Risk Management in Financial Institutions

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Determinants of Risk Management in Financial Institutions

Risk management in financial institutions

- Since financial crisis, much debate of risk management failures
- Yet basic patterns and determinants are not known
- Essential for monetary and macro-prudential policy
- Empirical work guided by risk management theory

Identification

- Drop in net worth due to drop in local house prices
- Difference-in-difference and triple-differences estimation

Interest rate & foreign exchange risk

- Largest markets for derivatives
- Banks largest users of tradable securities for hedging purposes

Theory: Risk Management Subject to Financial Constraints

Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1993)

- Financial constraints imply effective risk aversion
- Prediction: more constrained firms hedge more (counterfactual!)

Rampini/Viswanathan (2010, 2013)

- Risk management requires net worth
- Financial constraints link financing and risk management
- Basic prediction: financing and risk management trade-off
 - Constrained firms hedge less as financing dominates hedging concerns

Risk management in financial institutions

- Froot/Stein (1998), Rampini/Viswanathan (2019), Vuillemey (forthcoming)
- Evidence on risk management and risk exposures Empirical literature

Hypothesis and Preview of Results

Hypothesis: net worth key determinant of risk management

Prediction for hedging in cross section and time series

Empirical evidence on relation between hedging and net worth

- Positive and significant relation in cross section
 - ... and within institution over time
- Identification: net worth drops lead to cut in risk management
 - and differentially so for institutions with high real estate exposure
- No evidence for alternative hypotheses

Data

Data sources

- Call reports and CRSP
- Time frame: 1995-2013; quarterly data; up to 76 quarters

Unit of observation: Bank holding companies (BHCs)

- 22,723 BHC-quarter observations
- Evidence similar at bank level

Sample

Exclude main dealers, results robust to their inclusion

Measurement: Interest Rate & Foreign Exchange Hedging

Net interest rate hedging

Change in market value of interest rate derivatives

Gross interest rate hedging

Gross notional of interest rate derivatives for hedging purposes

Gross foreign exchange hedging

- Gross notional of FX derivatives for hedging purposes
- All scaled by total assets

Hedging in Financial Institutions – Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for hedging, trading, and exposure

Panel A: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	S.D.	5th	10th	25th	Median	75th	90th	95th	98th	99th	Obs.
Hedging variables												
Net IR hedg.	0.016	0.325	-0.798	-0.182	0	0	0	0.236	0.986	0.986	0.986	19,832
Gross IR hedg.	0.039	0.088	0	0	0	0.001	0.034	0.120	0.203	0.344	0.570	22,723
Gross FX hedg.	0.001	0.009	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.002	0.014	0.026	22,707
Trading variables												
Gross IR trad.	0.031	0.161	0	0	0	0	0	0.019	0.110	0.504	1.218	22,723
Gross FX trad.	0.012	0.098	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.010	0.072	0.483	22,723
Exposure variable	s											
Maturity gap	0.094	0.178	-0.196	-0.120	-0.011	0.091	0.205	0.317	0.384	0.468	0.538	22,697
FX exposure	0.007	0.046	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.006	0.091	0.222	19,284

Measurement: Net Worth of Financial Institutions


Key state variable: Net worth

- Net worth determines tightness of financial constraints
- Construct (new) Net worth index first principal component of
 - (1) Market value of equity / Market value of assets [weight: 0.307]
 - (2) Size (log Total book assets) [weight: 0.149]
 - (3) Net income / Total assets [weight: 0.272]
 - (4) Cash dividends / Total assets [weight: 0.272]
- Construct Net worth index (ex size) first principal component of
 - (1) Market value of equity / Market value of assets [weight: 0.359]
 - (3) Net income / Total assets [weight: 0.329]
 - (4) Cash dividends / Total assets [weight: 0.312]
- Evidence using individual components and ratings similar

Net Worth Index for Financial Institutions


Distribution of net worth index over time

- ... with median (dash), mean (diamond)
- ... and 5th/95th (whiskers) and 25th/75th (rectangles) percentiles




