

A NEW ARISTOTLE READER

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judges what is healthy for a body and what is not, and by reference to which each thing is to be done up to a certain amount, and is healthy, but is not so if less or more is done. So too for the virtuous man, with respect to his actions and choices of the things naturally good but not commended, there must be some limit both for the possession and the choice and avoidance of abundance and exiguousness of material goods and of successes. Now *as principle prescribes* is what was said earlier. But that is as if, in matters of nutrition, someone were to say, *as medicine and its principle prescribes*. But that, though true, is not clear.

So it is needful, as in other cases, to live by reference to the governing thing, and by reference to the state and activity of what governs, as a slave to the rule of the master and each thing to its appropriate governing principle. But since a human being, also, is by nature composed of a thing that governs and a thing that is governed, each too should live by reference to its own governing principle. But that is of two sorts; for medicine is a governing principle in one way, and health in another; for the first is for the sake of the second. Thus it is with the speculative part. For the god is a governor not in a prescriptive fashion, but it is that *for* which practical wisdom prescribes (but *that for which* is of two sorts—they have been distinguished elsewhere—since the god is in need of nothing). So if some choice and possession of natural goods—either goods of the body or money or friends or the other goods—will most produce the speculation of the god, that is the best, and that is the finest limit; but whatever, whether through deficiency or excess, hinders the service and speculation of the god, is bad. Thus it is for the soul, and this is the best limit for the soul—to be aware as little as possible of the non-rational part of the soul as such. But let what has been said be enough on the limit of nobility, and what the goal is of things good without qualification.

POLITICS*

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

Observation tells us that every state is an association, and that every association is formed with a view to some good purpose. I say 'good', because in all their actions all men do in fact aim at what they think good. Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good, that association which is the most sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods. This is the association which we call the state, the association which is 'political'.

It is an error to suppose, as some do, that the roles of a statesman, of a king, of a household-manager and of a master of slaves are the same, on the ground that they differ not in kind but only in point of numbers of persons—that a master of slaves, for example, has to do with a few people, a household-manager with more, and a statesman or king with more still, as if there were no differences between a large household and a small state. They also reckon that when one person is in personal control over the rest he has the role of a king, whereas when he takes his turn at ruling and at being ruled according to the principles of the science concerned, he is a statesman. But these assertions are false.

This will be quite evident if we examine the matter according to our established method. We have to analyse other composite things till they can be subdivided no further; let us in the same way examine the component parts of the state and we shall see better how these too differ from each other, and whether we can acquire any systematic knowledge about the several roles mentioned.

* Translation: T. A. Sinclair and T. J. Saunders (Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1981); Text: W. D. Ross (Oxford Classical Texts, 1957).

CHAPTER 2

25 We shall, I think, in this as in other subjects, get the best view of the matter if we look at the natural growth of things from the beginning. The first point is that those which are incapable of existing without each other must be united as a pair. For example, the union of male and female is essential for reproduction; and this is not a matter of
 30 *choice*, but is due to the *natural* urge, which exists in the other animals too and in plants, to propagate one's kind. Equally essential is the combination of the natural ruler and ruled, for the purpose of preservation. For the element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and by nature master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave, one of those who are ruled. Thus there is a common interest uniting master and slave.

1252^b Nature, then, has distinguished between female and slave: she recognizes different functions and lavishly provides different tools, not an all-purpose tool like the Delphic knife; for every instrument will be made best if it serves not many purposes but one. But non-
 5 Greeks assign to female and slave exactly the same status. This is because they have nothing which is by nature fitted to rule; their association consists of a male slave and a female slave. So, as the poets say, 'It is proper that Greeks should rule non-Greeks', the implication being that non-Greek and slave are by nature identical.

10 Thus it was out of the association formed by men with these two, women and slaves, that a household was first formed; and the poet Hesiod was right when he wrote, 'Get first a house and a wife and an ox to draw the plough.' (The ox is the poor man's slave.) This association of persons, established according to nature for the satisfaction of daily needs, is the household, the members of which Charondas calls 'bread-fellows', and Epimenides the Cretan 'stable-companions'.

15 The next stage is the village, the first association of a number of houses for the satisfaction of something *more* than daily needs. It comes into being through the processes of nature in the fullest sense, as offshoots of a household are set up by sons and grandsons. The members of such a village are therefore called by some 'homogalactic'.¹ This is why states were at first ruled by kings, as are foreign
 20 nations to this day: they were formed from constituents which were themselves under kingly rule. For every household is ruled by its

¹ I.e. 'sucklings of the same milk'.

senior member, as by a king, and the offshoots too, because of their blood relationship, are ruled in the same way. This kind of rule is mentioned in Homer: 'Each man has power of law over children and wives.' He is referring to scattered settlements, which were common in primitive times. For this reason the gods too are said to be governed by a king—namely because men themselves were originally ruled by
 25 kings and some are so still. Just as men imagine gods in human shape, so they imagine their way of life to be like that of men.

The final association, formed of several villages, is the state. For all practical purposes the process is now complete; self-sufficiency has been reached, and while the state came about as a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure the *good* life. Therefore every
 30 state exists by nature, as the earlier associations too were natural. This association is the end of those others, and nature is itself an end; for whatever is the end-product of the coming into existence of any object, that is what we call its nature—of a man, for instance, or a horse or a household. Moreover the aim and the end is perfection; and self-sufficiency is both end and perfection.

It follows that the state belongs to the class of objects which exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. Anyone who by
 1253^a his nature and not simply by ill luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman—he is like the war-mad man condemned in Homer's words as 'having no family, no law, no
 5 home'; for he who is such by nature is mad on war: he is a non-cooperator like an isolated piece in a game of draughts.

But obviously man is a political animal in a sense in which a bee is not, or any other gregarious animal. Nature, as we say, does nothing without some purpose; and she has endowed man alone among the
 10 animals with the power of speech. Speech is something different from voice, which is possessed by other animals also and used by them to express pain or pleasure; for their nature does indeed enable them not only to feel pleasure and pain but to communicate these feelings to each other. Speech, on the other hand serves to indicate what is useful
 15 and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For the real difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. It is the sharing of a common view in *these* matters that makes a household and a state.

Furthermore, the state has priority over the household and over any individual among us. For the whole must be prior to the part. Separate
 20

hand or foot from the whole body, and they will no longer be a hand or foot except in name, as one might speak of a 'hand' or 'foot' sculptured in stone. That will be the condition of the spoilt hand, which no longer has the capacity and the function which define it. So, though we may say they have the same names, we cannot say that they are, in that condition, the same things. It is clear then that the state is both natural and prior to the individual. For if an individual is not fully self-sufficient after separation, he will stand in the same relationship to the whole as the parts in the other case do. Whatever is incapable of participating in the association which we call the state, a dumb animal for example, and equally whatever is perfectly self-sufficient and has no need to (e.g. a god), is not a part of the state at all.

Among all men, then, there is a natural impulse towards this kind of association; but the first man to construct a state deserves credit for conferring very great benefits. For as man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development, so he is worst of all when divorced from law and justice. Injustice armed is hardest to deal with; and though man is born with weapons which he can use in the service of practical wisdom and virtue, it is all too easy for him to use them for the opposite purposes. Hence man without virtue is the most savage, the most unrighteous, and the worst in regard to sexual licence and gluttony. The virtue of justice is a feature of a state; for justice is the arrangement of the political association, and a sense of justice decides what is just.

