Engineering Robust Server Software

Vulnerabilities
Common/Famous Vulnerabilities: Do Not Do!

• Common vulnerabilities
  • Buffer overflow
  • Failure to sanitize
    • SQL
    • Command injection
    • Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
  • Cross Site Request Forgery
  • Privilege Escalation
    • Time of check to time of use (TOCTTOU)
• Famous vulnerabilities: Dirty COW, Heartbleed, Apple goto
Buffer Overflow

- Common security vulnerability: buffer overflow
  - Allow more data to be read into an array than space in that array
- Why is this so bad problem?
Buffer Overflow

- Common security vulnerability: buffer overflow
  - Allow more data to be read into an array than space in that array
- Why is this so bad problem?
Buffer Overflow

- What happens when the function returns?
Buffer Overflow

• What happens when the function returns?
  • Begins executing instructions that were delivered by attacker!
  • Runs with same permission as whatever program
    • Running as root? Completely compromised.
Buffer Overflows

- Buffer Overflows result from programmer carelessness
  - Use of terrible functions (e.g., gets())
  - Assuming the user will not input more than a certain size
  - Not ensuring that space allocated matches size limit read
- Memory safe languages (Java, python, sml, …)
  - Not an issue: receive array index out of bounds exception (or similar)
No Execute Protection

• Hardware defense: No Execute Protection (NX bit)
  • Mark stack pages as Read/Write/Non-executable
  • Available in Intel/AMD processors since early 2000s

• How does this help?
### Buffer Overflow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sp-&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myArray-&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fp-&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Evil Code)</td>
<td>(Evil Code)</td>
<td>(Return Addr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- If stack is not executable, returning to it -> segfault
Buffer Overflow

- If stack is not executable, returning to it -> segfault
  - Is this a perfect defense?
Return To libc Attacks

- Instead of returning to custom crafted code on stack
  - Return to existing code (often found in libc)
  - E.g., make the return address the system() library call…
  - Need to arrange for useful arguments
# include <stdio.h>
# include <stdlib.h>

int main(void) {
    int x = 3;
    printf("%p\n", &x);
    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

brian@rss:~$ ./a.out
0x7fff67605974
brian@rss:~$ ./a.out
0x7fff5689c44
brian@rss:~$ ./a.out
0x7ffcc0adf03b4
brian@rss:~$ ./a.out
0x7ffddce2d1904

- **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)**
  - Loader randomly adjusts address layout
ASLR: Weaknesses

• ASLR is not perfect either
  • NOP slide: attack code starts with many NOPs
  • Attacker can succeed by guessing any location in NOP slide

• Similar ideas can be applied to other data
  • ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////bin/bash

• Attacker may be able to learn information about layout
  • Format string injection
  • Timing attacks against branch predictor:
Format String Injection

- How dangerous is this code?
  - VERY

```c
char * str = NULL;
size_t sz = 0;
if(getline(&str,&sz, stdin) > 0) {
    printf(str);
}
```

```
Saved FP
Saved RA
```
%n conversions: most dangerous

• Even more potential danger: %n conversions!
• From the man page for printf:

    n  The number of characters written so far is stored into the integer
        pointed to by the corresponding argument. That argument shall be an
        int *, or variant whose size matches the (optionally) supplied integer
        length modifier. No argument is converted. The behavior is undefined if
        the conversion specification includes any flags, a field width, or a pre-
        cision.
Failure To Sanitize Inputs

• Format strings:
  • Example of data with special meaning (%)
  • We don't want the special meaning, but end up with it anyways :(
• For printf format strings, best choice is to just
  • printf("%s", theString);
  • or use puts which does not format output
• Other situations: sanitize input
  • Remove, or escape special characters
SQL Injection

SELECT * FROM students WHERE name = 'Timmy';
SELECT * FROM students WHERE name = 'Robert'); DROP TABLE Students;--'
SELECT * FROM students WHERE name = 'Robert'); DROP TABLE Students;--'
Guarding Against SQL Injection

- **Django:**
  - Using built in model operations will sanitize vs SQL Injection
  - If you write RAW query strings, use an appropriate library

- **Java:**
  - Use `PreparedStatements`

- **C++:**
  - Use quote function in `pqxx::work` to embed string value in SQL safely
  - Or use prepared statements

```c++
void prepare_find(pqxx::connection_base &c)
{
    // Prepare a statement called "find" that looks for employees with a given
    // name (parameter 1) whose salary exceeds a given number (parameter 2).
    const std::string sql =
        "SELECT * FROM Employee WHERE name = $1 AND salary > $2";

    c.prepare("find", sql)();
}
```
Command Injection

• Danger: using shell to execute command with user-input argument
  • some-command blah blah \texttt{userinput}

• What is the danger here?
Command Injection

- Danger: using shell to execute command with user-input argument
  - some-command blah blah userinput
- What is the danger here?
  - `some command`
  - xyz && another command
  - xyz || another command
  - | some command
  - ; another command
Cross Site Scripting

https://bobsrecipes.com/contest/enter

Welcome to Bob's recipe website! We are hosting a contest for the best recipes. Enter yours below to win!

