

**Keeping Workers Off the Ballot**  
Electoral Gatekeepers and the Shortage of Candidates from the Working Class

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## **Abstract**

Why do so few lower-income and working-class people hold office in the United States? One possibility suggested by research on underrepresented groups is that qualified workers might receive less encouragement from the gatekeepers who recruit new candidates (e.g., party leaders, politicians, and civic organizations). Building on studies of gatekeeping biases against women, this paper analyzes a new national survey of the county-level leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties. On several measures—including a hypothetical candidate evaluation experiment—party leaders exhibit clear and substantial preferences for white-collar professionals (even controlling for other relevant aspects of candidates' backgrounds and party leaders' strategic environments). These findings constitute the first evidence that gatekeepers are less likely to recruit working-class candidates, and they have important implications for research on descriptive representation, the candidate pipeline, and political inequality. One reason so few working-class Americans hold office may simply be that so few are encouraged to.

**Keywords:** descriptive representation; social class; survey experiment; conjoint analysis; party leaders; candidate recruitment; inequality

Working-class Americans—people employed in manual labor, service industry, and clerical jobs—almost never go on to hold political office in the United States. To the contrary, politicians in every level and branch of American government tend to vastly outrank the citizens they represent on virtually any measure of class or social attainment: they are wealthier, more educated, and more likely to come from a white-collar occupation (Domhoff 1967; Key 1956; Matthews 1954; 1985; Squire 1992; Sadin 2012). If millionaires were a political party, that party would make up roughly 3 percent of American families, but it would have a super-majority in the Senate, a majority in the House, a majority on the Supreme Court, and a man in the White House. If working-class Americans were a political party, that party would have made up more than half the country since the start of the 20th century. But legislators from that party (those last employed in working-class jobs before entering politics) would never have held more than 2 percent of the seats in Congress (Carnes 2012; 2013).

These inequalities in the economic or social class makeup of American political institutions appear to have serious consequences for public policy. One emerging line of research has found that lawmakers from different classes tend to bring different perspectives to the political process. Just as the shortage of women in office affects policy outcomes on issues related to gender (e.g., Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Swers 2002; Thomas 1991), the shortage of working-class people—who tend to be more progressive on economic issues—appears to tilt policy on issues like the minimum wage, taxes, and welfare spending in favor of the more conservative positions typically favored by affluent Americans (e.g., Carnes 2012; 2013; 2016; Grose 2013; Griffin and Anewalt-Remsburg 2013; Kraus and Callaghan 2014).

Building on these findings, a related line of research has begun to ask why so few working-class Americans hold political office in the first place. Scholars have investigated social

class gaps in qualifications (Carnes 2013, ch. 6; forthcoming), voter biases against working-class candidates (Sadin 2012; see also Campbell and Cowley 2014 and Carnes and Lupu np), the low salaries paid to many state and local officials (Carnes and Hansen np), the role of labor unions (Carnes forthcoming; see also Sojourner 2013), and the practical burdens associated with campaigning and holding office (Carnes forthcoming).

In this paper, I focus on an explanation that scholars have not yet tested, namely, that lower-income and working-class Americans seldom hold public office in part because they are seldom encouraged by *electoral gatekeepers*, the political and civic leaders who identify, recruit, train, and support political candidates.

There are a number of reasons to suspect that gatekeepers might play an important role in the underrepresentation of the working class. Electoral gatekeepers—who can include party officials, politicians, interest group leaders, activists, and journalists—are extremely consequential in the larger candidate entry process; the vast majority of candidates report that they were first encouraged to run for office by a local political figure (Broockman 2014; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Lawless 2011). When gatekeepers encourage a potential candidate, it can vastly increase their chances of actually running. And, likewise, when electoral gatekeepers prefer not to recruit candidates from a particular social group, it can ultimately have significant consequences for the group’s numerical or descriptive representation. Party leaders and other gatekeepers often underestimate how well female candidates perform in elections, for instance, and consequently recruit fewer women, which ultimately contributes to the shortage of women on our ballots and in our governing institutions (Crowder-Meyer 2010a; 2013; Lawless and Fox 2005; 2010; Niven 1998; Pimlott 2010; Sanbonomatsu 2002; 2006). It is easy to imagine a host of reasons why gatekeepers might be similarly unfavorably disposed towards potential

candidates from lower-income or working-class backgrounds. If we wish to understand why politicians are so much better off than citizens in the US and why so few working-class Americans go on to hold public office, we may need to start paying closer attention to the kinds of gatekeeping processes that scholars of gender have been studying for over a decade.

This paper uses a new national survey of one important group of gatekeepers—*the leaders of the roughly 6,000 county-level (or equivalent) branches of the Republican and Democratic parties*—to conduct the first systematic analysis of social class preferences in the candidate recruitment process in the United States. In this study, I explore party leaders’ answers to questions about the number of blue-collar candidates they recruit, their responses to survey items about the strengths and weaknesses of working-class candidates, and data from an experiment embedded in the survey in which party leaders were asked to evaluate two hypothetical candidates whose social classes were assigned at random.

Across all three types of measures, I find clear evidence that party leaders hold unfavorable views about working-class candidates and prefer recruiting white-collar professionals. These gaps appear to be substantial; an analysis of parallel questions about male and female candidates suggests that anti-worker preferences are comparable in magnitude to the well-documented bias that gatekeepers exhibit against female candidates. Party leaders’ preferences for professionals appear to stem in part from strategic concerns about the difficulties workers might face on the campaign trail, particularly concerns about fundraising, although it is also possible that their preferences for professionals are not entirely strategic: even in experiments that control for potential candidates’ talents, skills, and political experience (including their experience with fundraising), party leaders prefer white-collar candidates over those from the working class.

These findings represent the first evidence that candidate recruitment practices are part of the explanation for the shortage of working-class Americans in political office in the United States, and they have important implications for research on descriptive representation, the candidate pipeline, and political inequality. Just as the shortage of women in political office partly reflects the habits and behaviors of electoral gatekeepers, one reason so few working-class Americans hold office may be that so few are asked.

### **Candidates, Gatekeepers, and the Working Class**

The numerical or *descriptive representation* (Pitkin 1967) of any social group—that is, the number of lawmakers who are from that group—can be thought of as the result of a winnowing process, a series of steps that each screen out more people from the group in question. First, some people from the group will not be qualified for office, either because they are not legally eligible (a 34-year-old cannot be president) or because they do not have the necessary skills (someone who doesn't know who the current president is doesn't stand much of a chance, either). Second, of those who are qualified, most won't run. And of those who run, many won't win. If a social group is disproportionately screened out at any stage—if people from the group are less likely to be qualified or to run or to win—the group will be numerically underrepresented in public office relative to its numbers in the population as a whole.

To date, most research on the descriptive makeup of American political institutions has focused on the shortage of *women* and *racial or ethnic minorities* in political office. Scholars have explored structural differences in the qualifications that promote success in politics (Gaddie and Bullock 1995; Palmer and Simon 2001), differences in candidate entry (Thomsen 2014; 2015), biases in candidate recruitment on the part of party and interest groups leaders (Crowder-Meyer 2010a; Lawless and Fox 2005; 2010; Niven 1998; Pimlott 2010), institutional

arrangements that disadvantage women and minorities (Trounstine and Valdini 2008), and biases in elections themselves (Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Dolan 2004).

There has been far less research on the shortage of working-class Americans in political office. However, the work that has been done seems to suggest that most of the winnowing happens at the *candidate entry stage*, that is, that workers in the US rarely go on to hold office not because they are not qualified or because they lose elections, but because they rarely run in the first place. Although working-class Americans tend to score lower on many standard measures of qualifications (e.g., political interest, knowledge, and so on), efforts to link these skill deficits to the overall underrepresentation of workers in public office have come up empty-handed; the social class gaps in most measures of qualifications are far smaller than the gaps in officeholding rates (see, for instance, Carnes 2013, ch. 6; forthcoming). Likewise for efforts to explain the shortage of workers by focusing on elections: both observational (Carnes 2013, ch.6; forthcoming) and experimental studies (Sadin 2012; see also Carnes and Lupu np) find little evidence of voter biases against working-class candidates. Working-class Americans do not seem to be underrepresented in public office because they lose elections or because they are not qualified. They seem to be underrepresented because qualified workers simply do not run as often as qualified professionals.