Net Worth of Financial Institutions - Main Variables

Distribution of main net worth measures over time



Net Worth of Financial Institutions - Auxiliary Variables

Distribution of auxiliary net worth measures over time



Stylized Facts: Cross-Section & Within Evidence

Strong positive relation between hedging and net worth

- ... for interest rate and foreign exchange hedging
- ... in pooled, Tobit, and within regressions
- ... controlling for exposures

	Net	Net IR hedging			Gross IR hedging			Gross FX hedging		
	Pooled	Tobit	Within	Pooled	Tobit	Within	Pooled	Tobit	Within	
NWIndex	0.161^{***} (0.024)					$\begin{array}{c} 0.042^{***} \\ (0.007) \end{array}$	0.137^{**} (0.057)			
Exposure	0.106^{**} (0.041)	0.085^{**} (0.034)	0.004 (0.007)	0.170^{***} (0.059)		$\begin{array}{c} 0.015^{***} \\ (0.004) \end{array}$	0.321^{**} (0.165)	0.040^{*} (0.021)	0.090^{***} (0.005)	
Time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Institution FE	Ν	Ν	Υ	Ν	Ν	Υ	Ν	Ν	Y	
R^2 /Within- R^2	0.181	0.181	0.221	0.061	0.028	0.012	0.127	0.105	0.019	
Obs.	18,396	$18,\!396$	$18,\!396$	20,562	$20,\!652$	$20,\!652$	19,270	19,270	19,270	

Stylized Facts: Cross-Section & Within Evidence (Cont'd)


Positive relation between hedging and net worth indices

	Net IR hedging			Gros	s IR he	dging	Gross FX hedging		
	Pooled	Tobit	Within	Pooled	Tobit	Within	Pooled	Tobit	Within
NWIndex	0.161^{***} (0.024)	0.173^{***} (0.024)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.054^{***} \\ (0.012) \end{array}$		0.156^{***} (0.028)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042^{***} \\ (0.007) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.137^{**} \\ (0.057) \end{array}$	0.152^{***} (0.046)	0.022^{***} (0.006)
Exposure	0.106^{**} (0.041)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.085^{**} \\ (0.034) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.007) \end{array}$		0.115^{***} (0.041)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.015^{***} \\ (0.004) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.321^{**} \\ (0.165) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040^{*} \\ (0.021) \end{array}$	0.090^{***} (0.005)
Time FE Institution FE R^2 /Within- R^2 Obs.	Y N 0.181 18,396	Y N 0.181 18,396	Y Y 0.221 18,396	Y N 0.061 20,562	Y N 0.028 20,652	Y Y 0.012 20,652	Y N 0.127 19,270	Y N 0.105 19,270	Y Y 0.019 19,270
NWIndex (ex size)	0.070^{***} (0.023)		0.049^{***} (0.011)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032\\ (0.026) \end{array}$		0.036^{***} (0.006)	0.106^{*} (0.062)	0.085*** (0.006)	0.022^{***} (0.006)
Exposure	0.117^{***} (0.043)	0.098^{***} (0.005)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.007) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.182^{***} \\ (0.061) \end{array}$		$\begin{array}{c} 0.015^{***} \\ (0.004) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.328^{**} \\ (0.167) \end{array}$	0.049^{***} (0.003)	0.090^{***} (0.006)
Time FE Institution FE R^2 /Within- R^2 Obs.	Y N 0.165 18,396	Y N 0.123 18,396	Y Y 0.221 18,396	Y N 0.045 20,562	Y N 0.016 20,652	$Y \\ Y \\ 0.012 \\ 20,652$	Y N 0.121 19,270	Y N 0.089 19,270	Y Y 0.019 19,270

Difference-in-Differences - Interest Rate Hedging

- Interest rate hedging in treatment and control group
 - Treatment house price drop above median (2007Q1-2008Q4)
 - Mortgage-weighted avg ZIP code level house price change
 - Price change: -21.1% (median -18.2%) vs. -6.2% (median -4.2%)