Submit

I'll host a contest and let users type in their favorite recipes!
Cross Site Scripting

https://bobsrecipes.com/contest/viewAndVote

Recent entries in the recipe contest. Vote below

Halloumi with Date/Walnut Paste
Put 1 cup dates, 1/2 cup walnuts
1 tsp balsamic vinegar and 1 tbsp warm water in the food processor.
Blend until it forms a thick paste.

Chocolate Chip Cookies
Cream together 1/2 cup butter
3/4 cup brown sugar, and 3/4 cup sugar.

I'll host a contest and let users type in their favorite recipes!
Welcome to Bob's recipe website! We are hosting a contest for the best recipes. Enter yours below to win!

Submit

https://bobsrecipes.com/contest/enter

I'd love to participate in this "contest"
Welcome to Bob's recipe website!
We are hosting a contest for the best recipes. Enter yours below to win!

Homemade Pitas
<script type="text/javascript">(evil code)</script>
Dissolve 1 tbsp yeast in 1 cup warm water
Let sit for 5 minutes, until foamy

Submit

I'd love to participate in this "contest"
Recent entries in the recipe contest. Vote below

**Halloumi with Date/Walnut Paste**
Put 1 cup dates, 1/2 cup walnuts 1 tsp balsamic vinegar and 1 tbsp warm water in the food processor.

**Homemade Pitas**
Dissolve 1 tbsp yeast in 1 cup warm water
Let sit for 5 minutes, until foamy
Mix in 1 tbsp sugar and 1/3 cup olive oil

Let's see how my recipe is doing..

Ohh pitas!
Cross Site Scripting

https://bobsrecipes.com/contest/viewAndVote

Recent entries in the recipe contest. Vote below

Homemade Pitas
Dissolve 1 tbsp yeast in 1 cup warm water
Let sit for 5 minutes, until foamy
Mix in 1 tbsp sugar and 1/3 cup olive oil

Halloumi with Date/Walnut Paste
Put 1 cup dates, 1/2 cup walnuts
1 tsp balsamic vinegar and 1 tbsp warm water in the food processor.

<script type="text/javascript">(evil code) </script>

More like

Ohh pwn3d!
Cross-Site Scripting

- Eve injects a `<script>` into HTML that will be viewed by other users
  - Alice's browser will run Eve's code
- Two main types
  - Persistent (what we saw): injected code stored on server
  - Reflected: injected code stored in URL that user will click
- Vulnerable anytime you take un-sanitized data and display back to user
- Not to be confused with Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
CSRF

• Cross Site Request Forgery:
  • Eve crafts a request to change something
  • Gets Alice's browser to send that request while Alice is logged in
    • Alice's browser sends her authentication cookie
    • Site believes Eve's request
CSRF GETs (which shouldn't be a thing..)

• If site allows modification with GET requests
  • Bad! GET should be for reads only. Use POST!
  • Eve injects something like
    
    <img src="https://bobssite.com/api/sendMoney?amt=100&dstAct=456789">
    
     • When Alice's browser loads this, it will try to GET that image..
     • If Bob's site allows this modification with GET, it will perform the action
     • Note that Eve does not get to (nor need to) see the response
CSRF POST

• Ok, so Bob's site doesn't allow modifications with GET. Safe?
• No: Eve can still craft malicious POST requests
  • E.g., she can make a `<form>` and have a `<script>` submit it
• How to defend?
  • Generate random token which must be in POST data
  • Eve has a hard time guessing
• Django requires this by default for POSTs:
  • Put `{% csrf_token %}` inside `<form>` that will be sent back to YOUR site
    • Do not leak token to other sites!
  • Django handles the rest
Introducing TOCTOU
Consider The Following Psuedo-Code

File f = openFile(inputCommands);

for each line in f
  if(!checkUserCanExecute(line, currentUser))
    return false;

rewind(f);

for each line in f
  execute(line);

close(f);
return true;
Consider the following pseudo-code:

```java
File f = openFile(inputCommands);

for each line in f
    if(!checkUserCanExecute(line, currentUser))
        return false;

rewind(f);

for each line in f
    execute(line);

close(f);
return true;
```

I have a plan... Anyone see it?
Consider The Following Psuedo-Code

File f = openFile(inputCommands);

for each line in f
    if(!checkUserCanExecute(line, currentUser))
        return false;

rewind(f);

for each line in f
    execute(line);

close(f);
return true;

commands.txt:
change Eve's password to xyzzy42
print Eve's Account Balance
print Eve's Last Action