Why, then, are working-class Americans less likely to run? On this point, political scientists have less concrete evidence. To date, there simply has not been much research on the micro-level factors that discourage working-class Americans from running for office (or, for that matter, the larger structural forces that could drive those individual-level differences).

There has, however, been a great deal of research on why lower-income and working-class Americans are less likely to participate in politics in more routine ways, like voting or volunteering for campaigns. Scholars of political participation and civic engagement have known for decades that Americans participate in politics when they have the resources, the motivation, and the encouragement needed to do so—and that working-class Americans are less likely to have all three. We engage in political life when we can, we want to, and someone asks us (e.g., Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). It is probably sensible to think of the decision to run for public office as an extreme version of the same process: people pursue elected office when they have the resources to do so, when they are sufficiently interested in holding the position, and when they are encouraged to do so by others.

From this theoretical standpoint, it is easy to imagine a host of reasons why even highly-qualified potential candidates from working-class backgrounds might not choose to run for public office. Perhaps many qualified workers *can't* run for office, for instance, because they have less free time and spare money, and that in turn makes it difficult or impossible for them to campaign or hold office. Or perhaps disproportionate numbers of qualified working-class Americans simply *do not want to* run. Perhaps they are less likely to find campaigning and governing personally appealing (e.g., Thomsen 2014; 2015). Perhaps they do not see public office as a feasible or desirable career move (the way a lawyer or a business owner might). It may well be that many working-class Americans do not run for office simply because they do not want to.

The third possibility highlighted by theoretical models of political participation is that qualified workers may not receive as much encouragement to run for office, that is, they may not



run because *no one asks them*. The electoral gatekeepers who recruit political candidates simply may not be encouraging many workers to run for public office.

Could that be the case? Should we expect workers to receive less encouragement? Research on gatekeepers has generally been somewhat limited—work on electoral politics has tended to focus more on candidates, campaigns, and voters than on candidate recruitment (Broockman 2014). As I see it, however, at least three aspects of the logic of electoral gatekeeping suggest that we might expect gatekeepers to avoid recruiting working-class citizens.

First, gatekeepers often recruit new candidates from among their own acquaintances and friends (*convenience*). Finding people to run for office and convincing them to do so is difficult and time-consuming. Moreover, it is uncertain; most gatekeepers try to recruit candidates who share their views and preferences, but it can be difficult to know where a person who has never held office truly stands on the issues. As a result, many gatekeepers look to the people they personally know when they recruit new candidates. And since most gatekeepers are white-collar professionals themselves (Crowder-Meyer 2010a), when gatekeepers look to the people they know and trust for potential candidates, they often see a pool of white-collar professionals.

Second, gatekeepers recruit candidates who they think will have the best chances of winning (*electoral strategy*). Campaigning for public office is difficult and expensive. It takes lots of time, and it often requires lots of money. Electoral gatekeepers can usually help to offset these burdens by supplying candidates with campaign funds, volunteers, and other resources (Bawn et al. 2012; Masket 2011; Masket and McGhee 2013). But of course a gatekeeper's resources are limited, and candidates who need less campaign support are usually more appealing. If a party leader had to decide between recruiting a high-profile attorney and an equally smart and hardworking restaurant server, the leader might guess that the attorney would

find it easier to take time off work, raise money, and win the election. Gatekeepers want to see the candidates they recruit go on to hold office (Aldrich 1995)—and they want to invest as little of their own resources as possible—and that might give many electoral gatekeepers strategic incentives to recruit affluent professionals, not blue-collar workers.

Third, gatekeepers could also be biased against potential working-class candidates in ways that cannot simply be attributed to convenience or electoral strategy (*non-strategic bias*). Scholars have known for decades that many Americans dislike or look down on lower-income and working-class people (e.g., Baron, Albright, and Malloy 1995; Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, Tagler 2001; Fiske et al 2002; Jost and Hunyady 2005; Lott and Saxon 2002). Of course, many people do not experience these kinds of prejudices, and even those who do often choose not to act on them (Schneider and Chein 2003). But given the longstanding underrepresentation of the working class, it stands to reason that at least some gatekeepers may experience biases against working-class people that cannot be attributed to just convenience or electoral strategy. Perhaps party leaders mistakenly underestimate the chances that workers could run successful campaigns (because they have so few examples to call to mind), the way they often do with female candidates (Crowder-Meyer 2010a). Or perhaps party leaders simply feel more comfortable interacting with affluent professionals and therefore tend to prefer recruiting them. If biases among electoral gatekeepers are indeed part of the reason why so few workers run for public office, it may be because of convenience or electoral strategy—but it might also stem from prejudices or negative stereotypes about the working class.

Of course, it is also possible that gatekeeper preferences are not part of the explanation for why so few working-class Americans run for public office. No prior study has ever documented anti-worker preferences among electoral gatekeepers (although, to my knowledge,

no prior study has ever tried). Moreover, gatekeeper preferences for professionals are by no means *necessary* to explain the shortage of candidates from the working class. There are many other viable explanations for why so few workers run—perhaps they cannot and they do not want to, and that is all there is to it. And although there are reasons to expect gatekeepers to prefer affluent candidates, there are also countervailing reasons why we might expect them to *support* the working-class candidates they encounter. Politicians with working-class credentials often have a special cachet with the electorate, so much so that candidates sometimes exaggerate their experiences with economic adversity (Pessen 1984; Carnes and Sadin 2015). Especially in the wake of the Great Recession, electoral gatekeepers may be on the lookout for qualified working-class candidates who can connect with voters. Although there are good reasons to suspect that gatekeepers are part of the explanation for the shortage of working-class candidates, we cannot simply assume as much. We need to test this possibility systematically.

In the remainder of this paper, I focus on the question of whether gatekeepers do in fact prefer to recruit white-collar professionals. When possible, I also test the implications of the convenience, electoral strategy, and non-strategic bias hypotheses. If party leaders prefer affluent candidates for strategic reasons (for instance, because workers have a harder time raising money) then party leaders should exhibit a stronger preference for affluent candidates when their strategic incentives are stronger (e.g., in places where elections are more expensive). If, on the other hand, party leaders' attitudes about or behaviors towards potential candidates from the working class are not sensitive to actual variations in the strategic environment, we might have reason to suspect that something more like negative stereotypes or prejudices are at work.

Of course, distinguishing prejudice from political strategy can be difficult, and my analysis of possible mediating factors is often more suggestive than definitive. My primary aim

here is to answer the larger question of whether electoral gatekeepers—who appear to exert a significant influence over the candidate entry process and the demographic makeup of our politicians—should be considered part of the explanation for why so few working-class Americans run for public office.

### **The 2013 National Survey of Party Leaders**

To determine how gatekeepers feel about potential candidates from the working class, I analyzed data from the 2013 National Survey of Party Leaders (Broockman et al 2013) or NSPL, a cooperative survey of the roughly 6,000 leaders of the county-level branches of the Republican and Democratic parties.

County-level party leaders are by no means the only political actors who engage in the candidate gatekeeping, of course. However, the NSPL was an ideal sample for this analysis for several reasons. First, in most federal, state, and local elections, party leaders are among the most important candidate gatekeepers. Party organizations at every level of government engage in significant candidate recruitment activities (Aldrich 2000; Cotter et al 1984; Crowder-Meyer 2010b; Gibson et al 1983, Gibson et al 1985; Sanbonmatsu 2006), and they often powerfully influence who ultimately appears on the ballot on election day (Cohen et al 2008; Masket 2011).

