concentrated on astronomy, mathematics, and theology, and Meno on medicine. Unfortunately, these works too are lost and survive only in fragments quoted by later thinkers. But where they are available, they provide important insights into Presocratic thought.

The Roman orator and philosopher Cicero (mid-first century B.C.) included quotations from and references to earlier Presocratic thinkers in his accounts of earlier philosophy.

Clement of Alexandria (second half of the second century A.D.) wrote a work called *Miscellanies*, comparing Greek and Christian thought, in the course of which he often quotes Presocratic writings.

Sextus Empiricus, the skeptical philosopher of the second century A.D., quotes a number of Presocratic texts on sense experience and knowledge.

Plutarch, in the second century A.D., quotes from many of the Presocratics in his moral essays. The evidence from Plutarch is complicated by the fact that there are several works also attributed to Plutarch, but not written by him, that also quote the Presocratics (these are designated as by "pseudo-Plutarch"). John Stobaeus (fifth century A.D.) wrote a book called *Eclogae Physicae (Selections on Natural Philosophy)* in which he, too, quoted many Presocratics. H. Diels argued for an earlier (second century A.D.?), lost common source for the work of pseudo-Plutarch and Stobaeus, which he called the *Placita (Opinions)* by Aetius.

In the late second or early third century A.D. Hippolytus, Bishop of Rome, wrote a book called *Refutation of All Heresies.* There he argues that Christian heresies can be linked to Greek philosophical thought. In the course of this ambitious project, he both gives summaries of Presocratic thought and quotes from a number of Presocratics.

Diogenes Laertius (third century A.D.) wrote a wide-ranging but unreliable *Lives of the Philosophers.* Though it contains lively accounts of the lives and work of the Greek philosophers, it must be used with care because it contains much hearsay and invention.

THE MILESIANS

Three philosophers from the city of Miletus in Ionia, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, make up the Milesian "school." Thales is reported to have been the teacher of Anaximander, who was, in turn, the teacher of Anaximenes. The three agree that the cosmos began as a single stuff that changed to become the universe as we see it today. (This view is called material monism.) They also concur that this underlying stuff constitutes the real and basic nature of all that makes up the cosmos, and that the original material has within it its own source of motion and change.

Thales

Thales is often included among the Seven Sages of Greece, a traditional list of wise men. Apollodorus suggests that he was born about 625. (We should accept this date with caution, as Apollodorus usually calculated birthdates assuming that a man was forty years old at the time of his greatest achievement. Thus, Thales' suggested birthdate is arrived at by assuming that he was forty in 585, the year he reportedly predicted the eclipse.) Plato and Aristotle tell stories about Thales that testify that even in ancient times philosophers had a mixed reputation for practicality:

> Once while Thales was gazing upwards while doing astronomy, he fell into a well. A clever and delightful Thracian serving-girl is said to have made fun of him, since he was eager to know the things in the heavens but failed to notice what was in front of him and right next to his feet.
>
> (Plato, *Theaetetus* 174a4–8 = 11A9)

> The story goes that when they found fault with him for his poverty, supposing that philosophy is useless, he learned from his astronomy that there would be a large crop of olives. Then, while it was still winter, he obtained a little money and made deposits on all the olive presses both in Miletus and in Chios.

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Since no one bid against him, he rented them cheaply. When the right time came, suddenly many tried to get the presses all at once, and he rented them out on whatever terms he wished, and so made a great deal of money. In this way he proved that philosophers can easily be wealthy if they desire, but this is not what they are interested in.

(Aristotle, *Politics* 1259a9–18 = 11A10)

Thales argued that the basic stuff of the universe was one thing, water, by which he meant either that everything is really water in one form or another or that everything comes from water. Aristotle, who is the source of these reports, seems unsure about which of these propositions Thales adopted; this tells us that even by Aristotle's time Thales was known only by report rather than by any direct evidence. According to the tradition with which Aristotle was familiar, Thales also said that the earth rests or floats on water (though this may be the result of a confusion about his claim that everything is water).