CHAPTER 3

Now that I have explained what the component parts of a state are, and since every state consists of households, it is essential to begin with household-management. This topic can be subdivided so as to correspond to the parts of which a complete household is made up, namely, the free and the slaves; but our method requires us to examine everything when it has been reduced to its smallest parts, and the smallest division of a household into parts gives three pairs—master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. And so we must ask ourselves what each one of these three relationships is, and what sort of thing it ought to be. The word 'mastership' is used to describe the first, and we may use 'matrimonial' (in the case of the union of man and woman), and 'paternal' to describe the other two, as there is no more specific term for either. We may accept these three; but we find that

there is a fourth element, which some people regard as covering the whole of household-management, others as its most important part; and our task is to consider its position. I refer to what is called 'the acquisition of wealth'.

First let us discuss master and slave, in order to see how they bear on the provision of essential services, and whether we can find a better way towards understanding this topic than if we started from the suppositions usually made. For example, some people suppose that being a master requires a certain kind of knowledge, and that this is the same knowledge as is required to manage a household or to be a statesman or a king—an error which we discussed at the beginning. Others say that it is contrary to nature to rule as master over slave, because the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just.

CHAPTER 4

Now property is part of a household, and the acquisition of property part of household-management; for neither life itself nor the good life is possible without a certain minimum supply of the necessities. Again, in any special skill the availability of the proper tools will be essential for the performance of the task; and the household-manager must have his likewise. Tools may be animate as well as inanimate; for instance, a ship's captain uses a lifeless rudder, but a living man for watch; for a servant is, from the point of view of his craft, categorized as one of its tools. So any piece of property can be regarded as a tool enabling a man to live, and his property is an assemblage of such tools; a slave is a sort of living piece of property; and like any other servant is a tool in charge of other tools. For suppose that every tool we had could perform its task, either at our bidding or itself perceiving the need, and if—like the statues made by Daedalus or the tripods of Hephaestus, of which the poet says that

self-moved they enter the assembly of the gods

—shuttles in a loom could fly to and fro and a plucker play a lyre all self-moved, then master-craftsmen would have no need of servants nor masters of slaves.

Tools in the ordinary sense are productive tools, whereas a piece of property is meant for action. I mean, for example, a shuttle produces

something other than its own use, a bed or a garment does not. Moreover, since production and action differ in kind and both require tools, the difference between their tools too must be of the same kind. Now
 5 life is action and not production; therefore the slave, a servant, is one of the tools that minister to action.

A piece of property is spoken of in the same way as a part is; for a
 10 part is not only part of something but belongs to it *tout court*; and so too does a piece of property. So a slave is not only his master's slave but belongs to him *tout court*, while the master is his slave's master but does not belong to him. These considerations will have shown what the nature and functions of the slave are: any human being that by
 15 nature belongs not to himself but to another is by nature a slave; and a human being belongs to another whenever, in spite of being a *man*, he is a piece of property, i.e. a tool having a separate existence and meant for action.

CHAPTER 5

But whether anyone does in fact by nature answer to this description, and whether or not it is a just and a better thing for one man to be a slave to another, or whether all slavery is contrary to nature—these are
 20 the questions which must be considered next. Neither theoretical discussion nor empirical observation presents any difficulty. That one should command and another obey is both necessary and expedient. Indeed some things are so divided right from birth, some to rule, some to be ruled. There are many different forms of this ruler-ruled relationship, and the quality of the rule depends primarily on the
 25 quality of the subjects, rule over man being better than rule over animals; for that which is produced by better men is a better piece of work; and the ruler-ruled relationship is itself a product created by the men involved in it.

For wherever there is a combination of elements, continuous or
 30 discontinuous, and a common unity is the result, in all such cases the ruler-ruled relationship appears. It appears notably in living creatures as a consequence of their whole nature (and it can exist also where there is no life, as dominance in a musical scale, but that is hardly relevant here). The living creature consists in the first place of
 35 mind and body, and of these the former is ruler by nature, the latter ruled. Now we must always look for nature's own norm in things whose condition is according to nature, and not base our observations

on degenerate forms. We must therefore in this connection consider the man who is in good condition mentally and physically, one in whom the rule of mind over body is conspicuous—because the bad and unnatural condition of a permanently or temporarily depraved person will often give the impression that his body is ruling over his soul.

However that may be, it is, as I say, within living creatures that we first find it possible to see both the rule of a master and that of a statesman. The rule of soul over body is like a master's rule, while the rule of intelligence over desire is like a statesman's or a king's. In these
 5 relationships it is clear that it is both natural and expedient for the body to be ruled by the soul, and for the emotional part of our natures to be ruled by the mind, the part which possesses reason. The reverse, or even parity, would be fatal all round. This is also true as between man and the other animals; for tame animals are by nature better than
 10 wild, and it is better for them all to be ruled by men, because it secures their safety. Again, as between male and female the former is by nature superior and ruler, the latter inferior and subject. And this must hold good of mankind in general.

Therefore whenever there is the same wide discrepancy between
 15 human beings as there is between soul and body or between man and beast, then those whose condition is such that their function is the use of their bodies and nothing better can be expected of them, those, I say, are slaves by nature. It is better for them, just as in the cases
 20 mentioned, to be ruled thus. For the 'slave by nature' is he that can and therefore does belong to another, and he that participates in reason so far as to recognize it but not so as to possess it (whereas the other animals obey not reason but emotions). The use made of slaves hardly differs at all from that of tame animals: they both help with their
 25 bodies to supply our essential needs. It is then part of nature's intention to make the bodies of free men to differ from those of slaves, the latter strong enough to be used for necessary tasks, the former erect and useless for that kind of work, but well suited for the life of a citizen
 30 of a state, a life which is in turn divided between the requirements of war and peace.

But the opposite often occurs: people who have the right kind of bodily physique for free men, but not the soul, others who have the right soul but not the body. This much is clear: suppose that there
 35 were men whose bodily physique showed the same superiority as is shown by the statues of gods, then all would agree that the rest of

1255^a mankind would deserve to be their slaves. And if this is true in relation to physical superiority, the distinction would be even more justly made in respect of superiority of soul; but it is much more difficult to see beauty of soul than it is to see beauty of body. It is clear then that by nature some are free, others slaves, and that for these it is both just and expedient that they should serve as slaves.

CHAPTER 6

On the other hand it is not hard to see that those who take opposing views are also right up to a point. The expressions 'state of slavery' and
5 'slave' have a double connotation: there exists also a *legal* slave and state of slavery. The law in question is a kind of convention which provides that all that is conquered in war is termed the property of the conquerors. Against this right many of those versed in law bring a charge analogous to that of 'illegality' brought against an orator: they hold it to be indefensible that a man who has been overpowered by the
10 violence and superior might of another should become his property. Others see no harm in this; and both views are held by experts.

The reason for this difference of opinion, and for the overlap in the arguments used, lies in the fact that in a way it is virtue, when it acquires resources, that is best able actually to use force; and in the
15 fact that anything which conquers does so because it excels in some good. It seems therefore that force is not without virtue, and that the only dispute is about what is just. Consequently some think that 'just' in this connection is a nonsense, others that it means precisely this, that 'the stronger shall rule'. But when these propositions are dis-
20 entangled, the other arguments have no validity or power to show that the superior in virtue ought not to rule and be master.