Moreover, it is more straightforward to identify the party leaders in any level of government in the US than to identify other kinds of gatekeepers. It can be difficult to know which interest groups are involved in candidate recruitment in a given community (due to the sheer number of civic organizations in the US), or which sitting politicians help to identify and recruit candidates, or which journalists act as kingmakers, and so on. In contrast, the organization of the two major political parties is roughly the same in virtually every state and local context: the two parties have clear-cut federated structures (county offices, state offices, federal offices,

and so on). As a result, it is far easier for researchers to study party gatekeepers than to identify the other interest groups, journalists, and politicians who also recruit new candidates.

As for the level of office, the leaders of *county-level* political parties are more numerous than the leaders of state or federal political parties and often more willing to participate in scholarly research. And they are far easier to identify and contact than the leaders of city-level political parties. Data on county party leaders provide us with an easy window into the community of electoral gatekeepers—and enough cases to make sensible empirical inferences.

Following Crowder-Meyer's (2010a) research on gatekeeper biases against women, the 2013 NSPL began by first collecting the email and/or physical mailing addresses of the leaders or chairs of every county-level (or equivalent)<sup>1</sup> branch of the Republican and Democratic parties nationwide. (Nine states were excluded because neither party posted contact information for county-level officials: GA, IN, IA, KY, MI, NH, NM, OK, and WI.) The NSPL first sent postcards and pre-survey emails to each respondent, then followed up a week later with a full letter and/or email inviting the chair to complete the survey. (If both a mailing address and an email address were available, the study attempted to contact party leaders both ways.)

Of the 6,219 chairs who were contacted, 1,118 completed the survey (18%), a response rate comparable to recent self-completed surveys of sitting politicians (e.g., Broockman and Skovron 2013), although somewhat lower than Crowder-Meyer's (2010a) comparable survey in 2008. There were no obvious regional differences in response rates (see Figure A1 in the Appendix), and rates were nearly identical for Republican and Democratic party chairs (18.0%

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<sup>1</sup> Louisiana's parties are organized by parish, Alaska's are organized by borough, North Dakota's are organized by district, Connecticut's are organized by city, and the Democratic party in Massachusetts is organized by sub-city unit.

and 17.9%, respectively) and for party leaders previously identified as men and women (18.2% and 18.5%; among party leaders whose genders were not known, the response rate was 16.5%).

Importantly for this study, the NSPL included three items designed to measure differences in how gatekeepers recruit candidates from white-collar and working-class occupations—as well as comparable questions about how party leaders recruited or thought about male and female candidates. These additional questions about gender provided a useful benchmark for evaluating party leaders’ responses to questions about class. Political scientists have documented clear biases in how gatekeepers evaluate and recruit female candidates; with the NSPL, we can ask whether party leaders prefer professionals—and whether that preference is comparable in magnitude to the consequential preference they exhibit for male candidates.

Of course, measuring social group preferences is a notoriously thorny methodological challenge. The NSPL used three different types of questions to gauge how party leaders treat working-class people in the candidate recruitment process: a question that asked party leaders to estimate how many working-class candidates they had recently recruited (and an analogous item about female candidates), a block of questions about party leaders’ general attitudes about working-class candidates (and, again, an analogous block about women), and an experiment in which party leaders evaluated two hypothetical candidates whose social classes and other characteristics (including gender) were randomly assigned. No single measure is bulletproof, of course, but by using three different approaches, the NSPL provided a robust answer to the question of whether party leaders prefer professionals over candidates from the working class.

The first item on this topic was phrased as a simple *recall* question: “In the last few elections, what percentage of the following groups would you estimate were employed in working-class jobs (e.g., factory workers, restaurant servers, receptionists) at the time? . . . The

potential candidates your party tried to recruit.” The survey also asked an analogous question about women: “In the last few elections, what percentage of the following groups would you estimate were women? . . . The potential candidates your party tried to recruit.” With these data—and the known percentages of working-class and female citizens in the general public—we can answer the simple question of whether party leaders self-report recruiting working-class candidates less often than white-collar professionals—and how any social class gaps we observe compare to the self-reported gender gap in candidate recruitment.

The second set of questions were *attitude* items that asked party leaders their general views about how well working-class candidates perform on several tasks related to campaigning and governing: “In races for county and local office in your area, relative to candidates with professional backgrounds, do you think candidates from working-class jobs (e.g., factory workers, restaurant servers, receptionists) tend to be [options: more, the same, less] . . . Qualified to hold office? Easy to convince to run? Preferred by voters? Good at fundraising? Good at campaigning?” Again, the survey also included an analogous question asked about female vs. male candidates (“relative to male candidates, do you think female candidates tend to be . . .”). Of course, the responses party leaders gave did not measure the reality of how working-class candidates actually perform in campaigns and elections, but rather how party leaders *believe* they perform. With these data, we can look more closely at how party leaders think about working-class candidates. (And by matching their responses to other items on the NSPL that tapped their strategic environments—e.g., data on how much campaigns in their areas cost—we can also test the convenience and electoral strategy explanations.)

The survey’s third measure was an exercise designed to observe the actual *behavior* of party leaders by asking them to make a choice between two hypothetical candidates. The item

began, “Suppose there is a primary for an open [county board / state legislative / US House] seat in your county and the two individuals below are considering running. We’d like you to consider the following two potential candidates for this office.” Following Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014), the survey then described “Candidate A” and “Candidate B” by displaying two side-by-side lists of the candidates’ personal attributes (for an example, see Figure A2 in the Appendix). Unbeknownst to the party leader completing the survey, each aspect of each candidate’s biography was independently randomized: the survey supplied each candidate’s name (randomizing among a set of male and female first names), age (randomizing between 43 and 47), occupation (randomizing among law, business, politics, education, or working-class jobs), experience in the party (randomizing how active the candidate had been in the party organization), life circumstances (randomizing among having free time, being a veteran, having flexible work hours, being independently wealthy, or having two young children), personal characteristics (randomizing among assertiveness, fundraising experience, work ethic, physical attractiveness, public speaking ability, and name recognition), and political ideology (randomizing among being similar to the party’s typical voter, somewhat more liberal, somewhat more conservative, much more liberal, and much more conservative). This *conjoint experiment* measured how a wide range of characteristics—including class and gender—affected party leaders’ recruitment decisions.

Of course, each of these measurement strategies could suffer from halo effects and other problems associated with survey responses. The party leaders completing the surveys might have exaggerated how inclusive their recruitment efforts really are. They might have misremembered how many workers they recruited. They might have misunderstood what “working class” means or mistaken some white-collar professionals for blue-collar workers, or vice versa (although the



survey clearly defined “working class” in each question). Survey data are imperfect. However, the NSPL is the only dataset to my knowledge that is suitable for empirically determining whether working-class Americans receive less encouragement from electoral gatekeepers.


And on balance it is generally well-suited to the task. Any halo effects should be predictable: if party leaders exhibit anti-worker preferences in surveys, it is probably safe to assume that their preferences are even more pronounced in real life. And although each type of question has important limitations, the use of three different measurement techniques significantly reduces the chances that a single imperfect survey item will lead us astray. The NSPL is the best dataset for answering the questions at issue in this paper, and it is a good starting point for research on the links between political gatekeeping and the social class makeup of government.

### **Are Party Leaders Less Likely to Recruit Workers?**

On all three measures, the party leaders who responded to the 2013 NSPL exhibited clear preferences for white-collar candidates over those from the working class.