1. Of those who first pursued philosophy, the majority believed that the only principles of all things are principles in the form of matter. For that of which all existing things are composed and that out of which they originally come into being and that into which they finally perish, the substance persisting but changing in its attributes, this they state is the element and principle of things that are. . . . For there must be one or more than one nature out of which the rest come to be, while it is preserved. (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3 983b6–18 = 11A2)

2. However, not all agree about the number and form of such a principle, but Thales, the founder of this kind of philosophy, declares it to be water. (This is why he indicated that the earth rests on water.) Maybe he got this idea from seeing that the nourishment of all things is moist, and that the hot itself comes to be from this and lives on this (the principle of all things is that from which they come to be)—getting this idea from this consideration and also because the seeds of all things have a moist nature; and water is the principle of the nature of moist things. (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3 983b18–27 = 11A12)

things. (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3 983b18–27 = 11A12)

3. Some say it [the earth] rests on water. This is the oldest account we have inherited, and they report that Thales of Miletus gave it. It rests because it floats like wood or some other such thing (for none of them is by nature such as to rest on air, but on water). As though the same argument did not apply to the water supporting the earth as to the earth itself.

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 2.13 294a28–34 = 11a14; tr. Curd)

4. Some declare that it [the soul] is mixed in the whole [universe], and perhaps this is why Thales thought all things are full of gods. (Aristotle, *On the Soul* 1.5 411a7–8 = 11A22)

5. From what has been related about him, it seems that Thales, too, supposed that the soul was something that produces motion, if indeed he said that the magnet has soul, because it moves iron.

(Aristotle, *On the Soul* 405a19–21 = 11A22; tr. Curd)

Anaximander

Diogenes Laertius says that Anaximander was sixty-four years old in 547/546. This dating agrees with the ancient reports that Anaximander was a student or follower of Thales. He was said to have been the first person to construct a map of the world. Anaximander agrees with Thales that there is one material stuff out of which everything in the cosmos comes, but he disagrees about the nature of this stuff. He seems to have argued that if the originating material is something as definite as water (which, after all, has a particular character of its own), then it cannot really become everything else. He claims that the single original material of the cosmos is something indefinite or boundless (apeiron *in Greek). This indefinite stuff is in motion, and, as a result of the motion, something that gives rise to the opposites hot and cold is separated off from it (Anaximander does not say what this something is). The hot takes the form of fire, which is the origin of the sun and the other heavenly bodies. The cold is dark mist, which is transformed into air and earth. Both of these are originally moist, but dry as the result of the heat of fire. Thus, in the first development from the moving, indefinite stuff, Anaximander's theory postulates substantial opposites which act on*

Anaximander's theory postulates substantial opposites which act on

each other and which are the matter for the sensible world. The reciprocal action of the opposites is the subject of fragment B1, the only direct quotation that we have from Anaximander. In the fragment he stresses that changes in the world are not capricious, and with the mention of injustice and retribution he affirms that there are lawlike forces that guarantee the orderly processes of change between opposites.

6. Of those who declared that the first principle is one, moving and indefinite, Anaximander . . . said that the indefinite was the first principle and element of things that are, and he was the first to introduce this name for the first principle [i.e., he was the first to call the first principle indefinite]. He says that the first principle is neither water nor any other of the things called elements, but some other nature which is indefinite, out of which come to be all the heavens and the worlds in them. The things that are perish into the things out of which they come to be, according to necessity, for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice in accordance with the ordering of time, as he says in rather poetical language.
(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 24.13–21 = 12B1 + A9)

7. This does not have a first principle, but this seems to be the first principle of the rest, and to contain all things and steer all things, as all declare who do not fashion other causes aside from the infinite . . . and this is divine. For it is deathless and indestructible, as Anaximander says and most of the natural philosophers. (Aristotle, *Physics* 3.4 203b10–15 = 12A15)

8. He declares that what arose from the eternal and is productive of [or, capable of giving birth to] hot and cold was separated off at the coming to be of this cosmos, and a kind of sphere of flame from this grew around the dark mist about the earth like bark about a tree. When it was broken off and enclosed in certain circles, the sun, moon and stars came to be.
(pseudo-Plutarch, *Miscellanies* 179.2 = 12A10)

9. The earth's shape is curved, round, like a stone column. We walk on one of the surfaces and the other one is set opposite.

