

The distribution of income in a target society can also provide psychological warfare operations with numerous openings for propaganda. This is especially true in the more equalitarian societies, such as the United States and the states of Western Europe. Particularly during war time, when equal sacrifice is expected of all, real or alleged inequities in the distribution of income among different groups in the target society provide fertile soil for the propagandist's attempts to create dissatisfaction, resentment, and distrust. A review of propaganda and counter propaganda in recent wars indicates that themes dealing with the distribution of income have been effectively used in many psychological warfare operations.

OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE

Closely associated with but not identical to distribution of income in modern societies is what we may call occupational structure. The occupational structure of a society, community, or institution tells us how many people do what kinds of work. There are numerous classification schemes to choose among for this purpose. That adopted by the United States Census, for example, divides the working force population into six groups: professional and semi-professional; manager, proprietor (including farmers), official; clerk or office worker; skilled worker; semi-skilled worker; and unskilled worker—laborer, domestic, farm worker, etc. A somewhat broader classification, more widely used in European countries, divides the working force into four major groups: bourgeoisie—large landholders, large entrepreneurs, major executives, stockholders, etc.; petite bourgeoisie—small landholders, small proprietors, artisans, etc.; intelligentsia—members of the liberal professions, white collar workers, officials, etc.; and proletariat—urban (workers) and rural (peasants).

There are further and more detailed classifications for both society as a whole and for major institutional segments thereof (for example, the church, the military, the state administration). Whether a broad or a detailed breakdown should be adopted for occupational analysis of a given target depends largely on the availability of data and the purpose for which it is to be used.

In passing it might be noted that because schemes of occupational classification are of relatively unambiguous empirical reference, they have been of immense value in furthering the analysis of more abstract sociological dimensions, such as social class, prestige class, and social mobility. For psychological warfare purposes, however, the relevance of this dimension of analysis lies in the facility with which it can be used to identify the crucial clusters of attitudes, social dynamics, and communication habits that are peculiar to the various target groups in a society.

In this connection, decades of social research in America and abroad have consistently underscored the differences in communication habits, and thus in receptivity to different media of communication, on the part of different potential target groups. A commonplace finding of such research in our day is that groups occupying a higher occupational status are more prone to respond

to books and other printed material than groups of lower occupational status. Similarly, it is known that the more specialized the occupational group (such as, doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists), the less effective are the mass media, and the more effective are specialized media (for example, trade and professional journals) in influencing its attitudes and opinions.

The amount of attention devoted to different media is still another factor that varies markedly from occupational group to occupational group. For example, the proportion of attention given to audio and audio-visual media as opposed to purely visual media is greater among the lower occupational strata than among the higher strata, where more time is devoted to the various forms of print. As regards impact of presentation, research has shown that controversial issues phrased in terms of personalities are more effective in influencing those at the bottom range of the occupational scale, while issues phrased in terms of policy alternatives have more effect on those at the top of the hierarchy.

Factors of this sort lie at the very core of the problem psychological warfare faces in selecting media and designing modes of approach to its targets.

PRESTIGE CLASSES (STATUS GROUPS)

When we speak of prestige or status, we are referring to the differential distribution of honors or privileges in a society or community. Who defers to whom, who can normally feel superior to whom—these are the kinds of questions involved.

Prestige rankings accord in large measure with occupational and income rankings. Nevertheless, there are often significant contrasts between people's prestige ranking and their ranking on other dimensions of stratification. Variance between prestige and income ranking are the most common; that between prestige and occupation is less common, although not by any means rare. For instance, the position of a Supreme Court Justice in America is by no means so remunerative as many other positions, but is accorded high prestige. Such stereotypes as the "respectable but impoverished landed gentry" or the "vulgarity of the nouveau riche" are further evidence of discrepancies in ranking along the dimensions of social stratification.

Like occupational differentiations, inequalities in the distribution of prestige among different persons and groups in a society have important implications for the selection and mode of approach

of psychological warfare media. Different media, like the different status groupings themselves, carry varying amounts of prestige. Book-reading, for example, is generally regarded as a more prestigeful leisure time pursuit than newspaper reading or radio listening. Similarly, different periodicals appeal to different status groups, and are regarded, in consequence, as more or less prestigeful (e.g., Colliers vs. the Readers Digest vs. Harpers).

One reason why the propagandist needs to be aware of the prestige dimensions of his target is the danger of talking down to people, which inevitably creates resentment and suspicion.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN SPACE

Just as differences in income, occupation, and prestige create social boundaries between persons, so do they create spatial boundaries between them. The most important breakdown here is the rural-urban one which results from differentiated occupational pursuits (agriculture, business, industry).

Research in human ecology, the science that studies the location and distribution of persons, facilities, and institutions in space, has well demonstrated that competition for favorable sites and residences results in a fairly consistent spatial patterning in the modern metropolitan center. In the absence of unusual topographical features, the center of the city is typically the business district, which is the area of highest rents. Surrounding this is the zone of light and medium industry, in which transportation facilities occupy a conspicuous place and surrounding that the area of workers' tenements and small homes, followed further out by the apartment houses of the white collar groups. At the edges of the city and in its immediate suburbs one generally finds heavy industrial plants, around which are clustered a secondary growth of working class quarters. Still further out, toward the periphery of the metropolitan area, are the suburbs, where the relatively large and well-cared-for homes of the business, managerial, and professional classes are located.

Of course, in any particular metropolitan area there are local variations from this pattern of spatial distribution so that in no two metropolitan areas will quite the same pattern be found.

Ecological data are relevant to a wide range of psychological warfare operations. For example, the ready information that urban ecology provides concerning the concentration of working class quarters near factory sites can be of use in coordinating

leaflet propaganda with Air Force bombing strikes at industrial targets. The bombing of industrial sites inevitably causes some damage in nearby working class areas, and usually results in at least a temporary loss of employment. While it is somewhat foolish to expect enemy working people to approve such bombing, leaflet propaganda disseminated from aircraft can at least forewarn them, and explain why the bombings are necessary, and ultimately in their best interests.

In a broader sense, generalized knowledge of what classes, ethnic groups, and occupational groups live in what geographical areas makes possible more accurate dissemination of any propaganda whose appeals are couched in class, ethnic, or prestige terms.

SOCIAL CLASSES

Definitions of social class abound in social science theory and research. For our present purposes, however, it is enough to say that a man's social class is the position he occupies in society as a result of his combined ranking along such scales as those of income, occupation, prestige, place of residence, family background, and education. Class differences, roughly speaking, are differences in over-all style of life.

This conception of class differs in certain crucial respects from the traditional Marxist conception. The latter concept, though it does take account of broad style-of-life differences in society, refers primarily to natural social divisions allegedly resulting from the economic order, which is regarded as determinant of society as a whole. In other words, it is broad categories of life situation arising from legal and social relationships "implicit" in the system of production that constitute the central focus of Marxist theory. A man is an entrepeneur seeking profits, or a wage worker; he owns property from which rents are collected, or he is propertyless, and his way of life, his outlook, vary accordingly. The usefulness of the concept of social class for propaganda purposes depends in large part on the extent to which the class divisions in a society are permeated with "class consciousness" or "class identification" on the part of class members. "Class consciousness" is said to be less prevalent in America than Europe; and apparently it is assuming increasing importance in contemporary Asia, where the ancient caste-like divisions are rapidly breaking down into class divisions. However, social class is too crude a

tool of analysis for most psychological warfare purposes, especially the purpose that is of most concern to us here, namely, the wise selection of psychological warfare media. This is because other groupings (e.g., occupational, prestige, regional), which cut across class divisions, exercise more direct influence upon and correlate more precisely with attitudes and communications behavior.

To the extent that class membership is behaviorally reflected in the attitudinal, political, and communication areas, the psychological warfare campaign can profitably attempt to incite, inflame, or neutralize antagonisms and hatreds between classes. The conquests of Napoleonic France, and the dawn of the Bolshevik regime in Russia—particularly as it contributed to the weakening of the East front German Army and to the revolutionary uprisings within Germany—are prominent historical instances of the successful propagandistic exploitation of class divisions and antagonisms in an enemy country. It should be noted that class appeals may call either for the recognition of a lower class (for example, the proletariat) or for the restoration of the "rightful" position of a class that is losing position and privileges (for example, the lower middle "white collar" and "shopkeeper" class, or the nobility). Because of the lack of communication across class lines in some target societies, it is possible, on occasion, to address different and even contradictory appeals to different classes—as the Italian and German Fascist movements frequently did. Ordinarily this is accomplished via different media, or via different sub-media such as separate newspapers. If public opinion is in a sufficiently confused state, however, a single medium or sub-medium, such as a single newspaper, can turn the trick.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Social mobility is the dynamic aspect of the numerous analytical dimensions we have been discussing. This is a matter of the movement of persons or groups up or down the income, occupational, class, and prestige scales of a society. Just as a person's comparative ranking may, as we have seen, vary from one dimension to another, so his comparative mobility may vary from scale to scale. An appreciable increase in income may fail to bring with it increased prestige. Conversely, a marked decrease in income may occasionally result in heightened prestige, for

example, the private business executive who leaves his post to work for government in a high official capacity.

Of less immediate relevance for media selection than for the detection of a target's strategic psychological vulnerabilites, the phenomena of social mobility should be viewed in relation to the common goals and values of a society. How is the "good life" defined? How is it realized, and what are the differential opportunities for its realization by different social groupings? Questions of this sort—more concretely focused, of course—point the operator toward actual or potential discrepancies between culturally nurtured aims and actual achievements. He can then tap important sources of existent or latent frustration inherent in the target's social structure, and systematically exploit them for psychological warfare purposes.

Frustration and deprivation themes suggested by a target's social mobility patterns are not, of course, equally promising in all situations. In a caste society, where birth determines individual social status, people neither expect nor strongly desire an advance in status. This type of social system, in other words, is the complete negation of social mobility, and offers psychological warfare scant opportunity for solving discord.

Most modern societies, however, at least pay lip-service to the concept of a more or less open class system offering socially legitimate possibilities for occupational advancement, increased prestige, and greater material comfort. Even such regions as large parts of Asia and Africa that have been relatively dormant for many centuries, have come, with the spread of the industrial and technological revolutions, to adopt the ideology and outlook of the open class system. The rapid tempo of the breakdown of the caste system in India is a case in point.

In short, a markedly unequal distribution of the chances for advancement, or the presence of sharp contradictions between what persons are taught they can achieve in life and what is really possible for them, constitute major sources of psychological vulnerability under an open class system. In contemporary Soviet society, for example, tuition and entrance restrictions have made it more difficult than formerly for children of working class families to obtain higher education, and there is an ever-growing disparity in the enjoyment of material comforts by the Russian working, bureaucratic, and professional classes. This will unavoidably produce frustrations for psychological warfare to exploit, the more because a major tenet of communist ideology is the removal of all class distinctions.

In capitalizing upon such opportunities, psywar must, of course, direct the frustration and buried resentment in the enemy audience at the symbols of governmental or military authority.

In selecting media for his propaganda, the operator must bear in mind the fact that in a given target there may be greater political than social mobility. Political leaders (for example, those of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or Labourite England) are often predominantly self-made men. Leaders who have been out of power for a long time are likely to react favorably and vigorously to appeals for more mobility. When they are in power, they regard the same appeals as irrelevant and inappropriate, since they have, in their own persons, demonstrated the fact of mobility. Hence, the same newspapers, books, leaflets, playing upon social mobility frustrations will have sometimes a positive effect on some target individuals and a negative effect on others.

ELITE-MASS CONFIGURATION

Who are the leaders, and who the led? How did the leaders get where they are, and how securely entrenched are they? How, and how much, do the two groups communicate with each other? Questions of this sort belong to the dimension of elite-mass configuration and are of great importance in the conduct of psychological warfare.

While this dimension of analysis, like social mobility, affords little in the way of specific implications for media selection, it does help the operator to estimate certain target strengths and vulnerabilities.

A crucial distinction in this area, and one of broad strategic concern to psychological warfare, has to do with the manner in which the leaders and the led communicate with each other. Is their communication unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral? Is the political communication process totalitarian or democratic in character?

If by leadership we mean the initiation of policy, the making and implementation of decisions, and the over-all direction of affairs, we can discuss striking contrasts between the totalitarian and democratic patterns. Totalitarian elites, while they do seek to familiarize themselves (most often in a covert fashion) with the living conditions and perhaps even the desires of the led, nevertheless initiate, implement, and execute policy in a unilateral fashion. Very little open, public, or direct communication takes

place between them and those further down in the leadership pyramid. Democratic elites, by contrast, tend to operate from a broad base of policy initiation and are subject to public, open, and direct criticism at every step of the decision-making process.

Both configurations have their strengths and weaknesses. The strength of the totalitarian scheme rests on the rapidity and seeming efficiency with which policy can be made and executed. Dissident parties and groups can quickly be silenced, or at least prevented from giving wide public circulation to their complaints. At the same time, however, the unilateral communication network that the totalitarian state fosters tends to open an ever-widening gap between the leaders and the led. In times of crisis this frequently results in mass despair and apathy, if not active resentment and hostility.

Democratic elites, necessarily more solicitous regarding the views, desires, and whims of those who elect them, or of the power groups that influence their appointment to office, are prone to compromise issues, to avoid clear-cut responsibility for the initiation and implementation of policy, and, as the British put it, to "muddle through." Furthermore, because they are accountable to the mass of citizenry, they are subject to strong pressures, more or less absent in totalitarian society, that bring out into the open disagreements and feuds between different elite factions. This frequently results in popular confusion and uncertainty, which lays the entire society open to certain types of psywar attack. In general, however, the multilateral system of communication in the democratic state, and the resultant sense of participation and potential influence in the decision-making process on the part of the citizenry, tend to increase their resolution and staying power in times of crisis and adversity.

Another area of major concern in the elite-mass problem is divisiveness among the leaders themselves. In a stable society there are sub-elites, composed of the "ins" and the "outs," and there are further divisions among all these with respect to power, wealth, and leadership, for example, labor organizations and religious groupings. While, in a sense, all of them have a big stake in the existing social order, their morale may be effectively augmented or diminished by propaganda through appropriate media.

In societies of present or potential instability (and most nations today are such), the major political elites are often highly exclusive. When an elite comes to power, other elites are liquidated or otherwise repressed. Thus, the De Gaullists in France can

be expected, if they achieve power, to try to eliminate the Communist Party as an effective influence, and perhaps other political parties as well. Elites tending toward such exclusiveness or possessing such exclusiveness (e.g., the Spanish Falangists, the Chinese Communists) tend to be characterized by a high degree of integration, high morale, and low vulnerability to external propaganda. They generally follow a strict, hierarchic leadership principle and their followers are less vulnerable to propaganda than the population as a whole. For example, the German SS troops were unreceptive to Allied propaganda, even at a time when visible results were being obtained with regular troops. Unless, however, the exclusive elite has established a totalitarian regime, potential counter-elites exist and may react with great eagerness to external propaganda.

MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL TARGETS

Little need be said here of such major targets as the family, church, and school, except that, apart from the state itself, such institutions are the leading foci of authority and social control. Charged as they are with the responsibilities relating to the primary functions and transitions of life, for example, birth, child-rearing, education, marriage, worship, and death, they evoke in their members the very deepest sentiments, loyalties, and expectations.

Such institutions tend, as a result, toward a strong traditionalism, which psychological warfare ignores at its peril. Reform movements have found them to be unsurmountable barriers to sudden changes of any great magnitude, and even modern totalitarian societies, despite their machinery of coercion, have had on frequent occasions to retreat before them. In both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, for example, stringent efforts to change the organizational basis and character of family and church were, in general, unsuccessful.

CHAPTER VII

MESSAGE CONTENT AS RELATED TO MEDIA SELECTION

FUNCTIONS OF CONTENT

In the above chapters we have spoken only incidentally of content as a factor in the selection and utilization of media, and we postpone until Part III the question of what content can best be carried by each medium. Meantime, the question arises as to the different capabilities of different types of content for psychological warfare, and as to what general criteria may help in the selection of media for each type of content.

There are a number of variables to be kept in mind in connection with content, including: complexity, richness of imagery, power to stimulate emotions, relevance to current events, scope, intimacy, stylistic form, explicitness, intelligibility, and representativeness. The relevance of this or that variable to the selection of psychological warfare media in a given situation must depend, as we have said, on the purpose of the psychological warfare mission and on the characteristics of the audience. If, for example, psychological warfare must convey a single important fact to a semi-literate mass audience, available media would probably be ranked with primary regard to the relative simplicity and intelligibility of the messages each medium can deliver. A leaflet cartoon disseminated by air might be the answer to the problem. If, instead, the psychological warfare mission is intended to produce a sudden emotional change, e.g., panic fear, such criteria as vividness and dramatic impact would determine the choice of media. A surprise radio broadcast might fulfill the operator's expectations in such a case.

THE QUALITY OF CONTENT

Simplicity vs Complexity of Content

As indicated above, one quality of content that must be taken into account in selecting the appropriate medium is the simplicity

or complexity of the psychological warfare message. The reasons for this are:

The more complicated the message is, the more necessary it is that the recipient be able to refer to it at will. Print in its various forms (leaflets, newspapers, books) meet this requirement, whereas the audio-visual media (radio, film) do not. Kitchen recipes to housewives are mostly wasted when broadcast by radio, but the cookbook is always there to supply the information when wanted. Any fairly complicated list of directions to be followed by the target at some future time, then, should be communicated by the medium of print.

The simpler the message, the more reason there is to use only those media that require only one perceptive sense (hearing or sight). For such messages media involving two or more senses (television, theater, pageantry) should be avoided. They are not merely superfluous, but frequently distract the target from the central theme of the message, as when a documentary film fails to make its point because of the distractions occasioned by scenic or action shots.

Denotative vs Expressive Content

"Denotative" content means content that is objectively clear and, for the most part, "instrumental"—that is, intended to help in meeting a practical situation. Mathematical symbols and the language of science are examples of purely denotative content. Instructional guides, how to build a boat, how to organize a revolutionary movement, are examples of denotative communication. The typical newspaper story, which tells the reader what happened, where, when, and how, is also denotative and fairly explicit.

Expressive content, by contrast, seeks to suggest rather than to spell out its meaning. It therefore presents a structure of verbal or audition images which stimulate the target to "build up" the message from its own previous emotional experiences and imaginative associations. Music, poetry, and rhetorical eloquence (as in patriotic speeches) are clear examples of expressive or connotative content.

While science and poetry represent the extremes of the range between factual and imaginative content, most of the content that psychological warfare has to communicate is a mixture of both. The following remarks should be read with this fact clearly in mind.

The greater the expressive element in the message, the more important it is to select media that appeal to more than one sense at the same time, such as, films, theater, television.

Likewise, the greater the expressive element in the message, the more promising are the media that give the impression of closeness and person-to-person contact—e.g., radio, film, theater, and, naturally, direct face-to-face talks. As we know from every-day experience, we respond emotionally to someone we actually see or hear much more readily than to disembodied words on paper.

Scope of Content

The important questions in this connection are: How many different points does the communication cover? In how great detail are the points spelled out? Some media—for example, a book—are more appropriate for subjects of broad scope; and others—for example, the loudspeaker—for subjects of narrow scope. This distinction has the following implications:

Media that permit the recipient to move along at his own pace (pamphlets, newspapers, books) can better convey broad-scope subjects than the media for which the pace is determined by the sender (radio, films, or television). Besides permitting the reader to "turn back and check up," the printed words alone (because the sound and sight of the sender are not present to distract him) will more readily induce the contemplative and reflective states of mind required for independent analysis of subject matter.

Since messages involving considerable detail and description are generally limited in their appeal, that is, interest only specialized audiences, presenting them in printed form makes it easier for the message to "find" the specialized audience. Unprinted media like radio and film are less likely than print to reach such audiences, since they are restricted, both by technological and commercial factors, to the "common denominators" of mass-audiences.

DESIRED EFFECTS OF CONTENT

Content may also be differentiated in terms of the type of effect it is intended to produce upon the target. Desired effects, in turn, can be related to the relative capabilities of the various media for producing the effects desired. Hence desired effects are a further consideration that must be taken into account in selecting media. They may be thought of, for the present purpose, as belonging to one or another of three classes: entertainment effects; reinforcement effects; and instrumental effects.

Entertainment Effects

In this class the message gives the recipient a pleasurable experience, which in its mildest form amounts to mere respite from tension. The content serves no purpose other than to attract and please an audience. Anything goes here that will hold the target's ear or eye, as in radio and television programs sponsored by national advertisers. On the international stage, some fair examples would be the Soldaten Sender, which addressed seductive music plus propaganda to German troops in the ETO, or the human interest sketches that the Voice of America broadcasts in the hope that sketches of the "Good Humor Man" and other Americana will both entertain its foreign audiences and increase their liking for Americans as people.

The major purpose, if not the major effect, of most communications of this type is not to influence the target individual, but to "bring him aboard." It goes without saying that all media that can compel his attention can serve the purpose of entertainment. In any general ranking, the audio-visual media would normally rank highest from the standpoint of capacity to do this.

Reinforcement Effects

Here the message reinforces a present attitude of the recipient and converts him to another, more acceptable attitude on a controversial issue. (Prestige effects, where content increases the recipient's self-approval, may also be included in this class.) This type of content (persuasive) is accordingly the crucial one for purposes of psychological warfare. It can be broken down into three closely related subtypes: first, that which seeks prestige effects; second, that which seeks reinforcement effects in the strict sense of the term; and third, conversion effects.

The first subtype, content that tells the target something calculated to give it a better opinion of itself and hence add to its prestige is, in a sense, a disguised form of entertainment. Most people want to be flattered (unless the flattery is too obviously insincere), and the relief from painful inferiority feelings that prestige-building content can give undoubtedly tends to make the audience feel better disposed toward the sender. The media best adapted to this purpose are naturally those that permit a high degree of finesse—as in the various art forms such as the theater, literary fiction, and the film. The cruder and blunter media, like loud-speakers, leaflets, posters, and film-strips would be used only if no others were available.

Second, content that reinforces ideas already present in the mind of the target individual, is normally the most persuasive, because it has only to help him believe what he already wants to believe. Such content figures prominently in most psychological warfare missions that involve the building up of one side of a controversial issue.

Third, content looking to conversion of the target individual from unfriendly to friendly attitudes toward the sender or one of the sender's policies, is based on extension of the reinforcement principle. The classical examples of sudden religious conversions, like that of St. Paul for instance, generally involve recognition by an individual of some new idea, or the achievement of a new insight about an old idea that "tips the scales" in its favor. If the psychological warfare message, or a long and well-planned series of messages, can build up that side of an issue that the sender wishes the target individual to accept, and can build it to a point that makes "our" side of the argument more convincing to him than "their" side is, then he may become,in greater or lesser degree, the sender's ally or supporter. Sudden conversions to a political faith, for example, communism, are popularly supposed to be far more frequent and widespread than they are in fact. Most conversions, even from one political party to another, occur slowly and result from a long series of persuasive experiences.

This short sketch of the reinforcement aspect of persuasion is perhaps sufficient to indicate that the most persuasive media are essentially those first mentioned, namely those which (like the theater or television) can make the most vivid impression upon all the physical senses of the target individual, and can also charge the message with persuasive emotional currents.

Instrumental Effects

The message, in this class, gives the recipient fuller knowledge of a practical problem and a greater competence in dealing with such a problem. Instrumental purposes are served by psychological warfare content when the target individual is given more or less explicit instructions that will enable him to do certain things that he could not do, or at least could not do as well, in the absence of such instructions. Instrumental effects are produced by all media, perhaps most efficiently by the simpler media—that is, short broadcasts (including those by loudspeakers), and short factual statements in handbills, leaflets, or newspaper inserts.

In concluding this discussion of desired effects as an aspect of content that must be considered in selecting media, we must note that persuasive content covers a wide range of intended effects. The content ranges from the "nudging" by loudspeaker or leaflet of front line soldiers with a half-formed intention to desert, to the nudging (by international radio, foreign service officers, or government-sponsored documentary films) of target individuals in general who have partially formed attitudes favorable to the sender's interests.

DIFFUSION OF EFFECT

Another category involved in problems of media selection has to do with the diffusion of communication effects. By diffusion of effect is meant the rate and extent to which responses to a message are transmitted by one recipient to another. Responses to a message may vary in character from solitary contemplation to debate and discussion to mob behavior and panic. The variable factors that distinguish these different states are: (a) the amount of spontaneous inter-personal interaction taking place; and (b) the degree of rational control exercised. At one end of the spectrum, that is, the person engaged in solitary contemplation, there is no interpersonal interaction, but a high degree of rational control. At the other end, that is, the aggressive mob or the panic, there is a great deal of spontaneous interaction, and a minimum of rational control.

It is frequent in sound psychological warfare to guide the target individual toward one or another of these states—contemplation, debate, discussion, mob aggressiveness, or panic. Here again, the different media have different potentials, depending on what state psychological warfare seeks to produce.

Media which by the conditions of their reception tend to draw large numbers of persons together, for example, street loudspeakers, public speeches and agitation, and to some extent movies as well, are more capable of exciting extreme forms of crowd and mob behavior than the more "private" media like books, newspapers, or radio. Naturally, there must be significant predisposing elements in the target before the extreme forms of group behavior can be produced: its members must be physically close to each other, they must be pervaded by a sense of unrest and must therefore be seeking ways of ridding themselves of accumulated tensions. These preconditions allow for spontaneous

transmission of excited feeling from individual to individual, emergence of a common object of attention, dissemination of a common mood, and attendant individual feelings of being swept along and of putting aside rational controls. Crowd gathering media, provided the target is predisposed as indicated and provided the sender has the target somewhat on his side, can furnish a common object of attention and possibly direct resultant crowd activity in the desired direction. A serious danger always exists, however, in that some chance object or occurrence may catch the attention of the crowd and lead it in some non-predictable direction.

When other factors are held constant, the media whose reception is confined to a single individual or at most several individuals (e.g., books, radio, newspapers) are more suitable for generating discussion and debate than for inducing the other states discussed above. Such media work more slowly but more surely, and produce more lasting effects on the target in the long run.

CHAPTER VIII

AUTHENTICITY AND AUTHORITY OF MESSAGES

Authenticity is the degree of reliability and validity accorded a message by the target audience. Authority is the degree to which a message is believed by the audience to represent a mode of thought or action deserving of respect and acceptance. These two message characteristics are related but separate. A message is rarely regarded as authentic without being regarded as authoritative. The reason for this is that many people regard as reliable whatever they believe to be authoritative. Hence, for the propagandist, a practical way of establishing authenticity for his message is to establish its authoritative character.

It is essential for the operator to maximize both the authenticity and the authority of his messages. This can be accomplished most successfully if the operator is aware of the standards of evidence applied by the target to media output and of the symbols of authority most appealing to the given target. For example, an audience of professional people is more likely to be impressed if the forms of proof are scrupulously observed than, say, an audience of housewives. Again, an audience of Americans gives less authority and hence less credence to an utterance of an American President or Senator than does an audience of foreigners. A Japanese audience will credit the authority of their Emperor more readily than Americans will credit the authority of their President. There are, of course, exceptions. The operator must estimate the probable authenticity and authority of a message with reference to the situation at hand.

The problem of authenticity and authority is an urgent practical problem, which should be the constant preoccupation of the operator. The message fails when, despite maximum fulfillment of all other operational requirements, it falls short of establishing significant authenticity and authority. A message must be believed and deemed worthy of respect before it can take effect.

Generally speaking, authenticity and authority are most difficult to achieve with canny civilians and soldiers, especially the latter.

There are very few psychological warfare messages that enemy troops in combat will receive without deep suspicion. Even a surrender pass signed by the theater commander is normally (and naturally) regarded as a trick, and the off-chance that it may be authentic will seem worth taking only when the alternative is a strong probability of being killed, wounded, or captured in combat. Messages to the population of an area occupied by our own forces can, by contrast, be clothed fairly easily with considerable authority. For example, the message can be constructed with reference to facts that are fully and equally familiar to both the sender and the target; the message can be issued, spoken, or signed by some dignitary of the occupied population, to whom the population is getting accustomed to listen; and the message can be timed to coincide with local actions that corroborate and substantiate the truth of the message.

When the target has access to facts that enable it to check the authenticity and essential truth of the message, and shows a disposition to do this, messages should be couched in more rational, logical, empirical terms, and with less emphasis on mere authority.

Several great classes of propaganda operations can be distinguished, each having as its reason for existence a basic type of relationship to authenticity and authority.

The first of these types of operations we may call the official. The speeches of Joseph Stalin and the editorials in Pravda are perfect examples of propaganda (in this case domestic, thus not psywar) that carries the fullest measure of official authority. The essential factors that determine authoritativeness are the political status of the speaker, whether he is speaking to his own constitutents (who can presumably check the veracity of his statement) or to foreign (including enemy) audiences, and the way the speaker's remarks are reported by the press and radio of the foreign (including enemy) state that is the target.

A second type may be labeled "the comrade voice." A good example is found in the current propaganda broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, an unofficial enterprise financed by popular contributions from American citizens. Part of the mission of Radio Free Europe is to separate the Soviet satellite states from the Soviet Union. The obvious advantages of this type of propaganda include freedom from official red tape—i.e., the obligation to

clear every action, as well as operation and campaign, through hierarchical channels.

The "comrade voice" permits minority groups in the sending country to speak "as equals to equals" with the groups in other states that are most likely to respond favorably to messages in the interest of the sending country. American labor groups, for example, can speak to labor unions in foreign states on a plane of common interest, and thereby carry far stronger conviction than any official communication.

A third type is the black propaganda operation. Black propaganda differs from white in that it is under no obligation to tell the truth, may and generally does impersonate some fictitious source, and commonly pretends to come from some location behind the enemy's lines.

Black propaganda or psychological warfare thus has certain advantages and disadvantages as compared with white propaganda. The disadvantages include constant risk that the enemy will expose its real point of origin, the even greater risk that the black message will contain statements that the target audience can identify as contrary to fact from personal knowledge, and the probability that the intelligence on which the black message is based has become "dated."

The advantages of black operations are also considerable. They include the opportunity to predict political developments favorable to the sending nation, and put such predictions in the mouths of officials in whom the target presumably has confidence; the opportunity to "smear" key individuals without normal restraints and without damaging the sender's reputation for reliability, and the freedom to impersonate spokesmen of the particular groups in the target audience who have the best reason to oppose the target elite's policies toward the sender.

CHAPTER IX

EVALUATION OF MEDIA ACTIVITY

PURPOSES OF EVALUATION

Continuous evaluation of media activity is a necessary function of a psychological warfare operation. Without it, the sender would know nothing of the impact of his media, their misses, or their hits.

There is no one simple method of evaluation whereby the effects of the psychological warfare media can be accurately gauged. Depending on what phase of the operation is to be evaluated, the operator will use one or another of a variety of sources and methods.

The different methods of evaluation are limited in scope, so that none can be employed under all conditions. Methods useful for evaluating effects on the sender's own population, for example, can seldom be used in friendly or neutral states. In the case of hostile populations, or the targets of combat psywar, the available sources and methods are few in number and extremely difficult to employ, so that the problem is not how to choose among alternative sources and methods, but rather how to use whatever ones are available. In time of war, in other words, evaluation of psychological warfare is a matter of improvising means of obtaining trustworthy evidence, and calls for great ingenuity.

Psychological warfare must not only evaluate its own media activities, but also those of neutral, friendly, rival, or hostile powers. This is true for these reasons:

The incoming messages frequently indicate (by direct commentary on our messages, by significant omissions, by changes in propaganda line, and otherwise) highly important clues as to the effectiveness of the sender's psychological warfare efforts.

The same incoming reports frequently point up salient events and themes that the sender's psychological warfare can exploit in later messages to the target.

Having noted what the opposing psychological warfare considers to be the sender's own vulnerabilities, and those of countries friendly and allied to him, his psychological warfare can better prepare counter-measures and counter-propaganda.

There are at least three phases of the sender's own psychological warfare operations that require continuous evaluation. These are output, dissemination, and effects. By output we refer simply to production of the message itself—that is, the number of pamphlets printed, the number of hours broadcast, the number of films produced. Dissemination refers to the number, location, and other relevent characteristics of the people presumably reached by the message. Effects are the attitudinal and behavioral changes presumably brought about in the target through the impact of the media.

While output and dissemination are prerequisite to any media activity, it is the production of effects in the target (see section on "Techniques of Evaluation") that is most important to evaluate. The evaluation of output and dissemination is chiefly if not solely important on account of what it contributes to the evaluation of effects.

SCOPE OF EVALUATIVE ACTIVITY

Output

Of the three phases of evaluation we have outlined it is apparent that that involving analysis of output is the simplest. This is a matter of recording the number and kind of leaflets or other publications printed, the number of hours broadcast to different targets, the number of documentary films released for distribution, and the like. Finer breakdowns of the content are sometimes useful as a basis from which the subsequent evaluation of media effects can proceed. Broadcast hours for example, can be broken down into types of program, (music, drama, news commentary) or even into the themes carried by each. Programs of news and commentary can be broken down according to the time and frequency with which certain themes are treated: for example, themes concerning the large productive capacity of the sender nation, the repressive labor policy of the target nation, and the support the sender nation is gaining among neutral nations.

Dissemination

Just as media effects cannot be clearly evaluated in abstraction from media content, so they cannot be evaluated without

knowing to whom in the target audience the message has been disseminated. Unlike the record of output, however, the record of dissemination is often merely a rough estimate, because of the sender's lack of access to the audience. To the population of the sender's own nation, to that of a country occupied by him, and possibly to those of friendly or neutral nations, access is easy enough to permit reliable estimates of the size and characteristics of the audience actually exposed to his messages. The psychological warfare staff itself, an allied agency, or a private research organization on contract with psychological warfare can, by sampling a small proportion of the population (seldom more than 1 percent), make highly accurate estimates of the size and social composition of the audiences reached by psychological warfare media. Furthermore, the personal interviews by which the investigator obtains evidence on exposure will also obtain evidence on the attitudinal and behavioral effects.

Evidently such methods of evaluating dissemination cannot be employed under combat conditions, or with the population of an enemy power. Here psychological warfare is generally forced to rely on traditional sources of combat and strategic intelligence, which provide data of a more impressionistic sort than the sample survey. In combat, for example, enemy prisoners of war can be interrogated with a view to determining how many and what sort of troops read psychological warfare's leaflets, how they react to typical leaflets, whether they discuss the leaflets with fellow troops, and so forth. In estimating the dissemination of media output to hostile and enemy civilian populations, psychological warfare can sometimes collect data from the diplomatic and consular staffs of neutral nations, from reports in the neutral and enemy press, from travelers and tourists friendly to the sender nation, or from secret agents. Naturally, like all intelligence data, the collected material must be carefully sifted and checked for reliability and accuracy before it is permitted to influence operational decisions.

Effects

Although the estimate of media effects is the goal of all pyschological warfare evaluation, it is usually difficult to learn with any degree of exactness how the target audience responds to media output. Apart from the question of audience accessibility, mentioned above, media effects are so complex, so diffuse, and so variable in character that they defy simple analysis or uniform description. Some notion of their complexity may be sug-

gested by the following considerations: responses to communications may be specific or general in nature; they may be of short or long duration; they may be of low or high intensity. In some instances a communication may produce a significant change in attitude with no accompanying change in observable behavior. In other instances, behavior appears to change markedly without any appreciable change in attitudes. Some intended effects may be produced in some people by carefully planned messages. In other audiences the same messages may produce precisely opposite effects, or no effects at all. In short, the question that is of most interest to the psychological warfare operator, namely, that as to the target's intellectual and emotional responses to his messages, is still largely unanswered by students of the human sciences.

Much of the difficulty in this connection arises from the rather mechanistic "stimulus-response" psychology that has guided the thinking of many researchers in the communication field. Conceiving of the communication process as a series of particularized stimuli that initiate another series of preconditioned and particularized responses, that is, effects in the respondent, they have given sufficient attention to the role of imagery and interpretation in interpersonal behavior. That communication stimuli and responses can be meaningfully related in so atomistic a fashion seems improbable. Students have also largely neglected the intricate complex of environmental and situational factors that mediate the kind and quality of responses to any given communication. Systematic consideration of this problem would, however, lead us too far afield here.

Many rival schools of psychological and sociological theory have addressed themselves to this problem, but none of them has as yet provided anything approaching a satisfactory solution.

The foregoing remarks are intended to stress the extreme difficulty, and perhaps futility, of attempting, given the present state of our knowledge, to establish a one-to-one relationship between specific communication content and specific communication effects. An example of the extremes to which loose thinking in this field can lead is the conclusion by numerous psychologists and moralists that high rates of juvenile delinquency are explained by the influence of the movies, or that sadism in children's play is explained by comic books. Until the total socio-psychological context in which the communication process occurs has been more adequately described and analyzed,

the psychological warfare operator must rest content with only partial and sketchy answers.

Notwithstanding these gaps in our knowledge of precisely how communications affect people, the psychological warfare operator need not despair of evaluating media effects. From a practical point of view, it is sufficient to assume that psychological warfare messages do cause people to behave one way rather than another, even if that "one way" is hard to predict in advance. The primary object of the psychological warfare mission is to induce certain types of behavior. Hence media evaluation procedures need first of all to learn whether the desired behavior has in fact been, or can be, stimulated by the media, without being greatly concerned with the "how" of the process.

The methods used to evaluate media effects vary with circumstances. During a state of hostilities, there is no chance to conduct the surveys, tests, and personal interviews with enemy civilians that could supply the desired evidence on psychological warfare effects. Hence psychological warfare operators are forced to rely on careful inferences from their own output, on pretesting by cooperative prisoners, and on the analysis of characteristics of the target audience. An inference that psychological warfare's repeated broadcasts about impending food shortages will hasten the demoralization of the less privileged groups in the enemy population, typifies the sort of judgment psychological warfare can make under combat conditions. To some extent such inferences can be supplemented from the routine sources of covert intelligence, for example, agents' reports on increased grumbling in food queues. In any case, it is only after hostilities have ceased that psychological warfare can systematically check the correctness of its inferences. And even then, the situation may have changed so radically that people are no longer able to report accurately on how they responded to the wartime messages.