Figure 1 plots responses to the *recall* item, which asked county party leaders about the percentage of working-class citizens who they encouraged to run for office in recent elections. Whereas working-class Americans make up over half of the general public, party leaders reported that workers made up 28% of the candidates they had recently attempted to recruit. (and the gap was statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$ ). This figure probably overstates the actual percentages they recruited, of course; if party leaders felt some pressure to seem inclusive—or if they simply misremembered—they may have reported recruiting more workers that they really did. (This may well be the case; in several related items on the NSPL, party leaders estimated

**Figure 1: (Recall Items) Party Leaders Report Recruiting Fewer Workers**



*Sources:* US Census Bureau (2013) and Broockman et al (2013).

that workers made up roughly 30% of the candidates who ran and won, although prior research suggests that working-class people make up less than 10% of local officeholders.)

Even with their halos on, however, party leaders estimated that they recruited far fewer working-class candidates than professionals—the recruitment gap in Figure 1 was substantial (about half the magnitude of the total underrepresentation of workers in most public offices) and was comparable in size to the difference between the share of women party leaders recruited and their numbers in the general public. When asked to recall how they recruit new candidates, party leaders reported that they give significantly less encouragement to potential candidates from the working class.

The NSPL’s attitude questions yielded similar results. Figure 2 plots the breakdown of responses, again comparing how party leaders evaluated workers and women. The items in this block of questions asked party leaders how the group in question (workers or women) generally


compared to its complement (white-collar professionals or men, respectively) in terms of how qualified group members were to hold public office (labeled “Qualified” in Figure 2), how easy they were to recruit to run (“Recruitable”), how easy or difficult they generally found fundraising (“Fundable”), how easy or hard they found campaigning (“Runnable”), and their odds of winning the election (“Electable”).

On all five measures, at least a quarter of party leaders reported that they viewed working-class citizens as worse potential candidates than white-collar professionals. These gatekeepers had especially dim views of the ease with which workers could be recruited to run for office—more than half reported that workers were harder to recruit than white-collar professionals—and the ease with which workers could raise money—two thirds of party leaders believed that working-class candidates would have a harder time raising money. These negative views about working-class candidates were at least as common as negative views about female candidates (as the bottom panel of Figure 2 illustrates). Simply put, party leaders do not have high hopes for candidates from the working class.

Moreover, these low opinions appear to be widespread. Figure 3 plots the percentage of party leaders who reported that they felt working-class candidates were less qualified (the top bar in the top panel of Figure 2), this time disaggregating the sample using several additional items on the NSPL (listed in their entirety in Appendix Note 1) that asked party leaders about their own personal backgrounds (e.g., the party leader’s gender, race, and income) and strategic context (e.g., the number of safe seats in the district).

Strikingly, most measures yielded trivial differences in party leaders’ views. Male and female party leaders and white and non-white party leaders were equally likely to view working-class people as less qualified for office. Likewise, party leaders whose organizations met at least


**Figure 2: (Attitude Items) Party Leaders Have Doubts about Working-Class Candidates**



Source: Broockman et al (2013).

once a month and recruited candidates from among active campaign volunteers were about as likely to say that workers were less qualified as party leaders whose organizations met less often or recruited candidates from other sources. Expensive vs. cheap elections; safe seats vs. contested races—the gaps were small. The most striking differences in Figure 3 were between Republicans and Democrats (Democratic party leaders were less likely to report that they viewed working-class candidates as less qualified), party leaders who reported having at least one working-class person on their party organization’s executive committee and those who did not

**Figure 3: (Attitude Items) The Perception that Workers are Unqualified is Widespread**



*Note:* Bars report the percentage of party leaders in each group who reported that they felt that working-class people tend to be less qualified for county and local offices in their area. Statistically significant differences are denoted as follows: +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ .  
*Source:* Broockman et al (2013).


(those who did not were more likely to report low opinions of workers’ qualifications), and party leaders who earned high and low incomes (higher-income leaders were more likely to doubt workers’ qualifications). But even those gaps were tiny: close to a quarter of Democratic party leaders, lower-income party leaders, and party leaders with working-class board members

reported that they viewed workers as less qualified. The most striking feature of Figure 3 is not variation, but rather how consistently party leaders of very different strategic and personal stripes reported that they viewed working-class Americans as less qualified to hold office.

Figure 4 repeats the analysis in Figure 3, this time focusing on the item that most party leaders reportedly saw as a weakness for working-class candidates, namely, their ability to raise money. Again, this view was remarkably widespread—when I subset party leaders in the same fashion as in Figure 3, in every subgroup, at least 58% of leaders endorsed the view that workers are worse fundraisers.

Importantly, the most pronounced differences in this measure were between party leaders who reported that local elections in their area were inexpensive (less than \$5,000 on average) and those who reported that local elections were very expensive (more than \$25,000). One hypothesis about *why* party leaders prefer more affluent candidates is that they have strategic reasons to do so, including concerns about whether workers could raise enough money (or about the amount of resources and effort party leaders would have to invest to compensate for workers' shortcomings on this front). The analysis in Figure 4 was squarely in line with this explanation: party leaders were significantly more likely to question workers' ability to raise money in places where elections are more expensive. If party leaders reported that workers were bad fundraisers regardless of how much elections cost, we might worry that their stated concerns about fundraising were just some kind of rationalization—for instance, that they *disliked* workers, but justified not recruiting them in terms of some invented shortcoming. The analysis in Figure 4 suggests, however, that party leaders worry about workers' ability to fundraise at least partly reflects the *electoral strategy* explanation.

**Figure 4: (Attitude Items) The Perception that Workers Have a Hard Time Fundraising**



*Note:* Bars report the percentage of party leaders in each group who reported that they believed working-class people in their area tend to be worse at raising campaign money. Statistically significant differences are denoted as follows: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .  
*Source:* Broockman et al (2013).

I reached similar conclusions when I estimated larger regression models (available in their entirety in Table A1 in the Appendix) relating the outcome variables in Figures 1 and 2 to controls for party leaders’ party identifications, genders, races, incomes, self-reported political ideologies, the cost of elections, the percentage of safe seats, the party organization’s resources

(year-round physical office, campaign office, website, constitution, monthly meetings), whether any working-class people served on the party's executive committee, whether the party had a formal candidate recruitment program, and where party leaders reported that they usually recruited candidates (people active in elections, current officeholders, business groups, and so on). The regression exercise provided some clear support for the *convenience* and *electoral strategy* explanations for gatekeepers' preference for professionals: when campaigns were more expensive, party leaders were more likely to report viewing workers as less fundable (consistent with the electoral strategy explanation, as in Figure 4); parties that regularly recruited candidates from labor unions or voter lists reported recruiting more working-class candidates; and those that regularly recruited candidates recommended by donors recruited significantly fewer workers (consistent with the convenience explanation). The anti-worker preferences gatekeepers exhibited seem to be linked at least in part to strategic considerations like the ease of finding qualified workers or the relative difficulty workers would face in campaigns.

Then again, many of the variables in my larger regression models were surprisingly uncorrelated with party leaders' answers to recall and attitude questions. In sharp contrast to the *convenience* explanation, party leaders were no more likely to report recruiting or feeling positively about working-class candidates when they had workers on on their executive committees. In contrast to the *electoral strategy* explanation, election costs were not associated with the percentage of working-class candidates party leaders actually reported recruiting, and the percentage of seats that were safe for the party was not associated with any of the outcomes considered here, with one exception<sup>2</sup> (less than what would be expected by chance alone).<sup>3</sup> Of

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<sup>2</sup> In the safest districts, party leaders were slightly less likely to say that workers would have a hard time campaigning.



course, these non-findings could reflect weaknesses in the survey design; perhaps the items did not tap some important strategic consideration (omitted variables) or were not worded in a way that elicited accurate responses (measurement error). However, they could also be a sign that the responses party leaders gave to questions about recruiting working-class candidates were the result of more than just convenience and electoral strategy. On this point, the evidence here is suggestive but indeterminate: party leaders say they give workers less encouragement (the central question at issue in this paper), and electoral strategy appears to be part of the reason, but there are also signs that the non-strategic bias explanation is worth exploring in future research.