Difference-in-Differences - Foreign Exchange Hedging

- **Foreign exchange hedging in treatment and control group**
 - Treatment house price drop above median

Panel B: Foreign exchange hedging



Difference-in-Differences and Triple-Differences Estimation

Treatment – house price change below median

Triple-differences by tercile in real estate exposure in 2008Q4

	Net IR	hedging	Gross IR hedging		Gross FX	A hedging
$\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i$	-0.122^{*} (0.061)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002\\ (0.106) \end{array}$	-0.309^{***} (0.071)	-0.113 (0.097)	-0.221^{***} (0.062)	-0.045 (0.066)
$\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i \times \text{MidRE}_i$		-0.124 (0.125)		-0.259^{**} (0.115)		-0.185 (0.110)
$\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i \times \text{HighRE}_i$		-0.299^{**} (0.121)		-0.325^{***} (0.115)		-0.312^{***} (0.105)
$Post_t \times MidRE_i / HighRE_i$	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Υ
Exposure	Y	Y	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Time FE	Υ	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ
Institution FE	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Υ
Within- R^2	0.133	0.241	0.029	0.030	0.020	0.021
Obs.	4,268	4,268	4,804	4,804	4,804	4,804

Panel	A :	Baseline	estimation	Ĺ
Panel	A :	Baseline	estimation	1

Propensity Score Matched DiD and Triple-D Estimation

Treatment – house price change below median

Propensity score matching by financial variables & exposures

	Net IR	hedging	Gross IR hedging		Gross F2	X hedging	
$\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i$	-0.222^{*} (0.140)	0.006 (0.108)	-0.336^{***} (0.111)	-0.052 (0.114)	-0.192^{**} (0.095)	-0.091 (0.090)	
$\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i \times \text{MidRE}_i$		-0.131^{*} (0.112)		-0.245^{**} (0.119)		-0.235^{*} (0.090)	
$\text{Post}_t {\times} \text{Treated}_i {\times} \text{HighRE}_i$		-0.414^{***} (0.121)		-0.421^{***} (0.142)		-0.351^{***} (0.120)	
$\text{Post}_t \times \text{MidRE}_i / \text{HighRE}_i$	Υ	Υ	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	
Exposure	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ	Y	
Time FE	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ	Y	
Institution FE	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ	Y	
Within-R ²	0.142	0.231	0.035	0.041	0.024	0.027	
Obs.	4,268	4,268	4,804	4,804	4,804	4,804	

Panel B: Estimation with propensity score matching

DiD and Triple-D Estimation - Net Worth

Treatment affects net worth

• ... and differentially so for institutions with high real estate exposure

	NWIndex		NWIndex (ex size)		MktCaj	p/Assets	Size	
$\text{Post}_t {\times} \text{Treated}_i$	-0.412***	-0.295***	-0.438***		-0.263***	-0.209***	-0.205***	0.049
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.061)	(0.061)
$Post_t \times Treated_i$		-0.031		-0.049		0.023		-0.412^{***}
$\times MidRE_i$		(0.048)		(0.051)		(0.035)		(0.052)
$Post_t \times Treated_i$		-0.517^{***}		-0.562^{***}		-0.239^{***}		-0.971^{***}
$\times \mathrm{HighRE}_i$		(0.048)		(0.052)		(0.032)		(0.050)
$Post_t \times MidRE_i/Highl$	$RE_i Y$	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Exposure	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν
Time FE	Y	Υ	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	Υ	Y
Institution FE	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ
Within- R^2	0.296	0.324	0.312	0.345	0.374	0.382	0.005	0.068
Obs.	4,788	4,788	4,788	4,788	4,804	4,804	4,804	4,804

Panel A: Effect of treatment on net worth

DiD and Triple-D Estimation – Exposures

No effect of treatment on measures of exposures

- Interest rate exposure: maturity gap (net assets repricing in 1 year)
- FX exposure: income from loans in foreign offices