At the other extreme, in consolidation operations, systematic surveys, intensive interviews, and other standard methods can be applied. Neutral or friendly populations constitute intermediate situations. Access is not entirely out of the question, but systematic procedures of the survey sample type are not applicable.

In the remainder of this chapter certain evaluation procedures will be discussed with reference to situations in which they can be used.

SELECTED TECHNIQUES OF EVALUATION

Pre-Tests

A pre-test is any systematic procedure for determining beforehand how an audience will respond or react to a communication by first submitting it to a small group regarded as representative of the larger audience. Prior to being dropped on enemy troops, a leaflet, for example, may first be shown to a small sample of recently captured prisoners of war. The sample's reactions are noted, their criticisms and suggestions invited, and the leaflet revised in the light of them.

Pre-tests are also used for large-scale operations. Assume, for instance, an area occupied by the sender, the mission being to encourage workers to save a larger portion of their incomes. A promotional campaign (newspaper items, spot radio announcements, pamphlets, a documentary film) emphasizing the personal and national benefits to be derived from larger savings is prepared. Before the full-scale campaign is launched, the effectiveness of the promotional materials can be tested in a few cities selected to represent the nation as a whole. Besides providing some estimate of the percentage increase in savings to be expected from the campaign, the pre-test can show what types of appeal are most effective, the kind of persons who do or do not pay attention to the promotional materials, and the most efficient distribution of emphasis among the media.

Pre-tests are thus feasible only when some sample of the target audience is available. The pre-test group must be checked for psychological as well as sociological representativeness (age, sex, income, education, etc.). These two things should not be confused. Prisoners of war, for example, while they may be much like their uncaptured comrades from a sociological point of view, are very different from them psychologically speaking. They are relatively safe in a prisoner of war compound, and no longer need be afraid of being killed or wounded in action. Hence, while they may be fair subjects for pre-tests of some kinds of propaganda they are not suitable for certain other kinds.

The same is true of political escapees and refugees. Although frequently useful as sources of intelligence concerning events and conditions in areas inaccessible to psychological warfare, they may not share the attitudes and temper of their former compatriots. The very fact that they chose to flee, and are now situated in such different surroundings, affects their perspective and reduces their value as pre-test subjects.

No clear rules of guidance can be laid down here. In each instance psychological warfare must consider the nature of the material to be pre-tested, the type of subjects available, and the over-all psychological atmosphere in which the pre-test is conducted, before a reasonable estimate can be made of the probable reliability of a proposed pre-test.

Sample Surveys

The sample survey is perhaps the most popular of the systematic methods for learning the effects of media content. Its application is limited, of course, to situations where the audience is accessible to the surveyors.

The sample survey, unlike the pre-test survey (which may employ all the procedural and statistical forms of the survey), is usually conducted during or after the launching of a promotional or propaganda campaign. By making inquiries of a relatively small sample of persons, scientifically selected to insure a certain representativeness, the survey can obtain highly accurate data on (a) the size and composition of the audience the communication actually reaches, and (b) how the audience responds to the communication.

Without entering into the numerous statistical, technical, and interpretive problems that arise in planning, conducting, and analyzing a sample survey, it should be noted that while the sample survey is excellent for gathering extensive data on communication exposure and effects, it frequently fails to produce intensive data. Time limitations, the need for keeping the questionnaire simple and standardized, and the complicated processing of data, all prevent any close analysis of the impact and meaning that different communications have for different people. The sample survey is better adapted to telling us who reacts in what way than to saying why they react that way. Another way of stating this is that the sample survey is a good tool for delineating crucial points and problem areas in the communications fabric, which can later be attacked by the more intensive methods of the panel, the depth interview, and personality projective techniques.

The Panel

The panel method is a variant of the survey-sample method. It differs from the latter in that the initial sample of persons, the panel, having been chosen to represent some larger population, is interviewed not just once, but repeatedly, at more or less regular time intervals.

This technique, by comparison with the others, not only allows for the gathering of greater amounts of relevant data, but each repeated interview enables it to make a better estimate of long-run as against short-run effects on attitudes and behavior. The greater richness of the data obtained also permits the analyst to draw more accurate inferences about how and why the communication affects people, as well as the direction in which they are moved by different kinds of communications. This method is perhaps the only feasible technique for gauging both the long-run and the short-run effects of the media.

As with the survey-sample method, the panel method requires free access to the audience. It also calls for skilled handling of what is called interviewer affect, that is, biases introduced into panel members' responses as a result of the repeated interviewing, of their heightened awareness of the issues, and of their being objects of special study. Some of these difficulties can be minimized by selecting a control group whose members are matched with those of the panel. If the control group members are interviewed only twice, preferably at the start and at the conclusion of the study, any significant differences that finally appear in the responses of two groups may be attributed to interviewer effect, and can be allowed for statistically.

The Depth Interview

Essentially the depth interview is an outgrowth of the psychoanalytic interview, but is somewhat more directive and, of course, not therapeutic in its aim. As in the psychoanalytic interview, the object is to put the respondent at ease and get him to express himself as freely as possible on the subject at hand. If the interview is to progress satisfactorily, the psychological atmosphere must be permissive, and the respondent must be made to feel that nothing he says will be "used against him" or embarrass him in any way. Naturally, some personalities can adapt themselves more readily to this free and permissive setting than others can. Likewise, some interviewers are more skillful than others at inducing the proper atmosphere for the depth interview. In any event, if none of the required conditions obtain and the interaction between respondent and interviewer is stilted and defensive, the results will not justify the trouble.

By its very nature, the depth interview produces the best results when it tackles broad subjects of vital concern and interest to the respondent, rather than narrowly specific questions that call for ready-made answers. In other words, a question like

"How would you feel if you could not see your family for another two years?" is a better question to initiate a depth interview than "Are you married?" Questions that permit the respondent to draw on his life experiences, to make free associations, and to "fantasize" about them, are the sort that spark the depth interview and make it serve its basic purpose.

The purpose of the depth interview is to give insights into the deeper meanings that some objects and events hold for the respondent, and to clarify the psychological processes and mechanisms by which these meanings are formed, perpetuated, and changed. In order to gain insights of this kind from the depth interview, however, the interviewer must possess considerable psychological sophistication, as well as a good grounding in the principles of modern dynamic psychology. Clumsy and aimless depth interviewing produces nothing, and its indiscriminate application by amateurs can easily result in more confusion than insight.

Little can be said here of the specific use to which depth interviewing can be put in the evaluation of media effects, except that when it is skillfully executed many fruitful insights can result from it. Ideally, the method is best suited to exploratory research, where the investigator is trying to find his bearings in a problem area. The insights obtained can add much of value to subsequent research.

Content Analysis

As the term implies, content analysis is a technique for the systematic and quantitative description of communication content. "Quantitative" means counting, and "systematic" refers to certain clearly stated criteria, rules and procedures (different for each target) by which communication symbols are classified as falling in one or another analytical category.

Categories for content analysis are devised and selected in accordance with the problems or hypotheses to be examined. For example, Harold D. Lasswell has, in line with his interest in the psychology of political propaganda, devised such categories as "symbols of deprivation," "symbols of indulgence," ". . . of deference," ". . . of income," ". . . of safety," " . . . of well-being." Other categories can, of course, be devised to meet any immediate situation.

It should be clearly apparent that the technique of content analysis is a way that actual communication content, not communication effects, can be described. Its contribution to the evaluation of media

effects is, at best, purely inferential. Support for this conclusion is found in a recent survey of the uses to which content analysis was put by various propaganda and psychological warfare agencies during World War II. The evidence suggests that content analysis, when used by itself, produced little in the way of satisfactory, practical, results. When used in conjunction with intelligence, survey, and other kinds of data, however, it did clarify—and help to verify—inferences regarding the dissemination and effects of propaganda.

Other Methods and Techniques

Still other methods and techniques are occasionally useful in the evaluation of media activity. Foremost among those is that of participant observation. An observer representing the sender, but unknown to the target, inconspicuously shares in the latter's life, and gathers data at first hand on the range and impact of psychological warfare media.

In certain rare instances, where psychological warfare has directly or indirectly intervened in the political life of another country, election returns may give some clue to the effectiveness of psychological warfare's appeals. Unless other factors can be held constant, however, the extent of psychological warfare's influence under these conditions is extremely difficult to estimate.

Letters, correspondence, foreign periodicals, and newspapers are further sources of information on the effects of psychological warfare activity. Since the source of such information is seldom clearly known, it can seldom be accepted as valid unless carefully checked by comparison with other relevant evidence.

Last, though certainly not last in importance, are the numerous routine sources of intelligence that serve the various policy and service agencies. The number of such sources is so large, and their variety so great, that no description will be attempted in the present discussion. There is, however, one point that has been established by systematic comparison of military intelligence with information obtained from such different sources as social science studies, foreign correspondents' reports in important newspapers, and studies made in the field. The comparison shows that by and large military intelligence is more useful, and at least no less useful, for psychological warfare purposes, than information obtained from the other sources—provided the individuals who gather the data have been previously briefed on what questions are most important from the standpoint of psychological warfare. Without such briefing, the data, even if accurate, are likely to be

so incomplete that their value to the psychological warfare operator is greatly reduced.

In this connection, emphasis should also be placed on the need for following a systematic procedure in the writing of intelligence reports, so as to expedite the subsequent work of the intelligence analyst. Rambling narrative reports that confuse fact, belief, and opinion, do not clearly indicate sources of information, and do not distinguish between the important and the trivial, only complicate the analyst's task, and frequently cause him to lose sight of significant items.

CONCLUSION

To conclude this first and somewhat more theoretical section of the present volume, it may be helpful to remark that the discussion is intended merely as an introduction to the treatment of the individual media in the section that follows. The several chapters of the present section have, therefore, been deliberately restricted to the characteristics that the several psychological warfare media have in common, despite the fact that some characteristics are far more conspicuous in some media than in others.

PART III

THE USES OF THE MEDIA

CHAPTER X

NEWS OPERATIONS AND NEWSPAPERS

PRINTED MEDIA

In this chapter we begin to discuss the conditions of employment of particular media. The first four—newspapers; leaflets; news sheets and posters; and books, pamphlets, and articles—involve the printing of words or pictures on paper, and are for this reason subject to some common limitations to the use of any printed medium for propaganda and share certain advantages over other media.

The effectiveness of any printed communication necessarily depends in part on the level of literacy of the target population. Having stated this obvious principle, however, we must note that there are numerous levels of literacy (we do not have a simple two-way break-down, literates and illiterates; within the category of literates, reading skill varies from people accustomed to read difficult material in many languages down to people who can "read" a diagram or sketch).

The psychological warfare operator must, therefore, determine the nature as well as the degree of literacy of his target, and select his printed medium accordingly.

Printed media, by contrast with all other media, can transmit messages of any length or complexity of detail. This advantage, of course, increases with the complexity of the message. The choice between leaflets and the radio is a matter of indifference when, for example, the message is merely a one-sentence instruction, for while the broadcast may have wider coverage, the leaflet may make the instruction more unmistakably clear. But for a well-reasoned analysis of a tangled political situation, there is no substitute for the "white paper," pamphlet, or book. The operator who decides to use printed media for his message must, in short, select the particular medium with careful attention to the scope and complexity of the message to be delivered.

The employment of printed media, unlike that of some other media (except perhaps motion pictures with sound track), is sharply limited by production requirements. Printed media require skilled technicians, expensive equipment and transport facilities, and supplies of paper, inks, bindings, and other materials that are generally hard to obtain in foreign areas; they also take considerable time to produce. The organization of a long-term printing mission of wide scope calls, in short, for a far-flung organization, and carefully worked out arrangements for its continuous management.

SUPPORTING SERVICES

Most news operations in a foreign theater are complicated enterprises. They require the systematic coordination of at least four basic elements: collection, selection, editing, and publication of news.

Collection of news is in most western nations a task performed by highly organized and commercially competitive news and picture services. These supply raw materials upon which all newspapers depend—for instance, spot news, by-lined columns, editorial comment, feature and background articles, texts of speeches, official announcements and proclamations, and official communiques, cartoons, news photos, and picture stories.

The psychological warfare operator in a foreign area must obtain these raw materials either from some commercial international news service, from his home office, or from a news service that he has himself organized or taken over in his theater of operations.

Only the local psychological warfare operator is in position to select, from the materials supplied by the news services, those that will both serve his mission and make most sense to the target. The editing of such news may be indicated in part by directives from his home office, but the "right slant" can be determined, in the last analysis, only by the local operator.

The procedure for supplying operators in foreign theaters of operations with materials is best exemplified by the procedure currently employed by the Department of State.

Washington is the primary source of matter for publication in foreign areas. News of an official nature and background and feature materials are gathered by the Department's own staff of reporters, and cover at least the significant events in the daily

news. Editorial comment, supplemental feature materials, and cartoons are clipped from daily newspapers in all American cities. United Nations news is telegraphed to Washington by a Voice of America reporting staff that covers United Nations headquarters. Releases from other government agencies and outside news sources arrive regularly by messenger and mail. Reporters from Washington occasionally cover important events in other parts of the country, or even overseas—for example, a four-power foreign ministers' conference. The Department does not cover spot news (unless it is official), as a psychological warfare team would do in time of war. But the spot news services of the major commercial news agencies are available for tips.

A research and writing staff or the Department staff produces specialized articles on such subjects as economics, labor, agriculture, literature and art, education, Negro affairs, and also fills specific requests from overseas posts. Magazines are scanned regularly for articles to be reprinted (with permission) overseas. Pertinent articles, cartoons, and photographs are received occasionally from overseas posts, for cross-communication to other countries.

A corps of staff photographers based at Washington and of staff writer-photographers scattered over the country provide needed pictures. Some photographs are purchased from private newsphoto agencies or free-lance photographers. Occasionally staff photographers are assigned overseas to cover important subjects. The bulk of photo reproductions are made in a staff-run photo laboratory. Photo-editorial staff members prepare picture stories, film strips, photo-poster layouts and picture exhibits, and selected news photos and cartoons, and also supervise the production of plastic plates.

Staff-produced magazines and pamphlets, some in end-product form and others in dummy form for overseas reproduction, are prepared in Washington and New York. American books and periodicals for use in libraries and reading rooms overseas are selected by a separate Washington staff.

Thus, in general terms, Washington constitutes a central "factory" and assembly-point for basic materials needed by personnel making tactical and strategic use of publications in foreign posts. Washington's many products reach the outpost via Morse wireless transmission, cable, plane, and ship, depending upon their timeliness, perishability, and bulk. The material most nearly approaching spot news, for example, reports of official news developments of prime political significance, and

a daily roundup of world newsbriefs designed to keep United States personnel overseas informed, is sent daily via short-wave radio and canalized by the overseas posts as they see fit. Urgent items for individual countries are sent by cable, and material of less urgency via airmail and airpouch. Bulky and timeless material is sent by surface mail or surface pouch.

In the overseas outposts, American operators receive the Washington output, mold it to the specific needs of their respective targets, and supplement it with local material as they see fit. Some posts also monitor the Voice of America and use transcripts of its commentaries for publication. All posts ask Washington from time to time for special materials not available in the normal output.

Under combat conditions, the foregoing supply procedures are too slow. The wartime operator must deal largely in spot news. He is the major if not the sole spot news source in his area. This means that psychological warfare planning for combat situations requires the establishment of reliable source channels for spot news. One solution is for the operator's home government to establish around-the-clock spot news service, and beam its news to combat areas by short-wave radio (Morse). During World War II, US psychological warfare teams often had to improvise, monitoring any reliable newscast available (for example, the British Broadcasting Corporation), when atmospheric conditions or other complications cut them off from normal supply channels.

While a full-scale Washington supply organization can be expected to operate in wartime, US psychological warfare planners should take into account the likelihood that shipping and transmission schedules may be disrupted and that supply channels to their field teams may be cut. Such obstacles can be partly overcome by establishing news services behind the fighting lines, far enough away to be free from repeated disruption but near enough to maintain contact with advanced psychological warfare teams.

Much of such a team's most valuable content material for tactical operations will be obtained on the spot, from intelligence or through newspaper-type coverage and photography by its own members. The necessity for improvisation and initiative on the part of those who publish leaflets and other items under combat conditions should thus be a major consideration in the selection of publications personnel for psychological warfare units.

It is possible that under war conditions certain facilities not available to peacetime operators may be placed at the disposal

of psychological warfare teams. Transmission of photographs by radio, for instance, which is very expensive and involves a kind of competition with private enterprise not likely to be encouraged in peacetime, would almost certainly be available to American psychological warfare operations in wartime. New techniques are now being developed, moreover, that are aimed at transmission of the written word over long distances into a receiving arrangement that greatly simplifies mass reproduction. It is possible but not certain that some of these technical developments will simplify the publication problems of overseas psychological warfare units.

NEW VERSUS ESTABLISHED OUTLETS

The psychological warfare operator must decide whether to run his news messages into established local channels or develop his own channels or outlets.

This decision is usually dictated by local conditions. Targets under enemy control will, of course, have to be reached primarily through channels created by the operator. Targets in liberated, occupied, neutral, or friendly states are reached more efficiently through already established channels for the dissemination of news.

The advantages from the use of existing channels are plain. It is evidently better to have our message written for an Iranian by another Iranian or for a Moslem by another Moslem, and thus sidestep the hostility many readers feel toward foreign propaganda. A further advantage lies in the ease of pinpointing a target group by utilizing its habitual news channels—for instance, labor publications for labor unions, professional journals for professors, or mass-circulation newspapers for the general public.

A secondary advantage lies in the human ties with local publishers that are developed through personal contacts, and through their gradual indoctrination with the sender's point of view. For example, press copy supplied to a local editor, if not printed as received, may then turn up in his editorials. A further advantage derives from the mere fact of cooperating with local publishers, who are thereby assured that they need fear no competition from the psywar operator. Use of local outlets is likely, moreover, to focus the attention and effort of the psychological warfare operator on selecting and supplying the most effective raw materials to the local editors and publishers, which is where they should be focused.

Some of the most widely used types of printed copy are world spot news, including important texts, local and regional spot news, news photographs in print form and news photographs in plastic plate form, picture stories, editorial comment, feature articles on specialized subjects, news background articles, and columns of commentary bearing a by-line (real or fictitious). Such copy the local operator will normally obtain from his home office and relay to the news publishers in his theater of operations.

The use of local facilities may be clarified by some examples.

The choice between creating new outlets and using existing ones was not open to Allied news operators in France during the German occupation of World War II. The French press was Nazi-controlled and thus closed to outside influence, so that Allied messages could only be dropped from planes or smuggled in through underground channels. As the Allied forces advanced through France in 1944, Allied news operators provided the liberated areas with temporary news services—for example, wall newspapers—and also helped the French to reestablish their own newspapers. Within a few months after the end of hostilities French newspapers and magazines were appearing regularly, and the role of Allied news operators became primarily that of supplying materials. However, they still continued to reach the Fench public directly through posters and film strips.

TARGET ANALYSIS

That systematic target analysis is a prerequisite for any effective propaganda is a frequently recurrent theme of this book. The basic importance of this theme is such that it must be played over in the discussion of each medium, with such variations as may be indicated by the degree to which characteristics of the medium in hand differ from those of the media previously discussed.

Analysis of the targets at which news publications are aimed should focus on these questions: What symbols should be stressed because they carry favorable associations? What symbols should be avoided because of the unpleasant associations they suggest to the minds of the target population?

Experience has shown a publication is convincing more or less in proportion to the author's familiarity with the way his intended readers react normally to the verbal symbols he uses. The reactions of some Far Eastern readers to certain conventional western symbols are, for example, the direct opposite

of the normal western reactions. There are equally sharp differences in the reactions of American and foreign readers to, for example, various styles of journalism. The "inverted pyramid" style, that is, the gist in the first sentence and the supporting facts in a fade-off, which is standard for American newspapers, may greatly irritate the reader accustomed to an article that builds up to a climax or punch line.

Target analysis is of course indispensable also to correct identification of vulnerabilities. For example, prisoner interrogations reveal that the confronting enemy division comprises hundreds of men whose homes are in city "X." The operator knows that his air force has blasted city "X" two nights in succession. If he believes that the enemy will react with pessimism rather than antagonism to this news, he may drop leaflets that tell the enemy soldiers from city "X" what is happening to their homes, why further fighting is futile, and what good treatment they will receive after surrendering. He may then reduce their will to fight and increase their desire to surrender. Or the operator may have facts to support a statement that city "X" will be bombed again very soon. If so, he gains the further advantage of demonstrating the tactical superiority of his side.

Target analysis is also needed in order for the operator to select the language or dialect in which his message is to be expressed. In a country of many languages, like India or China, there is obviously a great danger of writing leaflet texts, press articles, picture captions, and so on, in language that the recipients do not understand. Target analysis may tell the operator to use Urdu when he would otherwise have used Bengali (and he may then need to write his message by hand if he has no Urdu type font available). In any case, the operator must write the living language of his readers, including their colloquialisms and avoiding the archaic or double-entendre words that can turn an otherwise effective message into laughter.

A psychological warfare team that plans to exploit fugitives from enemy countries must learn whether the enemy's security police can be expected to take vengeance on the families of the fugitives. On the basis of this information the team decides whether it can wisely identify the fugitives by picture or by name, whether their stories must be told anonymously, or whether the material should be passed up. Similarly, information on the degree of secret police penetration of the populace in a target area is needed in order to determine the size, type, and number of leaflets or pamphlets prepared for air-drop distribution. If

the police and informer system is efficient, and if there is a drastic penalty for possession of foreign leaflets, then the operator must make his leaflet easy for people in the target group to hide, and must design his content so as to pack all the "meat" possible into the smallest space.

After World War II, target analysis showed the Italian Communists to be on the horns of a dilemma in the dispute over whether Trieste and the province of Venezia Giulia should be ceded to Italy or to Jugoslavia (then closely allied to Russia). They faced a choice between loyalty to Italy and loyalty to communism. Most of the population were Catholics, and thus torn also between opposing pressures from their religion and from communism, its arch-enemy. The operator's task, clearly, was to drive a wedge between Italians and communism. Both Italian outlets and the operator's own outlets could be used. Publications could stress the virtues and close ties of homeland and religion, together with the evils of communism. They could show in scores of ways the evils of the dictator state, the recent examples of Communist deception, and the fickleness of the Communist leaders, who support a person or group until its usefulness has ended and then withdraw their support. Publications could vividly portray the Catholic attitude toward a godless ideology and those who embrace it. Furthermore, publications could stress the historic and contemporary ties between Italians and the free world, and contrast the free world's efforts to help rebuild Italy and Europe with the Communist's attempts to spread chaos and misery.

EXAMPLES OF US NEWSPAPERS IN FOREIGN THEATERS

The newspaper is a flexible psywar medium. By means of the "play" given a news story, editorial, article, or picture, that is page one versus obscure inside page, position on page, size and wording of headline, juxtaposition with other items, etc., the newspaper editor can greatly increase or decrease the importance the general reader will attribute to it.

As an example of the use of newspapers as a psywar medium, let us take the weekly publication in India called The American Reporter, which carries important propaganda messages to an elite readership. (Newsprint and other shortages affecting the Indian newspapers had effectively blocked American access to the Indian readership through the established Indian channels.)

The Reporter deals in spot news only rarely, as when some spot development, occurring near press time, is of great common interest to India and the United States. A large part of its content is items about the United States and the United Nations chosen for their probable interest to Indians. Along with these, it carries photographs, letters to the editor, and articles bearing the by-lines of Indian writers on the operator's staff. Frequently these "by-liners" are based, in whole or in part, on the operator's source material, supplied by Washington but supplemented by local on-the-spot reporting.

The Reporter is published in English and in five Indian tongues, with a separate edition for each, and has a constantly growing readership now numbering tens of thousands. At first it was sent to picked opinion leaders and policy-makers, including government officials, educators, librarians, business leaders, and the like. Later, other individuals and groups—students, beauty parlor operators, military officers—requested the publication, and were duly added to the mailing list. Periodically, however, the circulation lists are "purged": a return addressed card is sent to each recipient, with a request that he return it if he wants to continue receiving the paper. Those who fail to reply are cut off. Often readers who intend to return the card fail to get around to it, and after missing the next issue send in a complaint.

Variations on this technique of reaching a foreign audience are daily or weekly mimeographed bulletins carrying full texts of important American speeches, reports, press conferences, and other psychological warfare content that the indigenous press cannot or will not publish. Ordinarily the distribution system for such bulletins is similar to that of The American Reporter.

One possible danger in publishing such material in newspaper format is that the local press will consider it "competition," and become uncooperative. This possibility should always be taken into account in launching any such enterprise. In India, however, that was no obstacle. The Reporter was distributed free, did not accept advertising, and so did not cut into the indigenous papers' revenue. Also, the range of subject matter overlapped with that of Indian papers little if at all.

A greater danger was that the Indian government, technically friendly to America but actually cautious about American influence, might decide that The Reporter had too much influence on lawmakers and government officials. It might then attempt to stop or reduce circulation by indirect methods, for example, barring it from the mails, or refusing to let newsprint for the

publication enter the country free of duty.

Die Neue Zeitung, as operated in Germany in 1951, may serve as another example. It was a German language newspaper directed by an American top staff, following US government policy, but using a large number of Germans as editorial and mechanical employees. It was published simultaneously in Munich, Frankfurt, and Berlin. In contrast to The American Reporter, it did carry spot news, and was sold on the newsstands in direct competition with German indigenous newspapers.

Its status grew out of the unique situation in which America found itself in relation to Germany. The United States was an occupying power, committed to an effort to influence the whole population of its zone of Germany toward true understanding of, belief in, and practice of political democracy. US policy-makers appear to have felt that the United States needed to keep the German people informed, if it was to influence them successfully of developments in their own country and in the world about them as seen from the American viewpoint.

Thus Die Neue Zeitung served the dual role of a newspaper on which certain readers depended for their news, and a psychological warfare medium through which the American government spoke more or less directly to the German people. After the collapse of the Hitler regime, and with it the Nazi propaganda empire, the Americans had had to establish news sources for the people in their occupation zone. At first all the newspapers were run by Americans. Then, gradually, non-Nazi Germans were cleared by intelligence and licensed to run newspapers. Since most pre-war German journalists had either turned Nazi, been liquidated, or fled the country, it was necessary to train entire staffs of editors, writers, and reporters. Free world concepts of a free and responsible press were urged upon the trainees and licensed editors.

Eventually the German licensed press in the US zone reached the point where it could be considered a strong democratic force, in its day-to-day operations as well as in its outlook. When licensing was abolished in 1949, and the right to publish was vouchsafed to all comers, the former licensed press surprised many prophets of doom by holding its place well in open competition.

The nearest US parallel to Die Neue Zeitung is a similar newspaper, Wiener Kurier, published daily under American auspices in Austria since World War II.

These newspapers have been able to perform valuable propaganda tasks in Germany and Austria. During the four-power foreign ministers' talks in London in November and December,

1947, concerning a German peace treaty, and the concurrent talks of their deputies on an Austrian treaty, both gave their readers special staff coverage of the day-to-day developments. Their reporters worked closely with American policy-level representatives. (Russia was directing intensive propaganda at the Germans and Austrians in the attempt to use the London meetings as a propaganda platform.)

Die Neue Zeitung in Berlin also published a weekly small edition for distribution in East Germany.

FEEDING THE LOCAL PRESS

Some of the most effective work in non-war situations can be done by feeding raw materials to newspapers already established in the foreign theater.

There are some types of content that are so obviously "musts" for local editors that publication is assured in advance. A case in point, illustrative of cooperation and avoidance of competition with private information agencies, occurred when the American destroyers were transferred to the Greek Navy.

A State Department photographer covered the transfer ceremony in Boston, developed his prints in New York, and within a few hours radioed the pictures to Athens (at US government expense). Meantime, the US operator in Athens had been alerted by cable to give the photographs to representatives of private American newsphoto agencies in Athens as soon as they reached him. The agencies were then allowed 24 hours in which to place the pictures with their customers, after which the press operator was to distribute free copies to the Greek provincial press. The photos turned out to be best sellers, and were published widely. Since private agencies realized their profit, they were pleased rather than resentful about the competition.

The press operator, of course, does not always have at his disposal such interesting raw materials. He must, therefore, develop techniques for placing copy for which there is little or no ready appetite. Personal contacts with local editors enable him, for example, to familiarize the operator with each editor's specific interests and will, if successfully exploited, build up a day-to-day cooperativeness that he can count on. One standard technique that has worked well in many countries is to offer exclusive publication rights on articles, picture stories, or other items. The "exclusives" are given first to one outlet and then to

another, to avoid alienating the majority by favoring a single publication. Another technique is to deliver specialized subject matter to appropriate newspapers and magazines. An article on color television would go to a magazine specializing in electronics, an item on the League of Women Voters to a woman's page editor or a woman's magazine, an item on labor-management cooperation to a labor or a businessman's magazine. Another, on the life of a coal miner or a railroad engineer, would go to a trade union publication, or to a general newspaper in a labor district.

Sometimes the press operator can suggest a subject the editor might be interested in, draw up an outline with him, then ask Washington to furnish the article and appropriate illustrations.

Often the role of raw material placed locally is to combat false impressions concerning American activities or motives. Such misapprehensions are not always traceable to any particular source: for instance, the story that all Americans have 16-cylinder cars and live in skyscrapers is probably not a deliberately-planted canard. But hostile foreign propaganda does plant canards; for instance, the report that lynching of Negroes is a common practice of the capitalist warmongers in the United States. Still other false impressions result from thoughtless handling of information by private American news agencies operating abroad.

For example, a major United States news agency cabled to Manila a brief news item saying the city of Los Angeles was donating several thousand textbooks to Philippine schools, but stating also that the books were obsolete and of no further use to the city, and would have had to be burned had they not been given away. The Filipinos resented the implication that obsolete books were good enough for them but not good enough for Californians. The Manila Times even demanded that the gift be declined.

The American operator cabled Washington, asking for counteractive material. Washington spoke by telephone with the Los Angeles city education office. The correct story proved to be that the books, far from being obsolete, were still in use in many places in the US, that Los Angeles happened to be short of copies and was going to have to order a reprinting, and that it would save money in the long run by printing a full run embodying certain revisions. Moreover, it was a Philippine educator who had suggested the donation and Philippine diplomatic representatives had given their approval; the books, on the other hand, were state property, and could not be given away without

formal condemnation proceedings, and it was at these proceedings that the news agency reporter had got his story. In short: the city had offered the books to the Filipinos as a brotherly gesture, and would of course wish to withdraw the offer if anyone's feelings were going to be hurt.

The correct version, together with useful quoted statements from the city school superintendent, was promptly cabled to Manila, and Philippine newspapers obliged by printing it more widely and more conspicuously than they had printed the original item. The whole tone of Philippine comment changed completely overnight, and numerous Filipinos urged that Los Angeles let its offer stand.

But for alert action by American media operators, both in Manila and Washington, a single erroneous news item might have produced resentment with far-reaching effects over the years.

As an example of how hostile foreign propaganda can be counteracted through the local press of another country, let us look at what happened when the Communists launched their charge that American planes had dropped potato bugs on East German crops. A press operator in Germany called Washington for help. The Washington operators promptly got in touch with agricultural experts, who stated that a low-cost insecticide, available in large quantities in Germany, would bring the pest under control. One expert commented that if the Communists really were concerned about the lot of the German farmers, the thing for them to do was furnish them supplies of the insecticide they needed, instead of trumping-up foolish charges. This information was radio-teletyped to Germany, where it was distributed to—and given good play by—the German press. The Communist potato bug campaign was soon forgotten.

The practice of distributing full texts of important speeches, and other comparable pronouncements, has often produced fruitful results of various kinds. For one thing, it keeps local editors better informed than they would otherwise be, and the pay-off for this frequently shows up precisely where it can be most useful, that is, in the tone or wording of their editorials, or in the play they subsequently give to this or that relevant news item. Let us consider a typical instance of how this works. A newspaper in a foreign country had given front-page play to a "hot" story, actually a news agency's sensationalized and erroneous report on a speech delivered by a high American official. Soon after the paper had gone to press, an American press operator showed

up with the full text of the speech. Next day the editor, a fair-minded man, printed the full text, starting it on page one, to correct the wrong impression his paper had given its readers.

Equally impressive results have been obtained by distributing to local editors the texts of editorial comment from US newspapers on significant events, particularly on events concerning the country in which the texts are distributed. A case in point is that of the prominent American who made remarks, following his return home from a country he had visited, that caused widespread resentment among nationals of that country. American newspapers commented editorially on the matter through a period of several days, most of them expressing great respect for the country involved and excoriating the prominent American for his remarks. The cumulative effect of those editorials, delivered in full to the press of that country, reportedly turned the incident into a propaganda victory for us.

Another valuable raw material product for local distribution is the so-called plastic plate, which is a photograph reproduced in plastic in such a way that it can run in a newspaper as easily as the metal plate that well-to-do newspapers prepare by photo-engraving processes. These plastics, which can be mass-produced at low cost, can be sent to small newspapers that could not possibly afford to carry photographs in the absence of some such device. This makes them a good medium for propaganda, most local publishers indeed being so glad to get them that they do not look too closely at the photo or cartoon content. Plastics can be used on either a flat-bed or rotary press. The newspaper can print directly from them or make from them a papier-mache matrix from which a metal plate is cast.

The cold war has encouraged both press operators and local editors to develop variations on normal media functions. Some of the ideas under study in 1951 related to black and gray propaganda. One, suggested by a violently anti-Communist editor in a "critical" country, was to have operators in Washington cable him a regular column, originating ostensibly from "his correspondent" and bearing a fictitious by-line. Its content would be slanted for strong ethnic appeal to the editor's readers, and would be strongly anti-Communist. Its origin would remain hidden, that is, it would be "black" although its contents would be exclusively "white."

A British operator in the Middle East has reportedly employed "gray" methods with some success in distributing material to a local newspaper serving an outlet for a large amount of material

from a Communist propaganda agency. He printed news releases on paper with a heading (masthead) that looked exactly like that of the Communist agency's releases, left off all British identification, and simply arranged for the material to "appear" on the editor's desk.

THE PRESS IN COMBAT AREAS

The operator in combat or consolidation zones becomes automatically an editor and publisher of newspapers, whether of regular daily newspapers or of news sheets to be posted on the city square and on strategically situated walls, trees, and posts depending on whether he has a press and adequate newsprint and a large staff or a small one, on the fluidity of the military situation in his sector, and on other similar considerations.

In such a situation the press, in coordination with other media, can play an important role in combating rumors and otherwise preventing panic among civilians. It is one means by which the high command can give the people instructions, assurances, and explanations. Frequently the operator's media become a major news source for troops in the sector.

The content of the newspapers and wall sheets fits generally into the psychological warfare pattern described in other sections of this volume. The sources of content material have been discussed in an earlier section.

EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS

Precise evaluation of the results of press campaigns, operations, and actions in psychological warfare is often out of the question. In some cases, such as the Manila book incident cited above, immediate and unmistakable proof of having struck the target dead center and produced the desired reaction is readily available. Much psychological warfare, however, especially in peacetime, is aimed at long-range trends. Hints of success or failure show up from time to time in the action of a legislature in a target area, in a general shift in the tone of editorial comment, or in the preponderance of remarks overheard on a bus or in a grocery store.

Psychological warfare operators should not place too much faith in the mere statistics of "number of column inches printed"

in the local press or of total circulation of an end product. The fact that an item is published in a newspaper of 50,000 circulation, or that the sender's magazine has 10,000 circulation, means merely that a certain number of people have been exposed to it, not that they have read it, or, assuming they have, that they have reacted to it in the desired manner.

CHAPTER XI

LEAFLETS

TYPES OF LEAFLETS

The usual leaflet (or handbill) is a single sheet carrying a message on one or both sides and directed as a "single shot" at its target. Its principal use is in war propaganda, air and artillery accounting for the bulk of its dissemination. It is also used, however, as a vehicle for emergency proclamations, and for announcing and reinforcing political meetings, rallies, and campaigns.

Given their inherent limitations, leaflets and handbills must carry a message that is brief, succinct, and attractive. Only objectives that can be achieved with a message of this kind, therefore, call for leaflets. In general, it is the "immediate reaction" type of objective that the leaflet or handbill is most likely to forward. An example would be the Congress of Industrial Organization's Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC) using this medium in union hall elections, or in general elections, when organized labor's potential vote is subjected to propaganda immediately prior to the balloting.

The usual artillery-fired or air-dropped leaflet is aimed at the enemy's surrender or cessation of resistance.

Visual media are usually regarded as more "lasting" than auditory media. Leaflets must be classified somewhere in between the two, since a leaflet or handbill is clearly more lasting than a radio broadcast but less so than a poster or even a newspaper. The poster is affixed to a stanchion, a wall, or a kiosk; someone may deface it or even tear it down, but until someone gets around to doing that, sometimes weeks after it has been posted, it remains a constant reminder—and one that may carry considerable authority by reason of its design, its colorfulness, and its size.

Most recipients do not retain a leaflet or handbill unless it happens to be of potential use (some soldiers collect them as souvenirs), or unless the propaganda message is designed with a view to the leaflets being retained. If it is, as with surrender passes, the need of retaining the leaflet should be impressed on the reader.

Variation in Leaflet Types

It should be noted here that experiments are under way with "gimmick" types of leaflet that do lend themselves to permanency. One of these is the pliofilm bag, now being used for the first time in Korea. It is about the same size and shape as a large leaflet, but it is in the form of a bag, and is made of an almost indestructible plastic material. It can be used for carrying food, water, valuables, medical supplies, etc. It promises, in other words, to be useful to the target individual; it is pegged to his needs, and his retention of it will abet its propaganda function. On its sides, the pliofilm bag-leaflet, as it is being used today, carries an authenticated surrender appeal, together with a picture demonstration of how to surrender. The printing is in "permanent" ink; it cannot be washed off, scraped off, or burnt off. The only way to destroy the message is to destroy the bag itself, and even that must be done slowly, one bag at a time. Here is a leaflet that is lasting because of its design and its utilitarian functions. Experience has already shown that such a gimmick encourages retention in a way in which the usual leaflet or handbill cannot do.