Some take a firm stand (as they conceive it) on 'justice' in the sense of 'law', and claim that enslavement in war is just, simply as being legal; but they simultaneously deny it, since it is quite possible that
25 undertaking the war may have been unjust in the first place. Also one cannot use the term 'slave' properly of one who is undeserving of being a slave; otherwise we should find among slaves and descendants of slaves even men of the noblest birth, should any of them be captured and sold. For this reason they will not apply the term slave to such people but use it only for non-Greeks. But in so doing they are
30 really seeking to define the slave by nature, which was our starting-point; for one has to admit that there are some who are slaves every-

where, others who are slaves nowhere. And the same is true of noble birth: nobles regard themselves as of noble birth not only among their own people but everywhere, and they allow nobility of birth of non-Greeks to be valid only in non-Greek lands. This involves making two
35 grades of free status and noble birth, one absolute, the other conditional. (In a play by Theodectes, Helen is made to say, 'Who would think it proper to call me a slave, who am sprung of divine lineage on both sides?') But in introducing this point they are really basing the distinction between slave and free, noble-born and base-born, upon virtue and vice. For they maintain that as man is born of man, and
1255^b beast of beast, so good is born of good. But frequently, though this may be nature's intention, she is unable to realize it.

It is clear then that there is justification for the difference of opinion: while it is not invariably true that slaves are slaves by nature
5 and others free, yet this distinction does in some cases actually prevail—cases where it is expedient for the one to be master, the other to be the slave. Whereas the one must be ruled, the other should exercise the rule for which he is fitted by nature, thus being the master. For if the work of being a master is badly done, that is contrary to the interest of both parties; for the part and the whole, the soul and the
10 body, have identical interests; and the slave is in a sense a part of his master, a living but separate part of his body. For this reason there is an interest in common and a feeling of friendship between master and slave, wherever they are by nature fitted for this relationship; but not when the relationship arises out of the use of force and by the law
15 which we have been discussing.

CHAPTER 7

From all this it is clear that there is a difference between the rule of master over slave and the rule of a statesman. All forms of rule are not the same though some say that they are. Rule over naturally free men is different from rule over natural slaves; rule in a household is
monarchical, since every house has one ruler; the rule of a statesman is rule over free and equal persons.

A man is not called master in virtue of what he knows but simply in
20 virtue of the kind of person he is; similarly with slave and free. Still, there *could* be such a thing as a master's knowledge or a slave's knowledge. The latter kind may be illustrated by the lessons given by a certain man in Syracuse who, for a fee, trained houseboys in their

25 ordinary duties; and this kind of instruction might well be extended to include cookery and other forms of domestic service. For the tasks of the various slaves differ, some being more essential, some more highly valued (as the proverb has it 'slave before slave, master before master').

30 All such fields of knowledge are the business of slaves, whereas a master's knowledge consists in knowing how to put his slaves to use; for it is not in his acquiring of slaves but in his use of them that he is master. But the use of slaves is not a form of knowledge that has any great importance or dignity, since it consists in knowing how to direct
35 slaves to do the tasks which they ought to know how to do. Hence those masters whose means are sufficient to exempt them from the bother employ an overseer to take on this duty, while they devote themselves to statecraft or philosophy. The knowledge of how to *acquire* slaves is different from both these, the just method of acquisition, for instance, being a kind of military or hunting skill.

So much may suffice to define master and slave.

BOOK III

CHAPTER I

1274^b In considering now the varieties and characteristics of constitutions, we must begin by looking at the state and asking what it is. There is no unanimity about this; for example, some say that an action was taken
35 by the state, others that it was taken not by the state, but by the oligarchy or by the dictator. Now obviously the activities of statesman and legislator are wholly concerned with the state, and the constitution is a kind of organization of the state's inhabitants; but like any
40 other whole that is made up of many parts, the state is to be classed as a composite thing; so clearly we must first try to isolate the citizen, for the state is an aggregate of citizens. So we must ask, Who is a citizen?
1275^a and, Whom should we call one?

Here too there is no unanimity, no agreement as to what constitutes a citizen; it often happens that one who is a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen in an oligarchy. (I think we may leave out of account those
5 who merely acquire the title indirectly, e.g. the 'made' citizens.) Nor does mere residence in a place confer citizenship: resident foreigners and slaves are not citizens, but do share domicile in the country.

Another definition is 'those who have access to legal processes, who may prosecute or be prosecuted'. But this access is open to any person
10 who is covered by a commercial treaty—at any rate partially open, for a resident foreigner is in many places obliged to appoint a patron, so that not even this degree of participation is open to him unqualifiedly. (Likewise boys not yet old enough to be enrolled, and old people who
15 have retired from duty, must be termed citizens in a sense, but only with the addition of 'not fully' or 'superannuated' or some such term—not that it matters which word we use since what we mean is clear enough). What we are looking for is the citizen proper, without any defect needing to be amended. Similar difficulties may be raised, and
20 solved, about persons exiled or with civic disqualifications.

What effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participation in giving judgement and in holding office. Some offices are distinguished in respect of length of tenure, some not being
25 tenable by the same person twice under any circumstances, or only after an interval of time. Others, such as membership of a jury or of an assembly, have no such limitation. It might be objected that such persons are not really officials, and that these functions do not amount to participation in office. But they have the fullest sovereign power, and it would be ridiculous to deny their participation in office. In any case nomenclature ought not to make any difference; it is just that
30 there is no name covering that which is common to a jurymen and to a member of an assembly, which ought to be used of both. For the sake of a definition I suggest that we say 'unlimited office'. We therefore define citizens as those who participate in this. Such a definition seems to cover, as nearly as may be, those to whom the term citizen is in fact applied.

On the other hand we must remember that in the case of things in which the substrata differ in kind, one being primary, another
35 secondary, and so on, there is nothing, or scarcely anything, which is common to all those things, in so far as they are the kind of thing they are. Thus we see the various constitutions differing from each other in kind, some being prior to others—since those that have gone wrong or deviated must be posterior to those which are free from error. I will
1275^b explain later what I mean by 'deviated'. A citizen, therefore, will necessarily vary according to the constitution in each case.

For this reason our definition of citizen is best applied in a
5 democracy; in the other constitutions it *may* be applicable, but it need not necessarily be so. For in some constitutions there is no body

comprising the people, nor a recognized assembly, but only an occasional rally; and justice may be administered piecemeal. For example, at Sparta contract cases are tried by the Ephors, one or other of them, cases of homicide by the Elders, and other cases doubtless by other officials. Similarly at Carthage all cases are tried by officials.

But our own definition of a citizen can be amended so as to apply to the other constitutions also. We simply replace our 'unlimited' office of juror or member of assembly by 'limited'. For it is to all or some of these that the task of judging or deliberating is assigned, either on all matters or on some. From these considerations it has become clear who a citizen is: as soon as a man becomes entitled to participate in office, deliberative or judicial, we deem him to be a citizen of that state; and a number of such persons large enough to secure a self-sufficient life we may, by and large, call a state.

CHAPTER 2

For practical purposes a citizen is defined as one of citizen birth on both his father's and his mother's side; some would go further and demand citizen descent for two, three, or even more generations. But since these are only crude definitions, employed by states for practical purposes, some people pose the puzzle of how a great or great-great-grandfather's citizenship can itself be determined. Gorgias of Leontini, partly perhaps in puzzlement and partly in jest, said that, as mortars are what mortar-makers make, so Larissaeans are those made by the workmen, some of whom were Larissaeans-makers. The answer to such objectors is simple: if they participated in the constitution in the manner prescribed in our definition, they were citizens. Of course, the criterion of having citizen-parents cannot be applied in the case of the original colonists or founders.

I think however that there is perhaps a more important puzzle here, namely about those who got a share in the constitution because it had changed—as for example after the expulsion of the tyrants from Athens, when Cleisthenes enrolled many foreigners and slaves in the tribes. The question here is not 'Are these persons citizens?', but whether they are citizens justly or unjustly. Some would go further and question whether anyone can be a citizen unless he is justly so, on the ground that unjust and false mean the same thing. But when persons exercise their office unjustly, we continue to say that they rule, though unjustly; and as the citizen has been defined by some

kind of office (i.e. if he shares in such-and-such an office, he is, as we said, a citizen), we cannot deny the propriety of using the term even in these cases.