The hypothetical candidate conjoint experiment yielded similar findings: party leaders preferred professionals, and some—though not all—of that preference appeared to be linked to strategic considerations. In one section of the NSPL, party leaders were shown two hypothetical candidates, then asked to evaluate whether they would encourage each candidate to run and whether they perceived the candidate as less likely to win the primary, win the general election, raise enough money for his or her campaign, recruit enough volunteers, remain loyal to the party once in office, and be an effective elected official. Importantly, the experiment ruled out the convenience explanation by design (party leaders were shown two candidates—they didn't have to seek them out) and attempted to control for many factors related to electoral success (although of course no study can rule out every conceivable factor), including the level of office the

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<sup>3</sup> By far the best predictor of the percentage of workers party leaders recalled recruiting was the party leader's own income: relative to the poorest party leaders in the sample, the party leaders who made higher incomes reported recruiting 7 to 10 percentage points fewer working-class candidates, a finding that could reflect convenience (perhaps affluent party leaders simply recruit their affluent friends) but could also reflect prejudice or other non-strategic social biases.

candidates would be seeking and each candidate's ideology, prior experience, life circumstances, and talents—even prior experience with fundraising for a local nonprofit.


Figure 5 plots estimates from regression models (presented in their entirety in Table A2 in the Appendix) in which I treated each hypothetical candidate as an independent observation (following Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), then regressed the probability that a party leader would choose that candidate as the one they would encourage (then, separately, the one more likely to win the primary, and so on) on each of the independent, randomly-assigned candidate attributes (using clustered standard errors clustered by a unique identifier for each respondent, in order to account for the fact that each candidate was a part of a two-candidate head-to-head comparison in the survey).<sup>4</sup>

Most of the experimental manipulations worked exactly as expected. In my larger regression models, party leaders were significantly more likely to say they would recruit and to express confidence in candidates with more experience, a closer match to the party's preferred ideology, and favorable life circumstances. Even after controlling for these characteristics, however, party leaders still exhibited significant preferences for affluent candidates. As the first bar in Figure 5 illustrates, a candidate randomly described as a blue-collar worker was six percentage points less likely to be chosen for recruitment. (In contrast, there was a small and non-significant positive effect when the candidate was randomly described as a woman.) This six percentage point penalty was about as large as the penalty associated with having two small children (relative to having a great deal of free time; seven percentage points) and the benefits

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<sup>4</sup> I also conducted the diagnostic tests recommended by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014). See Tables A3, A4, and A5 in the Appendix.

**Figure 5: (Behavior Items) How a Candidate’s Working-class Job Affects Party Leader Perceptions**



*Note:* Bars report how much more or less likely (on a 0 to 1 scale) a party leader was to say “yes” to each of the items listed on the left when a hypothetical candidate was randomly described as having a working-class occupation (receptionist, restaurant server, or factory worker) and not a white-collar occupation (attorney, business owner, investor, lawyer, nurse, small business owner, social worker, or teacher). <sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$

associated with being a hard worker, a gifted public speaker, and a veteran (relative to being assertive; five points, five points, and ten points, respectively).

The main reason party leaders preferred professional candidates seemed to be because they believed that working-class Americans have a hard time raising money and winning elections. Party leaders were just as likely to say that they believed working-class candidates could recruit volunteers, stay loyal to the party, and serve in office effectively. However, they were vastly less likely to believe that working-class candidates could raise money or win elections. These beliefs persisted even after controlling for whether the candidate was active in the county party, was active in the interest groups that were important to the party, was a frequent campaign volunteer, had a great deal of free time, was assertive, was attractive, was a

gifted public speaker, or was an experienced fundraiser for a local nonprofit. (There were no comparable penalties for female candidates on any of these measures.)

Even when presented with evidence to the contrary, party leaders simply assumed that working-class candidates would be bad fundraisers and would struggle to win elections, and they were less likely to encourage them to run for office. Of course, the evidence they were presented with may not have been exhaustive—they may have had other strategic concerns about working-class candidates that were not addressed by the attributes listed in the conjoint experiment. Like what party leaders reported in questions about how often they recruited workers and how they viewed working-class candidates, party leaders given the opportunity to support a hypothetical qualified working-class candidate were significantly more likely to say they would recruit a white-collar professional, citing concerns about electoral strategy. Of course, it is also possible that their preferences were partly non-strategic—even after controlling for a host of strategic factors, party leaders still preferred professionals over workers. Regardless, it is clear from these data that these important electoral gatekeepers prefer to recruit professional candidates.

### **Keeping Workers Off the Ballot**

Electoral gatekeepers—party and interest group leaders, politicians, and journalists—powerfully influence who runs for public office and, consequently, who serves in the country's most important political institutions. When they prefer not to recruit candidates from a given social group, they can hamper that group's inclusion in American political institutions.

There are good reasons to suspect that electoral gatekeepers play an important role in the underrepresentation of the working class in American political institutions. Many gatekeepers are affluent themselves; when they search for new candidates to fill their benches, they likely have an easier time finding affluent recruits. Gatekeepers also want to win elections; many may

back affluent candidates because they feel they are best positioned to field effective campaigns. And electoral gatekeepers are people, too: many likely harbor negative stereotypes about the less fortunate or simply feel more comfortable around rich people. If gatekeepers exhibit social class preferences when they recruit candidates, they may be one of the main factors keeping lower-income and working-class Americans from holding office in the United States.

To my knowledge, no prior study had ever tested the idea that gatekeepers might be behind our white-collar government. This paper's analysis of the 2013 National Survey of Party Leaders is the first hard evidence that gatekeepers do, in fact, privilege professional candidates: they report that workers make up disproportionately small percentages of the candidates they recruit, they perceive workers as bad candidates, and they choose white-collar candidates over blue-collar workers in hypothetical exercises. Their reasons seem to be at least partly motivated by strategic concerns: party leaders are more likely to view workers as bad fundraisers in places where elections are expensive, for instance. However, a dim view of working-class candidates is nearly universal among party leaders nationwide, and when party leaders encounter hypothetical working-class candidates with experience and skills, they often nonetheless choose white-collar professionals. Party leaders prefer to recruit affluent candidates for strategic reasons, but we cannot rule out the possibility that they are also biased for non-strategic reasons like unjustified low expectations—or even negative stereotypes or prejudice.

These findings are especially striking in light of the how well working-class candidates actually perform at the polls. In elections, candidates from the working class tend to receive about as many votes as candidates from professional backgrounds (Carnes 2013a, ch. 6). The same seems to be true in carefully controlled experiments: in an illuminating series of studies, Meredith Sadin (2012; see also Carnes and Lupu np) has recently shown that voters randomly

assigned to evaluate a hypothetical candidate from the working class are just as likely to report that they would vote for him as people randomly assigned to evaluate an otherwise identical hypothetical candidate from an elite professional background. I know of no study of whether workers are indeed as bad at fundraising as party leaders think, but the evidence about elections suggests that party leaders are incorrect about how working-class candidates perform at the polls.

How important are these kinds of gatekeeping preferences in the aggregate, though? Party leaders are less likely to encourage working-class candidates, but how much of an effect does that ultimately have on the supply of new candidates? It is difficult to know with the data in this study. Lawless and Fox (2005, Table 5.8) find that qualified people who were encouraged to run by an electoral gatekeeper were 18 percentage points more likely to consider running for office. If there were a pool of 100 qualified workers and 100 qualified professionals, all with roughly equal probability of running (say, 5% to begin with), and party leaders recruited 20 people in the fashion described in Figure 1 above (5 workers and 15 professionals) the 18 percentage point boost in the odds that they would run would add up to 6 working-class candidates in expectation and 8 professionals. In this hypothetical scenario, workers would make up 43% of the candidate pool—in other words, if we simply extrapolate from this study, we might conclude that gatekeepers explain about one eighth of the gap between working-class representation in the general public (about 50%) and in most political offices (about 3 to 5%).