Another example of the "trick leaflet," in reality less than a leaflet but frequently even more effective, is the "surrender disc," made of plastic, metal, or pressboard, which the individual may carry in his pocket, out of sight, and yet bring to his own attention any time he touches it. Calling it a surrender disc appears to make it applicable only to combat situations. Actually, any succinct action message printed on such a disc would reach its target in much the same way—by drawing attention every time the target individual reaches into his pocket. Feeling the disc, he will be reminded of the message on it.

The gimmick known as the "half-bill" falls into this same category. It is another type of leaflet, in the form of half of a dollar bill, or half a bank note of any kind. On it is printed part of a propaganda message, the rest of which is on the other half of the note. The relative permanence of this type of message is self-evident. The target individual will retain the first half of the bill until he finds the other, so as to read the remainder of the message. After that, it is most likely that he will keep both

halves—the whole message—as a curio, much as he would keep the surrender disc.

USE OF LEAFLETS

The use of any one of these various types of leaflet, as well as the use of leaflets at all, should of course depend upon the type of psychological warfare mission to be performed, and on prior analysis of the target for the mission. Available methods of dissemination, probable "shock" effect on the target audience, time available to complete the mission, geographical factors, the "receptivity factor" in the target, all must play an important role in the decision to use or not use leaflets, in whatever shape or form.

Like many printed media, leaflets or handbills cannot cross the artificial barriers maintained in peacetime, the Iron Curtain for example, or even normal international boundaries, without extraordinary preparations having been made. International comity, the diplomatic structure within which nations legally at peace with one another conduct their international relations, prohibits a country from openly flooding another land with such obvious propaganda vehicles as leaflets. Since the war, to be sure, a good deal more latitude has obtained as regards the exchange of official information between countries than before the war. The existence of American information centers, the distribution of the State Department's Amerika, and, to some extent at least, the publication of Die Neue Zeitung and the Wiener Kurier, all reflect the breakdown of the pre-war limitations on international propaganda. In any case, a country so unfriendly as to forbid another nation's newspapers and radio messages is evidently too unfriendly to let its leaflets be disseminated. Thus even where other peacetime media may be fully employed, leaflets are sure to be relatively useless.

In military maneuvers, of course, leaflets may be dropped by tactical or strategic aircraft, fired by artillery shells, or even distributed by hand within the target territory by special agents, including underground groups. Leaflet delivery may also be accomplished by hand-carried or jeep-carried bazookas, rifle grenade launchers, or lighter-than-air balloons. The capabilities of these various mechanisms are treated in special reports and manuals available elsewhere. In peacetime, no such convenient methods would be countenanced by an unfriendly target elite, even

if it maintains diplomatic relations with the sender. Ordinarily, if protocol is observed, the government of the target audience must concur in the aim of the psychological warfare to be conducted within its sphere of jurisdiction before that psychological warfare becomes feasible. The United States, at least, has been carefully treading the line that divides what can be got by with and what cannot, as is evidenced by the constant threat from foreign governments to close down United States information services in their countries. Overt US operations in many of the countries behind the Iron Curtain have been curtailed in the past two years, and US diplomatic relations with those same countries have often become delicate because US psychological warfare has not met with the target elite's approval.

Despite such formal barriers, there still remains at least one means of disseminating leaflets where they are not desired by the target elite. Because of their size, leaflets may be distributed by friendly organizations, or even through elite channels themselves, within a non-hostile target area. In combat situations, covert hand-to-hand dissemination is the nearest conceivable parallel. Where the target is hostile but not at war, the field of coverage to be obtained in this way would be so small as to discourage the use of leaflets, unless the projected change in the target is such that only limited circulation of the propaganda message is required.

ADJUSTMENT OF LEAFLETS TO VARIOUS SITUATIONS

Once identified, the target requires considerable detailed study before psychological warfare may be directed effectively against it. It is not enough, in planning a leaflet mission, to select simply a large heterogeneous mass of people, vulnerable to our aircraft, on whom we are physically able to shower down a million or a billion pieces of propaganda paper. Leaflets certainly may be widely dispersed under certain conditions, but usually they are and should be designed for a specific act-result, as we have already said. Therefore the target audience must be specific, and its particular characteristics analyzed before leaflet propaganda can be properly used.

The more specific the target, of course, the more detailed the analysis must be. As we have suggested, designing a leaflet to make a particular appeal requiring a specific action-result on the part of an individual requires a thorough comprehension of that

individual's personal receptivity to the propaganda message. This, in turn, presupposes knowledge of the individual's status in his community, in his society, and in the political structure we want to affect. These factors we must determine and have in hand in order to make a leaflet mission effective.

The appearance of a leaflet or handbill generally creates in the mind of the reader the impression that he alone is being incited to react in a certain way. Despite the leaflet's "personal" characteristics, its writer has some lee-way as regards inciting a purely individual reaction on the one hand or whatever natural "herd instinct" exists among the target population on the other. The text of the leaflet may say "Keep this to yourself" (letting word spread by subversive means) or "Spread the word" (engaging each reader as a propaganda agent). If the first, the fact that the appeal is individualized does not preclude a summons to collective behavior. Resentment between social and economic classes, varying standards of living, or other economic or political differences—or similarities—all these may be played upon successfully in the content of such a leaflet. They must, however, be determined and analyzed early in the planning for a specific psychological warfare mission. They are adaptable to leaflet propaganda perhaps more than any other type. If they cannot be established, and their pattern determined, it may be that some other medium is called for.

Target Control of Propaganda

A leaflet, or any similar type of propaganda vehicle which is to be delivered to target individuals for their perusal and perhaps retention, is highly vulnerable to "target control." The target elite's surveillance over its own communications media is a factor that must be taken into account in planning a psychological warfare mission. If, for example, all target radios are pre-set to the elite's frequencies, the psywar operator cannot get his message across in broadcasts. Similarly, if the target audience is tightly controlled in its reading matter, or if the target elite so exercises its powers as to penalize its people for reading other than locally produced matter, leaflet propaganda is not likely to be very effective. While such controls exist, the best bet sometimes is to rely on the target's own communications media and media production facilities. This is usually out of the question in the case of a hostile target, though Allied use of the French maquis in the last war proved that it is not always so, and that the psywar operation that can count on an underground

or partisan force within a hostile target can employ leaflets or handbills and even give them an added fillip. The appearance of anti-elite propaganda in leaflet form, obviously printed and disseminated from within the elite's own borders, unquestionably gives that elite something to worry about. It also serves to heighten the morale of the anti-elite marginal population, and thus increases anti-elite sentiment within the target. The very limitation on the quantity of material underground elements can produce and disseminate is a positively effective factor. Cleverly written, cleverly designed propaganda, printed and disseminated under the very noses of the elite, is likely to create such interest among and to have such appeal for a target audience as to create a "black market" in propaganda. Reports of such a situation filtered back to the Allied lines via German prisoners of war in the combat phases of the last war and, in another sense, a quasi-black market arose in connection with a striking poster designed for France in the early days of the Allied liberation there. French patriots picked up Anglo-American themes, and carried on display-type psychological warfare in areas of France still occupied by the enemy. Care must be exercised, especially with the leaflet medium, that the target elite does not capitalize on them by copying the message's text and design, with some significant change that turns the real meaning of the appeal inside out. Careful scrutiny of his output, plus constant surveillance and evaluation of its effect, will enable the operator to catch the first such "turnabout" as soon as it occurs. An immediate stop can then be put to the message in question, and a new campaign, perhaps even with another medium, can be launched.

Social Structure of the Target

Content of leaflet propaganda cannot be ignored when analyzing the target. Experience has shown that in planning a leaflet mission and seeking out the vulnerabilities of the projected target, some attention must be paid to the possible usefulness of small-scale text and art presentations to the target audience. It must be determined, for example, from a study of target mores, whether or not the handbill type of reading matter is acceptable to the people, completely aside from the target elite control factor. A detailed study must be made of popular habits with respect to such material. One may ask: is the target area accustomed to advertising? The social structure of the target area must be thoroughly understood, and a judgment made as to its accessibility to brief, hard-hitting, active appeals. The social structure must

also be borne in mind when leaflet texts are being prepared. Given the permanence of certain types of leaflets, we must be certain that what we say will not only attract a target individual's attention, but will hold his interest and perhaps encourage him to perform the required action, yet without offending his predilections concerning the social structure—of which, after all, he remains a part.

Literacy Factor

There is another basic requirement for effective use of leaflet material in psychological warfare: adjustment to the target's literacy. Words will mean nothing to the target individual if he cannot read them. If the target is not literate, and leaflets are nevertheless the most feasible means of reaching it, we must resort to pictures, diagrams, tricks of design, or perhaps even gimmicks in leaflet form, in order to get our message across. Other means are also available by which to override this obstacle, as well as appeal to specific types of individuals where target analysis had indicated less receptivity for textual material than is ordinarily taken for granted in leaflet propaganda. This will be discussed below, under "Content." Here it is enough merely to point out the necessary relationship between target analysis and leaflet themes.

Time Factor

Leaflets are often used for shock purposes, or to drive a wedge between the rank and file target audience and the target elite. The time factor—when it is best to disseminate such and such persuasive messages and when best to demand that action be taken—is an indispensable part of sound target analysis. Whenever possible, the time factor must be highly specified, not merely in months or weeks but even hours of the day. This is especially true, for example, where a "special public" is concerned, such as slave laborers, prisoners, or simply working men and women, whose hours of accessibility for a leaflet drop, for example, gathering on street corners, are limited.

Adaptability to News Reports

Because of the ease with which news reports can be illustrated with maps and photographs, leaflets are particularly well suited for communicating news. The news must be obtained from a competent and reliable agency, whether commercial or governmental, and it must be fresh, timely, applicable, and uncensored (except

for military security). The decision as to what news to use, and as to how much emphasis to put on certain kinds of news, is the responsibility of the leaflet writer, following his mission directives. The news reports must be correct. Falsifying the news (this does not include omitting reports or slanting them) will serve only to destroy his credibility and create suspicion of the entire operation.

The best type of news to put into a leaflet is news that will readily capture the attention of the particular target audience—news of world-shaking international developments, of changes in governments that may affect its security or welfare (the Arab League vis-à-vis Israel, for example), or news about events within the target itself. The leaflet may present such news "straight," i.e., it may content itself with merely revealing the new development, or it may weave such news into an interpretation calculated to drive home its significance.

Basically, of course, the theme for the text of a leaflet will depend upon the mission and the goal to be accomplished. Keeping in mind the fact that leaflets are not well suited to argumentative appeals, the operator can still use them to discredit the target elite by carefully exploiting symbols or slogans, by reminding the target audience of the goal the psywar operation is trying to achieve, by holding out encouragement and hope, and by making promises (where security permits) concerning the relief of a situation they themselves want changed. Frequently, leaflet propaganda will be geared specifically to a desired action result by explaining how the change is to come about. What is required, what is to be done to meet that requirement, and how it may be accomplished—these are all appropriate topics for leaflets, assuming that target analysis has shown that the target lends itself to the medium. Leaflets are, for example, extremely useful for conveying a set of instructions for sabotage, for surrender, for espionage, for escape, or for revolt (on the principle of individual action leading to mass action via the "herd instinct").

CONTENT

Individual Appeal

Leaflet propaganda, as pointed out above, is especially indicated where it is desirable to produce an immediate or proximate reaction on the part of target. Its content should fit that

purpose. In this connection, let us use the term "marginal man" to denote the individual within the target audience to whom so personal an appeal as a propaganda leaflet can profitably be addressed. He represents a specifically situated type of person in his present relationships with his society and/or government. He is not, for example, a fanatical advocate of the target elite's philosophy. On the other hand, neither is he the ardent revolutionist who is already convinced that we are right and the target elite wrong, and is busy doing something about it. The "marginal man," rather, is that person, multiplied perhaps by the hundreds or thousands in a potential target area, who finds frequent fault with the target elite, and is capable psychologically and behaviorally of reacting to the message. Psychological warfare provides him with the urge to act, and by producing a lasting effect on him via a series of appeals and messages, explains how he is to act. It gives him a map for his conduct. The "marginal man" is teetering between subservience to the elite and revolution. He is not merely vulnerable to psychological warfare. He requires it, in the form of encouragement, guidance, or instruction.

Obviously, these are personal traits. Before leaflets are selected as a medium for any particular psychological warfare mission, it must be clear that such factors can be translated into terms that will make a mass appeal effective, without destroying the individualistic characteristics that are intrinsic to the leaflet medium per se. For example, we must know that the target audience is to some extent interested in what we have to say. When we propose action to an individual, even action that is to be performed on a group basis, we must be certain that the required act is feasible, and not fantasy or wishful thinking on our part. We must appeal to a great many people to do a particular thing, but we must make the appeal so direct as to attract the attention and interest of individuals who have at stake principles or realities that they hold valuable above all else. We must be aware of those values, and play up to them rather than to what we would like them to be.

In other words, a psychological warfare campaign directed against, for example, an oppressed people, cannot be couched in glittering generalities. The present as the audience experiences it is too oppressive. For each of the hundreds or thousands of persons to whom the message is addressed freedom from that oppression is the most important problem. If liberation is in sight, as detailed an outline of its timing as the security framework will permit will be the most effective presentation. To

speak of peace and freedom in hackneyed phrases is useless; the same words are probably being employed by the target elite in its own propaganda to its own people. The operator cannot afford to let himself be trapped in the quicksand of semantics. Rather he must inform, guide, direct, and if necessary instruct his target audience, and so lead them to the desired action result.

Selecting Leaflet Material

These are the challenges that confront the leaflet writer. They must be weighed when leaflets are being considered as a medium for a propaganda mission. If they cannot be met satisfactorily, to fit precisely the psychological warfare pattern in which the mission has been created in the first place, then leaflets are not the proper medium. And the operator must weigh carefully, too, just how much he can do in a leaflet, and what he is trying to do.

Leaflets do not permit of weighty argument. The operator cannot hope to combat, even in a campaign series of leaflets, the target elite's self-propagandizing efforts. He will do better, if that is what he wishes to accomplish, to adapt his mission to some other medium, to find some means of "infiltrating" it into an already accepted medium within the target audience's own framework of mass communications.

There is no set of infallible rules for selecting the words and pictures for leaflet propaganda. To be adaptable to printed media, of course, an idea or an appeal of any kind, once adjusted to the habits and sensibilities of the target audience so that it will mean something to its members in the way of a suggestion or a stimulus, must be of such character that it can be expressed in words or pictures. An abstract "concept" that calls for discursive or rhetorical treatment, for example, could hardly be communicated by leaflet, or any other medium that is fast in transmission or requires a quick response.

In short: simple, readable words and phrases, alone or combined with photographs or broad brush art, are the best content for leaflets. This does not mean, of course, that leaflet propaganda is limited to the stark nakedness of, for example, outdoor advertising posters.

Make-up Effects

The operator can achieve sudden shock and immediate publicity, if that is what he seeks, by the splashing use of bright colors. He can exploit a piece of news by combining it with a map, or adjust to the target individual's inability to read by using picture

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stories or cartoons. He can use drawings to explain the action instructions he is trying to get across, as in a sabotage appeal to foreign workers confined by a hostile force.

The opposite effect can be achieved by surrounding a simple phrase, slogan, or symbol with a page of white space. This has been done successfully in national advertising campaigns in this country. Whether it would be similarly successful in leaflet propaganda would depend on the audience's sophistication and receptivity to such a presentation (the audience might consider it wasteful, for example, and thus ridiculous), and also upon how sure the operator is that he can give the audience, later, the necessary "follow-up" leaflets."

Although there are great dangers in overcrowding a page of printed matter, a news leaflet that carries a brief text accompanied by a photograph or even a photograph and a map may be indicated. The quantity of material to be put in any one leaflet depends on its size and format as much as on any other factor. And these two factors, in turn, depend both on the means of dissemination to be employed and the desired final disposition of the leaflets within the target area. If they are to be concealed for safekeeping, they should be of convenient size. If they are to be passed around openly, like handbills, they should be of a size easy to handle.

The best combat leaflets are neither too slick nor too bald. If too slick, they look "canned" to the target, and not sensitive enough to its needs. If too bald, they convey an impression of inefficiency, poverty, and grossness. It must be remembered that a secondary but not negligible effect of well-planned, well-designed and skillfully disseminated leaflets on the psychology of opposing troops is the impression of skillful organization made upon them. In the Seventh American Army sector in the last war, German documents were captured that described a "propaganda contest" among German combat units. Prizes were to be awarded the soldiers making the best suggestions for the preparation and dissemination of propaganda among Allied troops. The stated motive of the contest was to improve existing German propaganda materials and practices. Since, however, the Germans were conducting little propaganda at the time, it seemed fairly certain that the contest was intended to make the german troops think that their authorities too were engaged in remarkable propaganda campaigns against the Allies.

Language Problem

The problem of language lies at the very center of the problem of constructing sound leaflets. Leaflet propaganda affords the operator an opportunity to satisfy several special requirements in this field simultaneously. The famous "surrender pass," for example, required not only the language of the enemy target, but also, for security's sake, an English translation of its contents. Another first rate example is the multiple target (intended for slave labor or foreign workers) type of leaflet, which is designed to reach various segments of one target audience, each familiar with a different language.

Another device having to do with the language problem in leaflet construction, considered by some to be especially effective where the best means of convincing the target is through mild deceit, is the use of the sender's own language in material intended for a target of another nationality. For example, a leaflet printed in English for distribution in Transylvania would attract the attention not merely of the target elite but also of those individuals in the area who are sufficiently allied to American interests to be familiar with the language, or at least are willing to take the trouble to find out what the Americans have to say.

The "roundabout" use of English, rather than of the target language, has been suggested for use in wartime. A handbill, perhaps in the form of a simulated regimental order to the operator's own troops, would be circulated among the enemy, to convince them of the sincerity of promises to give "good treatment" to prisoners of war. Pictures would be excluded from such leaflets, and mass dissemination would be self-defeating, since such leaflets must ostensibly fall into enemy hands by accident.

Other practices include the use of luminescent inks (expensive, scarce, and hard for mobile units to handle) to attract attention after nightfall, or of colored stock to contrast with foliage or other ground colors. Symbolically-shaped leaflets were reportedly employed in the war against the Japanese. Some writers have extended this idea by proposing a delayed-action leaflet which, dropped or "sown" during a heavy winter snowfall, would "unfold" with the coming of spring. Where this kind of thing is done, the shocked or surprised reaction on the part of the target may be as effective as the message itself.

The effect on the individual, as opposed to the mass of individuals, is of primary importance in calculating the potential of leaflet propaganda. Basically, leaflet messages are designed to create a result in the mind of a single person or of a small group

of persons. The leaflet's content is intended to surprise and tantalize—to appeal to very personal habits and individual receptivity—to drive one point home quickly and unforgettably, and to achieve a direct action result either immediately or at some future date. Used in a series, leaflets may well depict a situation, and then solve the target's real problem of how to do something about it.

Auditory media, by definition, do not have the graphic appeal of the words and art forms used in printed material. Leaflet messages, in other words, lend themselves to graphic handling, as radio messages, for example, do not. Radio's uses are limited to argument and conviction in a very special, long range sense (with the possible exception of immediate pre-action instructions and warnings). Leaflets and certain other printed media thus make heavy demands on the writer's and designer's ingenuity. Until television becomes a workable medium for psychological warfare, as it may in certain ways before long, leaflets and to a lesser extent posters and wall bulletins are the primary field for extensive propaganda in combat situations.

Consideration of Target Situation

Leaflets also, as indicated above, lend themselves to the reporting of news. Moreover, they provide attractive, effective, and persistent reminders of vulnerabilities within the target, and thus offer excellent opportunities for "needling." Through emphasis, repetition, association of facts, and interpretation, leaflets can, over a period of time, effectively build up an apathy among the target population, or create a receptive attitude toward a desired change. How best to appeal to any target individual or group of individuals on whom we may count for mass action when the time comes, or for continuing mass action if we expect it to develop, is a problem for the leaflet planner to examine with great care.

Beginning with an item of news, for instance, the leaflet planner can substantiate his facts with photographs, drawings, maps, cartoons (where applicable), and so forth. The value of each of these or of any combination of them will depend on the specifics of the target situation to which he is directing his material. He must, for example, weigh the facts as he knows them against the target's credibility factor. In other words, no matter how well documented his facts are, and no matter how straightforwardly he presents them, they will do the job only if they are acceptable to the target audience in terms of its experience, education, and indoctrination.

An example of this may be drawn from the Korean conflict. A leaflet prepared for a specific Chinese Communist unit was pre-tested on a panel of accredited prisoners of war. The leaflet depicted the recent annihilation of a neighboring enemy unit by Turkish United Nations forces. The material was well written, properly documented with photographs, and considered likely to be accepted. But the pre-test panel warned our propagandists against its use:

"Why do you lie?" they asked. "We all know for a fact that the Turks were themselves massacred on that very same battle-ground a month ago."

Another example may be adduced from World War II experience. Leaflets to German groups in Italy contained photographs and figures relating to the size of Allied invasion convoys and war production. Prisoners of war informed psychological warfare interrogators that they regarded the photographs and figures as fraudulent. They asserted that such masses of materiel could not be mobilized by the Allies for the Italian operations. The truth was too much for them to believe.

In both the instances cited, the truth was plainly beyond the realm of credibility for the target audience. In both instances, what the audience was capable of believing was limited by previous indoctrination and experiences. In a word, the truthfulness of a message is not enough to get it accepted. It must also be compatible with the target's awareness of the world and how it works.

Tricks of presentation, of course, can help in avoiding the pitfall just mentioned. Depending upon the situation, poetry, symbolism, or a combination of both, might enhance the appeal of the facts to certain types of people. The drama of battle news is much enhanced by maps. If personalities are involved, cartoons may make them seem more real.

The leaflet writer may "package" his product attractively by his choice of words. The important requirements in this connection are simplicity and readability. As in all writing, however, the rhythm of the words used may add to their appeal to the individual reader. Where so much is being crammed into so small a space, the rhythm of the sentences may not only attract the reader and retain his interest in what is being said, but also cause him to repeat what he has read to others.

The graphic design of leaflets is also a factor. Color, for example, will attract a target audience. But it will also draw the attention of the target elite, and therefore be inadvisable

whenever strong controls have been imposed on the target population as regards receiving messages.

To summarize, then, in any operation in which leaflets are the medium to be used, the psychological warfare operator must take into account several things.

1. Eye-appeal. The material must be attractive to read, must elicit immediate attention, and must be attuned to the target audience's conception of what such materials should be like. The operator may use color to attract attention, or he may avoid it to make the leaflet less conspicuous. He must adapt his typography to the paper stock required by the mission, as well as to the norm within the target population. Thus, although fine type faces should be used on highly calendared stocks, Gothic script should not be used in material directed to an audience not familiar with it.

2. Intellect-appeal. Words must be readable; ideas must be simple; and, where words are inadequate for maximum effects, the leaflet creator may use maps, pictures, symbols, cartoons, picture-stories, and so forth, to carry his point.

3. Result-appeal. Given a target problem to be solved with leaflets, the medium must carry its message in such form as to solve that problem for the target audience and in language geared to the target's interests, motivations, experiences, education, faith, recollections, and such other "contact points" as will provide readers with a rationale for taking the desired action.

AUTHENTICITY AND AUTHORITY

Whether or not a sender authenticates his product depends upon his mission. A leaflet or handbill may be designed, written, and disseminated so as to hide its source. Thus an American leaflet directed at the Huks purported to come from a native patriot, and was distributed through local political organizations. It included a terse, forceful narrative, in the first person singular, by a native who had joined the Huks because of glowing promises, but gradually had become disgusted with their duplicity and brutality and finally escaped from them to freedom.

This is what propagandists term "black" or undercover operations. In "white" operations, the operator may give his material greater respectability for the audience by attributing it to, or at least pegging it on, some authority he knows in advance to be

respected by the target audience. If that authority is a member of the target elite, so much the better.

A good example of the use of an authority to lend credence to propaganda is the "news peg" technique just mentioned. If the operator wishes to convey a certain point of view held by his government, he may well have to resort to this familiar newspaper device. Thus a statement of policy which no one would pay attention to on the strength of its emanating from the psywar operation, will get the attention of certain target audiences if it is reported out of a press conference with the President, or at least someone of considerable stature in government. The fact that the operator is able to frame it in quotation marks, in other words, helps to emphasize the authenticity of the idea as well as the idea itself. Similarly, target personalities themselves, when it is possible to quote them, lend immense credibility to propaganda materials.

In the realm of news reporting, the leaflet newspaper offers a specific opportunity for the gradual development of authority over a period of time. During World War II military operations against Germany, it was found that the target audience, when eager for news in newspaper form, will warmly welcome a chance to read a leaflet newspaper. But this did not mean they believed what it said. The success of various Allied newspapers like Frontpost was not immediate. It grew as Allied assertions, reported in them from week to week, were confirmed at a later date by the target elite's own news output. As Allied propaganda was proved right time and again, its credibility was strengthened. Finally, its leaflet newspapers came to be accepted in their entirety, including such emphases, small variations from fact, and unreliable and invalid phrases as propaganda tactics dictated it should contain. Nor is this all. As time passes, and the operator provides more reliable and valid news than the target's own, the result is to shame and confuse the target audience about its own elite.

The credibility and acceptability of a given leaflet of course varies with its origin. An air-dropped leaflet is likely to be considered an opposition message as a matter of course, at least by some members of the target audiences. On the other hand, one handed around at a street corner meeting or a political rally might well evoke the opposite mind-set.

Where a target audience is naturally suspicious of leaflets or handbills of any nature, leaflets may be made to appear like and resemble in content authoritative statements from a source

respected by the audience. Leaflets lend themselves, more than any other type of printed material save official documents, to the use of authority in design. Newspapers into which the operator's message has been sluiced may be accepted because of their familiar masthead. Posters may achieve a reverence effect because of a traditional design or illustration (Garibaldi's head was used in an Italian poster entitled "Risorgimento," for example). Leaflets can combine both of these elements and, in some instances, add still another. The World War II "surrender pass" and the post-war military government announcements, may be cited as examples. Both of these were not only designed to look official, they were imprinted with the signature—not the printed name alone, but the handwritten signature—of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces. This lent weight to the leaflet, and post-operations interrogation made it clear that their combined authenticity and authority had achieved just the result intended. In other words, official instructions and warnings to slave laborers, foreign workers, railroad employees, and other special publics, when signed by the Supreme Commander himself, lent the weight of authority to appeals of the propagandist. Sanctions were promised explicitly for anyone disobeying the message. This added to the impact created by the logical and desirable substance of the message.

EVALUATION OF LEAFLET RESULTS

A good test of whether a leaflet or a handbill has been effective is immediate observation of the target audience after the message has been delivered. Personal observation and interrogation, provided the individuals questioned are dependable, will determine immediately whether a desired attitude change has been achieved.

In instances where personal observation and immediate interrogation are not feasible, the sender must wait for some sign from the target audience that his message has been effective. Such indications may not come for a day or a week—for instance, where the leaflet has incited the target audience to sabotage or similar subversive activity, and it might take as long as a month or six months if the subversion is a long-term affair. In an election or a strike, on the other hand, the effects of a leaflet may be observable, even from a distance, within a day or two. The constant collection of intelligence information, for example via

monitoring the target's own media of communications, or where it is feasible via interrogation of the target individuals, will indicate, if not prove, the efficacy of the propaganda mission.

In military operations in the past psychological warfare operators have found it worthwhile to create a panel of prisoners of war, drawn from the target population, on which to pre-test each projected leaflet. One must bear in mind, however, that such a panel is a captive jury and not the ultimate and real jury. The danger of setting up a panel of undependables is always present. The prisoners, or even non-captive refugees or target audience representatives, may be eager to create a good impression and so try to answer questions in a way calculated to please the interrogators. There is also the danger of "plants," coached by the target elite in ways and means of misleading interrogators.

Under the best possible circumstances, interrogation of a sample of a target population is certainly one of the most effective ways of testing a leaflet campaign. What the persons interrogated actually know about the leaflets that have been disseminated, what appeals and symbols they remember, which they believed and which they disbelieved—all this is highly useful information for the operator to have. The leaflets themselves may be produced and discussed in the interrogation. Leaflets often call upon the target for action of a simple positive or negative character, and the response to such leaflets can be more readily discerned than the response to, say, long-range leaflet missions or radio campaigns. The interviewer should remember this distinction and ask first about short-range actions, proceeding only later to the over-all effects and success or failure of the sender's basic psychological warfare strategy.

CHAPTER XII

NEWS SHEETS AND POSTERS

GENERAL FUNCTIONS

News sheets and posters include all single-sheet printed or hand-drawn material that is transmitted via placarding. They may be affixed to poles, fences, trees, interior and exterior walls, bulletin boards, billboards, special frames, or other holders. In content, they may resemble newspapers, news leaflets, or agitational leaflets and handbills. Their intent, like that of leaflets, is usually to inform or to activate (reinforce, convert, tell what to do and how to do it) or both, and many of the principles for preparing news sheets and posters coincide with those to be followed in preparing leaflets.

In peacetime operations, small eye-catching picture posters, combining photographs with cartoons, maps, and other visual attractions, have largely replaced large-sized educational posters containing many photographs. In line with a tendency toward "targeting" all possible psychological warfare material to single countries, natural geographic groupings, and ethnic groups, American posters at the time this is being written are prepared in dummy layout form in Washington, with final content and mass production left to operators at strategic points overseas. The posters are of three general types: (a) newsposters, keyed to a semi-spot news theme but making a clear propaganda point; (b) posters dealing with political topics; and (c) longer-range educational themes (for example, health, education, agriculture), geared for the most part to under-developed areas and a low level of literacy.

The news sheet or news poster, by comparison with the activational poster, is used in a narrow range of situations. This is

because news can be conveyed with almost equal facility via newspapers, loudspeaker, or radio. When these media are not available, or for some reason do not adequately cover the target audience, then news may be conveyed by news posters. Such situations might well present themselves in newly occupied enemy or allied populations in wartime, in areas suffering from newsprint shortages, or in areas lacking radio receivers and adequate newspaper coverage because of either temporary or permanent technological deficiencies.

Small picture posters produced by the State Department are being used by indigenous newspapers in certain countries as a picture page insert. The visual media operator delivers the posters to the newspaper in bulk, and the newspaper staff inserts them as part of a regular edition.

Activational posters, as suggested above, can be used under all conditions, including peacetime situations in which the press and radio are already doing their jobs. This universal utility of activational posters arises from the fact that such posters perform certain unique functions. In using them, the operator may:

Achieve responses as quickly or more quickly than by other media. For example, posters can be used to build up a rally audience quickly, especially if they are supplemented by mobile loudspeakers. Newspapers and radio may be too slow or unreliable.

Build up collective suspense for collective action. Poster audiences tend to be collective rather than individual. Posters thus achieve the transition to collective acts (rallies, mobilization, and so forth) more easily than do radio, newspaper, or leaflet messages.

Give impact and intensity to a message beyond the ordinary capabilities of the press and radio. The poster is an isolated, striking communication. In order for the press and radio to achieve comparable effects it would be necessary for them to neglect their usual functions.

Get across a more durable message than the radio, press, loudspeaker, and film. The poster stands in the same location and does its work continuously for hours, days, or weeks.

Tell his story through pictures which appeal to all intellectual levels. One and the same poster can, that is to say, tell its story to an almost illiterate person or plant an unforgettable picture in the mind of a highly educated person.

The poster does not lend itself to such tasks as that of conveying complicated instructions, because people do not stand still in a public place for a long enough period of time. The poster cannot, therefore, produce activities of the complicated kind that

instructional pamphlets or disciplined organizations sometimes produce.

PREPARATION AND CONTENT

Activational posters must hit hard. They must drive home a simple message in sloganized form.

The message of an activational poster must be one that can be remembered easily, free of argument or hesitation, and without the kind of elaboration that conceals the main point. If the message is not of this character, it will not utilize the intrinsic advantages of the poster medium at a maximum.

The main point or climax of the message should be strikingly placed on the poster, and should be the first thing to be read. It should normally occupy the visual center of the poster.

The larger the lettering the more attention the message will receive. The few words of the major message can, therefore, be enlarged profitably at the expense of the remaining printed matter. The slogan should be pulled away from other copy, although it may be run through the picture material. The slogan may also be emphasized by leaving an unusual amount of clean space around it.

The use of pictorial material is almost always helpful as regards increasing attention and effect. Such material should always either add to the point or be the point of the poster; it should never tell a separate story or make some additional point. The total poster, in other words, must be kept unified, whether it includes a picture or not.

The pictorial matter may be symbolic or realistic, handdrawn or photographic. A symbolic picture would be the American national seal or the flag; a realistic picture would be a photograph of Congress in session. The more dramatic the picture the more force it is likely to carry. The slogan "America Helps Its Allies" can be emblazoned across a photo of a tremendous massing of armor, a huge stockpile of food, or a great convoy of ships. There are few slogans that will not benefit from pictorial accompaniment.

The clever use of materials plays a large part in effective poster propaganda. Although complicated effects may be achieved by expert personnel and expensive machinery, equally dynamic effects can be achieved by imaginative amateurs working with

practically nothing. Letter faces may be clipped from magazines or newspapers, and photographs may be taken from books, magazines, newspapers, or pamphlets. These can then be pasted up, photographed, and offset onto poster paper and cards. Even hand-lettered messages run off on a mimeographing machine have sometimes proved quite effective. The smallest print shop is likely to have some large wooden headline type, colored paper and ink, and a hand press suitable for primitive posters.

DISTRIBUTION AND EVALUATION

The operator's goal in distributing the posters is to make a captive audience of the whole target population. The posters should be placarded in the strategic areas through which the target audience must pass in the time period between the posting and the planned moment of communication (which need not be the moment at which the intended effect is to take place). Not all areas, therefore, are of equal strategic value from the standpoint of the poster medium, and different areas should therefore have different priorities assigned to them. The important placarding will then occur first and the least important last, or, if there are not enough posters, not at all. The operator must survey the physical movements of his target audience (a procedure rarely required for other propaganda media) before he can possibly do good placarding. A good placard location may well be a hundred times as valuable as a poor one, just around the corner. It is no accident, for example, that an advertising company will pay several thousands of dollars for the right to placard the subways of Boston for a month and only a few dollars to placard the buses of Muscatine, Iowa for the same length of time.

Once the desirable locations have been identified and rated in order of importance, the operator must give some thought to the legal status of his operation. Front-line areas in war afford almost complete liberty of placarding. The most important consideration there, then, is decorum, not legality. If a poster is plastered on the walls of the main church in town, it will certainly be seen, but many people will be highly offended at its having been so placed, law or no law. This consideration applies in varying degrees everywhere, and the operator must assess carefully the probable sentimental and religious reactions to the physical location of his posters.

In many countries and localities, placarding is governed by laws and ordinances, and in peacetime psywar these assume great importance for the operator. He is likely to be operating by leave of or in cooperation with indigenous authorities, which means, among other things, that licenses must be obtained for his posters. Posting on private property, for example, is forbidden in many places except by owner consent, and the operator needs not only official but also private permission to proceed. Legal difficulties of this character should not, however, be allowed to discourage the search for the best locations. An excellent location is worth trouble and expense if the message is important, and doubly so if competition is to be expected from other poster propagandists.

Posters are peculiarly vulnerable to informal counter-propaganda. The operator should bear in mind, of course, that posters, like the press, the radio, and films are part of a battle of words. He should also bear in mind that non-target people are mixed up with target people in the poster audience. Communists read anti-Communist posters and anti-Communists read Communist posters, and posters are peculiarly vulnerable to defiling and defacing, to "back-chat," and to ridicule. An apt and effective slogan may be turned into effective counter-propaganda by three strokes with a brush. The official poster reading "Mussolini Is Always Right!" becomes "Mussolini Is Never Right!" thanks to an unknown editor who appears and disappears during the night. The operator may well keep in mind, while appraising a projected poster, its possible vulnerability to this sort of attack, on pain of providing his opponents with an opportunity for some easy and inexpensive counter-propaganda. Whenever possible, for the same reason, the operator should police his placards, in order to remove torn or defaced material and substitute fresh posters for it.

Outdated posters are nearly always posters that have turned into counter-propaganda. The operator should, therefore, tear down posters as soon as their object has been accomplished or has ceased to be important, as soon as they have been disproved by events, or as soon as they have been successfully counter-propagandized. Poster operations have seldom in the past been regarded as involving thorough cleanup work, but their importance cannot be exaggerated, especially if the audience knows the source. Psychological warfare differs here from commercial advertising. A billboard poster for a carnival can stay up long after the event without doing the carnival management any harm. Not so with

political propaganda. Nothing is so damning as a poster proclaiming the opposite of what has occurred. The victorious Allied armies in Europe constantly encountered the (in retrospect) ludicrous promises of their enemies emblazoned upon the walls. In several cases, the military government authorities expressly forbade their removal, because they reminded the population every day of the emptiness of their former ruler's promises. When the poster mission extends over a long period of time, poster cleanups are needed for another reason: to yield clean space and also solicit increased attention for new posters. Old, jaded posters undoubtedly lead attention away from fresh posters, giving the audience an impression of an uninterrupted, tiresome succession of messages, and requiring it to pick out for itself those that are still meant to communicate.

Evaluation of effects is simpler with posters than with certain other media. The messages they carry are clear and succinct, and the audience is accessible by definition, so that some of the questions that must be raised about other media do not have to be asked about posters. The best way of testing the poster's effects is to interview a sample of the target population and find out what proportion have seen it and can recall its message. The sampled individuals may then be asked whether they agreed with the message, and whether they were moved to action in conformity with it. They may also be asked whether they recall other posters that the operator has used, and, if so, what comparisons they can draw between them. "Depth" questions are especially fruitful when one is evaluating a poster: the subjects can be asked to describe all of their feelings when they saw it, to say how easy or difficult it was to remember, and to recall whether the poster message ever came to their minds in any real life situations to which the poster was intended to apply. If the poster was about black markets, for example, the subjects, having been asked the usual questions, can be invited to describe their emotions upon first viewing the poster, and to say whether black marketeering struck them as a more serious problem as a result of seeing it (did the poster cause them to hesitate before entering black market exchanges?).

