# APPENDIX D
# RANDOM AND PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATION

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Random numbers play an important role in the use of encryption for various computer security applications. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the use of random numbers in computer security and then look at some approaches to generating random numbers.

## D.1  THE USE OF RANDOM NUMBERS

A number of network security algorithms based on cryptography make use of random numbers. For example,

- Reciprocal authentication schemes such as Kerberos. In such schemes, random numbers are used for handshaking to prevent replay attacks.
- Session key generation, whether done by a key distribution center or by one of the principals.
- Generation of keys for the RSA public-key encryption algorithm (described in Chapter 22).

These applications give rise to two distinct and not necessarily compatible requirements for a sequence of random numbers: randomness and unpredictability.

### Randomness

Traditionally, the concern in the generation of a sequence of allegedly random numbers has been that the sequence of numbers be random in some well-defined statistical sense. The following two criteria are used to validate that a sequence of numbers is random:

- **Uniform distribution:** The distribution of numbers in the sequence should be uniform; that is, the frequency of occurrence of each of the numbers should be approximately the same.

- **Independence:** No one value in the sequence can be inferred from the others.

Although there are well-defined tests for determining that a sequence of numbers matches a particular distribution, such as the uniform distribution, there is no such test to "prove" independence. Rather, a number of tests can be applied to demonstrate if a sequence does not exhibit independence. The general strategy is to apply a number of such tests until the confidence that independence exists is sufficiently strong.

In the context of our discussion, the use of a sequence of numbers that appear statistically random often occurs in the design of algorithms related to cryptography. For example, a fundamental requirement of the RSA public-key encryption scheme discussed in Chapter 22 is the ability to generate prime numbers. In general, it is difficult to determine if a given large number $N$ is prime. A brute-force approach would be to divide $N$ by every odd integer less than $\sqrt{N}$. If $N$ is on the order, say, of $10^{150}$, a not uncommon occurrence in public-key cryptography, such a brute-force approach is beyond the reach of human analysts and their computers. However, a number of effective algorithms exist that test the primality of a number by using a sequence of randomly chosen integers as input to relatively simple computations. If the sequence is sufficiently long (but far, far less than $\sqrt{10^{150}}$ ), the primality of a number can be determined with near certainty. This type of approach, known as randomization, crops up frequently in the design of algorithms. In essence, if a problem is too hard or

time-consuming to solve exactly, a simpler, shorter approach based on randomization is used to provide an answer with any desired level of confidence.

## Unpredictability

In applications such as reciprocal authentication and session key generation, the requirement is not so much that the sequence of numbers be statistically random but that the successive members of the sequence are unpredictable. With "true" random sequences, each number is statistically independent of other numbers in the sequence and therefore unpredictable. However, as is discussed shortly, true random numbers are seldom used; rather, sequences of numbers that appear to be random are generated by some algorithm. In this latter case, care must be taken that an opponent not be able to predict future elements of the sequence on the basis of earlier elements.

## D.2  PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS (PRNGS)

Cryptographic applications typically make use of algorithmic techniques for random number generation. These algorithms are deterministic and therefore produce sequences of numbers that are not statistically random. However, if the algorithm is good, the resulting sequences will pass many reasonable tests of randomness. Such numbers are referred to as **pseudorandom numbers**.

You may be somewhat uneasy about the concept of using numbers generated by a deterministic algorithm as if they were random numbers. Despite what might be called philosophical objections to such a practice, it generally works. As one expert on probability theory puts it [HAMM91],

For practical purposes we are forced to accept the awkward concept of "relatively random" meaning that with regard to the proposed use we can see no reason why they will not perform as if they were random (as the theory usually requires). This is highly subjective and is not very palatable to purists, but it is what statisticians regularly appeal to when they take "a random sample" —they hope that any results they use will have approximately the same properties as a complete counting of the whole sample space that occurs in their theory.