CHAPTER 3

This question of justice or the lack of it cannot be separated from the dispute we have already mentioned, which arises from the difficulty some people raise as to whether it was or was not the state that acted—for example when a change takes place from oligarchy or tyranny to democracy. There are those who after such a change claim that they are no longer obliged to fulfil the terms of a contract; for it had been entered into, so they say, not by the state but by the tyrant. Similarly they would disown other obligations, if these have been incurred under one of those types of constitution which rest on force and disregard the common interest. It follows that if there is a democracy of this type, we must say that the acts of this constitution are acts of the state to the same degree as those flowing from the oligarchy or tyranny are.

And this topic seems to be part of yet another question—how are we to tell whether a state is still the same state or a different one? We might try to investigate this question using territory and inhabitants as criteria; but this would not carry us very far, since it is quite possible to divide both territory and population into two, putting some people in one part and some into the other. That is not a very serious difficulty: it arises from our use of the word *polis* in more than one sense. Such a puzzle is therefore resolved easily enough.

Another question is this: when a population lives in the same place, what is the criterion for regarding the state as a unity? It cannot be the walls, for it would be possible to put one wall round the whole Peloponnese. Babylon is perhaps a similar case, and any other state with a circumference that embraces a nation rather than a state. (It is said of Babylon that its capture was, two days later, still unknown to a part of the city.) These questions of the state's size—both how big it should be and whether it helps to have the population drawn from one nation or more than one—are problems to which it will be useful to return later, since the statesman has to keep them in mind.

But when the same population continues to dwell in the same territory, must we say that the state remains the same so long as there is continuity of race among that population, even though one generation

of people dies and another is born—just as a river or spring is commonly said to be the same, although different water passes into and out of it all the time? Alternatively, ought we to speak of the *population* as being the same for the reasons stated, but say that the *state* is different? For the state is a kind of association—an association of citizens in a constitution; so when the constitution changes and becomes different in kind, the state also would seem necessarily not to be the same. We may use the analogy of a chorus, which may at one time perform in a tragedy and at another in a comedy, so that we say it is different—yet often enough it is composed of the same persons. And the same principle is applicable to other associations and combinations, which are different if the combination in question differs in kind. For example, we say the same musical notes are fitted together differently, to produce either the Dorian or the Phrygian mode. If this is right, it is clear that the main criterion of the continued identity of a state ought to be its constitution. This leaves it quite open either to change or not to change the *name* of a state, both when the population is the same and when it is different.

But whether, when a state's constitution is changed, it is just to disown obligations or to discharge them—that is another question.

CHAPTER 4

Connected with the matters just discussed is the question whether we ought to regard the virtue of a good man and that of a sound citizen as the same virtue, or not. If this is a point to be investigated, we really must try to form some rough conception of the virtue of a citizen.

So then: we say a citizen is a member of an association, just as a sailor is; and each member of the crew has his different function and a name to fit it—rower, helmsman, look-out, and the rest. Clearly the most exact description of each individual will be a special description of his virtue; but equally there will also be a general description that will fit them all, because there is a task in which they all play a part—the safe conduct of the voyage; for each member of the crew aims at securing that. Similarly the task of all the citizens, however different they may be, is the stability of the association, that is, the constitution. Therefore the virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are more kinds of constitution than one, there cannot be just one single *and perfect* virtue of the sound citizen. On the other hand we do say that the good *man* is good because of one single

virtue which is perfect virtue. Clearly then it is possible to be a sound citizen without having that virtue which makes a sound man.

Look now at the problem from another angle and consider the same point in relation to the best constitution. That is to say, if it is impossible for a state to consist entirely of sound *men*, still each of them must do, and do well, his proper work; and doing it well depends on his virtue. But since it is impossible for all the *citizens* to be alike, there cannot be one virtue of citizen and good man alike. For the virtue of the sound citizen must be possessed by all (and if it is, then that state is necessarily best.) *But* if it is inevitable that not all the citizens in a sound state are good, it is impossible for all to have the virtue of the good man.

Again, a state is made up of unlike parts. As an animate creature consists of body and soul, and soul consists of reasoning and desiring, and a household consists of husband and wife, and property consists of master and slave, so also a state is made up of these and many other sorts of people besides, all different. The virtue of all the citizens cannot, therefore, be *one*, any more than in a troupe of dancers the goodness of the leader and that of the followers are one.

Now while all this shows clearly that they are not the same in general, the question may be asked whether it is not possible in a particular case for the same virtue to belong both to the sound citizen and the sound man. We would answer that there is such a case, since we maintain that a sound ruler is both good and wise, whereas wisdom is not essential for a citizen. Some say that from the very start there is a different kind of education for rulers. They instance the obvious training of the sons of royalty in horsemanship and war, and a saying of Euripides, which is supposed to refer to the education of a ruler: 'No frills in education please . . . only what the state doth need.' But though we may say that the virtue of good ruler and good man is the same, yet, since he too that is ruled is a citizen, we cannot say in general that the virtue of citizen and man are one, but only that they may be in the case of a particular citizen. For certainly the virtue of ruler and citizen are not the same. And that doubtless is the reason why Jason of Pherae said that he went hungry whenever he ceased to be tyrant, not knowing how to live as a private person.

But surely men praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and the virtue of a citizen of repute seems to be just this—to be able to rule and be ruled well. If then we say that the virtue of the good man is to do

with ruling, and that of the citizen to do with both ruling and being ruled, the two things cannot be praiseworthy to the same degree. . . .

For there is such a thing as rule by a master which we say is concerned with necessary tasks; but the master has no necessity to know more than how to *use* such labour. Anything else, I mean to be able actually to be a servant and do the chores, is simply slave-like. (We speak of several kinds of slave, corresponding to the several varieties of operation. One variety is performed by manual workers, who, as the term itself indicates, live by their hands; among these are the skilled mechanics.) Hence, in some places, only with the arrival of extreme democracies have workmen attained to participation in office. The work then of those who are subject to rule is not work which either the good statesman or the good citizen ought to learn, except occasionally for the personal use he may require to make of it. For then the distinction between master and slave just ceases to apply.

But there is another kind of rule—that exercised over men who are free, and similar in birth. This we call rule by a statesman. It is this that a ruler must first learn through being ruled, just as one learns to command cavalry by serving under a cavalry-commander and to be a general by serving under a general, and by commanding a battalion and a company. This too is a healthy saying, namely that it is not possible to be a good ruler without first having been ruled. Not that good ruling and good obedience are the same virtue—only that the good citizen must have the knowledge and ability both to rule and be ruled. That is what we mean by the virtue of a citizen—understanding the governing of free men from both points of view.

Returning now to the good *man*, we find the same two qualities. And this is true even though the self-control and justice exercised in ruling are not the same in kind. For clearly the virtue of the good man, who is free but governed, for example his justice, will not be always one and the same: it will take different forms according to whether he is to rule or be ruled, just as self-control and courage vary as between men and women. A man would seem a coward if he had only the courage of a woman, a woman a chatterbox if she were only as discreet as a good man. Men and women have different parts to play in managing the household: his to win, hers to preserve. But the only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom; all the others must be possessed, so it seems, both by rulers and by ruled. The virtue of a person being ruled is not practical wisdom but correct opinion; he is

rather like a person who makes the pipes, while the ruler is the one who can play them.

These considerations have made clear whether the virtue of the good man and that of the sound citizen are the same or different, and the sense in which they are the same and the sense in which they are different.