CHAPTER XIII

BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, ARTICLES

The several types of publications that are bulkier than posters, leaflets, and newspapers we may call the "slow" media, a term which suggests the inherent limitations of a book or any other fairly long piece of reading matter as a means of precipitating mass action. The term must not however, be understood to imply that the psychological warfare missions, for which articles, pamphlets, or books are used, are likely to be accomplished any faster, or even accomplished at all, via some other medium.

Lengthy articles, pamphlets, monographs, and books have more similarities than differences as psychological warfare media. Such publications differ among themselves primarily as regards length, but for this very reason there are important differences also as regards time and cost of production, methods of distribution, access to the target audience, and effects upon the target audience.

The long book has more content than any other single unit of communication. It therefore involves most of the advantages and most of the disadvantages of the various types of publication used for psychological warfare purposes on a scale so large that they are easy to see.

MISSIONS OF BOOKS

One type of psychological warfare mission in which we see at once that books can have no place is the tactical combat mission. They would be next to impossible to distribute, and, in any case, no one in a combat situation is likely to have time or opportunity for sustained reading. Even wartime strategic missions, requiring as they do the delivery of messages to the enemy's civilian population, seldom use books as a medium. In short, for

most missions on the tactical and strategic levels of operation books are of little or no use. Articles and short pamphlets, by contrast, have often proved very useful in strategic operations.

The broad, high-policy, long-range mission, both on the political and the consolidation level, is often served more efficiently by books than by any other medium. Such long-range missions often involve one or another of the objectives described below.

Improving Relations with Allies and Neutrals

This purpose may be and frequently is accomplished by normal peacetime international exchange of books through commercial channels. It seems probable, though hard to establish, that the exchange of scholarly and technical books and monographs among professionals in different countries is the best example we have of communication across national boundaries.

It seems equally probable that the free international exchange of popular books, both fiction and non-fiction, though not so highly organized, goes far to explain various existing likes and dislikes on the part of the more literate, intellectual, and sophisticated social groups in different countries. Most American travellers have doubtless been impressed by the number of their foreign acquaintances whose image of and interest in the United States is based on some one powerful book—Mitchell's Gone with the Wind, for example, or Willa Cather's O Pioneers or My Antonia.

Books improve or worsen foreign relations in a different way from, for example, newspapers, and often with different results. The typical book is written by one person, who reveals his personality more or less openly, and hence invites the friendship of sympathetic readers. The newspaper conveys an impression of hasty impersonality. Moreover, a book that is interesting enough to justify the costs of importation (and perhaps of translation as well) is likely to have something inspiring to say, while the atomized news item or editorial in the press seldom makes any deep impressions on its readers. A third difference is that the readers of foreign books are a small and highly selected class; their collective influence as "opinion formers" may have an effect upon the trend of public opinion quite out of proportion to the smallness of their number as compared to that of newspaper readers.

Improving Relations with Friendly Groups in Unfriendly or Hostile Countries

The book serves this purpose by psychological processes similar to those described above. The degree of hostility between the two countries involved, and the absence or presence of severe censorship will, of course, determine whether books serving the psychological warfare mission can be distributed commercially. If not, they can be distributed via neutrals, either commercially or via a subsidy to the neutral publisher or jobber. Examples of such distribution are the American books that found their way to German readers via Swiss and Swedish jobbers during the last war.

The foreign book that the interested reader must overcome obstacles to obtain has the added flavor of forbidden fruit, and is likely to be read by a considerable number of intellectuals among the target population.

Exposing Questionable or Dishonorable Policies of an Unfriendly or Hostile State

Where this is the mission, books can hardly perform it by themselves, but can serve as an auxiliary medium.

Given the mission of exposing the double-dealing, dishonest practices, or other reprehensible conduct of some foreign state and thus further justifying United States policy in the eyes of world opinion, psychological warfare would naturally use all the media at its disposal: press stories, broadcasts, possibly even documentary films. But as part of this complex arsenal of psychological warfare weapons, books have one peculiar virtue: they can examine the issues calmly, objectively, and exhaustively. They can thus speak with an authority that the other media lack, and hence carry far more conviction with the influential few in any target society, provided of course that those few are interested and take the time to examine the books in question at first-hand. Such readers can be trusted to reach opinions of their own and to defend their opinions with far more energy and persistence than those persons who adopt their views ready-made from newspapers.

There are numerous examples of books that have contributed in this way to the achievement of psychological warfare objectives. Some have been produced by governments, others by private individuals. The official books have mostly been of the "white paper" types that governments prepare in order to explain important actions they have taken by reference to the available documents.

A variant of this type of book is such a publication as the collection of Nazi-Soviet official correspondence during the Hitler-Stalin honeymoon that the US State Department issued in 1948. Among books by private individuals we may mention sober memoirs like Byrnes' Speaking Frankly, which made numerous important friends for United States foreign policy, hard-hitting satires like George Orwell's The Animal Farm, and any of the numerous sensational exposes of recent years—for example, Kravchenko's I Chose Freedom.

It may be added that publication of a book may have several important byproducts. The release by our State Department of the captured official correspondence between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, for example, was in itself a newsworthy event. Newspapers and broadcasts quoted extensively from its pages, and scholarly journals and popular magazines carried abstracts and reviews in most countries. Books, in short, can reinforce and feed back into other media.

Consolidating an Occupied Area

Consolidation propaganda uses books for purposes quite similar to those just described, and the very fact of being the occupying power not only makes for great economies but simplifies such tasks as translation, printing, and distribution. Local publishers may be given free or low-cost translation rights and so produce American books that normally they could not afford to touch. The virtual cessation of indigenous publication, which is usually the state of affairs at the outset of an occupation, gives the occupying power an open road, as far as serious domestic competition is concerned, for books it wishes to sponsor; and any book possessing literary merit and attempting to explain the occupying power and its objectives is likely to be eagerly received by intellectuals, who want nothing at such a time so much as to understand the country's new situation.

TARGET ANALYSIS FOR BOOKS

The identification of sub-targets for books is largely a matter of learning what kind of books the intellectuals or other elites of the target population have an appetite for.

Physical Accessibility

The physical accessibility of the book target is largely determined, as suggested above, by the nature and scope of local institutions, public and private, and by the character of local commercial agencies for the distribution of books. The way books reach readers differs greatly from country to country. The operator's first task is thus to study the local situation, and learn how books appropriate to the mission can most easily reach the intended reader.

If the books must first be translated, the operator may well approach the local publishers who have had most experience with titles in a given field, and who are, therefore, the sources to which readers look for books in that field. If the publisher receives the translation and publication rights almost free—a small token price is generally preferable to an outright gift—and decides to add the title to his regular list, he can carry on from there with very little help from the psychological warfare agency. He will know how to feed the finished books into the channels most likely to bring them to the attention of potential readers—in public and private libraries, bookstores, clubs, and so forth.

If the operator ignores local channels and attempts to distribute his books independently, he can easily commit serious mistakes. Cost per copy is likely to be excessive, since only an experienced publisher can make a reasonably fair estimate of the number of copies he can sell of a given title. Direct planting of copies, for example, by direct mail, clearly labels a book as a piece of propaganda by a foreign power, and seriously prejudices readers against it in advance.

Technological Accessibility

The technological accessibility of the book target is determined by: the operator's command of the facilities needed for producing the desired books locally, or for importing them from his own interior zone; the adequacy of local commercial or state-operated channels for book distribution; the willingness of public officials and the key figures in the book trade to sanction the distribution of foreign (that is, the operator's) books; and, finally the size of the target—that is, the number of people who are sufficiently literate to read and understand a given book, and whose status as "opinion formers" or "natural leaders" is such as to permit the hope that they will prove efficient relay points for the message the book contains, and hence justify the (always high) costs of using the book as a psychological warfare medium.

Book-Reading Habits

Some data on the book-reading habits (what types of people read what kinds of books in what quantities, etc.) are available

for the United States and Canada, Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and Germany and Austria. In other countries in which books play a significant role in the formation of public opinion, information on such points is sketchy, unsystematic, and behind the times. There can be no doubt, however, that in the countries just mentioned, and in France, Italy, Switzerland, the Low Countries, and Japan, books provide a channel to an intelligentsia with considerable, even if indirect, political power. In the Near East and much of Asia, books reach a much smaller but highly sophisticated intellectual class, which has fairly direct access to the holders of political power. The book audience in Russia is large and influential, but the roads that lead to it are, of course, strictly controlled.

The operator should bear clearly in mind one characteristic that sharply distinguishes the book target from other targets: most books are written for persons whose interest in the subject matter is more or less taken for granted. They are not tailored (as most other psychological warfare messages are) to a particular and previously defined target. The reader usually seeks the book; the book seldom seeks the reader. This principle bears directly upon each of the several aspects of the book as a psychological warfare medium that are to be discussed in the rest of this chapter.

The operator who is considering the use of a given book for psywar purposes has merely to select some of the kind of people he wants to reach, persuade them to read the book, and then discuss it with them with a view to learning their reactions. If they read the book with interest, and do react favorably to it, that is all he needs to know for all practical purposes. Everywhere, whether in America, Indonesia, or the Soviet Union, the natural place to look for groups that can be influenced through books is among the relatively well-educated, which in most cases means among the professional classes and the middle or upper-income groups, and among people who enjoy (or think they should enjoy) considerable social prestige. If individuals within these groups do not react favorably, there is nothing psychological warfare can do except try another book.

Since the book is such an expensive medium, and since book readers are at best so small a proportion of the target, it is clear that psychological warfare should employ the book medium only when no other cheaper and more easily "tailored" medium can reach the desired sub-targets or carry the message so clearly.

Essentially, what a book can offer that no other medium can possibly offer equally well is an expression—systematic, artistic,

or both—of an author's best thinking on the subject in hand. The author of a book can, other things being equal, express himself as freely and as fully as he likes. He addresses himself to readers, few or many as the case may be, who share his interest in the subject. The book author is thus free from the pressures that guide the pen of the article-writer, the script-writer, and, at the other extreme from himself, the leaflet writer, for example, the danger that by being too prolix, or using some word that will displease, he may reduce the size of his audience.

The practical bearing of all this on the use of books in psychological warfare may, as we have implied in the discussion of mission, be summarized in the following way.

First, the book as a medium should be avoided when the desired message can be conveyed to the same target by other and simpler media. Second, books should be used as media to convey the type of message that seeks to produce entertainment effects of a highly sophisticated or intellectual quality, the type that seeks to persuade (by reinforcement, conversion, and other processes), or to inform via the presentation of a large bulk of evidence concerning all important aspects of an issue. Third, books should reach the types of target that cannot be reached as effectively by any other medium. These targets include: key officials, respected intellectuals, and other important individuals in the target audience whose conversion to a more sympathetic attitude toward our policies can only, or best, be accomplished by giving them the full evidence and allowing them to arrive at their own conclusions by doing their own thinking or by participating in small group discussions; the small academic and intellectual groups who read only what they regard as good literature—for example, the dispossessed intellectuals in Hungary at the present time; and the several social groups in any civilized society whose reading is largely confined to books—for example, school children, upper- and middle-class housewives, members of the learned professions, and scientists.

AUTHENTICITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE BOOK

The book, by contrast with other media, carries considerable authority, and at least the presumption of authenticity. To say "I read it in a book" is, with many people, enough to win respect for a fact or viewpoint.

What authenticity and authority any book has above the base line just mentioned depends upon the competence, industry, and, perhaps above all, the sincerity of its author. Since most book readers—that is, most of the constituents of any book target—are fully aware of the possibility of an author's being less than sincere, there must be very few psychological warfare missions that are better served by insincere books than by sincere ones.

Prostituting the book, the traditional vehicle for "the best that man has thought in this world," to the ends of downright deception, is if discovered likely to have a powerful boomerang effect. An obvious example is the Nazis' sponsorship of the spurious Protocols of Zion, and the way the latter backfired during the last years of World War II. Thus while a book's serving an important strategic mission as black propaganda is not inconceivable, the dangers of a disproportionate adverse reaction are so great that the risk is almost never worth taking. The book reader is, almost by definition, more likely than most other targets to see through a trick.

The authority a book carries with it merely by virtue of being a book is, in short, its chief asset for propaganda purposes, and one that should be exploited to the full if a book is to be used at all. That authority is enhanced when the book is openly official, as in the conventional "white papers." As a vehicle for "official documents that tell their own story without fear of contradiction," the book has no peer.

The only other propaganda function that books can sometimes serve equally well is that of speaking with "the comrade voice." Examples from the past history of psychological warfare are Silone's Bread and Wine (in Italy during World War II) and Kravchenko's I Chose Freedom (in postwar Western Europe). This type of book is not dishonest, because it is written by a genuine comrade (whether past or present) of the target individuals being addressed. Once the author is established as a genuine comrade (which is not always easy to bring about) such a book may have powerful and far-reaching effects. If well written, it can convey the full expression of a political faith along with devastating critique of the policies the operator seeks to discredit, an expose of the hypocritical moral pretensions of an enemy state, or a full-bodied message of encouragement to an oppressed intelligentsia. It lends itself, in short, to a well-nigh infinite variety of uses.

RESOURCES PREREQUISITE TO BOOK PUBLICATION

The resources needed in order to publish and distribute the right book to an appropriate readership are both expensive and elaborate. In addition to those discussed in Chapters I, II, and XX, all of which are required here as with other psychological warfare media, book publication for psychological warfare calls for certain resources peculiar to itself.

Foremost among these is an adequate supply of a certain type of paper. The ingredients of any serviceable book printing paper (say a 35-gram silicate) are materials which are always in short supply. The sources of the basic ingredient, that is, wood and vegetable fibers for cellulose, are fairly dependable, but the rising demand for cellulose from the new industries like plastics and atomic research is making heavy inroads on the available supplies. Other prerequisites for printing paper are coal, paper mills, transport, skilled labor, and a jobbing organization.

The basic fact—that there is an increasingly inadequate world supply of magazine and book printing papers—is one that psychological warfare planners should take fully into account. Because of it, newsprint fluctuates widely and unpredictably in price. Stockpiling by the United States government of newsprint that could be released in support of any strategic or high-policy psychological warfare publication in areas in which paper is scarce, would, therefore, greatly increase our psychological warfare capabilities.

EVALUATION OF RESULTS

The effects of any convincing book on the attitudes and behavior of the reader, let alone any social effects that it may produce, do not become visible at once. The procedures laid down in the chapter of this book that deals with evaluation are, therefore, less directly applicable in book operations than in operations using other media. Book readers are so small a proportion of any community that very few turn up in any random sample.

The panel is perhaps as effective a procedure as we have for this purpose. To estimate the short-run effects of a good book it is generally sufficient to pretest it, by asking a few members of the target group to read it and state their honest opinion of it. In general, it is sound policy to use a book as a psychological warfare medium only when such pretests indicate that the target will at least read it with real interest.

PAMPHLETS

Under the heading "pamphlets" belong numerous types of printed matter, ranging from small cartoon books to large, magazine format combinations of pictures and text. The foregoing statements about books as a psychological warfare medium apply with equal force to pamphlets, which are similar to books in all respects except size. Because of their smaller size, however, they lend themselves far more readily than books to psychological warfare purposes. Their smaller format reduces costs of production. It facilitates direct mailing and, if this is desired, free distribution.

Pamphlets, in other words, combine the authority and convincingness of the book with the wider distribution and access to less well-educated readers of the leaflet or news sheet. Potential pamphlet readers in any literate community outnumber several times the potential readers of full-length books.

Another important point here is that the production of pamphlets lies within the planning and administrative capacity of the typical psychological warfare organization, while that of books does not. As in the case of posters, the trend in pamphlet operations has been toward preparing basic layouts, source materials, and so forth, in the United States, and leaving final decisions as to content and distribution to the overseas post.

Pamphlets lend themselves to psychological warfare content of various types, from simple statements of fact about the originating country to tactical infighting and grey and black operations. For example, a pamphlet entitled Meet Some Americans showed natural life photographs of typical Americans, such as the steel worker at his job; another, entitled Eight Great Americans, was a cartoon book about some key personalities out of American history; Herblock Looks at Communism was a compilation of that famous cartoonist's drawings, in which he pokes fun at the Communists and strikes telling blows at the Russians' spurious "peace" campaign.

MAGAZINES

Whether produced by the operator or picked up and utilized by him as indigenous outlets, magazines are another useful vehicle for long-range psychological warfare material. The fact that they use color greatly enhances their attractiveness to readers. More than with most newspapers, readers tend to hand them along to

other readers or, failing that, to retain them. There is reason to believe that the Russian language magazine Amerika, published by the United States State Department and distributed (50,000 copies of each issue) in Russia by agreement with the Soviet government, brought thousands of Russians their first accurate glimpse of the United States—this despite the fact that controversial matters were excluded from it and that the copy was pre-censored by the Russians before final publication. One reason for believing that it did an effective psychological warfare job is the fact that the Soviet government early began to try to squirm out of the agreement to let it circulate in the USSR.

Much of what has been said about reaching target audiences through indigenous newspapers applies also to the exploitations of indigenous magazines.

Germany, as in the case of Neue Zeitung, has provided a testing ground for several end-product magazine projects. At one time the Americans were publishing four magazines in Germany, besides "servicing" hundreds of indigenous ones. One of the four was a picture weekly, roughly analogous to Look. Another was a monthly of the general type and intellectual level of Reader's Digest. The other two were aimed at a relatively high intellectual and educational level, approximately that of the Saturday Review of Literature.

ARTICLES

Articles may be either short or long. Short ones have roughly the same advantages and limitations as leaflets (see Chapter XI). Long ones have roughly the same advantages and limitations as the pamphlet. Articles nevertheless have certain peculiar characteristics:

The normal article is a report or short discussion of some timely topic. It may range in length from one column or less in a newspaper to ten or twenty pages in a magazine. (Most Americans probably think of an article as the kind of thing published in a general interest magazine—for example, Harpers, Colliers, or Life. But general magazines are not so numerous or widely read in other countries as in the United States. In most European countries, for example, the word "article" suggests a signed editorial in a party-owned newspaper or one of several contributions to a professional journal or other periodical addressed to and financed by some special interest group.)

So defined, the article as a psychological warfare medium has some noteworthy advantages: first, it can be placed in readers' hands with relatively little trouble, often without cost to the psychological warfare operation; second, the tendency in most countries is to have one or more periodicals for each special interest group. If, in these countries, the right article can be planted in the right periodical, its effective dissemination to the chosen target readership (members of a profession, scholars in a given field, members of a particular trade union, women, children, etc.) is virtually assured; and third, articles are often published unsigned and without mention of the agency from which the magazine has obtained them.

The article thus combines some of the psychological warfare capabilities of the pamphlet with the economy of free distribution to a readership (that is, the subscribers to the periodical) that is fairly well known in advance. It is, therefore, a highly effective medium for small-target propaganda.

PHOTO EXHIBITS

Photo exhibits are essentially a way of telling a picture story on a wall in some prominent place rather than in a newspaper or magazine. Particularly when they are made up of color photos and photos blown up to unusually large size, they can be counted on to command attention, and there is no better method with which to get a target audience up close to something else one wants them to see or pick up and carry away. For some purposes, series of interesting though unrelated news or scenic shots is more useful than a story, especially when an exhibit is used for its lure possibilities rather than for its direct propaganda effect.

READING ROOMS OR INFORMATION CENTERS

The United States Information Service (USIS) evolved from the Allied consolidation propaganda operations in occupied areas after World War II, and has, in recent years, assumed large proportions in many countries. Among other things, it maintains libraries of American and other books, pamphlets and magazines, and for that reason belongs within the scope of the present section.

The selection of materials for United States libraries in foreign cities throughout the world, the question of the proper ratio between

publications in English and publications in the local language, the selection and training of American and native personnel, and the wide range of administrative problems peculiar to libraries maintained for psychological warfare purposes—these are all topics that are beyond the scope of this volume. But there seems no doubt that such libraries expedite the distribution of propaganda materials, and provide a rallying point for persons friendly to the operator's objectives.

CHAPTER XIV

RADIO

Radio may appeal to its audience either by entertaining it or by informing it. It may reason with its listeners, or convey its message to them in emotive language. It may be used to transmit messages that are specific or of the most general character. The principal advantage of radio over print is that it closely approximates that medium of communication that is the most effective of all, the face-to-face communication. The radio message is a message spoken directly by one person to another person. That is why neither print nor film can give an audience the sense of actually participating in contemporary world events that it gets from radio. Radio not only can bring us the news but can bring it as it happens, which is qualitatively different from bringing us the news with an impressively short delay (as, for example, newspapers do).

RADIO MISSIONS

Where, how, and for what purpose the medium of radio should be used for psychological warfare are questions that can be variously answered.

In peacetime, radio's mission is likely to be general and long-term. The law under which the Voice of America was established states the mission of this and other information agencies as follows: to "promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world" through the dissemination abroad of "information about the United States, its people and its policies . . . ." The mission of the Voice of America, then, is to promote better understanding of the United States through the dissemination of symbolic material via radio throughout the world until such time as the Congress directs that it be terminated.

In time of war, radio may be directed to assist military operations. The objectives of propaganda in the ETO during World

War II were to destroy the Fascist fighting spirit, undermine the enemies' will to resist, and facilitate the victory of Allied arms. The official account of operations by the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, defines the aims of propaganda as follows: "to destroy the fighting morale of our enemy, both at home and at the front, and to sustain the morale of our Allies" (The PWD: An Account of its Operations, p. 21).

A top echelon program statement of this kind is usually the basic guide for the radio operator, just as it is for the leaflet writer or any other media specialist. But how is the directive for psychological warfare in general translated into the particular mission for the particular medium—that is, radio—at a specific place and time?

The translation usually occurs when a target is designated that is suitable for attack by radio psychological warfare, and thus usually happens when a higher command, governmental or military, has decided that the radio weapon can help it achieve its objective. (Other targets, of course, "develop" during the course of the resultant campaign.) According to the Standing Directive of PWD, SHAEF paragraph 8:

> The conduct of Psychological Warfare forms part of the conduct of military operations, and must be coordinated with other arms of war. It is the task of Psychological Warfare to assist the Supreme Commander in fulfilling his mission against the enemy with the most economical use of troops and equipment.

With this and other similar guidance concerning missions and functions, Allied propagandists beamed broadcasts from London prior to D-Day and, later, from transmitters on the Continent. The broadcasts seeking to undermine the will to resist of German soldiers and civilians were not confined to the German language: transmitters carried multi-lingual messages to resistance groups in German-occupied areas, to civilians in the Allied armies' zones of operations, to foreign forced laborers within Germany, and even to alien elements within the German armed forces. But the underlying function of these broadcasts—to whatever group, regardless of message content, and at all stages of the war—was to assist the Allied forces to defeat the enemy—to attack and destroy the morale of the enemy and sustain the morale of the Allies.

Besides designating the target, the mission must state the manner in which the target is to be affected. Decisions as to media use, themes, and methods of procedure are all decisively

influenced by the reaction the operator desires to produce in the target. For instance, radio is not well suited to precipitating immediate action by members of the target audience. A combat leaflet or loudspeaker message is much more likely to tip the balance between an enemy's continued resistance and his surrender than any radio broadcast. In a radio psychological warfare operation against an isolated German garrison at Lorient, the propaganda unit transmitted, among other messages, instructions on how to surrender; but it never used the battle cry of Allied leaflets: "Schluss machen," that is, "cease resistance." Radio can, however, be used to create a frame of mind that will later be receptive to a call for some kind of immediate action.

Radio broadcasts may, to be sure, be used to alter behavior, but in a way that is not easily assessed by such overt acts as surrender. Creating mutual distrust between officers and men, encouraging malingering, raising doubts about national leaders and aims—all of these are objectives that do alter behavior; morale is damaged, and the target soldier ceases to perform his duties as well as he might. In such cases, reduction in battle efficiency may be all that is required to fulfill the mission, and success need not be equated with surrender, desertion, or any similar overt act.

If an infantry unit finds it easier to take an objective because its defenders are divided, their discipline is gone, and their will to resist is at the vanishing point—and these effects are partially attributable to radio propaganda—then radio will have performed a valuable service to the combat arm. If radio helps to sow doubt, fear, or distrust of officialdom in the minds of enemy civilian workers, so that they do not work as hard or produce as much, then radio will have materially contributed to victory. If radio helps to inculcate suspicion or increase discord among enemy leaders or allies, again it will have been of significant though quantitatively non-measurable assistance in achieving our diplomatic or military goals.

But one should not assume that psychological warfare is always or even necessarily designed to cause a change in behavior, whether immediate or projected and whether open or below the surface. It will be recalled in this connection that one of the aims of psychological warfare, as described by PWD, SHAEF, was "to sustain the morale of our allies." The targets, that is, included friend as well as foes. Rather than alter present attitudes or behavior, broadcasts may seek to justify the target's behavior and so confirm or reinforce its beliefs and persuade it to maintain its attitudes and actions.

Broadcasting instructions and encouragement to partisan forces in enemy or enemy-occupied territory is of this nature. So also are broadcasts to nations allied with the operator and to neutral nations whose middle-of-the-road policy may be of benefit to his cause for any number of political, economic, or military reasons. During the first year of the Korean conflict, strategic broadcasts from Tokyo were devoted almost entirely to messages of encouragement to the people of the Republic, messages designed to sustain the will to fight of a people across whose devastated land the waves of war lashed back and forth.

Implied in the preceding remarks is the acknowledged close relationship between the statement of the mission and target analysis, for any plan of operations is of course based on intelligence. There is no rigid boundary between them: they are not points at either end of a straight line, but stand in a circular relationship to one another. Thus any decision as to mission demands some degree of knowledge about the target, for there could be no intelligent formulation of the mission without such knowledge. (Designation of the target and the manner in which it is to be affected is, as we have seen, the focal point in any statement of mission.)

Selection of the target, then, precedes selection of the medium. Enthusiasm for the general virtues of any single medium—in this case, radio—must not sway one's judgment as to its relative effectiveness in influencing a particular target. Both the medium and its use must be tailored to the mission, not the mission to them.

PHYSICAL BARRIERS

With the proper equipment it is physically possible to send a radio message to almost any point on the globe. Often, however, the fact that long-distance transmission calls for short-wave radio, not long-wave, becomes a barrier to communication. Even in a population that possesses a large number of receivers, few are likely to have equipment for receiving short wave. Short-wave signals have the additional disadvantage of "fading," and this fading may reduce the audibility of a signal to zero. Friendly relay stations are one means by which psychological warfare can widen its audience in those cases where short-wave transmission is difficult or impossible; they pick up the message and rebroadcast it over standard wave.

The physical distance between the broadcaster and his target may be widened by a topographic limitation as well. That is,

local topography—for instance, mountains or strong magnetic fields—within many countries either make certain areas inaccessible or cause poor reception. Besides space and topography, there is the barrier of time, for radio signals are more likely to be received at certain hours of the day than at others (there is usually not much point in broadcasting to a target at 0330 hours). Atmospheric disturbances are another factor that may interfere with good reception and so prevent delivery of the message.

These limitations imposed by space, topography, time, and weather are inherent hazards of radio transmission. They are, however, engineering problems, which need not concern the average operator except in the sense that he should be aware of their implications for radio psychological warfare. Even broadcasting via one kilowatt transmitters or the like across the front lines of a battlefield must face the foregoing difficulties (as also the fact that few enemy soldiers, especially among the lower ranks, have receivers).

There is also a second set of physical barriers that are not natural but man-made. These are the barriers erected within totalitarian states to prevent the mass of people from receiving the psychological warfare message.

First, there may be an absolute ban on owning radio receivers. Since, however, this would prevent domestic radio propaganda (except by controlled loudspeakers) the target government is not likely to impose this particular restriction. But it may prohibit the manufacture or possession of other than fixed-channel, low-receptivity, or wired radios. Fixed-channel radios are capable of receiving only a certain station; radios with low receptivity can receive only local stations; and wired radios are little more than a telephonic type of arrangement whereby the signal is transmitted to the receiver by wire, so that the sender has absolute control over what the listener hears.

In Nazi Germany, at the direction of the government, manufacturers produced a low-powered "people's set" that could receive but two stations, the regional station nearest to where the set was located and the high-powered national station. In the Soviet Union, where very few receiving sets are in private hands but broadcasting activities are extensive, a major control device is to set up receivers in central locations such as club rooms on the collective farms, in army barracks, and in factories, and have them tuned exclusively to the channel of an official station. Wired receivers are another control device widely used in the USSR.

Another man-made barrier to psychological warfare transmission is jamming, that is, rendering an outside signal inaudible by creating an artificial disturbance in reception. The interfering signal, say a whistle or shrieking sound, is transmitted on the same wave length that the outside broadcaster is using. Blocking a foreign message by such means has two limitations: a change in frequency by the originating station forces the jamming transmitter likewise to alter its frequence, a task that cannot be accomplished immediately, and, second, the use of a transmitter for jamming bars its utilization for any other purpose, that is, for disseminating domestic propaganda. As of mid-1951, the USSR was reported to have at least 200 transmitters engaged wholly or partly in jamming activities.

Punishment for those who listen to foreign broadcasts is the final measure by which a government may seek to neutralize a foreign psychological warfare effort. Police measures were widely practiced by the Nazi regime in its campaign to isolate the German people from any propaganda other than that of the government or the party. These proscriptions received an amount of publicity in the free world that was probably disproportionate to their effectiveness. Any such regulation is difficult to enforce even in a police state, if a large number of receivers are privately owned. The prohibitions, which must be publicly announced, direct attention to the foreign broadcasts. And, finally, the fact that listening is illegal may give people a feeling of participating in a conspiracy, and make it attractive to persons who would not bother to listen if there were no rules against it. Consequently, antilistening laws may in part operate to the advantage of the psychological warfare operation against which they are directed.

Restrictions on the type and power of receivers that can be manufactured and sold are probably the most certain way to erect a screen between the foreign broadcaster and his potential audience. This is particularly the case in technologically backward countries that have only recently entered the field of mass communications and have done so under the auspices of the state. Where the state controls the means of production it is in a position to fashion a communications network designed to maximize the effectiveness of domestic propaganda while minimizing the likelihood of penetration by outside influences.

Only one other possible physical barrier remains to be noted. It has to do with the technical facilities of the broadcasting group, which must be sufficient to fulfill the assigned mission. Radio

requires an extensive and expensive buildup of power in transmitters, not too far from the border of the country one wishes to penetrate. In the case of an American desire to influence a country in the eastern hemisphere, powerful relay bases must be erected in the eastern hemisphere capable of transforming short-wave broadcasts coming from the United States into medium or long-wave broadcasts. This takes money, and requires governmental approval in the country in which the relay base is located. (Floating transmitters may be one way around the latter difficulty.) A five kilowatt transmitter may be satisfactory for a mobile broadcasting unit operating in a combat situation; it is patently inadequate for political or strategic propaganda to a distance audience.

RADIO AS A PSYWAR MEDIUM

As a medium of psychological warfare, radio has as its outstanding characteristic the fact that it is relatively independent of national boundaries, censorship, or local official aid. This is an enormous advantage in penetrating hostile territory or territory occupied by a hostile power, and it is also a great advantage in carrying an undiluted political message into the territory of skeptical or lukewarm friends, who tend to put barriers in the way of locally-originated, straightforward, hard-hitting American propaganda. Motion pictures, for example, or publications distributed through normal channels, require governmental approval, or at least freedom from active governmental opposition. Radio does not.

The following characteristics of radio have a specific bearing on its use in psychological warfare.

Radio has a shotgun character. Once a radio message goes out over the air waves, no one can predict exactly who will pick it up. What is intended for one audience can and usually will be overheard by other audiences. To a greater extent than print, and to a far greater extent than moving pictures or word of mouth propaganda, radio is inherently incapable of pinpointing a specific target. An exception occurs when, over a period of time, different audiences learn to seek deliberately programs that suit their specific interests.

This simple fact has a number of implications that are not always appreciated. For example, consistency is important. What is said to the Poles about the Oder-Neisse line must not be inconsistent with what is said to the Germans about the same issue,

since some Poles will be sure to hear what is said to the Germans, and vice versa. Similarly, what is said to the Indo-Chinese about imperialism must not be inconsistent with what is said to the French. This elementary lesson has been well learned by the Soviet radio. However much its emphasis may shift in broadcasts to one nation as compared with another, it scrupulously avoids any out and out self-contradictions.

Hot controversial issues should be avoided if they are not essential to the main purpose, since broadcasts intended to please side A are likely to be heard by the supporters of side B, and cause a reaction on the latter's part against the operator. Here, too, Moscow well knows the score. Contrary to the common stereotype, which pictures Communists as implementing their divide and conquer policy by fomenting all existing antagonisms, Radio Moscow has tended to give a wide berth to such antagonisms as that between Jews and Arabs, between India and Pakistan, between Italy and Yugoslavia on the Trieste question, between Catholics and Protestants, and so on. In its radio propaganda, indeed, it has even tended to soft-pedal the question of private property in the means of production, which theoretically constitutes the core of Marxism. An interesting case in point is the land reform issue in Italy. During the crucial elections in the spring of 1948, it was reported that Communist word-of-mouth propaganda was making much of the land-reform issue: agitators went from farm to farm, pointing out to individual peasants what land would allegedly be theirs if the Communists came to power. But Soviet radio propaganda during this period made little of the land issue: rather it concentrated its fire upon broad issues like American imperialism and the danger of war—issues on which all Italians, not merely the landless peasants or propertyless poor, might find the Soviet position acceptable. To some extent this was perhaps a shrewd recognition of the fact that radios are owned primarily by the more well-to-do elements in Italy, including property-conscious middle class as well as upper class persons. At the same time, however, it is consistent with the broad Soviet policy of avoiding radio controversy on any issue that does not lay itself out neatly from the standpoint of the Soviet dichotomy of friend versus foe, pro-Stalin versus anti-Stalin.

The above generalization can be looked upon as one corollary of the principle of "minimal change" which holds that the propagandist who wishes to change a target individual's attitudes on this or that matter of major importance to himself will be more

likely to succeed in doing so if he lets him alone on all points that are not of major importance.

Another reason for avoiding controversial issues has to do with the mechanism of scapegoating or displacement. The hostilities generated by a controversy can be quickly displaced upon any outsider who "meddles" in it by those who feel that that outsider is against them. The emotional intensity of this reaction is, moreover, likely to be much greater than that of the favorable reaction of those who feel the outsider is supporting them. The reaction of the Arab world to American "interference" in Palestine —and the consequent closed-mindedness of many Arabs to the American case in Korea—is a recent case in point.

Broadcasts should be adapted to a wide range of intellectual levels. An operation has no way of controlling the intellectual level of its listeners: the program intended for the masses may be overheard by intellectuals, and vice versa. The radio audience, in other words, is heterogeneous by definition; and the content of radio broadcasts should therefore deal with matters of universal interest, and should be neither too esoteric for the common man nor too simple for the sophisticated.

Broadcasts should be followed up with attempts to learn the reactions of the typical or average listener. A highly differentiated picture of various target audiences, with hypotheses as to how and why they differ from each other, is less necessary for the radio propagandist than for, let us say, the word-of-mouth agitator, who can pinpoint his listeners. What the radio propagandist needs is knowledge of what the large majority of his heterogeneous audience want and believe. If he can genuinely understand and adapt to the majority—or, better still, to the common elements in the psychology of sub-audiences that are in other respects fairly diverse—his primary task of target-analysis is accomplished.

Since radio effectiveness is limited by the incidence of receiving sets in the target population, but not by the incidence of literacy, it has both a disadvantage and an advantage by comparison with printed materials. The disadvantage is that those who have no access to radios cannot listen. In an Iron Curtain country, where individual receiving sets are found almost exclusively among the governing elite, or in a technically backward country where only the well-to-do can afford sets, this is a serious drawback. On the other hand, a group of illiterate Greek peasants in a village coffee house can listen to the coffee house radio even if they are quite incapable of reading the Athens newspaper lying on the table. (Radio also has the advantage as regards propaganda for areas

difficult to reach by ordinary transportation. In many underdeveloped areas [for instance, Afghanistan], there are many villages whose chief source of up-to-date news is a single radio set.)

This raises the complex question of what intellectual level should be assumed in planning radio programs. As a basis for discussing it, let us assume: (a) that Western radio propaganda must attempt to prove to people in general, and thus to disadvantaged groups in target populations, that they will be at least as well off under non-Soviet as under Soviet rule; and (b) that it must appeal to them in terms of universal values such as peace and individual freedom, which it must show to be endangered by Soviet aggression and Soviet dictatorship. Neither of these assumptions is likely to be seriously challenged, but some might infer from them that Western radio propaganda should be directed at a relatively low intellectual level, i.e., that of the masses. But the better view appears to be this: most radio propaganda should be pitched at what might be called the upper-middle intellectual level, though it should cast as broad a net as possible both above and below this median target group.

In view of the fact that the lower and lower-middle class groups in all parts of the world are the most numerous ones, this suggestion calls for some justification. Why should we talk about an "upper-middle" group as the median target?

Let us, to begin with, distinguish between the upper-middle intellectual level and the upper-middle class level. In terms of intellectual level a labor leader, or an opinion leader in a lower class group, may well be distinctly above the average of the people he leads or represents. Radio, like all propaganda, must square off to the opinion leader concept. It must accept the likelihood that its chief influence will be indirect, by way of the face-to-face word-of-mouth contact between opinion leaders who have been influenced by the mass media and opinion followers, who tend to rely chiefly on these leaders for their political opinions. It should also be recognized that a certain dignity and correctness of style is respected and desired by the average man, even if this involves speaking to him on a higher level than that on which he would himself speak or think. He wants to have his interests represented, but he wants them represented with intelligence and with dignity and thus by men who are a cut above him in intelligence and dignity. This is not to say, of course, that radio propaganda can afford to be unintelligible: propaganda which is too esoteric, too complex, too "highbrow," will never move the masses emotionally. There is an optimum level, however, that

is high enough above the average to command respect and not so high as to be unintelligible.