## Linear Congruential Generators

By far, the most widely used technique for pseudorandom number generation is an algorithm first proposed by Lehmer [LEHM51], which is known as the linear congruential method. The algorithm is parameterized with four numbers, as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| $m$ | the modulus | $m > 0$ |
| $a$ | the multiplier | $0 < a < m$ |
| $c$ | the increment | $0 \leq c < m$ |
| $X_0$ | the starting value, or seed | $0 \leq X_0 < m$ |

The sequence of random numbers $\{X_n\}$ is obtained via the following iterative equation:

$$X_{n+1} = (aX_n + c) \bmod m$$

If $m$, $a$, $c$, and $X_0$ are integers, then this technique will produce a sequence of integers with each integer in the range $0 \leq X_n < m$.

The selection of values for *a*, *c*, and *m* is critical in developing a good random number generator. For example, consider *a* = *c* = 1. The sequence produced is obviously not satisfactory. Now consider the values *a* = 7, *c* = 0, *m* = 32, and $X_0$ = 1. This generates the sequence {7, 17, 23, 1, 7, etc.}, which is also clearly unsatisfactory. Of the 32 possible values, only 4 are used; thus, the sequence is said to have a period of 4. If, instead, we change the value of *a* to 5, then the sequence is {5, 25, 29, 17, 21, 9, 13, 1, 5, etc.}, which increases the period to 8.

We would like *m* to be very large, so that there is the potential for producing a long series of distinct random numbers. A common criterion is that *m* be nearly equal to the maximum representable nonnegative integer for a given computer. Thus, a value of *m* near to or equal to $2^{31}$ is typically chosen.

[PARK88] proposes three tests to be used in evaluating a random number generator:

$T_1$:  The function should be a full-period generating function. That is, the function should generate all the numbers between 0 and *m* before repeating.

$T_2$:  The generated sequence should appear random. Because it is generated deterministically, the sequence is not random. There is a variety of statistical tests that can be used to assess the degree to which a sequence exhibits randomness.

$T_3$:  The function should implement efficiently with 32-bit arithmetic.

With appropriate values of *a*, *c*, and *m*, these three tests can be passed. With respect to $T_1$, it can be shown that if *m* is prime and *c* = 0, then for certain values of *a*, the period of the generating function is *m* − 1, with only

the value 0 missing. For 32-bit arithmetic, a convenient prime value of $m$ is $2^{31} - 1$. Thus, the generating function becomes

$$X_{n+1} = (aX_n) \bmod (2^{31} - 1)$$

Of the more than 2 billion possible choices for $a$, only a handful of multipliers pass all three tests. One such value is $a = 7^5 = 16807$, which was originally designed for use in the IBM 360 family of computers [LEWI69]. This generator is widely used and has been subjected to a more thorough testing than any other PRNG. It is frequently recommended for statistical and simulation work (e.g., [JAIN91], [SAUE81]).

The strength of the linear congruential algorithm is that if the multiplier and modulus are properly chosen, the resulting sequence of numbers will be statistically indistinguishable from a sequence drawn at random (but without replacement) from the set 1, 2, . . . , $m - 1$. But there is nothing random at all about the algorithm, apart from the choice of the initial value $X_0$. Once that value is chosen, the remaining numbers in the sequence follow deterministically. This has implications for cryptanalysis.

If an opponent knows that the linear congruential algorithm is being used and if the parameters are known (e.g., $a = 7^5$, $c = 0$, $m = 2^{31} - 1$), then once a single number is discovered, all subsequent numbers are known. Even if the opponent knows only that a linear congruential algorithm is being used, knowledge of a small part of the sequence is sufficient to determine the parameters of the algorithm. Suppose that the opponent is able to determine values for $X_0$, $X_1$, $X_2$, and $X_3$. Then

$$X_1 = (aX_0 + c) \bmod m$$
$$X_2 = (aX_1 + c) \bmod m$$

$$X_3 = (aX_2 + c) \bmod m$$

These equations can be solved for *a*, *c*, and *m*.

Thus, although it is nice to be able to use a good PRNG, it is desirable to make the actual sequence used nonreproducible, so that knowledge of part of the sequence on the part of an opponent is insufficient to determine future elements of the sequence. This goal can be achieved in a number of ways. For example, [BRIG79] suggests using an internal system clock to modify the random number stream. One way to use the clock would be to restart the sequence after every *N* numbers using the current clock value (mod *m*) as the new seed. Another way would be simply to add the current clock value to each random number (mod *m*).