BOOK VII

CHAPTER I

If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life; for if we do not know that, the best constitution is also bound to elude us. For those who live under the best-ordered constitution (so far as their circumstances allow) may be expected, barring accidents, to be those whose affairs proceed best. We must therefore first come to some agreement as to what is the most desirable life for all men, or nearly all, and then decide whether it is one and the same life that is more desirable for them both as individuals and in the mass, or different ones.

In the belief that the subject of the best life has been fully and adequately discussed, even in the external discourses, I propose to make use of this material now. Certainly nobody will dispute one division: that there are three ingredients which must all be present to make us blessed—our bodily existence, our intellectual and moral qualities, and all that is external. (No one would call blessed a man who is entirely without courage or self-control or practical wisdom or a sense of justice, who is scared of flies buzzing past, who will stop at nothing to gratify his desire for eating or drinking, who will ruin his closest friends for a paltry profit, and whose mind also is as witless and deluded as a child's or a lunatic's.) But while there is general agreement about these three, there is much difference of opinion about their extent and their order of superiority. Thus people suppose that it is sufficient to have a certain amount of virtue, but they set no limit to the pursuit of wealth, power, property, reputation, and the like.

Our answer to such people will be twofold. First, it is easy to arrive at a firm conviction on these matters by simply observing the facts: it is not by means of external goods that men acquire and keep the virtues,

1323^b but the other way round; and to live happily, whether men suppose it to consist in enjoyment or in virtue or in both, does in fact accrue more to those who are outstandingly well-equipped in character and intellect, and only moderately so in the possession of externally acquired goods—more, that is, than to those who have more goods than they need but are deficient in the other qualities. Yet the matter can be considered on the theoretical level too, and the same result will be seen easily enough. External goods, being like a collection of tools each useful for some purpose, have a limit: one can have too many of them, and that is bound to be of no benefit, or even a positive injury, to their possessors. It is quite otherwise with the goods of the soul: the more there is of each the more useful each will be (if indeed one ought to apply to these the term 'useful', as well as 'admirable'). So clearly, putting it in general terms, we shall maintain that the best condition of anything in relation to the best condition of any other thing is commensurate in point of superiority with the relationship between the things themselves of which we say these conditions are conditions. Hence as the soul is a more precious thing (both absolutely and relatively to ourselves) than both property and the body, its best condition too will necessarily show a proportionate relationship to that of each of the others. Moreover, it is for the sake of our souls that these things are to be desired and all right-minded persons ought to desire them; it would be wrong to reverse this priority.

Let this then be agreed upon at the start: to each man there comes just so much happiness as he has of virtue and of practical wisdom, and performs actions dependent thereon. God himself is an indication of the truth of this. He is blessed and happy not on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature. And for these reasons good fortune must be something different from happiness; for the acquisition of goods external to the soul is due either to the coincidence of events or to fortune, but no man is just or restrained as a result of, or because of, fortune. A connected point, depending on the same arguments, applies with equal force to the state: the best and well-doing state is the happy state. But it is impossible for those who do not do good actions to do well, and there is no such thing as a man's or a state's good action without virtue and practical wisdom. The courage of a state, or its sense of justice, or its practical wisdom, or its restraint have exactly the same effect and are manifested in the same form as the qualities which

the individual has to share in if he is to be called courageous, just, wise, or restrained. 35

These remarks must suffice to introduce the subject; it was impossible to start without saying something, equally impossible to try to develop every relevant argument, for that would be a task for another session. For the present let this be our fundamental basis: the life which is best for men, both separately, as individuals, and in the mass, as states, is the life which has virtue sufficiently supported by material resources to facilitate participation in the actions that virtue calls for. As for objectors, if there is anyone who does not believe what has been said, we must pass them by for the purposes of our present inquiry and deal with them on some future occasion. 40 1324^a

CHAPTER 2

It remains to ask whether we are to say that happiness is the same for the individual human being and for the state, or not. The answer is again obvious: all would agree that it is the same. For those who hold the view that the good life of an individual depends on wealth will likewise, if the whole state be wealthy, count it blessed; and those who prize most highly the life of a tyrant will deem most happy that state which rules over the greatest number of people. So too one who commends the single individual on the basis of his virtue will also judge the more sound state to be the happier. 5 10

But there are still these two questions needing consideration: Which life is more desirable, the life of participation in the work of the state and constitution, or one like a foreigner's, cut off from the association of the state? What constitution are we to lay down as best, and what is the best condition for the state to be in (whether we assume that participation in the state is desirable for all or only for the majority)? The first question was a matter of what is desirable for an individual; the second belongs to political theory and insight, and we have chosen to examine it now. The other question would be merely incidental, this second one is the business of our inquiry. 15 20

Obviously the best constitution must be one which is so ordered that any person whatsoever may prosper best and live blessedly; but it is disputed, even by those who admit that the life of virtue is the most desirable, whether the active life of a statesman is preferable to one which is cut off from all external influences, i.e. the contemplative life, which some say is the only life for a philosopher. Both in earlier and in 25

30 modern times men most ambitious for virtue seem generally to have preferred these two kinds of life, the statesman's or the philosopher's. It makes a considerable difference which of the two is correct, because we must, if we are right-minded people, direct ourselves to the better of the two aims, whichever it may be; and this equally as individuals and collectively as members of a constitution. Some hold that to
 35 dominate neighbouring peoples in the manner of a slave-master involves the greatest injustice, but to do so in a statesmanlike way involves none, though it does mean making inroads on the comfort of the ruler. Others hold pretty well the opposite, namely that the life of
 40 active statesmanship is the only one worthy of a man, and activity springing from each of the individual virtues is just as much open to those who take part in public affairs under the constitution as to
 1324^b private persons. That is one view, but there is also a set of people who say that the only style of constitution that brings happiness is one modelled on tyranny and on mastery of slaves. And in some places the definitive purpose both of the laws and of the constitution is to facilitate mastery of the neighbouring peoples.

5 Hence, even though in most places the legal provisions have for the most part been established on virtually no fixed principle, yet if it is anywhere true that the laws have a single purpose, they all aim at domination. Thus in Sparta and Crete the educational system and the bulk of the laws are directed almost exclusively to purposes of war;
 10 and outside the Greek peoples all such nations as are strong enough to aggrandize themselves, like the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts, have always set great store by military power. In some places there are also laws designed to foster military virtue, as at Carthage, where men reputedly receive decorations in the form of armlets to the
 15 number of the campaigns in which they have served. There used also to be a law in Macedonia that a man had to be girdled with his halter until he had slain his first enemy; and at a certain Scythian feast when the cup was passed round only those were allowed to drink from it who had killed an enemy. Among the Iberians, a warlike race, the
 20 tombs of their warriors have little spikes stuck around them showing the number of enemy slain. There are many other such practices, some established by law and some by custom, among different peoples.

Yet surely, if we are prepared to examine the point carefully, we shall see how completely unreasonable it would be if the work of a statesman were to be reduced to an ability to work out how to rule and

be master over neighbouring peoples, with or without their consent. How could that be part of statecraft or lawgiving, when it is not even lawful in itself? To rule at all costs, not only justly but unjustly, is unlawful, and merely to have the upper hand is not necessarily to have a just title to it. Nor does one find this in the other fields of knowledge: it is not the job of a doctor or a ship's captain to persuade or to force patients or passengers. Certainly most people seem to think that mastery is statesmanship, and they have no compunction about inflicting upon others what in their own community they regard as neither just nor beneficial if applied to themselves. They themselves ask for just government among themselves; but in the treatment of
 30 others they do not worry at all about what measures are just. Of course we may be sure that nature has made some things fit to be ruled by a master and others not, and if this is so, we must try to exercise master-like rule not over all people but only over those fit for such treatment—just as we should not pursue human beings for food or sacrifice, but only such wild animals as are edible and so suitable to be hunted for
 40 this purpose.