Of course, this kind of extrapolation is only a rough estimate of the effect of gatekeepers on the underrepresentation of workers. This study has provided the first evidence that gatekeepers are part of the explanation for why so few working-class Americans run for office, but more work is still needed to understand how much of the gap is attributable to workers not being asked to run—and how much is the result of workers not being able to or not wanting to.

Moreover, this study has several important limitations that are worth reiterating here. The findings reported here point clearly to the idea that party leaders are less likely to encourage working-class candidates to run for office, but they provide only suggestive evidence about the relative importance of the mechanisms that might explain why (convenience, electoral strategy, and non-strategic biases). Just as we need more work to understand the effects of gatekeepers on working-class candidate entry, we still have a lot to learn about the causes, too.

Moreover, this paper has relied on surveys of gatekeepers, with all the obvious limitations that that entails. We can learn a great deal from surveys, of course, but they are no substitute for studying actual behavior. Just as scholars of voter turnout have learned a great deal from both election surveys and actual turnout data, scholars interested in gatekeeper biases will undoubtedly benefit from studying both surveys of gatekeepers (like this one) and data on how gatekeepers actually behave.

Another important limitation is that this study has focused primarily on party leaders. Party officials are ideal for this kind of analysis, but they are not the only people who engage in candidate gatekeeping. If we wish to understand the barriers facing potential candidates from the working class, we will need to continue studying the larger community of candidate recruiters.

Despite these limitations, the analyses reported here suggest clearly that gatekeepers are part of the explanation for the shortage of workers in office. They suggest that scholars interested in explaining why so few lower-income and working-class Americans go on to be politicians should be paying careful attention to the role of party leaders and other institutional gatekeepers.

These findings also have implications for scholars interested in representation and political equality. They suggest that the pioneering research on the shortage of women in public office may have far-reaching implications for other social groups. Gatekeeper biases and other

processes that have been shown to keep women out of office may be a common explanation for the underrepresentation of other groups. There may be a larger *politics of exclusion* in the candidate recruitment process that keeps a wide range of social groups from pursuing office.

The findings reported here also underscore the importance of studying electoral gatekeepers, a group that is often neglected in research on campaigns and elections, which tends to focus more on voters and candidates. This study adds to the growing body of evidence suggesting that electoral gatekeepers are consequential figures in American elections and supports recent calls for renewed attention to how gatekeepers influence the choices on our ballots and ultimately the makeup of our political institutions.

Finally, this study highlights a previously undocumented mechanism of elite influence in the United States. Scholars of political inequality often focus on inequalities in who votes, who participates, who donates, and who lobbies. This study joins a growing body of research on the fact that less affluent Americans seldom govern—and highlights an important factor keeping them out. Why are the rich so powerful in American politics? Part of the explanation may be that they are the ones recruiting the next generation of American politicians.



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
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## Appendix

**Figure A1:** NSPL Response Rates, by State



*Source:* Brockman et al (2013).

## Appendix

**Figure A2: Example of Conjoint Experiment**

**2013 NATIONAL SURVEY OF PARTY LEADERS**

#36294

**Suppose there is a primary for an open county board seat in your county and the two individuals below are considering running. We'd like you to consider the following two potential candidates for this office:**

	Candidate A	Candidate B
Name	Samantha	Christopher
Age	47	43
Occupation	Social worker	Social worker
Experience in party	Active and well known in group important to the party	Frequent campaign volunteer for last four election cycles
Life circumstances	Has flexible work hours	Has two young children
Talents	Talented public speaker	Well known in community
Positions and ideology	Somewhat more liberal than the typical voter from your county in your party	Somewhat more conservative than the typical voter from your county in your party

*Source:* Broockman et al (2013).



## Appendix

### Note A1: Questions Wording for Subset Variables in Figures 3 and 4

What is your gender? Male / Female

What is your race or ethnic background? (check all that apply) White / Black / Hispanic or Latino / Asian-Pacific Islander / Native Americans / Other \_\_\_\_\_

In general, how would you describe your political views? Very liberal / Liberal / Slightly liberal / Moderate / Slightly conservative / Conservative / Very conservative / Other \_\_\_\_\_ (NOTE: No one selected “Other”)

Running for political office these days can be expensive. Thinking about elections over the last five years in your area, about how much would a candidate for the following offices have to spend, on average, to win both the primary and general election for the following offices? . . . County legislative office (e.g., county supervisor or commissioner) \_\_\_\_\_

In your area, about what proportion of political offices would you consider safe for your party or are almost certain your party will win? 0-25% / 26-50% / 51-75% / 75-100%

Does your party organization have . . . (check all that apply) A year-round physical office / A physical campaign headquarters during election season / A website / A constitution, charter, or other set of formal rules / Meets at least once a month

We’re interested in knowing who gets active in politics in your area. Thinking about the executive committee of your county party, to the best of your knowledge, how many current members are . . . Manual laborers or service workers (Currently, or before retirement)

Does your party have a formal process, committee, or person in charge of identifying and encouraging candidates to run for office (at any level)? Yes / No

Thinking about elections over the past five years, how often have your party officials looked for new state legislative, county, or local office candidates . . . (check on per row: Rarely or Never / Sometimes / Often) Among people active in election and issue campaigns (e.g., volunteers, activists, campaign managers) / Among those already holding other offices (e.g., commission members, city council members) / Among business and professional groups (e.g., Chamber of Commerce) / Among those working in specific, high-skilled occupations (e.g., business, law, medicine) / Among education or youth-related organizations (e.g., PTA, Youth Activities League) / In labor unions / In ethnic, nationality, or civil rights organizations / In service or fraternal organizations / Based on recommendations from current officeholders / Based on recommendations from financial donors / Based on recommendations from people in party members’ personal networks / By posting ads, or sending mass e-mails or mailings / Using voter lists / Other \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix

**Table A1:** Regression Analyses of Recall and Attitude Items

<i>Self-reported measure of attitudes about working-class candidates</i>	Pct. of Workers Recruited (%)	Workers Less Qualified? (ind.)	Workers Less Recruitable? (ind.)	Workers Less Fundable? (ind.)	Workers Less Runnable? (ind.)	Workers Less Electable? (ind.)
<i>Demographics</i>						
Party: Democrat (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Republican	2.39 (4.54)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)
Gender: Female (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male	4.58* (2.15)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Skipped	9.68 (9.62)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.17)	-0.24 (0.16)	-0.30 (0.16)	-0.31* (0.15)
Race: White	-8.00 (6.27)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.09 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)	0.05 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.10)
Black	-4.63 (8.20)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.14)	0.06 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.14)
Hispanic	-3.08 (8.12)	0.14 (0.12)	0.09 (0.13)	0.23 (0.12)	0.12 (0.13)	0.08 (0.12)
Asian / Pacific Islander	-10.16 (13.84)	0.16 (0.22)	-0.13 (0.25)	0.09 (0.23)	0.12 (0.23)	0.11 (0.23)
Native American	-2.15 (6.45)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.10 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.20 (0.12)	-0.16 (0.11)
Other Race	-11.89 (7.39)	-0.13 (0.12)	0.11 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)
Income: 0-30k (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
30-50k	-3.10 (5.01)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)
50-75k	-9.79* (4.88)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.15 (0.08)
75-100k	-3.78 (4.93)	0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)
100-150k	-11.20* (4.91)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)
150k +	-7.72 (5.23)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	0.17* (0.08)
Rather not say	-5.69 (5.23)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)
No answer	-1.55 (12.90)	-0.13 (0.20)	-0.14 (0.23)	0.01 (0.22)	0.10 (0.21)	0.21 (0.21)
Ideology: Very liberal (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Liberal	-0.66 (3.48)	0.09 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Slightly liberal	3.16 (4.40)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)
Moderate	3.65 (4.30)	0.12 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)
Slightly conservative	-0.41 (6.06)	0.14 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.09 (0.10)	0.14 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)
Conservative	7.83 (5.43)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.10 (0.09)	0.13 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.09)
Very conservative	12.87* (5.98)	0.01 (0.10)	0.00 (0.11)	0.05 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.10)
No answer	4.80 (12.37)	0.06 (0.18)	0.17 (0.21)	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.19)	0.39* (0.19)