## Cryptographically Generated Random Numbers

For cryptographic applications, it makes some sense to take advantage of the encryption logic available to produce random numbers. A number of means have been used, and in this subsection we look at three representative examples.

### *CYCLIC ENCRYPTION*

Figure D.1 illustrates an approach suggested in [MEYE82]. In this case, the procedure is used to generate session keys from a master key. A counter with period *N* provides input to the encryption logic. For example, if 56-bit DES keys are to be produced, then a counter with period $2^{56}$ can be used. After each key is produced, the counter is incremented by 1. Thus, the pseudorandom numbers produced by this scheme cycle through a full period: Each of the outputs $X_0, X_1, \ldots X_{N-1}$ is based on a different counter value and therefore $X_0 \neq X_1 \neq \ldots \neq X_{N-1}$. Because the master key is

protected, it is not computationally feasible to deduce any of the session

keys (random numbers) through knowledge of one or more earlier session

keys.

To strengthen the algorithm further, the input could be the output of a full-period PRNG rather than a simple counter.

### DES OUTPUT FEEDBACK MODE

The cipher feedback (CFB) mode (Figure 20.7) of DES can be used for key generation as well as for stream encryption. Notice that the output of each stage of operation is a 64-bit value, of which the $s$ leftmost bits are fed back for encryption. Successive 64-bit outputs constitute a sequence of pseudorandom numbers with good statistical properties. Again, as with the approach suggested in the preceding subsection, the use of a protected master key protects the generated session keys.

### ANSI X9.17 PRNG

One of the strongest (cryptographically speaking) PRNGs is specified in ANSI X9.17. A number of applications employ this technique, including financial security applications and the secure e-mail program PGP.

Figure D.2 illustrates the algorithm, which makes use of triple DES for encryption. The ingredients are as follows:

- **Input:** Two pseudorandom inputs drive the generator. One is a 64-bit representation of the current date and time, which is updated on each number generation. The other is a 64-bit seed value; this is initialized to some arbitrary value and is updated during the generation process.

- **Keys:** The generator makes use of three triple DES encryption modules. All three make use of the same pair of 56-bit keys, which must be kept secret and are used only for pseudorandom number generation.

- **Output:** The output consists of a 64-bit pseudorandom number and a 64-bit seed value.

Define the following quantities:

$DT_i$      Date/time value at the beginning of $i$th generation stage

$V_i$      Seed value at the beginning of $i$th generation stage

$R_i$      Pseudorandom number produced by the $i$th generation stage

$K_1, K_2$      DES keys used for each stage

Then

$$R_i = \text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], [V_i \oplus \text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], \text{DT}_i)])$$

$$V_{i+1} = \text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], [R_i \oplus \text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], \text{DT}_i)])$$

where $\text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], X)$ refers to the sequence encrypt-decrypt-encrypt using two-key triple DES to encrypt $X$.

Several factors contribute to the cryptographic strength of this method. The technique involves a 112-bit key and three EDE encryptions for a total of nine DES encryptions. The scheme is driven by two pseudorandom inputs, the date and time value, and a seed produced by the generator that is distinct from the pseudorandom number produced by the generator. Thus, the amount of material that must be compromised by an opponent is overwhelming. Even if a pseudorandom number $R_i$ were compromised, it would be impossible to deduce the $V_{i+1}$ from the $R_i$ because an additional EDE operation is used to produce the $V_{i+1}$.

## Blum Blum Shub Generator

A popular approach to generating secure pseudorandom number is known as the Blum, Blum, Shub (BBS) generator, named for its developers [BLUM86]. It has perhaps the strongest public proof of its cryptographic strength. The procedure is as follows. First, choose two large prime numbers, $p$ and $q$, that both have a remainder of 3 when divided by 4. That is,

$$p \equiv q \equiv 3 \; (\text{mod } 4)$$

This notation, explained more fully in Appendix A, simply means that ($p$ mod 4) = ($q$ mod 4) = 3. For example, the prime numbers 7 and 11 satisfy $7 \equiv 11 \equiv 3 \; (\text{mod } 4)$. Let $n = p \times q$. Next, choose a random number $s$, such that $s$ is relatively prime to $n$; this is equivalent to saying that neither $p$ nor $q$ is a

factor of *s*. Then the BBS generator produces a sequence of bits $B_i$ according to the following algorithm:

$$X_0 = s^2 \bmod n$$
$$\textbf{for } i = 1 \textbf{ to } \infty$$
$$X_i = (X_{i-1})^2 \bmod n$$
$$B_i = X_i \bmod 2$$