Surely too a single state could be happy even on its own (provided of course that its constitution runs well), since it is possible for a state to
 1325^a be administered in isolation in some place or other, following its own sound laws; the organization of its constitution will not be directed to war or the defeat of enemies, for the non-existence of these is postulated. The conclusion is obvious: we regard every provision
 5 made for war as admirable, not as a supreme end but only as serving the needs of that end. It is the task of a sound legislator to survey the state, the clan, and every other association and to see how they can be brought to share in the good life and in whatever degree of happiness
 10 is possible for them. There will of course be different rules laid down in different places; if there are neighbouring peoples, it will be part of the legislative function to decide what sort of attitude is to be adopted to this sort and that sort, and how to employ towards each the proper rules for dealing with each. But this question, 'What end should the best constitution have in view?', will be properly examined at a later
 15 stage.

CHAPTER 3

We must now deal with those who, while agreeing that the life which is conjoined with virtue is the most desirable, differ as to how it is to be

followed. Some reject altogether the holding of state-offices, regarding the life of a free man as different from that of a statesman, and as the most desirable of all lives. Others say that the statesman's life is best, on the grounds that a man who does nothing cannot be doing well, and happiness and doing well are the same thing. To both parties we may say in reply, 'You are both of you partly right and partly wrong. Certainly it is true, as some of you maintain, that the life of a free man is better than the life like that of a master of slaves: there is no dignity in using a slave, *qua* slave, for issuing instructions to do this or that routine job is no part of noble activity. But not all rule is rule by a master, and those who think it is are mistaken. The difference between ruling over free men and ruling over slaves is as great as the difference between the naturally free and the natural slave, a distinction which has been sufficiently defined in an earlier passage. And we cannot agree that it is right to value doing nothing more than doing something. For happiness is action; and the actions of just and restrained men represent the consummation of many fine things.'

But perhaps someone will suppose that if we define things in this way, it means that absolute sovereignty is best, because then one is in a sovereign position to perform the greatest number of fine actions; and so anyone who is in a position to rule ought not to yield that position to his neighbour, but take and keep it for himself without any regard for the claims of his parents or his children or friends in general, sacrificing everything to the principle that the best is most to be desired and nothing could be better than to do well. Perhaps there is some truth in this, but only if we suppose that this most desirable of things is in fact going to accrue to those who use robbery and violence. But maybe this is impossible and the supposition is false. For a man who does not show as much superiority over his fellows as husband over wife, or father over children, or master over slave—how can his actions be fine actions? So he who departs from the path of virtue will never be able to go sufficiently straight to make up entirely for his previous errors. As between similar people, the fine and just thing is to take turns, which satisfies the demands of equality and similarity. Non-equality given to equals, dissimilar positions given to similar persons—these are contrary to nature and nothing that is contrary to nature is fine. Hence it is only when one man is superior in virtue, and in ability to perform the best actions, that it becomes fine to serve him and just to obey him. But it should be remembered that virtue in itself is not enough; there must also be the power to translate it into action.

If all this is true and if happiness is to be equated with doing well, then the active life will be the best both for any state as a whole community and for the individual. But the active life need not, as some suppose, be always concerned with our relations with other people, nor is intelligence 'active' only when it is directed towards results that flow from action. On the contrary, thinking and speculation that are their own end and are done for their own sake are *more* 'active', because the aim in such thinking is to do well, and therefore also, in a sense, action. Master-craftsmen in particular, even though the actions they direct by their intellect are external to them, are nevertheless said to 'act', in a sovereign sense.

As for states that are set up away from others and have chosen to live thus in isolation, there is nothing in that to oblige them to lead a life of inaction. Activity too may take place as among parts: the parts of a state provide numerous associations that enter into relations with each other. The same is true of any individual person; for otherwise God himself and the whole universe would scarcely be in a fine condition, for they have no external activities, only those proper to themselves. It is therefore clear that the same life must inevitably be the best both for individuals and collectively for states and mankind.

CHAPTER 13

We must now discuss the constitution itself, and ask ourselves what people, and what kind of people, the state ought to be composed of if it is going to be blessed and have a well-run constitution. The well-being of all men depends on two things: one is the right choice of target, of the end to which actions should tend, the other lies in finding the actions that lead to that end. These two may just as easily conflict with each other as coincide. Sometimes, for example, the aim is well-chosen, but in action men fail to attain it. At other times they successfully perform everything that conduces to the end, but the end itself was badly chosen. Or they may fail in both, as sometimes happens in the practice of medicine, when doctors neither rightly discern what kind of condition a healthy body ought to be in, nor discover the means which will enable their goal to be attained. Wherever skill and knowledge come into play, these two must both be mastered: the end and the actions which are means to the end.

It is clear then that all men aim at happiness and the good life, but some men have an opportunity to get it, others have not. This may be

1332^a

due to their nature, or to some stroke of fortune, for the good life needs certain material resources (and when a man's disposition is comparatively good, the need is for a lesser amount of these, a greater amount when it is comparatively bad). Some indeed, who start with the opportunity, go wrong from the very beginning of the pursuit of happiness. But as our object is to find the *best* constitution, and that means the one whereby a state will be best ordered, and since we call that state best ordered in which the possibilities of happiness are greatest, it is clear that we must keep constantly in mind what happiness is.

We defined this in our *Ethics* (if those discussions were worth anything), and we here state, again, that happiness is an activity and a complete utilization of virtue, not conditionally but absolutely. By 'conditionally' in this connection I refer to things that are necessary, and by 'absolutely' I mean nobly. For example, actions relating to justice, the infliction of just chastisements and punishments, spring from virtue; but they are 'necessary' and whatever good is in them is there by necessity. (It is preferable to have a state of affairs in which such things would be *unnecessary* both for state and for individual.) But actions directed towards honours and abundant resources are noblest actions, in an absolute sense. For the former actions are but the removal of some evil, the latter sort are not; they are on the contrary the creation and the begetting of positive goods.

A sound man will nobly utilize ill-health, poverty, and other misfortunes; but blessedness requires the opposite of these. (This definition too was given in our ethical discussions—that the sound man is the sort of man for whom things absolutely good are good, on account of his own virtue; and clearly his utilization of them must be sound and noble absolutely.) Hence men imagine that the causes of happiness lie in external goods. This is as if they were to ascribe fine and brilliant lyre-playing to the quality of the instrument rather than to the skill of the player.

From what has been said it follows that, while some things must be there from the start, others must be provided by a lawgiver. Ideally, then, we wish for the structure of our state all that Fortune has it in her sovereign power to bestow (that she *is* sovereign, we take for granted). But it is not Fortune's business to make a state sound; that is a task for knowledge and deliberate choice. On the other hand, a state's being sound requires the citizens who share in the constitution to be sound; and for our purposes *all* the citizens share in the

constitution. The question then is, 'How does a man become sound?' Of course, even if it is possible for all to be sound, and not just each citizen taken individually, the latter is preferable, since each entails all.

However, men become sound and good because of three things. These are nature, habit, and reason. First, nature; a man must be born, and he must be born a man and not some other animal; so too he must have body and soul with certain characteristics. It may be of no advantage to be born with some of these qualities, because habits cause changes; for there are some qualities which by nature have a dual possibility, in that subsequent habits will make them either better or worse. Other creatures live mainly by nature, some by habit also to a small extent. Man, however, lives by reason as well: he alone has reason, and so needs all three working concertedly. Reason causes men to do many things contrary to habit and to nature, whenever they are convinced that this is the better course. In an earlier place we described what men's nature should be if they are to respond easily to handling by the legislator. After that it becomes a task of education, for men learn partly by habituation and partly by listening.