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The stars come to be as a circle of fire separated off from the fire in the cosmos and enclosed by dark mist. There are vents, certain tube-like passages at which the stars appear. For this reason, eclipses occur when the vents are blocked. The moon appears sometimes waxing sometimes waning as the passages are blocked or opened. The circle of the sun is twenty-seven times <that of the earth> and that of the moon <18 times>, and the sun is highest, and the circles of the fixed stars are lowest. (Hippolytus, *Refutation* 1.6.3–5 = 12A11)

10. Some, like Anaximander . . . declare that the earth is at rest on account of its similarity. For it is no more fitting for what is established at the center and equally related to the extremes to move up rather than down or sideways. And it is impossible for it to make a move simultaneously in opposite directions. Therefore, it is at rest of necessity.
(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 2.13 295b11–16 = 12A26)

11. Anaximander says that the sun is equal to the earth, and the circle where it has its vent and on which it is carried is twenty-seven times the size of the earth. (Aetius 2.21.1 = 12A21)

12. Anaximander says that the stars are borne by the circles and spheres on which each one goes. (Aetius 2.16.5 = 12A18)

13. Anaximander says that the first animals were produced in moisture, enclosed in thorny barks. When their age increased they came out onto the drier part, their bark broke off, and they lived a different mode of life for a short time.
(Aetius 5.19.4 = 12A30)

14. He also declares that in the beginning humans were born from other kinds of animals, since other animals quickly manage on their own, and humans alone require lengthy nursing. For this reason, in the beginning they would not have been preserved if they had been like this.
(pseudo-Plutarch, *Miscellanies* 179.2 = 12A10)

15. Anaximander . . . believed that there arose from heated water and earth either fish or animals very like fish. In these

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humans grew and were kept inside as embryos up to puberty. Then finally they burst and men and women came forth already able to nourish themselves.

(Censorinus, *On the Day of Birth* 4.7 = 12A30)

Anaximenes

Anaximenes was said by ancient sources to be a younger associate or student of Anaximander. Anaximenes agrees with Thales and Anaximander in adopting material monism, but proposes a different underlying reality, which he calls aer *(usually translated "air" although* aer *is more like a dense mist than what we think of as air).* Aer *is indefinite enough to produce the other things in the cosmos but it is not as vague as Anaximander's boundless. Anaximander had left it quite unclear just what it is that comes from the indefinite that is productive of hot and cold, and Anaximenes may well have argued that the indefinite was too nebulous a stuff to do the cosmic job Anaximander intended for it. Anaximenes says that everything is really just* aer *in some form or other, but he improves on the theories of Thales and Anaximander by explicitly including in his account the processes, condensation and rarefaction, by which* aer *is transformed into everything else.*

16. Anaximenes . . . like Anaximander, declares that the underlying nature is one and boundless, but not indeterminate as Anaximander held, but definite, saying that it is air. It differs in rarity and density according to the substances <it becomes>. Becoming finer it comes to be fire; being condensed it comes to be wind, then cloud, and when still further condensed it becomes water, then earth, then stones, and the rest come to be out of these. He too makes motion eternal and says that change also comes to be through it.

(Theophrastus, quoted by Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 24.26–25.1 = 13A5)

17. Just as our soul, being air, holds us together and controls us, so do breath and air surround the whole cosmos.

(Aetius, 1.3.4 = 13B2)

so do breath and air surround the whole cosmos.