## Appendix

(continued from above)	Workers Recruited (%)	Workers Less Qualified (ind.)	Workers Less Recruitable (ind.)	Workers Less Fundable (ind.)	Workers Less Runnable (ind.)	Workers Less Electable (ind.)
<i>Elections</i>						
Cost: \$0-5k (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
\$5-10k	0.78 (2.93)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.15** (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
\$10-15k	4.71 (4.40)	-0.11 (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)
\$15-20k	-0.12 (4.97)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.18* (0.09)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)
\$20-25k	0.54 (4.43)	0.04 (0.07)	0.07 (0.08)	0.27*** (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)
\$25k+	0.22 (2.80)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Don't know / No Answer	-1.53 (3.04)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)
Safe seats: 0-25% (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
26-50%	0.53 (2.74)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
51-75%	-0.21 (2.72)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
75-100%	-1.96 (2.68)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)
Don't know / No Answer	-11.18 (10.69)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.29 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.14)
<i>Does the party organization LACK . . .</i>						
Year-round physical office	3.23 (2.34)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Campaign headquarters	-0.00 (2.10)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)
Website	5.01* (2.37)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Constitution / charter	4.79 (2.91)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Monthly meetings	-1.43 (2.28)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
(Skipped the above items)	21.23** (7.41)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.18 (0.12)	-0.17 (0.11)	0.00 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)
Worker(s) on exec committee	-6.94*** (2.07)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.08* (0.03)
(Skipped the above item)	-1.85 (3.46)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)
Formal candidate recruitment	0.91 (2.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
(Skipped the above item)	-14.73 (11.41)	0.37* (0.15)	0.24 (0.17)	0.23 (0.16)	0.31 (0.16)	0.30 (0.16)
(continued below)						

## Appendix

(continued from above)	Workers Recruited (%)	Workers Less Qualified (ind.)	Workers Less Recruitable (ind.)	Workers Less Fundable (ind.)	Workers Less Runnable (ind.)	Workers Less Electable (ind.)
<i>Sometimes / often recruits candidates from</i>						
People active in elections	1.80 (3.17)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Current officeholders	11.03** (3.53)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
Business groups	-2.41 (2.39)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
High-skilled occupations	1.59 (2.38)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education organizations	1.59 (2.38)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Labor unions	8.31** (2.61)	-0.14** (0.04)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)
Ethnic or civil rights groups	-1.83 (2.37)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Service or fraternal organizations	2.70 (2.18)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Recommend. from officeholders	-2.37 (3.16)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	0.09 (0.05)
Recommendations from donors	-5.22* (2.18)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Recommendations from friends	-0.10 (2.66)	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Posting ads or sending emails	2.23 (2.45)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)
Using voter lists	4.37* (2.13)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
(None of the above)	2.65 (10.21)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.21 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.11)
Intercept	18.01 (9.63)	0.25 (0.15)	0.77*** (0.17)	0.54*** (0.16)	0.30 (0.16)	0.26 (0.15)
<i>N</i>	709	882	877	881	821	878
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.171	0.078	0.092	0.122	0.083	0.098

Source: Broockman et al (2013).

Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models. <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , two tailed.

## Appendix

**Appendix Table A2: Regression Analyses of Hypothetical Candidate Experiment**

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
<b><i>Demographics</i></b>							
Occupation: Worker	-0.06 <sup>+</sup> (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.13** (0.03)	-0.21** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Professional (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Gender: Female	0.06* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Male (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Age: 47	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
43 (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<b><i>Experience</i></b>							
None (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Active in county party	0.23** (0.04)	0.21** (0.04)	0.19** (0.04)	0.15** (0.04)	0.27** (0.04)	0.23** (0.04)	0.20** (0.04)
Active in important groups	0.15** (0.04)	0.18** (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.21** (0.04)	0.16** (0.04)	0.16** (0.04)
Frequent campaign volunteer	0.18** (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.28** (0.04)	0.18** (0.04)	0.15** (0.04)
Recent campaign volunteer	0.13** (0.04)	0.08 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.21** (0.04)	0.16** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)
<b><i>Ideology (Republicans)</i></b>							
Very conservative (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Somewhat conservative	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)

(continued below)

## Appendix

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
Middle of the road	0.09 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.11 <sup>+</sup> (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Somewhat liberal	-0.33** (0.06)	-0.39** (0.05)	-0.21** (0.06)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.47** (0.05)	-0.39** (0.05)
Very liberal	-0.53** (0.05)	-0.52** (0.05)	-0.34** (0.06)	-0.26** (0.06)	-0.29** (0.06)	-0.59** (0.05)	-0.51** (0.05)
<i>Ideology (Democrats)</i>							
Very conservative	-0.37** (0.05)	-0.36** (0.05)	-0.17** (0.05)	-0.12 <sup>+</sup> (0.05)	-0.24** (0.05)	-0.42** (0.04)	-0.39** (0.05)
Somewhat conservative	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.21** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.11 <sup>+</sup> (0.05)	-0.33** (0.05)	-0.14* (0.05)
Middle of the road	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Somewhat liberal	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.11 <sup>+</sup> (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.10 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)
Very liberal	-0.20** (0.05)	-0.23** (0.05)	-0.19** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.12 <sup>+</sup> (0.05)	-0.21** (0.05)	-0.19** (0.05)
<i>Life circumstances</i>							
Has a great deal of free time (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Has flexible work hours	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.08 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	-0.08 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Has two young children	-0.10 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.10 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	-0.09 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Is independently wealthy	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.22** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.12* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Military veteran	0.07* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)
<i>Talents</i>							
Assertive (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(continued)

## Appendix

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
Experienced fundraiser	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)	0.12* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)
Hard worker	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	0.08 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Physically attractive	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)
Talented public speaker	0.06 (0.04)	0.10 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	0.09 <sup>+</sup> (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Well known	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
<i>Level of office</i>							
County board (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
State legislature	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
US House	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Intercept	0.48** (0.06)	0.60** (0.06)	0.50** (0.06)	0.55** (0.06)	0.36** (0.06)	0.56** (0.06)	0.50** (0.06)
<i>N</i>	1480	1688	1676	1660	1654	1660	1614
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.177	0.140	0.107	0.125	0.090	0.181	0.157

*Source:* Broockman et al (2013).

*Notes:* Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models relating the outcome in question to indicators for the hypothetical candidate's characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , two tailed.

## Appendix

### Appendix Tables A3, A4, and A5: Diagnostic Tests

To check for *profile order effects*, I re-ran the regression model described in Table A2 interacting the indicator for working-class candidates with a variable indicating whether the candidate appeared first or second (see Table A3 in the Appendix). To verify *random assignment*, I regressed several party leader demographics (gender, race, and party) on the hypothetical candidate characteristics they were randomly assigned to see (see Table A4 in the Appendix). To check for *atypical profiles* effects, I excluded hypothetical candidates who were randomly described as being blue-collar workers and also independently wealthy (see Table A5 in the Appendix). The basic findings reported above were still evident in each of these diagnostic tests, although marginally-significant coefficients sometimes dipped below conventional levels. Unfortunately, I could not test for *attribute order effects* the way Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) proposed because the survey in question did not randomize attribute order. *Carryover effects* were not possible in this application because the experiment in question presented each respondent with only one pair of candidates, not multiple back-to-back pairs (as in Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).