CHAPTER 14

Since every association of persons forming a state consists of rulers and ruled, we must ask whether those who rule and those who are ruled ought to be different persons or the same throughout life; for the education which will be needed will depend upon which way we make this distinction. If one group of persons were as far superior to all the rest as we believe gods and heroes to be superior to men, and if they had both bodies and souls of such outstanding quality that the superiority of the rulers were indisputable and evident to those ruled by them, then it would obviously be better that the same set of persons should always rule and the others always be ruled, once and for all. But since this is not a condition that can easily be obtained, and since rulers are not so greatly superior to their subjects as Scylax says the kings are in India, it is clear that, for a variety of reasons, all must share alike in the business of ruling and being ruled by turns. For equality means giving the same to those who are alike, and the established constitution can hardly be long maintained if it is contrary to justice. Otherwise everyone all over the country combines with the ruled in a desire to introduce innovations, and it is quite impossible for even a

numerous citizen-body to be strong enough to withstand such a combination.

Yet it cannot be disputed that rulers have to be superior to those who are ruled. It therefore becomes the duty of the lawgiver to consider how this is to be brought about and how they shall do the sharing. We noted earlier that nature herself has provided one way to choose: that very element which in respect of birth is all the same she has divided into older and younger, the former being fit for ruling, the latter for being ruled. No one objects to being thus ruled on grounds of age, or thinks himself too good for it; after all, once he reaches the required age, he will get back his contribution to the pool. There is then a sense in which we must say the 'same' persons rule and are ruled, and a sense in which we must say they are 'different' persons. So their education too must be in one sense the same, in another different; for, as is often said, one who is to become a good ruler must first himself be ruled. (Rule, as was said in our first discussions, is of two kinds; according as it is exercised for the sake of the ruler, which we say is master-like rule, or for the sake of the ruled, which we say is rule over free men; and some instructions that are given differ not in the actual tasks to be performed, but in their purpose, which is why many jobs generally considered servile may be honourably performed even by free men, by the younger among them. For the question whether a job is honourable or not is to be decided less with reference to the actions themselves than in the light of their end and purpose.) But since we hold that the virtue of citizen and ruler is the same as that of the best man, and that the same man should be first ruled and later ruler, it immediately becomes an essential task of the lawgiver to ensure that they both may become *good* men, and to consider what practices will make them so, and what is the aim of the best life.

Two parts of the soul are distinguished, one intrinsically possessing reason, the other not possessing reason intrinsically but capable of listening to it. To these belong, we think, the virtues which qualify a man to be called in some sense 'good'. To those who accept our division of the soul there is no difficulty in answering the question 'In which of the two parts, more than in the other, does the *end* lie?' For what is inferior is always for the sake of what is superior; this is equally clear both in matters of skill and in those of nature; and the superior is that which is possessed of reason. There is a further twofold division, which follows from our custom of making a distinction between

practical reason and theoretical reason; so clearly we must divide this part similarly. Actions, we shall say, follow suit: those of that which is by nature better must be regarded as preferable by those who are in a position to attain all three or two of them. For each man, that which is the very highest that he can attain is the thing most to be preferred.

Again, all of life can be divided into work and leisure, war and peace, and some things done have moral worth, while others are merely necessary and useful. In this connection the same principle of choice must be applied, both to the parts of the soul and to their respective actions—that is to say, we should choose war for the sake of peace, work for the sake of leisure, necessary and useful things for the sake of the noble. The statesman must therefore take into consideration the parts of the soul and their respective actions, and in making laws must have an eye to all those things, but more especially to the better ones and to the ends in view; and he must regard men's lives and their choice of what they do in the same light. For one must be able to work and to fight, but even more to be at peace and have leisure; to do the necessary and the useful things, yes, but still more those of moral worth. These then are the targets at which education should be aimed, whether children's education or that of such later age-groups as require it.

It is obvious however that those Greeks who have today a reputation for running the best constitutions, and the lawgivers who drew up those constitutions, did not in fact construct their constitutional plans with the best possible aim, and did not direct their laws and education towards producing all the virtues; but instead, following the vulgar way of thinking, they turned aside to pursue virtues that appeared to be useful and more lucrative. And in a similar manner to these some more recent writers have voiced the same opinion: they express their approval of the Lacedaemonians' constitution and admire the aim of their lawgiver, because he ordered all his legislation with a view to war and conquest. This is a view which can easily be refuted by reasoning, and already in our own day has been refuted by the facts. Just as most men crave to be master of many others, because success in this brings an abundance of worldly goods, so the writer Thibron is clearly an admirer of the Laconian lawgiver, and so too is each of the others who, writing about the Spartan constitution, have stated that thanks to their being trained to face dangers they came to rule over many others. But since today the Spartan rule is no more, it is clear that they are not happy and their lawgiver was not a good one. There is also something

laughable in the fact that, for all their keeping to his laws, and with no one to stop them from using those laws, they have lost the good life.

They are also wrong in their notion of the kind of rule for which a lawgiver ought to display admiration; for rule over free men is nobler than master-like rule, and more connected with virtue. To say that a state has trained itself in the acquisition of power with a view to ruling its neighbours—that is no ground for calling it happy or applauding its lawgiver. Such an argument may have dangerous consequences: its acceptance obviously requires any citizen who can to make it his ambition to be able to rule in his own city—the very thing that the Lacedaemonians accuse King Pausanias of seeking, and that too though he was already in a position of such high honour. So none of these theories or laws is of any value for a statesman, and they are neither useful nor true. The same things are best for a community and for individuals, and it is these that a lawgiver must instil into the souls of men.

And as for military training, the object in practising it regularly is not to bring into subjection those not deserving of such treatment, but to enable men (a) to save themselves from becoming subject to others, (b) to win a position of leadership, exercised for the benefit of the ruled, not with a view to being the master of all; and (c) to exercise the rule of a master over those who deserve to be slaves. The lawgiver should make particularly sure that his aim both in his military legislation and in his legislation in general is to provide peace and leisure. And facts support theory here, for though most military states survive while they are fighting wars, they fall when they have established their rule. Like steel, they lose their fine temper when they are at peace; and the lawgiver who has not educated them to be able to employ their leisure is to blame.

CHAPTER 15

Since it seems that men have the same ends whether they are acting as individuals or as a community, and that the best man and the best constitution must have the same definitive purpose, it becomes evident that there must be present the virtues needed for leisure; for as has often been said, the end of war is peace and leisure is the end of work. Of the virtues useful for leisure and civilized pursuits, some function in a period of leisure, others in a period of work—because a lot of essential things need to be provided before leisure can become

possible. Hence a state must be self-restrained, courageous, and steadfast; for as the proverb says, 'no leisure for slaves', and those who cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of their attackers. We need courage and steadfastness for our work, philosophy for leisure, and restraint and a sense of justice in both contexts; but particularly in times of leisure and peace. For war *forces* men to be just and restrained, but the enjoyment of prosperity, and leisure in peacetime, are apt rather to make them arrogant. Therefore a great sense of justice and much self-restraint are demanded of those who are thought to be successful and to enjoy everything the world regards as a blessing, men such as might be living, in the poets' phrase, in the Isles of the Blest. For these especially will need philosophy, restraint, and a sense of justice; and the greater the leisure that flows from an abundance of such blessings, the greater that need will be. Clearly then the state, too, if it is to be sound and happy, must have a share in these virtues. For if it is a mark of disgrace not to be able to use advantages, it is especially so in a period of leisure—to display good qualities when working or on military service, but in leisure and peace to be no better than slaves.