(Aetius, 1.3.4 = 13B2)

18. Anaximenes . . . said that the principle is unlimited [boundless] air, out of which come to be things that are coming to be, things that have come to be, and things that will be, and gods and divine things. The rest come to be out of the products of this. The form of air is the following: when it is most even, it is invisible, but it is revealed by the cold and the hot and the wet, and movement. It is always moving, for all the things that undergo change would not change unless it was moving. For when it becomes condensed and finer, it appears different. For when it is dissolved into what is finer, it comes to be fire, and on the other hand air comes to be winds when it becomes condensed. Cloud results from air through felting, and water when this happens to a greater degree. When condensed still more it becomes earth and when it reaches the absolutely densest stage it becomes stones.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation* 1.7.1–3 = 13A7)

19. Anaximenes determined that air is a god and that it comes to be and is without measure, infinite and always in motion.

(Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.10.26 = 13A10)

20. Anaximenes stated that clouds occur when the air is further thickened. When it is condensed still more, rain is squeezed out. Hail occurs when the falling water freezes, and snow when some wind is caught up in the moisture.

(Aetius 3.4.1 = 13A17)

21. Or as Anaximenes of old believed, let us leave neither the cold nor the hot in the category of substance, but <hold them to be> common attributes of matter which come as the results of its changes. For he declares that matter which is contracted and condensed is cold, whereas what is fine and "loose" (calling it this way with this very word) is hot. As a result he claimed that it is not said unreasonably that a person releases both hot and cold from his mouth. For the breath becomes cold when compressed and condensed by the lips, and when the mouth is relaxed, the escaping breath becomes warm through the rareness.

(Plutarch, *The Principle of Cold* 7 947F = 13B1)

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22. When the air is felted the earth is the first thing to come into being, and it is very flat. This is why it rides on the air, as is reasonable. (pseudo-Plutarch, *Miscellanies* 3 = 13A6)

23. Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Democritus say that its flatness is the cause of its staying at rest. For it does not cut the air below, but covers it like a lid, as bodies with flatness apparently do, since these are difficult for winds to move because of their resistance. They say that the earth does this same thing with respect to the air beneath. And the air, lacking sufficient room to move aside, stays at rest in a mass because of the air beneath. (Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 2.13 294b13–20 = 13A20)

24. Likewise the sun and moon and all other heavenly bodies, which are fiery, are carried upon the air on account of their flatness. (Hippolytus, *Refutation* 1.7.4 = 13A7)

PYTHAGORAS AND PYTHAGOREANISM

Pythagoras was born on the island of Samos in the eastern Aegean sometime around 570; according to tradition, his father was a gem-cutter or engraver. He reportedly traveled in Egypt and Babylonia, leaving Samos around 530 to escape the rule of the tyrant Polycrates. Eventually Pythagoras settled in Croton (in Southern Italy) and founded a community that was philosophical, religious, and political. After about twenty years there was an uprising in Croton and elsewhere against the Pythagorean influence; the Pythagoreans were temporarily driven out and many were killed. Pythagoras himself was said to have taken sanctuary in a temple in Metapontum where he starved to death. Despite these and other setbacks, there continued to be Pythagoreans in Southern Italy (one of them, Archytas of Tarentum, was a friend of Plato). Little is known of the views of Pythagoras himself, except that he had a reputation for great learning (a reputation that would later be mocked by Heraclitus), and that he was probably the originator of the important Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls (a view ridiculed by Xenophanes). Sometime during Pythagoras' life or soon after his death, his disciples split into two groups, the mathematikoi *and the* akousmatikoi. *The* akousmatikoi *were followers who venerated Pythagoras' teachings on religion and the proper way to live (the word* akousmatikoi *comes from* akousmata, *"things heard"), but had little interest in the philosophical aspects of Pythagoreanism. The* mathematikoi *had a great reputation in the ancient world for philosophical, mathematical, musical, and astronomical knowledge (the word* mathematikoi *comes from* mathema, *"study" or "learning"). These different sorts of knowledge were connected in Pythagorean thought, for the Pythagoreans believed that number was the key to understanding the cosmos. Their original insight was that the numerical ratios of the musical scale indicate that the apparent chaos of sound can be brought into rational, knowable order by the imposition of number. They reasoned that the entire universe is a harmonious arrangement (in Greek,* kosmos*) ordered by, and thus knowable through, number. The*