## Appendix

**Appendix Table A3: Regression Analyses of Hypothetical Candidate Experiment**  
(Diagnostic Check for Confounding Profile Order Effects)

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
<b><i>Demographics</i></b>							
Occupation: Worker	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.19*** (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
<i>Candidate appeared second?</i>	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
<i>Cand. app. second</i> × Worker	0.02 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Professional (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Gender: Female	0.07** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Age: 47	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
<b><i>Experience</i></b>							
None (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Active in county party	0.24*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)
Active in important groups	0.15*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)
Frequent campaign volunteer	0.18*** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
Recent campaign volunteer	0.13*** (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)
<b><i>Ideology (Republicans)</i></b>							
Very conservative (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Somewhat conservative	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)

(continued below)

## Appendix

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
Middle of the road	0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Somewhat liberal	-0.33*** (0.06)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.47*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)
Very liberal	-0.53*** (0.05)	-0.51*** (0.05)	-0.34*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.29*** (0.06)	-0.59*** (0.05)	-0.51*** (0.05)
<i>Ideology (Democrats)</i>							
Very conservative	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.36*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.04)	-0.39*** (0.05)
Somewhat conservative	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.05)
Middle of the road	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Somewhat liberal	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)
Very liberal	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)
<i>Life circumstances</i>							
Has a great deal of free time (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Has flexible work hours	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Has two young children	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Is independently wealthy	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Military veteran	0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
<i>Talents</i>							
Assertive (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(continued)

## Appendix

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
Experienced fundraiser	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Hard worker	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Physically attractive	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)
Talented public speaker	0.06 (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Well known	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
<i>Level of office</i>							
County board (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
State legislature	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
US House	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Intercept	0.49*** (0.06)	0.59*** (0.06)	0.52*** (0.06)	0.53*** (0.06)	0.34*** (0.06)	0.56*** (0.06)	0.52*** (0.06)
<i>N</i>	1480	1688	1676	1660	1654	1660	1614
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.178	0.141	0.108	0.126	0.092	0.183	0.159

*Source:* Broockman et al (2013).

*Notes:* Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models relating the outcome in question to indicators for the hypothetical candidate's characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. <sup>+</sup>*p* < 0.10; \**p* < 0.05; \*\**p* < 0.01, two tailed.

## Appendix

**Appendix Table A4:** Regression Models Predicting Party Leaders Characteristics using Randomly-Assigned Candidate Characteristics in Conjoint Experiment  
(*Diagnostic Check for Non-Random Assignment*)

<i>Party Leader Characteristics</i>	<i>White?</i>	<i>Female?</i>	<i>Republican?</i>
<b><i>Demographics</i></b>			
Occupation: Worker	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
Professional (omitted)	--	--	--
Gender: Female	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Male (omitted)	--	--	--
Age: 47	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
43 (omitted)	--	--	--
<b><i>Experience</i></b>			
None (omitted)	--	--	--
Active in county party	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Active in important groups	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)
Frequent campaign volunteer	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Recent campaign volunteer	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
<b><i>Ideology (Republicans)</i></b>			
Very conservative (omitted)	--	--	--
Somewhat conservative	-0.04 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)	--

(continued below)

## Appendix

<i>Party Leader Characteristics</i>	<i>White?</i>	<i>Female?</i>	<i>Republican?</i>
Middle of the road	-0.02 (0.03)	0.09 (0.05)	--
Somewhat liberal	-0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)	--
Very liberal	-0.04 (0.02)	0.08 (0.04)	--
 <i>Ideology (Democrats)</i>			
Very conservative	-0.07* (0.03)	0.16** (0.05)	(see below)
Somewhat conservative	-0.04 (0.03)	0.18*** (0.05)	--
Middle of the road	-0.01 (0.03)	0.16** (0.05)	--
Somewhat liberal	-0.03 (0.03)	0.12* (0.05)	--
Very liberal	-0.03 (0.03)	0.12* (0.05)	--
 <i>Life circumstances</i>			
Has a great deal of free time (omitted)	--	--	--
Has flexible work hours	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
Has two young children	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Is independently wealthy	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Military veteran	0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
 <i>Talents</i>			
Assertive (omitted)	--	--	--
 (continued)			

## Appendix

<i>Party Leader Characteristics</i>	<i>White?</i>	<i>Female?</i>	<i>Republican?</i>
Experienced fundraiser	-0.01 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Hard worker	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Physically attractive	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Talented public speaker	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Well known	0.02 (0.02)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
<i>Level of office</i>			
County board (omitted)	--	--	--
State legislature	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
US House	0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Intercept	0.94*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.49*** (0.05)
<i>N</i>	1870	1870	1870
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.022	0.005

*Source:* Broockman et al (2013).

*Notes:* Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models relating the outcome in question to indicators for the hypothetical candidate's characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.10$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ , two tailed.

(from above)

The candidate ideology variables in these models are interactions of randomly-assigned treatment categories—how liberal or conservative the hypothetical candidate was—and the respondent's own party identification. As such, I must omit them in the third model (of respondent party identification). The significant coefficients on these variables in the first two models are the result of the larger association between party identification and race or gender among party leaders: within each party, the point estimates for the randomly-assigned candidate ideology variable are statistically indistinguishable from one another and from zero at a rate consistent with the hypothesis that treatment assignment was indeed random.

## Appendix

**Appendix Table A5: Regression Analyses of Hypothetical Candidate Experiment  
(Diagnostic Check Excluding Atypical Profiles)**

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
<b><i>Demographics</i></b>							
Occupation: Worker	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Professional (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Gender: Female	0.07** (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Male (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Age: 47	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
43 (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<b><i>Experience</i></b>							
None (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Active in county party	0.23*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)
Active in important groups	0.14*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
Frequent campaign volunteer	0.16*** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Recent campaign volunteer	0.13*** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)
<b><i>Ideology (Republicans)</i></b>							
Very conservative (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Somewhat conservative	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)

(continued below)

## Appendix

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
Middle of the road	0.05 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Somewhat liberal	-0.34*** (0.06)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.18** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.47*** (0.05)	-0.38*** (0.06)
Very liberal	-0.56*** (0.05)	-0.53*** (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.06)	-0.24*** (0.06)	-0.32*** (0.06)	-0.59*** (0.05)	-0.53*** (0.05)
<i>Ideology (Democrats)</i>							
Very conservative	-0.40*** (0.05)	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.04)	-0.41*** (0.05)
Somewhat conservative	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.34*** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.05)
Middle of the road	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Somewhat liberal	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Very liberal	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)
<i>Life circumstances</i>							
Has a great deal of free time (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Has flexible work hours	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Has two young children	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Is independently wealthy	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Military veteran	0.07* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)
<i>Talents</i>							
Assertive (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(continued)



## Appendix

<i>Measure</i>	Encourage to run?	Win the primary ?	Win the general election?	Raise enough money?	Recruit enough volunt.?	Stay loyal to the party?	Be effective ?
Experienced fundraiser	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Hard worker	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Physically attractive	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Talented public speaker	0.04 (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Well known	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
<i>Level of office</i>							
County board (omitted)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
State legislature	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
US House	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Intercept	0.51*** (0.06)	0.61*** (0.06)	0.50*** (0.06)	0.53*** (0.06)	0.38*** (0.06)	0.58*** (0.06)	0.52*** (0.06)
<i>N</i>	1397	1591	1578	1564	1557	1566	1521
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.179	0.143	0.110	0.128	0.091	0.184	0.162

*Source:* Broockman et al (2013).

*Notes:* Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models relating the outcome in question to indicators for the hypothetical candidate's characteristics. *Atypical profiles—those in which the hypothetical candidate was randomly described as a blue-collar worker who was independently wealthy—are omitted.* Standard errors are clustered by respondent. <sup>+</sup>*p* < 0.10; \**p* < 0.05; \*\**p* < 0.01, two tailed.