Numerous examples suggest themselves. The level of Life magazine or the Reader's Digest is pretty much what is meant here by the term "upper-middle;" Roosevelt's speeches, Churchill's speeches, and the commentaries of Ilya Ehrenburg, the most brilliant of the Soviet writers quoted by the Soviet radio, are well within range of what is meant. Among American commentators Elmer Davis perhaps represents the upper limit of what can have mass appeal. These examples may suggest concretely what is meant by aiming at the upper-middle intellectual level as a "median" target, and they may also suggest how feasible it is actually to appeal simultaneously to a broad range of levels above and below this level. By combining clarity of style with meatiness of substance, most of these persons succeed in appealing simultaneously to below-average and to decidedly above-average intellectual levels.

Of course the incidence of set ownership in the target population needs to be taken into account in pitching the level of broadcasts to any particular national audience. Broadly speaking, however, radio sets are owned primarily by persons who are above average in both economic and intellectual levels, which tends to support the position adopted here. Broadcasts to populations with a relatively high educational and political level (Scandinavia, Finland, Germany, France, Israel) should naturally be pitched somewhat higher than broadcasts to nations that are relatively backward in these respects (for instance, Poland, the USSR, and most of the Middle East and Far East). But, it should not be forgotten that in these relatively backward countries set ownership is itself much more selective than in countries where all social classes tend to have access to radios. In Iran or Indonesia only the highest economic and intellectual strata are likely to have access to radios, and these highest strata are comparable in educational and political level with the average radio owner in France or Sweden.

CONTROLLING THE AUDIENCE

Radio Reception Control

Radio reception is easily controlled by the listener. The radio listener can always turn off the program that irritates or bores him with a turn of the dial. Within this sphere he is the absolute master. The wise operator accepts this fact realistically and

humbly, and fixes careful attention on its implications.

To a large extent the same thing is true of printed material, moving pictures, and word-of-mouth propaganda. A newspaper too can be easily discarded if it bores or irritates the reader. Turning off a radio program, however, is easier than walking away from a friend or out of a moving picture audience, and somewhat easier than throwing away one newspaper and buying another.

There are six major implications of this absolute listener control:

First, it is self-defeating to antagonize the listener needlessly. This does not mean that punches should be pulled in discussion of the propagandist's central message. It is an established fact that the politically conscious listener is likely to listen to "what the other side says," even when he violently disagrees with it. But the principle of "minimal change" is especially applicable to radio. Issues and controversies that are wide of the central message should be scrupulously avoided, and the more scrupulously put to the extent that the audience is known to be vitally interested in them. The cultural taboos and cherished sentiments of the listener should be handled with kid gloves, as Japanese emperor-worship was during World War II. The national pride of the audience should be recognized and utilized, insofar as this can be done without resorting to crude flattery; at the very least there should be an attitude of equality rather than the boastfulness and condescension that are widely believed to be typical of Americans. In every way the broadcaster should try to sympathize with his listener, anticipate what might antagonize him, and avoid it.

Second, the listener's desire for authentic news should be satisfied. In a world weary of "propaganda" and hungry for solid, reliable, meaningful knowledge, a broadcasting station that acquires a reputation for providing such knowledge has, in the long run, an enormous advantage. The British Broadcasting Corporation and the Swiss radio are cases in point.

People behind the Iron Curtain are likely to judge the Western radio in terms of how accurate its statements are about the things they, as individuals, see around them. They are hungry for the world news their Communist governments keep from them, but they want that news from a source that shows itself to be knowledgeable about the situations with which they have first-hand familiarity. If an East German hears over the Western radio that the Soviet troops in East Germany are undernourished, while he can see for himself that they are relatively well fed, he tends to discredit the whole Western radio output—or, if he is already our supporter,

feels both disillusioned and embarrassed, since we have exposed him to ridicule by his less pro-Western acquaintances for pleading the case of people who tell such "lies."

There is also the question of the relative emphasis to be put on news and on commentary. Since commentaries carry the main propaganda message directly and explicitly, it is in the propagandist's interest to use them just as much as the tolerance of the listener will permit. At the same time, he cannot afford to give listeners the impression that his programs are "just propaganda." Thus he should try to discover for a given audience what the optimum proportion of commentary is, and should, in any case, see to it that his commentaries themselves are largely composed of facts. Commentaries should, that is to say, weave facts together into an integrated and meaningful picture, and should not sound like polemics in which facts are used merely to support a thesis.

Third, news should be put in a meaningful context. While argument without facts is likely to be dismissed as mere propaganda, facts without clear implications are likely to be seen as meaningless and therefore boring. The assimilation of facts to an established frame of reference is essential not only for propaganda impact but also to give the radio listener an incentive to stay tuned to the program.

Whether the "clear implications" should always be spelled out is a big problem that cannot be discussed here as fully as it deserves. Perhaps the chief single difference between the Soviet propaganda philosophy and that of the Western democratic nations is on this point. Soviet propaganda consistently makes its propaganda message fully explicit, even in the presentation of news, while Western propagandists leave more to the independent thought processes of the listener. The Western practice has unquestioned advantages. For instance, the listener is likely to feel more fully identified with conclusions he thinks he has arrived at independently and on the basis of the facts rather than with conclusions he feels he has been pushed into by some propagandist. At the same time, if the listener does not spontaneously see the implications of a fact, no message is conveyed at all, and there is again the danger of boring him. Where the optimum lies is a matter for empirical research. But it is clear that a considerable part of the art of propaganda lies in presenting facts in such a way, and in such a context, that their implications are actually clear even to a dull listener, and at the same time in not laboring implications to the point where the listeners will feel that the "propaganda" is too obtrusive.

Fourth, full use should be made of drama, human interest, and humor. Wherever a genuine political message can be combined with these elements of audience appeal, without loss of dignity and without wasting time on mere entertainment, there is everything to be said for using them. Whether much radio time should be devoted to pure entertainment is a separate question. Clearly the answer depends in part on the nature of the audience. Listeners behind the Iron Curtain, for example, run a genuine personal risk when they listen to the Western radio, and are likely to feel cheated if all they get is some kind of politically irrelevant entertainment. In such areas the political interests of those who listen at all are so strong that no come-on or listener-bait is necessary. In Western Europe, on the other hand, where other sources of news and opinion are available in abundance, some pure entertainment may well be needed in order to get a broad listening audience.

Fifth, commentaries should not be too long. The length of a good commentary is not a matter of hard and fast rules. One whose content is inherently interesting can afford to go on longer than one that has to fight for attention. But few topics can carry a commentary more than ten or twelve minutes. The listener is likely to get bored with the commentary that goes on longer than that, and dial some other station.

Finally, there is a limit to the amount of repetition that is desirable. While repetition is a basic principle of propaganda and one that Western propagandists, trained as they are in the entertainment-minded Western tradition, are disposed to neglect—nevertheless there is a limit to what the listener will take. The principle of novelty or contrast as a determinant of attention applies as directly to radio as to other media. And there is reason to think that Soviet radio propaganda, while it makes masterly use of the repetition principle (as Hitler did), errs on the side of being too repetitious.

EMOTIONAL COMMUNICATION

The human voice is more suited to emotional communication than the printed page. Human beings learn to talk before they learn to read, and the face-to-face social relationships that constitute the stuff of life for most of us are carried on far more by speech than by writing. The voice, moreover, is a subtle and powerful medium for expressing emotion. The nuances of irony

and humor, as well as the cruder emotions such as anger and grim determination, can be conveyed by the qualities and inflections of the voice but hardly come through on the printed page at all. Hitler recognized this, and discussed it at length in his chapter on "The Significance of the Spoken Word." The use of the voice, then, constitutes an advantage shared by the radio, the talking picture, and word-of-mouth propaganda, but not possessed by any purely visual medium.

This implies, among other things, that the great possibilities of radio for drama and humor should never be overlooked. It does not necessarily imply, however, that radio speeches or commentaries should be "emotional" in tone. Restraint often pays higher dividends than pulling out all the stops of the organ. The kind of mass meeting in which Hitler's type of emotional oratory was most effective is very different from the relatively detached and matter-of-fact atmosphere in which most radio programs are heard, and the operator must keep the difference in mind. Soviet radio commentators, for example, are notably "objective" in tone. Their manner is confident and determined but not excited—more like the manner of Elmer Davis than, say, that of Gabriel Heatter. In this respect Soviet radio propaganda seems well adapted to a world of propaganda-weary listeners; its content is grossly "propagandistic," but not its tone.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RADIO VOICE

First, the radio voice lacks any visual accompaniment. Human beings learn to talk before they learn to read, but they learn to see before they learn to talk. The fact that they enable visual perception of the human face and body and of dramatic situations constitutes a great advantage of television, moving pictures, word-of-mouth propaganda, and even of still photographs, which radio does not share. This involves, among other things, a considerable depersonalization of the radio announcer or commentator. The voice from the ether is disembodied, anonymous. It is worthwhile, therefore, to use to the full whatever means may still be available to personalize a commentator or a character in a radio drama. Speakers should be used whose voices are colorful, expressive, and distinctive. The commentators' names should be mentioned at every opportunity, and time should be allowed to build up a sort of personal relationship between the commentator and his listeners. Radio Moscow is extremely poor in this respect; its commentators

(with the exception of Ehrenburg) tend to a dull, impersonal uniformity of both style and content. Not so the British (for instance, Bruce Lockhart for the British Broadcasting Corporation) or the Germans (Dittmar as a military expert for the Nazi radio, for example).

Second, the radio listener cannot stop to think or to reread. Thus the listener cannot go back over what has been said as a reader can when he rereads a sentence or a paragraph. Nor can the listener easily stop to think about what he has heard, as a reader can stop to mull over what he has read. If the listener stops to think he may lose the thread of the discussion. Both of these considerations restrict the presentation of complex ideas over radio, and they imply that if it is essential to present some complicated thought (for example, the unacceppability of Soviet proposals on atomic energy), special care must be taken to simplify and repeat. The tempo also has to be much slower than that of ordinary talking if all of the words are to sink in and be understood. (There are national differences in this respect; the tempo preferred by the French is faster than that in America, while that preferred by the Germans is somewhat slower.)

Third, the radio listener cannot talk back or ask questions. Radio is like the press and ordinary moving pictures in this respect, and unlike word-of-mouth propaganda or any planned program (filmstrip, moving picture) in which a speaker is present who is prepared to answer questions. Radio is essentially a one-way type of communication. This may especially irritate the listener who has critical thoughts or counter-arguments on the tip of his tongue, and does not find them being recognized or successfully handled by the radio commentator.

A radio operation must, therefore, develop as much of a feedback of ideas as it can, and use them at a maximum. Listeners can be urged to write letters containing comments on the programs, and not to hold their punches; though it should be kept in mind both that letter writers are seldom typical, and that the extent and nature of their atypicality is always difficult to estimate. Another device for this purpose is to arrange tryouts or pretests of programs with small groups of listeners, selected with a careful eye to their representativeness, and conversational tests of intended themes with individuals drawn from the target audience. Any and every available means should be utilized to find what skeptical thoughts are likely to arise in a listener's mind as he listens to a given theme or program, and then to take this knowledge into account in planning what is said. Themes that will be accepted

without challenge can then be stated briefly and without supporting proof, while themes the audience is going to be skeptical about must be stated with careful precision, factual buildup, and attention to the particular counter-arguments that are likely to suggest themselves.

Fourth, radio cannot present maps or diagrams, and is handicapped in presenting figures. This is a real disadvantage when it comes to presenting military news or strategic analyses, to discussing scientific and technological developments, to explaining economic data, or to describing what the listener needs to do about something (for instance, using a new improvement in agricultural method, or such and such a form of sabotage). In some cases the defect can be made up by seeing to it that the necessary pictorial matter is made available (as when Roosevelt asked all of his listeners to equip themselves with a map of the world). More often the only thing that can be done is to seek ways of expressing the desired content that are simple and graphic enough to make pictures unnecessary. A military commentator may take pains to explain why a place with an unfamiliar name is strategically important. An announcer communicating economic news can, instead of saying "an increase from one billion two hundred and seventy-three million to one billion seven hundred and fifty-nine million" (which would be quite intelligible if the two figures could be presented visually, one above the other), simply say "an increase of nearly 40 percent."

Fifth, radio can be jammed. Thus one special and crucial problem in connection with penetrating Iron Curtain is peculiar to radio. On the other hand, it is a great mistake to assume that this obstacle is necessarily insuperable. Reports from Americans in Russia indicate that (as of 1951) the Voice of America could be heard in Moscow 30 to 40 percent of the time, and in most of the rest of the country 60 to 70 percent of the time. In the satellite area, where jamming is, in general, much less effective than in the USSR, the chances of listening in are correspondingly greater. Nevertheless, jamming certainly discourages listening. The business of trying to search out an audible signal in between the jamming signals is too nerve-wracking for most people who do not have some urgent reason for tuning in. But for the fact that the grapevine probably serves to increase greatly the social impact of any one man's listening, the prospect of effective radio broadcasting to the USSR from outside would be dark indeed.

For adapting radio programs to the fact of jamming, the following devices are recommended:

1. Short, self-sufficient messages, often repeated. Since jamming of a given frequency may start within a matter of seconds after the listener picks it up, it is important that what he hears during these few seconds should be both significant and intelligible. It cannot be fully intelligible if it is part of a long commentary whose parts are carefully related to one another. A paragraph torn out of context is intelligible only if the context is not needed to set off or complete its main thought. When, therefore, the operator expects his broadcast to be jammed, he should select the few most significant news items or commentary ideas, compress each of them into a single paragraph, so worded that it will be understandable if heard in isolation from what precedes or follows it, and, without regard to normal considerations as to boring the listener, repeat these paragraphs again and again, so that any listener who captures the signal for even a few moments will hear something he can latch onto.

2. Primary stress on news that has been suppressed or distorted by the hostile government. Such material lends itself much better than political commentary to one-paragraph treatment.

3. Memorable slogans or catchwords. The more interrupted a message is, the more important it is that it should contain some phrase or slogan so apt and pithy that the reader will retain it, repeat it to himself, and pass it along to others. "Government of the people, by the people and for the people," "liberty, equality and fraternity," "open covenants openly arrived at," "the Four Freedoms," "peace, land and bread"—the historical importance of such phrases is great enough to warrant a deliberate search for similar ones applicable to the lives of captive populations behind the Curtain, and their widest possible use in broadcasts specially designed for the jamming situation.

4. Choice of subject matter that lends itself to spreading by the grapevine, with a view to reaching those whom jamming has kept from hearing the original broadcast. Everything that is known about the psychology of rumor is relevant here. For instance, there should be news items giving psychological structure and understanding where structure is lacking and where strong anxieties exist (for example, with regard to the atomic or hydrogen bombs); all items should attempt to tap strong psychological needs; all should be novel or even bizarre in character, so as to command attention.

RADIO'S ADVANTAGES

Radio does not betray its own origin. The inherent mysteriousness of radio, and the fact that the typical listener has no means of locating the source, make it especially suitable for black propaganda. During the Greek civil war, for example, "Radio Free Greece" was able to pass itself off constantly as emanating from mountain strongholds in northern Greece, when actually it was operating safely from secure Communist territory in the Balkans. In World War II the Allies had transmitters on their side of the battle line that successfully posed as dissident stations within Germany.

An obvious great advantage of radio as compared to any other medium from the standpoint of penetrating the Iron Curtain is that the operator's physical presence is not required. Any hostile police state will automatically prevent the operator from making direct propaganda by press, moving picture, or open word-of-mouth agitation. Only the dropping of leaflets (which poses great problems in times of peace) can be compared with radio as a curtain-penetrating device.

The advantages of radio in penetrating territory that is hostile or occupied by hostile forces should not be permitted to obscure its potential usefulness in friendly countries. To consolidate the morale or good will of an ally may be as important—and may be much more feasible psychologically—than to influence an enemy (the latter's mind may be closed against "American propaganda" from the outset), and a friendly government, even a neutral one, is not likely to jam the operator's signal. The operator should, then, give careful attention to ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of radio in friendly countries. Two of these are local promotion and local programming.

Experience has shown how much the amount of listening to a particular radio source is influenced by printed materials setting forth the facts as to its availability (when to hear it, what wavelength, etc.). Like other commodities, radio programs need the help of advertising. This is a considerable handicap for foreign stations, since local stations are usually well publicized and tend to be jealous of competition, at least during "peak" listening hours. The effectiveness of foreign radio depends very much, therefore, upon the effort, the money, and the tact devoted to obtaining adequate local publicity.

Radio is like all other media in that its effectiveness depends largely on the degree to which it identifies itself with the life of

the listener. There is no substitute here for intimate knowledge of the listener's way of life, which again constitutes a great handicap for broadcasts originating abroad. There is, moreover, a tendency in many people to distrust anything that might be "foreign propaganda." For both reasons it may be better, when possible, to have an idea presented by a local broadcasting station rather than by a foreign station, that is, to get a certain amount of control of a local station and sluice the operation's content into its programs. It will usually be better, for this purpose, also to employ local personnel, who are closely in touch with the local situation and up-to-date on new developments in it. There are, to be sure, counterbalancing disadvantages of local programming, such as difficulty of supervision and inadequate exploration of intelligence data.

AUTHENTICITY AND AUTHORITY

When a radio psychological warfare broadcast speaks in the name of the United States or any military or civilian agency of the nation, then it is using authority to promote acceptance of its message by the target group. Sometimes this gives a message a kind of weight in the minds of the listeners that it could not possibly have in and of itself. When one learns that similar editorials have appeared on the same date in Izvestia, Pravda, and Red Star, one knows that it is the Soviet government speaking either to its people or to people out over the world. The message automatically carries a type of authority that editorials in the press of free nations do not possess.

Similarly, listeners rightly associate messages from Radio Peiping with the top Chinese Communist rulers. The official preparations for the Korean cease-fire talks were transmitted in the main through Radio Pyongyang and Radio Tokyo, the voice of United Nations Headquarters. The later crossfire of official charge and countercharge was carried out, with sideline comments from Radio Peiping, through these same agencies. Such messages were accepted as official both because they were announced as such (the responsible authorities did not, as it happens, themselves broadcast the messages) and because it was known to all concerned that each transmitter spoke in the name and with the approval and direction of a higher authority. The messages were therefore accepted on each side as authentic.

In the realm of psychological warfare proper there is this same interrelationship of authority and authenticity. No nation would permit a message that was not authentic to be transmitted over a radio station known as its official voice without carefully weighing the predictable damage to the latter's reputation, and the predictable embarrassment for its government. That is why white (overt) propaganda closely adheres to national policy and to verifiable, though certainly selected, truth in its broadcasts. Falsehood plays a very small role in white psychological warfare.

Even in black (covert) broadcasting, messages are best kept fairly close to the truth, with a view to building a reputation for factual reporting, until such time as the broadcaster decides to cash in and exploit the target's trust in his reliability with a calculated falsehood, thus tricking it into a decisive act that it otherwise would not have made. The "comrade" appeal in black operations grows out of the broadcaster's pretense that he speaks in the direct interest of the target group from a place within the target area or immediately adjoining it (never, of course, from enemy territory).

Covert broadcasting, needless to say, requires a high degree of skill and attention to detail in all departments. A false step or miscalculation will ruin the whole enterprise. Once the target discovers the true source of black psychological warfare it not only turns a deaf ear to it, but reacts in a way that may destroy the achievements of the operator's white psychological warfare and the authority of its source. Scrupulous attention must be paid to maintaining reliability, and the value of black broadcasting remains speculative at best. (Whether the black radio operations in World War II paid their way is an unresolved question.)

Much safer than black radio in the foregoing respects would be a radio transmitter actually operated by dissident members of the target group, especially when fully controlled by the operator's authorities. No example of this type of operation can be cited, however. The Free French maintained a transmitter during much of World War II, but it was not controlled by Allied headquarters. Radio Free Europe, which speaks in the name of the American people but not in that of the United States government or of any foreign dissident group, engages in a somewhat similar but still essentially different type of broadcasting. Financed by voluntary contributions, it is the unofficial voice of the American people, as contrasted with the official Voice of America. It is the people of one land, as distinct from the government of that land, communicating with the peoples of other lands.

Such a transmitter must rely, of course, upon building its own reputation for authenticity, since in the beginning, it can claim no authority for its statements other than that provided by any reservoir of good will for the American people that may exist in the countries addressed. Later, the good name it wins for itself and its output may give it added authority.

EVALUATION

Most radio psychological warfare, as noted above, seeks long-term goals. The operator does not expect to produce immediate changes in behavior or rapid modifications of attitudes. Even combat radio propaganda restricts itself primarily to preparing the ground for attack by other media. In other words, one expects no direct "payoff" from radio. Its function is to make more certain a payoff through other means. And progress toward long-term goals is, by definition, almost difficult to measure, or to attribute to a single medium or influence.

One of radio's leading advantages over other media, its ability to transmit a message over great distances, increases the difficulty of evaluating its effectiveness. This is particularly true in cases where the operator is almost completely denied access to the target group, as US psychological warfare operators are today denied access to their major target groups.

At first glance, it might be thought that a large-scale effort to jam the operator's broadcasts, or increasingly stringent police measures directed against listening to foreign stations, are sure indications that the broadcasts are effective. However, such prima facie evidence can be deceiving. It may mean only that the operator is penetrating the target area, a success of sorts, but certainly not a scientific measure of the effectiveness of that penetration. An intelligence agent may penetrate enemy lines, and the enemy's efforts to capture him may fail. But if the agent returns to his own forces without any information, his effectiveness for intelligence purposes is zero. It may be another matter, of course, if one includes under effectiveness the anxiety that he may have caused the enemy and the latter's uncertainty as to whether he was successful in obtaining the information he sought. The same thing is true on the psychological warfare side. The message may reach the target despite efforts to prevent reception, but if it is not influential then its effectiveness is likewise zero—unless again there are indications that the target's authori-

ties are inconvenienced and perform irrational actions because they believe the messages are affecting their population.

Information obtained from travelers, refugees, deserters, and the like may prove worthwhile if similar reports come from a reasonably large and differentiated number of persons. The opinions of a single individual or a small group with the same interests or background should be looked at askance, if for no other reason than that the sample is small. So should reports from those who, for whatever reason, wish to ingratiate themselves with the operator—for instance, prisoners of war. In evaluation procedure, what matters is not praise but sober criticism.

Also, the extent of the average person's judgment is almost certain to be restricted to likes and dislikes concerned with matters of programming—music selection, announcers' voices, and so forth. These are of course important, but not of much assistance in deciding about the effects of the operator's message content. Radio psychological warfare is in the entertainment business only as a means to an end, and the real concern in evaluation must remain centered upon how the product is selling—a type of assessment for which most persons within the target have little competence. And because the judgments of such persons are largely restricted to personal likes and dislikes, their opinions may be many and confusing.

What is more, if propaganda has any degree of finesse, its purpose will have escaped the respondent's notice, and any direct question as to its effectiveness will show him to be unaware of its existence. Open-ended depth interviews, however, as opposed to direct one-shot questions, may yield evidence as to the extent to which basic propagandistic purposes are being achieved. If such an interview reveals that this member of the target group has, knowingly or unknowingly, traded his own views for the sender's, and if the latter can determine that such a change is attributable at least in part to his psychological warfare efforts, and if other interviews with selected persons produce the same result, then he has a measure of effectiveness that is valuable. Interviews with persons whose knowledge and background fit them to judge radio psychological warfare effectiveness are, of course, another matter. The opinions of such persons, if they are deemed reliable in other respects and have recently emerged from the target group, are of incalculable value.

The evaluation procedure of pretesting is also somewhat difficult to apply to radio content. A prime advantage of radio, its

timeliness, here stands in the way of evaluating its possible effectiveness. Policy statements, directives to groups, warnings, and other materials of like nature that may be scheduled early in an operation for transmission at a later phase, can be submitted to a panel for criticism. But news or even news commentaries clearly cannot be held up while an appraisal of this kind is being conducted. Such extreme cautiousness would probably cost more than the gains would justify.

The analysis of content in the communication media of the target group offers another method of estimating effectiveness. If the target's media appear to be putting forth extra effort to counterattack the operator's themes, then there is some reason for concluding that he is being effective. But again one cannot accept such evidence as conclusive. First, the authorities in the target area can be expected to realize their own vulnerabilities, and such efforts may be undertaken only in the regular course of their propaganda activities. Second, as with jamming or harsh anti-listening laws, such counterpropaganda may be indicative merely of the fact of penetration, and of the authorities' fears that the operator is affecting the target, rather than of actual effectiveness on the part of the operator's themes.

CHAPTER XV

LOUDSPEAKERS

The use of microphones and sound amplifying equipment for transmitting messages over distances of from a few yards to several thousands of yards has become a standard part of the activities of civil and military propaganda agencies. Ordinarily, owing to limitations of range and effect, civil agencies find loudspeakers useful only for such special purposes as political rallies or assisting mobile motion picture missions or, in technologically backward countries, for propaganda tours with mobile vans. On the military side, experience in World War II and in Korea has established the great utility of mobile public address systems in both combat and consolidation psychological warfare.

METHOD OF UTILIZATION

Before the end of the World War II campaigns, American psychological warfare personnel had mounted high-powered (200 watt amplifier) loudspeaker systems on tanks that traveled with armored spearheads, ready at the psychological moment of breakthrough to assist in and to exploit the enemy's demoralization. Tank-mounted and jeep-transported loudspeakers were responsible directly for the capture of thousands of German prisoners, the reduction of many rear guard roadblocks, and the capitulation of a number of beleaguered town garrisons.

In the war against Japan, divisional intelligence sections and Navy psychological warfare teams discovered numerous new potentialities in loudspeakers. Because so many operations in the Pacific area were amphibious, loudspeakers had to be mounted, for one thing, on a wider variety of vehicles and naval craft than in Europe. Amplifiers and accessory equipment were mounted not only on tanks and jeeps, but on weapons carriers, trucks, ambulances, half-tracks, small naval craft—especially LCI's and torpedo boats—and several types of aircraft. As examples of how aircraft can be used in combat propaganda via loudspeakers, one may cite the broadcasts to the enemy by a Navy PV-1 (Polly) during mop-up operations in the Marshall Islands, in February and March, 1945, and similar actions in Luzon and other islands of the Philippine Archipelego by an L-5 light liaison aircraft.

In Korea in 1950, public address equipment was mounted on two C-47 cargo planes and used in propaganda operations against enemy front-line troops and against guerilla forces both in enemy and friendly territory. Speaker sets were also regularly used in ground operations both by infantry units themselves and by the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. In Korea the list of loudspeaker-mounted vehicles included light and medium tanks, tracked personnel carriers, and quarter-ton trailers. Experiments were conducted also with mounting equipment on light liaison planes organic to the infantry division.

MILITARY AND CIVIL MISSIONS

The missions of loudspeakers vary greatly, depending upon local combat conditions, the military objectives of the unit in whose support the psychological warfare detachment is operating, and the wishes of the unit's commander. A frequent reason for using loudspeakers is the simple one that no alternative medium could possibly accomplish the objective.

When loudspeaker units can be equipped with recording and transcription devices, as they sometimes have been, the variety of combat psychological warfare missions that may be undertaken is greatly enlarged. For the most part, however, public address systems have been used to appeal to bypassed troops to surrender or cease resistance, and to issue ultimata and instructions to towns and fortified locations holding up the advance of friendly forces.

The various types of combat mission that a loudspeaker detachment could conceivably be assigned by a unit commander include the subversion of enemy soldiers through appeals to surrender either individually or in groups, and the harassing of enemy troops through the creation and amplification of messages or noises calculated to induce fear and/or nostalgia. Enemy forces may, for example, be deceived as to the true intentions and plans of a friendly force by the judicious amplification of noises that simulate troop movements, gunfire, heavy shelling, or explosions.

Since noises of a fear-inducing and an irritating character may have extremely adverse effects upon friendly forces who chance to hear them, special precautions must be taken to shield friendly troops from such broadcasts. Also, it is possible for too prolonged or too frequent use of noise-transmitting devices, especially if they are not accompanied by a genuine display of firepower, to produce precisely the wrong reaction on the part of the enemy.

In consolidation operations, loudspeaker crews have assisted military government and civil affairs officers by speeding up pacification of liberated and conquered territory. Appeals have been made to civilians asking them to help clear the roads for military traffic, to report the location of booby traps and mines, or of hostile individuals dressed in civilian clothing, or to turn in all weapons pending the arrival of Military Government and Civil Affairs Officers.

After military operations, including those associated with pacification activities, have actually terminated, loudspeakers can be used as media for the dissemination of news releases and the issuing of military government proclamations, pending restoration of normal peacetime radio, newspaper, and postal communications in the liberated or conquered areas.

Public address systems lend themselves to a much wider variety of psychological warfare missions than they were used for in World War II. However, in order for them to be used more advantageously and more fully, military commanders will have to be given a fuller understanding of their capabilities in support of advancing infantry and/or armored forces.

Mobile loudspeakers also lend themselves to countless peacetime and quasi-peacetime propaganda uses. Wherever there is no established radio communication channel, for example, mobile or stationary speaker units may be used to broadcast regular news and propaganda programs to civilian target groups. Even prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, United States Information Service personnel in South Korea had been working in intimate cooperation with officials in the Republic of Korea Departments of Public Information and National Defense on missions of great importance for the cold war in that country. USIS units were used, for example, to stimulate the interest of South Koreans in their own national elections of 1948. Korean announcers broadcast over USIS equipment in the zone along the 38th parallel in the hope of luring defectors over from North Korea. USIS sets were also used in broadcasting news and special messages to Korean villagers.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MISSIONS

More than other media, loudspeakers depend for successful performance upon friendly agencies other than the psywar unit, especially the commanders of the military units to which the psychological warfare personnel are attached, whether for temporary or extended service. One of the primary tasks of the operator is to acquaint military leaders with the wide variety of missions that loudspeakers are in a position to undertake.

Combat loudspeaker missions should, ideally, be carried out on any echelon only after full and free discussion of military objectives, enemy capabilities, and available friendly resources. The participants in the discussion should include at least the unit commander, the operations officer (G-3 or S-3), the senior psychological warfare officer of the command, the loudspeaker personnel who will supervise the activity and, if possible, a senior officer of the unit's intelligence section who is familiar with enemy capabilities. If the mission involves the coordinated use of artillery, armor, smoke, or air strikes, senior representatives of each of the relevant services should take part in the planning early enough to affect the drafting of the operational order.

In normal circumstances, the final decision as to whether missions will be undertaken should be made by personnel who do not think of themselves as involved directly in psychological warfare activities; either the regimental commander or the operations officer (S-3). The most successful loudspeaker missions are, however, likely to be those which psychological warfare personnel have accepted as feasible when asked for an opinion by the military commander of the unit involved, and questions as to which psychological warfare media to employ and what detailed techniques to use may very well be left to the psychological warfare personnel to determine. Often, however, the availability or non-availability of resources media will limit the area of free choice in these matters.

As military commanders come to have an increased understanding of the capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare, more and more missions will be determined by them and not left to the semi-exclusive judgment of the psychological warfare personnel as they often are now. The chances are, however, that the directive to the psychological warfare detachment from that quarter will be highly general, that is, that it attempt to lower the morale and battle efficiency of enemy troops prior to a planned

assault, and leaving it up to the psychological warfare personnel to determine how the mission is to be accomplished.

Without thorough coordination of activity all along the line, even the best laid plans for psychological warfare support are not likely to achieve maximum effectiveness. Coordination is required in several directions. Staff sections in higher, lower, and adjacent echelons must know what is being tried and what success is being achieved. Assault troops in and near the zone of action must be informed as to what psychological warfare measures are being taken and what is expected of them. They may be asked to hold or increase their fire in a given sector, or in a predetermined time pattern. On the other hand, nothing more may be required of them than that they closely observe how the enemy reacts to the psychological warfare demarche.

Regardless of what the psychological warfare operational plan or order may be, friendly front-line troops must be brought into the picture by being told how they are to react, and must be made to conform strictly to the operational order. (As has been pointed out above, if the mission of the loudspeaker detachment is to harass the enemy with irritating and fear-inducing noises, precautions must be taken to make sure that front-line friendly troops are not adversely affected.)

Lest supporting weapons from higher echelons, tactical air support, armor, artillery, and so forth, interfere with successful execution of carefully laid plans, higher echelons must be informed promptly and in detail of what is to be attempted in the way of psychological warfare support. Without such information, the necessary coordination cannot be carried out by the higher headquarters.

Through liaison personnel and other channels of communication, adjacent military units must be brought into the program, so that no false move by an adjacent unit will render pointless the long hours of planning and preparation that precede a psychological warfare attack.

Several factors must be taken into account in outlining the details of a loudspeaker psychological warfare mission. First, the message should be so timed as to arrive at the proper psychological moment. This may require the most intimate type of coordination. Plans must be shaped with the full knowledge of how other weapons, artillery, armor, and tactical air, will be tied into the over-all picture.

Second, loudspeaker presentation involves questions as to the length of the broadcasts and the number of repetitions over a given

time period. It is impossible to lay down rules here, since conditions of stress, not to mention cultural and emotional peculiarities on the part of the target, vary so much that no two situations will be exactly alike. A few generalizations may nevertheless prove helpful.

In evaluating the results of loudspeaker missions, one important question to raise is whether broadcasts are repeated frequently enough to insure clarity and yet infrequently enough to provide some psychologically desirable shock effects.

Because the combat loudspeaker message largely depends on shock effect for maximally effective results, no single broadcast in the combat zone should be more than a few minutes in length. If a broadcast drags on to a point where the target audience begins to weigh the contents of the spoken message, it becomes too long to be maximally useful. And there is the highly important further consideration that prolonged broadcasts from stationary positions may draw enemy mortar and artillery fire, thus unnecessarily endangering friendly lives and equipment.

Whatever the length of the broadcast message, the key sentences in broadcasts should be short, and should be repeated for emphasis and clarity. If the broadcast is made from mobile equipment, the message must be carefully prepared, so that each sentence constitutes a complete thought in itself, and one that is not likely to be misunderstood or misinterpreted. Each sentence ought to be so constructed that if an enemy soldier were to hear only it he would be influenced in the direction desired by the sender.

PROBLEMS IN TARGET ACCESSIBILITY

There are a number of physical factors that must be kept in mind because they affect the clarity of the reception of loudspeaker broadcasts and thus also, indirectly, the results achieved. Among these factors are: the configurations of the terrain across which the broadcasts are made; climatic conditions (for example, low humidity, the direction and intensity of the wind); the extent to which the target audience is a physically compact group; and finally, the character and loudness of competing sounds, especially the din and noise in battle zones.

In planning loudspeaker broadcast operations it is desirable to make a detailed study of the terrain over which the message or sound is to be projected. In hilly mountainous terrain, for example, the echo may be such as to make clear reception well

nigh impossible. Jungle terrain, again, tends to absorb sounds, while sound projected over water or low-lying coastal plains will carry a long way.

In the past, when loudspeaker equipment was mounted only on surface-bound vehicles, there were a number of targets in mountainous and coastal areas that could not be reached without serious distortion of the sound waves. It is now possible, with airborne loudspeaker equipment, to hit such targets with relatively little distortion or absorption.

It is well known that sound travels better at night than in the daytime, and better under conditions of low temperature and low humidity than under conditions of high temperature and high humidity.

Loudspeakers are an ideal medium for striking fixed fortifications, such as pillboxes, caves, military outposts and barracks, where there is a physically compact target group, and thus the probability not only that the message will be heard by a relatively large number of persons, but also that it will be passed along by word of mouth to those who do not hear it. But this can cut two ways. If the compact group is made up of highly disciplined troops from a modern totalitarian state, the chances are that it will include well-disciplined totalitarian agents who will make it their business to produce competing noises and so prevent those who might be receptive to the message from hearing it.

The Chinese soldiers fighting in Korea are known to have believed that the pilots of UN planes possessed a mysterious capacity, or perhaps instrument, that enabled them to pick up and hear whispers and other nearly inaudible man-made noises. Whenever aircraft were immediately overhead, therefore, they were careful to remain motionless and silent, and this made voiceplanes ideal craft from which to project messages to them. Their superstition, in short, kept them from doing—or letting anyone near them do—the one type of thing that defeats the purpose of an enemy voiceplane.

Loudspeakers used for transmitting psychological warfare messages have at least one advantage over radio, since they do not require a target group that has special receiving equipment or even a target group prepared to go to the trouble of tuning in to receive the message. They have, similarly, some advantages over printed media: they communicate as readily to the illiterate members of the target audience as to the literate ones, and target individuals can receive their messages without risking punishment by the security forces (which they can do neither with printed matter nor radio).

Many combat area loudspeaker missions are aimed either at the military or the civilian elements within the area addressed. Often, that is to say, the intended target does not include everyone within earshot of the horns. When a plan of action is being drafted, therefore, it must take into account the fact that persons other than those to whom the message is primarily directed may hear it. How those others will react, whether negatively or positively, is a question that must not be overlooked.

Nothing is more important for the attainment of maximally effective results than that every scrap of information concerning the enemy be sifted and analyzed, and his vulnerabilities identified and understood, before a psychological warfare attack of any kind is attempted. When loudspeakers are the media to be used, however, the analysis usually must be made quickly and, for the most part, at lower echelon units, since it is highly improbable that intelligence transmitted from higher echelons will be sufficiently timely to provide adequate themes. Tactical interrogation of prisoners of war will give important information on the enemy's order of battle and his forthcoming battle plans, which if processed on the spot will be of great usefulness to the loudspeaker unit. The same can be said of interviews with civilian line crossers, and of enemy documents hastily and even crudely translated in front-line areas. Loudspeaker personnel operating with lower echelons must, therefore, above all maintain intimate contacts with intelligence officers and interrogation and documents translation detachments, so they may lay hands on useful material in time to make maximum use of it.