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PARMENIDES

The best reports on the life of Parmenides of Elea suggest that he was born about 515. Diogenes Laertius says that he was a student of Xenophanes "but did not follow him" and that he was also associated at some time in his life with the Pythagoreans although he rejected their theories as well. There is no way of knowing whether or not these reports are true, and it may be that certain similarities between Parmenides' account of being and Xenophanes' account of the single god is the source of the claim about that connection. It is less surprising that Parmenides should have been associated with the Pythagoreans, as Elea is in Southern Italy, home of the Pythagorean movement. Like Xenophanes, Parmenides wrote in verse: His poem is in Homeric hexameters, and there are many Homeric images in it, especially from the Odyssey. *In the poem, Parmenides presents himself as being taken in a chariot to meet a goddess, who tells him that he will learn "all things," and assures him that what he is to be told is sure and certain, but adds that he himself must assess the arguments she gives. Parmenides is one of the most controversial figures among the Presocratics, and there is no general agreement among scholars about the details of his theory. In the section of the poem traditionally called* Truth, *Parmenides argues that genuine thought and knowledge can be only about what is, for what is not is literally unsayable and unthinkable. Parmenides rejects what he calls the "beliefs of mortals" that are based on sense experience and in which there can be "no true trust." Rather, one must judge by understanding what follows from the claim that what-is can be and that what-is-not cannot be or even be thought of. Parmenides proceeds to explore the features of genuine being: What is must be whole, complete, unchanging (it can neither come to be nor pass away, nor can it undergo any qualitative change), and one. Only what has these features can be grasped by the understanding and genuinely known. Given Parmenides' arguments, it becomes clear that the theories of the Milesians, in which a single stuff actually undergoes changes so as to become something else; of Heraclitus, in which opposites are a genuine unity, so that what is both is*

aclitus, in which opposites are a genuine unity, so that what is both is

and is not; and of the Pythagoreans, where opposites are the basis of number, are unacceptable to Parmenides. One of the aspects of Parmenides' work that is particularly intriguing to modern scholars is that, having apparently rejected the changing world as literally unreal, he presents the goddess as giving a cosmological account of the universe—traditionally called the Doxa *("beliefs" or "opinions")—an account that the goddess claims to be deceptive. Is this cosmology supposed to be a parody of other cosmological accounts? Is it perhaps the best that can be said for the physical world? Or is the Goddess giving a lesson so that the hearer who understands both the nature of what-is and the nature of the deception in the cosmology could give an acceptable cosmological account? Parmenides' interest in metaphysics and epistemology is connected with similar interests in Xenophanes and Heraclitus, but Parmenides was the first Western philosopher to see the importance of metatheoretical questions about the nature of philosophical theories, and to provide comprehensive arguments for his claims. His arguments were powerful, and his views about knowledge, being, and change became a serious challenge not only for the Presocratic philosophers who came after him, but for Plato and Aristotle as well.*

1. The mares which carry me as far as my spirit ever aspired
were escorting me, when they brought me and proceeded
along the renowned road
of the goddess, which brings a knowing mortal to all
cities one by one.
On this path I was being brought, on it wise mares were
bringing me,
straining the chariot, and maidens were guiding the way.
The axle in the center of the wheel was shrilling forth the
bright sound of a musical pipe,
ablaze, for it was being driven forward by two rounded
wheels at either end, as the daughters of the Sun
were hastening to escort <me> after leaving the house
of Night
for the light, having pushed back the veils from their
heads with their hands.
There are the gates of the roads of Night and Day,
and a lintel and a stone threshold contain them.

and a lintel and a stone threshold contain them.