I have permission to execute all these commands....
Consider The Following Psuedo-Code

File f = openFile(inputCommands);

for each line in f
    if(!checkUserCanExecute(line, currentUser))
        return false;

rewind(f);

for each line in f
    execute(line);

close(f);
return true;

commands.txt:
change Eve's password to xyzzy42
print Eve's Account Balance
print Eve's Last Action

Let's run this program..
Consider The Following Psuedo-Code

```java
File f = openFile(inputCommands);

for each line in f
    if(!checkUserCanExecute(line, currentUser))
        return false;

rewind(f);

for each line in f
    execute(line);

close(f);
return true;

commands.txt:
change Eve's password to xyzzy42
print Eve's Account Balance
print Eve's Last Action

While this runs...
One quick change to input file...```
Consider The Following Psuedo-Code

File f = openFile(inputCommands);

for each line in f
    if(!checkUserCanExecute(line, currentUser))
        return false;

    rewind(f);

for each line in f
    execute(line);

close(f);
return true;

commands.txt:
change Alice's password to xyzzy42
print Eve's Account Balance
print Eve's Last Action

Bwahahaha!
While this runs...
One quick change to input file...
Example of TOCTTOU Attack

- **Time of Check To Time Of Use**
  - Race condition between *validation* and *use* of data
  - Attacker can present valid data
  - Then change the data before it is used

- **Defense:**
  - Ensure that data cannot be changed between validation and use
  - Previous example, either:
    - Execute each command as read
    - Read file into memory, then validate/execute from memory
[eve@linux] $ cat ~alice/secret.txt
ls: /home/alice/secret.txt: Permission denied
[eve@linux] $
What Might Eve Do?

- Find bug in setuid binary (or service running as root)?
  - "trick" it into doing privileged actions for her
- Find files with wrong permissions
  - Shouldn't be suid but is?
  - Is writeable but shouldn't be?
- Exploit kernel bug?
  - Dirty COW: up next
Privilege Escalation: Not Just Shell

• Can have privilege escalation bugs in other settings
• Webapp:
  • Can Eve alter her permissions?
    • E.g, Admin functionality w/o proper checks?
Dirty COW

- Serious Linux kernel vulnerability (fixed 2016)
  - Race condition in Copy-On-Write (COW) handling
  - Could allow writing read-only data
    - mmap file read only
    - End up writing to file!
  - Allowed privilege escalation:
    - User could become root

- [https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/21/linux_privilege_escalation_hole/](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/21/linux_privilege_escalation_hole/)

- Linux includes Android
  - Could be used to "root" Android devices

- [https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dirtycow/dirtycow.github.io/master/dirtyc0w.c](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dirtycow/dirtycow.github.io/master/dirtyc0w.c)
Heartbleed (Explained by xkcd)

**How the Heartbleed Bug Works:**

**Server, Are You Still There? If So, Reply "Potato" (6 Letters).**

User Meg wants these 6 letters: **POTATO**. User Ollie wants pages about "irl games". Unlocking secure records with master key 5130985733435.

**TLS Heartbeat**
SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY "BIRD" (4 LETTERS).

HMM...

SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY "HAT" (500 LETTERS).

TLS Heartbeat
SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?
IF SO, REPLY "HAT" (500 LETTERS).

User Meg wants these 500 letters: HAT. Lucas requests the "missed connections" page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server's master key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about "snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to change account password to "Password".
User Meg wants these 500 letters: HAT. Lucas requests the “missed connections” page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server’s master key to “14835038534”. Isabel wants pages about “snakes but not too long”. User Karen wants to change account password to “CoHeBaSt”. User Arber requests pages.
... if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &clientRandom)) != 0) goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0) goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0) goto fail;
goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0) goto fail;

err = sslRawVerify(...);

... fail:
    //free memory, etc
return err;

TLS verification code in iOS/OSX, 2014
…
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &clientRandom)) != 0)
goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0){
goto fail;
}
goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
goto fail;
err = sslRawVerify(...);
...
fail:
    //free memory, etc
return err;
Apple Goto

- Always use `{ }` for bodies of anything (if, while, for, do)
- Test test test test!
  - There should have been a test case for this…
  - There should have been a test case for every one of those failing!
Barely Scratched The Surface..

• Cyber security experts?
  • We've barely scratched the surface!

• Covered the basics (most important/common things)
  • Use encryption (AES + RSA)
  • Hashes? Use SHA-256 or SHA-512 [and PBKDF2]
  • Variety of exploits:
    • Code carefully!
    • Think like a hacker