The text of each loudspeaker broadcast should be tailored to a specific audience and a definite battle situation. Usually, though not invariably, the effective texts are those that have been prepared in advance, and carefully checked against the latest available intelligence. (The exceptions occur when the loudspeaker unit itself witnesses a new development, and improvises a message on the spot in order to exploit it.)

The enemy unit should always be addressed by name or by reference to some other identifying characteristic. It should then be told, in concise and accurate language, about its tactical situation, preferably in such fashion as to weave in any hot intelligence that can be used without compromising current and/or future intelligence collection operations. For nothing is so disheartening to a front-line soldier as to find that accurate, hard-to-get information as to battle plans, units involved, and so on, has fallen into enemy hands.

In World War II, German soldiers regularly addressed US units by name when propagandizing them by loudspeaker. Sometimes, indeed, it was clear that American battle plans had fallen into enemy hands prior to the jump-off hour. On such occasions the morale of American troops suffered a very severe blow, at the very moment when it should have been at its highest pitch.

If it is to use non-verbal broadcasts of the type mentioned above (for example, where mere sounds are transmitted for their psychological effect), the psywar unit will need recording devices, expendable speaker horns, plenty of cable wire, and a crew of sound effects men and laboratory technicians.

CONTENT AND ANNOUNCING

Policy directives and guidances are less inhibiting to loudspeaker operations than to operations via other media. This is true for several reasons:

Loudspeaker broadcasts in combat situations, which is where loudspeakers are most advantageously used by the military, cannot profitably deal with problems associated with policy matters or with long-range strategic considerations. Loudspeaker announcers should refrain from presenting their information or appeals in the form of carefully reasoned arguments. In most combat situations time is simply too short for appeals to the rational judgment or logic or the target individual. The material used should be presented in a simple, matter of fact way that stresses the inevitability of the course of action being recommended.

Where loudspeaker equipment is used in consolidation and quasi-peacetime propaganda activities, many of these same considerations are applicable, especially if broadcasts are to be made from a moving vehicle or craft. Broadcasts with stationary equipment should, in general, follow the rules and principles set forth in the foregoing chapter on radio.

If the mission is the dissemination of a verbal message to, say, an enemy military unit, one indispensable requirement is an announcer who speaks the language of the target audience and knows and understands both the local tactical situation and the audience's point of view.

In the event that a psychological warfare officer finds himself obliged to recruit his own assistants for a loudspeaker operation, what are the qualities or attributes that he should insist upon in those to whom he is to entrust the responsibility of broadcasting to enemy target audiences in combat areas?

Several qualities are generally recognized as well-nigh indispensable for a good announcer:

1. He should possess a good command of the language of the target group.
2. He must be able to speak vigorously without displaying hatred of the target, and without bringing some hatred stereotype to the surface in the mind of the typical target individual.
3. He must have an intimate and detailed knowledge of the customs, folklore, and manner of speech of the target group, and thus be able to adapt his script and presentation in such a fashion as to conform to their idiosyncrasies and concepts. (In most cases, this will be a matter of his having spent many years in the target country.) Prisoners of war whose sympathies are clearly with the operator can be used in lieu of such a man within the psywar organization. Having come only recently from the enemy's camp, they know some things better than anyone within the operation possibly could: current slang, topics of current discussion, and all of the expressed and unexpressed grievances the ordinary enemy soldier feels against his leaders and against the army itself. Where security prevents the use of prisoners of war in live broadcasts, they can be exploited via recordings.
4. He should have a flexible, alert mind. It is seldom possible to forecast accurately how a particular target group will respond to a given loudspeaker message or theme, or whether the results achieved by a particular technique will compensate for the effort expended. Hence the need for a nimble-witted announcer, who can alter his script to meet unanticipated developments. Hence, also, the need for continuous, careful observation of the target audience and its reaction to various themes and techniques. During the early stages of the conflict, indeed, all operations should be thought of as essentially experimental. . . i.e., as a means of learning what appeal and techniques to use later on.
5. He should possess a clear, commanding voice, preferably one with a high pitch, and with enough flexibility to convey various types of emotional appeal.
6. He should have a perceptive grasp of the ever-changing military situation, especially as regards its implications for the enemy; otherwise he will not be able to make the most of the intelligence and order of battle information relayed to him by the S-2's, or to vary his approach as the situation develops.
7. He should have social gifts that will enable him to negotiate with military officers of varying ranks with ease and confidence.

8. Preferably, though by no means necessarily, he should be a man with real combat experience on the hardware side, and able to take care of his unit's needs in the field and able to command the respect of the combat troops, since it is with them that he will do his work. The greater the trust and understanding between front-line soldiers and the announcer, the greater the likelihood that maximally effective results will be achieved.

The above qualities are listed, roughly speaking, in order of importance. It will, of course, seldom be possible to send an individual who possesses all of them, or even most of them. But it cannot be overemphasized that if no announcer is available with the required language skill, then the use of loudspeakers to transmit propaganda messages must be severely curtailed. The man who has the required language skill can shore up his deficiencies by drawing help from others. Loudspeaker messages, for example, should have the brevity, crispness, and slogan-like quality of leaflet messages, so that leaflet writing personnel can be of great assistance in preparing scripts. The man who does not know the language that is to be spoken over the loudspeaker cannot get outside help so easily.

EVALUATION OF RESULTS

Evaluative devices are needed, for loudspeaker as for other psychological warfare media, both to make sure that the operation is paying its way and to enable continuous improvement in performance.

If the sole or even major objective of loudspeaker operations were that of inducing enemy soldiers to surrender, one could estimate their effectiveness by careful study of surrenders. However, as has been noted above, the mission of loudspeakers is restricted to no such narrow limits, and evaluation operations must, therefore, be conceived in broader terms than merely interviewing prisoners of war.

Periodic Checking of Equipment Operating Efficiency

Loudspeaker equipment, of whatever design and however mounted, is composed of many intricate and delicate parts. Given the rough treatment the equipment receives in the combat area, breakage is a constant hazard and, short of breakage, poor adjustment of the parts to one another, which makes for lowered efficiency even if it does not silence the equipment. Often, moreover, the

equipment operates at lower efficiency, without the announcer or those about him realizing that this is the case. Only through the frequent and thorough checkups of equipment can a loudspeaker unit make sure that it is doing a job rather than merely going through certain motions.

Pre-testing Equipment on Prisoners of War

It is not enough merely to determine that the equipment is capable of transmitting a message in the English language audibly and clearly over a given distance. The equipment should be tested on persons who, without being deaf, hear less well than others. It should be tested for the voice and enunciation of the announcers who are to use it. And it should be tested in the language for which it is to be used, preferably with prisoners of war as the listeners.

During World War II experiments undertaken in the Pacific area showed that there are great differences in the hearing capacity of individuals from different countries. A loudspeaker system installed in a jungle area was audible to a United States Marine at a distance of 500 yards, but could not be heard by Japanese troops over a distance greater than 300 yards. Thus tests conducted in English do not necessarily throw any light on the questions the loudspeaker team actually needs to have answered.

A useful device both for pretesting loudspeaker appeals and for uncovering needed intelligence, is that of the directed discussion among prisoners of war, carefully selected so that they will represent various levels of educational achievement and ability and various major segments of the target society. The discussion should be so handled as to direct (but not force) upon the prisoners of war topics that are of primary concern to the psychological warfare observer. It may be the latter's aim to discover, for example, the extent to which past psychological warfare operations have been hitting the area in which they are most likely to yield significant results, or new data concerning enemy practices, superstitions, and beliefs. Whatever his aim, experience has shown that where a genuine discussion situation can be created useful information can be got from the participants without their even realizing what is going on.

Observation of the Target Audience

To evaluate results in many instances, nothing more need be done than to carefully observe the target audience's reaction to a particular appeal or mission. If the members of the group addressed proceed to act in the desired way, and there is no ap-

parent reason for their doing so except as a result of the broadcasts they have been listening to, then there is good reason to conclude that the operation has been effective. Often it is not difficult to identify the effects of a given stimulus.

Interviews with selective samples of prisoners of war and depth interviews with individual prisoners remain, however, the major evaluation instruments available to a loudspeaker operation. In using the former, great care must be taken to see that a representative cross section of the target audience is included in the group interviewed where what is desired is information as to the general reaction to the operator's messages. Sometimes, however, what the operator wishes to know is how segments of the target reacted, for example, the officers, and for this purpose he will wish to interview all officer-prisoners of war who surrendered during a given period of time on a particular front. For maximally useful results psychological warfare personnel must themselves participate in the interrogations, rather than leaving them to non-psychological warfare interrogation personnel. Since, moreover, no one can think of all the relevant questions, or state them beforehand, there is much to be said for leaving the prisoners a great deal of latitude as to how they are to answer questions and as to what they are to talk about. Direct questions should, in general, be avoided.

A useful variant of the routine interrogation of prisoners of war is, as suggested above, the intensive depth interview, in which all manner of points can come up for discussion. Such interviews are especially useful for the light they throw on the prisoners' values, loyalties, and opinions.

At least this note of caution must be interjected. There is always the temptation to rely too heavily upon the words of the amiable and smiling prisoner who seems eager to cooperate. The temptation must be resisted, not because the amiable prisoner is necessarily insincere, but because he is unlikely to be representative of the enemy soldiers who continue to offer resistance in the field. For purposes of evaluation and the uncovering of vulnerabilities, the aggressively arrogant prisoner of war is probably the better guinea pig. He is more likely to be the prototype of the enemy soldier who has stood by his guns and is, for that reason, the man against whom future psychological warfare activity must be directed.

CHAPTER XVI

MOTION PICTURES

USE AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MEDIUM

Without attempting a definitive analysis of motion pictures as a communication medium, this section will indicate some of the characteristics of motion pictures that have an important bearing on their usefulness in psychological warfare. The effectiveness with which the Nazis pictured the devastating power of the Wehrmacht during the early months of World War II is well known. Pictures of Hitler's armies overrunning Poland brought home to millions of people the seriousness of his past assertions about the destiny of the German people. Among the American people and our allies, similarly, the "Why We Fight Series" provided a picture of the enemy that solidified the free world's will to resist and mobilized the strength of the Allied Powers around common aims and purposes. In Latin America, the "Good Neighbor Policy" was implemented by a film program reflecting a sympathetic understanding of the region's problems and evidencing a willingness on the part of the US to help. The effectiveness of these and other film programs offers ample testimony that motion pictures can make a major contribution wherever the need to win or retain the cooperation, confidence, or sympathy of other peoples is involved.

There are four aspects of film communication that it is useful to distinguish for psychological warfare purposes. The first of these, naturally, is film content. The value of a film program is, however, all too frequently measured exclusively in terms of what is pictured and said in it. Such an appraisal, important as it is, is all too narrow. It tends to ignore a second aspect—that is, the presence of the film program as such, and all that it implies about the interest that one people have in another. The very fact that the United States Government was, until recently, exhibiting films in, for example, Poland, may well have affected people more profoundly than anything they saw, or might have seen, in the films

themselves. A third aspect is identification of interest, which is the term used to describe the state of affairs when local groups and organizations join forces with the operator and arrange and put on film showings. Finally, there is supplementation and follow-up, by which, again, individuals are often more deeply influenced than by film content.

This fourth aspect is illustrated by what happened in a village in Germany, whose citizens had shown deference to the prestige and authority of the local burgomaster as far back as anyone could remember. Film showings were held regularly in the village in question, and members of the audience were encouraged to discuss the topics treated and explore the questions raised by the film. As the audience became more and more familiar with this procedure, discussions were continued at increasingly greater length in the local beer hall long after the formal meeting had ended. One evening the discussion finally turned to an urgent local problem, namely the fact that wild pigs were destroying crops in the neighborhood, and that local regulations prohibited the citizens from owning the firearms with which they might rid themselves of such pests. The suggestion was finally made that talk was not enough, with the result that they went in a body to the burgomaster's house, got him out of bed, and presented their demands. The regulation was relaxed, the firearms made available, and a group of German citizens found that they had had their first recent experience of genuine self-government.

Brazilian school children writing short essays on some films they had just seen about the United States headed their papers with a picture of the crossed flags of the two countries, thus giving symbolic expression to the broad implications of their experience in viewing the films. The fact that films are frequently motivators, stimulants to action, whether it be reading a book, building a latrine, or joining a delegation to petition a burgomaster, in turn multiplies the initial impact of the film.

While the second, third, and fourth of the aspects do not constitute direct communication via the motion picture medium, they are important byproducts of film operations, and their potentialities in connection with psychological warfare activities are tremendous. (Often they create opportunities that other media can exploit.)

Watching a motion picture is probably the closest approximation to actual experience that man has yet achieved. Many of the things that could be said about the impact of actual experience on the attitudes and behavior of individuals also apply to films. In viewing a film, in other words, the audience experiences vicariously the

things it depicts. If the film is well made, the individual viewer, psychologically speaking, is no longer sitting in a chair or on the ground before a silver screen, but is living momentarily in the world of the picture.

Such vicarious experience, of course, does not have the same impact upon the individual as does daily life. Hunger is not assuaged or clothing put on the backs of people by showing them a film. Nor do people learn what it is to be hungry and inadequately clothed by seeing motion pictures of the starved and the half-naked. But they may well come away from the pictures with a new understanding, that could hardly have come to them in any other way, of famine and exposure, which is the first important characteristic of films that the psywar operator must take into account: they are capable of bringing experience, situations, events, and things into meaningful relationships regardless of time and place.

The Berlin Airlift and the events that made it necessary can today be made visibly real to people from Indo-China to Iceland to the Magellan Straits. The American Revolution, recreated on Hollywood stages, can be brought to the corner movie. The seven years of the doctor's professional training can be pulled together and communicated in a brief 30 minutes. United Nations troops on the battlefields of Korea are brought to life on thousands of screens around the world. While the Security Council discusses plans to resist Communist aggression, the camera rests on the empty chair of the Soviet delegate, mutely testifying to that nation's attitude toward the issue under consideration. The Communists try to make the world believe that the United States alone is fighting the North Koreans and their Chinese allies. But a motion picture flashes back to the United Nations, counts the votes, shows the mobilization of troops and materiel in Canada, England, Greece, Turkey, Thailand, and the Philippines, and moves into the combat area, where these forces are combined under the UN battle flag. Thus people all over the world are presented with the most compelling evidence possible that the Communists have pitted themselves against the will of the vast majority of nations, each of which has subscribed to the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

In addition to condensing experience—pulling together significant aspects of events widely separated by time and place—motion pictures can magnify and elaborate upon otherwise imperceptible components of an event or situation. An individual may have made some great discovery or committed an act of violence. The act itself may have involved only a fraction of a minute. But the mo-

tion picture spends an hour or longer delving into the many facets of the person's past experience that combined to make that moment possible.

Motion pictures are potent molders of behavior patterns. Everyone is familiar with fads that have been picked up and communicated to vast numbers of people at the movies: a new coiffure, a new dance step, a new kind of game, a different style in clothing, a new phrase or expression for conversational use, and so on. What a soldier should do if he is made a prisoner of war and how civilians should behave in case of an enemy attack or occupation have been pictured with equal effectiveness.

Films can be used both to stimulate and to remove fears and tensions. During World War II, the civilian inhabitants of a Japanese occupied Pacific island had been told that the Americans would rape and plunder if they succeeded in taking the island. When American forces did move in, they photographed the first civilians they captured, catching the expressions on their faces as they were being fed, sheltered, and cared for. The film was then shown to all the other civilians as they came through the lines. As a result the native people were brought into control with a mere fraction of the troops that the situation would have otherwise required.

Similarly with the insidious fears of people in Western states, in whom uncertainties arise, growing out of rumors, as to the purposes and policies of other nations, and the inability to get convincing evidence of the true state of international affairs. Skillfully prepared and skillfully distributed motion pictures can alleviate them—or accentuate them. The individual citizen who has not experienced tangible benefits from the current economic aid program might well be receptive to the notion that the nation is launched on a program of economic imperialism, and may react with skepticism when he hears it all explained in terms of high-minded purposes and altruistic motives. But show him a motion picture that brings home to him the benefits that people like himself are receiving from the aid program, and how he too will ultimately benefit, and his doubts will begin to subside.

On the other hand, motion pictures are sometimes used, for good or for ill, to awaken fears where they do not exist, rather than to allay them where they do. Hostile intentions may be hidden by gestures of warm friendship and the promise of relief from sickness and hunger. Such deceptions can be vividly portrayed in films: they are the age-old confidence game practiced on a mass scale. Films can show people what will happen to their most esteemed institutions and what life will be like under enemy domination—what will happen to family, the church, education, personal freedom, and national independence.

Soviet and satellite films are today attempting to create fear of the US through cinematographic distortion of the American character and the American way of life. Americans are portrayed in Soviet films as men and women who will do anything for a dollar, and are completely irresponsible in their personal actions and social relationships.

If the task is that of creating reciprocal understanding between peoples, again films can make a major contribution. The fact that we are exhibiting a ten-minute film on immunization in India demonstrates to the Indians that Americans understand something of the urgent problems of health in that country and are willing to help in solving them. In the story of the Tennessee Valley Authority they see Americans struggling to resolve social and economic problems by no means unlike their own.

REQUIREMENTS OF THE FILM OPERATION

Effective employment of motion pictures by psychological warfare involves three things: analyzing the psychological warfare mission, estimating the capabilities of films in relation to that mission, and gaining access to the target audiences.

For estimating film capabilities in a given case several considerations are of the first importance:

1. Is physical access to the audience possible?
2. Can the medium effectively communicate the kind of content the mission requires?
3. Are technical facilities available for doing the job?
4. Are appropriate films available?
5. What is the timing? Is it to be a long- or short-range project?
6. How large is the target, and with what frequency should films be introduced into it?
7. Are motion pictures the only medium that can be employed effectively because there are barriers to the other media (illiteracy, lack of radio receivers among the audience, etc.)?

Physical Access to the Audience

The factors involved in physical access to an audience become apparent when one examines the conditions necessary for a successful film showing. There must be a place that will accommodate the audience at the time when it can be present. The place must be

"darkenable." Films, projector, screen, other accessories, not to speak of a person capable of taking charge of the showing and operating the projector, all these must be on hand. A source of the electric power the equipment requires must have been tapped. There should be reasonable assurance that the showing can proceed unmolested by any local elements that might object. These conditions are the principal reason why the use of motion pictures with audiences under the domination or control of hostile forces is severely restricted.

Since the characteristics of the medium itself impose these limitations, target analysis must indicate, among other things, the amount of back-stopping needed to conduct the kind of film program the psychological warfare mission requires. It should include data on the number and location of 16-mm projectors, on how many are for sound and how many for silent films, on who controls their use, on the kinds of groups that use them, on the source of the films currently being shown, and so forth. Similar information on commercial motion picture theaters should be obtained, with all available facts about their schedules and the distribution channels through which they get their films, and as to whether they employ 16-mm or 35-mm equipment. This information, in addition to helping the operator establish his own film program, can be useful when it comes to disrupting the supply of enemy films (if it should ever prove desirable to take such action).

Another important aspect of physical access to audiences is transportation. To get both efficient and effective use of films and projection equipment, they have to be moved about a great deal, now by airplane, now by helicopter, now by boat or truck, now by a wagon drawn by a mule. In backward and underdeveloped areas this is a major problem, particularly when the target includes large areas, where it is necessary for the operator to bring practically all the elements of the program with him. Films, projector, projectionist, and generator must all be moved at brief intervals.

Mobile motion picture units are the most significant recent development for meeting the foregoing problem. They are usually mounted on one-ton trucks, with accessory equipment and bodies designed especially for the areas in which they are to operate, and thus as self-sufficient as the local situation requires. Some have a built-in generator, driven via a power take-off arrangement by the vehicle's own engine, and are set up to show films under almost any conditions.

Once an operation has acquired such a unit, the problem becomes that of learning to know the roads, the condition they are in at various times of the year, the audiences that can be reached via them.

Target Analysis

Besides these physical and technical problems that must be solved in order to reach targets with films, there are problems of "cultural distance" and social variation that the operator must keep constantly in mind. If films are to accomplish their psywar purpose, they must, in most cases, be designed for the specific target at which they are directed. They must, that is to say, use visual symbols, language, music, and sound effects that are meaningful to the audience.

Target analysis must, then, in addition to suggesting the type of film content needed to accomplish the psychological warfare mission, indicate the terms in which the content must be communicated if it is to be understood and assimilated. With what kinds of people and situations will the audience readily identify? What kinds of behavior do they consider taboo? Do they have language peculiarities that must be taken into account? Is Western music unfamiliar to them? Will they find it distracting or irritating? What is their level of sophistication about motion picture technique? Can they follow a flash-back? Will rapid changes in camera angles on the same subject confuse them? Will they understand current techniques for showing lapse of time? Will they be thrown off by fast cutting and rapid pacing? These and many other problems must be faced at the time films are produced, and can be solved only if the target analysis has been carried out in the context of a thorough understanding of production requirements.

Finally, there is the problem of assuring effective utilization of the films within the target area. A motion picture program is most likely to succeed if it is conducted through and with the assistance of existing natural groups and formal organizations: youth groups, labor unions, civic organizations, churches, schools, professional societies, recreational clubs, or occupational groups —or, on another level, villages and local communities.

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Film production and distribution must, evidently, be planned in accordance with broad psychological warfare strategy. The

types of films to be used, where they are to be used, the number of each required, and the channels through which they are to be exhibited—all these should be decided in advance of the operation.

Types of Films Used

Five broad types of films are generally useful for psychological warfare purposes: (1) documentary-informational films, (2) newsreels, (3) animated cartoons, (4) instructional films, and (5) entertainment features. Any film of any of these five types is the result of a process that includes planning and writing, photographing, editing, writing and recording language versions, laboratory processing, and shipping. Each of these functions requires a skilled staff, most of them also call for elaborate technical material and equipment. (Basic to the entire operation, for example, is an adequate supply of raw film which can be made available when and where needed.) And all must be coordinated if the right film is to be available at the right place and the right time.

A newsreel can be produced in a very brief time. The event can be photographed on one day and be on the screen the next. Moving through theatrical channels abroad, it can reach upwards of one hundred million persons in a week. But these statements apply only to the newsreel about an event or situation that has news value in its own right, so that it can be pictured as it occurred and with a minimum of editing.

The newsreel is largely a tactical weapon. Documentaries, features, cartoons, etc., are by contrast better adapted to strategic purposes. They may take from six months to a year to make, and may cost thousands of dollars, and for this if for no other reason must be conceived and produced to serve the psychological warfare program's long-term purposes (which change less rapidly than the short-term ones). They hammer away, for example, at the true character of the enemy, which remains much the same however the war is going. They project the aims and purposes of the sender, and build up confidence in his moral integrity.

The production of films to reach as many as 40 or 50 different language groups in as many (or more) countries is, as will be clear from the above, a huge task. If the films to be made are of such character that many must be photographed in the field, and if the bulk of the recording studios, film laboratories, and so forth are in the zone of the interior, then the task is all the more formidable. But that is an accurate description of the task this nation faces today in the production of propaganda films.

One relevant consideration here, of course, is that of the character and accessibility of production facilities in foreign areas. Extreme caution, however, must be exercised in using foreign commercial facilities. A picture photographed at great expense and effort can be easily destroyed at the laboratory stage by a single error in the use of chemicals.

The major part of any psychological warfare film program is likely to be overt. But opportunities for effective covert operations do occur. For example, films and exhibition equipment can be supplied to indigenous groups and attributed to some local source, or a friendly local firm or group may be subsidized to produce and distribute films in its own name. The tightest kind of security is needed, however, for this type of operation, particularly if the resulting films imply any strong criticism of a government with which the sender seeks to maintain diplomatic relations. A leak might cause serious trouble, and destroy confidence in the sender's overt activities.

Filmstrips

Filmstrips are an adaptation of the old lantern slide. The filmstrip, in its present form,is 15 to 40 photographs printed on 35-mm film and arranged in such fashion as to fit into a connected story. The pictures are projected on a screen before the audience, and the story is told by word of mouth. One great advantage of this medium is that the strip can be stopped or rolled back to any picture, either during the original presentation or during a subsequent question-answer period, and the audience encouraged to discuss it. Another is that it can be used with a kerosene projector, which makes it extremely useful in rural areas that are without electricity. Its major use up to now has been in schools, but civic groups and other organizations have also shown an interest in it. USIS libraries sometimes offer filmstrip showings for the general public.

A "gimmick" use of filmstrips was being undertaken experimentally in 1951. A cardboard box, small enough to hold in one hand, was fitted with a plastic lens magnifying about three or four diameters. The back of the box, opposite the lens, was left open, so that a filmstrip could be passed across the open space and viewed through the lens. Psychological warfare strips of 10 to 15 frames each were to be printed and made available for use with these "throwaway viewers." (Both viewers and strips were to be shipped overseas as a giveaway item for psychological warfare operators.)

Knowing the Target Audience

Numerous social factors help determine what groups can or cannot be reached. Distribution of income within the target may, for example, be an important factor in determining who do and who do not attend motion picture performances. Religious beliefs may, as they do among certain Moslems, preclude whole segments of a target from attending any movies whatsoever.

Because of these and other factors, the successful psychological warfare operator using films needs to know the social structure with which he is dealing as well as its dynamics. For example, industrial labor may be a primary target. If so, the operator needs a list of all the various organizations and channels through which industrial workers can be reached. He then needs to identify and contact the key people in these organizations: labor union officials, factory managers, church leaders, or officers of recreational clubs. And he must establish contacts with commercial theaters serving working class neighborhoods.

In addition, he must become familiar with the purposes and outlook of the groups he has identified, and must determine which segments of the target exercise the greatest power and influence—so as to concentrate his efforts on those who hold out the greatest promise of significant results. Enemy propaganda may be (and often is) directed at gaining control of the transport workers' union, which is in a key position to paralyze the nation's economy. Or, in the absence of enemy efforts, it may be determined that this union is of such strategic importance that everything possible must be done to insure its cooperation and support of the sender's policies and programs.

The above considerations are all the more important because with this medium above all others there is no problem in finding an audience. People love movies, and will quickly exhaust the energies and resources of any film operation if the door is flung open to all comers. The big problem is to find, and focus effort upon, groups in which showings will produce significant results.

Systematic and purposeful programming of films, therefore, calls for prior information about the continuity of group membership. If the operator can be sure of reaching the same individuals over a period of several months, then he can plan his programs with an eye to their cumulative effect: what is presented early in the series can be counted on to serve as background for what is presented later. If, on the other hand, the groups he is using have a high membership turnover, or if the group members' attendance at his programs is irregular, this fact must be taken into account,

and each showing must be so planned as to be meaningful without reference to what has been or will be shown.

The choice of the films to be shown at any single program should be based on a knowledge of the particular audience's characteristics—its educational level, its experience, and its most urgent needs. For example, a tropical audience will never have seen snow, so that a film that includes pictures of children coasting on their sleds may well be lost on it. The snow may be seen as sugar, salt, or flour, and if so will evoke whatever feelings they happen to have about those things. In short: only intimate knowledge of the audience combined with intimate knowledge of the films can insure that the audience will understand what it sees.

Political Barriers

Barriers to the free and unhampered use of films are not all geographical, technical, social, or cultural. Many—sometimes the most restricting of all—are political. In a number of countries film censorship is required by law. In others official permission may have to be obtained before a showing can be offered. The freedom of movement of mobile units may be restricted. Supplies and equipment coming through customs may suffer unexplained delays. Groups hostile to the psychological warfare operation may attempt to sabotage its equipment or disrupt its showings. Inadequate law enforcement may result in thievery or vandalism that has no political motivation whatever.

The proximity of a friendly neutral country to enemy territory may cause that country to deny the sender certain privileges on the grounds that they would precipitate trouble or be reason for the enemy's demanding similar privileges. At least one friendly country that has a common border with the Soviet Union has refused, on precisely these grounds, to permit the United States to operate its mobile units within its territory. It did, however, accede to a compromise, the result of which was that the units were operated under its own auspices.

Commercial theater owners will generally refuse to exhibit films that might result in mass picketing of their establishments or vandalism on their property. The idea of a stench bomb in the theater, of a bolt thrown through a screen, of upholstered chairs neatly slit with razor blades, will loom large in the mind of any theater owner who has any reason to expect such things to happen.

However desirable a hard-hitting, frontal attack on the enemy might be, the film operation has to be conducted within the framework of these limitations. The film that no one will risk showing

or that can be used with only a small and insignificant audience, had just as well never been made.

The foregoing is by no means a complete statement of the many items of information that will help the operator gain effective access to target audiences with motion pictures. However, it suggests the major areas from which accurate information and intelligence are needed.

SELECTION OF FILMS FOR A GIVEN AUDIENCE

The business of making films to accomplish specific purposes is far from being a precise science. This is particularly true when the target is a foreign audience.

Whatever meaning is derived from a film is, first of all, a product of the interaction that occurs between the audience and what it sees on the screen. What is shown on the screen, who is in the audience, and what the situation is when the showing takes place—these are some of the variables which can never be more than partially controlled. No single aspect of this composite, moreover, can be isolated and analyzed without reference to the total context in which it occurs. Thus, the proper voice for narrating one film might be wholly inappropriate for another, even if both are to be shown to one and the same audience. Each film must have its own internal consistency, and give an impression of wholeness—with visual content, action, voice, sound effects, and music all in keeping with, and seeming to belong to, one another. Similarly, it must strike a sympathetic chord in the audience, which means that it must somehow fit into the total situation in which the audience finds itself. The "Why We Fight Series" produced during World War II could not have the same meaning for people today, or the same impact on them, as during the war years, because their situation has changed in relevant respects. But Valley of the Tennessee, made about the same time, relates to one of the most persistent and pervasive problems of mankind, and will continue to be effective for a long while.

On one of its many sides, the art of the motion picture consists of manipulating visual symbols, one of whose characteristics is that their meaning for any individual is determined by his culture. A shot of children playing in a school yard, with a school visible in the background may, for example, have different meanings for different audiences. Let it be American school children, and let the picture be shown to American adults, and what it will probably

call to mind is their own youth, which they associate with the symbol "school." But show the same scene to youngsters now in school, and what you will get is a more specific reaction, reflecting their feelings about school life as they are living it. Show it to an audience of illiterate peasants in Iran, and it may well call up feelings of resentment against all of the forces and elements in their environment that prevented them from learning to read and write when they were themselves youngsters. And show it in a place where schools are unknown or where children do not romp and play in school yards, where, in short, the scene can be associated with nothing in the audience's experience, and the scene may evoke nothing but bewilderment.

Film-makers must, therefore, strive to employ only visual symbols that have a common meaning for sender and receiver, or at least symbols whose meaning to the receiver is known and understood beforehand. An unoccupied office with a mahogany desk, upholstered furniture, paintings on the walls, drapes on the windows, and a carpet on the floor tells the average American and probably the average European, something about the character and status of the person who will later take his place at the desk. We can predict, therefore, what will happen, in an audience made of average Americans and Europeans, if in the next scene a charwoman walks in and seats herself at the desk. Everybody will be amused. But an audience for whom such an office is not a symbol of prestige will not be amused at all. Even very different cultures, nevertheless, will be found to have some symbols in common, along with their different symbols for the same meanings and their different meanings for the same symbols.

These differences between audiences are even sharper when it comes to verbal symbols. We know of one culture whose language distinguishes some sixty different varieties of bamboo, but has no counterpart for our word "tree." The Eskimos, similarly, have no generalized term for "snow" but distinguish between various situations in which snow poses greater or lesser difficulties for travel. Telling an Eskimo why Americans like snow on the ground at Christmas time cannot, therefore, be easy, and this is typical of the kind of problem that the operator producing psywar movies must face.

There are also such problems as those of continuity and treatment. How many ideas can be introduced in one scene without losing the audience? What should the over-all length of the picture be? What kind of dramatic situation is required to hold audience interest? What sort of verbalization will enhance the

film's impact? Will numerous changes in camera angle be confusing? How can transitions from one scene to another be accomplished without losing the audience? No psychological warfare program can ignore the fact that for years to come the strategic areas of the world will comprise millions of people who have yet to see their first motion picture and to whom the films that communicate readily to Americans and Europeans would be actually incomprehensible.

For it must meet the requirements of the naive and inexperienced audiences as well as those of the sophisticated and experienced audiences in countries like England, France, Italy, and Sweden. The same pictures, even if prepared in all the languages concerned, cannot always be made to suffice for both types of audience. In general, American motion picture producers are better equipped to meet the needs of the experienced than of the inexperienced audience.

With audiences of the type just described as naive and inexperienced, the producer must in effect go back to the basic concepts of the silent film: he must, first and foremost, make a film that can be understood without benefit of sound or voice. He must study the indigenous dramatic forms of the audiences to which he must communicate, steep himself in their literature and art, and gear his productions to their concepts and symbols. He must turn his back on the technically superb sound stages of his own country, carry what equipment he can move into jungle villages and desert towns, and take as his subjects the filth, sickness, and hunger on which, in the opinion of many observers, enemy propaganda feeds. By making its films in the audience's own surroundings the psychological warfare operation can minimize the likelihood of intended meanings being misunderstood (that is, of failures of communication). This, however, is only a partial answer to the problem, for what the sender is always trying to do, ultimately, is interpret himself to the receiver, and taking his equipment closer to the receiver merely removes some of the difficulties standing in his way. Beyond this point, he can rely only on ingenuity, imaginativeness, and, above all, empathy.

EVALUATION

In attempting to determine the effectiveness of a film operation one must seek to answer three broad questions: Did the audience

understand the film? How did they react to it? What was the impact of the program as a whole on the target?

The first two questions can be answered in part by observing audience behavior during showings. Was there evidence of distraction or confusion, or was the audience generally quiet and attentive throughout the showing? What sort of whispered remarks were overheard? What kinds of questions were asked after the showing? What were the people talking about as they left? Interviews can be conducted with a view to finding out what parts of the picture most impressed typical members of the audience. How clearly did the viewer identify the time and place of the events pictured? What were the latter associated with in his own experience? Special effort should be made to identify the effective components of his response, as well as those of a more reasoned and intellectual character.

The information gleaned from representative samples and carefully selected panels of viewers of individual films will prove useful for production guidance as well as for further program planning in the area.

The third of the above questions is the most difficult to answer. Given a target in or on which several different media are being used, it is rarely possible to determine the contribution made by any particular medium to any observable change in opinion or behavior. If people are seen boiling their drinking water after a film showing the dangers of polluted water, one can, to be sure, safely infer that the film was effective. But if an intensive program involving all media has been carried out prior to an election, the election results will seldom throw light on the relative importance of the several media. Public opinion polling may dig up some useful clues as to why people voted as they did, but the results will never be conclusive.

CHAPTER XVII

GIMMICKS AND RELATED DEVICES

GIMMICKS

There are several media that do not fit into any of the categories discussed in the foregoing chapters. These gimmicks, dozens of which have been used in psychological warfare in the past, will no doubt play an important role in future psywar operations as well. For example, in World War II large quantities of little soap cakes and needles were distributed among friendly occupied populations from aircraft. Each item was wrapped in paper bearing a propaganda message. As time passes, new items will presumably be added to those used in the past, which include matches, soap, playing cards, toy cardboard airplanes, cardboard dial phones, cigarettes, and candy. One current gimmick proposal calls for tiny crystal radios, tuned to one of the sender's stations, and capable of greatly increasing radio audiences in backward or enemy-controlled areas.

The limits on the use of gimmicks is usually set by the mission of the propaganda action, operation, or campaign. The reasons for this are clear: (a) gimmicks are expensive—so expensive that they should be employed only if there are strong reasons for believing that the item that carries the message will greatly forward the psychological warfare mission in hand. Gimmick production should, therefore, have a low priority in relation to all other psychological warfare media production; (b) gimmick production requires scarce resources, careful planning, and valuable personnel, all of which, other things being equal, can make a greater contribution if devoted to some higher priority activity; and (c) many gimmicks are out of tone vis-a-vis the psychological warfare operation as a whole.

Certainly no summons to serious thinking, no urgent warning, no demand for extreme sacrifices, should be conveyed to the target wrapped up in a trivial or frivolous gift. Partisans yearning

for guns that they cannot have will be more likely to welcome plain words on plain pieces of paper than messages wrapped around a toy or a piece of candy.

The operator should have the last word on whether the gimmick suits the politics, culture, and social conditions of the target; that is, he should decide whether the item is appropriate to the message on the one hand and the environment of the target on the other. There are opportunities here for great blunders. American wit and humor may connect the item in an amusing fashion with the message (for example, toilet paper imprinted with the face of an enemy elite leader and a message asking the target not to support its government); but the target individual may miss the point, and react unfavorably even if he shares the sender's view of the leader).

Gimmicks lend themselves poorly, moreover, to messages asking for action. The target's first impulse is likely to be to consume the item rather than assimilate the message. Furthermore, the useful item used as a gimmick will often be eagerly sought after by persons who are not likely ever to support the sender's mission. Printed matchbooks, for example, are more likely to find their way into the hands of those who want the matches than those of the persons who are hungry for the message.

TIE-IN GIFTS

Another device that belongs in the category of give-aways for the target audience we may call the tie-in gift—i.e., the desirable item that is offered to the target individual on condition that he respond to the sender in some way. He may be told by radio, press, or some other medium that a desired response—writing a letter, giving information, telling a story, or the like—will bring by return mail a reward of some kind. Whatever the size of the prize, the tie-in gimmick may solicit primarily intelligence or greater psychological acceptance and response of the message. It is a way of getting the target to help propagandize itself.

PACKAGE APPEAL

A third type of medium in the gimmick class is the package appeal, where substantial economic or military aid is wrapped up with or accompanied by the sender's propaganda. Guerillas, for example, may be provided with weapons, but told at the same time how they must use them in a way that will forward the sender's

cause and why that cause is so important. Or, for example, indigent target individuals may be given food wrapped in a printed argument or appeal on behalf of the sender's policies (ECA shipments). Or packages of cigarettes for prisoners of war may be covered with pictures and print favorable to the sender.