High in the sky they are filled by huge doors
of which avenging Justice holds the keys that fit them.
The maidens beguiled her with soft words
and skillfully persuaded her to push back the bar for them
quickly from the gates. They made
a gaping gap of the doors when they opened them,
swinging in turn in their sockets the bronze posts
fastened with bolts and rivets. There, straight through
them then,
the maidens held the chariot and horses on the broad
road.
And the goddess received me kindly, took my
right hand in hers, and addressed me with these words:
Young man, accompanied by immortal charioteers,
who reach my house by the horses which bring you,
welcome—since it was not an evil destiny that sent you
forth to travel
this road (for indeed it is far from the beaten path of
humans),
but Right and Justice. There is need for you to learn all
things—
both the unshaken heart of persuasive Truth
and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true
reliance.
But nevertheless you will learn these too—that the things
that appear
must genuinely be, being always, indeed, all things.

(lines 1–30: Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.111–114; lines 28–32: Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens*, 557.25–558.2 = 28B1)

2. Come now, I will tell you—and bring away my story safely
when you have heard it—
the only ways of inquiry there are for thinking:
the one, that it is and that it is not possible for it not to be,
is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon Truth),
the other, that it is not and that it is necessary for it not
to be,
this I point out to you to be a path completely unlearnable,
to be,
this I point out to you to be a path completely unlearnable,

for neither may you know that which is not (for it is not to
be accomplished)
nor may you declare it.
(Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* 1.345.18;
lines 3–8. Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's*
Physics 116.28 = 28B.2; rev. Curd)

3. . . . For the same thing is for thinking and for being.
(Clement, *Miscellanies* 6.23; Plotinus 5.1.8 = 28B3)

4. But gaze upon things which although absent are securely
present in thought.
For you will not cut off what is from clinging to what is,
neither being scattered everywhere in every way in order
nor being brought together.
(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.15.5 = 28B4; rev. Curd)

5. And it is all common to me
From where I am to begin; for to there shall I come back again.
(Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*
1.708 (16 Cousin) = 28B5; tr. Curd)

6. That which is there to be spoken and thought of must be.
For it is possible for it to be,
but not possible for nothing to be. I bid you consider this.
For <I bar> you from this first way of inquiry,
but next from the way on which mortals, knowing nothing,
two-headed, wander. For helplessness
in their breasts guides their wandering mind. But they are
carried on
equally deaf and blind, amazed, hordes without judgment,
for whom both to be and not to be are judged the same and
not the same, and the path of all is backward-turning.
(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*
86.27–28; 117.4–13 = 28B6; slightly rev. Curd)

7. For in no way may this prevail, that things that are not, are.
But you, bar your thought from this way of inquiry,
and do not let habit born from much experience compel you
along this way
and do not let habit born from much experience compel you
along this way

to direct your sightless eye and sounding ear and tongue,
but judge by reason the heavily contested testing
spoken by me.
(lines 1–2; Plato, *Sophist* 242a; lines 2–6, Sextus
Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.114 = 28B7)

8. There is still left a single story
of a way, that it is. On this way there are signs
exceedingly many—that being ungenerated it is also
imperishable,
whole and of a single kind and unshaken and complete.
Nor was it ever nor will it be, since it is now, all together
one, continuous. For what birth will you seek for it?
How and from where did it grow? I will not permit you
to say
or to think <that it grew> from what is not; for it is not
to be said or thought
that it is not. What necessity would have stirred it up
to grow later rather than earlier, beginning from nothing?
Thus it must either fully be or not.
Nor will the force of conviction ever permit anything to
come to be
from what is not beside it. For this reason, Justice has
permitted it
neither to come to be nor to perish, relaxing her shackles,
but holds fast. But the decision about these matters lies
in this:
it is or it is not. But it has been decided, as is necessary,
to let go the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for it
is not
a true way) and that the other is and is real.
How could what is be in the future? How could it come
to be?
For if it came into being, it is not, nor if it is ever
going to be.
In this way, coming to be has been extinguished and
destruction is unheard of.
Nor is it divided, since it all is alike;
nor is it any more in any way, which would keep it from
holding together,
[illegible]
holding together,