	M	laturity gap		FX exposure			
	Unmatched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Unmatched	Matched	
$Post_t \times Treated_i$	-0.159	-0.153	-0.101	0.091	0.111	0.091	
	(0.133)	(0.186)	(0.164)	(0.081)	(0.135)	(0.112)	
$Post_t \times Treated_i \times MidRE_i$		-0.004	0.002		-0.013	0.002	
		(0.293)	(0.285)		(0.101)	(0.097)	
$Post_t \times Treated_i \times HighRE_i$		-0.011	-0.022		-0.016	-0.018	
_		(0.262)	(0.241)		(0.102)	(0.098)	
$Post_t \times MidRE_i / HighRE_i$	Y	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	
Time FE	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Institution FE	Y	Y	Υ	Υ	Y	Y	
Within- R^2	0.112	0.112	0.121	0.012	0.040	0.038	
Obs.	4,804	4,804	4,804	4,511	4,804	4,804	

Panel B: Effect of treatment on risk exposures

Robustness – Placebo Tests

Evidence on parallel trends

Include year-treatment dummies in pre-treatment period

-	Net IR h	edging	Gross IR	hedging	Gross FX hedging		
	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	
2005	-0.073	-0.003	0.049	0.043	0.066	0.035	
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.068)	
2006	-0.003	0.019	-0.021	0.018	0.089	0.032	
	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.068)	
2007	0.107	0.085	-0.007	-0.002	0.121	0.060	
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.068)	
2008	-	-	-	-		-	
	-	-	-	-	-	-	
2009	0.072	0.020	-0.217^{*}	-0.223^{*}	0.051	0.045	
	(0.134)	(0.128)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.068)	
2010	-0.063	-0.153	-0.378***	-0.397***	-0.069	-0.141*	
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.068)	
2011	-0.218*	-0.270^{*}	-0.413^{***}	-0.418^{***}	-0.147^{*}	0.165^{**}	
	(0.122)	(0.125)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.068)	
2012	-0.218*	-0.328**	-0.388***	-0.370***	-0.228***	-0.183***	
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.068)	
2013	-0.154	-0.221^{*}	-0.327^{***}	-0.338***	-0.269^{***}	-0.271^{***}	
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.068)	
Exposure	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Year FE	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	
Institution FE	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	
Within- R^2	0.323	0.325	0.025	0.026	0.018	0.017	
Obs.	4,268	4,268	4,804	4,804	4,804	4,804	

Treatment Based on Housing Supply Elasticity

- Treatment housing supply elasticity below median
 - Mortgage-weighted avg MSA-level housing supply elast. (Saiz 2010)
 - Housing supply elasticity: 1.54 (median 1.56) vs. 3.18 (median 3.19)
 - House price change: -16.1% vs. -6.5%

	Net IR	hedging	Gross II	Gross IR hedging Gross		
$\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i$	-0.157^{*} (0.082)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \\ (0.099) \end{array}$	-0.224^{**} (0.110)	-0.041 (0.118)	-0.126 (0.090)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.016 \\ (0.093) \end{array}$
$\text{Post}_t {\times} \text{Treated}_i {\times} \text{MidRE}_i$		-0.166 (0.128)		-0.200** (0.126)		-0.0126 (0.092)
$\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i \times \text{HighRE}_i$		-0.252^{**} (0.125)		-0.298^{***} (0.126)		-0.195^{**} (0.092)
$Post_t \times MidRE_i / HighRE_i$	Υ	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ
Exposure	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ	Υ
Time FE	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	Y
Institution FE	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ	Y
Within- R^2	0.082	0.095	0.022	0.022	0.017	0.018
Obs.	4,268	4,268	4,804	4,804	4,804	4,804