IDENTITY OF SENDER

Ordinarily, gimmicks are used in white propaganda directed at friendly or neutral populations, occupied or unoccupied. In some cases, scurrilous or slanderous material may be circulated with gimmicks without mentioning the sender (gray) or with some element or group within the target identified as the sender (black). Black gimmicks call for a message and item that are closely intertwined, for example, a cardboard puzzle which turns into a message exposing and degrading the enemy as it is solved. Valuable items are likely to defeat their purpose here, since the audience will see that no element of the target population would be able or inclined to incur such an expense for such a purpose. Gimmicks are likely to appeal particularly to the materially deprived groups in the population. The elite usually have adequate supplies of such items as soap and matches.

Another type of black gimmick is counterfeit money, the purpose of which is to debase the currency of the target government.

FOLK DEVICES

Besides the three stated classes of combined consumables and propaganda, we must mention also a miscellany of folk devices, which utilize indigenous media of communication other than radio, press, and film—for example, the so-called "grapevine," the wandering minstrel, or the phonograph record. In localities of low literacy and primitive technology, it is possible to identify the men and women whom others regard as dependable sources of news and opinion. These persons are, so to speak, the root of the grapevine, and if a psywar message can be got into their mouths its effectiveness will be assured. Similarly, ballad singers, like the Calypso singers, can often convey political messages to an audience of considerable size. And if the people of a given locality have no access to radios and newspapers, they can be counted on to listen avidly to any new phonograph records which may get into the hands of phonograph owners.

CHAPTER XVIII

AGENTS AND RUMOR-MONGERS

USE OF SPECIAL AGENTS IN PROPAGANDA

By "use of special agents" is meant the employment of individuals in specific secret propaganda missions—for example, to spread rumors, a topic which will be treated later in this chapter. Other cases would be secret expeditions in which psychological warfare is a prominent motive—for example, the capture of a prominent enemy leader with a view to striking fear in the hearts of the enemy or a secret diplomatic demarche whose purpose is to divide the enemy against itself. (The most famous example of an operation of the latter type is the treaty of peace signed by the German leaders in World War I with the Bolshevist faction of the Russian revolutionary movement; it secured the Germans' Eastern Front, and greatly strengthened the domestic hand of the Bolsheviks.) The whole post-World War I notion of "fifth columnists," who in addition to committing acts of sabotage and mongering rumors, spread subversive propaganda among soldiers and civilians, incite rebellion, propose surrender, and otherwise undermine the morale of the target population.

It will be noted that all of the foregoing types of special missions are of a "delicate" character. They are not to be entered upon without mature consideration—on a high echelon of command—of their possible consequences. Most of them, moreover, expose a greater or lesser number of individuals to great personal risks, so that identifying the right personnel is perhaps a greater problem than designing the action. It is questionable a priori whether any considerable part of a propaganda or coordinate organization should be devoted to such activities. Probably the function of the ordinary operators in connection with such missions should be suggestive (for example, proposing new missions) or auxiliary (lending equipment, and so forth). In short: such special missions should originate with a designated office, closely coordinated with the top

field command, and manned by personnel with highly diversified operational and staff skills.

While the risks and limitations of such actions should be kept constantly in mind, their potential value is so great that no psychological warfare organization should be without a branch or unit charged with responsibility for them. The rescue of Mussolini by a German commando group had consequences of a psychological character, that is, over and beyond its purpose of restoring Fascism to part of Italy, far exceeding the investment of forces required. The same thing can be said of the activities of the limited number of German agents seeking to destroy troop and civilian morale during the Battles of the Low Countries and France in 1940. All of these, it will be noted, are cases where considerable effort and risk were involved, but the anticipated results were spectacularly and enormously "profitable"—failing which they should not have been attempted. All of them, moreover, combined prospective psychological warfare gains with benefits of a military or economic character.

RUMOR-MONGERS

A rumor-monger is a person who passes a rumor on to someone else. A rumor is a chain of similar or parallel statements passed among a series of persons and purporting to be reasonably accurate though lacking what a reasonable man would regard as adequate evidence. The individual statement achieves the status of a rumor only when it is being passed along by a considerable number of persons (rumor-mongers). A rumor may be true or false or merely unprovable one way or the other in terms of existing knowledge (as contrasted with knowledge that will come to light later). Its essential characteristic is that within the field of perception of the rumor-monger, inadequate evidence is available with which to determine its truth or falsity. He transmits it in spite of the inadequacy of evidence, and may do so from several motives: (a) he may be a deliberate rumor-monger, acting as an agent in a rumor campaign; (b) his emotional investment in the contents of the rumor may be such that he derives satisfaction from transmitting it to others; or (c) he may have, as a great many people do have, a not very accurate or critical mind, and may be incapable of transmitting accurate reports. While having no emotional investment in the rumor's contents, he is an inaccurate reporter.

A typical rumor is compounded of the second and third motives. Deliberate rumor-mongering, in which a person knows that he is rumor-mongering, is probably infrequent.

For the psychological warfare operator, the second and third motives are sheer windfalls if the rumor be one in whose currency he is interested. (Through skillful rumor analysis he can, moreover, learn what is occurring on the rumor front, and take steps to counterattack any rumors whose currency he wishes to discourage.) Planned rumor-mongering, however, is psychological warfare's major weapon in this area, although too little is known about how rumors work for it to place much reliance on rumor-mongering campaigns. Only rarely have psychological warfare operators engaged successfully in such campaigns.

However that may be, the origins and careers of rumors are of great interest to the psychological warfare operator. He is, therefore, concerned with: the process of rumor-mongering; audience accessibility to rumors; monitoring rumors; countering rumor-mongering; and engaging in deliberate rumor-mongering.

The Process of Rumor-Mongering

A rumor, as has been stated above, is a much-relayed report backed up by inadequate evidence. The pattern of the rumor chain usually follows people who are in close communication with one another. The chain is, however, haphazard, that is unplanned, so that the rumor is likely to hit one and the same person more than once, and thus reinforce itself through increased interest and belief. For a rumor undoubtedly depends for its transmission in large part on the emotional investment of those who pass it on. This emotional investment is tied up with one or both of two major characteristics of a rumor: the event reported is important to the monger and the previous mongers; it is regarded by them as being indeterminate, that is, concealed from the public and confined to the private knowledge of a few, or as involving something unmentionable or highly explosive.

Little precise knowledge is available about the origins of rumor, although rumors have been started and their spreading observed under laboratory conditions. Usually, it seems, there is a shred of fact—or near fact—in a rumor at its inception. We do not know the origin of the rumor that Hitler is alive and in Argentina. But we do know (1) that Hitler's body was not found, at least that its discovery was not reported by the authorities, so that as a matter of fact he could be alive and in Argentina, and (2) Argentina is reported by the newspapers as maintaining foreign

and domestic policies of a kind we could expect in Hitler's place of refuge. Indeed, many rumors originate from a true and complete statement of an event.

The following occurs in creating a rumor:

1. The report is levelled: simplification sets in. The successive reports are briefer and briefer, and give fewer and fewer details of the event. The rumor thus becomes easier to communicate. The loss of detail is greatest at an early stage in the rumor-mongering chain. Later, the rumor crystallizes, and is repeated faithfully.

2. The report is sharpened: certain key elements in the report acquire far less prominence as the rest is levelled. Catchy or unusual phrases are far less likely than ordinary phrases to fall by the wayside, especially if they refer to the key element in the report. Sometimes sharpening takes the form of expanding the details of the key element of the story.

3. The report is assimilated to the mongers' unconscious motives: they hear and transmit that which, for whatever reason, pays them psychological dividends. Minor items in the report are rearranged so as not to conflict with the major theme. If some item in the report is not complete but would be more satisfying, from the standpoint of psychological dividends, it gets rounded out with details and is thus brought into closer conformity with the rumor's emergent central burden.

The rumor-creating process, then, usually serves the unconscious purposes of the rumor-monger. From the standpoint of the operator, it is necessary to understand what the unconscious purpose of each rumor is, or to put it another way, what function the rumor is performing for the emotional structure of those who pass it along. The same rumor may, of course, perform different and even conflicting functions for different individuals; it may "realize" their "worst fears"; it may satisfy an intense but shameful unconscious wish. The "Hitler in Argentina" rumor illustrates both functions. In view of this wish-fulfillment or fear-fulfillment function of rumors, accurate assessment of the audience is no less necessary here than in other psywar activities. Study of the audience invariably throws light on the character of a rumor. And one of the most important things to find out about the audience is where, how, and why it is accessible to rumors.

Audience Accessibility to Rumors

Tense and critical situations are great breeding grounds for rumors. For the target audience becomes increasingly accessible

to rumors as its faith in the reliability of its traditional sources of news and directives diminishes, as its news channels are disturbed, and as its physical and psychological deprivations increase.

The tendency to rumor-monger does not appear to vary with the educational or class background of the persons concerned. But the contents of rumors do appear to vary with background data. Lawyers and doctors are vulnerable to one type of rumor, laborers or members of an evangelistic sect to another. One type of person will believe and transmit a rumor involving an imminent miracle, while another will believe and transmit essentially the same rumor but will substitute for the miracle an imminent act by a great personage. An objective report on food conditions may split into two rumors, one circulated by civilians and the other by fighting men—the first stressing civilian deprivations and waste in the armed forces, the other alleging black market activities and shirking of burdens on the part of civilians. The group that appears to be least accessible to rumors is the political elite, those who control public affairs, but the same cannot be said of their subordinates, who monger rumors purporting to reveal the "inside dope" known by their superiors. Yet these same subordinates are less vulnerable than other people to rumors current among the general population about political affairs.

There is no convincing evidence that the people of one country are more susceptible to rumors than the people of another country, or that a primitive community is more vulnerable than one that is technologically advanced, or that the form of government under which people are living affects their vulnerability to rumors. For example, it is not known which, the Soviet or the English population, is basically the more attractive target for a rumor offensive. For the time being, then, the safest assumption for the operator to adopt is that peoples are equally disposed to rumor-mongering under the same conditions of stimulus, although the same stimulating conditions—deprivation of usual news sources, physical deprivation, and so on—will undoubtedly set up different rumors not only in different groups in the same population but also in different countries.

Monitoring Rumors

Rumors help determine people's actions and also help form their attitudes. They can, for example, strengthen or weaken civilian and military morale. They do not, however, judging from present evidence, themselves cause major political events: they do not destroy regimes or armies, although they can hasten the

destruction of a regime or army, and, similarly, can help one get back on its feet.

Systematic monitoring of rumors increases the psychological warfare operator's knowledge of his target. Rumors, besides affecting actions and attitudes, are likely to be symptomatic of underlying conflicts. The operator who knows the status of rumor-mongering in his target will not only be in a better position to help scotch any future rumor uncongenial to his objectives and/or to launch a rumor himself the day he needs one, but also will have a stronger hand for psywar demarches that have nothing to do with rumors.

Countering Rumor-Mongering

Let us assume that in the process of monitoring rumors within his target the operator determines that certain current rumors are actually or potentially dangerous to his general mission. And let us assume further that he is able to arrive at a probable judgment about the age, source, and motive of the rumor in question. He can then attempt to counter it in one or more of several ways, all of which, however, pose great difficulties:

First, he can seek ways and means of eliminating the motive or motives that are causing people to circulate the objectionable rumor. The chances are, however, that this will call for manipulating a basic element in the target's psychological structure, which he is not likely to have either the knowledge or the resources to do. A rumor, for example, that exaggerates the gravity of the failure of one of the operator's foreign policies or of one of his armies cannot be disposed of by merely disseminating proof that no such failure has in fact occurred. For this leaves untouched the wish on the part of the target that causes it to exaggerate any data pointing to a failure and make of them the content of a rumor.

Second, he can take steps calculated to bring sanctions down on the heads of rumor-mongers. This might mean "exposing" the "deliberate" character of the mongering and the motives underlying it, or it might mean ascribing the rumor to persons of ill repute among the target population, and reporting favorably any punishment meted out to persons found guilty of rumor-mongering. But this cuts both ways, since the operator may merely step up the pace of rumor-mongering by fixing attention on it, and even help give currency to the rumor he is trying to scotch. A better method, perhaps, is to go after the particular rumor itself, for example, by organizing a panel of experts (psychologists, etc.) and having it dissect the rumor on a radio panel or in a newspaper.

Third, he can try to distort the rumor by, for example, setting in motion a modified version that is less hurtful to his interests. For instance, if he monitors a rumor exaggerating the defeat of his foreign policy, the operator might convey the impression that there is "inside dope" according to which the defeat is only apparent, and according to which, further, there will be a big announcement with respect to it in, say, three weeks. The rumor may now shift in direction and tap some other motive on the part of the rumor-mongers, but continue to circulate in its modified and less noxious form.

Engaging in Deliberate Rumor-Mongering

Earlier in this section it was stated that deliberate rumor-mongering is a difficult and essentially unpredictable operation. Agents, for example, are not so plentiful that they can often be spared in quantity for rumor-mongering.

The best channels through which to launch a rumor are the black mass media, which can give currency to unsupported reports without jeopardizing the operator's reputation for accuracy and reliability, and, so to speak, the between-the-lines portions of the output of the white mass media, where innuendo and allusion and double-talk ("Stalin, whose rumored grave illness still awaits documentation," etc.) can often set a rumor in motion.

In general, the operator will be well advised to refrain from manufacturing rumors of his own, and merely seize upon and give wider currency to congenial rumors already circulating. This procedure is recommended because rumors originate and flourish as a result of a process somewhat like that of survival of the fittest in nature. The operator cannot hope to duplicate the efficacy of the natural process. A rumor that has started and survived up to now, in short, is more likely to roll and keep on surviving, than one that has not welled up out of the target.

We may notice, finally, that the key circulation points for rumors, their switchboards, so to speak, are the centers of face-to-face communications—workshops, barber shops, clubs, cafes, union halls, piazzas, promenades, trolley cars, and similar locations. Whatever the operation is that is to be performed—launching a rumor, distorting a rumor, monitoring a rumor—the operator should utilize these locations. And one of the things the operator most needs from psywar intelligence is information as to where the busiest switchboards are to be found.

CHAPTER XIX

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Political organizations are voluntary associations that seek to influence public policy by propaganda and agitation. They are media of psychological warfare insofar as they can be made to serve the purposes of a psywar mission. Often the political organizations that psywar uses are bona fide political parties, whose ultimate purpose is to govern the country. Some, again bona fide, are reform groups, nationality groups, revolutionary groups, or cultural associations with a political slant. Many, however, are brought into existence by the operator and his agents.

Political organizations as psywar media pose very different problems from those associated with the ordinary communications agencies such as radio stations, motion pictures, and the press, which are, as we have seen, of constant concern to all psychological warfare operations.

Political organizations, by contrast, become relevant in a psychological warfare operation only in special situations, and when they do are best regarded as lying off the main path of the operation's activities. Using them, for example, calls for special knowledge and special techniques on the part of the actual operator.

CHARACTER OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Six categories of organizations are of concern to this phase of psychological warfare.

First are the unofficial organizations composed of elements of the target audience which are located in the target area. Some examples would be the French Radical Socialist Party, the Italian Christian Democratic Party, or the British Labor Party.

Second are the unofficial organizations composed of elements of the target audience which are located both in the target area

and elsewhere. Examples are the Italian, French, Polish, and Yugoslav resistance movements during World War II.

The third group are the unofficial organizations composed of elements of the target population located outside the target area. Some examples are the refugee groups and movements (the Ukrainian and the Polish, for example) following World War II.

Fourth are the unofficial organizations composed of elements of the target audience and other elements located elsewhere. Examples of these organizations are International Rotary, International Red Cross, International Chamber of Commerce, hobby groups, and scientific and professional associations.

Fifth are the official organizations composed of elements of the target audience located in the target area. The official party of the one-party state belongs here, for example the Spanish Falangists and the Kuomintang.

The last category is the official organizations composed of elements of the target audience and other elements located elsewhere. Examples are the United Nations, the Soviet-controlled Cominform and its subsidiary organizations, the International Labor Organization, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Each of the six types of organization listed may be to any degree hostile or friendly toward the sender's general mission. Each, no matter how friendly, has its own reason for existence and its basic goals that are independent of those of the sender, and thus cannot be relied upon indefinitely for close support or constant hostility. The exceptions here are organizations created by the sender or in every way tied to the fortunes of the sender.

EMPLOYMENT OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Political organizations may be used as media of psychological warfare in seven general ways: as contributors of supplemental personnel skills; as providers of the supplemental physical media of psychological warfare; as sources of material helpful in the execution of missions; as sources of intelligence; as aids in occupying more strategic positions for one's media; as authenticating agencies and authoritative sponsors; and as agent operators of media denied the principal operator.

Contributors of Supplemental Personnel

The number of politically active and politically knowledgeable people in any society is small, perhaps no more than one person

in every sixty of the population. These politically active individuals will be found, as a matter of course, in those organizations that are constantly active, so that the outside operator is constantly beset by the problem of making do with inadequate personnel or working with men and women who neither fully share his goals nor are prepared to channel all their energies into them. Allied psychological warfare personnel in World War II for example, were in large part recruited from among members of resistance movements, allied or cobelligerent military elements, employees of regulated communications enterprises, and leaders and members of sympathetic political parties or factions. This state of affairs continued to the very end of the war, and a similar state of affairs has existed during the Korean War. The operator must, then, constantly take into account and prepare himself for the fact that the personnel at his disposal will be something less than devoted and something less than fully dependable.

As Providers of Supplemental Physical Media of Psychological Warfare

To a greater extent than their counterparts in the United States, political organizations abroad have their own propaganda media. In countries whose technology is primitive, for example, political movements must either develop their own media resources or do without them, there being no radio stations, newspapers, or other communication channels whose facilities they can buy or rent. In technologically advanced countries, political organizations of great importance in the political picture often hold views that are denied propagation via existing channels and consequently set up media networks of their own. Any political organization, moreover, whether party, civic group, or cultural group, has an inside-run in this matter, since it has by definition a special audience on whose interest and support it can more or less count if it launches media of its own. Thus the psywar operator abroad who persuades a political organization to work with him acquires access to media that would otherwise be denied him.

As Sources of Materiel

Since they are at home in the scene of operations, political organizations are often in a position to furnish materiel required by the operator: scarce paper stocks, replacement parts for machinery, ink supplies, and so on.

As Sources of Intelligence

Any political organization the operator associates with his operation is likely to be more familiar than he with local activities, especially local political activities. If the operator chooses, therefore, he can obtain useful data regarding the effectiveness of his propaganda from the leaders of these local activities, and can be advised about the probable reaction to slogans, appeals, etc., and intelligence on the "lay" of interests and opinions within the target.

As Aids Through Which the Operator Can Occupy More Strategic Positions with His Media

The operator is often able, via the intervention of friendly organizations, to obtain access to public and private communications facilities that would otherwise, for administrative or political reasons, be closed to him. At worst, this is likely to mean "most favored nation" treatment; at best, it may give the operator a more or less complete monopoly of the facilities relevant to his purposes.

The strategic position of the operator may also be improved by the mere fact that his interests as an outsider are bound up with the interests of an influential local political organization. For example, if he reaches a mutually beneficial arrangement with some political organization as regards the propagation of his messages, that organization will henceforth have a stake in defending the legitimacy and/or propriety of the operator's presence and activities. (This, of course, cuts both ways. If the organization becomes weak or unpopular, the operator's interests may suffer.)

As Guarantors of Authenticity and Authority

"Media are known by the company they keep." If the operator's messages are carried simultaneously by his own media and by highly prestiged media within the target country, they will be automatically authenticated and authorized in the minds of many members of the target audience. Transmission via a political organization, whatever the medium, is thus an important way of authenticating and authorizing a message, at least for the organization's own constituency.

As Agent Operators of Media Denied the Principal Operator

In some cases, the principal operator cannot undertake this or that type of propaganda because law, custom, or political expediency forbid, but can get it undertaken by a friendly local

organization. Examples would be the holding of mass meetings favorable to the operator, the distribution of leaflets, and the performance of research (conduct of interviews, submission of questionnaires, etc.). The principal operator may carry the whole burden aside from identifying himself as the source, in which case, of course, he is engaged in black propaganda; or he may merely encourage or at most guide the otherwise spontaneous action of the local organization.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN USE OF ORGANIZATIONS

A number of problems arise in connection with the use of political organizations in psychological warfare. Some of these have been noted in the preceding discussion. Others require special mention.

Directive Conflict

Since the purposes for which an organization exists and the mission of the operator rarely coincide, the use of such organizations for conveying propaganda messages is fraught with perils. The operator's directives may not be accepted wholeheartedly, and on some issues may not be accepted at all; in any case, acceptance is likely to be preceded by long negotiations, in the course of which the operator may have to give up a good deal that he is after. No political organization with domestic purposes can afford to devote a disproportionate amount of its energies to US propaganda, or even to popularizing American culture. Moreover, mere acceptance of directives by the organization is not enough, for once they are loosed to the mercies of the interpretation process they are likely to move further and further away from the essential purpose of the operator. The latter, accordingly, must constantly monitor the activities of the organizations he is working through, his best recourse here being to withhold benefits as gracefully as possible when commitments go unfulfilled (which calls, to begin with, for the giving of benefits periodically over the whole duration of the relationship, rather than paying 100 percent down).

Quid Pro Quo

The political organization that consciously helps to transmit the operator's message does so, in most cases, in the hope of payment or some kind of reward. political, economic, psychological,

or prestigious as the case may be, and real or illusory as the case may be. Selecting an appropriate quid pro quo is a problem that can never be solved once and for all, for it varies not only from organization to organization and from individual to individual, but within the same organization or with the same individual from time to time.

The weaknesses of some of the quid pro quos the operator can offer should not prevent their complete utilization. Even if he is able to grant material aid, which by and large is the strongest incentive he can hold out, it is a mistake for him to neglect the various weaker incentives (encouragement, respect, approval, promises about the remote future). It would have done Pavlov no good to feed his dog without ringing the bell, if what he wished was to establish a reaction to the bell. Similarly, the operator cannot train a political organization to cooperate with him by extending it gifts alone: with them must go messages and gestures of all kinds to illuminate their meaning. On the other hand, it is well to realize that men cannot live on promises or cheers and yet survive in the hard life of politics. The leaders of political organizations whom the operator wishes to propagandize or whom the operator wishes to engage as media for his propaganda are almost invariably necessitous. One seldom finds a "well-heeled" political organization anywhere except in one-party states, thus not in the states to which the operator is likely to be sent. Consequently, materiel in large quantities is usually the asking price of the support given the operator, who must accordingly give careful thought to building up his nonmaterial value to the organization, to the chances of taking the organization's price down, and to his own capabilities for providing material support. It may prove wise for him to give minor gifts—clothing, pay, transportation, passes, etc.—to the organization's leaders and members rather than to its headquarters, or to provide films, radio equipment, office supplies, paper, and many other necessities for propaganda rather than money, since they increase the organization's capacity to help him.

The complexity of the problem of quid pro quos, as these comments show, is such that only specialized personnel should be used for tasks in which it must be faced. The single-medium specialist cannot, as such, be expected to exercise the skill and judgment required in making the necessary decisions. Nor can intelligence specialists be entrusted with these tasks. For, while the intelligence staff often includes men of great general knowledge, knowledge and savoir faire are not the same thing.

Personal Relations with Organizations

One of the most difficult problems relating to the use of a political organization is that the operator must hold himself aloof from it although he is deeply involved in its affairs. He must be both a participant and a participant-observer, which is to say that while he is busy forwarding the organization's interests and activities, or or at least part of them, he is simultaneously called upon to report on progress both to himself and his superiors, and to do so objectively. Lastly, he is a participant-deviate, forever trying to bring the organization into line with directives that most of its members are at most lukewarm about. Untrained or temperamentally unsuited operators often, for these reasons, end up either breaking with the organization or joining it as full-fledged participants, losing their objectivity, feeling guilty about their own behavior, or thinking and doing other things damaging to their primary mission.

The Organization's Conflicting Roles

The operator seeks to influence an organization either because it is powerful in its own right, or because of its influence over its members, or because of its influence over other parts of the target audience. The first of these two purposes does not often conflict with the others, but the third frequently conflicts with either or both of the other two, with highly damaging results. Such a conflict is likely to arise when, for whatever reason, the organization leaders get the idea that in helping the operator to "use" others they are being "used" themselves. Some leaders, of course, are realistic enough to grasp the rationale behind the collaboration and not develop such suspicion; but others, particularly in certain types of "high-minded" or "do-good" organizations, cannot understand the role of trading in politics and will take to their heels, not only disillusioned but hostile, if they find themselves involved in a trade or anything remotely like one. Skilled diplomacy is called for here: astuteness in bargaining plus dedication to the mission are not enough. The operator must have a sense of the kind of people he is dealing with, and be able to adjust to the type of organizational leader just mentioned when he has one on his hands, which is in large part a matter of knowing how to act as if there were no quid pro quo while in the very act of delivering it.

SUBVERSION OF UNFRIENDLY ORGANIZATIONS

Nowhere will the psychological warfare operator find all political organizations on his side. There will inevitably be organizations the essential basis of which puts them in opposition to the

operator's major directives. Given the present world situation organizations of this type are likely to be either Communist or Communist-penetrative. But not necessarily; in most countries some of them will be parties and factional groups to whom, on various grounds, the operator's policies and purposes are more or less objectionable.

The operator will rarely be well advised to come out into the open and fight against such groups. His home government would probably take a dim view of his waging open political warfare against such elements, and the host government would certainly do so. Within limits, however, the skillful operator will be able to hamper the activities of hostile organizations to counter their propaganda. This he may do by withholding support, by exploiting or inciting schisms, by aiding promising groups that are antagonistic to the organization he wishes to hurt, and by giving this or that twist to the content with which he loads the media wholly within his control.

Withholding support is likely to succeed to the extent that the operator has genuine benefits to bestow on his friends on the one hand, and to the extent that the hostile organization will chafe at the idea of being denied these benefits. Every means by which cooperative organizations may be assisted becomes a means of depriving non-cooperative ones. Only rarely will the operator be able to take positive punitive actions against hostile organizations (for example, by using his influence to get a hostile organization's license to operate a radio station revoked by the local authorities). Generally, as it is hardly necessary to point out, such action should not be traceable to the operator.

Exploiting and inciting schisms within the hostile organization is always a possibility. If, for example, the dominant faction of the target country's Socialist Party is playing footsie with the Communist Party, then the operator, by playing up the opposition forces within it, can prepare the party for an internal revolt that may replace the hostile elite with a friendly one. Or, if what is wanted is a shift in party policy, rather than the overthrow of an elite, the operator can single out promising members of the elite known to support the desired change and do what he can to strengthen their position and increase their prestige.

More frequently than not, any hostile group will be engaged in a struggle for power and/or influence with a group or groups friendly to the operator. The latter, therefore, can help his own cause and at the same time hurt the hostile group, when this is needed, by increasing his support for the friendly group or groups.

Extra effort, for example, can go into getting special features, films, speakers, news breaks, material, rations, and the like for groups whose friendliness is beyond question and who are short on resources and are hard put to win the competitive struggle, whatever it may be, in which they are engaged. This does not mean, of course, that the operator should aid friends simply because they are friends, and without regard either to their necessitiousness or to the pressure they are under from hostile organizations. The operator must dispense benefits in a manner dictated by his mission, not his likes or dislikes. Too many operators, flattered to find enthusiastic supporters, no matter how insignificant their stature as propaganda media, have squandered resources upon them that could have been much more profitably used elsewhere.

The surest means of reducing the effectiveness of hostile groups is perhaps counter-propaganda. Here, as in most psychological warfare, the operator should strive to avoid open argument with opposing propagandists, but he can often, by shifting the direction and content of his messages, deal effectively with the assaults of hostile groups without mentioning them—or the hostile groups either. Encouragement of counter-organization is usually the most promising bet in this type of counter-propaganda. Specifically, without attacking any hostile organization directly or questioning the satisfactions it offers its members, the operator can stress the advantages to be derived from membership in a comparable organization on the other side of the political fence. To illustrate, the operator can show that belonging to an anti-Communist organization can be as satisfying an experience as belonging to a Communist organization, and that moving from the one to the other is an easy matter, and at the same time he can demonstrate the moral claims of anti-Communist organizations.

CHAPTER XX

MEDIA COORDINATION AND CONTROL

COORDINATION

A mission is a process with a beginning and an ending, and each medium that is used in connection with a mission is called in at a particular moment, by preference a carefully chosen particular moment, between the two. These points are, of course, crucial, since without them no propaganda messages would be delivered; but the process also includes planning or programming, a considerable number of actions having to do with coordination and support, and, finally, evaluation of results. The medium is the essential stage in the process, but it should never be thought of as functioning in a vacuum. In all organized operations of any magnitude, the particular parts function now by themselves and now in conjunction with one another.

Rarely, for example, is a single medium completely autonomous through the whole process. Even a single radio broadcast is a chain of actions that involves a program staff that is likely to have serveral radio actions in hand, an operations staff, an intelligence and writing staff, a staff of language specialists, and an evaluation staff, all of whom have a finger on other media activities.

A single medium, moreover, is likely to embrace several sub-media. Radio, in any extensive propaganda organization, includes both medium-range and short-range radio. It may include both mobile and stationary installations, and may control any number of transmitters and relay stations. The problem of coordinating the timing, programming, and content is, therefore, difficult—and too often neglected. It is not unusual in psychological warfare for radio programs sponsored by one and the same authority actually to undo one another's work in certain respects.

Lastly, a good many missions require combinations of media, just as many military operations require simultaneous operations by distinct weapons or even distinct branches of the armed forces; combined print and radio missions, combined leaflet and loudspeaker missions, and so on, have played an important part in psywar in the past, and may play an even more important part in future operations.

The determination of themes and choice of media tools for reaching any particular target involves a multiplicity of considerations. Target analysis may, for example, tell the American psychological warfare operator in Paris that French factory workers are worried about current threatening moves by Russia and its satellites, which they believe may mean that the Red Army will soon be marching toward the channel, and that they are clinging to nominal Communist Party membership, or at least avoiding commitment against Communism, just to be on the safe side in case of a future Russian occupation. Meantime, the operator's policy guidance from Washington bids him to stress the steadily increasing defensive strength of the free world, and thus build up confidence among the peoples of the North Atlantic Treaty countries.

The operator becomes convinced, let us suppose, that what is needed is a psychological warfare barrage at French factory workers, and decides to use mainly visual media so that he can "pinpoint" his attack on the specific target. Washington, he finds, can supply him impressive data on how the resources of the free world stack up against those of the Communist-dominated world, pictorial and textual material on real wages in the free world as compared to those earned by Russian workers, picture stories on French trade unionists visiting American defense factories, the training of NATO forces, and the buildup of Western defense production, and finally, a filmstrip on the life of General Eisenhower, whom many Frenchmen regard as a symbol of strength and victory—and other related items.

Again putting on his target analysis cap, the operator identifies suitable indigenous outlets, and chooses his specific media. He decides to offer an exclusive picture story to a leading labor journal. He arranges for French unions, civic groups, and schools in the target area to show the Eisenhower filmstrip, with accompanying "patter"in French. He distributes the comparative-resources data, broadside, to all the newspapers in the area. His barrage is now under way, and he keeps it going, now more and now less intensely, until he feels either that he has gained

his objective or that he has reached the point of diminishing returns (saturation point).

Meanwhile, his co-workers on the Voice of America, although not themselves engaged in a frontal assault on the target, provide background material of general interest, and help some by programming special talks or news commentaries for the French workers.

While the several media of psychological warfare are discussed separately in this volume, they have much in common, and implementing a certain theme for a certain audience may make it necessary to bring all of them into play. In other cases a single medium can turn the trick, and in still others this or that combination of media. Often one medium greatly enhances the effectiveness of another—as when leaflets or posters are used to announce program schedules for radio or films.

The broader the mission, the more likely it is that combinations of media will be required. By the same token, a highly specific mission is likely to call for a single medium. A psychological warfare campaign whose purpose is to depress the morale of the general population of a large country over a five-year period would probably utilize, at one time or another, all available media. But if the mission is to say to the 444th Grenadiers that their commanding officer is a prisoner so why think of the act of surrender as shameful, a single medium, that is, leaflet shells, will do the job. If the mission is to reach ten million enemy civilians who are five thousand miles away with a certain message by next week at the latest, then it will be a matter of using short wave radio or nothing at all. Note, however, that loudspeakers might conceivably be used in the first case and that airborne leaflets, if the message were of overriding importance, might serve as the medium in the second case.

Media are coordinated with several purposes in mind. First, they are coordinated to avoid conflict and contradiction, and increase control. Second, they are coordinated in order that the operator may achieve maximum propaganda output when it is needed. Where a message or message-series must be driven home to a large audience in a minimum of time, all media must be focused on the target, even if this means using this or that medium, for the moment, at less than its full efficiency. Thirdly, media are coordinated with a view to making sure that each does what it can to increase the audience for other media, as when combat propaganda leaflets are used to advertise radio programs to enemy troops. Fourthly, media are coordinated

with a view to reaching different parts of one and the same target with the same message. German army staff officers well knew the rules regarding prisoners of war from official sources, but German enlisted men often learned them (and, more important, learned to believe in them) from Allied leaflets. It may, for example, take loudspeakers to reach factory workers and radio to reach their families at home. Fifth, media coordination is often required in order to establish the authenticity and authority of a theme. The media, so to speak, "verify each other." Finally, media must sometimes be coordinated in order to "phase" a mission. A black propaganda rumor, for example, may be helped on its way by being reported as news over the white radio or in the white press. Or a press and radio buildup of information may be taken over by a loudspeaker or political rally as of when the buildup reaches the threshold of action.

CONTROL AND SUPPORT OF MEDIA

Implementing the foregoing recommendations concerning the employment of psychological warfare media is often impossible without the cooperation and support of units and agencies (both military and civilian) that are above or beyond the jurisdiction of psychological warfare personnel. The extent and quality of such support often determines the success or failure of a psychological warfare operation.

The first and most important aspect of any psychological warfare operation that is profoundly affected by other agencies is the policy aspect. The doctrine of policy control, as formulated by each of the three services and by the Department of State and other governmental agencies, can be found in their respective instructions and manuals. The central point to grasp, however, is that the psychological warfare message must be in complete conformity with the relevant over-all policy—if only to prevent the message from being repudiated by higher authority. This brings us to the problem of policy guidance, an example of which would be a statement by the Department of State to each of our embassies and to the High Commissioners of occupied areas—Austria, Germany, and Japan—concerning the coverage given the political areas covered by the respective embassies or High Commissioners. Such guidance is based on official United States policy. It leaves a good deal of latitude to local operators as regards adapting the official policy to special situations. But

the planning of any psychological warfare operation must conform to the guidance as closely as local conditions permit in order to insure the closest possible coordination with other propaganda operations by other United States agencies, official and unofficial, dealing with the same general subject matter.

A second aspect of any psychological warfare operation that is affected by other agencies is security. Purely aside from the necessity for making secure all planning information (this is all military doctrine), the security of psychological warfare intelligence, plans, and operations has a peculiar and major importance. If B knows what A is about to tell him, in order to deceive or otherwise persuade him, B can easily block A's message either by a well-aimed counter message or by ad hoc briefing of the target audience. Coordination with counterintelligence is thus a prerequisite for effective psychological warfare security.

Thirdly, psychological warfare operations depend on other agencies for the bulk of the intelligence they receive. What psychological warfare planning most needs is intelligence concerning the relative vulnerability of identifiable enemy groups—military and civilian. The discussion of target analysis in this book calls attention again and again to the topics that adequate psychological warfare intelligence covers.

A final aspect of psychological warfare operations that depends on other agencies is the procurement of psychological warfare equipment. Histories of propaganda frequently include strictures on the inadequacy of transmitters, loudspeakers, and so forth, and accounts of the development of basic propaganda equipment through many stages of increasing efficiency over a short period of time. Usually the equipment available to a field operation is determined not with an eye to what is desirable but to what is procurable. The psychological warfare personnel responsible for the publication of leaflets, news sheets, front newspapers, and posters will, of course, be completely satisfied only with presses that can produce metropolitan newspapers. But effective propaganda has often been made with a manually-powered letter press.

RELATION OF PUBLIC TO PRIVATE COMMUNICATION MEDIA

The government operated communications media in the United States and most other countries share their audience with

commercial, or at least privately owned, media. The Voice of America, for example, transmits news items that members of the audience can also learn about from dispatches filed by the American news services for the overseas press. In the United States, as in a few other countries, the principle of freedom of the press is firmly guaranteed, and the right of private agencies to send—via any medium they like—whatever messages they please to any foreign audience at least in time of peace, has never been questioned.

Radio companies, however, have never been able to make their overseas operations profitable, and government radio has a virtual monopoly of messages sent abroad by that particular medium. The private news agencies and the motion picture industry, by contrast, are extremely active in the foreign field, and regularly supply large quantities of news, features, and entertainment to customers abroad. More foreigners than Americans see American films, for example, and, as is well-known, US films are marketed abroad with little or no attention to US foreign-policy interests or the impression that the United States government may wish to have created in the minds of audiences abroad. The news agencies also follow their own bent, although in the nature of the case the picture they present of American life is less likely to be "angled" than the picture presented in films.

The psychological warfare operator, then, rarely operates in territory where no other American has preceded him. On the contrary, he encounters an audience predisposed in a certain way toward American messages by an image wrought by the American movies and the American conception of news, with some local modifications induced by local market choice among available showings and publications. In analyzing his audience, the operator must therefore ask himself, among other questions, the following: What picture has been given of America by those who have preceded me? What gaps are there that I can fill? What images have been planted that should be broken down? What should be substituted for them? The operator cannot afford to accept current dogmas on these matters, either with respect to Hollywood or with respect to the press. He must satisfy himself, on the basis of local audience studies, that specific effects can be traced to American communication media, and learn in great detail what they are.

The presence of these alternative sources of messages from the United States compels the operator to monitor his own domes-

tic agencies as they impinge upon the target. He will often find, for example, that he cannot present such and such an account of a given matter to this target because another and more plausible version is being presented by another US medium. He may have to put greater emphasis on this side or aspect.