or any less, but it is all full of what is.
Therefore, it is all continuous, for what is draws near to
what is.
But unchanging in the limits of great bonds,
it is without start or finish, since coming to be and
destruction
were banished far away and true conviction drove them off.
Remaining the same in the same and by itself it lies
and so stays there fixed; for mighty Necessity
holds it in the bonds of a limit, which pens it in all round,
since it is right for what is to be not incomplete;
for it is not lacking; if it were, it would lack everything.
Thinking and the thought that it is are the same.
For not without what is, in which it is expressed,
will you find thinking; for nothing else either is or will be
except that which is, since Fate shackled it
to be whole and unchanging; wherefore it has been named
all things
mortals have established, persuaded that they are true–
to come to be and to perish, to be and not <to be>,
and to change place and alter bright color.
But since there is a furthest limit, it is complete,
like the bulk of a ball well-rounded from all sides,
evenly balanced in every way from the middle; for it must
be not at all greater
or smaller here than there.
For neither is there what is not–which would
stop it from reaching
its like–nor is what is in such a way that
there could be more of what is
here and less there, since it is all inviolate;
for equal to itself on all sides, it meets with its limits
uniformly.
At this point I stop for you my reliable account and
thought
concerning Truth; from here on, learn mortal opinions,
listening to the deceitful ordering of my words.
For they made up their minds to name two forms,
of which it is not right to name one–in this they have
gone astray–
of which it is not right to name one–in this they have
gone astray–

and they distinguished things opposite in body, and
established signs
apart from one another–for one, the aetherial fire of flame,
mild, very light, the same as itself in every direction,
but not the same as the other; but that other one, in itself
is opposite–dark night, a dense and heavy body.
I declare to you all the ordering as it appears,
so that no mortal opinion may ever overtake you.
(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 145.1–146.25 (lines 1–52); 39.1–9 (lines 50–61) = 28B8; revised Curd)

9. But since all things have been named light and night
and the things which accord with their powers have been
assigned to these things and those,
all is full of light and obscure night together,
of both equally, since nothing shares in neither.
(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 180.9–12 = 28B9; rev. Curd)

10. You shall know the nature of the aether and all the signs in
the aether
and the destructive deeds of the shining sun's pure
torch and whence they came to be,
and you shall learn the wandering deeds of the
round-faced moon
and its nature, and you shall know also the surrounding
heaven,
from what it grew and how Necessity led and shackled it
to hold the limits of the stars.
(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.14, 138.1 = 28B10)

11. . . . how earth and sun and moon
and the aether which is common to all and the Milky Way and
furthest Olympus and the hot force of the stars surged forth
to come to be. (Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 559.22–25 = 28B11)

12. For the narrower <wreaths> were filled with
unmixed fire.
12. For the narrower <wreaths> were filled with
unmixed fire.

The ones next to them with night, but a due amount of fire is
inserted among it,
and in the middle of these is the goddess who governs all
things.
For she rules over hateful birth and union of all things,
sending the female to unite with male and in opposite
fashion,
male to female.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 39.14–16 (lines 1–3); 31.13–17 (lines 2–6) = 28B12)

13. First of all gods she contrived Love.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 39.18 = 28B13)

14. Night-shining foreign light wandering round earth.

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1116A = 28B14)

15. Always looking towards the rays of the sun.

(Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon* 929AB = 28B15)

16. For as each person has a mixture of much-wandering
limbs,
so is thought present to humans. For that which thinks—
the constitution of the limbs—is the same
in all humans and every one; for which is more is thought.

(Theophrastus, *On the Senses* 3 = 28B16)

17. [That the male is conceived in the right part of the
uterus has been said by others of the ancients.
For Parmenides says:]
<The goddess brought> boys <into being> on the right
<side of the uterus>, girls on the left.

(Galen, *Commentary on Book VI of Hippocrates' Epidemics II*, 46 = 28B17)

18. In this way, according to opinion, these things have grown
and now are
and afterwards after growing up will come to an end.

and now are
and afterwards after growing up will come to an end.

And upon them humans have established a name to mark
each one.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 558.9–11 = 28B19)

19. Such, unchanging, is that for which as a whole the name is
"to be."

(Plato, *Theaetetus* 180e1 = "The Cornford Fragment")