Thus, the least significant bit is taken at each iteration. Table D.1 shows an example of BBS operation. Here, $n = 192649 = 383 \times 503$ and the seed *s* = 101355.

The BBS is referred to as a **cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator** (CSPRBG). A CSPRBG is defined as one that passes the *next-bit test*, which, in turn, is defined as follows [MENE97]: A pseudorandom bit generator is said to pass the next-bit test if there is not a polynomial-time algorithm[1] that, on input of the first *k* bits of an output sequence, can predict the $(k + 1)^{st}$ bit with probability significantly greater than 1/2. In other words, given the first *k* bits of the sequence, there is not a practical algorithm that can even allow you to state that the next bit will be 1 (or 0) with probability greater than 1/2. For all practical purposes, the sequence is unpredictable. The security of BBS is based on the difficulty of factoring *n*. That is, given *n*, we need to determine its two prime factors *p* and *q*.

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[1]   A polynomial-time algorithm of order *k* is one whose running time is bounded by a polynomial of order *k*.

# Table D.1 Example Operation of BBS Generator

| $i$ | $X_i$ | $B_i$ | $i$ | $X_i$ | $B_i$ | $i$ | $X_i$ | $B_i$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 20749 | | 7 | 45663 | 1 | 14 | 114386 | 0 |
| 1 | 143135 | 1 | 8 | 69442 | 0 | 15 | 14863 | 1 |
| 2 | 177671 | 1 | 9 | 186894 | 0 | 16 | 133015 | 1 |
| 3 | 97048 | 0 | 10 | 177046 | 0 | 17 | 106065 | 1 |
| 4 | 89992 | 0 | 11 | 137922 | 0 | 18 | 45870 | 0 |
| 5 | 174051 | 1 | 12 | 123175 | 1 | 19 | 137171 | 1 |
| 6 | 80649 | 1 | 13 | 8630 | 0 | 20 | 48060 | 0 |

## D.3 TRUE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS

A true random number generator (TRNG) uses a nondeterministic source to produce randomness. Most operate by measuring unpredictable natural processes, such as pulse detectors of ionizing radiation events, gas discharge tubes, and leaky capacitors. Intel has developed a commercially available chip that samples thermal noise by amplifying the voltage measured across undriven resistors [JUN99]. A group at Bell Labs has developed a technique that uses the variations in the response time of raw read requests for one disk sector of a hard disk [JAKO98]. LavaRnd is an open source project for creating truly random numbers using inexpensive cameras, open source code, and inexpensive hardware. The system uses a saturated CCD in a light-tight can as a chaotic source to produce the seed.

Software processes the result into truly random numbers in a variety of formats.

There are problems both with the randomness and the precision of such numbers [BRIG79], to say nothing of the clumsy requirement of attaching one of these devices to every system in an internetwork. Another alternative is to dip into a published collection of good-quality random numbers (e.g., [RAND55], [TIPP27]). However, these collections provide a very limited source of numbers compared to the potential requirements of a sizable network security application. Furthermore, although the numbers in these books do indeed exhibit statistical randomness, they are predictable, because an opponent who knows that the book is in use can obtain a copy.

## Skew

A true random number generator may produce an output that is biased in some way, such as having more ones than zeros or vice versa. Various methods of modifying a bit stream to reduce or eliminate the bias have been developed. These are referred to as *deskewing algorithms*. One approach to deskew is to pass the bit stream through a hash function such as MD5 or SHA (described in Chapter 21). The hash function produces an $n$-bit output from an input of arbitrary length. For deskewing, blocks of $m$ input bits, with $m \geq n$, can be passed through the hash function.

## D.4  REFERENCES

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