Panel B: Estimation with propensity score matching

External Validity - IV Based on House Prices

Instrument net worth with house price changes

Mortgage-weighted avg ZIP-level house price changes

	NWIndex		NWIndex	x (ex size)	MktCap	o/Assets	Size	
Δ House prices	$\begin{array}{c} 0.106^{***} \\ (0.034) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.107^{***} \\ (0.032) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.115^{***} \\ (0.034) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.121^{***} \\ (0.029) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.168^{***} \\ (0.030) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.129^{***} \\ (0.029) \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.009)
Exposure	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Time FE	Y	Υ	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Y
Institution FE	Ν	Υ	Ν	Υ	Ν	Y	Ν	Υ
R^2 /Within- R^2	0.295	0.436	0.312	0.431	0.391	0.562	0.017	0.693
F-statistic	17.12	16.45	18.64	17.17	23.10	21.96	5.15	15.47
Obs.	$12,\!843$	12,843	$12,\!843$	$12,\!843$	$13,\!470$	$13,\!470$	$13,\!470$	$13,\!470$

Panel A: First stage

Panel B: Second stage

	Net IR hedging			t hedging	Gross FX hedging	
NWIndex (instr.)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.227^{***} \\ (0.062) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.178^{***} \\ (0.061) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.076^{**} \\ (0.039) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.029) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \\ (0.017) \end{array}$	0.001 (0.005)
Exposure	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Time FE	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ	Y
Institution FE	Ν	Υ	Ν	Υ	Ν	Y
Obs.	12,843	$12,\!843$	$12,\!843$	12,843	$12,\!843$	$12,\!843$

No Evidence for Alternative Hypothesis

Not sophistication or fixed costs

- Evidence at the intensive margin and within-variation
- Similar results excluding bottom tercile or controlling for size terciles

Not risk shifting

- Same pattern away from default (excluding bottom tercile)
- Strong positive relation between trading and net worth

Not risk exposures

Not regulatory capital

No strong relation with regulatory capital

Trading and Net Worth


Positive and significant relation between trading and net worth

... both in cross-section and for IR hedging within institutions

	Gr	Gross IR trading			Gross FX trading		
	Pooled	Tobit	Within	Pooled	Tobit	Within	
NWIndex	$\begin{array}{c} 0.210^{***} \\ (0.053) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.207^{***} \\ (0.046) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.021^{***} \\ (0.005) \end{array}$	0.160^{**} (0.067)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.202^{***} \\ (0.062) \end{array}$	-0.013^{***} (0.004)	
Exposure	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	
Time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Υ	
Institution FE	Ν	Ν	Y	Ν	Ν	Υ	
R^2 /Within- R^2	0.035	0.056	0.028	0.029	0.103	0.007	
Obs.	20,568	20,568	20,568	20,568	20,568	20,568	

Alternative Hypothesis: Regulatory Capital

- Measurement
 - Total/Tier 1 regulatory capital / Risk-weighted assets
- Weak relation between hedging and regulatory capital
 - Weak relation with mixed signs (mostly negative)
- Davidson-MacKinnon (1981)'s J-test of model nestedness
 - Regulatory capital, but not net worth, typically rejected



Conclusion

Financial institutions with higher net worth hedge more

- New and robust stylized fact in cross section and time series
- Interest rate and foreign exchange hedging
- DiD/Triple-D specification causal effect of net worth on hedging
- Financing needs of hedging key barrier to risk management
- Key for macro-finance and monetary/macro-prudential policy

Empirical Literature

- Risk exposures and risk management by financial institutions
 - Effect on lending policies
 - Purnanadam (2007), Landier/Sraer/Thesmar (2015)
 - Begenau/Piazzesi/Schneider (2015)
 - New methodology to measure interest rate risk
 - Trading positions increase interest rate risk exposures
 - Monetary policy and risk exposures
 - Drechsler/Savov/Schnabl (2017), Di Tella/Kurlat (2018)
- Corporate hedging mostly: single cross-section; user dummies
 - Tufano (1996)
 - Hedging by gold mining firms; focus on executives' incentives
 - Rampini/Sufi/Viswanathan (2014)
 - Empirical laboratory: airlines' fuel price risk management
 - Advantage: measurement fraction expected fuel expenses hedged
 - Panel data at intensive and extensive margin
 - Financial constraints impede risk management