Training in virtue, therefore, should not follow the Lacedaemonian model. The difference between them and other nations lies not in any disagreement about what are the greatest goods but in their view that there is a certain virtue which will produce them with particular effectiveness.

We have already distinguished three essentials—nature, habit, and reason. Of these we have already dealt with the first, determining the qualities we should have by natural endowment; next we must ask whether education should first proceed by means of reason or by the formation of habits. Certainly these must chime in perfect unison; for it is possible to make an error of reason about the best principle, and to find oneself equally led astray by one's habits.

One thing is clear from the start: just as in everything else, so here too coming into being originates in a beginning, and the end which originates in some beginning is itself the beginning of another end; and for us, reason and intelligence are the end to which our nature tends. Thus it is to these that the training of our habits, as well as our coming into being, must be directed. Next, as soul and body are two, so also we note two parts of the soul, the reasoning and the unreasoning; and each of these has its own condition, of intelligence in the former case, of appetite in the latter. And just as the body comes into

being earlier than the soul, so also the unreasoning is prior to that which possesses reason. This is shown by the fact that, while passion and will as well as desire are to be found in children even right from birth, reasoning and intelligence come into their possession as they grow older. Therefore the care of the body must begin before the care of the soul, then the training of the appetitive element, but this latter for the sake of the intelligence, and the body's training for the sake of the soul.

BOOK VIII

CHAPTER I

1337^a No one would dispute the fact that it is a lawgiver's prime duty to arrange for the education of the young. In states where this is not done the quality of the constitution suffers. Education must be related to the particular constitution in each case, for it is the special character appropriate to each constitution that set it up at the start and commonly maintains it, e.g. the democratic character preserves a democracy, the oligarchic an oligarchy. And in all circumstances the better character is a cause of a better constitution. And just as there must also be preparatory training for all skills and capacities, and a process of preliminary habituation to the work of each profession, it is obvious that there must also be training for the activities of virtue. But since there is but one aim for the entire state, it follows that education must be one and the same for all, and that the responsibility for it must be a public one, not the private affair which it now is, each man looking after his own children and teaching them privately whatever private curriculum he thinks they ought to study. In matters that belong to the public, training for them must be the public's concern. And it is not right either that any of the citizens should think that he belongs just to himself; he must regard all citizens as belonging to the state, for each is a *part* of the state; and the responsibility for each part naturally has regard to the responsibility for the whole. In this respect the Lacedaemonians will earn our approval: the greatest possible attention is given to youth in Sparta, and all on a public basis.

CHAPTER 2

It is clear then that there should be laws laid down about education, and that education itself must be made a public concern. But we must not forget the question of what that education is to be, and how one ought to be educated. For in modern times there are opposing views about the tasks to be set, for there are no generally accepted assumptions about what the young should learn, either for virtue or for the best life; nor yet is it clear whether their education ought to be with more concern for the intellect than for the character of the soul. The problem has been complicated by the education we see actually given; and it is by no means certain whether training should be directed at things useful in life, or at those conducive to virtue, or at exceptional accomplishments. (All these answers have been judged correct by somebody.) And there is no agreement as to what in fact does tend towards virtue. For a start, men do not all prize the same virtue, so naturally they differ also about the training for it.

Then as to useful things: there are obviously certain essentials which the young must learn; but it is clear that they must not learn *all* useful tasks, since we distinguish those that are proper for a free man and those that are not, and that they must take part only in those useful occupations which will not turn the participant into a mechanic. We must reckon a task or skill or study as mechanical if it renders the body or intellect of free men unserviceable for the uses and activities of virtue. We therefore call mechanical those skills which have a deleterious effect on the body's condition, and all work that is paid for. For these make the mind preoccupied, and unable to rise above lowly things. Even in some branches of knowledge worthy of free men, while there is a point up to which it does not demean a free man to go in for them, too great a concentration on them, too much mastering of detail—this is liable to lead to the same damaging effects that we have been speaking of. In this connection the purpose for which the action or the study is undertaken makes a big difference. It is not unworthy of a free man to do something for oneself or for one's friends or on account of virtue; but he that does the same action on others' account may often be regarded as doing something typical of a hireling or slave. The established subjects studied nowadays, as we have already noted, have a double tendency.

CHAPTER 3

25 Roughly four things are generally taught to children: reading and writing, physical training, music, and, not always included, drawing. Reading and writing and drawing are included as useful in daily life in a variety of ways, gymnastics as promoting courage. But about music there could be an immediate doubt. Most men nowadays take part in music for the sake of the pleasure it gives; but originally it was
30 often been said, wants to be able not merely to work properly but also to be at leisure in the right way. And leisure is the single fundamental principle of the whole business, so let us discuss it again.

If we need both work and leisure, but the latter is preferable to the former and is its end, we must ask ourselves what are the proper
35 activities of leisure. Obviously not play; for that would inevitably be to make play our end in life, which is impossible. Play has its uses, but they belong rather to the sphere of work; for he who toils needs rest, and play is a way of resting, while work is inseparable from toil and strain. We must therefore admit play, but keeping it to its proper uses
40 and occasions, and prescribing it as a cure; such movement of the soul is a relaxation, and, because we enjoy it, rest. But leisure seems in
1338^a itself to contain pleasure, happiness, and the blessed life. This is a state attained not by those at work but by those at leisure, because he that is working is working for some hitherto unattained end, and
5 happiness is an end, happiness which is universally regarded as concomitant not with pain but with pleasure. Admittedly men do not agree as to what that pleasure is; each man decides for himself following his own disposition, the best man choosing the best kind of enjoyment from the finest sources. Thus it becomes clear that, in order to
10 spend leisure in civilized pursuits, we do require a certain amount of learning and education, and that these branches of education and these subjects studied must have their own intrinsic purpose, as distinct from those necessary occupational subjects which are studied for reasons beyond themselves.

Hence, in the past, men laid down music as part of education, not as
15 being necessary, for it is not in that category, nor yet as being useful in the way that a knowledge of reading and writing is useful for business or household administration, for study, and for many of the activities of a citizen, nor as a knowledge of drawing seems useful for the better judging of the products of a skilled worker, nor again as gymnastics are

useful for health and vigour—neither of which do we see gained as a
20 result of music. There remains one purpose—for civilized pursuits during leisure; and that is clearly the reason why they do introduce it, for they give it a place in what they regard as the civilized pursuits of
25 free men. Thus Homer's line, 'to summon him alone to the rich banquet'; and after these words he introduces certain other persons, 'who summon the bard whose singing shall delight them all'. And elsewhere Odysseus says that the best civilized pursuit is when men get together and 'sit in rows up and down the hall feasting and listening to the bard'.

Clearly then there is a form of education which we must provide for
30 our sons, not as being useful or essential but as elevated and worthy of free men. We must on a later occasion discuss whether this education is one or many, what subjects it embraces, and how they are to be taught. But as it turns out, we have made some progress in that direc-
35 tion: we have some evidence from the ancients too, derived from the subjects laid down by them—as the case of music makes clear.

It is also clear that there are some useful things, too, in which the young must be educated, not only because they are useful (for example they must learn reading and writing), but also because they are often
40 the means to learning yet further subjects. Similarly they must learn drawing, not for the sake of avoiding mistakes in private purchases, and so that they may not be taken in when buying and selling furniture, but rather because it teaches one to be observant of physical
1338^b beauty. But to be constantly asking 'What is the use of it?' is unbecoming to those of broad vision and unworthy of free men.

Since it is obvious that education by habit-forming must precede
5 education by reasoned instruction, and that education of the body must precede that of the intellect, it is clear that we must subject our children to gymnastics and to physical training; the former produces a certain condition of the body, the latter its actions.