Besides monitoring the output of US private agencies, the operator must, as much as possible, coordinate with them, though without expecting to exercise any authority to affect, even marginally, the private agency's output. Only in a war zone and in other quite unusual circumstances is such authoritative coordination possible. Most of the time the operator is dependent on such good relations as he can establish with the private media operators. Often he will win no privileges beyond that of being told something more of the private agency's activities than it has occasion to tell its customers and its ultimate audience. Even this, however, is frequently no negligible advantage, since good intelligence and good timing are essential to the success of most propaganda missions. The past record indicates that the government operator must expect various levels of coordinate and cooperative effort from co-national media operators. Often he will run up against a private media operator who regards his interests as directly opposed to those of the government operation, or even gives a helping hand to counter-propaganda against the government operation. Nor is that all.

Different enterprises within a particular medium may square off differently to the government operation, and particular enterprises may be cooperative today and uncooperative tomorrow, or the cooperativeness of private personnel may vary from area to area within the same enterprise, or each propaganda mission may require a redefinition of relationships, so that each news event, each new film, each broadcasting innovation will call for its own ad hoc coordinating agreement. The relations between public and private media operators assume, in any case, an important role in the conduct of propaganda and even though there is reason to expect co-national operators, public and private, to agree on basic ideals and at least some events of propagandistic importance, the opportunities and occasions for conflict are many.

Experience with such conflicts has sensitized operators to their meaning and importance. C. D. Jackson, Director of the Committee for Free Europe and Publisher of Fortune, and former Deputy Director of the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF, wrote in 1949 as follows:

> The American press when it operates abroad is in effect doing a propaganda job, as well as undertaking a commercial venture. . . Private information organizations should not see Paris in terms of Chicago, or Rome in terms of New York. Once they leave our shores, our newspapers, magazines and films are more than newspapers, magazines and films; they are representatives of America.
>
> Private enterprise should develop an increased awareness of its international responsibility, an awareness that would result in better news, better movies, better books in Europe. And it must jealously guard against distortion.
>
> Finally, the efforts of private enterprise should complement the government's efforts—and *vice versa*. Only this kind of teamwork can wipe out the areas of ignorance abroad about American ways, American motives and American policy—and, unless they are wiped out, our whole program will be injured immeasurably.

No doubt the relationship can be better planned from the psychological warfare side than it has in the past. Study of such plans is beyond the scope of this volume, and circumstances may arise in which formal coordination will be required, with or without sanctions for failure to conform to agreements reached or for failing to agree. Such coordination can be effectively established at three key points: on the highest level of private and government media control in the nation, on the theater of operations level of control, and among the operators at the point of emission of messages—at the radio stations and the news and film distribution points.

CHAPTER XXI

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE TOTAL FRAME OF PURPOSIVE ACTION

This volume has for the most part dealt with two types of questions of general importance to psychological warfare. The first type, the primary subject matter of Part II, asks the following: Given a target, what media can reach it? The answer to this type of question runs in terms of the political sociology of the target. The second type of question, which has to do with particular media (Part III), runs in such terms as the following: Given the medium, what are its targets? What are the particular media especially adapted for? Left without systematic treatment were the several other important facets of psychological warfare: policy, themes and content, psychology (treated in a companion volume), organization, equipment, personnel, and administrative procedures. If all of these matters had been treated systematically herein or elsewhere, the operator would then have at his disposal an adequate portrayal of all aspects of his complex problem. Even when he has mastered them, however, the operator will face many perplexing problems in the coordination of psychological warfare missions with economic and military ones. Propaganda is only one of the three major ways of influencing human behavior, the other two being force and economic measures. Under certain conditions it is the only available method. Others are blocked for reasons of morality, law, or policy. And frequently, as today, propaganda is in some areas and at some times subordinate to economic and military measures as part of a combined arms mission. It is in these circumstances that the resourceful psychological warfare operator (and the resourceful economic or military operator) may devise operations and actions superior in total effect to actions carried out by a single arm alone.

Although the principal mission of military forces in war is to reduce materially the capacity of the enemy to resist, an implied sub-mission is to reduce the enemy's mental evaluation of his own capacity to resist. The sub-mission accounts for the employment of psychological warfare by the armed forces and for the fact that a great many maneuvers and actions of the armed forces have as a byproduct a psychological effect. The psychological warfare establishment of the army can only account for that portion of the psychological impact of the armed forces that can be specially organized—basically through the media of print, radio, and film. Beyond these organizable elements of psychological warfare, extend the unorganizable psychological consequences of many military acts. Responsibility for attention to the psychological impact of these acts must rest with specialists in conventional warfare "in addition to their other duties."

Citing merely a few such psychological warfare byproducts of conventional acts of warfare will demonstrate the necessity for attention to "warfare psychologically waged." Every artillery and air barrage has a psychological aspect. "What does the enemy suffer physically?" is a primary question. "What does the enemy now fear, feel, and expect?" is a secondary, but important question. The distinction may be posed in a question that has not yet been answered: "Granted there is a point of maximum physical return from an artillery barrage, is there also a point (deviating from it) of maximum psychological return?" An S-2 usually has the physical point in mind, rarely the psychological point.

To cite another example, disheartening and unstabilizing noises are employed on occasion in battle, but not to the extent to which they might be employed or with the flexibility with which they ought to be employed. The Chinese bugles, though qualifying as an effective medium of psychological warfare for a time, came to be regarded with little alarm by American troops. The bugles remained to bolster Chinese morale, rather than as psychological warfare weapons against American troops.

Akin to demoralizing noises are diversionary noises. Friendly intelligence must be presumed to know the intelligence habits of opposing forces. Every intelligence staff placed some reliance upon reports of military noises, flashes, and movements. Although enemy intelligence cannot be permanently disabled by diversionary tactics, temporary errors can be converted into valuable advantage by one's own forces. Even though

much of this is best done by the psychological warfare organization itself, some is within the competency of conventional warfare units.

Another example of warfare waged with skill in psychology could be found in the selection of targets for aerial bombardment. Thus, the Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany suggested that light and relatively inexpensive bombings of untouched areas, especially semi-rural areas, would have had great psychological effect, perhaps justifying the slighting of a certain amount of bombing conducted solely on "physical" principles. To quote the Survey: "The maximum morale effects of dropping a given tonnage of bombs on Germany would have been attained by lighter raids as widely distributed as possible, rather than by concentrated heavy bombing in limited areas." The Survey found that one out of three civilian Germans indicated that his morale was more affected by air assaults than by any other factor, including the defeats at the front.

The passage of troops through a newly occupied territory can be made the occasion for a show of strength exceeding the impression ordinarily made. This is especially helpful when the occupying troops are small in number. Not only do such actions incite greater cooperation from the population, but they discourage hostile acts, making the work of counterintelligence easier, and serving to deceive the nearby enemy.

The list of examples may be extended to include the most effective use of warships at ports of call, the punishing of traitors and offenders as object lessons to impress the general population, and many other events coming within the ken of non-specialized military personnel that hold promise of having striking psychological effect. It is not too much to say, though it is too much to hope for, that every soldier may be taught the rudiments of behaving in a manner that furthers the general propaganda mission of an army and a nation.

APPENDIX

SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS

PART I. INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. THE SELECTION AND USE OF MEDIA

Scope of Volume

The conditions of employment of the means of communication are the subject of the book; such media problems are considered mainly apart from problems of policy, theme, psychology, personnel, equipment, organizations, and procedures; yet the correct use of media is conditional upon knowledge of these other elements of propaganda.

Method of Proceeding

First comes a discussion of missions, then Part II treats target analysis of the political sociology of targets, with reference to the effects of target conditions on the selection and use of media. Part III discusses the particular attributes of the important media. Part IV indicates the value and problems of combined media missions, tells what controls and supports psychological warfare needs, shows how government and private media compete and cooperate, and relates psychological warfare to other modes of influencing the behavior of other peoples.

CHAPTER II. DETERMINATION OF MISSION

Missions are defined as operational formulae; missions may be campaigns, operations, actions.

Directives: What Is To Be Done

A directive as the basis of mission; total psychological warfare may not be the main objective of a total mission that involves the use of psychological warfare; psychological warfare must be subordinate to policy, and may suffer legitimate

embarrassment as the result of having certain types of policy; the importance of clear specification of projected target change.

Planning and Timing

A planned mission is one scientifically designed; timing is an important element in good mission design; timing is essential in both news and non-news actions; the advantages of "being there first" in propaganda struggles; close hierarchical coordination helps timing; silence is difficult to obtain and should be used cautiously.

PART II. GENERAL TARGET ANALYSIS AS APPLIED TO MEDIA SELECTION

CHAPTER III. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET

What a Target Is

A target is defined as the object of a message and distinguished from the audience, which is all actual message receivers; missions should state target groups and the media by which they are to be approached; missions determine targets (ease of access should not rule operational judgment).

Where Targets Come From

While missions set targets, missions vary with events and targets vary with them. This principle is illustrated by American propaganda to Italy on the levels of campaign, operation, and action.

Problems in Target Delimitation

Targets are rarely coterminous with audiences, and many audiences are composed of overlapping, partial targets.

CHAPTER IV. PHYSICAL ACCESSIBILITY OF TARGET

Considerations of Space

Media range from face-to-face to extremely distant communications; distance, with some exceptions, diminishes the force of communication. Written messages are less dependent upon instantaneous reception and cognition than auditory messages. An effort should be made to approximate intimacy, and to use media to reinforce each other. Terrain is often a barrier to operations.

Technological Considerations

Sender's equipment and target's equipment are potent limitations of most efforts. Even with both in ideal condition, other uncontrolled media are competitors for attention. Other barriers are raised by jamming, penalties against receiving messages, and counter-propaganda.

CHAPTER V. CULTURAL DISTANCE BETWEEN TARGET AND SENDER

Language

Reasonable fluency is required, not only in grammar but in inflection, color, levels of address, etc.; perfection is not invariably needed, though required in much black propaganda, and to make complex explanations; perfection is unnecessary in life and death matters, or where perfection implies treason, or where imperfection preserves social distance.

History

Knowledge of history is essential to avoid biases, especially in ideological propaganda. Meaning of many words like "democracy," a "free press," varies between sender and target.

Religion and Moral Sentiment

Dangers of invading religious sphere and causing offense are to be guarded against. Even "secular" countries have taboos and religious sensitivities.

Wit and Humor

Should be guarded carefully against excessive use, especially at expense of the audience. Wit and humor vary considerably among countries otherwise culturally alike. Humor should not be used to give target catharsis when propagandist wants other attitudes and actions. Humor is out of place where deprivations are excessive among target population.

Invidious Comparisons between Target and Sender

Short-range hostile interchanges between target and sender are frequently encountered as obstacles to mission. Envy of America is found universally and causes wide range of defensive reactions against American propaganda. Propaganda touching upon invidious themes generally ought to be avoided. Even well-intentioned "education" is often boomerang propaganda. Illustrations from German training of Ukraine farmers, and front-line surrender propaganda are cited. Operator often has mission of redressing abuse and assuaging hurt pride.

Universal Messages

While there is no set of propaganda appeals to all audiences, certain ideological slogans have extremely wide verbal acceptance. Vast agreement on bills of rights, which, though not actual, represent propaganda vulnerability.

CHAPTER VI. SOCIAL DIFFERENCES AND SUB-TARGET PROBLEMS

Introduction

Peoples and societies have numerous internal social differences. Language and regional history are two major differences often found. Others are treated below.

Society: Unity through Diversity

A "society" denotes a group of people working together towards vaguely defined common goals; but modern societies especially are highly differentiated, the essence of social action is compromise and adjustment, but social conflict is always present and may be exploited by propaganda. Social differences provide many different targets within a nation.

Distribution of Income

Income is unequally distributed everywhere and the unequal distribution is often a source of discontent. Propaganda plays on the discrepancies within hostile powers, refrains from comment in friendly propaganda. Media access (like radio sets) is often determined largely by income, in the USSR as elsewhere.

Occupational Structure

The United States Census classes and broader European categories of occupations, when applied to target analysis, provide ready distinctions in manner of life, foci of interest, likes and antipathies among target population. Different occupational levels have their favorite media, and differ in the themes and content they find of interest.

Prestige Classes (Status Groups)

"Who feels superior to whom?" is a question that divides society into prestige rankings; these correlate usually with income and occupation, but sometimes non-wealthy groups are accorded and demand disproportionate respect. Different publications reach varied prestige classes. Propagandist must avoid talking over the heads of some and talking down to others.

Social Stratification in Space

Ecology of target population important in such missions as airdrops of leaflets, posters. Different classes occupy different sectors of cities. Rural-urban differences are often pronounced and require variant messages.

Social Classes

Social class is a combined index of the income and other indices already described and corresponds to a person's over-all style of life and chances in life. Use of the concept in psychological warfare depends on existence of class consciousness and class identification; then propaganda may address itself to either side of the "class struggle" or both, depending on the mission. Different media and sub-media afford entry to the different conflicting parties.

Social Mobility

Social mobility is the movement of persons through different power, occupational, income, prestige and other rankings, up or down. Certain groups and individuals will subscribe to slogans against social mobility, others to slogans of "freedom of opportunity." Most modern societies ostensibly prefer slogans of high mobility, "giving everyone a chance." Propaganda finds many targets among individuals whose mobility

is frustrated. To an increasing extent, the USSR affords such targets. Where elites are self-made men in large part, propaganda of mobility fails on them.

Elite-Mass Configuration

Elites are the few in a target population or audience who have the highest index on any given characteristic or combination of characteristics—income, occupation, power, prestige, military rank, etc. In totalitarian communities, leader-follower communications are less direct, frequent, and prolonged than in democratic societies; hence, they are more vulnerable to propaganda aiming at damaging leader-follower relations. Democratic populations rarely have a brittle elite-mass crystallization and are more inured to leadership weaknesses. Apathy can be induced more readily in totalitarian targets; dissension in democratic ones. The elite in modern societies is rarely homogeneous; it contains many conflicting elements within it; all with some exploitable demands and grievances; a totalitarian state has the most stable elite, because of thoroughgoing controls and extinction of competing elites. The operator should always know clearly the composition of the elite, its degree of stability, and its potential and actual schisms.

Major Institutional Targets

The family, church, and school are formidable foci of authority and social control. They are so venerated by influential and numerous sections of society that they offer great resistance to state controls. When such controls are attempted, long-enduring resentments are created, bolstered by strong moral sentiments. These provide the operator with targets, though the targets may not be organized into a rebellious group.

CHAPTER VII. MESSAGE CONTENT AS RELATED TO MEDIA SELECTION

Functions of Content

A large number of qualities are included in content. When seeking to assure one quality, such as intelligibility, to an illiterate audience, the cartoon leaflet is an example of an appropriate medium.

The Quality of Content

The more complex a message, the more the recipient should be able to refer to it to establish its meaning. The simpler the message the more frequently it can be conveyed through one sense. Most propaganda content is a mixture of denotative and expressive content. The greater the expression to be conveyed, the more necessary to appeal to several senses via supporting media. Printed media allow greater scope of content of to be conveyed. Material going to specialized audiences usually requires printed rather than "broadcast" form.

Desired Effects of Contents

Effects desired may be to entertain, to reinforce (and convert), or to instruct. Entertainment is used principally to build an audience in psychological warfare. The most persuasive media are those that can maximize expressive impact, combining great emotion with reinforcing arguments.

Diffusion of Effect

Diffusion, as against concentration of effects, is the dissemination of a message among people who are engaged in considerable interaction. Media that draw people together have diffusive effects and are useful for commencing mass action (for instance, movies, loudspeakers); the "privatizing" media, mostly printed, generate argumentation and private change, rather than crowd response.

CHAPTER VIII. AUTHENTICITY AND AUTHORITY OF MESSAGES

Authenticity is the degree of reliability and validity accorded a message; authority is the degree to which a message is accorded respect and acceptance. Ordinarily authoritative messages are regarded as authentic; hence the operator strives to win authenticity and authority, and does so by observing the standards of truth and obedience characterizing his target populations. Battle conditions are worst for establishing the conditions, but astute propaganda can accomplish a great deal. Where audience has access to the facts of an event, the operator must exercise greater logic and evi-

dence. Several basic types of propaganda operation derive from consideration of authenticity and authority: the official voice; the comrade voice; black propaganda. The advantages and limitations of each are enumerated.

CHAPTER IX. EVALUATION OF MEDIA ACTIVITY

Purposes of Evaluation

Continuous evaluation of media activity is necessary. No single method of evaluation applies to all activity. Methods useful in evaluating effects of propaganda on one's own population are seldom applicable to friendly or neutral states, and rarely to hostile populations. The operator must evaluate the output of uncontrolled media because they give him clues as to his own media effectiveness; they point up events and themes which he can exploit in his own propaganda; and he can assess his own nation's propaganda vulnerabilities.

Scope of Evaluative Activity

Evaluation is conducted with reference to media output, dissemination, and effects. Analysis of output is the simplest; careful recording of all outgoing communications by various means is necessary. Discovery of the dissemination of one's propaganda is more difficult. Sampling the target population and the propaganda audience is a common technique. In warfare, combat and strategic intelligence give data about dissemination. The estimate of media effects is most important of all and is likewise difficult. Sometimes effects are overt and other times hidden. Sometimes action and other times attitude changes are desired. Rarely can one establish a perfect relationship between a specific message and a specific effect. However, the operator may assume that messages do influence people. Careful inferences of the relationship between a given output and the changed behavior of the target will frequently allow a respectable judgment to be made.

Selected Techniques of Evaluation.

Pretests are systematic procedures for determining beforehand how an audience will react to a communication by submitting the communication to a small group which is representative of the target audience. Pretests are feasible only

when samples of the target are available. Refugees are useful, but have blind spots. Pretests can show what appeals are most effective, what kinds of persons pay attention to the appeals, and what to emphasize and to avoid.

The sample survey is conducted usually during or after a propaganda mission by taking a small group representative of the whole target and determining therefrom the effects of the communication upon the whole target. The sample survey is best to get extensive data rather than intensive. Surveys should be simple, standardized, and carefully worked on beforehand to avoid bad questions.

The panel method uses a sample of the target for repeated interviews in order to gather greater amounts of the required data and observe the changes in the target accomplished by a series of propaganda actions. The panel has a tendency to become different from the target because of being subjected to repeated interview.

The depth interview puts the respondent at ease and gets him to express himself freely on the relevant subjects. The respondent will often talk at length before he begins to give the deeply hidden information the questioner desires. Skillful interviewing is necessary.

Content analysis is a technique to describe systematically and quantitatively the contents of communication. Categories of content are devised according to the questions for which answers are sought, the propaganda is fed into the various categories, and the results analyzed. Finally, inferences are made about the habitual behavior and changing behavior and attitudes of the target as disclosed in what the target says.

Other techniques include participant observation, analysis of election returns, letters, correspondence, periodicals, and newspapers; also the routine sources of intelligence. The standardization of the scope, preparation, form, and time of submission of intelligence and evaluation reports is highly desirable.

Conclusion

Brief introduction to Part III.

PART III. THE USES OF THE MEDIA

CHAPTER X. NEWS OPERATIONS AND NEWSPAPERS

Printed Media

The effectiveness of any printed medium varies directly with the literacy of the target. Printed media, by contrast with other media, can transmit messages of any length or complexity. Printed media are severely limited by production requirements.

Supporting Services

News operations abroad require coordinating the collection, selection, editing, and publication of news. The operator abroad must obtain these raw materials from a commercial service, his home office, or a locally organized news service. Washington is the primary source of news materials for foreign propaganda operations. Official news and background material are joined with daily newspaper clippings and with specially reported UN news and with many official releases and with occasional spot coverage of important events; all this is fed to stations abroad. Washington staff members also do special research and writing and include a corps of photographers. Some magazines and pamphlets are prepared in Washington and New York, and some books and magazines are selected by staff members in Washington. Washington thus is a central factory and assembly point for basic materials. Operators abroad receive the output and mold it to specific needs. They also do spot news and monitoring. Often in warfare the local operator must establish his own sources, especially for combat propaganda.

New Versus Established Outlets

Whether to rely on the operator's own media or on established local channels to propagate his materials depends on local conditions. Established channels are preferable in neutral or friendly states, and, for some purposes, in liberated or occupied states. The existing channels allow local authenticating and authoritative publication of materials. Furthermore, favorable relations with local interests result. In the long run, operations may begin as completely controlled and develop into autonomous local operations.

Target Analysis

Foreign journalistic style and habitual formats often differ from the operator's practices. Indigenous models should be followed. The operator must use the living language of his readers and watch carefully for current or hidden meanings of words and phrases. He must constantly avoid exposing or harming his friends. He may often capitalize on events, as was done in the Trieste dispute after World War II.

Examples of US Newspapers in Foreign Theaters

The American Reporter, a newspaper published in India, appeals to Indian opinion leaders on behalf of American policy. Die Neue Zeitung, published in German cities by an American staff is discussed as the voice of an occupying force, as is the Wiener Kurier.

Feeding the Local Press

The case of the transfer of American destroyers to the Greek Navy is followed through to show the technique of maximizing the propaganda value of an event by means of cooperation with the press abroad. "Exclusives" are given as gifts to cooperative editors. The local press may be used to counteract unfriendly news reports from other sources if it is fed the proper material on time. A Philippine example is given. Distribution of texts of important speeches prevents distortion of American official or public actions. Plastic photo plates are an inexpensive medium much welcomed by local publishers. Certain black and gray distribution techniques are possible also.

The Press in Combat Areas

The combat operator often combines newsgathering, editing, and publishing. He must improvise constantly and move from one technique to another. He is most useful to the local military commander.

Evaluation of Effectiveness

It is unusual to have clear and unmistakable proof of striking the target dead center and producing the desired reaction. Rather, over the whole course of a general mission hints of effectiveness or failure come up from time to time from a

wide variety of sources, remarks on the state, meetings, opposition press, friendly advisers, and the like. Quantity of output such as circulation figures or column inches printed is prima facie evidence of effect, but is far from proving the desired reaction has been obtained.

CHAPTER XI. LEAFLETS

Types of Leaflets

A leaflet is a single sheet containing a message directed as a single shot to its target. It is principally used in war, and is disseminated by air, artillery, and minor means. It must carry a brief, succinct, and attractive message.

Adjustment of Leaflets to Various Situations

The leaflet message must be adjusted to a specific target and must make particular individual appeal, causing the individual to decide on the favorable action in isolation (though at times collective action should follow the individual decision). The target elite usually opposes reception of leaflets, and sometimes underground methods are required to disseminate them, or inconspicuous forms and colors must be used. The operator on the spot is primarily responsible for the material contained within the leaflet, for the selection of the messages, and for the dissemination. The leaflet may contain news, even becoming a newspaper in some cases, or may be a simple slogan or set of instructions directed at cooperative or marginal members of the target audience.

Content

The marginal man as a leaflet target is the person capable of the action proposed in the leaflet. The leaflet gives him a map for his conduct. Glittering generalities are usually out of place in leaflets, unless they apply directly to the prevailing anxieties of the target. Leaflets do not permit of weighty argument. Maps, cartoons, photographs, and emblems work well into leaflets. Leaflets should not be too slick or too bald. The leaflet language must be grammatically correct. The leaflet fact statement must be credible to the audience; often the total truth is too much to accept. A rhythmical slogan that can be repeated is excellent. Leaflets must have eye-appeal, intellect-appeal, and result-appeal.

Authenticity and Authority

Authority may be achieved by the quotation of one's officials or of target officials. Reliable news over a period of time becomes authoritative. "Black" leaflets can be used on occasion.

Evaluation of Leaflet Results

Evaluation may consist of immediate observation of the target audience during and after delivery of message. Continued observation thereafter for new evidence and hints is useful. Collection of intelligence information by content analysis and otherwise is recommended. A panel of prisoners of war and a sample of prisoners of war or available members of the target population are good techniques. A sample survey of the total population is effective, but is impossible in war.

CHAPTER XII. NEWS SHEETS AND POSTERS

News sheets and posters include all placarded material. They may be printed or hand drawn and affixed to many kinds of carriers. The news sheet is ordinarily used in lieu of regular media of communications. This chapter is more concerned with agitational posters, which are useful at all times in propaganda. By using activational posters one may achieve quick responses, build up collective suspense for collective actions, give impact and intensity to a message, and provide a durable medium for a message. The use of pictures enhances the poster's effect. The agitational poster should drive home a simple message in slogan form. The main point of the message should be the first thing to be read. Pictorial material should add to the message or be the message, but never tell a separate story. The pictorial matter may be symbolic or realistic, hand drawn or photographic. Expensive equipment is not needed. The best poster is useless unless it reaches its target. The object is to make the target population a captive audience. Physical surveys of good locations for placarding are necessary. The operator often faces legal obstacles and informal counter-propaganda through defacing of posters. He should police his posters. Outdated posters are counter-propaganda against oneself. They detract from new propaganda

and they point to past failures. Evaluation of posters may be accomplished by sample surveys and by depth interviews.

CHAPTER XIII. BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, ARTICLES

The slow media have unique functions to perform. A book has more content than any other media. It may be used to improve relations with allies and neutrals, with friendly groups in friendly or hostile nations, to expose the questionable policies of a hostile state, and to consolidate an occupied area. The physical accessibility of the book target depends upon local commercial agencies. Use of local distributors is almost always necessary. To determine the target for any given book, the operator selects a few people of the type he wants to read the book, has them read it, and then learns their reactions. The book contains materials that reach a highly sophisticated element in any population. Book readers are always few, but never without influence. Books may entertain, persuade by complicated argument, and convey complicated instructions. The book by its nature carries considerable authority among common people. A fraudulent book is always bad propaganda. A book written by a comrade of the target can be most influential when distributed among the target population. The basic ingredients of books are often in scarce supply and stockpiling is recommended. The effects of a book take a long time to register. Both short and long-run effects can be ascertained by a panel of readers of the desired type.

Pamphlets range from cartoon books to magazine format combinations of pictures and text. They are smaller than books; they can be given away; and yet they retain some of the authority of books. Pamphlet readers are several times more numerous than book readers. Pamphlets, too, may be produced by the psychological warfare agency, while books cannot. Articles may be also prepared and distributed abroad. Magazines like Amerika have done effective jobs for American policy. Articles may be deliberately unsigned and fed to local presses. Photo exhibits are a way of telling a picture story on a wall in some prominent place. They are related to posters and news sheets and work well as target lures. Reading rooms or information centers expedite the distribution of materials to targets and provide a rallying point for friendly forces.

CHAPTER XIV. RADIO

Radio is more of a face-to-face communication than print. It can carry the latest news and can report it as it happens. It can also entertain.

Radio Missions

The development of a radio mission is described. Combat radio has definite limitations. It usually must stop at a certain point in undermining the will to resist. Combat radio is useful in encouraging partisan efforts. Since radio speaks to everyone who listens, it tempts the operator to avoid target analysis, a disastrous mistake.

Physical Barriers

Radio coverage is restricted by possession of receivers, by the power of the stations, by the availability of relays, by topography, and by unfriendly controls—a ban on radio ownership, gearing sets, wired receivers, jamming, punishment for listening, and restriction of purchasing.

Radio As a Psywar Medium

Radio transcends national boundaries, censorship, and dependence upon local authorities. Radio has a shotgun character; consistency is important; controversial issues should be avoided if they are not essential to the main purpose. Broadcasts should be adapted to a wide range of intellect. It is important to know the reactions of a typical listener. Radio effectiveness is limited by the extent of set ownership but not by the extent of literacy.

Controlling the Audience

Radio reception is easily controlled by the listener, and the operator should satisfy his demand for news and not antagonize him needlessly; news should be put into a meaningful context, and full use should be made of drama, human interest, and humor; commentaries should not be too long and considerable repetition is desirable.

Emotional Communication

The human voice is more suited to emotional communication than the printed page. But the radio voice lacks visual force.

The radio listener cannot stop to think and reread, and the tempo must be slow. Nor can the radio listener talk back or ask questions. Radio handles figures badly, and cannot present maps or diagrams. Radio does not betray its own origin. Radio can go where men cannot. Where once radio is permitted, local promotion is needed to build the audience.

Limitations of the Radio Voice

Local programming is also required, and local personnel are often superior to foreign or faraway personnel. Radio can be jammed, and when jammed should employ short, self-sufficient repeated messages.

Authenticity and Authority

Official government radios speak authoritatively. Black broadcasting requires great skill and most careful camouflage. Stations like Radio Free Europe establish their own authenticity and authority as "the comrade voice."

Evaluation

Immediate changes rarely come from radio broadcasts. The effects are indirect. Information about the effects of radio in hostile countries may be obtained from travellers, deserters, and the like. People who are unreliable are likely to want to please. Often respondents of any character cannot assess the effects of radio upon them consciously. They may like or dislike the messages for reasons irrelevant to the purpose behind the message. Pretesting can be done rarely, because the audience is so widely distributed and often far away, and because so many radio programs are prepared for immediate release. Extra effort from opposing media may indicate effectiveness or simply fright.

CHAPTER XV. LOUDSPEAKERS

Microphones and amplifiers can transmit messages over several thousands of yards, and are used by civil and military agencies. Military use preponderates.

Method of Utilization

Loudspeakers are transported by tanks, naval craft, weapons carriers, trucks, and several types of aircraft. Recording and transcription equipment extends the scope of loudspeaker operations.

Military and Civil Missions

Loudspeakers are used to subvert enemy soldiers and to harass enemy troops or to deceive them. Friendly troops must be protected against reacting adversely to their own loudspeakers and against enemy reactions to friendly loudspeakers. Loudspeakers are useful to military governments in many ways, and in peacetime may be used in rural areas and areas without regular media as a substitute medium.

Planning and Execution of Missions

Of all media, loudspeakers are perhaps most dependent upon friendly agencies for continued success. Careful planning is required in battle missions and planning should involve unit commanders, operations and intelligence officers, and propaganda personnel. Commanders can call for a variety of missions, but must respect psychological warfare personnel's advice on the successful employment of equipment. The commander's missions may be broad, leaving all to the propaganda personnel, or may be specific. Careful adherence to the operational plan is required to prevent disaster. The broadcast must be timed perfectly. No single broadcast should be more than a few minutes long for reasons of effect and safety. Key sentences should be short and repeated. Bad reception must be expected and allowed for.

Problems in Target Accessibility

Topography, humidity, wind conditions, the compactness of the target audience, and battle noises are varying barriers to message reception. Airborne speakers can reach hilly recesses. Night broadcasts carry better. Loudspeakers are ideal for reaching fixed fortifications. Loudspeaker messages can be received with greater safety by the target than leaflets. The more specific the knowledge possessed of the target at the moment of broadcast, the more effective the message. The target should be addressed by name and other traits.

Content and Announcing

Policy directives and guidances are less inhibiting to loudspeaker missions than to other media. No permanent record remains to be turned back in counterpropaganda. Furthermore, policy discussions should be avoided. Appeals should be matter-of-fact and simple. These conditions change somewhat in civilian operations. The ideal announcer should have a good command of the target language; should display no hatred of the target; should have spent several years among the target population; should have a flexible, alert mind; should possess a clear, commanding voice; should have a quick grasp of the changing military situation; should associate easily with combat troops; and should be physically rugged.

Evaluation of Results

Among the methods of judging the effectiveness of loudspeaker actions are (1) the periodic checking in rear areas and in actior of the efficiency of equipment, (2) pretesting equipment and messages on prisoners of war, (3) testing of appeals on panels of prisoners, (4) observing the target audience, (5) interviews with samples of prisoners, and (6) intensive depth interviews with prisoners.

CHAPTER XVI. MOTION PICTURES

Use as a Psychological Warfare Medium

The impact of the content of film is abetted by the presence of the program itself, by the identification of interests, and by supplements and follow-ups. Seeing a motion picture approximates actual experience. A single film can emotionally convey the whole reasoning behind American policy. Motion pictures can condense experience, magnify and elaborate otherwise imperceptible events, suggest behavior patterns, stimulate fears or relieve fears, and create reciprocal understanding among peoples.

Requirements of the Film Operation

Questions of accessibility involve acquiring audience, analyzing the effective possibilities of the medium, having the technical facilities, adjusting the timing and frequency of presentation,

and inquiring whether other media may do as well or better than film.

Technical Considerations

The several kinds of films include documentary-informational newsreels, animated cartoons, instructional and entertainment features. Numerous tasks go into the preparation of each. Filmstrips are useful supplements of a pictorial kind.

Selection of Films for a Given Audience

Audiences outrun film supplies. Films must be carefully targeted. Film censorship presents obstacles sometimes. Too controversial a film often cannot be shown commercially. Films cannot portray experience completely beyond the knowledge of the audience. Some national audiences are more sophisticated.

Evaluation

The audience behavior may be observed during the showing. Panels of film viewers are useful. Sometimes the desired behavior change can be seen afterwards.

CHAPTER XVII. GIMMICKS AND RELATED DEVICES

Gimmicks are messages associated with small, inexpensive consumer gifts as an inducement to receiving the message. Gimmicks are expensive, they present difficult production problems, they are sometimes out of keeping with the gravity of an occasion. Often gimmicks fall into the hands of people who want the item rather than the message. Tie-in gifts are desirable items offered if the target will respond to the sender. Substantial economic or military aid requires propaganda packaging. Folk devices include phonograph records, ballad singers, etc.

CHAPTER XVIII. AGENTS AND RUMOR-MONGERS

Use of Special Agents in Propaganda

Every use of foreign personnel and organizations constitutes a use of agents in propaganda. Special agents refer to the

use of individuals for secret missions, as to capture an enemy leader to incite fear; secret diplomacy; fifth columnists; and rumor-mongers. All such missions are delicate, require special organization within or outside the propaganda agency, and top-level coordination. Yet the results may be spectacular.

Rumor-Mongers

A rumor-monger is a person who passes on a rumor to someone else deliberately, out of emotion, or out of ignorance of what constitutes a reliable report. A rumor is a chain of similar statements passed among a series of persons as containing some truth but lacking what a reasonable man would regard as adequate evidence. The event reported is important to the chain, and is often believed to be "inside dope." A rumor is levelled, sharpened, and assimilated emotionally during transmission. Tense and critical situations foster rumor; so do conditions when normal communications break down. All groups save the top elite, and to a lesser extent, the lower elite, are vulnerable to rumors. Rumors never cause major events, but precipitate them. Systematic rumor-mongering is useful; it is also a first step in countering rumors, which is done by eliminating the motive, or increasing the flow of information, or invoking sanctions, or deliberately distorting the rumor. Favorable rumors may be helped along by the regular media. Deliberate rumor-mongering is too difficult in most circumstances. Places where people often meet are the key circulation points of rumors.

CHAPTER XIX. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Political organizations are voluntary associations that seek by propaganda and agitation to influence public policy.

The Character of Political Organizations

Political organizations include official and unofficial organizations, located in the target area, elsewhere, or both places, composed of the target population or mixed. No organization is fully dependable, save when organized and run by the operator.

The Employment of Political Organizations

They may be used as: contributers of supplemental personnel; sources of intelligence; aids in obtaining more strategic positions for operator's media; guarantors of authenticity and authority; and agent operators of media.

Special Problems in the Use of Organizations

Employment of autonomous organizations often imperils operator's directives; he must maintain control of the propaganda process. Operators must be expert in bargaining, as aid is not given free. Both psychological and material perquisites must be utilized maximally in bargaining. Special operating skills needed for bargaining with organizations. Danger of alienating organizations by aloofness exists; also the opposite danger of the operator losing himself in the organization instead of maintaining his primary role. Diplomacy of high order needed to get results and yet not cause organizations to feel they are "being used."

Subversion of Unfriendly Organizations

Weakening opposing groups may be accomplished by withholding support, exploiting or inciting schisms; aiding likely antagonists of hostile groups; and intensifying propaganda emanating from operator's own media.

CHAPTER XX. MEDIA COORDINATION AND CONTROL

Coordination

A single medium is rarely autonomous throughout its whole action process. Frequently the staffs of the various media do part of each other's work. Moreover, a single medium includes often several sub-media that also must be coordinated to prevent conflict. Usually the broader the mission the more media must be combined. Different media are coordinated to avoid conflict and contradiction, and to increase control; to achieve maximum propaganda output; to increase the audience for other media; to reach different parts of the same target; to establish more firmly the authenticity and authority of a theme; and to achieve the successive phases of a single medium. American operations in France are used as illustrations.

Control and Support of Media

Media are controlled by policy and policy guidance. Security must often be given propaganda activity. Adequate intelligence is continually required. The efficiency of equipment provided the operator varies enormously, but effective propaganda can emanate from inferior machinery.

Relation of Public to Private Communication Media

Government media often share their audiences with commercial media. This is especially true abroad with respect to the news services and also the motion picture industry. The operator is thus preceded by other American communications and must act amidst influence wrought by other Americans. He must monitor his own country's foreign output as it impinges upon the target. He must coordinate authoritatively or particularly cooperatively with his compatriot operators. The degree of cooperation afforded him varies among the different communication industries, among individual companies, among the personnel of a single company, and with each different propaganda machine. Coordinated relationships, save in wartime, are voluntary, and great tact will produce the most beneficial arrangements for the operator.

CHAPTER XXI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE TOTAL FRAME OF PURPOSIVE ACTION

Propaganda is only one of three major ways of influencing human behavior, the other two being force and economic measures. Sometimes it is most important and other times subordinate. While a specialized propaganda agency is vital, there exist a number of tasks which must be performed cooperatively among propaganda, economic, and military agencies, and also many tasks which can be performed by non-propaganda agencies in addition to their other duties. Illustrations included the psychological effects of barrages and bombardments, the maximum use of demoralizing noises, the use of troops in diversionary tactics, the use of troops and ships for psychological effect abroad, the punishment or rewarding of individuals or groups to set examples. The behavior of troops, tourists, and diplomats. Bureaucratization

of psychological warfare is to be avoided. Outside interests in solving propaganda problems should be solicited and aided. They should be made to feel that their responsibility for psychological warfare is not ended because of the necessary creation of specialized agencies of propaganda.

Stanley